Developing Engineering Leadership at NASA

Dr. Ed HoffmanNASA Chief Knowledge Officer

I. Cassini: Creative Solutions in a Complex Project Environment

Cassini-Huygens

U.S. - European mission to explore Saturn

NASA and Italian Space Agency: Cassini spacecraft

European Space Agency: Huygens probe

Launched October 1997

6.7 year voyage to Saturn

Total cost to date: $3B+

Cassini• Delivered Huygens

probe to Titan• Remained in orbit

around Saturn

Huygens• Released by Cassini to

land on surface of Saturn’s moon Titan

Cassini

Saturn

Titan

Huygens

The Complex Project Environment

Complex Project-Based Organization

Functional Organization

Problems Novel Routine

Technology New/invented Improved/more efficient

Team Global, multidisciplinary Local, homogeneous

Cost Life cycle Unit

Schedule Project completion Productivity rate

Customer Involved at inception Involved at point of sale

Survival skill Adaptation Control/stability

DIMENSIONS Technical Organizational StrategicCHARACTERISTICS

RISK

Interfaces

Technology development requirements

Interdependencies among technologies

Technical

Partners and suppliers Distributed/virtual team

Decentralized authority

Horizontal project organization Intensive learning needs

Talent requirements

Social

Stakeholders

Socio-political context

Funding

Geopolitical interests

Political

Complexity

Journey to Saturn included “gravity assists” (slingshot acceleration effects) from Venus, Earth and Jupiter - incredibly precise timing

Cassini orbiter would “insert” Huygens probe in orbit of Titan (one of Saturn’s moons)

Complex communications among Cassini, Huygens, Deep Space Network, and ground system

Technical Complexity: Zero Room for Error

Huygens descent to surface of Titan

Cassini trajectory to Saturn

Italian Space Agency ESA

Cassini high-gain antenna; radio subsystemequipment

Organizational + Strategic Complexity

NASA

Cassini orbiter; launch vehicleand associatedintegration & test

Huygens probeand associatedcommunications equipment on Cassini orbiter

International partnerships affect organizational and strategic complexity

Organizational Complexity

• 260 scientists

• 17 countries • 10 time zones

• 18 scientific instruments (payloads) with Principal Investigators

Project Management Challenge

All 18 payloads had reserves:• Cost ($ per fiscal year) • Mass (kg)• Power (watts)• Data rate to the spacecraft bus (kilobytes/second) Overruns would lead to de-scoping (i.e., instruments cut)

Problem:How would you manage the reserves to increase the likelihood that all instruments would fly on the spacecraft?

Challenge Solved

Solution:

Electronic trading exchange for Principal Investigators to trade reserves in cost, mass, power, and data rate.

• Governed by project management team (incl. veto power)

• Created win-win incentive for all• Gave PIs ownership / assured buy-in

II. Learning from Failure

Learning from Failure pt. 1

“NASA's current organization…has not demonstrated the characteristics of alearning organization.”Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report

Challenger accident

Mars failures

Columbia accident

1986

1999

2003

Why Projects Fail

Factors that Drive Program Costs and Technical Risks(1992 Jack Lee Study)

• Inadequate Phase B definition (i.e., before Preliminary Design Review)

• Unrealistic dependence on unproven technology• Annual funding instability• Complex organizational structure, including multiple unclear

interfaces• Cost estimates that are often misused• Scope additions due to “requirements creep”• Schedule slips• Acquisition strategy that does not promote cost containment

“7 Deadly Sins”

1. Vague roles, accountability, and delegated authority.

2. Team leaders in over their heads / ineffective.

3. Poor acquisition planning with poorly incentivized /

structured contracts. (Or contractors doing the wrong work.)

4. The defined scope is not doable within available resources.

5. Structures don’t support efficient systems engineering.

6. Ineffective risk management process.7. Broken project team context.

Review Boards and ExpertsChallenger “… signals of potential danger … were repeatedly normalized … at the intersection of the social and technical …. “Normalization of Deviance.” (Diane Vaughn)

Hubble “A leadership failure was the root cause.” (Lew Allen)

Mars Climate Orbiter “Communications failure was the root cause.” (Noel Hinners)

Columbia “In our view, the NASA organizational culture had as much to do with this accident as the foam. Organizational culture refers to the basic values, norms, beliefs, and practices that characterize the functioning of an institution.” (Doug Osheroff)

PMI “… ultimately projects fail or succeed on the basis of the individuals assigned to the project team, the culture and the leadership.” (Eleanor Haupt)

Technical expertise and process excellence are necessary but not sufficient for success.

Responses to Failures Examples

Standards and policies Revised procedures and requirements for project management; revised governance model

Communications Procedures to encourage dissenting opinions; case studies on lessons learned; senior leadership focus on communications

Training and development NASA Academy (individual training, team support, organizational learning)

Technical excellence NASA Engineering and Safety Center; NASA Safety Center; technical authority

A New Way of Thinking and Learning

To cope with a challenging world, any entity must develop the capacity ofshifting and changing—of developing new skills and attitudes; in short the capacity of learning.

Arie De Geus, The Living Company

Qualities of an Adaptive Organization

1. Elephants in the room are named.

2. Responsibility for the future is shared.

3. Independent judgment is expected.

4. Leadership capacity is developed.

5. Reflection and continuous learning are

institutionalized.

Source: Grashow, Heifetz, & Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership

Learning from Failure pt. 2

Challenger accident

Mars failures

Columbia accident

Individual PMCompetence

TeamPerformance

Knowledge /Communication

Integrated Competency Model

Role of the Office of the Chief Engineer

Policy Governance

Learning

Alignment with organizational strategy; codified knowledge of best practices

Checks + balancesamong projects,engineering, andsafety communities

Capability-building atindividual, team andorganizational levels

IV. Knowledge at NASA

NASA requires many different kinds of knowledge, including: Codified knowledge- Scientific knowledge- Engineering and technical knowledge - Business processesKnow-how- Techniques and craftsmanship- Social knowledge (e.g., political savvy)

All are critical to mission success.

Managing knowledge is critical for:

• Sustaining and expanding the use of the Agency’s intellectual capital across NASA’s enterprises and generations

• Increasing collaboration across barriers

• Supporting our people in executing NASA's missions efficiently and effectively.

EFFECTIVENESS

PEOPLE

SYSTEMS

Culture ofopennessand sharing

Networks,alliances, andcommunitiesof practice

Accessibleinformation,user-friendlyservices

Infusion oflessons learned,mishaps, andbest practices

Knowledge Effectiveness = People + Systems

CKOs outside NASA have tried to “manage” all the knowledge in their organizations…and failed.Given the complex nature of knowledge at NASA, the agency has adopted a federated model for coordination and collaboration of knowledge activities. The NASA CKO functions as a facilitator and champion for knowledge.Each NASA center and mission directorate has a CKO to address knowledge needs at the local level.

What Does the CKO Do?

Tools for Managing Knowledge

Map Network

Policy

Knowledge Categories

Knowledge Networks

NASA

Government Industry/ NGO

• Federal KM Working Group• CIA• FBI

• APQC• IPMC• World Bank

• Agency CKO• Local CKOs/POCs • Communities of

practice

Knowledge Policy

1. Governance model: federated approach to knowledge2. Roles and responsibilities3. Common vocabulary and definitions – six categories of

knowledge services

V. Closing Thoughts

– The practitioner knows best

– Reflection is a critical part of learning

– Sharing is learned through culture

– Learning happens through motivation