development, democracy and non-government organizations in indonesia

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Development, democracy and non-government organizations in IndonesiaPhilip Eldridgeaa Associate Professor in Political Science, University of Tasmania, Australia

To cite this Article Eldridge, Philip(1996) 'Development, democracy and non-government organizations in Indonesia',Asian Journal of Political Science, 4: 1, 17 35

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Philip Eldridge 19Definitions and ScopeResearch concerns in this paper only extend to groups and organizations seeking somekind of change, whether developmental or more general socio-political. Charitable,humanitarian and recreational associations are consequently excluded, although theseclearly fit the criteria stated above. On the developmental front, the focus is on thecapacity of N GO s to improve the situation of the lower socio-economic groups or thosein oth er ways socially disadvantaged. In a wider political sense, my research links the roleof NG O s to democratization processes, and is consequently m uch concerned w ith issue-oriented, or what are known in the Philippines as "cause-oriented" groups. NGOs'political imp ortance derives from the influence such issues and causes have in d eterminingthe content of political debate. More indirectly, the values they espouse can contributeto shaping public discourse in many ways.

NGOs are commonly defined as non-party and non-profit as well as non-government. Relations with political parties will be dealt with in a later section. "Non-profit" characteristics distinguish NGOs from business organizations. However, theirgrassroots work supports the establishment of many small enterprises, both co-operativeand individually self-employed. Trade unions, as primarily economic organizations, havetraditionally been excluded from NGO concerns. However, over the past 10-20 years,legal and human rights groups have strongly advocated the cause of free trade unions.Many have gone further and actively assisted in the formation of independent labourassociations. An example is the formation in July 1993 of the Indonesian Workers'W elfare Association (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, SBSI). Interestingly, one reasongiven by the Indonesian gov ernm ent for refusing SBSI's registration ap plication w as tha tit was an NGO, not a labour organization.Notions of a "non-profit sector" have recently surfaced, embracing not onlyN G O s, b ut also private philanthropies and "independ ent" policy research institutions.2Salamon considers that the proliferation of such bodies amounts to an associationalrevolution, which "... may prove to be as significant to the latter twentieth century asthe rise of the nation-state was to the latter nineteenth". 3 Other researchers areconsiderably less euphoric, observing more confl ict than co-operat ion betweengovernments and the non-profit sector. Disappointingly, many reports indicate "... atendency to 'turn to' the non-profit sector, reinforcing a hierarchical relationship whereNGOs are reduced to mere subsidiaries of government agencies".4While the "non-government" criterion is, by definition, crucial to NGOs' identity,it is clearly problem atic, at least at the m argins, if no t fundamen tally. Qu asi- or semi-government agencies such as public utilit ies or independent statutory bodies can beexcluded. The yardstick here is not the degree of autonomy in self-management butwhether their existence and definition of their role derives ultimately from some arm ofgovernm ent. G overnme nt-established research institutions represen t a similar case, eventhough some may in practice enjoy a very high degree of autonomy. 5Another way in which this issue becomes confused is that many organizationscalling themselves NGOs have been initiated by their governments. In the widerliterature, such organizations are often described as G O N G O s Go vernm ent OrganizedNon-Government Organizat ions.6 The GONGO phenomenon in Indonesia occurs in


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20 Asian Journal of Political Scienceorder to parallel or rival genuinely independent NGOs or to pre-empt autonomousactivities in given fields. One often quoted example is the Family Welfare Association(Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK), which dominates the social space availablefor women's activities in villages. Wives of village heads chair local PKK branches exofficio. Many official and semi-official bodies have legal aid institutes {lembaga bantuanhukurri) paralleling the well known legal and human rights NGO network, the Foundationof Indonesian Legal Aid Institutions (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia,YLBHI).

The Independent Elect ion Watch Committee (Komite Independen PemantauPemilu, KIPP),7 was founded in March 1996 with broad-based support from a cross-section of notable personalities such as Adnan Buyung Nasution, Chairman for manyyears of the foundation of Legal Aid Institutions (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan HukumIndonesia, YLBHI); Nurcholish Madjid, leading Islamic intel lectual ; GoenawanM oha mm ed, ed itor of the journal Tempo before its banning; former Governor of Jakarta,Ali Sadikin and Mochtar Pakpahan, Chairman of the Prosperous Indonesian Workers'Association (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, SBSI). It was immediately countered byGolkar, which established its own "objective" election watch team (Tim ObyektifPemantau Pemilu, TOPP), under the auspices of Pancasila Youth,8 an organizationreputed for strong-arm tactics against political opponents.It has, in practice, proved very difficult to find one single satisfactory term toadeq uately cover the relevant range of organizations and activities, witho ut also includingother kinds pursuing potentially conflicting directions. Term s other than "non-gov ernmentorganization" also have their own p roblem s. For example, despite an elemen t of unpaidlabour in NGO operations, the term "voluntary organization" (or "private voluntaryorganization" [PVO] in North American terminology) does not account for the realityof paid employment, besides carrying connotations of charity to more politically-minded activists.In India, the term "social action group" (SAG) has been commonly used todifferentiate one's organization from NGOs or voluntary organizations associated withdevelopmental or welfare programmes only. SAGs' favoured strategy is to mobilizepeople against specific issues or targets in the local power structure; also, rather thanund ertake their own dev elopmen t programm es, people are activated to dem and servicesand employment opportunities specified in official policies and legislation but notimplemented by local officials. In the Philippines, "cause-oriented" group is morecommonly used for what is often called advocacy elsewhere.After a certain stage, it is necessary for NG O s and associated small groups to formcoalitions and aggregations. Terms such as association, network, forum, federation are

commonly used in this context. In association with other elements in the society, thesemay coalesce into popular or people 's movements. These formations should bedistinguished from formally structured aggregations such as political parties or relatedpre-party formations.The term "non-government organization" (organisasi non-pemerintah, ORNOP)has proved to be controversial in Indonesia. Aro und 1983, leading NG O s w ere influencedby arguments attributed to Professor Emil Salim, at that time Minister for Populationand Environment, that the expression "non-government" was in practice perceived as"anti-government" in many decision-making and opinion-forming circles.


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Philip Eldridge 2 1The term "self-reliant community organization" (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat,LSM) was coined to overcome this perception. 9 Ap art from political pruden ce, the newterm was also seen as indigenous, giving it greater cultural authenticity and political

legitimacy than its W estern-imported coun terpart. "Swadaya", meaning self-reliance, orusing one's own power, also has connotations both of community service and culturalreassertion, in th e co ntext of Indonesia's national indep enden ce struggle."LSM" co mm onlyrefers to small N G O s. As will be discussed, LS M /NG Os should be distinguished frombase-level groups which they suppo rt, but w hich are formed and operated by the peop lethemselves. Larger NGOs which nurture the development of small NGOs are called"institutions for developing community self-reliance" (Lembaga Pengembangan SwadayaMasyarakat, LPSM).More recently, many activists are choosing to revert to the term "non-governmentorganization" in order to assert the independence of their organizations from thegovernment. They further charge established NGOs that adoption of the LSM/LPSM

terminology represents a form of co-option by the government and, in Gramscian terms,identification with hegemonic structures linking state and civil society. Such argumentsseem rather far-fetched, as they ignore the cultural and pragmatic rationale behind theoriginal decision. They are also extended to include any kind of NGO -gov ernm ent co-operation in developmental fields.10Finally, Indonesian N G O s are highly versatile at inventing their own terminology,designed to max imize vagueness and informality. Term s such as forum, club or grouping(perkumpulari), study group {kelompok studi), discussion group {kelompok diskusi),association {persatuati) represent a few examples. In the co-operatives sphere, formationof "pre-co-operatives" (pra koperasi)or shared en terprises (usaha bersama) avoids controlsassociated with formal co-operatives {koperasi), albeit with a loss of legal status andaccess to resources."

NGO Values and Orientations ParticipationParticipatory values are held in common by very diverse NGOs and activist groups,pervading their rhetoric, irrespective of ideological, tactical or personality differences.Efforts to find cohe rence in ideology and praxis, particularly to integrate activities in th edevelopm ental an d political spheres, centre on the conce pt of participation. W hile it isno t difficult to see tha t participatory values are very imperfectly realized in practice, andare, in some ways, too Utopian to be ever completely implemented, their normativesignificance in explaining NGOs' understanding of their goals and identity cannot beunde restimated. Ironically, NG O s have been mo re successful in promoting participatorypractice among base-level groups than within their own organizations. This is partly dueto managerial complexity of handling diverse programmes and groups. In the Indonesiansituation, as will be explained, evasion of governmental controls requires a combinationof legal forms and informal strategies which , while largely successful, ten d to sideline th eimportance of internal democracy.

Political scientists tend t o associate th e idea of participation primarily with electoralparticipation. As conceived by governments, it can often mean little more than largenum bers of people attending formal ceremonies and listening to speeches by imp ortan t


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perso ns. Its broa der m eaning refers to th e right to be involved in decisions affecting one 'slife. It entails identification of which groups participate or do not participate in variouskinds of decision-making, and through w hat processes and structures, whether formal orinformal. Applied systematically to development programmes, it covers conception,planning, implem entation, monitoring and evaluation stages.12 It often turns out th at th emajority of affected people are only involved in implementing programmes over whichthey otherwise have little say.

There is a further tendency, in selecting programmes, for outsiders to assume thatpoor people's needs are obvious. However, there is much field experience to indicatethat programmes only work effectively if the intended beneficiaries are willing toco m mi t their ow n scarce energies and resources in a sustained way . W iser social workersconseq uently stress the impo rtance of building on "felt need s" of peop le at th e "grassroots",identified through discussion. As people have many interrelated needs, it can be arguedtha t allowing them to choose their own "entry points" will later motivate them to m oveinto new areas.Participation in a single programme is unlikely to result in any continuing change.Groups formed only to implement such programmes are unlikely to survive theircompletion. More continuing forms of organization are needed to develop long-termgoals and strategies. Notions of awareness-building and empowerment have consequentlybee n d eveloped alongside participation. Th e first stage of awareness-building is comm onlyto conduct workshops and training programmes at which potential local leadership isidentified. NGO fieldworkers work with trained local cadres, who encourage people toform groups, develop an understanding of their situation and prioritize their needs.Ho we ver, it has been foun d tha t peo ple com mo nly lack self-confidence, as well as skills,resources and necessary organizational capacity. A longer-term process of empowermentis therefore needed.Properly conducted, processes of awareness-building can enable people tosystematize their understanding of their own c om mu nity, concerning which they are inany case better informed than outsiders. This will result in greater skills and confidencein identifying available local resources, particularly human resources. However, evenafter groups have become well-established, their capacity to operate at a local level islimited by lack of knowledge as to how the world beyond the village operates. Anextensive process of demystifying extern al systems and "institutions, including legal,financial, administrative and political institutions, is therefore needed. Many NGOs failto reach or even understand issues relating to empowerment, and continue playingintermediary roles rather than preparing local leaders to deal directly with outsiders,form coalitions and pursue campaigns. Local groups often remain isolated from eachother, with NGOs controlling communication between them. Successful empowermentin that context will result in groups forming networks, federations and other kinds ofassociation.N G O s have nevertheless played imp orta nt networking roles. Netwo rks are essentialif small groups are to emerge from isolation. They can play important roles in sharinginformation, providing access to legal and governmental structures, media and otheropinion -forming grou ps. Th ey can also provide a basis for lobbying on ma tters of mu tua lconcern.


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Philip Eldridge 2 3An example of a network which has been relatively successful in engaging withthe political system and decision-making structures generally is provided by the IndonesianEnvironment Netw ork (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup , W AL HI). On paper, several hund redN G O s and other groups are affiliated with W AL HI, although perhaps only 10 0-120 areactive in its affairs. It interacted closely with Professor Em il Salim, Minister for P opu lationand Environment from 1978-1993. Co-operation was achieved on many issues. Salimwas active in government circles, advocating a wider role for NGOs. He succeeded inwriting into the Environmental Law of 1982 (Article 19) a general provision for NGOsto participate in implem enting environm ental policy, although practical processes con tinueto present many obstacles.13 However, such co-operation did not prevent a good deal ofconflict, notably when WALHI took the Minister to court in relation to discharge ofeffluent by PT Inti Indorayon Utama into the Asahan River in North Sumatra. 14Unfortunately, WALHI is reported to have become inactive during the past two years.Its national congress has been postponed three times resulting in losses in externalfunding.NGOs operate in both political and developmental spheres, and so in theoryprovide a structural and ideological framework capable of linking both major streams ofhuman rights. This is well-illustrated by considering the role of the major national-levelNGO network, the International Forum for Indonesian Development (INFID). INFIDdeveloped from the earlier International No n-G overn me nt Grou p for Indonesia (ING I),which was established to m onitor Indonesia's aid negotiations with international donorsvia the Inter-Governmen tal G roup for Indonesia (IG GI). IGGI was dismantled in 1992 ,due to conflict between th e Indonesian and D utch governments, and replaced by a newConsortium Group for Indonesia (CGI) chaired by the World Bank. INGI's role oflobbying internationally against major development programmes relating to forestry,transmigration and large dams greatly angered the Indonesian government, as did their

perceived collaboration with and dependence on foreign funding. A change of name tostress their developmental emphasis together with a shift in the locus of activity fromThe Hague to Jakarta was considered politic.INFID has taken up a variety of issues, including the freedom to associate andbargain, child labour and discrimination between men and women. It has sought tocombine domestic and international pressures on the Indonesian government to followthe "rule of law" in these matters, and to modify the dominant development paradigm,stressing economic growth to include equity and participatory dimensions. In the publicsphere it has co-ordinated an anti-nuclear campaign, citing major safety worries and thehuge debt likely to be incurred.Internally, there has been a shift in membership balance within INFID, withlarger, long-established N G O s less active. Several have ad m itted to fears tha t identificationwith INFID will affect their relations with the government negatively. Formerly, theleading human rights (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI) andenvironment networks (WALHI) played major roles in INGI and INFID. YLBHI hassuffered severe internal strife in the proce ss of electing an Executive D irect or to replaceAdnan Buyung Nasution. However, INFID has been revitalized by an influx of smallN G O s, networking through several regional forums. As an example, mem bership of theForum LSM Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta NGOs Forum) has grown from around 10-12 in1991 to 74 at the beginning of 1996.


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24 Asian Journal of Political ScienceDemocracy and NGOsTh e strong assertion of participatory values by NG O s naturally leads to an expectationthat they will also be committed to democratic values in the wider political sphere.W hile this is to some e xtent th e case, reality has proved a good deal mo re com plex. InIndonesia, NGO values and praxis must be related to wider normative frameworksgoverning political discourse.

It is possible to identify three major traditions which have operated in Indonesiaduring th e struggle for national indep end enc e and the first 50 years of post-in dep end enc epolitics.Th e first is liberal democracy, th e core of which is freedom of speech, associationand organization; free and fair elections, including freedom to organize political parties,wh ich c om pete for pow er according to clear rules applying impartially to all; governm entswhich are accountable to those who elect them; and free and open information systems.Freedom to own property and wide scope for the private sector is also commonlyassociated with liberal demo cracy. H owe ver, this is an area of dispute betw een socialistsand liberals, who otherwise agree on the above ground rules, as do social democrats,who hold a middle position on issues relating to the social and economic role of thestate.

The second is the dominant tradition of Pancasila democracy. Liberal democratswould deny this is any kind of democracy at all. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted assuch in Indonesia, not only in official circles, even though many outside have becomecynical about the government's manipulation of Pancasila ideology and its determinationto monopolize interpretation and implementation. The governing principle underlyingPancasila is that, w hile individuals have a say as part of a group, valid decisions can onlybe made collectively. Processes of deliberation leading to consensus are preferred tomajority vo ting which is seen as resulting in disruptive co nflict. C o-op eration is suppo sedlyvalued above competition, at least in the political, if not economic spheres. Such debateshave now become common in the East and Southeast Asian region under the rubric ofso-called "Asian" versus "Western" values. Such terminology is largely redundant inIndonesia, given the general similarity in content of Pancasila.The third tradition emphasizes "popular sovereignty" {kedaulatan rakyai) basedon strategies of mass mobilization. This tradition dates back to the national ind epe nde ncestruggle, but was particularly strong during the immediate post-1945 revolutionaryperiod. A t that time, a comm on slogan was tha t national revolution should be accomp aniedby social revolution. This tradition has enjoyed a partial revival since the late 1980s inthe context of numerous land, labour and environmental struggles. Mass action anddirect confrontation with the authorities represent key elements in these struggles.While mass participation is one important aspect of democracy, this approach does notnecessarily guarantee freedom of opinion, accountability or even majority rule. It is alsoopen to manipulation by demagogues. While useful in showing expressions of popularfeeling [unjuk rasa), particularly if institutional channels for such expression are denied,this approach does not provide any means for specific decision-making of detailednegotiation. In practice, such functions are usually undertaken by a core group.


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Ph ilip E ldridge 2 5Primary goals of mass mobilization centre on achieving social and economicjustice. Political and legal reform are seen as instrumental to this. By contrast, liberal-democrats believe that all goals and programmes should be subject to competition

within a framework of law and constitution. This accords with Huntington's call forminim alist definitions of democracy, confined to achieving the essential processes necessaryfor democratic government.15 Groups pursuing major socio-economic and other reformstend to equate democracy with their achievement, whereas they are more properly thesubject of public debate and electoral competition. This "process democracy" approachis in turn attacked by critics as reflecting a particularistic Western cultural outlook.NGOs combine elements of all three traditions, though their aspirations in thisregard are rarely articulated clearly. From the liberal democratic tradition, of particularinterest to NGOs is the "right to organize", in theory guaranteed under Article 28 ofIndonesia's 1945 Constitution, but in practice subject to numerous obstacles andrestrictions. NGOs, together with all other public associations in Indonesia, are obligedto co nform to th e ideology of Pancasila. Mos t still see this as sufficiently vaguely definedto give them space. But over and above the need for outward conformity, the normativestrength of co-operative values at many levels of Indonesian society remains high. Thispredisposes NGOs towards establishing consultative structures in the various formal orinformal contexts in which they work.In the macro-political context, many NGOs and others seeking reform would liketo combine freedom of speech, organization and "rule of law" with values of co-operation. The ideal of voluntary co-operation w ithin and between a utonom ous groupsreflects important values within the NGO community. But these ideals confront thereality of "corporatist" structures at the m acro-political level, supp orted ideologically byan "integralist" theory of the state.16 This denies any distinction between state andsociety, which are seen as united in the form of a "large family". In practice, thegovernment determines which groups will be included in national consultations, whowill be their representatives and the organizational channels through which consultationshould occur. Operationally, this is achieved through a network of "functional groups"{gplongan karya G olkar) linking all elements of the governm ent and m ilitary, business,professional, labour, farmers, youth and women's groups.The Golkar formula necessarily entails highly centralized decision-makingstructures, which conflict directly with N G O s' core values. W hile more groups could beincorp orated in response to widen ing and de epenin g social mob ilization, it is hard to seehow such a system can be harm onized with freedom of association or basically reformedin a democratic direction. Goals of achieving "rule of law" {negara hukum) are equallyin conflict with th e highly personalized and arbitrary autho rity accorded to the President

under the New Order's system of "Pancasila democracy".17 While reformers, such as the"Petition of Fifty" group, have challenged the gove rnm ent's assertion of mo nop oly rightsin interpre ting Pancasila, logical difficulties outlin ed above wo uld still remain w ith anyalternative interpretation.In this context it is not surprising that the 1990s has witnessed the growth oforganizations explicitly devoted to democracy and human rights advocacy. Moreestablished bodies such as YLBHI and the INFID continue to play many important rolesin advocating democratic reforms. Prominent among the newer groups have been the


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26 Asian Journal of Political ScienceCentre of Information and Action Network for Democratic Reform (Pusat Informasidan Jaringan Aksi untuk Reformasi, PIJAR), and the Institute of Policy Research andAdvocacy (Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat, LESAM).

PIJAR has been particularly active over issues relating to freedom of the press,since the banning of three prom inent periodicals in June 1994. ELSAM 's core activitiescentre on policy impact studies, training and education, campaigning and network-building in relation to human rights. Campaigns and studies have been related not onlyto civil and political rights issues, such as torture and ratification of internationalcovenants bu t to the econo mic and social imp act of W orld Bank projects on the KedungOmbo struggle,18 family planning; and violation of indigenous people's rights in IrianJaya (Timika issue) and Kalimantan.Th e Forum for Dem ocracy, founded in 19 91, was established to act as a centrewhere different concepts of democracy could be discussed. According to its founder andco-ordinator (ketua), Abdurrachman Wahid, the new forum was not to be a socialorganization but an informal grouping (paguyabari). [9 Everyone is invited to participate,including members of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata RepublikIndonesia, ABRI). However, the military can only participate on an institutional basis.This would need support and initiative from above.Indonesian People for a Hum anitarian C om m unity (Masyarakat Indonesia Untu kKemanusiaan, MIUK) was formed in 1993, on the initiative of the Jakarta Legal AidInstitute, PIJAR, LESAM, the Jakarta Lawyers' Association (Ikadin) and other groupsassociated with the Indonesian Communion of Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-GerejaIndonesia, PGI). MIUK states its major objective as one of reforming the IndonesianConstitution. So far, its major campaign has focused on discrimination against formerpolitical prisoners {tahananpolitik, Tapo l) and oth ers labelled as criminals but consideredby many activists to be political prisoners [narapidana politik, Napol) . The campaign

succeeded in having the requ ireme nt for stamping th e identity cards of former politicalprisoners as "ex-Tapol" but implementation of this instruction at local level will nodoubt be long delayed.The third, radical action stream can be understood with reference to a networkformed in 1994, which describes itself as the Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement.Key groups in this network are the Centre for Indonesian Labour Struggles (PusatPerjuangan Buruh Indonesia, PPBI), Students in Solidarity with Democracy in Indonesia(Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia Demokrasi, SMID) and the National Peasants Union(Solidaritas Tani Nasional, ST N). These groups form par t of a netw ork called IndonesianPeoples' Solidarity Struggle with the Maubere People (Solidaritas Perjuangan RakyatIndonesia dengan Maubere, SPRIM), which links together various groups fighting for anindependent East Timor.SM ID was established in 19 91, based on associated local and regional stu den tforums, which retain their identity and autonomy in organizing local action. It hasrapidly established links with counterpart student groups in the Asian region (AsianStudents Association, ASA) and the Aksi Secretariat, which links Indonesian studentactivists in Australia. All these groups claim to be working in close solidarity withwo rkers and pe asants in striving for a just society, in oppo sition to capitalist andimperialist domination.


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Philip Eldridge 2 7SMID claims to have achieved substantial success in building an effectivemovement. In mid-1994, it took a decision to "... change the method of its struggletoward a legal, political method, as an open, mass movement".20 It is critical of what it

terms "elite opposition groups", specifically naming the Petition of Fifty, Forum forDemocracy and PIJAR.21 While acknowledging efforts of individuals and small groups,SMID claims that only it could supply the necessary mass action in defence of the threejournals {Tempo, Detik an d Edi tor] bann ed in mid-19 94, even though these reflected the"elite" groups' own liberal ideology. This analysis conveniently ignores the severe jailsentences passed on PIJAR activists and associated journalists in defence of pressfreedom. It also represents a continuation of battles to "claim credit" for actions jointlyund ertake n o ne of the less attractive features w hich has characterized activist networksduring the past ten years.Some established NGOs have shown themselves capable of responding to theradical challenge. The revival of regional forums, now dominated by small NGO/LSMslinked to INFID, evolved initially from trends within the student movement from thelate 1980s, seeking greater "closeness with the people" (pendamp ing rakyat]. It may berecalled that a previous surge in expansion of NG Os occurred du ring the 1970s alongsidestrong mobilization of students demanding democratic government, rule of law,accountability, an end to corruption, as well a more socially just model of economicdevelopment. Destruction of the on-campus student movement in the early 1980sthrough the institution of "campus normalization" (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus,NKK) caused students to look for issues with which to make contact with grassrootsgroups. In the late 1980s, they successfully took up land and environment related issuesin many parts of the country. However, students were effectively operating withoutorganization. This resulted in painful conflict with N G O s, which possessed organ izationsbut in most cases would not take up issues beyond the scope of their immediatedevelopmental programmes.22The interaction appears to have achieved some positive results and helped them atu rity of bo th sides, with several "big NG O s" becom ing m ore willing to take up issuesand grassroots struggles. For example, YLBHI has adopted a para-legal programme,training locally-based cadres to provide basic advice and liaison between people andprofessional lawyers. WALHI instituted a programme of "barefoot" environmentalimp act analysis (EIA), developing the capacity of local cadres to prom ote env ironm entalawareness and action.

Legal and Political ContextIndonesia's New Order government has progressively tightened restrictions on politicalactivity since first coming to power in 1966. The requirement for police permission formo re than five people to me et together was only formally abolished in D ecem ber 1995,but implementation of such instructions will be slow to seep down to local level. Themilitary intervene at will in labour and land disputes, public meetings, and mediareporting, whenever, according to their own interpretation, they perceive a threat to"security".


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The 1985 Social Organizations Law (ORMAS) requires all social organizations toado pt t he official ideology of Pancasila as the ir "sole principle". W hile t he law has causedmajor problems for some religious groups, particularly Muslims, most NGOs do not findconformity difficult, as many alternative interpretations can be proposed or quietlypractised. More difficult are clauses which allow the government to intervene in internalmanagement and programmes, or to force changes if they consider the organization'sdirection is contrary to the "national interest" or government policy. In practice, thisrarely happens. Relations with executive arms of government at regional and local levelshave always been of greater concrete importance to NGOs than legislative provisions.

An important reason for the ineffectiveness of the ORMAS legislation is that"social organization" has never bee n defined. In any case, the OR MA S law was prob ablydesigned to control mass organizations rather than NGOs. NGO/LSMs are careful toescape the law's provisions by avoiding formal m emb ership. Co mm only, they prefer the"foundation" {yayasan) structure. This only requires the vaguest statement of objectives.Trustees carry sole responsibility for management and operation, enabling founders tomaintain control. Indonesia has no law to control foundations. Such a law appearsunlikely, as it is the preferred structure used by political, bureaucratic, military andbusiness elites to maximize their freedom and lack of accountability in managing theiraffairs.

The government has also experienced problems in defining "Lembaga SwadayaMasyarakat" (LSM). As discussed earlier, this is a term designed to resolve problems ina specific socio-political context, without any legal validity. A draft decree drawn up in1994 with the intention of controlling LSMs could not be implemented for thatreason.23Paradoxically, the yayasan structure, while providing a very necessary shelter forgrassroots groups to organize, has the effect of limiting NG O s' internal de moc racy. Th usnumerous special "bodies" (badari) or institutions can be established under the "yayasan"umbrella, enabling grassroots groups to be formed and in many cases to operate fairlydemocratically. Meanwhile, the NGO itself remains under the control of often self-perpetuating trustees and boards of management. This contradiction partly explains theupheavals in the Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid Institutions (YLBHI), in whichthere are strong demands for internal democracy from associated small NGOs in theregions.24 However, if these demands are conceded in a formal sense, this is likely tobring YLBHI under the control of the ORMAS Law.

FundingThe Indonesian NGO scene is still dominated by foreign funding, though recentlyformed activist groups are m ore self-supporting. D epe nde nce on foreign funding agencies(FFAs) can weaken the legitimacy of NGOs. It also lays them open to counter-attackwhen they criticize their government in international forums. Reporting requirementsuse up organizational energies, directing accountability to FFAs rather than to thepeop le. How ever, foreign funding has proved th e m ost stable source of finance, particularlyto pay fieldworkers and local cadres at least a subsistence wage. How ever, su ch necessityoften causes NGOs to "chase projects".


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Phil ip Eldridge 2 9Looking at some alternatives, government funds may lead to control anddep end enc e. Such funds are usually only available for officially approv ed deve lopm entalor welfare programmes rather than for more controversial goals of "empowerment" or"awareness building". Income-generating programmes are commonly of two types: (i)enterprises which earn income for the people, such as handicrafts or small stalls.Fortunes of such enterprises fluctuate w ith th e ma rket and can be risky for the very poorunless th e N G O acts as guarantor; (ii) consultancy services for which th e m ain custom ersare gov ernm ent or foreign funding agencies. Large N G O s are often em ployed to evaluatesmaller or newer groups, co-ordinate programmes or networks. This has been a potentcause of tension between large and small NGOs.25In principle, NGOs should be able to raise more funds from among Indonesia'^growing rich and middle class, who are often the groups most prone to complain aboutforeign funding. A par t from their tende ncy to plead pov erty, traditions of giving remainoriented towards charity, welfare and religion. One interesting exception has been therelative success of the Indonesian Environment Network (WALHI) to raise funds

locally, including from business, through the medium of a "Friends of the EnvironmentFund" (Dana Mitra Lingkungan). In general, this situation points to the need for fargreater efforts at "development education" linked to fund-raising by Indonesian NGOsif they are ever to be weaned from dependence on foreign funds.Ideally, organizations should be sustained by subscriptions from members andsupporters. This is more feasible for action groups than those with costly long-termeducation cum development programmes in villages, and is limited by the lack ofresources of the very poor. It is nevertheless essential that they should make somecon tribution, even if only through labour, in order tha t they feel they have a stake in andcommitment to programmes.

NGO-Government RelationsRelations between Indonesian NGOs and the government are generally pragmatic,characterized by both co-operation and conflict. This can be understood by consideringcosts and benefits of co-operation from the respective standpoint of government andN G O s .

W hile N G O s' capa city to deliver varies greatly, they offer a gove rnm ent m ore realgrassroots contacts than it might otherwise achieve. While popular participation isneed ed for progra mm es to be effective and also to satisfy foreign d ono rs, wh o increasinglydem and e vidence of such participation as a cond ition of assistance, the gov ernm ent fearsthat participation and associated popular organization will get beyond its control,possibly challenging its authority. How ever, too mu ch control will underm ine people'swillingness and capacity to participate constructively in development programmes.

The main advantage to NGOs of co-operating with government agencies lies ingaining access to wider resources and potential influence specifically to spread themessage of com mu nity participation m ore widely and to develop appropriate structuresfor this within the official planning process. They recognize that scattered localizedsuccesses will no t make any general impa ct. O ne e xam ple of success from engagem ent


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30 Asian Journal of Political Sc iencewith government can be seen in the Indonesia-wide adoption of an "integrated villagehealth post" (Pos Pelayanan Terpadu, POSYANDU) cum extension system. Core ideasunderlying POSYANDU were pioneered by NGOs in the Solo region during the1970s.26 Negative aspects of co-operating with the government lie in the potential forco-option and the necessity to adapt internal systems to conform with governmentreport ing requirements.

N G O s' options in shaping their relations with the Indonesian governme nt includecom binations betwe en collaboration, keeping distance or opposition. The m atrix below,which excludes GONGOs, at tempts to encapsulate three major NGO paradigms,togeth er with th e approach of a fourth stream of radical activists, wh o show som e N G Ocharacteristics as well as important differences.27

O rien tation T hree N G O M odels N ew Radicals

Stance vs. officialdevelopmentprogrammesOrientation vs.state structures

Concept ofdemocracy

PopularMobilization

1

Co-operateFoster communityparticipationAccommodate

Participatoryproblem-solving

Small groupformation

2

Criticalcollaboration

Reform

Balance econom icand politicalrights

Promoteawareness

3

Avoidinvolvement

MaintaindistanceGrassrootsinitiativeEmpower

small groups

4

Oppose

Oppose

Directdecision-making

Mass action

Strategies vary according to whether an NGO only seeks influence related to itsspecific field experience (first stream) or more general political influence (secondstream), using grassroots groups to exert leverage and vice versa. The third stream ismo re purist in its approach , concentrating on empo we rm ent and group formation, whileminimizing contact with the government. The fourth, radical stream shares somecommon characterist ics with mainstream NGOs, notably a commitment to popularparticipation and avoidance of organizational power-seeking. Ho wever, i t is bo th moreconfrontational and has a more general agenda of political and structural change whichsets it apart.


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Ph ilip Eldridge 31NGOs and Political PartiesThe issue of relations with political parties has not yet crystallized in debates amongNGOs and related social activists, as the role of parties is extremely circumscribedwithin the Indonesian political system. Party organization, programmes, selection ofcandidates and campaigning are all strictly controlled, while notions of "opposition" areforbidden.Popular legitimacy of parties in such circumstances is very low, causing people toseek other outlets through which to channel their aspirations. N GO s have been seen asone such channel. By now it is clear that NGOs play all kinds of roles which have animpact in the political sphere: through interaction with government, including someimpact on pol icy-making; in shaping public debate; through organizat ion andempowerment of groups, which in turn bring new pressures to bear on governmentagencies; and perme ation of public discourse with values of popular p articipation. T heyhave combined with others to demand enforcement of the right to organize and otherrights of free speech and association supposedly guaranteed in Article 28 of Indonesia's1945 Constitution. Why not, therefore, join with parties and mass movements toachieve more fundamental political change?

The essential characteristic of parties is to combine interests and aspirations ofvarious groups into some broad ideology and programme capable of winning electionsand governing. NGOs must therefore decide whether they wish to be part of such acoalition-building process, entailing many compromises with interests which may beindifferent or opposed to their objectives. Also, how far can or should they integratethemselves into the processes of government, including involvement in fields beyondtheir immediate concern?The more normal role for NGOs is to advocate specific causes, befriend and workwith specific poor cum disadvantaged groups, seeking support from whatever quarterthis may be available. Orga nizational ties wi th parties are dysfunctional t o these objectives,as distinct from negotiation on specific issues, together with various kinds of informaland personal interaction. There may also be broad convergence over major issues ofpolitical reform, such as has existed between NGO networks and some oppositionparties in Malaysia over abolition of the Internal Security Act. Such convergence maynow be emerging in Indonesia between NGO and activist networks and the IndonesianDemocratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI) over issues of constitutional andelectoral reform. Other NGO networks feel greater affinity with the Muslim-basedDevelopment Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP).

State and Civil SocietyThe concept of civil society is difficult to define in the Indonesian context. ThreeIndonesian term s bangsa (nation), negara (state) and pemerintah (government) arepertinent to this debate.All groups are clearly part of the nation. The notion of state refers to the wholeapparatus of pow er, including all elements of government, quasi- and sem i-governmen t,


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32 Asian Journal of Political Sciencepolitical formations associated with the government, the legal and judicial apparatus andthe overall processes and arrangements holding these elements together. Given thefunctional groups (Golkar) system and state penetration of villages, it is hard either intheory or practice for any group to remain outside the state. Differentiation from thegovernment apparatus, in the narrower sense, is more realistic. Even so, it is never clear,at the village and sub-village level, where the institutions of government end and thoseof the local "civil society" begin. T he religious auth orities are obliged to identify closelywith and even to appear as part of the local government structure.

N G O s working at tha t level are bou nd to take account of official structu res suchas the Family Welfare Association (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PICK). In aformal sense, all outside groups should work throu gh t he Village Co mm unity ResilienceInsti tution (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa, LKMD) in developing theirprogrammes. Activities are organized within 10-15 sections, each under the ultimatecontrol of the village head. The rural arm of the Home Affairs Ministry (PembangunanDesa, Bangdes) has a close involvement with the LKMD system. In practice, it is largelymoribund, except where voluntary initiative is forthcoming or the village head isparticularly active.Assuming problems of definition can be overcome, care is necessary to avoidautomatically equating civil society, defined merely as distinct from government, asgood and all organizations and persons associated with government as necessarily bad.Neither possesses a monopoly of wisdom, concern for the common good, absence ofself-interest, corruption or even criminality. Pluralism is therefore not necessarily anunmitigated good. In each instance, the specific combination of state and non-stateelements involved in programmes, policy-making and opinion formation needs to beidentified.Nevertheless, in principle, pluralism remains an important democratic value in

providing choice of ideas and promoting a wider range of social and political forcescapable of balancing abuses of power by the central authorities. Maclntyre 28 and Liddle29have argued that pluralism is to some extent developing within the Indonesian state aswell as outside it. The essential test is capacity to mobilize independently from thegovernment. NGOs have been relatively successful in this regard. Newer groups are stillmore bold.It is also impo rtant to recognize that t he Indonesian government is not mo nolithic.Despite its military characteristics and unrelenting rhetoric about unity and stability,elements within the government are open to change. Some groups work quietly withinofficial struc tures to bring abo ut change, for exam ple, by enhancing pop ular particip ationin credit unions, co-operatives or farmers' groups. There are even some, admittedlymodest, prospects for internal reform within Indonesia's official trade union body, theAll-Indonesia Workers Union (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, SPSI). However, themain legal aid groups, NGOs and independent labour activists are cynical and oftenoutright opposed to efforts by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in this regard.


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Phil ip Eldridge 33Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals' Association (ICMI)Finally, both the difficulties in pinpointing distinctions and interactions between stateand civil society, and in relation the nature of a non-government organization, can beillustrated by considering briefly th e case of th e Indon esian Islamic Intellectuals A ssociation(Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI).The foundation of ICMI in 1990 can be seen as representing a change in thecomposition of the elite. A rift during the late 1980s between President Suharto andthen powerful elements within the armed forces, notably ABRI Commander GeneralBenny Murdani, motivated the President to seek support from other sections of society.This he found among Muslims, particularly modernist elements effectively sidelinedduring most of the post-independence period. Broadly, three alternative explanations ofICMI's role seem most plausible, though these are by no means exhaustive. 30

Firstly, it is seen, particularly by its critics, as an arm of government. Thegovernment's motivation in establishing ICMI, it is argued, is to co-opt Muslims intonon-political "modernization" roles, effectively de-linking them from more radical andpolitical elements at the "grassroots". The prominent role of Dr B.J. Habibie, Minister ofResearch and Technology, as ICMI's Chairperson [ketua), gives powerful support forthis view, which is further reinforced by reported business links between Habibie andthe Suharto family. ICMI's research institute, the Centre for Information andDevelopment Studies (CIDES), is located within the Ministry's office complex. If the"arm of government" interpretation is correct, ICMI can simply be categorized asanother GONGO. However, ICMI may equally be seen as penetrating and usinggovernment structures.A second view w ould see ICM I as a potentially powerful socio-political organization(Organisasi Sosial Politik, ORS OS PO L), w ith roots in the Islamic modernist mo vem ent,historically active through organizations like Muhammadijah throughout the twentiethcentury. Althoug h dem ands for an Islamic state prom oted in the 1950s by the Masjumiparty under Mohammad Natsir have been replaced by the more diffuse objective ofcreating an "Islamic society", ICM I is a prim e vehicle for realizing the historical m issionto give Islam its rightfully dominant place. For ICMI to play such a role would entail areturn to the aliran politics of the parliamentary democracy era.31 Whether the Suhar togovernment has itself embarked on a partial return to aliran politics, in a form it believesit can control, is a moot point. In any case, other elements in the society have reactedby forming their own ORSOSPOL, along familiar religious cum ideological lines,explicitly motivated by a desire to counter ICMI.Finally, there are those both within and outside ICMI who would like to see itplay a m ore progressive role in prom oting b oth dem ocracy an d social justice in Indon esia,using grassroots Islamic institutions to this end but avoiding sectarianism in relationswith peo ple of other faiths, as well as Muslims with a different perspective. W ithin thisstream ICMI contains powerful and independent-minded social and religious thinkerssuch as Dawam Raharjo and Nurcholish Madjid. Not a few other ICMI members havediverse backgrounds in grassroots activity.These explanations may not be mutually exclusive, given their widely agreedmission to Islamize society, whether through bureaucratic and political or more radical


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34 Asian Journal of Poli t ical Sc ience

mobilizing approaches in the cause of social justice. Islamic political movements havetraditionally supp orted representative democratic institutions partly due to Westernizinginfluences, partly from theological conviction and partly because they estimate that amajority will naturally support Islamic-based parties in any free and fair election.

32Itremains an open question whether Indonesia will be "with the people or with thegovernment" if and when that question crystallizes. For the purposes of this paper, bothth e gove rnm ental and non-gov ernm ental characteristics of ICM I illustrate the difficultiesof defining organizational forms and goals in the contemporary Indonesian polity.

ConclusionTh e term "non-governm ent organization" contains many ambiguities, particularly in theIndonesian context. The primary contribution of NGOs to democratic thought andpractice in Indonesia has been to uphold participatory values, initially in the context ofcommunity development but increasingly in the political sphere also. While individualNGOs perform unevenly, overall they have contributed significantly towards legitimizingprinciples of participation in public discourse. While autonomy from the state can onlybe relative in the Indonesian context, NGOs have developed a range of informalstrategies, including selective, sometimes critical collaboration with the government,enabling the m to retain significant initiative and freedom of action. Imp ortan t unresolvedproblems remain with regard to funding and internal democracy.

Notes1 For general analysis of the role of NGOs see A.G. Drabek (ed.), World Development, 15(Supplement on N GO s) (1987); D. Korten, Getting to the 2 1st C entury: Voluntary Action andthe Global Agenda (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1990); R. Kothari, S ta teAgainst Democrac y: In Search of Human Governance (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1988); H.Sethi and S. Kothari (eds.), The Non-Party P olitical Process: Uncertain Alternatives (Delhi:Lokayan, 1990); M. Edwards and D. Hu lme (eds.), Making a Difference: NGOs and Developmentin a Changing World (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1992).2 See Tadashi Yamamoto, E merging Civil Soc iety in th e Asia-Pac ific Com munity (Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995).3 Lester M. Salamon, "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector", Foreign Affairs (July/August 1994),pp. 108-122.4 Tadishi Yamamoto (1995), op. ci t . , pp. 4-5.5 The growing extent and role of these bodies in the Asian region is indicated, for example, inTadishi Yamamoto (1995), op. ci t .6 See Philip J. Eldridge, Non-Government Organizations and D emocratic P articipation (KualaLumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 15; and R. Kothari (1988), op. cit. , pp. 84-86.7 "Beberapa Tanggapan Atas Lahirnya KIPP", Suara Pembaruan (16 March 1996), pp. 1, 19.8 The Straits Times, 15 Apri l 1996, p. 18.9 See Philip J. Eldridge (1995), op. cit. , pp. 12-16 for a fuller discussion of this issue.10 Ibid., p . 43 .11 Ibid., p. 68.


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Phil ip Eldridge 3S12 See N. Uphoff et al. (eds.), Feasibili ty and Ap plication of Rural D evelopm ent Particip ation: A

State-of-the-Art Paper ( I thaca: Center fo r International Studies, Cornell Universi ty, 1979) .13 Phi l ip J . Eldr idge (1995) , o p . c i t , p p . 1 3 6 - 1 3 9 .14 Philip J . Eldridge (1995) , o p . c it ., p . 1 1 6 .15 S. H u n t in g to n , Th e Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century (Norman: Unive r s i tyof Oklahoma Press , 1991) .16 D . Bourchier , "Totali tar ianism a n d t h e 'Na t iona l Pe r sona l i ty ' : Recent Cont rove r sy about t h ePhilosophical Basis o f the Indonesian Sta te", in J im Schiller a n d Barbara Martin-Schil ler (eds.) ,Imagining Modem Indonesian Culture (Athens : Ohio Unive r s i ty P ress [ for thcoming 1996] ) .17 Ibid.18 Philip J . Eldr idge (1995) , o p . ci t ., p p . 1 2 2 - 1 2 4 .19 "Lahir , Gerakan Baru 'Forum Demokrasi '" , Suara Karya (4 April 1991) .20 "SPRIM Position Paper", 2/ 2 , v i a Aksi News Service, (1 A u g u s t 1 9 9 5 ) .21 Ibid.22 Philip J . Eldridge (1995) , o p . c i t.23 Philip J . Eldr idge (1995) , op . c i t ., p p . 50-51 .24 "Abang Buyung Pergi Tanggalkan Keretakan", Forum Keadilan ( 1 1 March 1996) , p p . 2 2 -2 3 .

25 Philip J . Eldridge (1995) , op . c i t ., p . 54 .26 Philip J . Eldridge (1995) , o p . ci t. , p p . 5 9 - 6 0 .27 For a fuller explanation se e Philip J . Eldr idge (1995) , op . c i t ., pp . 3 5 - 4 4 .28 A . MacIntyre , Business and Politics in Indonesia (Sydney: Allen a n d Unwin , 1990) .29 R . W . Liddle , " T h e Politics of Shared Growth: Some Indonesian Cases", Comparative Politics,V o l . 1 9 , N o . 2 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , p p .1 2 7 - 1 4 6 .30 F o r more extensive discussion of I C M I s e e Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi (ed.) , ICMI Antara Status Quodan Demokrasi (Jakar ta : Penerbit Mizan, 1995); a n d A . Schwarz , A Nation in Waiting:Indonesia in the 1990s (S t . Leonards , N .S .W: Al len a n d Unwin , 1994) , p p . 1 6 2 - 1 9 3 .31 Aliran refers t o a socio-cultural "stream", associa ted with a more general world-view.32 However, in the only recognized free election in 1955, Muslim parties won only around 45per cent combined of the overall vote.

development, democracy and non-government organizations in indonesia

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