September 2017

Development of innovative new standards jeopardised by IEEE patent policybyKeith MallinsonWiseHarbor

This article was commissioned by 4iP Council

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DevelopmentofinnovativenewstandardsjeopardisedbyIEEEpatentpolicy

Summary

InMarch2015,IEEEsignificantlyamendeditspatentpolicyinwhatwascouchedasan“update”butthatseekstosignificantlyrevisecommitmentsfrompartiesholdingpatentclaimsessentialtoIEEEstandardstolicensethoserightsonreasonableandnon-discriminatory(RAND)terms.Changesdisallowpatentholdersfromreceivinganyvalueattributabletothestandards,requirelicensingatthesmallestsaleablepatentpracticingunitlevel,anddenytheserightsholdersentitlementtoseekaninjunctionagainstanunlicensedimplementeruntilappellatereviewisexhausted.IEEE’sstatedobjectivewastoprotectimplementersfrompatentholdup,whichwasallegedwithoutanysubstantiation.1IEEEispromoting,byreducingtechnologylicensingcosts,theshort-terminterestsofcertainimplementerswhileunderminingstandard-essentialpatentvaluesandtheabilityofSEPownerstoreceiveadequatecompensation,theyareentitledto,fromlicensingtheirSEPs.

AsIpredictedintheIPFinanceblogpriortotheadoptionofthiscontroversialnewpatentpolicy,2andasindicatedbyothersincludingseniorgovernmentofficials,3thepurported“clarification”issignificantlyjeopardisingtheIEEEStandardsAssociationasavenuefordevelopmentofopentechnologystandardsthatincludesignificantpatentedintellectualproperty.LargeproportionsofcontributorstoIEEEstandardsarenowunwillingtoprovide“positive”LettersofAssurance(“LOAs”)underIEEE’snewpatentpolicy.

Inthispaper,IhavereviewedavailabledataonLOAsandsomethird-partyanalysisofthis.Myconclusionsarestriking:almostthreequarters(i.e.73percent)ofLOAsfortheIEEEflagship802.11WiFistandard,acceptedbyIEEEandpostedonitswebsiteinthe18-monthperiodtoJune2017,are“negative”LOAs,indicatingthesubmitter’slegitimateexanterefusaltopledgeRANDlicensingunderthenewpatentpolicy.Nearlyhalf(i.e.47percent)ofallacceptedLOAspostedontheIEEEwebsiteoverthesameperiodarenegativeLOAs.Morethanonethird(i.e.42percent)ofcompaniesportrayedasleaderswithLOAstoIEEEstandardsareunwillingtopledgetheirSEPsunderthenewpatentpolicyorhavenotprovidedLOAswhenaskedtodoso.

Thenewpatentpolicyhascreatedaperversesituationamongpatentownersandimplementers.IntheabsenceofpositiveLOAs,implementersareleftuncertainaboutwhichpatentpolicyapplies,ifany,andaboutfutureabilitytoimplementthestandard.Therefore,implementersmaybeunclearwhethermanySEPsaresubjecttonewlicensingterms,theoldlicensingtermsorarenotsubjecttoRANDlicensingtermsunderanypatentpolicyatall.Thisisunacceptable.Proponentsofthenewpatentpolicyarealsolamentingthislackofclarity,whiletryingtousethisasapretexttobreachbindingcontractualagreementsbetweenIEEEandpatentownersinpreviously-acceptedLOAs.4

1IEEE-SArequestforbusinessreviewletter,November7,2014;http://www.gtwassociates.com/answers/DOJ%20PDF/IEEEBRL2015/PatentHoldUpasRationaleIEEE_Bus_Review_Document_02_11072014.pdf2KeithMallinson:IEEEwilljeopardiseitsattractivenessasvenueforstandardsdevelopmentifproposednewIPpoliciesareadopted,February6,2015;http://www.ip.finance/2015/02/ieee-will-jeopardise-its-attractiveness.html3Seee.g.FormerRep.TerryLee,Don’tturnoffWi-FI(January8,2015),availableathttp://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/228817-dont-turn-off-wi-fi;AdamMossoff,RealityCheck:WeakeningWirelessTechnologyPatentsHurtsEveryone(RCRWirelessNews,January28,2015)availableathttp://www.rcrwireless.com/20150128/opinion/reality-check-weakening-wireless-technology-patents-hurts-everyone-tag10;LeahNylenandLewisCrofts,EUWarnsofImpactofIEEE’sPatentPolicyChange(MLex,January27,2015);U.S.SenatorChristopherCoonslettertoU.S.DepartmentofJustice(14January2015)availableathttp://www.advancingengineering.org/christopher-coons.4SeeMarch2017slidesbyGilOhanaonbehalfofCiscoathttp://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/pdf6eBTMFaO8V.pdf,http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00437.htmlandcommentsinresponseathttp://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00418.html.

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Chart1:Morethanonethird(10/24=42%)ofcompaniesIPlyticsportraysasleaderswithLOAstoIEEEstandardsareunwillingtopledgetheirSEPsunderthenewpatentpolicyorhavenotprovidedLOAswhenaskedtodoso

Source:IPlyticsempiricalstudyreportonpatentingandstandardisationactivitiesatIEEE5(blackandgreen);WiseHarboraddedCharttitlesinboldblack,identifiersandannotationsinothercolours.OrangeisthesuccessortoFranceTelecom.“Notapplicable:”PositiveblanketLOAacceptedpriortoMarch2015underpreviouspatentpolicy.

Approvalsfor“standard-amendments”802.11ahand802.11ahdeferredwithpolicyimpasse

Thereisdeadlockbetweenthetwosidesofthisargument–largely,patentownerswhoseekadequatecompensationfromlicensingtheirSEPsversussomeimplementers6whowouldliketominimisetheircosts.DespiteattemptsbyadvocatesofthenewpatentpolicytexttoportrayIEEEstandardizationworkascontinuingtoproceedwell,tothecontrary,thisisanillusionwithunreconcileddifferencesregardingapplicablepatentpolicyandLOAs.Previousattemptstosignificantlyunderminerightsofpatentownersinotherstandarddevelopmentorganizations(SDOs)havefailed:forexample;withanintellectualpropertyrights(IPR)policychangeatETSIinthe1990sthatwasabandonedbeforetakingeffect.

UnwillingnessofSEPholderstopledgetothenewpatentpolicyaredelayingstandardizationapprovaldecisions.IEEEseekstoapprovestandardsforwhichallknownSEPsarepledgedunderthenewpatentpolicywithacceptedIEEELOAforms.ButitisfailinginthisobjectivewithanunprecedentedhighnumberofnegativeLOAssubmittedandbecauseLOAsrequestedfromothersarenotforthcomingandshouldthereforeberegardedas“missing.”NegativeLOAsthathavebeenacceptedbyIEEEare,forexample,withstandard-amendments802.11aiand802.11ah.However,numerousotherprospectivenegativeLOAshavebeenrejectedbyIEEEbecausepatentownershavesoughttoindicate–andIEEEhasrefusedtoallow–willingnesstolicenseonabasisotherthanthenewpatentpolicy,suchasonthebasisofthepreviousIEEEpatentpolicy.WithnumerousknownSEPsforwhichtherearenolicensingcommitments,theaboveamendmentstothe802.11standardhaveonlybeen“conditionallyapprove[d]”bytheIEEE-SA’sStandardsBoard.7

5https://asoft20107.accrisoft.com/atfrand/clientuploads/news/IPlytics_2017_Patenting%20and%20standardization%20activities%20at%20IEEE.pdf6Thispaper’sauthorrecognisesthatalargeproportionofimplementersarealsopatentowners.7http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/1216sasbmin.pdf#page=22

Certicom was acquired by BlackBerry (RIM). LOA request for the Certicom SEPs in 802.11ai was sent to BlackBerry but was not provided

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ConditionalapprovalsaremerelydeferraltacticsbecausetherecanbenoreasonableexpectationthattheLOAconditionspreventingfullapprovalwiththenewpatentpolicywilleverbemet.PatentholderswhohavesubmittednegativeLOAsarenotgoingtochangetheirmindsandreplacethemwithpositiveLOAsintheprevailingcircumstances.Similarly,itseemsveryunlikelythatthosewhoacknowledgereceiptofarequestforanLOAbutrefusetosubmitapositiveLOAarelikelytochangetheirmindsaboutdoingsoandsubmitapositiveLOA.Deferringfullapprovaluntilthesetwoamendmentsarerolledupintothenextversionoftheentirestandard(i.e.802.11/D10)amountsto“kickingthecandowntheroad.”8

ThisimpassehasoccurredbecausemanycontributorstoIEEEstandardsare,independentlyofeachother,unwillingtopledgeassurancesunderthenewpatentpolicy,whichwasestablishedwithoutconsensus9amongaclosedgroupofinterestedparties.Thenewpatentpolicytextispurportedtobea“clarification”ofexistingpatentpolicyandnotanewpatentpolicy—beggingthequestionwhymanyofthenewpositiveLOAssubmittedmerelyrestatepreviousLOAsalready-submittedpursuanttothepreviouspatentpolicyneededtobesubmittedatall.Itis,instead,increasinglycreatingambiguitiesandconcernsthatcourtsmightinterpretnewconditionsasmandatory.Manypatentownersareunwillingtoagreetothenewpatentpolicybecausebeingboundbyitcouldunderminetheirlicensingbusinesses—includingpre-existingagreements.

AdjustedLOAcountshavereduceddramaticallysinceintroductionofnewpatentpolicy

ThecountsofsubmittedLOAshavebeenmisleadinglypresentedtosuggestthatthenewpatentpolicyishavingnooveralladverseeffectonlicensingcommitments.ThenumbersofacceptedLOAssincethepatentpolicychangehavebeeninflatedbyalargeproportionof“duplicate”LOAs(resubmissionsofLOAsforstandardsforwhichtherearealreadyexistingLOAs)thatarenotrequiredbyIEEEbylaws.Instead,aftersomewell-justifiedadjustmentstoLOAcountsfortheseandfornegativeLOAsand“missing”LOAs(incaseswhereIEEEsoughtfromadisclosedessentialpatentholder,butdidnotreceive,anacceptedLOA),figuresindicatethatLOAsaredramaticallyandstatisticallysignificantlylowersincethepatentpolicychange.Thisindicatesmajoradverseeffects.

8“Putoffconfrontingadifficultissueormakinganimportantdecision,typicallyonacontinuingbasis.”OxfordLivingDictionaries.9Tomaskit,inthefallof2014,theIEEE-SAremovedthemost-prominentindicationofitspreviouslylong-standingprinciplesofconsensus,dueprocessandopennessfromitswebsite.Seecomparativewebsitesnapshotshttp://web.archive.org/web/20140723051820/http://standards.ieee.org/about/strategy.htmlversusnewpage:http://standards.ieee.org/about/strategy.html.

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Chart2:RejectionofIEEE’snewpatentpolicyisindicatedbydramaticfallinpositiveLOAs10

Continuingactivityintechnicalworkinggroups,fornow,isnoassurancethiswillpersist

Technicalworkinggroupactivityiscontinuingwhileparticipatingcompanieswaittoseeifconflictswillberesolvedsothatnewstandards,aswellasimprovementsandamendmentstoexistingstandards,willbeapproved.However,anysuggestionsthatthecontinuingrateofProjectAuthorizationRequests(PARs)—tocommitIEEE-SAresourcestonewstandard-developmentwork—indicatethatalliswellinIEEEstandardisationarephoney.ManyIEEEprojectsdonotincludemany,orevenany,patentedtechnologies:so,thesemightbeunaffectedbydifficultieswiththenewpatentpolicy.Thestandardsthatprovidesignificantinnovativevaluebeyondcompatibilityarerichinpatentedtechnologies.LOAsidentifythesepatents,theirownership,andthebasisuponwhichtheycanbelicensed.Forthosestandardisationprojectsthatincludesignificantpatentedtechnologies,itiswhatisoccurringwithLOAs,ratherthatPARs,thatspellstrouble.

ItcouldbeseveralyearsbeforeitisevidenthowmuchIEEEstandardisationhasbeenharmed.Forexample,clarity(toimplementers,inparticular)couldberapidlyrestoredbyallowingpatentownersoptionallytoindicatetheirwillingnesstolicensebasedontheoldpatentpolicy.Meanwhile,IEEEstandardisationworkincludingsupportingR&DandproductimplementationwillsufferasparticipantsconsiderswitchingtootherSDOs.Bythenitcouldbetoolatetofixthings.

10StandardEssentialPatents–theempiricalrecordsinceadoption.SymposiumonAntitrust,StandardEssentialPatents,andtheFallacyoftheAnticommonsTragedy,Berkeley,CA.October29,2016.[UpdatedMarch,2017]RonD.Katznelson,Ph.D.*http://bit.ly/IEEE-LOAs

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1. IEEE’snewpatentpolicyismuchmorerestrictive

InMarch2015,IEEEsignificantlyamendeditspatentpolicyinan“update”thatseekstosignificantlyrevisecommitmentsfrompartiesholdingpatentclaimsessentialtoIEEEstandardstolicensethoserightsonreasonableandnon-discriminatory(RAND)termsthatexcludeanyvalueattributabletothestandard,requirelicensingatthesmallestsaleablepatentpracticingunitlevel,anddenytheserightsholdersentitlementtoseekaninjunctionagainstanunlicensedimplementeruntilappellatereviewisexhausted.IEEE’sstatedobjectivewastoprotectimplementersfrompatentholdup,whichwasallegedwithoutsubstantiation.Whatitreallywantsistounderminestandard-essentialpatentvaluesandtheabilityofSEPownerstoreceiveadequatecompensationfromlicensingtheirSEPs.11

Inthefaceofsignificantresistance,andviaahighlycontroversialandsecretiveprocess12,thenewpatentpolicysignificantlyrestrictedflexibilityintheRANDcommitmentwiththefollowingconditions:

• SEPholdersmustwaivetheirrightstoseekanyinjunctionsuntiltheyhavesuccessfullylitigatedclaimsagainstunlicensedimplementerstoconclusioninacourtofappeals;

• Royaltycharges“should”becalculatedbasedonthe“smallestsaleable”implementationofanyportionofthestandardandcomportwithareasonableaggregateroyaltyburdenoftherelevantstandard;

• OnlylicensesforwhichSEPholdershaverelinquishedtherighttoseek,enforce,oreventhreaten,aninjunctioncanqualifyas“comparablelicenses”fordeterminingRANDroyalties;and

• Reciprocalcross-licensingcannotberequired,exceptforpatentsreadingonthesamestandard.

The“update”alsoobligespatentholderstobeboundbytheIEEERANDcommitmenttolicensetheirpatenttoany“CompliantImplementation,”meaningthatapatentholdermakingsuchacommitmentcannotopttolicenseitspatentsforusingtheIEEEstandardsatcertainlevelsofproduction.13Someimplementersarehopingtoforcelicensingcostsdownbyinsistingonlicensingatthechiplevelinsteadofthedevicelevel.AlltheaboveconstraintsarecountertomostcommonindustrypracticesestablishedovermanyyearsoflicensingSEPsreadingonstandardsdevelopedbyIEEEandmanyotherSDOs.AsnotedbyGregSidakofCriterionEconomics,thepatentpolicychanges‘purporttomitigatetheriskofpatentholdupandroyaltystacking—theoreticallyandempiricallydisputedconjectures,whichpostulatethatSEPholdersroutinelyextractsupracompetitiveroyaltiesfromtheimplementersofastandard.Infact,the[patentpolicychanges]broadenthebindingprovisionsoftheIEEE’sFRAND

11Theextentoftherevisionscanbeseeninthefollowingredline:http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/SBBylaws_100614_redline_current.pdf.12SeeGeorgeWillingmyre,GivingProcessItsDueWhenanSDOChangesRulesOfTheGame(January2017)availableathttps://www.ip-watch.org/2017/01/22/giving-process-due-standard-development-organization-changes-rules-game/andalsoasSSRNWorkingPaperNo.2903602(23January,2017)availableathttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2903602. 13TheIEEERANDCommitmentobligatesapatentholdertomakeavailablealicense“tomake,havemade,sell,offertosell,orimportandCompliantImplementationthatpracticestheEssentialPatentClaimforuseinconformingwiththeIEEEStandard.”CompliantImplementationisdefinedas“anyproduct(e.g.,component,sub-assembly,orend-product)orservicethatconformstoanymandatoryoroptionalportionofanormativeclauseofanIEEEStandard.”

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commitment,diminishtheSEPholder’sabilitytoenforceitspatentrights,andunambiguouslylowertheroyaltiesthattheSEPholdermaychargealicensee.’14

WhileSDOshavesignificantlatitudeinmakingpatentpolicychanges,IEEEhasdonethiswithdisregardfortheopenandconsensus-basedprinciplesthatallSDOsusuallyfollow.AsalsonotedbyGregSidak,‘[o]newouldexpecttheprocesswherebyanSSOamendsitsbylawstobeconsensus-drivenandsupportedbynolesserprotectionsthanthosethatsafeguarditsstandardsetting.Yet,scrutinyoftheprocessbywhichtheIEEEamendeditsbylawsin2015revealsthattherewasexanteintensedissentamongadiscretesubsetofmembersoftheStandardsBoard,andtherewereexpostdeclarationsbythosesamemembersthattheywouldnotadheretocertainnewpricingrulesembeddedinthebylawamendments.ThosemembersassertedthattheprocessbywhichtheIEEEamendeditspatentpolicydidnotcomplywiththeprinciplesofopenness,consensus,balance,dueprocess,andrighttoappealthatareconsistentwiththeIEEE’sstandard-settingprocess.The2015bylawamendmentsdeviatedfromthesafeguardsthattheIEEEhadguaranteeditsmembersinboththefoundationaldocumentsoftheIEEEanditshistoryofconsensus-drivenpolicymaking.’15

Therearenumerouspitfallsforpatentlicensors.Forexample,ifaSEPholderpledgesnewRANDcommitmentsincompliancewiththenewpatentpolicy,itwillinmanycasesbeofferingmorefavourablelicensetermsthanthosealreadygrantedunderlegacyRANDagreementsforthesameSEPs.TheSEPholderisthereforeatriskofbeingdeemedtobediscriminatingagainstthelegacyimplementers,inviolationofitscommitmentstolicenseundernon-discriminatoryterms.Thiscouldexposenumerouspre-existinglicensestolegalchallenges.

Evenproponentsofthenewpolicyarealsolamentingthislackofclarity,whiletryingtousethisasapretexttobreachbindingcontractualagreementsmadebetweenIEEEandpatentownersinpreviously-acceptedLOAs.16IEEEcannotimposechangestopre-existingcontractsbetweenIEEEandpatentownerswithouttheirconsent,whichwouldnotbeforthcominginmostcases.

2. AdverseprecedentsinotherSDOswithwidespreadresistancetopatentpolicychanges

HistorydoesnotbodewellforthelongevityofthischangetoIEEE’spatentpolicy.AccordingtoresearchbyRonKatznelson,‘[s]ince2012,respondingtopressuresfromvariousstandardsimplementers,theInternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU)andtheEuropeanTelecommunicationsStandardsInstitute(ETSI)haveconsideredamendingtheirpatentpoliciestodefinethemeaningofFRAND.However,intellectualpropertyrightscommitteesofITUandETSIdeclinedtoadoptsuchamendments,perhapsbecausenoevidenceofpurportedpatent“holdup”waseverproduced.ThiswasnotthefirstoccasionthatETSIhadentertainedfurtherdefinitionofFRAND.Suchproposedamendmentsweremadein1993,2003,and2006;theywereintenselycontroversialwithinETSI,andultimatelydidnotsurvive.Since2007,ETSIGuideonIPRsspecificallydisclaimsanymorespecificdefinitionofFRAND,statinginsteadthat“suchcommercialtermsareamatterfordiscussionbetweentheIPRholderandthepotentiallicensee,outsideofETSI,”andthat“[s]pecificlicensingtermsandnegotiationsarecommercialissuesbetweenthecompaniesandshallnotbeaddressedwithinETSI.”MostotherSDOshavesimilardisclaimers.’(Citationsomitted.)17

14https://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/antitrust-divisions-devaluation-of-standard-essential-patents.pdf15https://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/bias-to-suppress-royalties-for-standard-essential-patents.pdf16Seesupranote5March2017slidesbyCiscoathttp://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/pdf6eBTMFaO8V.pdf,http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00437.htmlandcommentsinresponseathttp://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00418.html.17RonD.Katznelson,“PerilousDeviationfromFRANDHarmony–OperationalPitfallsofthe2015IEEEPatent

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ResistancetoIEEEpatentpolicychangeshasbeenstrongandsustainedsincetheoutset.ByApril2015,Nokia,Ericsson,andQualcommeachhadstatedpubliclytheirunwillingnesstolicensetheirtechnologiesessentialtotheIEEE’s802.11(i.e.WiFi)standardunderwhattheyregardedasnewpatentpolicyrules,andInterDigitalhadwrittentoIEEE-SAindicatingitssimilarunwillingness.18Inaddition,Alcatel-Lucent(nowownedbyNokia),Blackberry,IBM,NokiaSiemensNetworks(awhollyownedsubsidiaryofNokia),Orange,Panasonic,SanDisk,Fraunhofer,GeneralElectricandHuaweihavealsoopposedwhattheygenerallyregardaspatentpolicyrevisions.19MostoftheabovefirmsholdsignificantSEPportfoliosincludingthosereadingonIEEEandotherSDOs’standards,andsomegenerateappreciablenetroyaltyrevenuesthroughlicensingsuchportfolios.

3. LOAsindicatesignificantunwillingnesstograntlicensesonbasisofupdatedpatentpolicy

ResistancetothenewpatentpolicyamongSEPownersisillustratedbytherisingfloodofnegativeLOAs.ThishasbecomeincreasinglyapparentaftersomeSEPownershavewaitedfordevelopmentofnewstandardsoramendmentssuchas802.11ahand802.11aibeforesubmittingnewLOAs.SomeSEPownersjustifiablybelievethatLOAsacceptedbeforeMarch2015remainsubjecttothepreviouspatentpolicyandhavenotyetfeltitnecessarytosubmitnewLOAsforapreviouslyapprovedstandardorforpreviouslydeclaredpatents(includingblanketdeclarations).

[SinceMarch2015,manynegativeLOAsubmissionshavebeenrejectedbyIEEEfornotbeingcompliantwithitsLOAform.TheserejectedsubmissionsarenotvisiblepubliclyonlineintheIEEEstandardsdatabase.IEEEhasroutinelyandpedanticallyrejectednegativeLOAformsthathaveincludedadditionaltext,attachments,orURLsindicatingwillingnesstolicenseonalternativeterms,suchasinaccordancewiththepreviouspatentpolicy.

However,oncepurgedofthisusefulinformation,negativeLOAshavebeenacceptedbyIEEEandpostedonitswebsite.AdditionalacceptedLOAswilllikelyfollowwhenmoreSEPownersrecognisethefutilityoftryingtoindicatewillingnesstolicenseonanalternativebasisandinsteadsubmittoIEEE’srestrictiveform-filingrequirements.Inthe18monthsfrom1stJanuary2016to30thJune2017,32LOAswereacceptedandlistedonIEEE’sonlinedatabase.Nearlyhalfofthose–i.e.47percentor15ofthem–werenegativeLOAs,indicatingthesubmitter’srefusaltopledgeRANDlicensingunderthenewpatentpolicy.]

Policy,”IEEESIIT2015,9thInt’l.Conf.onStandardizationandInnovationinInformationTechnology,Sunnyvale,CA.(Oct-8-2015)(Availableathttp://bit.ly/IEEE-SIIT-2015).18AsnotedbyGregSidak,“See,e.g.,SusanDecker&IanKing,QualcommSaysItWon’tFollowNewWi-FiRulesonPatents,Bloomberg(Feb.11,2015,11:23AM),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/qualcomm-says-new-wi-fi-standard-rules-unfair-may-not-take-part;RichardLloyd,EricssonandNokiatheLatestToConfirmThatTheyWillNotLicenseUndertheNewIEEEPatentPolicy,IAM(Apr.10,2015),http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=d07d0bde-ebd6-495a-aa72-4eecb9dac67d;LetterfromLawrenceF.Shay,Exec.VicePresidentofIntellectualProp.,InterDigital,Inc.,toDavidLaw,Pa-tentComm.Chair,IEEE-SAStandardsBd.(Mar.24,2015),availableathttp://wpuploads.interdigital.com.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/2015/03/Letter-to-IEEE-SA-PatCom.pdf.”19StandardEssentialPatents–theempiricalrecordsinceadoption.SymposiumonAntitrust,StandardEssentialPatents,andtheFallacyoftheAnticommonsTragedy,Berkeley,CA.October29,2016.[UpdatedMarch,2017]RonD.Katznelson,Ph.D.*http://bit.ly/IEEE-LOAs

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Chart3:LOAsacceptedbyIEEEduringthe18-monthperiodfrom1stJanuary2016to30thJune2017(---802.11standard;---non-802.11standard)

Standard Submitter

LetterType

Date LinktoLOA

1. 802.11af Nokia Negative13January

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11af-nokia-13Jan2016.pdf

2. 802.11ad Nokia Negative13January

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ad-nokia-13Jan2016.pdf

3. 802.1br WolframKress2

patents3February

2016http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_3br-kress-03Feb2016.pdf

4. 802.16.1 Nokia Negative18March2016

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_16_1-nokia-18Mar2016.pdf

5. 802.11n Nokia Negative18March

201https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11n-nokia-18Mar2016.pdf

6. 802.11ai Microsoft4

patents12April2016

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11ai-ms-12Apr2016.pdf

7. 802.16sFullSpectrum

Inc.3

patents25July2016

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_16s-fullspectrum-25Jul2016.pdf

8. 802.3NextekPowerSystems,Inc.

9patents

29July2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_3-nextek-24Jul2016.pdf

9. 802.21 ETRI Blanket3August2016

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_21-etri-03Aug2016.pdf

10. 802.21.1 ETRI Blanket3August2016

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_21_1-etri-03Aug2016.pdf

11. 802.11ax ETRI Blanket23August

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11ax-etri-23Aug2016.pdf

12. 802.15.3e ETRI Blanket24August

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_15_3e-etri-24Aug2016.pdf

13. 802.3cbMarvell

SemiconductorBlanket

26August2016

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_3cb-marvell-26Aug2016.pdf

14. 802.11ah Ericsson Negative27

September,2016

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ah-ericsson-27Sep2016.pdf

15. 802.11ax Ericsson Negative27

September,2016

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ax-ericsson-27Sep2016.pdf

16. 802.3 ADTRAN,Inc. Blanket5October,

2016http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_3-adtran-05Oct2016.pdf

17. 802.11ah Nokia Negative7October,

2016http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ah-nokia-07Oct2016.pdf

18. 802.11ai Nokia Negative7October,

2016http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ai-nokia-07Oct2016.pdf

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Ifonefocusesonthe802.11WiFistandard,almostthreequarters(i.e.11ofatotalof15-or73percent)oftheLOAsacceptedoverthesameperiodwerenegativeLOAs.Ericsson’sandInterDigital’sareblanketLOAs,sotheirrefusaltograntRANDlicensesunderthenewpolicycouldrelatetodozensifnothundredsofpatents.

19. 802.11azIHPGmbH 1patent

10November,

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11az-IHP-10Nov2016.pdf

20. 802.3bwMicrochip Blanket

18November,

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_3bw-microchip-18Nov2016.pdf

21. 802.3bpMicrochip Blanket

18November,

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_3bp-microchip-18Nov2016.pdf

22. 1838

Mentor

Graphics2

patents31January,

2017https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-1838-mentor-31Jan2017.pdf

23. 802.3bu Broadcom Blanket28February,

2017https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_3bu-broadcom-28Feb2017.pdf

24. 802.11ax KAIST 3March2017

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11ax-KAIST-03Mar2017.pdf

25. 802ax.11ax InterDigital Negative15March2017

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/neg-loa-802_11ax-IPH-15Mar2017.pdf

26.

C57.147and

C57.155CooperPower

Systems

3patents

RF 5April2017https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa_c57-155_05Apr2017.pdf

27.

C57.147and

C57.155CooperPower

Systems Negative 5April2017https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/neg-loa_c57-155_05Apr2017.pdf

28. 802.11n Orange Negative19May2017

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11n-orange-part1-19May2017.pdf

29. 802.11n Orange Negative19May2017

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11n-orange-part2-19May2017.pdf

30. 1901 Orange Negative13June2017

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-1901-orange-part1-13Jun2017.pdf

31. 1901 Orange Negative13June2017

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-1901-orange-part2-13Jun2017.pdf

32. 802.11ad Nokia Negative20June2017

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ad-nokia-20Jun2017.pdf

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Chart4:LOAsacceptedbyIEEEinthe18-monthperiodfrom1stJanuary2016to30thJune2017(---802.11standardonly)

Furthermore,aftermakinglegitimateadjustmentstothecountsofLOAs,therehasbeenastatisticallysignificantreductionintotalLOAseversinceintroductionofthenewpatentpolicyinMarch2015.ThisisrevealedinanalysistoMarch2017byRonKatznelson.Hissummaryresultsappearinthefollowingtwocharts.

Standard Submitter

LetterType

Date LinktoLOA

1. 802.11af Nokia Negative13January

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11af-nokia-13Jan2016.pdf

2. 802.11ad Nokia Negative13January

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ad-nokia-13Jan2016.pdf

3. 802.11n Nokia Negative18March2016

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11n-nokia-18Mar2016.pdf

4. 802.11ai Microsoft4

patents12April2016

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11ai-ms-12Apr2016.pdf

5. 802.11ax ETRI Blanket23August

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11ax-etri-23Aug2016.pdf

6. 802.11ah Ericsson Negative27

September2016

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ah-ericsson-27Sep2016.pdf

7. 802.11ax Ericsson Negative27

September2016

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ax-ericsson-27Sep2016.pdf

8. 802.11ah Nokia Negative7October

2016http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ah-nokia-07Oct2016.pdf

9. 802.11ai Nokia Negative7October

2016http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ai-nokia-07Oct2016.pdf

10. 802.11azIHPGmbH 1patent

10November

2016https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11az-IHP-10Nov2016.pdf

11. 802.11ax KAIST Blanket3March2017

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11ax-KAIST-03Mar2017.pdf

12. 802.11ax InterDigital Negative15March2017

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/neg-loa-802_11ax-IPH-15Mar2017.pdf

13. 802.11n Orange Negative19May2017

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11n-orange-part1-19May2017.pdf

14. 802.11n Orange Negative19May2017

http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11n-orange-part2-19May2017.pdf

15. 802.11ad Nokia Negative20June2017

https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/negative-loa-802_11ad-nokia-20Jun2017.pdf

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Chart5:UnwillingnesstoacceptIEEE’snewpatentpolicyisindicatedbydramaticfallinadjustedLOAcounts

Source:RonKatznelson20

Inthisanalysis,negativeLOAs—therewereveryfewofthembeforeintroductionofthenewpatentpolicy;andtheyarecommonplacethereafter—arecountednegatively.“Missing”LOAs—incaseswhereIEEEsoughtfromadisclosedessentialpatentholder,butdidnotreceive,anacceptedLOAasofMarch15,2017—arealsocountednegatively.Thisanalysisdoesnotcount“duplicate”LOAsthatareLOArestatementsforwhichaspecificorblanketLOAonapatentorapendingpatentapplicationwaspreviouslyacceptedfromthesamepatentholder.Morethan100oftheseblanketLOAsarefromIntel:theywerenotrequiredbyIEEE;buttheymisleadinglyinflatethecountofLOAssubstantiallyifincluded.Also,asdiscussedbelow,theirnecessityisquestionablegiventheassertionthatthenewpatentpolicyisnotanewpolicybutamereclarification.

Accordingtoadvocatesofthenewpatentpolicy,includingIEEEexternalcounselMichaelLindsay,itspurposeis,ostensibly,toprovidemore“clarity”.21Ifitisonlyclarificationandnotoutrightpatentpolicychange,thereisnogoodreasontosubmitnewblanketLOAsforeachofnumerousamendmentstostandardssuchas802.11.22Theupdatedpatentpolicycertainlyreadslikeapatent

20StandardEssentialPatents–theempiricalrecordsinceadoption.SymposiumonAntitrust,StandardEssentialPatents,andtheFallacyoftheAnticommonsTragedy,Berkeley,CA.October29,2016.[UpdatedMarch,2017]RonD.Katznelson,Ph.D.*http://bit.ly/IEEE-LOAs21https://www.ip-watch.org/2016/03/03/ieee-patent-policy-changes-seek-to-put-brakes-on-surging-litigation/22Forexample,withthenewpatentpolicy,IntelhasinflatedthetotalnumberofblanketLOAs,includingthoseithassubmittedfor802.11,whicharemorethandoubleanyothercompany.IthasdonethisbysubmittingseparateblanketLOAsforamendments,corrigenda(correctionstoprintingerrors),editions,orrevisionstothisexistingIEEEStandardfor

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policychangetome,aspresumablyitwouldtomost10-yearolds,andthe“redline”comparingthetwoshowsthatmorethanhalfofthetexthaschanged.23However,IntelcannothaveitbothwaysbysubmittingnewblanketLOAstoboostthenumberof“positiveLOAs”asifitisapatentpolicychangewhilealsomaintainingthatitisonlyaclarificationofexistingpatentpolicy.

Chart6:UnwillingnesstoacceptIEEE’snewpatentpolicyisindicatedbydramaticreductioninadjustedLOAcounts

Source:RonKatznelson

Thestatisticalsignificanceoftheseresultsisveryhigh,asindicatedintheAnnex.

whichithadalreadysubmittedLOAsbeforeMarch2015(e.g.for802.11aa,802.11ac,802.11ad,802.11af,802.11ah,802.11ai,802.11k,802.11n,802.11n,802.11r,802.11s,802.11u,802.11v,802.11w,802.11y,802.11z).IthasalsopursuedthistacticwithotherIEEEstandards.23Aredlinecompareversionofthenewpolicytothepreviousoneisavailableathttp://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/SBBylaws_100614_redline_current.pdf

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4. AnalysisbasedonIPlyticsfiguresrevealsthatlargeproportionsofpatentsandpatentownersarenotpledgedtothenewpatentpolicy

IPlyticswascommissionedbyInteltoproduceareportonpatentingandstandardizationatIEEEincludingLOAs.24ItincludesmanychartsshowingnumbersofLOAs,patents,andpatentfamiliesbycompanyandbyyear.IhavereproducedseveralofthesewithmyadditionofsomeidentifiersandannotationsquantifyingwhereLOAs,patents,andpatentownersarenotpledgedtothenewpatentpolicyandwhereLOAcountshavebeensubstantiallyinflated(i.e.byIntel’snumerousblanketLOAsubmissionsfollowingthepatentpolicychangein2015).

Charts7to12arecopiesofIPlyticsreportfigures2,4,6,7,9and10(comprisingonlyblackandgreencolouring),towhichIhaveaddedemboldenedred,purple,blueandbrownidentifiersandannotations.

Chart7:Morethanonethird(10/24=42%)ofcompaniesIPlyticsportraysasleaderswithLOAstoIEEEstandardsareunwillingtopledgetheirSEPsunderthenewpatentpolicyorhavenotprovidedLOAswhenaskedtodoso

Source:IPlyticsempiricalstudyreportonpatentingandstandardisationactivitiesatIEEE25(blackandgreen);WiseHarboraddedCharttitlesinboldblack,identifiersandannotationsinothercolours.OrangeisthesuccessortoFranceTelecom.“Notapplicable:”PositiveblanketLOAacceptedpriortoMarch2015underpreviouspatentpolicy.

24EmpiricalstudyonpatentingandstandardizationactivitiesatIEEE,Dr.TimPohlmannIPlyticsGmbH-March2017-https://asoft20107.accrisoft.com/atfrand/clientuploads/news/IPlytics_2017_Patenting%20and%20standardization%20activities%20at%20IEEE.pdf25https://asoft20107.accrisoft.com/atfrand/clientuploads/news/IPlytics_2017_Patenting%20and%20standardization%20activities%20at%20IEEE.pdf

Certicom was acquired by BlackBerry (RIM). LOA request for the Certicom SEPs in 802.11ai was sent to BlackBerry but was not provided

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Chart8:Aroundonethird(6/19=32%)ofcompaniesIPlyticsportraysastop-20withblanketLOAsfor802.11arenotagreeingtothenewpatentpolicy

*Withthenewpatentpolicy,IntelhasinflatedthetotalnumberofblanketLOAs,includingthoseithassubmittedfor802.11,whicharemorethandoubleanyothercompany.IthasdonethisbysubmittingseparateblanketLoAsforamendments,corrigenda(correctionstoprintingerrors),editions,orrevisionstothisexistingIEEEStandardforwhichithadalreadysubmittedLOAsbeforeMarch2015(e.g.for802.11aa,802.11ac,802.11ad,802.11af,802.11ah,802.11ai,802.11k,802.11n,802.11r,802.11s,802.11u,802.11v,802.11w,802.11y,802.11z).IntelhasalsopursuedthistacticwithotherIEEEstandards.

Chart9:Approximatelyonequarterofessentialpatentsandessentialpatentfamiliesreferencingthe802.11standardwerefiledbycompaniesnotagreeingtothenewpatentpolicy

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Chart10:Morethanonequarterofspecifically-declaredSEPsandSEPfamiliesforthe802.11standardwerefiledbycompaniesnotagreeingtothenewpatentpolicy

PanasonichasalsoopposedtheIEEE’snewpatentpolicy.

Chart11:ThecompaniesfilingLOAswithpatentnumberincludedareoverwhelminglythosewhoarefilingnegativeLOAsorhavepubliclyopposedIEEE’snewpatentpolicy

NokiacompleteditsacquisitionofAlcatel-Lucentin2016.PanasonicandFraunhoferhavealsoopposedIEEE’snewpatentpolicy.

Asindicatedpreviouslyandillustratedagainbelow,itisblanketLOAs,notspecificdeclarations,thatareinflated.TheIPlyticsreportmightbecorrectinstatingthat“specificdeclarationsmustbeupdatedeachtimeanewessentialpatentisidentifiedevenastothesamestandard,whereasblanketdeclarationsdonotneedsuchupdatingforthesamestandardor,insomecases,evenforamendmentsthereto”(emphasisadded),butIPlyticsincorrectlyinfersfromthisthat“itisnotsurprisingthatapreferenceforspecificpatentdeclarationscouldleadtoaninflatedLOAcount.”

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Tothecontrary:

• LOAsaremissingfromIBMandHP,whohavepreviouslysubmittedspecificdeclarations,indicatingunwillingnesstolicensebasedonthenewpatentpolicy.

• ItisIntel—favouringthenewpatentpolicy—thathasfloodedandinflatedLOAsubmissionswithblanketLOAsthatareunnecessary(asIPlyticscorrectlynotes).

• Intel’sblanketLOAsalonerepresentedthreequartersofallLOAsacceptedin2015.

Chart12:IntelaccountedforthreequartersofLOAssubmittedin2015:Itmassivelyinflatedthetotalwithmorethan100blanketLOAsoutofatotalof138LOAsthatyear

TheIPlyticsreportmissesthepointaboutSEPdeclarationratetrends.AccordingtoIPlytics,‘evenacceptingthatLOAsweredownsomewhatatIEEEin2016,therearereasonstothinkthat“LOAcounting”isnotaparticularlymeaningfulmethodologyforevaluatingthehealthofanSSO.Forexample,atETSI–whichhasbeencitedasanexampleofahealthyandsuccessfulSSO–bothIPRDeclarationsandthenumberofdeclaredpatentfamiliesweredownsignificantlyin2015and2016comparedtoeachofthetwoprioryears.’InsteadofallthatwiththesignificanttemporalebbsandflowsinSDOactivity,togetherwithcorrespondingratesofpatentingandoverwhelminglypositivepledgestoETSI’sIPRpolicy,theissueatIEEEisnumerousnegativeandmissingLOAswithmanycompaniesanddeclarationsnolongerexplicitlypledgedtoanypatentpolicy.

InstandardsdevelopmentatIEEE:

• NegativeLOAsallownoalternativepatentpolicytoapplyanddonotallowforprocompetitiveexantedisclosureofanylicensingterms;

• MissingLOAscanpreventapprovalofthestandardoramendmentstoitandarealreadypostponingapprovalof802.11aiand802.ahwith“conditionalapproval,”whichisafudgeandplayingfortime;

• StatusofsomeLOAs(positiveandnegative)andapplicablepatentpolicyhasbecomeindeterminatesinceintroductionofthenewpatentpolicy;

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• MissingandnegativeLOAsthreatenfutureimplementationofIEEEStandards,includingWiFi;and

• MuchlowerLOAcounts(aftereliminatinginflationaryLOAeffectsofduplicateLOAsandreflectingthenatureofnegativeandmissingLOAs)areamajorsymptomofproblemsarisingfromintroductionofthenewpatentpolicythroughaflawednon-consensusprocess;apolicythatwasnotwantedbyatleastalargeminorityofSDOparticipants.

ThesituationisalsoproblematicforaccreditationofIEEEstandardsbyotherstandardsorganizations,whichisusually,forexample,withtheoldpatentpolicy,aroutinematter.Forexample,ANSIrequiresthatstandardsdonothavenegativeormissingLOAs.26IEEEwouldnotbeabletojustifyunderANSI’sGuidelinesthatit“reasonablybelievesthe[802.11/D10standard]meetsthecriteriaoftheANSI[PatentPolicy].”27

5. Wheredowegofromhere?

ThereisdeadlockbetweenthosewhoembraceandthosewhorejectIEEE’snewpatentpolicy.Anynotionthatalliswell,forexamplebecausetechnicalworkinggroupsarestillactive,isanillusion.TheaccumulatingnumberofnegativeLOAsillustratesmountingconflicts,theunacceptableuncertainties(atleastinthemindsofimplementers)aroundapplicablepatentpolicyorpolicies,andtheincreasingimperativeforapatentpolicychangereversal.Theoutlookis:

1. Logjamindefinitely.NotwithstandingIEEEfailingtomeetitsrequirementthatSEPsbepledgedunderacceptedLOAs,newstandardsandamendmentsmightormightnotgetadoptedandimplemented,orwilldosomoreslowly.Thiswillbeamuchmoreuncertainlicensingenvironmentthanhitherto.Delaysandprobablysignificantlitigationwilloccurbeforeclarityandcertaintyisrestored.ThenaturalresultofsuchasituationwouldbeforIEEEstandardstobecomelessandlessfavoured,giventhatopenaccesstothemisincreasinglynolongerassured.Or,acoupleofwaysout:

2. Agreetodiffer.Makeoptionalityclearandexplicit.RANDalreadyencompassesthepossibilityofroyaltyfreelicensingforthosepatentownerswhowouldliketolicenseonthatbasis.WithanewLOAform,patentownerscouldchoosetolicenseonthebasisof(i)theoldpatentpolicy,(ii)newpatentpolicy,or(iii)royalty-freeterms;or

3. Revert.Reintroducethepreviouspatentpolicy.

ThereisapressingexistentialthreattoIEEEasaforumfordevelopmentofhigh-qualityopenstandardsincorporatinginnovativeandvaluablepatentedtechnology.TheambiguitieswithLOAsandapplicablepatentpolicyarebecomingincreasinglyapparentandproblematic.TheIEEEgotintothisdirepredicamentonlybecauseacollectionofIEEEmemberspushedthroughmajorchangestothepatentpolicywhilesupressingthenormalprocessofconsensus,transparency,andopennessthatSDOsincludingIEEEroutinelyemployinselectingtechnologiestomakethebeststandards.

26GuidelinesforImplementationoftheANSIPatentPolicy,2016p4;https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/ANSI%20Patent%20Policy%20Guidelines%202016.pdf27Id.p4p8;

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ShameonIEEEforlettingthathappen;butitisnotyettoolatetomakeamends.IEEEmustrestoreclarityandpredictabilitytothetermsuponwhichthevastmajorityofSEPsreadingonitsstandardscanbelicensedfromthevastmajorityofSEPowners.IEEEhasdevelopednumeroushighly-successfulstandardsthathavenotbeenimpededbypatentlicensingunderpreviousarrangements.Thereisnoreasonwhyitshouldnotresumedoingthatorsomethingquitesimilar.

Nothingwasbrokenbeforethepatentpolicychangesoughttofixthings.Forexample,billionsofpeopleuseWiFiatverymodestcosts.Butthatisastorythatcouldtakeupanotherentirereport.

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Annex:StatisticalsignificancetestingbyRonKatznelsononhisownLOAanalysis

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Aboutthisarticleanditsauthor

Thisarticlewascommissionedby4iPCouncil28andwrittenbyKeithMallinsonofWiseHarbor.

KeithMallinsonisfounderofWiseHarbor,29providingexpertcommercialconsultancysince2007totechnologyandservicebusinessesinwiredandwirelesstelecommunications,mediaandentertainmentservingconsumerandprofessionalmarkets.Heisanindustryexpertandconsultantwith25yearsofexperienceandextensiveknowledgeoftheICTindustriesandmarkets,includingtheIP-rich2G/3G/4Gmobilecommunicationssector.HisclientsincludeseveralmajorcompaniesinICT.Heisoftenengagedasatestifyingexpertwitnessinpatentlicensingagreementdisputesandinotherlitigationincludingassetvaluations,damagesassessmentsandinantitrustcases.HeisalsoaregularcolumnistwithRCRWirelessandIPFinance–“wheremoneyissuesmeetintellectualpropertyrights.”

TheauthorcanbecontactedatWiseHarbor.Hisemailaddressiskmallinson@wiseharbor.comandyoucanalsofollowhimonTwitterathttp://twitter.com/WiseHarbor.

©KeithMallinson(WiseHarbor)2017.

28http://www.4ipcouncil.com/29http://www.wiseharbor.com/