dialogue - astha 017.pdfdavid devadas 5. kashmir at a threshold: recovery of integrity or surrender...
TRANSCRIPT
DIALOGUE
QUARTERLY
Volume-19 No. 2 October-December, 2017
Subscription Rates :
For Individuals (in India)
Single issue Rs. 30.00
Annual Rs. 100.00
For 3 years Rs. 250.00
For Institutions:
Single Issue Rs. 60.00 in India, Abroad US $ 15
Annual Rs. 200.00 in India, Abroad US $ 50
For 3 years Rs. 500.00 in India, Abroad US $ 125
All cheques and Bank Drafts (Account Payee) are to be made in the
name of “ASTHA BHARATI”, Delhi.
Advertisement Rates :
Outside back-cover Rs. 25, 000.00 Per issue
Inside Covers Rs. 20, 000.00 ,,
Inner page coloured Rs. 15, 000.00 ,,
Inner full page Rs. 10, 000.00 ,,
DIALOGUEQUARTERLY
Editor
J.N. Roy
Associate Editor
Pranav Kumar
ASTHA BHARATIDELHI
The views expressed by the contributors do not
necessarily represent the view-point of the
journal.
© Astha Bharati, New Delhi
Printed and Published by
Dr. Lata Singh, IAS (Retd.)
Secretary, Astha Bharati
Registered Office:
27/201 East End Apartments,
Mayur Vihar, Phase-I Extension,
Delhi-110096.
Working Office:
23/203 East End Apartments,
Mayur Vihar, Phase-I Extension,
Delhi-110096
Phone : 91-11-22712454
e-mail : [email protected]
web-site : www. asthabharati.org
Printed at : Vikas Computer and Printers, Naveen Shahdara, Delhi-32
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 5
Contents
Editorial Perspective 7
AAP : End of A Dream
The Modi-BJP Juggernaut Marches on
Jammu & Kashmir : Reconciling the Opposites
1. North-East Scan
Meghalaya & Nagaland Elections 2018:
Does Anyone Care About Issues? 15
Patricia Mukhim
Liberating Northeast India from its Geographical Isolation:
The Unfinished Agenda 19
Professor M. P. Bezbaruah
If Answer is Impossible, the Naga Question
Must be Changed 22
Pradip Phanjoubam
2. J&K: What Next? 25
A.S. Dulat
3. Kashmir, Dialogue is the Key 29
Bashir Manzar
4. The Idea is the Enemy 34
David Devadas
5. Kashmir At a Threshold: Recovery of Integrity or
Surrender to Violence 41
Rajiv Vora
6. Youth Radicalization in Kashmir 51
Mushtaq Ul Haq Ahmad Sikander
6 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
7. Jammu Down with Complex of
Least Priority Area and People 57
Binoo Joshi
8. Kashmir, What Next! 66
Sajjad Hussain Kargili
9. An Essay on the Rohingya Crisis 73
Jayanta Kumar Ray
10. Vision for Developing Andaman and Nicobar Islands 90
Air Marshal (Retd.) P. K. Roy
11. Nature and Implication of Radhakrishnan’s Idealism 102
Sanjay Kumar Shukla
12. The Political Frame of the Bhagavadgita 123
Dr. Binod Kumar Agarwala
13. Quest for Academic Autonomy and the
Making of Public Intellectuals: Some Reflections
on Martha Nussbaum’s Humanity Project 143
Vaibhav Shah & Ravi Saxena
14. Configuring Kibithoo as an Entrepot in India-
China Border Trade 159
Jajati K. Pattnaik
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 7
Editorial Perspective
AAP: End Of A Dream
It is too early to write the obituary of AAP as a political party. But with
the recent developments within the party, the last being the two
nominations (January 2018) to the Rajya Sabha and manhandling
(February 2018) of the Chief Secretary, Delhi government by party
MLAs in a meeting, in the presence of the Chief Minister, Arvind
Kejariwal, one can with confidence say that the dream which gave
birth to it has ended rather ignominiously. Born out of a successful
anti-corruption movement led by Anna Hazare since 2011 against the
hubris that the second UPA had become, it promised to usher in an
alternative political discourse in which people would be participants
and determinants. It was a promise of a new paradigm of governance
with the citizens at the core. Tired of the shenanigans of the UPA
government people, particularly the urban new generation, middle class
and those on the margins embraced it. Nothing else explains its prompt
success. It was a dream and promise of a change that drove it, despite
dire warnings of the simple Anna Hazare to avoid the cesspool of
political mess.
Many thought that the AAP leaders led by Kejriwal betrayed Anna
by entering politics (November 2012) to realize the cause of anti-
corruption dreams. Within a short while of three years, the AAP ended
up betraying the dream itself. Besides the internal bickerings and break-
ups, the nomination of two Gupta’s as its Rajya Sabha nominees and
manhandling of the Chief Secretary in an official meeting by party
MLA’s will prove the last nail in its coffin. The irony is what began as
an anti-corruption drive has ended, in popular perception, in money
bags. It may or may not survive as a political party, but the popular
trust it has betrayed will rankle for long and people will be loathe to
extend their support easily to a similar social/political movement for
sometime. The last one was the Total Revolution of Jayaprakash Narayan
8 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
in the 1970’s with similar philosophy but collapsed due to conflicts,
ambitions, and petty power politics of the Janata Party leaders. Recent
efforts of Anna Hazare to revive his movement is unlikely to enthuse
the common man in this background.
The end of Aap dream after an unprecedented 67 seats out of 70
in Delhi Assembly elections in December 2014, has been a function of
several factors. Besides mainly the ineptness and lack of political
experience of the Aap leaders and an obstructionist role of the BJP- led
Central government, which did not allow them to function as an effective
government. Despite this, it must be acknowledged that it delivered
creditably on power, water, education and health fronts. But their real
failure was in managing the popular perceptions about the party and
petty ambitions of its leaders and their party management. The fact that
the party today is in tatters controlled by a faction led by the Chief
Minister, Kejriwal, lacking popular credibility is, because it betrayed
the very principles of popular participation which catapulted it to power;
backed by enthusiastic volunteers, and prominent public figures with
credibility. The crucial difference was that it was backed by volunteers
and had no party cadres worth the name. These volunteers who formed
its core and its backers had hopes and believed in them. But these were
belied and prominent credible names left one by one, including Aruna
Roy, Admiral (Retd.) Ram Das, Mayank Gandhi, Raj Mohan Gandhi,
Damania, Yogendra Yadav, Prashant Bhushan, banker Meera Sanyal
etc. The latest one to be humiliated were Ashutosh and Kumar Vishwas,
over Rajya Sabha nominations. Crucial factor was not that Kumar
Vishwas and Ashutosh were denied tickets, but who were given tickets
instead – viz., moneybags with no party links or record of service. One
cannot ignore the fact that today the disillusioned Kumar Vishwas has
an iconic following on social media as a poet, and enjoys greater
credibility than the ruling coterie in the party. It will damage the party
considerably. With the kind of majority that it has the Aap government
in Delhi may last its term till 2019 but without much popular support.
Its 20 MLAs in the Punjab Assembly will also ensure its existence as
any other political party. In retrospect, Aap is not merely guilty of
failure in political terms, but of a more serious crime of betraying a
cause and dream. That also for petty power politics. Its leaders are
becoming an object of ridicule. These leaders who earlier held popular
Mohalla meetings are reduced to issuing press statements as they cannot
face people. What a fall and what a tragedy.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 9
The Modi-BJP Juggernaut Marches On
The election results (March 3, 2018) of three North-eastern States of
Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya have only confirmed that the Modi-
led BJP juggernaut marches on unimpeded. There is jubilation in the
BJP ranks as the North-east with Christian majority States, like Nagaland,
Meghalaya, Mizoram its entry was considered improbable. But now it
is in power in all the States of the North-east, except Mizoram, either
on its own or through coalition partners. These triumphs, however,
have to be seen in perspective. Smaller States like Arunachal, Nagaland,
Mizoram, Meghalaya, even Manipur, by and large, like to go with the
ruling party at the centre and hence, frequent defections and new
alignments. That’s how the Congress despite being the largest single
party in Meghalaya, and earlier in Manipur, and NPP in Nagaland it is
the BJP led or supported coalitions which formed the governments.
However, the BJP victory in Assam (2017) and now Tripura (March
2018), is remarkable. Congress has been in power in Assam for decades
and the CPM in Tripura for the last 25 years. These victories of the
BJP are the result of detailed planning, adjustments and above all
daring. There are not many Parliamentary seats from NE, but it’s a
psychological advantage for the 2019 parliamentary elections. As in all
such elections, the difficult part begins now, that of delivering on the
promises in an area with fickle loyalties, strong local identities, a
pervading belief of being neglected, and an apprehension of Hindu
agenda in the region. So far, unlike the Congress, the BJP is exhibiting
the panache to meet the challenge.
These developments in the North-east are only an extension of
what has been happening in other parts of the country. Ever since the
2014 Parliamentary election, Narendra Modi-led-BJP has kept up its
victorious march across the country, and now controls directly or
indirectly, 21 States and nearly 70 per cent of the population. The
Punjab and Karnataka seem small blips and the latter is in danger in
the forthcoming elections towards the end of the year. It can be said
that the BJP has replaced the Congress as a truly national party. Some
of the liberal and secular experts are aghast at the developments, and
see in it the triumph of the communal Hindutva agenda of the RSS and
fear for the future of the country as a secular State. They even feel that
the Constitution itself will be under threat. But the life and politics
have a tendency to balance itself, and in a diverse country like India,
10 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Hindutva as philosophy is unlikely to dominate, as Hinduism as a
religion or belief system is not a monolith and there are any number of
variations. Moderation is the life-blood of Hinduism and its defining
character. Hindutva elements only represent an angry and resentful
minority among Hindus against the Muslim-British rule in the last
millennium and the post-independence marginalisation at the hands of
the secular – liberal elite, who treated them as untouchables. On their
part BJP/RSS saw themselves as fighting for the perceived Hindu past
and glory. This estrangement from power centre is at the root of the
current assertive and abrasive behaviour of Hindutva elements. As the
BJP achieves the dominant status in Indian politics, the moderation is
likely to set in. The only fear is, that with clueless opposition and the
Congress in steady decline, some Hindutva elements may entertain
dictatorial ambitions of a Hindu Raj and even try to tamper with the
Constitution. Such fears at the moment are in future, based on past
prejudices and lack of understanding of the new generation of the non-
urban and non-elite Indians.
In all these developments, two things are important for the future.
One is to understand the reasons for the success of the BJP, its strengths
and weaknesses. The second is to fashion a democratic response to
resist the future temptations of a one party-rule or making India a
Hindu State. Both are inter-connected.
The unprecedented Modi-led BJP victory in 2014, was a function
of the two factors of the people’s disillusionment with the hubris that
the second UPA regime had become, wracked by allegations of
corruption, and cronyism and the Modi, led vision of development and
new clean leadership. In comparison to the Congress, Modi and his
campaign came out as a credible alternative. Till date, the BJP’s success
in elections (the losses in the Punjab and some by-elections,
notwithstanding) is built around the sincerity and credibility of the
Prime Minister. Its surprising that nearly four years in his tenure as the
Prime Minister, Narendra Modi retains the trust of the majority of
citizens and the youth. Even controversies like demonetisation, GST,
issues of Hindu vigilantes etc., have failed to dent his image. He is
always a step ahead of his political opponents. Another factor is that
unlike the Congress in the past, the BJP never hesitates in cobbling up
coalitions, conceding seats and even playing second fiddle to regional
parties to consolidate its hold. Another factor favouring the rise of the
BJP is the ruthless shedding of the old deadwood both at the national
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 11
and State levels. The new crop does not carry any baggage and can
operate freely. The main weakness of the BJP is its total dependence
on prime Minister to garner votes. Once his image starts declining, BJP
will face great difficulty in converting Modi votes into BJP votes. It’s
a paradox that even those opposed to RSS/BJP favour Modi.
A consummate tactician, the Prime Minister constantly keeps
harping on the corruption, family-centric and caste-centric opposition
parties and the leaders in his public discourse. This is backed by widely
accepted perception of a corruption free rule at the Centre and the BJP
ruled States – which forms the core of his credibility and trust of the
people. In all this and his foreign policy initiatives he has projected an
image of a sincere person trying to do something for the country, which
remains his primary concern. This attracts even fence-sitters and some
liberals. This attribute of trust and sincerity had also impacted the
image of BJP and was one of the reasons of success in the North-east.
On his part as a clever politician, Modi never gets involved in public
debates and arguments, including in the Parliament, and never addresses
press conferences, lest he is questioned. He sticks to his discourse
agenda, including through Man-ki-Baat, which connects him to people.
The recent example of the theme of examinations connected him to
crores of students appearing in exams. In politics, where perceptions
matter, PM’s perceived sincerity covers up inadequate delivery and
related failures.
On the other hand a dispirited, divided and clueless opposition has
failed to cobble up a credible contrary narrative and programmes. It is
busy lamenting successes of the BJP without any positive response.
Psychologically, it continues to see the BJP backed by the RSS as an
evil while the people at large necessarily do not. There is obvious
disconnect between the urban liberal-left perception of the BJP/RSS
and the new generation of Indians. The core virtue of Hindu moderation
will take care of the Hindu zealots and efforts at Hindu consolidation.
We should not forget that it is this 70 per cent of the Hindu population
that had kept the BJP/RSS at the margins for nearly 60 years. They will
not stand for the excesses of Hindu nationalists if challenged. The
PM’s popularity to a large extent covers up people’s reservations about
BJP and its political agenda.
The continuing decline of the Congress as a national party and that
of the left as a cadre based people-centric party, is equally responsible
for the non-emergence of a national level opposition group. The BJP
12 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
is today perhaps the only cadre-based (ala RSS) party. Former
communist/left leaders came from the grass-root trade-union and
farmer’s movements. Now they are produced in the campuses of the
JNU and like institutions. No wonder their ersatz revolutionary
credentials do not evoke public trust. The public discourse has shifted
from grievance to expectations and aspirations. It is a poor reflection
that nearly four years after the 2014 elections, the opposition, Congress
and others do not have any clear vision of their role in a changing
scenario. Incessant harping on threat to secularism is now an overused
and misused narrative. The role of opposition is left to the regional
parties like the, TMC, BJD, TDP, TRS and DMK/AIIDMK. BJP is
already trying to woo some of them.
The BJP is taking full advantage of the present disarray in opposition
ranks and is busy writing the obituary of the Congress and the
communists in the country. The future for the opposition parties in the
country looks bleak at least for the 2019 elections, although it is
hazardous to predict anything in politics and the dance of democracy.
But the rule is that there is never a political vacuum. It is possible that
in due course, a party or a credible coalition will emerge to challenge
the BJP domination. Presently, none of the opposition parties have
exhibited enough strength or will to fill the emerging vacuum. Gujarat
and now Rajasthan indicate that Modi’s popularity will be severely
tested. If Congress retains Karnataka, the opposition will get a leg up
for 2019. The opposition requires a different narrative to bridge the
credibility gap which the PM and BJP enjoy.
While the BJP’s efforts to electorally fashion a Hindu consolidation
is unlikely to succeed in the long run, the opposition narrative have to
move from lamentation to reflect the positivity of the nation. Protests,
boycotts and rallies are passé and now wasteful exercises. More
imaginative initiatives are needed. The first one has to reflect sincerity
and grasp of popular mood and compete. It has to be ready with a
saleable alternative post-2019 elections when the BJP will increasingly
be questioned on what it has delivered, and attempts to navigate the
post-Modi phase of transferring votes for Modi to the BJP, jettison the
lot of jetsam and flotsam it has collected in its ranks in its quest for
power. Like the BJP the opposition must also shed the old guard to
“margdarshak mandals,” and promote fresh faces; a difficult proposition
in the caste and family based parties where the patriarchy is well-
entrenched, including in the regional parties like the TDP, TRC, and
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 13
the BJD. Despite all the negative pulls of the caste, communal, regional
and linguistic divides the emerging new India, a decade hence, is likely
to be different needing a different political discourse. Both opposition
and BJP will need new idioms, around the ever present caste, communal
and regional pulls. Presently, the BJP is not being really tested because
of lack of meaningful opposition. In the Punjab and Gujarat where
credible opposition leaders surfaced the BJP faced problems.
One can only despair for the opposition but not the future. There
are no constants in politics, particularly in a diverse country like India.
But for the present electorally, it is the BJP vs the rest. As long as the
BJP does not make the mistake of converting its emerging political
monopoly into the BJP vs the people. Not a very unlikely scenario if
one remembers as to how in 1989 the dominant Rajiv Gandhi led-
Congress was humbled by hastily cobbled-up Jan Morcha, months before
the Parliamentary elections. Or the early 2004 defeat of the BJP’s
“Shining India” ploy on the back of resounding victories in State
elections of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh. Politics is a
strange arena where surprises abound more than certainties.
Jammu and Kashmir: Reconciling the Opposites
In this issue we have tried to introduce the writers from the J&K to
restore balance, since earlier articles were mostly from outside experts.
In this exercise, we find amidst the despairs generated by the militant
violence and the State response, there is a glimmer of hope if both
sides react less and reflect more on the underlying positives and the
need to change their narratives. Protagonists have to outgrow the past
prejudices and shibboleths and move beyond the Islamisation and
Pak-hand etc. generalisations.
It appears the anger and radicalisation of the Kashmir Valley youth
is indigenous in origin and grounded in day-to-day indignities and
denials implicit in the current violent scenario in the State. It would
appear that the youth anger has been accentuating via internet, influenced
by what is happening elsewhere in the Muslim world. This generation
of the angry youth, whose age profile has been coming down since the
2010, seems to be influenced by slick video and postings on social
media eulogising the IS fighters and empathisers, with the view that
Islam world over is under siege. What should worry authorities is that
the teenage radicalization and anger has no links with the separatist
14 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
movement, Madrasas or the mosque. Hardships implicit in current spiral
of violence only provide a context to the siege mentality.
What the State has to explore is a new paradigm which can sincerely
and transparently reduce the quantum of violence and empathetically
address the legitimate concerns of the young Kashmiris, where the
citizens and they, enjoy respect, personal dignity and freedom for
peaceful protest and dissent. Engagement with them may reduce
radicalization. All this is possible only if the current phase of armed
militancy ends and people do not extend support to it. Unfortunately,
all the interlocutors etc. cast all responsibilities on the State, including
winning the heart and minds of the people of the Valley without
mentioning that it would be only possible if the people do not support
militancy and their cause. Otherwise, security forces have to respond
and the AFSPA is part of that response mechanism. Those complaining
about the day-to-day indignities and hardships faced by the people due
to security forces actions are being disingenuous. Security forces are
there because of armed militancy, and hence people’s difficulties are
inherent in the ground situation. One cannot support and sympathise
with the cause of militancy on one hand and want normalcy on the
other. These are opposites and cannot be reconciled unless interlocutors
and other critics demand stoppage of armed militancy as a precondition.
The current spiral of violence and its dynamics is the real villain.
Peace dividend is not possible in a situation fraught with violent conflict.
The Chief Minister herself has pointed out the fallacy of supporting
militants and then complaining about alleged security forces excesses.
In broader perspective, only dialogue can ease the situation. But
for that to succeed, one has to be honest and not constantantly play the
card of victimhood. The special representative Dineshwar Sharma has
his task cut out of reconciling the opposites, where some want the
peace and normalcy, yet sympathise with and support separatists. Only
peace can ensure movement towards meaningful dialogue. It cannot
happen under the shadow of the gun.
—J.N. Roy
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 15
North-East Scan
Meghalaya & Nagaland Elections 2018:Does Anyone Care About Issues?
As Meghalaya and Nagaland go to the polls today, many issues crop
up about the aftermath of the voting. What were the issues this time
that are different from the 2013 elections in both states? Undoubtedly,
this time in both states the churches have played a prominent role in
trying to influence voters not to vote a party or parties that have no
respect for religious diversity and religious minorities – in this case
the Christians. The Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC) the apex
body of all Baptist churches In Nagaland have a clarion call not to vote
the BJP and the Neiphiu Rio -led National Democratic Progressive
Party (NDPP) an ally of the BJP. They reminded people of incidents
that happened on Christmas this year where carollers were attacked
and some priests were taken to the police station for questioning in
Satna District in Madhya Pradesh.
Turning Christmas Day to Good Governance Day and Good Friday
last year as Digital India Day have all added to make Christians in
these two states with a Christian majority population jittery and insulted.
While the BJP has fielded its Tourism Minister K.J. Alphons, it’s only
visible Christian face to woo the electorate here, the former civil servant
seems to have bungled big time. In Meghalaya, he publicly declared
that the Tourism Ministry assist churches with Rs 70 crore to give them
a facelift so that they become tourist destinations. Church leaders did
not take too kindly to this offer and felt that Alphons was actually
trying to woo them with money. At least two churches publicly declined
* The writer is editor, The Shillong Times and an eminent social activist, journalist
and member of National Security Advisory Board.
16 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
the offer. So a bad strategy cancels out the good intentions that Alphons
may have had.
That said, this election has seen one of the worst forms of mud-
slinging between the BJP and the Congress. When Rahul Gandhi visited
Meghalaya, all he could talk about were the evils of the BJP-led NDA
Government. He raved and ranted on the same old theme. So, except
for his ardent supporters, Rahul Gandhi’s rhetoric failed to convince
the voters that the Congress which was given an eight-year tenure in
Meghalaya and has failed in several fronts but especially for failing to
come up with policies on key areas of human development, another
chance at ruling the state. But what are the alternatives? The BJP is
unlikely to cross the single digit mark in Meghalaya. It is the National
People’s Party (NPP) which although it calls itself national is seen as
a very local and regional face considering it was born in Meghalaya.
Late P.A. Sangma had formed this party in 2013, just before the
Presidential elections which he contested. The Party is now led by
Conrad Sangma – a graduate of the Wharton School of Business, USA
and currently the MP Lok Sabha from Tura, Garo Hills. The NPP’s
baggage is that it is aligned with the NDA Government at the Centre.
So the NPP is termed by rival parties as Team B of the BJP. Both
parties have been denying this and saying they are fighting each other
in several constituencies but voters know better.
The major issues confronting both Nagaland and Meghalaya are
poor communication and a huge infrastructural vacuum. The number of
school and college dropouts is on the rise and successive governments
have failed to come up with strategies or a long-term vision on how to
integrate these disaffected youth, many of who get into substance abuse.
While Nagaland has been in the radar for drug abuse, the police in
Meghalaya have stated that drug peddling and drug use will be the
biggest challenge for the state because of the spin-offs from both.
Meghalaya does not have an education policy. Nor does it have a
health policy. According to the NFHS survey 2011, Meghalaya’s health
indicators particularly in Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) and Infant
Mortality Ratio (IFR) are very poor. In both, the state has very little or
no data since only 17 per cent of women go in for institutional delivery.
The rest give birth at home and hence maternal or infant death is
generally not recorded.
The Socio-Economic-Caste Survey 2011 has revealed that 76 per
cent of rural Meghalaya is landless. For a tribal state that used to boast
of community ownership of land, this figure is frightening because it
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 17
means that the traditional institutions have failed to safeguard the rights
of their people and the modern state too has reneged from its
responsibility to ensure equity and fair play. So why has the rural
population of Meghalaya become landless? Is it because of the land
guzzling coal mining activity? Or have the cement companies in the
state taken over large tracts of tribal land despite the existence of a
Land Transfer Regulation Act (1978)? Both answers are in the positive.
There is a lot of benami ownership of land in Meghalaya. While land
is in the name of an affluent tribal elite, it is being used by non-tribal
businessmen who seem the huge limestone resources as natural capital
they can extract and turn to cement. Coal mining and trading is a huge
business until the National Green Tribunal (NGT) banned coal mining
in April 2014, after a PIL was filed by a student’s body from Assam,
stating that rivers flowing downstream from the Jaintia Hills coal belt
are toxic and no longer sustain riverine life. The NGT asked the state
government to come up with a Mining Policy but that is still hanging
in the balance.
The Congress led, Meghalaya United Alliance (MUA) government
served two terms. Within those terms foundations stones were laid for
two medical colleges five years ago. Till date not even a single brick
has come up. Meghalaya’s state assembly building was gutted in 2001.
Till date the state could not come up with an alternative building,
although architectural designs have been submitted by several firms
several times. Things just don’t work here. Shillong used to be the
capital of the entire North Eastern Region which was then the undivided
Assam, yet the state does not even have a functional airport till date.
It must be the only state in the North East without an airport. Even the
rail link came only three years ago and only to Garo Hills.
The tribes of Meghalaya practice matriliny where lineage is from
the mother’s clan line. But a careful study will also reveal that this state
has the highest number of female headed households. This is because
marriages are brittle and divorce and abandonment very high. When a
man divorces or abandons his wife, the children are left to be brought
up by the mother because of the matrilineal system. This places a huge
burden on the woman. It is intuitive to note that in a society that never
had beggars, we now have street children selling bookmarks, betel nuts
and cigarettes at car parks because they are too poor to study and
because their mothers cannot support their education. If this is not an
issue for the government in Meghalaya then what is?
The Report on Fifth Annual Employment-Unemployment Survey
(2015–16) from Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of
18 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
India shows Meghalaya’s unemployment rate to be 48/1000. There is
no data for Nagaland. When the demographic dividend of a state or
country is not absorbed into its workforce it can become a huge liability.
Imagine 48 young people out of every thousand not having any work
to do. How do they spend their waking hours? Is this also the reason
why militancy in both states is an alternative, lucrative employment
avenue?
Sadly, all the above issues have been given short shrift by all
political parties. Early into the campaign the BJP came up with a
document called “Chargesheet” against the Congress Government in
Meghalaya. It listed out all the wrongdoings of the Government including
a particular one called the White Ink Scam where there was large-scale
nepotism in the appointment of primary school teachers by the then
Education Minister, Ampareen Lyngdoh. The BJP manifesto addresses
all the gaps in governance that Meghalaya has been suffering and
promises to turn the economy of the state around if elected. The
Congress on its part came up with its manifesto only three days ago.
What does this mean? That the Congress does not think a manifesto
matters? Interestingly, the BJP is wooing the coal mafia big time. The
Party has said it will revoke the ban on coal mining if it comes to
power in Meghalaya!
The NPP has taken up mainly local issues and so too the regional
parties but no one has made a commitment for radical reforms in areas
that demand it such as Land Reforms, Educational Reforms, Health
Reforms et al. The Regional Parties too have stuck to local issues as
if Meghalaya is an island. In terms of addressing issues that matter
both to Meghalaya and Nagaland are in the same boat.
So, on this dismal note, people have come out to vote and judging
by the long queues at polling stations people still seem interested to
vote but the EVMs are all playing up. Reports from different parts of
Meghalaya have spoken of EVM malfunction and in some villages
reporters have returned home or gone to their places of work. After all
who gives a holiday to daily wage earners?
March 3, when the result are out should tell us what our fates for
the next five years will be but in Meghalaya as we have to brace
ourselves for vigorous horse trading since as of now, no party – the
Congress, BJP, NPP, Regional Parties (UDP+HSPDP) can hope to win
an absolute majority. This is Meghalaya’s chequered history.
And as far as Nagaland is concerned, it is almost certain that the
NDPP+BJP combine will give the NPF a run for their money. The
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 19
Congress with only 18 candidates in the fray has lost its clout in
Nagaland. Besides, we cannot lose sight of the fact that in Nagaland it
is the government that the NSCN(IM) chooses, which will come to
power. Neiphiu Rio is known to be an NSCN(IM) sympathiser. So it
is almost sure that he will lead the next government.
Liberating Northeast India from itsGeographical Isolation: The UnfinishedAgenda
It has been stated time and again how the Northeast Region of India,
which was growing and “industrializing” under British colonial rule,
began to stagnate in independent India, following its virtual geographical
isolation, as a result of partition of the country in 1947. For decades the
region was viewed from outside as a remote outpost riddled with security
concerns while the people within carried a sense of neglect bordering
alienation. Fortunately, the situation within and the outlook from outside
started to change significantly by the end of the twentieth century. Two
important factors have been responsible for this positive change; (a)
emergence of East Asian economies as world’s new growth region and
(b) central governments proactive involvement with the developmental
aspiration of the people in the region, especially since the mid-1990s.
Once the Shukla Commission Report1 had amply documented the
extent of deficit in infrastructure and basic services that the region had
suffered from, infusion of central development funds to the region was
significantly enhanced during the 9th, 10th and 11th Five Year Plans (1997-
2012). The step-ups in the economic growth rates in the states of the
region over the last decade or so clearly has been aided by, inter alia, this
liberal inflow of central developmental funds.
* Professor M. P. Bezbaruah, Professor, Department of Economics, Director,
Gauhati University Institute of Northeast India Studies, Gauhati University;
Guwahati-781014 (Assam), Mobile: 09864055485,
Email: [email protected]
20 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Emergence of East Asia as a new growth zone of the world in the
last quarter of the twentieth century, finally brought to the consciousness
that the new hubs of bustling economic activities such as Hong Kong,
Bangkok and Singapore are just a short flight away from Guwahati, the
gateway to and from Northeast India. When the ‘Look East’ policy was
initiated by the Government of India in 1992, this virtually landlocked
region saw a ray of hope of shedding its partition-inflicted geographical
isolation and getting linked with the new growth centres in East and
Southeast Asia. This hope was further fuelled by such utterances as
‘Northeast India must be economically integrated with Southeast Asia
while the remaining be politically integrated with the rest of India’ and
‘Southeast Asia begins in India’s Northeast.’ However, from enunciation
of the ‘Look East’ policy in 1992, for over two decades the region failed
to harvest any visible and tangible benefit from the policy. While India’s
trade volume and other transactions with East and Southeast Asia
increased manifold, very little of the busy traffic moved across the
Northeast India corridor. The region continued to be unlinked with the
new centres of growth as it remained insulated by economically
anachronistic Myanmar in the east and none-too-friendly China and
Bangladesh on the north and the southwest. As hopes from ‘Looking
East’ was gradually turning to cynicism; the expectation were revived
when a new government in New Delhi vouched to invigorate looking east
by upgrading the policy to ‘Act East.’ As in case of its earlier version, the
contents of the ‘Act East’ policy also were not spelt out officially. But
from the policy actions that followed, it became clear that ‘Act East’ has
been taken forward through two broad strands; (a) expeditious
completion and enhancement of connectivity projects within Northeast
India and out of it, and (b) more energetic engagement with countries in
the east for broadening and deepening of economic, cultural and strategic
ties. Apart from these more vigorous interventions of the government of
India, what contributed further to the revival of positive expectations in
Northeast India were the changes in political-economic regimes in the
two major neighbouring countries of Bangladesh and Myanmar.
More than the political regime, the economic regime in Myanmar
used to be a major impediment for India to get across it to Southeast
Asia through its Northeast Region. Fortunately, following the change in
the political regime in Myanmar, the economic regime in that country
has also undergone reform and since been quickly coming into sync
with the systems in India and the other ASEAN countries. Thus, a
major impediment in external orientation of Northeast India began to
clear up. With Shiekh Hasina coming back to the helm of affairs in
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 21
Bangladesh, India’s tie with this important neighbour has undergone amajor uplift. Many pending issues between India and Bangladesh havesince been resolved and the subject of revival of Northeast India’straditional outlet to the rest of the world through Bangladesh has beenseriously pursued.
Amidst these positive turn of events it is necessary not to overlookthe fact that considerable uncertainty still remains in the path of theregion getting liberated from its seven decades old geographicalisolation. While Myanmar’s economic system has been gradually syncingwith that of India and the rest of the world, the situation inside is stilltoo fluid to take forward major projects such as India-Myanmar-Thailandtrilateral highway. The rise of conservative and extremist elements inBangladesh does not augur well for furthering trans-national economiccooperation. Relation with China, at least as far as the Northeast regionis concerned, has not improved if not deteriorated. Though India’srelation with Bhutan has remained cordial and mutually supportive, thehydro-power projects in that country have been looked upon with someapprehensions in the downstream areas in Northeast India.
Within the Northeast, notwithstanding the connectivityimprovements and a step-up in the pace of economic growth, progress inthe areas of land reforms other institutional changes has been preciouslittle. Institutional backlogs can put a drag on the economic resurgenceby restricting growth of modern productive enterprises. Moreover,institutional vacuum in the face of weakening of traditional communitybonding can threaten the age old equity sustained under old tribal order.Besides the institutional deficit, the ethnicity and identity relateddivisions among people have continued to be a problem as conflictscontinue to surface albeit with lesser frequency and intensity in recenttimes.
To make the resurgence of Northeast India irreversible, action willhave to be sustained on two fronts. Government of India has to continueto vigorously sustain economic diplomacy with the eastern neighbourswith interest of the Northeast region as the central focus. Governmentswithin the region need to engage with civil society much more vigorouslyto overcome the institutional backlogs and deal with the identity issues,so that broad based participatory development gets precedence over
divisive and xenophobic tendencies.
Notes
1 ‘Transforming the Northeast: Tackling Backlogs in Basic Minimum
Services and Infrastructure Needs,’ High Level Commission Report to
the Prime Minister, Government of India, Planning Commission, New
Delhi, 1997.
22 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
If Answer is Impossible, the NagaQuestion Must be Changed
The unexpected turn of events in Nagaland on the eve of the state
Legislative Assembly election scheduled on February 27 is yet another
indication how intractable the problem of peace in the state is.
Responding to a call for “No Election Before Solution” by a newly
formed Core Committee of Nagaland Tribal Hohos and Civil
Organization (CCNTHCS), all political parties which were expected to
be in the fray, have now signed an agreement that they will not be
fielding any candidates. There are indications that some of the national
parties, in particular the BJP, are not happy with the decision of their
local units, but it remains to be seen if they will disown the decisions
of the latter and go along with the election process. Whatever their
decisions may turn out to be, the air of uncertainty suddenly introduced
is palpable and now the field is wide open for speculations and punditry
on what scenario might emerge in the next few weeks.
This startling development comes even as election fever is heating
up, besides Nagaland in two other Northeastern states of Meghalaya
and Tripura, where Assembly elections are also due next month, the
terms of their current Assembly expiring at about the time. While it
seems it will be business as usual for Meghalaya and Tripura, with
their battles of the ballots fought as they are normally meant to be
fought, it is Nagaland which has now seemingly changed the rule of the
game. What then could be the likely outcome in this beleaguered state?
Given that all parties have ostensibly agreed not to participate in
the election, if even a single party, say the BJP, takes the bold step of
deciding to field candidates, it is a foregone conclusion that most or all
of them would win uncontested, a scenario not altogether new in Nagaland,
as such a situation did emerge in 1998, about two years after the Naga
ceasefire came into effect. The then ruling Congress decided to go against
a similar boycott and as reward, ended up as the uncontested victors in
53 of the total of 60 seats, with seven seats going to independent
candidates.
* The writer is editor, Imphal Free Press.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 23
Would the BJP or any other major party in the state now dare to do
an encore is a question every election watcher in the state would now be
desperate to find a clue. Again, if one party decides to enter the fray,
would the dam burst and all other parties also decide to jump into the
contest? If on the other hand, what would be the scenario if all parties do
decide to stay firm on not contesting? Apart from the commentaries on
the prudence or the lack of it, in such an eventuality one thing is certain
– there would be a constitutional crisis as the state would be without a
new Legislative Assembly to replace its outgoing one. The provisions of
Article 356 then will have to be invoked to meet the emergency, and a
spell of Central Rule through the office of the Governor of the state will
have to take over the administration until another Assembly can be elected
through popular mandate.
Would this be the resort? And if this does come about, would the
Naga solution become suddenly possible so that the deferred Assembly
election can be held at a later date? What if the solution is still not
forthcoming at the end of the first spell of Central Rule? Would President’s
Rule be extended by its constitutional leashes of six months at a time till
such a solution comes about? What if the solution continues to elude for
years and decades, as it has been all this while? Nagaland is indeed
headed for very interesting times, and we hope as good neighbours that it
is spared of unwarranted trauma.
The excruciating Nagaland dilemma will not be just for the people
of Nagaland, but also for those who are in the peace negotiations, which
incidentally has been going on since 1997, but with an added sense of
urgency since August 3, 2015, when a Framework Agreement was signed
rather hurriedly between the Government of India and the most powerful
of the Naga underground groups, the NSCN(IM). However, after more
than two decades, it is difficult to imagine not only what exactly could
have been agreed upon so far, but also what exactly can possibly be
agreed upon without upsetting too many apple carts, and dangerously
too. This is given the fact that certain intractable questions have come to
mark the Naga question, and these are still hopelessly unanswered, if
not unanswerable.
Under the circumstance, it is difficult not to recall the familiar timeless
piece of wisdom that if a certain question does not seem to have an
answer at all, the courageous and prudent thing to consider is changing
the question instead. We wonder then if it is not time for those searching
for an answer to the Naga question to also not consider this proposition.
Naga sovereignty is now more or less redundant, and so probably is
24 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Greater Nagaland or Nagalim. They probably have no answers, so should
not the effort be to find alternate ways?
As we see it, there is no other way out. Only recently we have seen
how even a hint in a section of the online media that an RSS sympathizer
suggested that the final solution to the Naga problem must involve creation
of a Greater Nagaland by incorporating certain districts from neighbouring
Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, resulted in mayhem in the Dima
Hasao area of Assam’s formerly North Cachar Hills district, resulting in
the death of two young agitators. Assam Chief Minister, Sarbananda
Sonowal has thereafter reaffirmed that no territory of Assam will be
sacrificed under any circumstance. Reactions in Manipur and Arunachal
Pradesh are hardly likely to be any different or any less violent, if this
proposition is pushed any further. It is clear then that what needs to be
realized and accepted by all stakeholders is that no ethnic exclusive
homelands can be carved out of what are essentially shared homes of
multi-ethnicities. This is one of the characteristic features of the entire
Northeast.
On the other hand, if sovereignty and Greater Nagaland are out of the
question, what would the Naga solution be like? After more than six
decades of struggle for sovereignty, and all the sufferings that came with it,
would the Nagaland be happy with a settlement that has chiefly to do with
refashioned autonomous councils for Naga areas in Manipur, Assam and
Arunachal Pradesh. Indeed, at this moment, no solution to the Naga problem,
we are certain is in anybody’s sight. The election boycott proposal in
Nagaland in this sense is also an expression of this deep frustration. On the
other hand, the slogan “No Election Before Solution” is also reminiscent
of one of the logics forwarded for the Crusades of medieval Europe, in
which rulers invoked lofty ideas of external aggressions to divert attention
from mounting irresoluble domestic problems. The turncoat political class
in Nagaland may be trying to divert attention and thus salvage themselves
from a complete loss of public faith, particularly in the wake of the
unprecedented and fickle floor-crossing drama amongst the ruling Naga
People’s Front, NPF, legislators, toppling and resurrecting chief ministers
several time in the span of a few months.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 25
J&K: What Next?
“—And from the death of each days hope another hope sprung up to
live tomorrow.”
- Charles Dickens.
The best news for Kashmir in a long time has been the appointment
of a representative “to understand the legitimate aspirations of people
in Jammu and Kashmir” as Union Home Minister, Rajnath Singh put it.
At the very least, the appointment provides hope. Kashmir has been a
cauldron of repressed anger of late. Not surprisingly there was palpable
excitement in Srinagar. And Dineshwar Sharma is the right man for the
job.
There is no better listener available in Delhi than Mr. Sharma, who
has all the attributes of an interlocutor. He is humble, talks little,
understands and feels for Kashmir and has infinite patience. Plus, he
has loads of experience, including a stint in Srinagar during the most
difficult days. That is exactly the reason he has been appointed
interlocutor to try and alter the situation in Kashmir by investing in
trust-building new bridges and repairing the old.
Unfortunately, Dineshwar’s two visits to Kashmir have not exactly
set the valley on fire, not due to lack of purpose on his part but Delhi’s
usual ambiguity. On Independence Day, the Prime Minister said
Kashmiri’s needed embraces not bullets but on the eve of Mr. Sharma’s
visit, the Army Chief warned civilians of “stern action, if they persisted
in disrupting anti-military operations.” Unfortunately, the Prime Minister
himself likened former Home Minister, P. Chidambaram‘s call for
* Shri A.S. Dulat, is former Director R&AW. He was also Advisor on J&K to the
former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. He is closely associated with
Track Two efforts with Pakistan.
26 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
restoration of J&K’s autonomy to an “insult to the martyrs.” What
hope does that leave Kashmir with?
As Omar Abdullah said: “a dialogue without a purpose was
meaningless,” there was confusion in Delhi about Mr. Sharma’s role.
The Minister in the Prime Minister’s office refused to acknowledge
him as an interlocutor.
“But engagement even for the sake of engagement is not a bad
idea.” As Professor Abdul Ghani Bhat, who met Dineshwar Sharma in
Srinagar on November 27 th said: “dialogue is the only effective and
civilised way of addressing issues bedeviling relations between nations
or people.” On the eve of the interlocutor’s third visit to the valley,
Prof. Bhat pleaded for a full fledged dialogue between India and Pakistan
to resolve Kashmir. He said the resolution of all issues between India
and Pakistan “passes through Kashmir.” This may amount to wishful
thinking at the moment, but it is a sentiment expressed by all Kashmiri
leaders which needs to be taken note of for the sake of peace in South
Asia. The Prof. added that it enjoined on the Kashmiri leadership to
work for peace.
Kashmiri’s crave for peace and desire engagement. Not talking has
brought Pakistan back into the game, when it was totally out of the
equation in Jammu and Kashmir. There is still no great love lost for
Pakistan; Kashmiri’s realise they have no future across the border, but
it remains the most convenient fall back. Alienation, disillusionment
and of late, anger and disgust bring out the green flags. Kashmir was
never mentioned in the 2013 elections in Pakistan, but will almost
certainly be an issue in 2018.
Added to that is the Kashmiri’s ultimate fear that they could be
reduced to a minority in their state. Threats of scrapping Article 370
and 34 A of the Constitution only add to Kashmiri’s apprehension,
leading to unnecessary turns in the debate on autonomy, a legitimate
Kashmiri aspiration. Thankfully, the Government has said that there
was no move to scrap Article 370 or 34 A, at least for the time being.
Mehbooba Mufti had warned sometime back that there would be no
one left in the valley to raise the national flag once 370 was removed.
2017 has been a comparatively peaceful year even though the
Kashmiri has not got out of his sulk and radicalism grows apace with
alienation. Anti-militancy operations have been more successful than in
the past, with a number of top militants having been neutralised. But
even Operation ‘All Out’ has it’s limitations. It is estimated that there
were about 150 militants in the valley at the time of Burhan Wani’s
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 27
killing in July, 2016. Now there are said to be 250 militants even
though the security forces have neutralised 210 since then; and locals
mainly from South Kashmir still outweigh foreigners.
The older generation has had enough, so too have those who have
been across and witnessed Pakistani ruthlessness. It is the new
generation, not knowing what Pakistan is like that are still attracted by
the gun because of our neglect. The majority of youth are opposed to
the gun, but see little hope elsewhere; we are choking our own space
by not providing the youth a way out.
“Dialogue is the only way forward in Kashmir. There is no other
way,” as Mufti Sahib had once said. If there is one message which
comes out of Kashmir, not today, not yesterday, but as far back as one
can remember, it is that one can achieve a lot through love and
compassion but you can never achieve it by force. Kashmir is not a
military or law and order problem but a political and emotive issue.
Dineshwar Sharma understands this better than anyone else and
has been quietly acknowledging it during his interactions in Kashmir.
One would not be surprised, if during his next visit to the valley, Mr.
Sharma drives straight to Gilani Sahib’s residence. He is not one to
throw in the towel so easily. He has a job on his hands and knows how
to deliver on Kashmir, understanding fully well that any dialogue without
the Hurriyat would be almost redundant. It cannot be deferred for too
long.
Unfortunately, all political activity is at a standstill except for Dr.
Farooq Abdullah’s occasional foray in North Kashmir. As a J&K Police
officer complained, how long could they keep dispersing crowds when
politicians refuse to do their bit. Kashmir being a political problem can
only be resolved by politicians. As far back as 2001, the Army Chief,
General Padmanabhan had said much the same thing; the Army’s job
was done and it was for politicians to sort matters out. More recently,
another former Army Chief, General V.P. Malik opined that the Army
could not be kept interminably in Kashmir. Whether the Army stays or
not and after almost 30 years it is difficult to visualise Kashmir without
the Army, but as a confidence building measure, AFPSA should at least
be diluted or partially revoked. The Kashmiri anger against bunkers is
a signal for removal of AFSPA.
The Chief Minister says little or nothing; the PDP is in reverse
gear. There is increasing murmur of discontent in the party. Mehbooba
will need much more than the induction of her brother in the Cabinet to
resurrect the party. The National Conference too needs to pull up its
28 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
socks to prepare for the next elections. Anti-incumbency alone may not
suffice to see it through. It is high time the party broad based itself by
reaching out also to separatists and others looking for political space.
The old shop still the best bet for Delhi could do with a facelift.
The detention and arrest of separatist leaders serves no purpose
except that it may provide Dineshwar Sharma a ready concession to
offer the Hurriyat. Invariably, the release of their colleagues is their
first demand. To that extent, it could facilitate dialogue. But as
Mehbooba said: “the National Investigation Agency needs to step back
to facilitate talks.”
Whether credible or not, Hurriyat thinking is still a factor in Kashmir
as much as Pakistan. Basically, the Kashmiri is not at peace with the
status quo. The peace with honour he bargained for still eludes him.
The reason that we have reservations talking to the Hurriyat and to
Pakistan are the very reasons we need to talk to them. The magic of
democracy is that hardliners get moderated and mainstreamed. The
vast majority realise that their future lies within India. They deserve a
chance.
The sentiment of sub-nationalism in Kashmir is not very different
from many of our other states except that in Kashmir it is guaranteed
by the Constitution.
War, we realise is not an option, so we are content with managing
Kashmir. But management can go out of control as it did for most of
last year. We need to find a way forward. Dr Farooq Abdullah has
repeatedly said that a settlement on the line of control was the most
practical solution. Kashmiri’s still prefer Musharraf’s four point formula.
Whichever way we need to pick up the threads on Kashmir with
Pakistan. Dr. Manmohan Singh and Musharraf had nearly done a deal.
There can be no peace or forward movement in Kashmir, so long
as we keep relating to elections elsewhere in the country, just as we do
our relationship with Pakistan. We need to talk to Pakistan as much as
we need to engage with Kashmir. If engagement is to depend on elections
then we have no hope till 2020. Peace like truth is an indivisible
burden.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 29
Kashmir, Dialogue is the Key
The situation in Kashmir is really worrisome – troubling, because there
is a huge multitude of actors who are working overtime to just ensure
that the situation here remains forever on the boil. And mind it, these
provocateurs are present on both sides of the political divide — non-
state actors as well as the state actors.
The new-age militancy with a strong dose of radicalization is
emerging as a serious challenge not only for the security apparatus but
also for Kashmiri society itself. Young boys, from well-to-do families
are joining militant ranks and unlike the youth of 1990’s, who took to
arms, by and large, in reaction to rigged election of 1987, today’s
youth are driven by fanatic religious ideology. That is the reason they
get attracted to groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM) and even idolize groups like ISIS.
On the political side, while the mainstream polity is struggling
unsuccessfully, to gain some credibility, the separatists are virtually
following militants and the street. Following Hizbul Mujahideen poster
boy, Burhan Wani’s killing, the separatists have almost lost the grip
over the situation and have been following the street, which is violently
angry. Instead of giving any political direction to the unrest, separatist
leadership comprising Syed Ali Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and
Mohammad Yasin Malik have confined themselves to calling strikes
and attending funerals of killed militants.
The ruling PDP-BJP coalition seems clueless and has failed to
make any mark on the ground that would have helped improve the
situation. While one has to appreciate that after becoming the Chief
Minister, Mehbooba Mufti didn’t get any time to breathe easy because
* Bashir Manzar is well known journalist and writer, based in Srinagar. He is
also editor of English daily, Kashmir Images published from Srinagar.
30 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
of the turmoil in the Valley. It goes without saying that her inability to
convince her coalition partner to open up communication channels
with the stake-holders, particularly separatists, has dented both her
own and her party’s image.
Right from its birth, PDP has been strongly advocating dialogue
with separatists as well as Pakistan for resolution of the Kashmir issue.
However, three years in power, Mehbooba has failed to convince the
Central leadership to move even an inch toward this direction.
Though the appointment of Dineshwar Sharma, former IB chief, as
interlocutor has brought in some relief for ruling PDP, but the fact that
the largest mainstream regional party National Conference (NC) and
the separatists decided to stay away from Sharma has diluted any
prospective gains of the process. Though Sharma has been meeting
cross-sections of people all over the state, but as of now any worthwhile
outcome seems unlikely.
Whether one likes it or not, unless New Delhi does something
serious to open up communication links with the separatist leadership,
things are not going to improve. Recent history stands witness that
whenever there has been some sort of communication between New
Delhi and the separatists, the ground situation in the Valley has shown
considerable improvement. However, with no movement forward on
the dialogue front, it is cynicism, desperation and depression that are
driving Kashmiri youth towards the extreme right – as they see no light
at the end of the tunnel. New Delhi will have to realize that separatist
leadership, despite all their shortcomings, is still an asset which has to
be kept intact.
Kashmir’s new-age militancy has already taken away much sting
from the separatists here. The talk of establishing an Islamic Caliphate
in the Valley emerging from militant camps is also eating on their
significance. In such a situation, New Delhi’s indifference towards this
leadership would only add to their irrelevance, and undo whatever little
leverage they have. So the question worth asking is: Will an irrelevant
and discredited separatist leadership fit in the broader game plan of
New Delhi? Given the ground realities here, the answer is a big “no.”
The young boys joining militancy in Kashmir are a radicalised lot.
They do not care about historical realities, United Nations resolutions
or Pakistan. They seem to have just one agenda – the establishment of
an Islamic Caliphate in Kashmir – a dream akin to the ideology of
terrorist groups like the Islamic State, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Once
the separatist leadership is out of the picture, New Delhi is likely to be
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 31
confronted by these largely faceless radicals, who believe in an ideology
where there is no scope for any dialogue or reconciliation.
Some security analysts may argue that it would give the government
a free hand to deal with it militarily. However, such thinking, if it
exists, is fraught with so many dangers.
Violent conflicts are like fire. Fire can cause wanton death and
destruction; but it is also true that fire, if channeled and regulated
properly, can also drive super-engines of progress and development.
So, wisdom lies in handling fires with due care and caution, so as to
control its mechanics the way it is harnessed constructively inside our
kitchens, factories, and engines. Now as the common sense has it, bare
hands cannot be used to control and manipulate fires. States suffering
violent conflicts have traditionally kept handy some kind of tools –
akin to a fire-poker, a spade and tongs – that they use as and when they
need to manage the fire, or to keep its thermo-politics from burning up
the state and its structures.
The Hurriyat Conference, Kashmir’s separatist political leadership,
has so far performed the role of these fire tools. Now, by throwing
them away, the Government of India is actually exposing itself to the
dangerous prospect of burning itself. At the time of need, it will no
longer have the privilege of using these tools to regulate the thermo-
politics of the Kashmir conflict, which, right now, is facing the added
threat of radical groups like ISIS and Al Qaida, blowing fresh air into
it.
New Delhi would have to move beyond Dineshwar Sharma initiative
if it really wants to have some breakthrough in Kashmir and engage
with the separatist leadership. That said, nobody can shut eyes to the
influence and control that Pakistan has over the separatist leadership.
Therefore, it will be naïve to suggest that separatist leadership will
agree to join any dialogue process unless it gets a go-ahead from the
neighbouring country. And this necessitates opening of communication
links with Pakistan as well.
Even when one cannot deny that in the aftermath of Pakistan’s
unabated attempts to strengthen and support militancy in Kashmir, the
tempers in the Indian political circles are running high, and
understandably so, but here former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee’s quotable quote – “One can change friends but not
neighbours” – comes handy to support the need of dialogue with
Pakistan.
32 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Regrettably, the political functionaries of both governments
(Pakistan and India) have remained so carried away by their respective
self-interests that they are simply being indifferent to and ignorant of the
larger interests of their countries. Just for the sake of showing off their
political loyalties, they are pushing both countries towards a sure-loser
and deadly confrontation – loser because modern-day warfare does not
throw up any winners.
Even when some indignation over ‘having been wronged time and
again’ by the western neighbour makes perfect sense, but it is also true
that New Delhi’s troubles in Kashmir are not essentially and exclusively
about Pakistan’s machinations alone. So people of Kashmir must be
spared of this unnecessary burden of being seen only as an “enemy’s
extension.” And should it happen, it will make life easy both for New
Delhi as well as for the people of Kashmir, who have otherwise only
looked at and suspected each other as the ‘political other.’
For years together, India and Pakistan have peddled their negative
nationalisms at the cost of Kashmir and its people, and yet both have
clearly and repeatedly failed the people here and the ones in their
respective mainlands as well. Insecurity, poverty, ambition are stated to
be the three roots of destructive nationalism. Since all three of these
conditions are endemic in both countries, the ambitious political executive
has taken recourse to appropriation of a myth of God “being on our side”
and is actively pursuing this mythology over the heads of poverty-stricken
ignorant masses and pushing them towards certain insecurity of life, and
bread and butter. Nationalism centred around religion as the only marker
of identity is a convenient wrapper both countries are using to shield
their inherent incapacities and deficiencies – of governance, of poverty
alleviation, and everything pledged by a welfare state.
Caught up in the midst of two mill-stones, Kashmir and its people
have all along bore the brunt of this constant India-Pakistan rubbing and
friction, and yet their own willful ignorance runs so deep that they too
have been blinded by negativity to the extent of taking to “a new idolatry
of blood and soil”, which according to the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm,
springs from an incapacity to recover from the loss of “our pre-modern”
social structures.
When nationalism becomes a culture of belonging, rather than a
civilization of culture, the democratic and humanist ideas of civilization,
society and community – all dependent on our ability to imagine the
‘other’ – those who are not part of ‘our’ ethnic or religious in-group – are
pushed to the margins, and demonized. This is what is happening in
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 33
India and in Pakistan and, courtesy of their politics Kashmir too is no
longer different.
In the early 1997, F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela described
the journey they (and South Africa too) had taken from war to peace
after realizing that the conflict was stalemated. Continuing the violence
would spell defeat for everyone; only through negotiations could both
sides hope to meet their needs – and this is what they did.
“If both sides could lose through a spiral of violence, then perhaps
both sides could win through a spiral of dialogue.” As Mandela put it,
“I never sought to undermine Mr. de Klerk, for the practical reason that
the weaker he was, the weaker the negotiations process. To make peace
with enemy one must work with that enemy, and the enemy must become
one’s partner.” (EOM)
34 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
The Idea is the Enemy
‘Radicalization’ is understood in various ways, but one may broadly
talk of two kinds of radicalization — political radicalization and religious
radicalization. Let us take political radicalization as the spread of those
ideas that lead people to try and overthrow the established government,
or even the established system of governance that is currently in place,
that is, the Constitutional arrangement. Religious radicalization has
generally referred in the past to ideas that call for different sets of
religious and social practices. Such movements seek exclusivism, that
is, they are intolerant of other faiths.
A difference which has existed for long has become more prominent
in the recent past: religious radicalism has become a form of political
radicalism. So, there are movements that not only insist on a particular
form of religious practice, but also seek to replace the established
government with a regime that is part and parcel of their particular sort
of religion-based belief system.
One often hears talks about ‘defeating radicalization.’ This is an
inadequate frame of reference, for `defeating’ is based on a war-like
framework of friendlies-versus-enemies, winners and losers—a scenario
that imagines something like a battalion of the radicalized ranged on a
hill, who have to be defeated with the smart deployment of tactics and
war strategies. It is the sort of scenario that comes naturally to a soldier’s
mind, to anyone steeped in war and battle tactics. But this sort of
framework might prove inadequate, for it confuses the ideas that motivate
* David Devadas is the author of the forthcoming book, Generation of Rage in
Kashmir (Oxford), and In Search of a Future, the Story of Kashmir (Penguin,
2007). He has covered Kashmir in depth for 30 years as a reporter, commentator,
analyst and writer. He has insights, having lived with the people for long
periods. He has been Senior Fellow at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library,
and Political Editor of Business Standard.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 35
the enemy with the enemy. I would rather think of the idea as the
enemy.
In a situation such as Kashmir, we should differentiate betwen
trends, currents, and movements within society, and the geopolitics of
the situation. If we make this differentiation, we might see that the
person with the idea is only the pawn who is very useful to the real
enemy, that is the external enemy. It is those enemies that gain, and
gain tremendous leverage, when we have large numbers of citizens
with radical ideas, that is, people who wage war against the state from
within, whether for political or religious, or politico-religious reasons.
Focus on Citizenship
In fact, since that person with the idea is a citizen, is within the country,
he or she actually should be a friendly. Let us recall the vital role of
citizens within society in Kashmir in 1947-48 and in 1965. As a Citizen
rather than as a Terrorist, that person could be the biggest enemy of the
external Terrorist. So, if our purpose is stability, then the effort should
be to turn those who have radical ideas into friendlies. To quote Mao
from the days of the Long March, guerrillas are like ducks, who cannot
survive without the pond, i.e. the support of the local populations among
whom they live.
If the person who is radicalized is from our country, the first
priority should be to contest the idea in his or her mind, and to work
towards a trusting and responsive relationship between state and citizen.
The alternative is a potentially unending stream of persons taking up
arms, and bloodshed becoming self-perpetuating.
This prospect is even more likely in light of the power of social
media and other forms of motivation. For, we are witnessing a steadily
increasing number of militants in the field, and on the other hand, a
steadily decreasing age profile. Both factors are worrying but perhaps
the latter—the age profile—should worry policymakers the most.
Decreasing Age Profile
Not only are teenagers taking up arms, videos of small children
supporting jihad and martyrdom are spreading. Even infants are picking
up ideas that validate violence on the basis of radical ideas. As they
grow, these boys will lob stones as soon as they can. And, they will
pick up guns with great ferocity, and a readiness to die. To combat the
36 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
boy’s willingness—in fact, his desire—to die is extremely tough. The
child has become the person who is affected by the idea. And parents
and care-givers encourage those ideas.
In this context, I am wary of such terms as LWEs1 and ANEs2.
Such terms tend to bunch together various kinds of persons, groups,
ideologies, and agendas. They obscure the possible differences between
genders, locales (such as towns, villages, and jungles), ethnic
particularities, and, perhaps most important, generations. Each of these
categories could potentially have different ideas, at least to some extent.
If we don’t dis-aggregate the different types, we could actually end up
adding to the problem while trying to sort it out—like a scalpel incision
that pushes a cancer to spread.
Over the past few years, I have stressed the urgency of engaging
with young Kashmiris. The response of policymakers has tended to be
dismissive. A very powerful policymaker asked me how he could
possibly engage with ‘young Kashmiris’ at large. Instead, he said: ‘tell
me an organization and I can deal with it.’ Seeking an organization
with which one might deal stems from an established sort of mindset—
let’s either buy over their leader, or threaten the main activists, or
actually decimate the individuals who can be identified as belonging to
that organization. But the sort of approach leaves the battle of ideas
aside. It leaves the ideas to spread.
This sort of approach and mindset particularly distresses me, since
it continues even after I have witnessed, living in Kashmir, how vibrantly
the Jamaat-e-Islami has re-emerged over the course of this decade. The
attempt to crush it through ruthless tactics, including daylight killings
at their doorsteps, by the mercenaries of Ikhwan (or men associated
with the police Special Operation Groups) from 1994 on has made no
difference to the strength of Jamaat on the ground two decades on. In
fact, if anything, those ruthless tactics may actually have won the
organization the sympathy of other Kashmiris—many of whom were
very skeptical about Jamaat in the past.
Methods of Spread
Let me briefly turn to the ways in which ‘radicalization’ came about in
Kashmir. Internet, mainly via telephony, has been a major input. Since
the early years of this decade, students at colleges and schools have
been receiving sophisticated, slickly produced videos valorizing Islamic
State commandos. Yes, that is what they looked like in some of those
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 37
videos— highly trained, motivated, and successful commandos. A lot
of people get mystified by the number of young Europeans and others
who went to fight for Islamic State, but they would not be mystified if
they focused on the inputs the young receive to motivate them.
The discourse at some mosques has also played a role. The
preaching of men like Mushtaq Veeri of the Ahle-Hadith is particularly
notable. In south Kashmir, Veeri overtook the much less radical Maqbool
Akhrani by the middle of this decade. He has openly called for support
to Baghdadi and the Islamic State in sermons. Over the past year or
two, even Veeri’s level of radicalism has been overtaken by some of his
acolytes. One of them, Ashiq Salafi, called for support to Zakir ‘Musa’
soon after Musa’s audio rejecting nationalism and democracy went
viral on 12 May last year. There has been much speculation about who
might be backing Musa. It really doesn’t matter beyond a point. What
matters is the level of support, even hero worship, Musa’s radical Islamist
ideas attract among young Kashmiris, mainly teenagers.
In this age of mass media, televangelists have played a bigger role
than preachers. Their messages often privilege, even valorize, religion-
based exclusivism. Apart from televangelism and social media
messaging, the discourse in schools, colleges, and universities has played
a much greater role to radicalize young Kashmiris than preaching at
mosques. The curriculum and teachers’ training are major concerns.
During the past few years, Kashmir University has become a hotbed of
anti-India radicalization. It is now under the strong influence of radical
activists. This is a major change since around the turn of the century.
Global Trend
Another dimension of this issue needs to be recognized. Radicalization,
in political and religion-based terms, is spreading in various countries
and in various religions. It is a global trend. Three kinds of trends are
visible. One, more and more people are influenced by exclusivist ideas
of identity — ‘who are we’ as the title of one of Huntington’s books
put it. Two, support is gaining ground for a strong uniting leader who
will protect what is seen as the interest of a pure identity. This trend is
gaining ground at the cost of earlier ideals of consensus, inclusion, and
the autonomy of regions and of religious, sectarian, and ethnic groups
of various sorts. This boils down to a move away from democratic
functioning, as it was understood a few decades ago. Three, there is
38 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
increasing acceptance of, if not backing for, violence of one sort or
another against those not considered to ‘belong’ to one’s own kind.
Some studies have drawn links between this trend towards violence
and exclusive identities on the one hand, and such trends as climate
change, stress in agricultural sector, water-related crises including
drought, urban migration, etc. in places like Syria. But those dimensions
of increasing radicalization are beyond the scope of this article.
Genie Out of the Bottle
If we recognize that radicalization is not just rising, but is global, how
should we understand it, if not as a battalion ranged on a hill, on which
it must be defeated? I prefer to think of it as a genie— a genie which is
out of the bottle. It has spread in society, in minds. And yet, it has not
spread uniformly. It is far more common among younger persons than
middle-aged or older Kashmiris. Now, ‘young’ covers a very large part
of the population. Almost 70 per cent of the Valley’s population is said
to be below the age of 30. Such are the demographic trends that almost
half the population in the Valley is below the age of twenty. That means
that half the people are teenagers or in their pre-teens. These are the
people who matter—or rather, the ideas in their minds mattter. In fact,
several of the leading militants, even those who call themselves
‘commanders’ are below the age of 22.
I have argued in my forthcoming book, The Generation of Rage in
Kashmir, that the term ‘stone-pelter’ is inadequate to understand who
we are dealing with in Kashmir. There have been three uprisings over
the past decade that have been described by the term ‘stone-pelting’—
in 2008, 2010, and 2016. The reason the term ‘stone-pelter’ is inadequate
is that it misses the point that those who were on the streets in 2008,
after land was transferred to the Sri Amarnath Shrine Board, were
broadly speaking not on the streets in 2016, after militant commander
Burhan Wani was killed—at least after the first three or four days.
Typically, those who were on the streets in 2008 were in their 20s and
30s. Some were even older. Those who were on the streets in 2010
were typically in their early 20s, some were in their teens. Now, those
who were in their early 20s in 2010 were in their late 20s by 2016.
Those who were in their late teens in 2010 were in their mid-20s by
2016. Even those who were in their early teens then were mostly past
their teens by 2016.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 39
After Burhan was killed, many young Kashmiris even in their late
20s were introspective. They talked of how pelting stones had done
them no good, and about the futility of violence. But those who had
become teenagers by then more than made up for them. These young
people were typically born around the turn of the century. They had
grown up with ideas about a global war on terror, about 9/11, ideas
about Muslims being oppressed in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq,
Afghanistan. We will get nowhere unless we deal with these ideas—
which are often carried by the extremely slick videos of Islamic State,
and about abuses in various parts of the world. The vehicle for those
ideas is social media. It is almost impossible to contain the internet, but
the genie is flying around the net.
The teenagers who are glued to cell phones are precisely the age
group that is most easily influenced by ideas of ‘pure’ religion, and by
sophisticated videos, which play subtly on emotions and sentiments.
One could categorize such videos very broadly as positive influencers
and negative influencers. Positive influencers are those videos and
messages that show preachers, historical allusions, Quranic verses, and
the glorified actions of militants, including those of such organizations
as the Islamic State. Negative influencers include videos and messages
that showcase cruelty and human rights abuses by the forces, including
the police.
Dealing with the Genie
Responses need to be carefully thought through. If we imagine
radicalization like a genie outside a bottle, let us think of it as invisible
smoke in the air. The more one beats at it, the more it will spread. And
the minds that perceive that beating will take it as proof of the messages
of radicalization. That assault will be seen as proof that ‘they hate us.’
That theme was studied ad infinitum in the US in the years after the 9/
11 attacks. Most of those studies failed to grasp that those who hate
have come to believe that they are victims of hate, and are only
responding to something started by the other side.
Responses need to be based on insightful study, and be far more
imaginative and thoughtful than they have hitherto been. Since one is
dealing with thoughts, ideas, and values, the projection of one religion,
or one sect, or one school of religion against another will only result in
strengthening that stream of thinking—about religion as the dominant
and rightful frame of discourse.
40 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
The antidote to a certain sort of understanding of religion is not
another form of religion. It certainly is not a criticism of religion, for
that only gets people’s backs up, and makes them defensive in a ‘us
against them’ framework. The ideas that need to be promoted as counters
must be about inclusion, engaging, accepting, and looking forward
towards the future. If this is a contest of ideas, it has to be held on the
battlefields of minds and of perceptions. In those battles in the mind,
the language of combat and offence will lose.
To begin with, this phenomenon requires understanding. There is
no point talking of ‘misguided youth’ in propaganda campaigns, but
not engaging with the ideas that guide—or misguide—their minds. It is
vital that they be engaged in a spirit of understanding, forgiveness and
acceptance. It must not be a patronizing, top-down approach. One needs
to understand the narratives, discourses, facts, and perceptions that
constitute the genie that is out of the bottle. Only then, can one discover
the points that can be counters.
Notes
1 Armed forces tend to use the term, short for Left-Wing Extremists, for
Maoism.2 Short for Anti-National Elements.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 41
Kashmir At a Threshold: Recovery ofIntegrity or Surrender to Violence
Kashmir that we know through politics, media and tourism is not
the same it opens up in trust. The challenge for anyone with a
responsibility to melt the frozen doors and channels of dialogue
with people and stakeholders in Jammu & Kashmir is to win their
lost trust in “Indians” and earn their confidence. Govt. of India’s
Special Representative puts youth radicalization at the center of
his agenda. Observations of this writer are based on his engagement
with Kashmiri youth in dialogues on non-violence since 2010,
more than 20 visits and more than two dozen dialogues including
on Kashmiri Muslim-Kashmiri Pandit rapprochement, as a part of
experiment in non-violence. Ultimate answer to any human misery,
rationalized violent radicalization must come from reawakening of
inner cultural-spiritual resources of people. Kashmir has it in
abundance. Besides a cursory view of the situation into which
GoI’s Special Representative‘s task is cut out; politics and the
dynamics of dialogue, the writer discusses a less attended and
explored socio-cultural dynamics triggering internal cultural-
spiritual alienation and loss of identity which in turn is a cause of
radicalization as religious radicalization affirms, recovers a sense
of lost identity. The breakage of pluralism, the ‘rishi-culture’ and
its recovery are closely related with radicalization and legitimacy
of violence. Kashmir is a complex culture, and so ore its problems
of violence and radicalization.
Dineshwar Sharma, appointed in late October 2017 “to start a
substantial dialogue in Jammu & Kashmir” in the words of Home
* Shri Rajiv Vora is Chairman, Swarajpeeth Trust and an eminent Gandhian
thinker and writer. He is closely involved in Kashmir problem.
42 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Minister Rajnath Singh, while concluding his first visit to Kashmir said
he “would try to make every effort to meet Hurriyat leaders” during
his next visit. Commentators voicing skepticism and cynicism may be
right in following text-book lessons on making political predictions,
but the uncommon factor of radical departure, a turnabout, on issue of
talks with the Hurriyat leaders, do not suggest an insincere time-
passing tactical move or a show for an international credit. Radical
departure become morally binding, for it suggests radical review of
earlier public position, a conviction and not a clever calculation.
Cynicism is good only as a reminder of earlier experiences of hopes
raised and let down, but not good for clearing the path of hopelessness
and loss of trust; – the twins borne of loss of meeting ground between
Indian Govt. and resistance leadership.
Right at the outset, Shri Sharma must have found how unenviable
is his task when reports suggesting a counter-line within the BJP
appeared in the J&K media; and when the news of his highly confidential
meeting with senior Hurriyat leader, its former Chairman, Prof. Abdul
Gani Bhat, got leaked to the media and the great possibility of bringing
the Hurriyat on board was sabotaged. Such things only underline the
complex, rather treacherous, power play to which Kashmir’s peace
process is subjected to. That makes Shri Sharma’s task unenviable. But
the possibility of exhausting his mandate reasonably can restore the
lost trust in the institution of interlocutor. Notwithstanding the title of
his designating, he perhaps can give to Kashmir more than earlier
interlocutors. That is a rewarding side of his task. To say the task is a
challenging one, is an understatement.
However, people in Kashmir know that they have greater stakes in
peace process than the critics and those who play the power game to
which peace is an anathema. Many Kashmiri youth are meeting Shri
Sharma, in spite of the fact that Indian state has lost its ground in
Kashmiri people’s mind considerably post-2016 mass uprising. But,
the main issues apart, people want the day-to-day life, its dignity and
democratic space to be secured first and foremost as a matter of duty
of the state. Militancy and terrorism are beyond them, but if the sate
too remains beyond them, Kashmir would be a much harder case than
it is already; disaffection will be beyond repair. Within such tender
circumstances it is an evidence of a sense of responsibility when
Kashmiri youth and others choose to meet Shri Sharma, a warm hearted
unassuming gentleman with a lot of goodwill and respect for Kashmiri
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 43
people. If interactions continue, it may create conditions for the Hurriyat
leaders to open their doors that they closed on the All Party
Parliamentary Delegation, which was not considered prudent by many.
An ordinary Kashmiri knows that they cannot wish away India. Their
leaders need to engage in talks. Therefore, in spite of people meeting
Shri Sharma, the Hurriyat leaders are watching and keeping silence
over what otherwise may be seen as defiance against them. All the
Hurriyat leaders do not hold the same stand as its present Joint
Command. Senior Hurriyat leader and its former Chairman Prof Abdul
Gani Bhatt did take the initiative. Had it not been sabotaged, it would
have perhaps worked towards opening up more doors and opportunities.
A keen observer of Kashmir would not fail to notice expressions
among the youth of frustration and, at times, of disaffection towards
resistance leadership and attempts at critique of the glaring weaknesses
of the movement. Such frustration does play critical role internally in
the benefit of their cause. In relation to Delhi it does not, for general
disaffection towards Delhi is the glue that binds them together in spite
of internal differences. Had the disaffection towards Delhi been of the
level of post-summer- 2010 when politicized youth would assert that
they do not hate India, they have complaint against it, the internally
growing disaffection towards their leadership could have worked
favorably for Delhi. Betrayal of the trust they reposed repeatedly in
interlocutors; mass uprising in 2016-17; indiscriminately lethal use of
so-called non-lethal pellet gun; blinding of innocent young ones, and
what followed, poisoned the minds of ordinary youth. Now they say
“we hate India.” How and who engineered the violent uprising is beside
the point. What matters is: the mood changed radically adverse.
Challenge of popular mood and that of the armed militancy are
dissimilar. Armed militancy may have, as it has, since 2002 onwards
reduced considerably and is confined to some pockets only; but, anti-
India mood has grown from limited pockets to larger population
including school going children. It is easy to shoot down a gun-wielding
militant – which the security forces are doing fairly efficiently, but you
cannot shoot down widely spreading and deepening public sentiment.
What has grown has far more serious consequences than what has
declined. Unlike armed militancy which carries with it long standing
structure, training, organization and international network, public mood
is largely autonomous, fed on sudden matters that swing sentiments:
sense of right and wrong; just and unjust; and, propaganda.
44 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Since the ideas of right and wrong, just and unjust on universally
held humanitarian principles are commonly respected; and, as none of
the parties can claim to be above the count of morality and righteousness,
give-and-take has its rationale and legitimacy. Both the parties know
what is un-bargainable and what is not. No sane party in a long drawn
conflict starts with the un-bargainable. Thus, even one party is sincere
if not the other; the seemingly frozen layers over relationship can be
melted. Resistance leaders know it too well, and so do all reasonable
people, that armed militancy coupled with international terror groups
on the one hand; and, on the other Islamist agenda of some, make
deadening space for ISIS-like mindset that has changed the very
paradigm of security, legitimizing the use of force by the state.
Rationale of Dialogue
As excess is inherent to the use of force; communion and empathy are
inherent to dialogue. Dialogue presupposes a level of trust. Interactions,
talks, as frequent and as open as possible build familiarity, help clear
negative stereotypes, build a relationship of listening, recognizing the
‘truth’ of the other, developing respect for the other’s views and bearing
with uncomfortable questions, recognizing where one has faulted the
other, accepting the wrongs of oneself, and right of the other….. And,
slowly trust develops, talks transform into dialogue. However, there is
one catch here: while the Govt. representative may have less freedom
than the people to open up, he has more power to execute within the
limitations of the mandate. It is thus upon the people of Kashmir to use
Shri Sharma’s powers to the maximum in order to realise the meaning
of PM‘s declaration on the Independence Day, 15 August 2017:
“Kashmir issue cannot be solved by bullets or abuses, but by embracing
every Kashmiri.” The spirit and message of this statement equals the
spirit and message of the then PM Bajpayi’s statement in Kashmir:
“Kashmir is not a constitutional issue, it is a humanitarian issue” PM
Mody’s statement establishes policy continuity with Bajpayi’s statesman
– like statement that won every Kashmiri’s heart. Home Minister’s
several statements encourages every stakeholder, whoever is positively
concerned with Kashmir situation. He has gone one step ahead this
time by appointing an official with open mandate. This again is in
continuity with his earlier statements and efforts. Though the damage
done by the indiscriminate use of the pellets is more than ever
recognized, a sincere initiative cannot go unrecognized. The present
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 45
initiative being signal of his commitment and resolve binds him morally.
This is significant, for political binding is conditional to power play
and its changing equations which implicates other parties too, while
moral biding implicates the self, including one’s politics.
Commitment and sincerity will be on the test, for Kashmir’s past
experience with interlocutors and their reports destroyed the very ground
for trust and confidence in the motives of Indian state. All the three
reports: K. C. Pant, N.N. Vohra and latest by Dilip Padgaonkar and
team were unceremoniously shelved. The very word ‘interlocutor’ lost
its meaning, became a symbol of betrayal for Kashmiris. Henceforth,
promise for dialogue and talks symbolized for them Indian state’s
dishonesty, deception and hypocrisy, for words were not followed up
by right action. When talks are initiated, – and this is what Kashmiri
stake holders need to recognize – the very dynamics of sitting together
for talks, and of dialoging, is such that even a complete disagreement
does not close doors on future communication. Parties in dialogue at
least share a sense of having tried, done a duty, and accomplished a
responsibility. It would not destroy a sense of having followed up on a
promise. And, even this much that they have not betrayed declared
purpose is enough to keeps trust alive. To fail is one thing – it is a part
of a process; one gets up and tries again. But to deceive is to rob one
of his trust and confidence. Kashmir’s loss of trust drives their youth
towards radicalization and armed militancy; makes them easy prey to
the religious extremism and terrorism. It works as emotional,
psychological refuge and reaffirmation of faith.
Statecraft and politics swing between two extremes: in a stable
society it remains restrained out of honor of self-aware public opinion;
or, in an unstable, ever changing society it remains fearful of ever
changing public opinion, or it turns its back on it. Accordingly,
governance may symbolize awakened human sensitivity – a characteristic
of an ideal democracy we know as ‘Ram Rajya;’ or, its human sensitivity
remains depressed, confused, perplexed and in conflict with itself – a
characteristic of modern democracy in which power depends on
manipulation of public opinion and mood; or, it is totally crushed, run
over – which is the trait of dictatorial rule. A politician’s challenge is to
resolve the innate conflict of modern governance between two
obligations: an obligation to the systemic unyielding cold hardness of
the state on the one hand; and, on the other the democratic-value based
obligation to humane sensitivity towards legitimate popular aspirations
and sentiments. Balance between the two in favour of making state
46 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
receptive to legitimate popular sentiments is ruler’s challenge. Kashmir
poses this challenge. In 2010 a senior professor at Kashmir University
told this writer: “We have seen only the hard and harsh face of the
Indian state.”
Success of a political leader lies in that he/she does not allow
state’s mechanical hardness to disfigure his/her humane image. This is
the distinction between them and the non-state stake holders. Hence,
arguments in justification of such hardness that over-runs the obligation
to the fundamental values of democracy are in a final analysis counter-
productive; for, the state is dealing not with an enemy nation, but with
its own people. PM’s independence day declaration: “..not by bullet
but by embracing …”; and, Home Minister declaring his doors open
for everyone, are in the nature of invocation of that depressed, perplexed
sensitivity, for which Kashmir has been thirsting. Kashmiri stake holders,
the Hurriyat leadership would do service to their own people by
cooperating. Perpetual cynicism is a sign of defeat.
2
Disinheritance, Loss of Identity and Aggression, Violence and
Radicalization
People in conflict with the State and within themselves may find
redresses for human right violations, social-political violence and
repression, economic and political grievances and disputes etc. through
mundane, repetitious, tiresome politics of struggle; but, redress of the
basic cause of aggression, religious-political radicalization, fanaticism,
extremism and violence cannot be had unless they are brought
face-to-face with society’s inner cultural-social-intellectual-spiritual
resources by identifying them and then removing the blockages that
have caused the discontinuity in the transfer to the present generation
of their inheritance of the treasure of plural culture which is the authentic
form of social-religious life of Muslim, Hindus and Buddhist in Jammu
& Kashmir. Radicalization on fundamental issues, issues central to life
does not and cannot have an answer in economism. What has taken
roots in the mind must be tackled at the level of the mind. Factors that
can assist, cannot take place of the factors that cause a phenomena.
The political discourse, which dominates the discourse on peace in
a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, pluralistic society-in-conflict, can neither
be the measure of its reality, nor can it be representative of the inner
voice of the people. Vote-bank politics keeps the inner voice of society,
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 47
its culture moorings on the extreme margins. Cultural democracy
weakens. This could be corrected, a dialogue that can mitigate mutual
mistrust – generated by circumstances created of a time – loss of
confidence in the ‘other,’ which, fed by vested political and communal
interests breeds antipathy, aggression and violence. This is easily
exploitable by extremism. If people’s narratives are recorded they will
show that the plural religious-social consciousness is their living reality
in their aspirations, it has not receded into the unconscious. And, that
is their best inner resource for recovery.
Two Forces and the Making of a Violent, Aggressive Situation
One, the forces, mostly overt, that seek sense of self-assertion, power
and identity in religious extremism and in communalism; the other,
covert, which, seeing religion based politics breeding fundamentalism
and its extreme dreadful forms and communalism and social divide,
find it unacceptable. They are in search of their Kashmiri Identity and
dignity. Religion being central to their life, an authentic Kashmiri Islam
is their ideal religious–social anchorage, and intellectual-spiritual soul’s
dwelling. But this is disrupted due to two factors: One, the change in
the religious-communal demography of Kashmir due to mass exodus of
the community of Kashmiri Pandits in 1990 at the height of insurgency
and its Islamic ends that left Kashmir society mono-religion, mono-
community society. Second, related with the first is disconnect of the
post-1990 generation, the present generation, of the youth from the
tradition of plural social culture, their disinheritance from their cultural
treasure. They have grown up amidst reigning environment of fear,
terror, violence, atrocities and death. These disoriented, traumatized
mass of youth provide recruits to the path of violent militancy.
Religious radicalization has relevance to the question of identity. It
has two aspects: one, orientation towards false, corrupted religiosity of
politics of religion, fundamentalism and extremism as affirmation of
religiosity. Here the identity is entirely a creation of casual incidents;
and two, orientation towards pure religiosity and tradition as source of
identity. An average Muslim youth comparatively more bound by
religion, is also comparatively more conscious of religious morality
and ethics and open to Islam’s uncommon Kashmiri form; and, similarly,
a Hindu, also Buddhists, too are more open and in tune with Kashmir’s
syncretism.
48 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Thus, to find one’s identity in Kashmiri form of social-religious
life, its famed tradition inherited by their ancestors almost up until their
grandparents and parents, is for a Kashmiri youth – Muslim, Hindu and
Buddhists – a matter of dignified self-affirmation as worthy sons and
daughters of the land of Kashmir. It is an altar at which the question of
disinheritance and loss of identity can be resolved, and so of aggression,
fundamentalism and violent militancy, if discourse could be reformed.
A Unique Inner Strength
Violence is often legitimized for the cause of religion. Fear thus keeps
many aspirations suppressed. Similarly anti-insurgency and special
power to armed forces curtails normal democratic freedom. Those youth
in the Valley away from militancy feel suffocated. Space for non-violence
can only give their voice and aspirations articulation. Radicalization
among the youth has entered a new phase post-2008 and 2010, and
finally 2016-17. The unresolved issue of the return of Pandits to their
homes in the Valley and religious radicalization of the youth keep the
fire on. However, there is another side to Kashmir, – of its very rich
social-religious and intellectual-spiritual resources, another realm of
inner turmoil of far-reaching, deeper consequences.
Kashmir has been a unique experiment in human history, at least in
the history of this region, of a successful synthesis between Islam,
Hinduism and Buddhism. That syncretism gives Kashmiri a unique
strength and identity that has transcended religious-communal otherness
and evolved into a social-religious and intellectual-spiritual culture so
unparallel. Its worldly, societal form is symbiotic merger into a one
Kashmiri identity, while being in one’s own religion.
Youths’ vision is circumcised by their post-1990 experience of
militancy and suffering, while the older generations place them in a
larger cycle of history, the history and tradition they have inherited, but
the post-1990 generation has not. In a society with cultural and spiritual
depth, the life of its people and related phenomena manifest in multiple
forms of expressions, experiences and interpretations. This complexity
is both the cause of its despair and anchor of its hope. The disconnect
of the post-1990 generation from the tradition of a plural socio-religious
culture is a cause of its despair; while the elder generation’s nostalgia
of the past that they have lived is a justification for hope, for it can
become the anchor if cause of interruption in transference of the
inheritance is removed. Past is not passé yet.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 49
Recovery of Integrity or Surrender to the Aggressive Violent
Force
The eternal truth of Kashmir, its people, has been subjected to
modification according to partisan political needs of specific historical
juncture; hopefully, only as an interruption. It is thus not in continuity
with Kashmir’s destiny in eternity, the eternal journey of its people.
This present historical juncture does not have in it the presence of its
past as an aspect of the wholeness of the identity of its people. If the
present generation gets bound to the fate of their age, “the created
circumstances” as Thomas Aquinas puts it, “they lose” what A. K.
Saran explains as “the fundamental freedom”; – the freedom of their
Kashmiri essence, and that leaves the entire space only for the communal
politics, religious fundamentalism, extremist forces of aggressive
violence and destruction.
References
Rajiv Vora: “The Disinherited Generation of Kashmir…” an Essay, and
Other reports on Gandhian Initiative in J & K published by Swaraj Peeth
Trust 2016.
M. K. Gandhi: Hind Swaraj, Navjeevan Pub. Ahmedabad, 1921.
A. K. Saran: Traditional Thought; Central Inst. Of Higher Tibetan Studies,
Sarnath, Varanasi, 2007.
A. K. Saran: Traditional Vision of Man; Above, 1998.
Arnold Toynbee: An Historian’s Approach to History; OUP, 1956.
Simon Weis: On Science, Necessity and Love of God; OUP, 1968.
Ernest Gellner: Thought and Change; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.
A.K. Coomaraswamy: Time and Eternity, Artibus Asian Publishers, 1947.
Ashis Nandy: Time Tracks; Permanent Black, 2007
Ashis Nandy: Regimes of Narcissism, Regimes of Despair; OUP 2013.
Erich Heller: The Disinherited Mind; Bowes & Bowes, London, 1975.
Hannah Arendt: Between Past and the Future.
A.K. Coomaraswamy: Myths of the Hindus and Buddhists, George
Harper& Co, London, 1913.
Syed Hussein Nasr: Science and Civilization in Islam.
Jacques Ellul: The Technological Society, Random house Vintage Books,
New York, 1967.
Jacques Ellul: Propaganda, The Formation of Men’s Attitude, 1973.
Samdhong Rinpoche: Uncompromising Truth for a Compromised World;
World Wisdom Press, 2006.
50 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Daya Krishna: Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia, Sage Publication,
2012.
Thomas Paine: Rights of Man.
Balraj Puri: Kashmir Towards Insurgency, Orient Longman, 1993.
Ajit Bhattacharya: Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Tragic Hero of Kashmir;
Roli books, Delhi, 2008.
Farukh Abdullah: “Atish e Chinar” Sheikh Abdullah’s biography.
David Devadas: In Search of a Future: The Story of Kashmir; Penguin
Viking, 2007.
IIC Quarterly Special Issue: A tangled Web: Jammu& Kashmir, New
Delhi Spring 20011.
Dilip Padgaonkar and Others: J&K Interlocutors’ Report, Min. of Home,
G o I. 1912.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 51
Youth Radicalization in Kashmir
The contemporary roots of Kashmir conflict can be traced down to the
partition of Indian subcontinent. The partition was responsible for the
division of State of Jammu & Kashmir. Since 1947, the international
dimension of Kashmir conflict has encouraged the movement for the
implementation of right to self determination to be the most vocal one.
The movement has passed through various phases during the past seven
decades. The current phase that initiated after the 2010 mass agitation
certainly needs to be witnessed in the context of the year 2008 Amarnath
Land Row agitation and 2009 Shopian double murder and rape case of
Asiya and Neelofar. The post 2010 years is what I term as the Post
militancy phase. Post militancy does not in any way signify that the
phase of armed insurgency is over but it translates to the fact that the
contours of insurgency have changed. This militancy is mostly
indigenous, ideologically thick, pan-Islamist in its outlook and lethal in
its execution.
Why only post 2010 did insurgency become more lethal, radicalized,
ideologically too strong and universal in its agenda? The reason being
that during 2008-2010, the non-violent intifada in Kashmir was met
with an iron fist policy of the Indian state. The response of the state
was quite similar as to that of combating insurgency. It sent a wrong
message across different sections of youth that the state does not
understand the language of non-violence. Also the spread of internet to
almost every nook and cranny of the valley made it possible for the
army and state atrocities to be given a wider dissemination, thus
reinforcing the ideology of secessionism. Further the tech savvy young
insurgents utilized the internet to its maximum potential particularly
* Mushtaq Ul Haq Ahmad Sikander is Writer-Activist based in Srinagar, Kashmir
and can be reached at [email protected]
52 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
the social media to reach out to the youth and it became a potential
theatre for recruitment of new insurgents.
The socio-political movements like the Arab Spring that has now
retrograded to Arab Winter and the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) had a considerable influence over youth. Add to it the rise
of Hindutva in India, with the news of daily harassment, lynching,
communal riots once again gave a new lease of life to the two nation
theory debate in Kashmir, that upheld the belief that the future of
Muslim valley is not safe with India. To add insult to injury, the
electronic media and prime time debates added more fuel to the fire by
humiliating the Kashmiri panelists and branding them as agents of
Pakistan. Everytime they are made to prove their identity, the perception
is strengthened that Kashmiris are second class citizens or new dalits
of India.
Given this context and background, a new debate has been generated
among the media circles, policy makers, political analysts and security
experts about the radicalization of Kashmiri youth. The term
radicalization is debatable, subjective and relative. Who goes on to
define the term radical and to whom can we term as a radicalized
youth? A youth who sports a beard, wears a skull cap, dressed up in a
long loose tunic with a keffiyeh around his neck? This is the stereotypical
image constructed by media of a radicalized Muslim youth. This image
is quite synonymous with everything vice including terrorism and being
misogynist. For a lady if she is adorned with whole body cloak, how
does it translate that she is oppressed and needs to be liberated?
At the heart of this debate is the modernization of madrasas and
Sufi versus Salafi or Wahabi debate. All the security and political experts
fail at this juncture as they buy the dominant media discourse that
states that madrasas and wahabis are promoting radicalization among
the youth of Kashmir. As far as the madrasas in valley or even of India
are concerned, they are/were never a part of Muslim radicalization,
though they are vocal about the issues of Muslims identity that includes
Triple Talaq, Babri Masjid row and uniform civil code. Madrasas in
India do reinforce radicalization but it is of different sort and type and
very few madrasas are exception to this rule. Each madrasa upholds
and propagates an interpretation of Islam and each interpretation is
antagonist and exclusive of the other. The interpretation is based on the
school of thought a madrasa adheres to. It is for this reason that they
declare each other as ‘deviated’ and in extreme cases label each other
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 53
as Kaafir or Mushriq too against whom a social boycott should be the
way of life.
Thus, instead of being a threat to the state or non muslims, they
are a threat to the Muslim community itself as they are dividing the
community internally. So, the alarm in the different institutions of the
state is a false one. Further, if we go for a background check of the
insurgents we will find that rarely there is an insurgent who has a
madrasa background. Madrasa alumina are not fuelled by a religious
zeal to declare Jihad and Qitaal against their opponents. Most of the
radicalized youth belong to the mainstream or secular educational
institutions who either drop out or after completion of their studies
venture out for a tryst with insurgency. So, the debate about the
modernization of madrasas and having a strict vigil over their activities
will just be a waste of time and resources. Any such action will be
counterproductive and certainly will alienate the Muslim masses as
they will brand it with Islam phobia and intervention in their religious
affairs.
Coming to the second debate of Sufi Islam versus Wahabi Islam. It
again is a stereotypical debate invented, generated and given currency
by half baked media men and analysts who have very little information
about Islam and its relationship with radicalization. To add to the
confusion a new term Kashmiriyat has been invented too. This term
was never used by any literary, cultural and religious stalwarts or icons
of Kashmir’s syncretic, plural and tolerant culture including Lal Ded or
Lalleshwari, Nund Reshi, Arnimal or Wahab Khaar. The best term to
describe the syncretic culture of Kashmir is Rishism that developed as
a result of influence of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam over the Kashmiri
society. This is the culture that has retrograded and is endangered not
some hoax Kashmiriyat, an obscure term till media gave it currency.
Rishism is under constant threat at the hands of narrow versions of
both Hindu and Muslim nationalism. Joint efforts need to be made to
stop the erosion of Rishi culture further.
The Sufi/Wahabi debate is quite new to the valley, as our culture
was Rishi one. Also to brand a certain version of Islam as Sufi (read
Barelvi) and others as Wahabi (read Deobandis and Salafis) is flawed
one. Further to make Sufi synonymous with Peace and Wahabi similar
to War is to commit grave injustice. This dichotomy is the creation of
post 9/11 U.S. media and think tanks who without bothering about the
genealogy of these terms used them indiscriminately. Sufis in different
54 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
parts of the world including India have been active in fighting aggression
against oppressors and colonizers. Imam Shamil was a Naqashbandi
Sufi who fought against Czar of Russia, Omar Mukhtar better known
as the Lion of Desert was a Sufi belonging to the Silsila (chain) of
Sanusi Sufis, Syed Ahmad Shaheed and Shah Ismail Shaheed who were
among the first to fight the Britishers in India were Sufis too. The
British used the term Wahabi for their resistance movements, whereas
factually they were Sufis. In Kashmir too, Sarjan Barkati who is known
as Pied Piper or Azadi Chacha and moved the crowds through his
innovative slogans during 2016 mass agitation is a Sufi (read Barelvi).
So this discourse again is very problematic and does not help in
understanding the radicalization of youth in Kashmir.
Also the increase in number of mosques of Wahabis has not helped
in any way in radicalizing youth, so that they will become a threat
against the state. Infact youth and few sections of insurgents term the
mullahs, imams and preachers as timid and impotent because they do
not talk about Kashmir issue or condemn the human rights violations at
the hands of security forces. Rather than the local grown influence of
wahabis or for the fact Barelvis or others in no way should be
constructed as the reason for the growth of radicalization among
Kashmiri youth. More than that, the influence of preachers of other
places, distant lands and events taking place in various countries have
a direct influence over Kashmir as internet and electronic media has
rendered it possible. So internet and electronic media are one of the
potent sources that are responsible for making youth quite sensitive
and politically conscious if not radicalized. Add to it the fact that
Muslims all over the world experience to be under siege, so it helps
them inculcate and articulate rabid political discourses, extreme and
exclusivist worldviews.
The paradigm of unemployment, progress and engaging the muslim
youth of Kashmir in productive sports and creative activities will be
met with a limited success because these issues do not demotivate
youth from becoming radicalized and indulging in violent subversive
activities. This radicalization has deeper roots, mostly native and few
transnational. The native roots are nurtured as they witness the daily
humiliation, torture, disrespect and worthlessness of a Kashmiri at the
hands of security forces. These security forces behave differently in
other parts of India while controlling mobs, but for Kashmir brutality
and naked violence is the order of the day. For every move without
distinction whether it is violent or non-violent activity, the response of
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 55
the state is a violent one. Pellets and their havoc is just reserved for
Kashmir and not for anybody else in the rest of India. Pellets have
made their victims particularly those rendered blind as the living
testimony of India’s brutality that will continue to fuel radicalization in
the coming decades.
Add to it the institutional apathy, nepotism, corruption and mistrust
of everything Indian. Also the state does not tolerate even the slightest
dissent. The student unions in colleges and universities are banned,
youth groups are nonexistent and youth are being booked and implicated
in false cases even if they circulate anything that state considers
‘seditious’ over the social media.
The J&K Police has become notorious for pushing the youth to the
wall, through harassment and implicating them in false cases or booking
them under draconian laws like Public Safety Act (PSA) in connivance
with bureaucracy. These high handed tactics have rendered many youths
with no option but to seek refuge in the shadow of the gun, as they feel
frustrated once they are on the wrong side of the state. The security
forces want that violence should continue as huge economic interests
are associated with it. The flow of money in the name of counter
insurgency is massively huge. This perpetual harassment has resulted
in radicalization of youth.
The transnational roots of radicalization are the reaction of growing
populism and rise of right wing in many countries including India. Also
the armed movements and groups fighting dictators, oppressive
governments and U.S. occupation in Muslim lands has also radicalized
a section of Muslim youth in Kashmir. The romantic ideal for creation
of an Islamic state is also inspiring a section of youth and insurgents to
be radicalized to the extent where they are calling for the assassination
and annihilation of all those who believe in anything except their version
of Islam. Zakir Musa and his men represent this trend among the
radicalized sections of Kashmiri insurgents. It is pan-Islamic in its
outlook but mostly it is located in local context because secular or
religious leadership could not mitigate the sufferings of a common man
and failed to put the requisite pressure on the state to resolve the crisis.
So, they are now offering a new outlook to reorient and reshape the
insurgency, though there is resentment against them among the general
masses and resistance camp particularly but for many this approach is
essential to breakdown the stalemate. The use of ISIS flag and then
their disapproval should be witnessed in this context because Kashmiri
society does not approve massive violence like that of ISIS.
56 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Thus, radicalization is a reality, but it is connected with excessive
militarization, brutality, black draconian laws, absence of freedom of
speech and dissent. If these obstacles and roadblocks are removed, the
issue of radicalization will be a relic of the past. Very little scale of
radicalization has been generated even by the influence of pan-Islamist
or Jihadi movements on Kashmiri youth. The debate about radicalization
needs to be looked afresh and the yellow glasses of wahabi and madrasas
broken down, only then can a pragmatic strategy for countering the
same evolve.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 57
Jammu Down with Complex of LeastPriority Area and People
On October 23, 2016, when Union Home Minister, Rajnath Singh
announced the appointment of former Director of Intelligence Bureau,
Dineshwar Sharma as the special representative on J&K to meet and
talk to all the stake holders in the state, there was lot of skepticism
instead of hope and promise. Kashmir Valley was keen to know the
mandate of the new man who, in the next few months, was to talk to the
“stakeholders” in the state. The past experience of the leaders in Kashmir
had made them more skeptical because their experience of the past
such exercises by the Centre was sheer disappointment. Their
disappointment had deepened because the Centre had not only failed to
address the political issues but faltered on its economic promises despite
recommendations by the experts and the working groups constituted by
the UPA government in May 2006. Barring the ruling People’s Democratic
Party that runs the government in the state in alliance with the BJP, other
Kashmir-centric parties in the Valley were not enthused at all.
Most of the times, Jammu – a different world of its own – views
things through diametrically opposite prism than that of Kashmir Valley–
because of the historical, geographical and demographic valley reasons.
But this time Jammu too had not much hope because its arch of
disappointment and disillusionment had spread from Srinagar – that
represents the Kashmir-centric rulers for the people of Jammu region to
Delhi that they once trusted as their sincere caretaker. Currently, the people
of Jammu are more disillusioned with Delhi and hence any move by
Delhi is seen as addressing the grievances of the people of Kashmir
Valley, where they think the Government of India has become a party to
* Binoo Joshi is Editor of J&K Today website. She has worked with BBC, IANS
and Associated Press for more than 20 years.
58 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
the appeasement of Kashmiris. They believe that the BJP regime at the
Centre is no different from the previous Congress governments.
Jammu had its own reasons to doubt whether the fresh exercise
initiated by the Government of India would be of any use to the region,
which is divided on religious and sub regional lines. Jammu had
engendered a grouse against Kashmir Valley and the rulers coming from
there, because it believes that the Valley was trying to subjugate their
ethnicity, culture and languages. Their greater grievance is that Jammu is
being systematically denied its share in the power politics and decision
making. Despite having a larger area than the Valley and almost equal
population, the region’s share in the seats in the Assembly stays lower
than that of the Valley. Jammu has 37 seats as compared to 46 of the
Kashmir Valley. Four seats are represented by the two districts of Kargil
and Leh of Ladakh region. They have been calling for the delimitation of
the constituencies, but the Kashmir-centric parties have overruled that
plea time and again. It is cited that since there is a moratorium on the
delimitation at the national level till 2026, therefore, Jammu and Kashmir
cannot undertake this exercise. Jammu and Kashmir is a special status
state under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the national laws
are not applicable to it, unless endorsed by the state legislature. The
Centre too failed to push the state government to listen to and act on the
plea of Jammu, though the national parties like Congress and BJP, the
latter in particular, have been paying a lip service for the equal share for
Jammu in all matters.
With such denials of their rights, the people in Jammu region have
come to the conclusion that their nationalism and patriotism are being
taken for granted by Delhi. They also believe that Delhi goes out of its
way to please Kashmir, hence it is also an exploiter and perpetuator of
injustice to the region. This perception is now shared by almost
everyone. One of the pitfalls of this is that the Jammu Muslim population,
particularly from the erstwhile Doda district, now fondly called “Chenab
Valley” – for the Chenab river flows through all the three districts of the
hilly region of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban – lying adjacent to the
south of the Kashmir Valley, has started looking for deliverance to
Kashmiri political groups. As Muslims are in majority and there are
relations between Kashmiri Muslins and the community members in the
hilly region of Jammu, the bonds are stronger. In 1990s, this region was
notorious for the massacres of Hindus and lot of attacks on the security
forces. Now the level of violence has come down to zero level, but
the voices of secessionism are becoming quite vociferous. This is where
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 59
this region is getting distanced from the plains of Jammu, where Hindus
were once in a clear majority. The sentiment of isolationism and distinct
identity that Chenab Valley people have also infected the twin border
districts Rajouri and Poonch of Jammu Region.
Rajouri and Poonch run parallel to the Valley on one side and the
Line of Control – that divides Jammu and Kashmir – on the other. This
has widened the influence of Kashmiri Muslim psychology, which is
invariably identified with that of secessionism, or at least sympathetic to
the secessionist sentiment that has driven the violent troubles across
the Valley for the past 28 years now.
Jammu drew the conclusion that Sharma’s appointment was primarily
to address the issue of Kashmir, where separatist leaders Syed Ali Shah
Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Farooq Abdullah, Omar Abdullah,
Mehbooba Mufti and others would matter more than any of the Jammu
leaders. The Kashmir-centric National Conference’s Jammu leaders too
toe the Kashmir line. They boycotted meeting with the special
Representative because the National Conference Kashmir leadership told
them to do so.
A widespread perception, rather belief, in Kashmir is that Jammu
has no problem. It’s only Kashmir that is having its issues with Delhi.
That is the thinking in Kashmir. Delhi is cornered on two different counts
– the mainstream parties National Conference and PDP believe that Delhi
has eroded special status of the state, which they believe, should be
restored. That is their issue with Delhi, while the separatists see Delhi as
a problem for not agreeing to “Kashmir being a dispute.” Delhi is also
charged with complicating matters by not talking to Pakistan on Kashmir.
Now this sentiment has gained further credence as the level of violence
in the State is going up. For Kashmiri leaders, Jammu makes unnecessary
noises about the discrimination against it and its people. For them, the
real problem lies in Kashmir where the people have launched a “resistance
movement” against the “Indian occupation” and “sacrificed hundreds of
thousands of lives.” They have tried to give situation in Kashmir a splendid
expression to make it look and sound attractive to the international
audience. Jammu’s Hindus are having no such pretensions nor they intend
to embarrass Delhi by siding or endorsing with Kashmiri sentiment, which
is isolationist and thrives on exclusiveness. Of late Kashmiri leaders have
started incorporating the erstwhile Doda and Rajouri ad Poonch districts
in their scheme of things – seeing them as part of their struggle against
the Indian rule. Increasingly, Jammu Muslims are also thinking on the
similar lines. Religious affinity and geographical proximity have
60 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
overridden the ethnic and linguistic identities. It is this religious affinity
that has facilitated the settlement of the Rohingiya Muslims in Jammu,
defying all the logic that why should have they been travelling such a
long distance from Myanmar or erstwhile Burma – the country of their
origin – where, of course, they are allegedly suffering persecution, to
settle in Jammu which is Hindu majority. There is a definite design. It
became clear and it was voiced with equal concern by Defence Minister
Nirmala Sitharaman, who in the wake of the February 10th and 11th terrorist
assault on Sunjwan, a military station, located in the suburbs of Jammu,
observed that “there was a local support that facilitated the terror attack.”
Whenever Jammu‘s Hindus raise these concerns, they are dubbed as
communalists. The blame is laid at the doors of RSS which is accused of
seeking to evict the Rohingiyas because they are Muslims. These are the
new fissures within the population and the political narrative. It became
more than clear when on February 10, Kashmir-centric National
Conference members protested against remarks of the Speaker in the J&K
Legislative Assembly, that the terror attack at Sunjwan camp could have
been made possible with the local support of Rohingiyas and
Bangladeshis who are settled in the area. They protested so much that
the Speaker had to adjourn the House. This was given a communal
colour.
It is very difficult for Sharma to address the two regions on the
same scale. As he himself acknowledged to some of the people whom he
met in Jammu region, that it appeared that there were two worlds –
Kashmir Valley and Jammu Region. There is no ground for their
reconciliation, and the narrative in Jammu is mostly against Kashmir. It
is this particular reason that Jammu has not been able to make its own
narrative nor present its own case in an effective manner at any forum.
Jammu suffers from a complex. Its problem stems from the fact that
it swings from extreme ego to beseeching vis-à-vis Kashmir. Some of the
people in this region live in the past, when Dogras used to rule the state
and would deal with Kashmiris with utmost contempt. They think that
Kashmiris have not been able to shun their mindset of slavery. But this is
misplaced ego and has no connect with the current reality. It is getting
increasingly aware of the fact that its identity is getting dominated by the
Kashmiri identity. Kashmiris have used both hard and soft power to expand
their influence and that’s why Jammu region is unable to think itself in
independent silos notwithstanding the noises for the independent state or
separation of Jammu from the Valley. This thinking is deep rooted. But
there are no channels to air that. The channels that air these grievances,
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 61
primarily focus on their political interests. With Delhi giving them no
credence or acceptance, they ultimately fall in the lap of Kashmiri parties.
Jammu is facing a peculiar situation. It has become a land of
refugees that have come to the region from Pakistan occupied Jammu
and Kashmir, displaced people during the wars of 1965 and 1971, 1999
Kargil war, as also West Pakistan refugees. Then there are Kashmiri Pandit
migrants whose number runs over 300,000. All these are considered the
natural consequences of the wars and conflict that Jammu and Kashmir
has seen since 1947, but what is inexplicable is the settlement of
Rohingiyas and Bandladeshis in Jammu city and its surroundings.
This reflects two situations in which Jammu region feels that it has a
right to speak for whatever happens in the Valley, for it is having a
large chunk of population from PoJK and also from the Valley, who
cannot be denied their say when it comes to looking for Kashmir
solution or peace within the state, particularly the Valley. Second, is that
its resentment against the outsiders Rohingiyas and Bangladeshis
is rebuffed by the Kashmir-centric leaders who defend their stay in
Jammu because of their hardcore Muslim community feeling. What is
more bizarre for the people of Jammu is that while the Kashmiri Muslim
leadership is for extending all the help and facilities to the Bangladeshis
and Rohingiyas, it is opposed to giving any rights to the West Pakistan
refugees who came here as a result of Partition when the displaced
people from either side of the border were free to go and settle at any
place of their choice. This kind of conflict between Jammu Hindus and
Kashmiri leadership has made the situation in this region more volatile.
There are more issues in Jammu region, but the people here are frustrated
by the fact that no one listens to them. Dinewshwar Sharma has listened
to them, but these are some of the issues that need mutual confidence not
the persuasive power or knowledge of the Special Representative to undo
the wrongs of seven decades.
That is more dangerous than that of the Valley. The dangers here
have angle of communalism. That is not the case in the Valley
because Kashmir is almost exclusively Muslim after the forced exodus
of Kashmiri Pandits in 1990s. Sikhs are having negligible population.
Within Jammu, of course the clashes at ideological level are
increasing between Hindus and Muslims, and there is a danger of these
getting manifested in physical violence and riots. Ugly signs of such a
situation become visible from time to time. Now the Kashmiri Muslim
leadership, both mainstream and separatists, have started fuelling the
communal sentiment, and the Hindu leadership across the country are
62 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
also engendering the sentiment the other way round. The communal
clashes in Jammu are just waiting for a flash point.
For example, rape and murder of an eight-year old Gujjar girl Asifa
in Kathua district, that should have been treated as a serious crime and
the culprits should have been punished, has become a communal issue.
The Muslim leadership of the Valley and that of the hilly parts of Jammu
region have started accusing the local Hindu leaders of stalling the
probe and also harassing the Gujjar population. A heinous crime has
been given a communal colour.
When the criminal acts assume communal colour, the social
and community relationship suffer fracture which deepen because of the
mutual lack of trust almost over everything. Particularly disturbing is the
fact that the Gujjar population lives close to borders and have been
found involved in facilitating the infiltrators. Their loyalties have become
suspect in the eyes of Hindu population. There has been a marked dilution
in the original trust that Gujjars were nationalists and had chosen India
as their country. They were uninfluenced by the Sunni Muslim “jihad” and
anti-India activities. But now that is changing. It is an ominous sign. The
PDP ministers have started playing with the communal sentiments of
Gujjars and the matters have been made worse by the government that
has forbidden eviction of Gujjars from the encroached forest land. It is in
a way encouraging the encroachments and any anti-encroachment drive
against them is dubbed as communal.
This makes the task of the Special Representative difficult, for unless
there is one voice on any issue, he cannot address the issue or suggest
the remedial measures. The hostilities between communities have
complicated his task. And, it is not his job to fix the fractures between
the communities because that is something that has to come from the
communities themselves. There are problems common to both the
communities but their trust deficit prevents them from talking in the same
voice. There is no way that Dineshwar Sharma can bridge the trust deficit
between the communities. It becomes near impossible task, when the
deficit rests on sharing of the pathways and natural resources.
Since the political groups ruling the state – PDP is patronizing the
Muslim population and warning law enforcing agencies against taking
action against Gujjars settled in forest land, without taking cognizance
of the breach of law – and BJP opposing such moves, the chances of
dialogue inevitably get dim. Dineshwar Sharma‘s mandate, if any, is to
address the issues that can bring peace, but when the State government
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 63
itself is involved in creating and expanding fissures, he can do little.
There lies his biggest problem.
For the past few months, Jammu’s border areas have become a theatre
of virtual war, where Pakistani shells are raining like never before in the
otherwise “peace times.” There have been a record number of ceasefire
violations – that is a misnomer because ceasefire is violated once or
twice in a year or two, when exchange of fire becomes a daily routine,
the ceasefire gets replaced by undeclared war. To restore peace on borders
requires government to government dialogue. To end this crisis on the
borders, the dialogue between the Indian and Pakistani government
becomes a necessity. Of course, Pakistan, too, is faced with the similar
crisis on the borders on its side because Indian side is “retaliating” with
equal or rather more force to Pakistan’s unprovoked firing targeting
military and civilian targets, but there is no let up in the firing from
Pakistani side. This has resulted in hundreds of people fleeing their
homes and taking refuge in make shift camps. The civilian
population suffers casualties and death. Schools become out of bounds
for the children.
Terror Attacks
Ever since the appointment of Dineshwar Sharma as the Special
Representative, things for him have become difficult and complicated
owing to the series of the terror attacks that have taken place across the
State. The most startling among them were the “fidayeen” attacks in
Lethpora, Awantipora in Kashmir, and Sunjwan army military station
in Jammu. These attacks cause a setback to the ground covered by
Sharma in meeting the youth and other stake holders in peace in
Kashmir. There is nothing that he can do to reverse the impact of the
terror attacks and the narrative that they generate. Why dialogue and
what for, if the terror attacks are not going to end?
It is known beyond any doubt that Pakistan and Pakistan sponsored
terrorist groups are behind such attacks, therefore to address the issue
with Pakistan is not within the brief of the Special Representative. That
is his limitation, which has also undermined the original mandate that he
ascribed to himself – addressing the problems of the youth, particularly
their alienation and also to arrest their drift toward radicalization. The
radicalization and alienation are two different things, but in the context
of Kashmir, the two are intrinsically linked.
64 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
The germs of alienation have grown on several planks e.g., political,
economic and religious and societal. These need to be explained in detail.
A general impression, and to a large extent true also, is that the Indian
democracy has never been allowed to enter and function in Kashmir. The
rigged and manipulated elections over the decades have given birth to
such views wherein it is taken as given that the Centre can manage and
manipulate elections. It decides who rules the state. There are
various examples. The opposition votes were not allowed to be cast or
they would be counted in such a manner that the ruling party candidates
would win somehow. The alleged 1987 rigged elections are the most
cited example. It is widely believed that the Congress of Rajiv Gandhi at
the Centre and the National Conference of Farooq Abdullah connived
to deny the victory to some of the Muslim United Front (MUF),
candidates. That is thought to be at the root of the political disillusionment.
Mohammad Yusuf, now better known by his nom de guerre Syed Salaha-
ud-Din, was one of the candidates whose victory in Assembly elections
from Amira Kadal constituency in Srinagar was converted into a defeat.
This kind of cheating was unbearable for the youth of the times, who had
taken part in the elections or voted on the slogan of “Yahan Kaya Chalega,
Nizam-e-Mustafa” (It will be Islamic rule here). The fears of Pakistan
getting a majority voice in the Assembly through MUF, a combination
of many Muslim groups, including Jamat-i-Islami that time led by Syed
Ali Shah Geelani were exaggerated. This was the biggest turning point
of the political disillusionment or alienation that till date has not
been bridged completely, despite relatively clean elections since them.
Economically, there are two prominent aspects that need to be taken
into account. One, there is lack of enterprise among the people of Kashmir.
They would prefer a casual labourer’s work in government rather than
setting up their own self-employment units or doing some private
job or tending the fields. Since the government jobs are limited, they
tend to get frustrated. This frustration deepens when they find that those
close to the politicians or those who bribe them get the jobs when more
qualified are left out. The latest round of troubles for the past 28 years has
shrunk the avenues in tourism and related activities. The drastic decline
in tourists footfall has also caused huge problems for them. They have
either taken to violence or support the forces of violence, while some of
them have shifted to Jammu and elsewhere where they offer competition
to locals, thus create economic and social difficulties in this region.
Religionwise, the Muslims in the Valley, and now increasingly in
Jammu, too, have developed a sense of community persecution. Despite
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 65
being in a majority in Jammu and Kashmir, the community views the
developments in the rest of the country – be it cow vigiliantism, few
cases of lynching and overall narrative in which the utterances of some
of the leaders are deemed as a systematic prosecution of the community.
That is what is causing more problems in Jammu where Hindu population
also has its own concerns.
Hindus’ concerns are focused on the linkage of the terror attacks
with the “local support” that emerged from the residential enclaves of
Rohingiya Muslims, who have been given all facilities by the politicians
who used them as vote bank. But the dangers were too obvious for the
army. This was clearly spelled out by Defence Minister Nirmala
Sitharaman on February 12, when she said that the terror attack was
possible because of the ”local support.”
In such a communally charged atmosphere where the communities
have developed mutual suspicion, the task of dialogue and repairing the
relations has become extraordinarily difficult. It is not for Dineshwar
Sharma to bring the communities together on a single platform because
even if he attempts do so, any fresh terror attack can derail that effort.
The terror attacks in J&K cannot be ruled out despite the heavy presence
of the army and other wings of the security forces. In fact, that makes the
terrorists’ task easy for they get plenty of targets. Now almost a two-
year-old phenomenon, stone throwing mobs interrupting the anti-militancy
operations by hurling stones at the vehicles and patrols of the army,
has created a situation where certain new conditions have appeared for
the continuation of dialogue. For example, Hindus in Jammu, are not
convinced that they are safe in their own land with drastic change in the
demography of the region and particularly the plains. The settlement of
the Rohongiyas combined with the ever-continuing flow of the population
from the Valley are becoming causes of serious concern for them. Now it
is being viewed with suspicion that not only the outsiders are settling in
Jammu but they have set up their business ventures and stake claims to
government and private jobs. This is becoming a communal issue as also
that of the economic competition and shrinking job opportunities for the
narratives. All this has been narrated to Dineshwar Sharma, but he has to
find a roadmap that is acceptable to all. But, at the moment, it seems,
that his plan of talks is not following a particular schedule. That is being
hobbled by the turn of events and the political narrative crisscrossing
between secessionism and clouds of war hovering over borders. In all
this, Jammu and its aspirations enjoy the least priority.
66 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Kashmir, What Next!
After decades of conflict, normalcy was returning in Kashmir Valley
but soon after the killing of Hizbul Mujahedeen Commander Burhan
Wani in July 2016, the situation in Kashmir further worsened. Many
people have been killed and numerous injured in the last two years.
The situation still doesn’t seem under control. The opposition parties
are accusing BJP-PDP coalition government for its failure to tackle the
ongoing crisis. However, the Chief Minister of the State, Mehbooba
Mufti on her part made statements often about the peaceful dialogue
with all state stakeholders of Kashmir, including Hurriyat and the
government of Pakistan. But its alliance partner BJP opposes such
proposal from CM.
The BJP, however, claims that their government is serious about
the peaceful dialogue in Kashmir and for that very purpose the Union
Home Minister Rajnath Singh has called several meetings with the
various stake holders of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and later the
union government has appointed former Intelligence Bureau Chief,
Dineshwar Sharma, who was tasked to talk to all stakeholders to find a
possible solution to the 30-year-old insurgency in the Jammu and
Kashmir. Sharma will also have three officers as point persons for
three regions of the State – the Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh –
to address the grievances of the local population.
After repeated turmoil’s in 2010, 2013 and 2016, people of Kashmir
seem to be losing faith in the process of dialogue, through interlocutors
by government of India. The turmoil in 2010 left nearly 120 people
dead. Members of the J&K Interlocutors Group, who had submitted a
report on the reasons behind that violence and ways to prevent its
* Sajjad Hussain Kargili is journalist based in Ladakh and presently Editor in-
Chief of Greater Ladakh.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 67
recurrence, insist that the present situation in the Valley would not have
arisen if the UPA government had not ignored their recommendations
and the NDA government had taken necessary action in time.
The interlocutors, Late Padgaonkar, Mr. Kumar and former
Information Commissioner M.M. Ansari in their report, urged the Centre
to reduce the army’s visibility, urgently address human rights violations,
review the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) which gives the
forces powers without corresponding accountability, and lift the
Disturbed Areas Act. They also said: “by and large the report was
ignored by the UPA. They had been assured that the report would be
tabled on the floor of the House and that there would be a debate on it
and all the parties would be allowed enough space to deliberate on the
recommendations, but that was not done. And the present government
has not done it either. Had they taken some serious notice of the
recommendations we had made, perhaps we would not have reached
the situation we have in Kashmir today.”
In Ladakh (Kargil & Leh) people are realizing a sense of alienation
and misuse of their patriotism by the union government. It has been
seen in the past that the peaceful people of Ladakh region are not even
considered at any level for dialogue. They are kept deprived in terms
of social and economic development. But whenever any issue comes
up in Kashmir, the union government reminds them that Ladakh is very
much loyal towards the nation. For the people of Ladakh, historically
and geographically the issue of Pakistan Administered Gilgit Baltistan
(PAGB) is actually important. The issue of PAGB has become one of
the central issues between India and Pakistan after the China Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) became operational. The region of PAGB
remained neglected for decades and has now become the cause for
controversy between India and Pakistan, after the latter indicated its
intention to declare the region as its fifth province. This development
ignores the fact that PAGB is essentially a part of the Kashmir dispute.
At the same time, the people of PAGB have been demanding
constitutional rights with full autonomy, which has been accorded to
Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. However, the Pakistani
Government is reluctant to agree, as there is pressure from India, which
claims this region.
Local leaders and stakeholders in Ladakh region have put forth
demands before the current tension boils over into a conflict. In addition
to an airport and the Zojila tunnel, there are demands for all-weather
road connectivity. As part of CPEC, around USD 46 billon will be
68 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
invested in Pakistan in general and specifically in Gilgit-Baltistan, where
several hydro-power projects are planned. If and when these projects
materialize, Gilgit-Baltistan will become like other parts of China.
It’s also needed to mention here that the Government of India has
recently approved Zojila tunnel which was widely welcomed by the
people and leaders of Ladakh. But unfortunately, the government has
again tried to focus that the tunnel is going to be constructed due to
ongoing problems with China rather than for the development of the
people of Ladakh region.
CPEC has already complicated relations between China and
Pakistan. In the past, their relationship was largely driven by the elite
with regard to military and political cooperation. However, this
relationship now faces greater scrutiny from the general Pakistani public.
The current discourse in Gilgit-Baltistan also suggests growing
dissatisfaction with CPEC despite its potential in terms of generating
local employment and revenue through electricity generation.
The political status of Gilgit-Baltistan remains disputed. In 1994
India had unanimously passed a resolution in Parliament declaring Gilgit
Balotistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir as an ‘integral part of
India.’ Unfortunately, mainstream politicians and media in India
remained ignorant of Gilgit-Baltistan. With the exception of security
and intelligence agencies, most people in India are unable to differentiate
between Baltistan and Balochistan. Earlier Gilgit-Baltistan were known
as Northern Areas, which was the term imposed on the region by
Pakistan government to dilute the unique regional and ethnic identity
of the region. In 2009, the then Pakistani government granted temporary
federal status to Gilgit-Baltistan. This was opposed by the Hurriyat
Conference, which argued that if Gilgit-Baltistan was given provincial
status, India would respond by abrogating Article 370 to absorb Jammu
and Kashmir.
Political activists and religious personalities in Gilgit Baltistan, who do
not comply with the dictates of the Pakistani Government or make
demands for basic rights, have been framed under anti-terrorism laws.
Several eminent nationalist leaders from Gilgit-Baltistan have been
detained over the years and popular newspapers like Bangesahar have
been banned by the Pakistani authorities.
Government of India continues to be in a state of denial with
regard to Gilgit-Baltistan. In 2012, a terrorist attack took place in
Chilas, Gilgit, during which they massacred Shias travelling from Gilgit-
Baltistan to Islamabad. Unfortunately, no one in India or even the pro-
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 69
freedom Hurriyat Conference uttered a single word of protest or outrage
over this terrorist act. The mainstream political leadership and
establishment in India lack a clear vision and policy for Gilgit-Baltistan.
They generally use the issue of Gilgit-Baltistan to counterweigh the
conflict over Kashmir. It’s about time that India developed a clear
policy for Gilgit-Baltistan.
In Ladakh the national leaders of Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) and
the BJP leaders of Leh district made promise for union territory status
and separation from Jammu and Kashmir. But the story is opposite in
Kargil, where leaders have previously rejected the demand of a Union
Territory. I do remember once, a journalist asked an eminent leader
and cleric from Kargil, late Sheikh Ahmed Mohammadi about
trifurcation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory
status for Ladakh, he replied: “We are against any kind of division of
the state on the basis of region, religion and language.” I also remember
that current MLA Kargil, Asgar Ali Karbalai also demanding the status
of Greater Ladakh and Ladakh Division status and rejected the Union
Territory status for the region. On June 2004, when I was invited for
youth initiative for peace conference in Pune, Qammar Ali Akhone, a
senior leader of National Conference – conveyed a message for greater
Ladakh and oppose any kind of division. The day I heard this statement
of the leaders of Kargil, I tried to understand about Union Territory
demand.
Actually, Union Territory is a sub-national administrative division
of India, in the federal framework of governance. Unlike the states of
India, which have their own elected governments, Union Territories are
ruled directly by the federal government or central government. There
are many UTs like Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra
and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep or Pondicherry in
India. But Jammu and Kashmir has their own identity and special status
in the India union. The current state has its own constitution and identity.
While on the other hand, nearly half of the area of the State is under
the administrative control of Pakistan, including Gilgit and Baltistan on
Ladakh side. On 22 February 1993, Government of India unanimously
passed a resolution in Indian parliament that these areas under Pakistan
control are the part of Jammu and Kashmir and India. It also mentioned
that India can take these areas anytime. But it’s unfortunate that India
has just passed this resolution and forgotten about it. Keeping all these
things in mind, if the Government of India will consider and accept the
demand of Union Territory by a small section of society of Leh district,
70 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
who are not even in majority, then a new crisis will begin in the region.
The leadership of Kargil district is demanding to preserve unity in
diversity. Though, they are demanding divisional status for Ladakh region
in the current scenario and when the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is
resolved, including the region of Gilgit, Baltistan with Ladakh, greater
Ladakh should be given to this area. The demand of Union Territory will
change the unique culture of Ladakh; it will go in the lap of corporate
mafia. Union Territory is a serious threat to the social, cultural values of
Ladakh. The identity and culture of Ladakh will disappear. While
demography of Ladakh would be changed, the governance powers would
officially be surrendered to New Delhi and we would have no right to
challenge any decision of New Delhi. Moreover, the people of Ladakh are
enjoying the benefits of hill council powers, ST status, article 370. All
these powers and special status of our territory will slowly vanish. Kargil
has cultural, historical, religious bonds with Kashmir. The bonds of thousand
year’s civilizations will be automatically wiped off. And it would be very
tough to start new bonds and build new relations. Kashmir can understand
the problems and crisis of the people of Kargil more than Delhi.
In 2016, the Department of National Security from Jammu University
organized a workshop titled Confidence Building Measures: Cross-border
Trade in Kargil and Leh districts of Ladakh region. After this workshop, a
report was submitted to Government of India, which highlighted various
issues and made recommendations. Some of the recommendations of this
report felt that there is a lack of strategic thinking among the elites and
public intellectuals on Ladakh. Ladakh itself seems inclined to play only a
limited role since it does not want to punch above its weight. Opportunities
must be created to cultivate strategic thinking about this region. Trade is
the new game in the region and New Delhi should view developments
through its geo-economic interests not just through a security prism. Some
recommendations were:
(1) Geopolitical changes and the current strategic environment
have created an opportunity for Ladakh to assert its identity
and its role in terms of leveraging India’s Central Asia Policy.
For Ladakh to play a meaningful role in the geopolitical
competition, it needs a dynamic and charismatic leadership to
reconnect its glorious past with the present.
(2) Opening up of the Nubra Road to Baltistan should be included
in the Sino-Indian bilateral border meetings; this would provide
easy access to India to reach Central Asia.
(3) There is a growing interest among a certain section of the
public and of security experts to visit Kargil, Drass, Batalik
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 71
and Tiger Hills. Security Tourism could be proposed or
introduced in collaboration with the Indian Army.
(4) An alternative route for the Kailash Mansaravor Yatra through
Demchok Road to Mount Kailash would be just 504km long
and can be done in 3 days.
(5) All India Radio stations should be set up along the LoC,
especially Batalik, Drass and adjacent sectors to broadcast
news and views from India regularly to the people in Gilgit-
Baltistan. The station could also air weather reports as well as
local pop and folk songs.
(6) A Research Hospital run by DRDO to deal with high altitude
medical issues especially trauma cases faced by the civilians
as well as military personnel should be set up in Kargil and
Leh with 200 beds.
(7) Leh attracts students to do research on Earth Sciences. A state
of-the-art laboratory on Rare Earth Elements also needs to be
built. This facility could later be managed or maintained by a
consortium of IITs or Universities specializing in these
disciplines.
(8) There is a need for all-weather connectivity via Zojila tunnel
or any other road route which the people of Kargil can use all
through the year.
(9) The Kargil airstrip is ready for use but is not functional. Until
the all-weather road connectivity materializes, connecting the
region by air could be the best alternative solution. A civilian
airport would also enhance tourism in Kargil. Confidence
Building Measures on Sub-Regional Trade & Connectivity.
Besides there are some other issues also which people of Ladakh
would like to be addressed. There are more than 18,000 divided families
in Ladakh and the members of these families’ desire to visit their
relatives across the border. To visit Gilgit and Baltistan, they have to
go through the Wagah border which is a cumbersome affair for poor
families. The government should consider facilitating a meeting point
at the Kargil-Skardu road where divided families can meet and people-
to-people contact enhanced. In this age of connectivity, the people of
Kargil are unable to connect with their relative’s across the LOC as
mobile service providers in Kargil do not allow outgoing calls to the
Gilgit-Baltistan region. The people from across the LoC, however, can
make calls to their relatives in Kargil in addition to internet chats and
voice calls between the people on both sides. India should consider
permitting mobile service providers to allow connectivity to the other
side.
72 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
There is huge trade scope for apple and apricot cultivators but the
1974 ban on its export is preventing the growth of this sector. Currently,
the Kashmiri apple growers’ lobby is against the export of fruits from
this region. The government needs to review its export ban and reopen
trade of Ladakhi apricot and other fruits from Kargil and Leh.
People of Kargil are living at the Zero Line near the LoC but the
benefits under the ALC (Along Line of Control) notification continue
to elude them.
Except for the cross-border shelling in 1999, Kargil has remained
peaceful. However, the Kargil-Skardu trade route (the traditional
centuries old Silk Route) has remained closed, while trade on Poonch-
Rawalkot and Uri-Muzaffarabad routes remain unaffected despite cross-
border violations, firing, and high tensions between India and Pakistan.
This situation must be rectified.
The FM Station of Kargil has 200KW setup which can reach up to
Gilgit-Astore but the station does not even broadcast news items. Radio
in short and long wave can become a bridge between the people of the
divided region.
An alternate route for Amarnath Yatris through the Baltal-Sonamarg
track would reduce pilgrim congestion in Kashmir. More infrastructure
facilities along this route are required.
There is much scope for development of Zanskar and Suru Valley
as tourist destinations to attract domestic as well as international tourists.
If construction of the Manali-Leh-Kargil route could be expedited,
any unrest in Kashmir will not affect economic activity in Kargil and
Leh, and keep the region connected with the rest of India at all times.
Given the potential to reach Central Asian markets, and of Ladakh
serving as the gateway to increasing trade with Central Asia, India
should consider opening the Kargil-Skardu trade route.
Besides, heavy military deployment at Ladakh border with Pakistan,
particularly at Siachen Glacier is an environmental hazard. Glacier is
already melting and may have adverse effect on hill communities of the
area. Measures to prevent militarisation of the area is required.
In Short, the people of Jammu and Kashmir in general and Ladakh
in particular strongly feel that there is a need to have peaceful and
fruitful dialogue with all stakeholders to maintain peace and stability in
the region. All nuclear neighborhoods must remain peaceful. Both the
Government of India and Pakistan should understand that, the use of
power cannot bring any solution to the conflict and the war can only
worsen the present situation of the State.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 73
An Essay on the Rohingya Crisis**
Rakhine (known as Arakan during British rule) is a province of
Myanmar. Buddhists form a majority in Rakhine. But, Muslims,
according to one assessment, emerged in Rakhine (Arakan) as early as
8th century AD, and the distinctiveness of Rakhine Muslims (Rohingyas
or Chittagonian Muslims or Chittagonian Bengali Muslims) became
evident by the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries.1 A UN Report on Rohingyas,
prepared by a human rights organization, also claims that Rohingyas
came to the region in the 8th century.2 However, there is another view
that Rohingyas never had millennia long connection with the Arakan
state, as it is a fabricated story that has no academic acceptability.3
Interestingly, from 1950s, the term ‘Rohingya’ began to be used by the
direct descendents of Muslim migrants from Chittagong.4 In 1785, the
Konbaung Dynasty of Burma occupied Rakhine. Later, the Anglo-
Burmese War (1824-26) started, and the British conquered the whole
of what they called Arakan (currently Rakhine). Bengali Muslims began
to migrate to Arakan, which was encouraged by the British. From 1826
onwards, British companies had been recruiting Bengali Muslims in
Arakan in commercial ventures, like mining, cutting of teak trees,
constructing roads and bridges, etc. It led to massive Muslim migration,
which continued for more than a century. There was a significant
economic reason behind the massive migration of Bengali Muslims
from Chittagong to Burma. Compared to Bengal, wages in Arakan
were very high.5 In the estimate of Burmans, who comprise the ethnic
majority in Myanmar, a majority of the Muslims currently living in
Rakhine are the descendants of the migrants from Chittagong, located
* Jayanta Kumar Ray, National Research Professor, Ministry of Human Resource
Development, Government of India. 309 Jodhpur Park, Kolkata -700068 (W.B.)
** This essay has been prepared with valuable assistance from the Indian Council
of Historical Research (ICHR), New Delhi.
74 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
in present day Bangladesh. During colonial rule, Chittagonian
immigrants turned into a dominant group in some parts of Burma.6
Burmans form the ruling circle, although since 1962, the military have
(visibly or invisibly) governed the country, and their concept of the
essentials of Burmese national culture excludes Rakhine Muslims,
obliterating even the distinction between Muslims living in the pre-
British era, and those arriving in the British era.7 It is important to keep
in mind that the Government of Myanmar considers 1826 as a watershed
regarding the issue of conferring citizenship rights on the Rohingyas. 8
One striking fact is that unlike any Muslim-majority country, despite
having its own Buddhist identity, Burma was a tolerant country and did
not declare Buddhism as state religion. Moreover, non-Buddhists had
complete freedom to practise their religion, and more significantly,
public opinion in Burma was not in favour of conversion from one
religion to another.9 None of these progressive features can be observed
in any Muslim country in the world. Indeed, British conquest of Burma
drastically changed the status quo of Burmese society, due to a significant
Muslim migration from India. With the substantial growth of immigrants
in Burma, Muslims began to develop their religious activities to the
fullest extent, such as building of mosques and other religious
institutions, which Burmese Muslims had never done before.10 After
the declaration of the British government that Arakan was a part of
Bengal presidency, Muslim population in Arakan increased in a huge
fashion, and subsequently reached twenty per cent of the total population.
Ceaseless Bengali Muslim migration to Arakan led to clashes between
Bengali Muslims and the Buddhists. The clash between Buddhists and
Rakhine Muslims, currently called Rohingyas, became inevitable,
especially because of aggressive anti-Buddhist activities of the
Rohingyas, such as destruction of Buddhist temples, forceful conversion
to Islam, etc. The British did nothing to stop such conduct of the
Rohingyas. Later, during the time of the Second World War, Rohingyas
supported the British, whereas Buddhists supported Japan. The British
government provided arms to Rohingyas, which were used to kill
Buddhists. In 1942, Rohingyas killed 20,000 Buddhists in Northern
Arakan. When Japan occupied some parts of Burma, the British
government formed Volunteers Force to provide arms training to
Rohingyas to fight against the Japanese, and Rohingyas used those
arms against the Rakhine Buddhists, killing Rakhine Buddhists and
destroying their religious institutions.11
In 1948, when Burma got independence, Rohingyas refused to be
citizens of Burma, and requested M.A. Jinnah to include Arakan in
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 75
East Pakistan. Nevertheless, Jinnah turned down their request. The
reason behind Jinnah’s refusal was not far to seek. The Eastern part of
Pakistan (called East Bengal till 1956) had a population already
exceeding that of the Western part of Pakistan. To add Rakhine Muslims
to East Pakistan was to aggravate the population disparity between the
two parts of Pakistan—which was a distinct disadvantage in the political
arithmetic of any democratic system. Under these circumstances,
Rohingyas formed the Mujahid Party in 1948, with an ambition of
establishing a Muslim state in Northern Arakan. From 1948 to 1962,
Rohingyas destroyed countless Buddhist temples and cultural centres.12
Subsequently, in 1962, this situation changed, when General Ne Win
came to power through a military coup. The Ne Win government passed
an exclusionary Citizenship Act, which made three categories of citizens–
National, Associate, and Naturalised–in 1982. Full citizenship was
conferred on 135 national races, officially declared as indigenous groups,
who have proven record of ancestry in Burma before 1823, i.e. prior to
the first Anglo-Burmese War.13 It is important to remember that even in
1971, Burma (called Myanmar since 1989) provided shelter to 75,000
Bengali Muslims, who had been tortured by the West Pakistani military,
seeking safety in Burma.
The Islamic terrorist organisation, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
(ARSA), formerly known as Harakah-al-Yakin, wants to establish an
Islamic state in Myanmar. It is an undeniable fact that Islamic terrorism
is largely responsible for today’s crisis in Myanmar. Saudi Arabia,
Malaysia, and a number of Arab states are providing resources to these
Muslim groups in Myanmar, which plays a key role in the crisis.14
Significantly, for a long time, Bangladesh has been patronising the
Rohingya terrorists. In 1978, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation
(RSO) was formed in Chittagong, and it provided arms training to the
local Rohingya youths with the help of Imam Abdul Karim of Markaz-
e-Islam located in Neela, a border town of Rahkine; all the meetings of
RSO used to be held in a hospital, Rabta-e-Islami, located in
Chittagong.15
On 25 August 2017, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)
concurrently attacked 30 police posts and an army base located in the
northern part of the Rakhine state, which led to the present day Rohingya
crisis. Indeed, the emergence of such an Islamic extremist group in the
region is a matter of serious concern.16 Abdullah, a representative of
ARSA, says that the purpose of the attack of 25 August was self-
defence and the restoration of rights of the Rohingyas.17 Ataullah abu
76 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Ammar Junjuni, chief leader of ARSA, was born in Karachi, Pakistan,
and he was also an Imam, i.e. Prayer Leader, of the Rohingya community
in Saudi Arabia. Also, he took training in guerrilla warfare under the
Taliban in Pakistan.18 Thus, the role of ARSA behind the emergence of
today’s Rohingya crisis is undeniable.
According to news agencies, in response to the 25 August attack,
Burmese troops retaliated against the rebels and burnt down 1,000
homes in 10 areas of the Rakhine state.19 Facing severe counterstrike
by the Myanmar Army, ARSA proposed a ceasefire, which was turned
down by the Myanmar Army as it was unwilling to negotiate with the
terrorists.20 Undoubtedly, Rohingya terrorists are the primary and the
consistent source of disorder in Myanmar. On 7 January 2018, Rohingya
terrorists launched an ambush on the Myanmar Security Force in
Northern Rakhine.21 Thus, Rohingya terrorists are largely responsible
for the misfortune of the Rohingyas, who face retaliation by the Myanmar
Army.
As an immediate consequence of retaliation by the Myanmar Army,
since 25 August 2017, 290,000 Rohingyas migrated to Bangladesh,
says Joseph Tripura, spokesman of UN Refugee Agency.22 An interesting
thing is that 66 per cent of the migrant Rohingyas are women, and the
rest of the people are old, sick, and men below 18 years. Almost no
man between the age group from 18 to 40 has migrated to Bangladesh
as they have joined the ARSA to fight against the Myanmar Army. 23
Strikingly, in a Rohingya refugee camp of Cox’s Bazar, 18,000 women
are pregnant and 200 children have already been born, which is a
matter of concern for Bangladesh government.24 However, the Relief
Minister of Bangladesh, Mofajjel Hussain Chowdhury, states that newly
born Rohingya babies are the citizens of Myanmar, and he describes
Rohingyas, who are currently living in Bangladesh, as infiltrators.25
London based human rights organisation, Amnesty International, appeals
to the international community to ensure that no Rohingya is pushed
back to Myanmar from Bangladesh until normalcy returns in Rakhine.26
Surprisingly, Bangladesh, a predominantly Muslim state, is unwilling
to provide shelter to its co-religionists, the Rohingyas, on the ground
that they are Myanmarese. However, it is written even in the Bangladeshi
school text books that Rohingyas had migrated to Myanmar from
Bangladesh.27
India cannot be blamed if its position in the Rohingya crisis is
favourable to that of the Myanmar government, as India itself is a
victim of Islamic terrorism. Therefore, Ashraf Asif Jalali, a Sunni Jihadi
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 77
Council Cleric, who preaches jihad by Myanmar’s Muslims and recruits
them, even children, in jihadi activities, goes so far as to announce that
Modi and Suu Kyi should be hanged.28 The United States promised to
press a diplomatic solution, and if its attempt failed, it alerted Myanmar
to the possibility of application of a variety of sanctions.29 The United
Nations Security Council, too, escalated pressure on Myanmar, as it
put forward a unanimous statement calling upon Yangon to terminate
its military moves in Rakhine, as also to extend cooperation to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.30 India has set
in motion a diplomatic process with Myanmar and Bangladesh, which
has sheltered more than 600,000 Rakhine refugees, whereas India
finds 40,000 of these illegal immigrants on its soil as also 14,000
registered by the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees.31
The United States Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Population,
Refugees and Migration has pointed out, following a visit to Bangladesh,
that Bangladesh is commendably supporting Rakhine refugees, and
that they can voluntarily return to Myanmar if political reconciliation
takes place, and conditions become safe.32 An interesting thing is that
unlike Rohingyas, Hindus of Myanmar are willing to return to their
homeland.33 This is because Myanmarese forces are not hostile to the
Hindus as Hindus are not involved in the terrorist activities in Myanmar.
An interesting fact is that during the time of the Rohingya-Buddhist
conflict, Rohingyas killed even the Hindus. The Myanmar Army
discovered mass graves of 28 Hindus, who were killed by the Rohingya
Muslims, in the Rakhine state.34 Moreover, in Cox’s Bazar of
Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees beat Hindu refugees, some of these
Hindu refugees were able to escape, whereas a Hindu refugee, Nirendra
Pal, was missing, and his brother, Rabindra Pal, was killed by the
Rohingyas.35 Hence, it is correct to observe that the ‘peace loving’
Rohingyas are not ready to tolerate any non-Muslims, no matter
Buddhists or Hindus. One striking thing is that unlike Muslims, the
Hindu community was integrated with the Buddhist community in
Burma.36 Unlike the muslim Rohingyas.
As already mentioned, in a Rohingya refugee camp of Cox’s Bazar,
18,000 Rohingya women are pregnant. Significantly, a survey, conducted
by ‘Save the Children,’ indicates that around 50,000 children will be
born in 2018 in the Rohingya refugee camps of Bangladesh.37 It is
apprehended that thus the steadfast increase of Muslim population, will
outnumber Rakhine Buddhists. According to a politician of Myanmar,
Shwe Maung, “they [Rohingyas] are trying to Islamise us through their
78 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
terrible birth rate.”38 Likewise, a spokesman of Rakhine State, Win
Myaing, said that “The population growth of Rohingya Muslims is 10
times higher than that of the Rakhine [Buddhists],” and he opines that
“Overpopulation is one of the causes of tension.”39 There are numerous
grim examples in history on how Islam used the strategy of population
growth to destroy indigenous religion and culture. For instance, centuries
ago, Indonesia was a Hindu state, whereas now 87.18 and 1.7 percent
of the total population of Indonesia are Muslims and Hindus,
respectively.40 Similarly, Malaysia, which used to be dominated by the
non-Muslims, especially Buddhists and Hindus, has now turned into an
Islamic country, with Muslims comprising 61.3 percent of the total
population.41 In addition, it has been shown below how the growth of
Muslim population has been changing the demographic patterns in
Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh.
Decline of Non-Muslim Population in Chittagong and CHT region (%)42
Year Religion Rangamati Khagrachhari Bandarban Cox’s Bazar
Chittagong
1981 Muslim 32.64 39.19 41.66 91.76 88.81
Buddhist 59.65 49.98 43.84 2.34 1.94
Hindu 5.91 17.29 2.67 5.75 14.08
1991 Muslim 39.27 47.45 47.62 92.13 83.92
Buddhist 53.83 35.51 38.00 2.17 2.01
Hindu 5.62 16.69 3.52 5.60 13.76
2001 Muslim 36.82 43.52 49.33 92.92 85.62
Buddhist 56.06 39.28 34.88 2.01 1.79
Hindu 5.31 16.43 3.62 4.91 12.37
2011 Muslim 35.15 44.67 50.75 93.97 86.90
Buddhist 58.23 37.68 31.69 1.65 1.59
Hindu 5.07 16.81 3.38 4.26 11.31
One can infer from this statistics that the process of infiltration and
gradual settlement of Muslim population in this hilly region is a major
reason behind the relative decline of non-Muslim population in the
Chittagong and CHT region. Whenever they thought it necessary,
Rohingyas migrated from Myanmar and settled in Chittagong.43
Here it is important to mention that for decades the policy of the
Bangladesh government and political leadership has been to replace
gradually the non-Muslim population in the CHT by Muslims. A matter
of added concern is that in South Asia, there are views that Bangladesh
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 79
has an aspiration to form a greater Islamic region, comprising West
Bengal, Assam, and parts of Arakan, of Bihar, of Meghalaya, and of
Tripura.44
In this context, the following figures are relevant.
Decline of Population of Hindus in Bangladesh (1941-2011)45
Year Percentage
1941 28.00
1951 22.00
1961 18.05
1971 13.05
1981 12.01
1991 10.05
2001 9.02
2011 8.05
It is unfortunate that in India, some political parties are campaigning
to provide shelter to the Rohingyas for their vote bank politics, although
it has been proved that Rohingyas have some connection with terrorism.
For instance, Hyderabad police arrested a Rohingya, Muhammad Ismail,
who was able to get a birth certificate issued from Dumdum, Kolkata.
First, he migrated to Bangladesh from Myanmar; then he came to
Kolkata from Bangladesh. A matter of great concern is that he had all
the crucial documents of Indian citizenship, such as the Aadhaar card,
Voter card, Pan card, and also Refugee card issued by the UN.46 It is
evident that without the help of local political leaders, no foreigner can
get these documents, and in West Bengal, leaders of Trinamool Congress
(TMC) allegedly are helping the Rohingyas. It is important to mention
here that TMC, the present ruling party in West Bengal, is illegally
providing shelter to the Rohingyas. For instance, in the Ghutiyari Sharif
of South 24 Parganas, which is a strong centre of TMC, Rohingya
infiltrators obtain shelter and financial support illegally from a wealthy
local Muslim, Hussain Gazi.47 Under the political patronage of TMC,
Muslims are extending their support to the Rohingya infiltrators.
Therefore, TMC is vocal about providing shelter to the Rohingyas, and
determined to disobey any order on Rohingyas by the Central
government. Significantly, in Kolkata, several Muslim organizations,
along with the Communist Party of India (Marxist)-(CPM)-and the
Congress Party, organised pro-Rohingya, anti-Myanmar, and anti-Centre
campaigns, whereas Pir Zada of Furfura Sharif Twaha Siddiqi praises
the Chief Minister of West Bengal for her pro-Rohingya and anti-
80 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Centre policy. Twaha Siddiqi also threatens that Muslims have the
capacity to damage the Consulate of Myanmar in Kolkata. Moreover,
in this campaign, Adhir Choudhury, an MP (Member of Parliament) of
the Congress Party in Baharampur, West Bengal, openly asks for refugee
certificates from the West Bengal Government for the Rohingya refugees
illegally settled in Lilua of Howrah.48 Despite the fact that all Rohingyas
are not terrorists, it is important to remember that even a small number
of jihadis are capable of causing mayhem.49
On the question whether India should provide shelter to the
Rohingyas or not, the Governor of Tripura, Tathagata Roy, says that
when one crore Hindu refugees migrated from East Bengal in the 1950s,
and spent days in the Sealdah railway station in Kolkata, no political
leader shed their tears, whereas Muhammad Selim of the CPM says
that India cannot deny its responsibility towards Rohingyas; this is a
direct support for TMC on the issue of Rohingyas.50 Besides the above
mentioned pro-Rohingya political parties in West Bengal, a number of
intellectuals are quite vocal about providing shelter to the Rohingyas.51
Moreover, from West Bengal, Muslim organisations, like the All India
Minority Association, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, Ahl-e-Hadith, Sunnat-
al-Jamat, and Anjuman-e-Jamat-e-Ulema, etc. are consistently sending
relief to the Rohingyas located in Bangladesh.52 Unfortunately, no
organisation sent such relief to the Hindus and Buddhists in Bangladesh
or even raised voices against the Muslim jihadis when, to take a few
among numerous examples since 1947, Bangladeshi Muslims tortured
Buddhists in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in 1990, destroyed many
temples, and in 1992, again, tortured Hindus and Buddhists. From
2001 to 2004, moreover, during Khaleda Zia’s rule, inhuman torture on
Hindus forced a large number of them to migrate to India. Subsequently,
in 2012, a number of Buddhist temples were destroyed.53
One can observe that India is not a signatory of the UN Refugee
Convention of 1951. Contrary to India’s position on the UN Refugee
Convention of 1951, there is a claim that the non-refoulement policy is
recognised by article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), and as India is a party to international treaties, like the
International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD), which corroborate non-refoulement policy, India cannot turn
away its face from the Rohingya refugees. Hence, it is feasible to
recommend the formation of a legal structure for refugee settlement in
India.54 Such a recommendation, favoured by pro-Rohingya individuals/
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 81
agencies, if carried out, can severely damage the internal security of
India. Indeed, it is unfortunate that although Indian secularists and
liberals are earnestly pleading in favour of Rohingyas, they never protest
against the torture by Indonesia of the people of East Timor, by
Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Middle Eastern Muslims on the non-Muslim
religious communities, such as Hindus, Buddhists, Christians,
Zoroastrians, Yazidis, Jews, etc. They also prefer to stay silent on the
torture by Boko Haram in Nigeria of the non-Muslims.55
Significantly, according to the reports of the Indian intelligence
agencies, Rohingyas are a serious threat to India as there is ample
evidence that Rohingyas are backed by the Pakistani terrorist
organisations, like Lashkar-e-Taiyaba and Hijbul Mujahidin, and can
anytime carry out Islamic State (IS) type ‘lone wolf’ attacks in India.
The Central government of India has impressed such data on the
Supreme Court of India in response to the petitions sited by two
Rohingyas asking for shelter.56 As RAW (Research and Analysis Wing),
and Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, has reported to
the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office), Rohingyas have links with Jamat
Ud Dawa (JUD) of Hafiz Saeed. Moreover, several Indian intelligence
agencies affirm that Rohingyas have links with ISIS or IS. However,
opposition groups ignore national interest and urge upon the government
of India to provide shelter to Rohingyas. Islamic organisations, such as
the Zakat Foundation of India, Jamat-e-Islam, Hind, are supporting
Rohingyas. Similarly, Mani Shankar Aiyar, a top Congress leader, argues
that India should open its doors to Muslims as much as to Hindus,
whereas Bangladesh and Pakistan are opposing Rohingyas for their
terror links.57 Moreover, a marriage between a Bangladeshi and a
Rohingya is an offence punishable with seven years’ imprisonment.
Recently, Dhaka High Court imposed a fine of 100,000 Taka
(Bangladeshi currency) on Babul Hossain, because his son, Shoaib
Hossain Jewel, married a Rohingya woman and ran away, while his
father, Babul Hossain, submitted a writ petition to the High Court for
registration of Shoaib’s unlawful marriage.58 Interestingly, Bangladesh
denies the fact that Rohingyas are Chittagonians.59 Significantly,
Brussels-based think tank, International Crisis Group (ICG), reports
that Rohingya insurgents have connections with Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan.60 It is evident that Pakistan is using Rohingya refugees to
destabilise India, as Ashraf Asif Jalali, who is a Sunni Jihadi Council
Cleric linked with Lashkar-e-Taiyaba (LeT), has decided to recruit one
lakh young jihadis to carry out attacks on India.61 A matter of concern
82 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
is that Lashkar-e-Taiyaba and its brother organization, Falah-I-Insaniyat,
are very active in the Rohingya refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar.62
Interestingly, one Thai intelligence agency has observed that jihadis are
recruiting the Rohingya refugees in the southern provinces of Thailand,
which proves that the jihadis have a grand plan to terrorise the region.63
Therefore, the Central government has no option but to inform the
Supreme Court that Rohingyas are ‘illegal immigrants,’ and that they
are posing serious threats to the national security of India.64 Subramanyan
Swami, a BJP leader, confirms that Article 2 of the Constitution of
India restricts some rights for the sake of sovereignty and security of
the country.65
It is also important to note that despite not being citizens of India,
Rohingyas are able to use the legal instrument via an appeal to the
Supreme Court in order to set aside the plea of the Central government
that Rohingyas are infiltrators and should be thrown out of India.
Significantly, Article 19 of the Constitution of India ensures that only
Indian citizens have the right to reside and settle in any part of India;
so, illegal immigrants, e.g. Rohingyas, cannot ask for this fundamental
right reserved for the Indians, as stated in the affidavit filed by the
Ministry of Home Affairs in the Supreme Court.66 Surprisingly,
Rohingyas are able to establish settlements in Kashmir, whereas no
other Indian from outside Jammu and Kashmir is allowed to settle in
the valley. For instance, around 14,000 foreigners, including Rohingyas
and Bangladeshi nationals, are settled in Jammu and Samba Districts,
and from 2008 to 2016, their population increased by 6,000.67 Contrary
to normal Muslim practice, in order to stay in India, Rohingyas have
requested the Indian government to consider them as ‘Human’ instead
of ‘Muslim.’68
Indeed, from the above mentioned discussion, one can easily
observe that the Rohingyas are a serious threat to the national security
of any country, not to speak of multi-religious and multi-cultural
countries, like India. Hence, one cannot take the risk of considering the
Rohingya issue from an exclusively compassionate point of view.
Myanmar’s most influential civilian leader, Suu Kyi, has visited
Rakhine and tried to spread a message of peace.69 But, neither the
international human rights groups nor the refugees themselves appear
to feel assured. The Secretary General of the UN, Antonio Gueterres,
has met Myanmar State Counsellor, Suu Kyi, and requested Kyi to
facilitate the return of refugees to Myanmar.70 Interestingly, Suu Kyi
appears to benefit from the relative inaction of Association of South
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 83
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the issue of Rakhine Muslims, as was
manifest in course of the ASEAN summit in Manila in mid-November
2017.71
According to a 1992 Joint Declaration, Myanmar is to receive 300
Rakhine Muslims from Bangladesh everyday through two check-points.
But today Myanmar claims that this repatriation of Muslims will be
conditional on Rakhine Muslims supplying proof that they have been
inhabitants or citizens of Myanmar, that they are returning voluntarily,
that guardians of children born in Bangladesh must be inhabitants/
citizens of Myanmar, and that Bangladesh courts can guarantee the
nationality of Muslims separated from their families.72 Obviously, few
in Bangladesh rehabilitation camps can fulfil such conditions. Therefore,
in the foreseeable future, Rakhine refugees may have to continue to
live in squalid camps, although visits to these camps by such eminent
persons as foreign ministers of Germany, Sweden, Japan and the
diplomatic chief of the European Union, can only raise a faint glimmer
of hope.73
The Rakhine Muslim problem—which the world depicts briefly as
the Rohingya problem, whereas Myanmar prefers to call it the issue of
illegal Muslim immigrants from Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh–is
not a sudden phenomenon, nor can it be viewed in total isolation from
such other problems affecting India as the illegal Bangladeshi Muslim
migration problem in eastern-northeastern parts of India. The Rohingya
problem, moreover, can be placed in the larger framework of the Saudi-
sponsored movement for establishment of the extreme Salafi version of
Wahabi Islam in different parts of the world. This is the assessment of
the highest religious head of Syrian Islam, the Grand Mufti, Ahmad
Badreddin Hassoun. Grand Mufti, Hassoun, recently visited New Delhi,
Srinagar, Lucknow and various other religious centres in India, and
provided extremely valuable assessment noted above, while he expressed
his amazement at how temples, mosques and universities were operating
independently in India and serving comprehensively the interests of the
people. In contrast, as Grand Mufti Hassoun appeared to stress, Saudi
Arabia was taking advantage of divisions in the Muslim world and
promoting its own authority by the dissemination of extremist Islam.
He pointed to the compelling need for redeployment of militias, trained
by Saudi Arabia (and the United States) after the establishment of
peace in Syria, as agents of Salafi Islam in new centres of Islamist
extremism, e.g. Rakhine. As to Jammu-Kashmir, Hassoun observed
that those who equated Islam to terrorism were really conspiring to
84 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
destroy Islam, and could hardly claim themselves to be Muslims.
Hassoun revealed that the spread of Salafism among Rakhine Muslims
was planned by the chief of the ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation
Army), Ataullah or Hafiz Toha, since 2012, when he received necessary
instruction and support from Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the Saudi
Ambassador to the US. The Rohingya uprising of 25 August 2017 was
planned for a long time by Ataullah, who formed Islamist sleeper cells
in Rakhine. The scale of the uprising was such as to provoke massive
military retaliation as also a chain reaction. Whereas Rohingya
infiltrators have been arrested from Assam, Manipur and Tripura (where
they entered illegally through Bangladesh), West Bengal remains a free
territory with no report of arrested Rohingyas.74
ARSA, significantly, is in the proud company of such other terrorist
agencies as Pakistan’s Jamat-ud-Dawa (JUD), Jaish-e-Muhammad
(JEM), Lashkar-E-Taiyaba (LET), Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI),
Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS), JEM Bangladesh (JMB), as also
Myanmar’s Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Arakan. The activities of all these
militant agencies in three countries are reportedly being orchestrated
by Pakistan’s ISI and Al-Qaeda for fulfilment of the objective
propounded in the 2014 videotape of the Al Qaeda Amir, Ayman Al
Jawahiri. The objective is to repeat in Assam in 2019 what was done
in Kashmir in 1989, when Hindus in different Muslim-majority areas
of Kashmir were driven out by a deft use of terror and propaganda, so
as to create free jihadi areas without any presence of Hindus. Wahabi
groups, in collaboration with ISI and Al-Qaeda, are alleged to be engaged
in the formation of ‘Operation Assam 2019’ that they have been able to
influence NATO countries, especially Turkey, to campaign in favour of
rehabilitation of Rohingya refugees. ‘Operation Assam 2019’ has
received some impetus from the preparation of the National Register of
Citizens in Assam, alleging discrimination against Muslims. Arshad
Madani, the President of Jamiat Ulema-E-Hind, has complained of
discrimination as a conspiracy. He has even threatened that the situation
is so explosive as to lead to Myanmar-like disturbances in Assam.75
Along with India, however, Bangladesh too faces the threats of
militancy and destabilisation due to the recruitment and training of
Rohingya refugees by global terrorist organisations in the Cox’s Bazar
refugee camps of Bangladesh. Reportedly, a Pakistan Army Major has
been entrusted with the supervision of the process of recruitment and
training of Rohingya refugees. Some ostensibly charitable agencies,
e.g. JUD and Falah-I-Insaniyat, are also enthusiastic participants in this
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 85
process. One provocation for such activities targeting Bangladesh
Government has arisen out of trials of war criminals of 1971 by the
Hasina Government. Nevertheless, any militancy/instability in
Bangladesh, caused by Rohingyas, cannot but overflow into India,
especially Assam and West Bengal.76
By way of mitigation of such instability, India took a positive step
on 20 December 2017. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),
signed with Myanmar on that date, signals India’s intention to assist
Myanmar in achieving normalcy in Rakhine, while facilitating the return
of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. For this purpose, India has promised
to build pre-fabricated residences in Rakhine. Significantly, unlike the
Muslim or Western countries, India has not tried to exert any unwelcome
pressure or apply sanctions.77
References
1. Cresa L. Pugh, ‘Is Citizenship the Answer? Constructions of belonging
and exclusion for the stateless Rohingya of Burma,’ International Migration
Institute, University of Oxford, Working Paper No. 76 (October 2013),
p. 4.2. Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh – Still No Durable
Solution, New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2000.3. Aye Chan, The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rakhine)
State of Burma (Myanmar), SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3,
No. 2, Autumn 2005, p. 396.4. Ibid., p. 397.5. Arthur Purvis Phayre, “Account of Arakan,” Journal of the Asiatic Society
of Bengal, 10, 1841, p. 696.6. Chan, op. cit., p. 401.7. Pugh, p. 12.8. See Rangan Dutta, ‘Travails of the Rohingyas,’ The Statesman, Kolkata,
25 September 2017.9. Moshe Yeagar, The Muslims of Burma: A Study of Minority Group, Otto
Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 1972, pp. 26-27.10. Ibid., p. 27.11. Chan, op. cit., p. 406.12. See Atin Das, ‘Rohingyader durdashar pechhone royechhe santrasheeder
apakarma’ (Misdeeds of the terrorists are responsible for the troubles of
Rohingyas), Jugasankha, Kolkata, 9 September 2017.13. Swagato Sarkar and Prabhakar Singh, ‘India’s role in Rohingya resolution,’
The Statesman, 19 September 2017. Also see Pugh, pp. 14-15.
86 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
14. See Atin Das, ‘Rohingyader durdashar pechhone royechhe santrasheeder
apakarma’ (Misdeeds of the terrorists are responsible for the troubles of
Rohingyas), Jugasankha, 9 September 2017.15. Atin Das, ‘Rohingya sankat dakshin-purba Asiar jonno ek asani sanket’
(Rohingya crisis is an ominous sign for Southeast Asia), Jugasankha, 5
October 2017.16. Mahfuz Anam, ‘Rohingya crisis should concern region,’ The Statesman,
9 September 2017.17. “Rohingya rebels cry ‘open war’ as Yangon cracks whip,” The Statesman,
29 August 2017.18. Mike Winchester, ‘Birth of an ethnic insurgency in Myanmar,’ Asia Times,
Hong Kong, 28 August 2017; Paul Millar, ‘Sizing up the shadowy
leader of the Rakhine State insurgency,’ Southeast Asia Globe Magazine ,
Phnom Penh, 16 February 2017.19. ‘Army burns Rohingya villages in rebel purge,’ The Statesman, 30 August
2017.20. After rebels’ truce, Myanmar says ‘we don’t negotiate with terrorists,’
The Statesman, 11 September 2017.21. ‘Rohingya rebels claim ambush on Myanmar security forces,’ The
Statesman, 8 January 2018.22. ‘Rohingya arrivals in Bangladesh near 300,000,’ The Statesman, 10
September 2017.23. ABP News, 5 October 2017, Videotape.24. Jugasankha, 25 September 2017.25. Amader Shomoy, Dhaka, 25 September 2017.26 Jugasankha, 6 October 2017. Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s army chief,
observed in a Facebook post that the army reaction to Muslim militancy
was proportionate, that the media exaggerated the number of refugees
from Myanmar, and that these refugees were all Bengali Muslims: Mint
News, Mumbai, 13 October 2017.27. Jannatul Ferdousi, Amadershomoy.com, 26 September 2017.28. Times Now, 18 September 2017, Videotape.29. AFP report from Dhaka, The Statesman, 6 November 2017.30. AFP Report from the United Nations, The Statesman, 8 November 2017.31. Statesman News Service report from New Delhi, The Statesman, 8
November 2017.32. AFP report from Washington DC, The Statesman, 9 November 2017.33. ‘Hindu refugees eagerly await return to Myanmar,’ The Statesman, 8
January 2018.34. ‘Mass grave of 28 Hindus killed by Rohingya militants found: Myanmar
Army,’ Hindustan Times.com, 24 September 2017.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 87
35 ‘Ukhiyay Hindu Saranarthir Lash Uddhar, Rohingyader Biruddhe Hatyar
Abhijog’ (Dead body of a Hindu Refugee is found in Ukhiya, Rohingyas
are accused of the murder), Amadershomoy.com, 24 September 2017.36. Yeagar, op. cit., p. 29.37. Jugasankha, 8 January 2018.38. Patrick Winn, “Do ‘rapidly breeding’ Rohingya Muslims really threaten
Myanmar’s Buddhist identity?” Global Post, Boston, 14 October 2013.39. ‘2-child limit in Rohingya towns,’ The Hindu, 26 May 2013. Interestingly,
in the Rakhine refugee camps of Bangladesh, officials are deeply worried
about the implementation of family planning measures. Camps are
overcrowded, but the Muslim refugees show little interest in family
planning. Many Muslims have more than one wife, and the number of
children can sometimes exceed nineteen. Officials have been able to
distribute less than six hundred packets of condoms to Rakhine Muslims.
But the recipients are reluctant to use these condoms. Women believe
that birth control measures are sinful and anti-Islam. A mother of seven
children reports that her husband refuses to wear any condom. Jugasankha,
29 October 2017.40. Achintya Biswas, ‘Khudra Bharater Jatrapala’ (Opera of tiny India),
Jugasankha, 13 September 2017.41. Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report
2010, Department of Statistics, Malaysia.42. For this and other relevant details see Population & Housing Census
2011, Zila Report, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Informatics Division,
Ministry of Planning, Government of Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh.43. Daily Janakantha, Dhaka, 3 October 2017.44. For details, see Bimal Pramanik, Endangered Demography, Kolkata: G..
C. Modak, 2005, pp. 5-6.45. These are well known facts for which there are numerous sources. But it
is advisable to consult Bangladesh Population Census 2011, and Bimal
Pramanik, Endangered Demography.46. Chitradeep Chakrabarty, ‘Hyderabad e Dhrita Rohingyar Janma Uttar
Dumdum e’ (Rohingya caught in Hyderabad born in North Dumdum), Ei
Samay, Kolkata, 16 September 2017.47. Raktim Das, ‘Ghutiyari Sharife Rajyer Ekmatro Rohingya Shibir’ (The
only Rohingya camp of West Bengal is in Ghutiyari Sharif), Jugasankha,
5 January, 2018.48. Ei Samay, 12 September 2017.49. Shantanu Mukharji, ‘Rohingyas and disturbing fallouts,’ The Statesman,
1 January 2018.50. Jugasankha, 11 September 2017.
88 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
51. See Jawahar Sarkar, ‘Bharat antata ja korte parto’ (What India could at
least do), Ananda Bazar Patrika, Kolkata, 27 September 2017.52. Jugasankha, 6 October 2017.53. For startling facts, see Jayanta Kumar Ray, Democracy and Nationalism
on Trial: A Study of East Pakistan, Simla : Indian Institute of Advanced
Study, 1968, esp. pp. 32-39, 278-82; and Jayanta Kumar Ray, India’s
Foreign Relations 1947-2007 , London/New Delhi: Routledge, 2016, esp.
Chapter 6. The international community took very little interest, except
in atrocities by Muslims in CHT. In sharp contrast to abject negligence
by the world community towards atrocities by Muslims on non-Muslims
in East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh over a period of seven decades,
the explicit concern for Rohingiyas in 2017 is a pleasant, if not puzzling,
surprise: note, e.g. the concern of the European Union and the United
States for Rohingyas reported in The Daily Observer, Dhaka, 25 November
2017 and The Statesman, 7 December 2017; “Extremists ‘linked’: 12
Buddhist Temples Torched, 50 Houses Smashed,” The Daily Star, Dhaka,
1 October 2012.
It is of interest to note that Hindus in East Bengal/East Pakistan/
Bangladesh never received any compensation for financial losses due to
unilateral atrocities by Muslims. In contrast, victims of sex slavery,
practised by victorious Japanese soldiers in areas including present day
South Korea, have received substantial (even if inadequate) compensation
from the government of Japan: see, e.g. Walter Qim, ‘Cannot be Swept
Under the Carpet,’ The Statesman, 24 December 2017.54. Saurabh Bhattacharjee, ‘India needs proper refugee legislation,’ The
Statesman, 8 September 2017.55. ‘Rohingyas threat to national security,’ The Statesman, 19 September
2017.56. ‘Rohingya Srote Bharate Dhhukche Pak Jongira’ (Pakistani Terrorists are
entering in India with waves of Rohingyas), Jugasankha, 15 September
2017.57. Times Now, 13 September 2017, videotape.58. Daily Janakantha, 8 January 2018; AFP report from Dhaka, The
Statesman, 9 January 2018.59. Chan, op. cit., p. 415.60. Jacob J., ‘Rohingya militants in Rakhine have Saudi, Pakistan links,
think tank says,’ International Business Times, New York, 15 December
2016; Simon Lewis, ‘Myanmar’s Rohingya insurgency has links to Saudi,
Pakistan,’ Reuters, 16 December 2016.61. Times Now, 18 September 2017, Videotape.62. Mausam Akan, ‘Bangladesher Rohingya Shibire Gopone Sakriya Lashkar-
e-Taiyaba!’ (Lashkar-e-Taiyaba is secretly active in the Rohingya camps
of Bangladesh), Jugasankha, 11 January 2018.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 89
63. Shantanu Mukharji, ‘Rohingyas and disturbing fallouts,’ The Statesman,
1 January 2018.64. ‘Rohingyas threat to national security,’ The Statesman, 19 September
2017.65. Times Now, 18 September 2017, Videotape.66. ‘Rohingyas threat to national security,’ The Statesman, 19 September
2017.67. ‘We settled in J&K out of compulsion: Rohingya,’ The Statesman,
21 August 2017.68. Jugasankha, 12 September 2017.69. Jugasankha, 9 November 2017.70. PTI report from Manila, The Statesman, 15 November 2017.71. AP report from Yangon, The Statesman, 14 November 2017.72. Report from news agencies in Rakhine, Jugasankha, 1 November 2017.73. AFP report from Dhaka, The Statesman, 18 November 2017.74. Information in the preceding paragraph has been collected from a long
article by Atin Das, Jugasankha, 19 October 2017.75. For an elucidation of data in the preceding paragraph, see Atin Das,
Jugasankha, 18 November 2017.76. Shantanu Mukharji, ‘Rohingya influx poses security challenge,’ The
Statesman, 20 October 2017.77. For an appropriate commentary on this India-Myanmar MoU, see an
editorial ‘India and Rakhine’ in The Statesman, 25 December 2017.
90 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Vision for Developing Andaman andNicobar Islands
Introduction
Francis Sempa, in his book Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st
Century has brought out how geography has been a major factor in
influencing the geopolitical orientation of a country. It is an accepted
fact that a continental setting of a nation is likely to orientate it towards
land whereas an insular or island location would orientate it to sea. In
case of countries that are situated on continent but also have access to
ocean, it could be either a sea or land orientation. However, the modern
day 21st century reality is that even though geography is constant, its
impact can change with the technology and scientific advance being
made. Therefore, the national power, national interests and national
strategic thinking could also be attributed to geographic factors.
India, the seventh largest country in the world, shares its 15000
kilometers land borders with Pakistan, China, Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar,
and Bangladesh. The narrowest distance between India and Sri Lanka
is only 64 km. Large part of Jammu and Kashmir area is disputed with
Pakistan, and the Aksai Chin area of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed
with China, as is the border of Arunachal Pradesh in northeast India.
The decades old pending border demarcation with Bangladesh has been
resolved in 2015.
* Air Marshal (Retd.) P.K. Roy is former Commander in Chief, Andaman &
Nicobar Command and Commandant National Defence College, New Delhi.
The article is based on research work done and published at USI, India while
holding Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 91
India shares maritime borders with five countries. Its 7,516
kilometers long coastline comprises 5,422 km for the mainland, 132km
for the Lakshadweep Islands, and 1,962 km for the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands. The Indian peninsula extends 1,980 km into the Indian
Ocean. Fifty per cent of the Indian Ocean basin lies within a 1,500 km
radius of India, a reality that has strategic implications. India has 1,197
islands in the Indian Ocean. (572 in the Andaman and Nicobar – 37 of
which are inhabited – and 23 in the Lakshadweep – 10 of which are
inhabited. In addition, there are 447 islands off the western coast and
151 islands off the eastern coast.
Indian Strategic Thinking
This unique characteristic of the Indian geography has guided its culture
and strategic thinking over the years. Its strategic thinking has been
profoundly influenced by its geography, history, culture and over two
centuries of the British rule. Geography, in the ultimate analysis has
had a profound effect on the thinking of Indian leaders/ decision makers.
Regular invasion of India from the North-West over centuries has
been responsible for the mindset of the Indian leaders adopting a
continental orientation over the oceans. The 20 th century military
conflicts with a belligerent Pakistan in the West (Indo-Pak conflicts of
1947 and others thereafter) and that with China to the North/ Northeast
(the 1962 conflict and the continuing border issues) have reinforced
this strategic thinking. Even today Pakistan in the northwest occupies
most of our attention followed by China in the north and north east.
However, South India which was relatively shielded from these invaders
has had an outlook more inclined towards the oceans. They have had a
very rich maritime heritage and culture with bustling trade nearly 2000
years back. India’s failure to appreciate the maritime domain has led
partially to the neglect of our strategic, security and economic prosperity.
All these are indicators of absence of a comprehensive vision on
maritime outlook except for a few states in South India.
What emerges, therefore, is that India has been hesitant to exploit
its maritime strength in general and that of the strategically located
Andaman and Nicobar Islands specifically. The ever evolving strategic
dynamism of the 21st century in the Indian Ocean Region re-emphasizes
the strategic importance of these islands.
92 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Brief Historical Background of Andaman and Nicobar Islands
(ANI)
Located on the busiest Sea Lines of Communications of the world, the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands have historically been inhabited by tribal
population. These islands find mention in the writings as far back as
the 7th century (Chinese Buddhist monk I-ching). Occupation by the
Chola dynasty, its use as a maritime base for Maratha ships in the 17 th
century, exploits these islands by Admiral Kanhoji Angre, its occupation
by the British and the Japanese indicates the appreciation of the strategic
significance of these islands since time immemorial.
Lord Cornwallis, the governor-general of India, in 1788, sent
Lieutenant Archibald Blair and Lieutenant R. H. Colebrook to check
the suitability of Andaman and Nicobar Islands for establishing a British
Colony. They established the first settlements on Chatham Island, a
small island near Port Cornwallis. The British, thereafter, founded a
penal settlement in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, after the
‘SepoyMutiny’ of 1857, with the sole intention of housing the ever
increasing number of rebels accused with disloyalty towards the British
empire. In 1887, construction of the jail at Port Blair commenced –
which came to be known as ‘Cellular Jail’ or ‘Kalapani.’ The large
number of so-called convicts who were housed at the Cellular Jail
suffered shocking atrocities under the British rule.
The Japanese occupied the Andaman and Nicobar Islands during
the WW-II in 1942 and continued their occupation till 1945, when the
islands were recaptured by the British. Thereafter, these islands became
a part of India on the 15 August, 1947 when India got its independence.
The government of India decided to populate these islands through
settling of the Bengali community mostly from erstwhile East Pakistan,
now Bangladesh, which lasted from 1949 to 1970s. Many mainland
settlers including ex-servicemen belonging to various communities –
the Tamilian, Marathi, Malayali and Punjabi communities were also
encouraged to rehabilitate there.
Strategic Significance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands
Unfortunately, the strategic significance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands
has somehow never been completely appreciated by the Government of
India. Very few know the fact that during the transfer of power to
India, these islands were almost lost out as the British wanted to exclude
them from the transfer of power and keep them as their base in the
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 93
region. Pakistan too had laid claim on these islands as an extension of
East Pakistan. Fortunately, better sense prevailed and on the advice of
Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy and Governor General of India, it finally
became a part of India. The government actually seems to have
awakened to significance of these islands only during the 1965
Indo-Pak War, when Indonesia had threatened to occupy some of the
Islands on behalf of Pakistan. Unfortunately, even today there is little
change in the strategic orientation despite extensive geo-political
changes. The strategic potential of these isands has not yet been fully
appreciated. This is despite the fact that IOR (Indian Ocean Region)
has once again become the Ocean of the 21st century.
The 21st century IOR, one of the most complex regions has become
an oceanic highway for the resource hungry growing economies of
Asian region, especially China and beyond. The existing locations of
oil and gas production platforms, Ocean based resources, movement of
energy resources through the IOR SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication)
are vital to the region’s economic productivity particularly that of the
developing states. Energy flow through the East Indian Ocean region is
controlled by five choke points namely Malacca Straits, Lombok Straits,
Sunda Straits, Six Degree Channel and Eight Degree Channel. An
economically buoyant China is looking beyond its region of influence
for access to resources as well as markets – into the Indian Ocean
Region through these choke points. It is using its economic power and
advantages thereof to realize its security and strategic goals in the
region of Indian Ocean. IOR would, by all accounts be the focus in
Chinese aspirations in enlarging this influence specially in the region
where it feels it is vulnerable and suspects interference by others
including India. These choke points located in the vicinity of the
Andaman and Nicobar islands, make these islands sentinels or gateways
to this oceanic highway and resource rich area as they sit astride the
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).
Andaman and Nicobar Islands are a valuable strategic asset for
India that can play a pivotal role in the emerging 21st century maritime
competition between India and China. Chinese ever increasing demand
for resources, its dependence on the maritime route for transporting
them from the Middle East/Africa and the need to look for alternate
source of resources i.e. sea bed resource manifest in its determination
to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean region. It considers the
ability of some countries including India to block its trade route by
blocking the Strait of Malacca – the “Malacca Dilemma,” as the greatest
94 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
threat to its development and prosperity. This threat manifests itself
through its ever increasing establishment of bases along the length of
Indian Ocean Region.
The Chinese presence in and around the Malacca Strait in the
Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea should be a cause of
concern for the Indian decision makers. Some of the major moves by
China that threatens Indian interest, especially in and around the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands are described in the succeeding
paragraphs.
80 per cent of China’s resource imports and exports of finished
goods have to pass through the Strait of Malacca. The Chinese believe,
and rightly so that – whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will control
its energy route through the IOR. In order to secure its energy and
trade routes, China over the years has initiated steps to enhance its
naval capacity and capability. This author can recall how way back in
2002-2005 during his tenure as the Military and Air Attaché at Embassy
of Ukraine, China bought the 70 per cent completed under construction
aircraft carrier ‘Varyag’ from Ukraine under false pretenses of utilizing
it as a floating casino through a Hong Kong based businessman. This
vessel was under construction at the bankrupt state-owned Ukrainian
shipyard at the time of disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was later
taken over by China’s armed forces, refurbished and launched as China’s
first aircraft carrier in 2012 – “Liaoning.”
China has been funding and executing construction of new ports/
modernizing existing ports in a large number of countries along the
Indian Ocean Region that form a part of its Maritime Silk Route
initiative.
There have been reports of China developing runways and other
monitoring infrastructure at Coco Island (Myanmar). If true, then their
presence so close to the ANI, would provide it with tremendous
advantage.
It is modernizing the Chittagong Port (Bangladesh) and attempting
to get a preferential access to it. It is also funding the modernisation of
Mongla port and is competing with Japan for construction of a deep
water port at Sonadia. It has been providing military hardware to
Bangladesh over the years and is now has provided submarines recently.
Construction of Hambantota port marked the beginning of the
establishment of “string of pearls” in the IOR. China is also supporting
Sri Lanka in establishment of the South Colombo Port’s, Colombo
International Container Terminal (CICT) under a BOT contract. Visits
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 95
by Chinese warships and submarines have reinforced this belief i.e.
Chinese objectives in Sri Lanka may not be merely commercial.
Pakistan has always been a Chinese proxy and the recipient of
enormous Chinese aid and investment. The Gwadar Deep Sea Port
(GDSP) and CPEC (a US$ 46 billion project) linking Gwadar with
China through road and pipeline passing through the Indian territory of
Gilgit, Baltistan and Pak occupied Kashmir (PoK) are the latest examples
of the same. The Pak military has acquired a large number of different
types of naval platforms like ships and submarines from China making
them dependent on the Chinese military hardware. Gwadar, located
close to Strait of Hormuz provides excellent support to the PLAN
(People’s Liberation Army Navy) in its operations in the IOR.
With Malaysia, China has recently commenced construction of a
new off-shore trading port in Malacca called as the Melaka Gateway,
with an aim to replace Singapore as the main trading port of SE Asia.
According to projections, 100,000 shipping vessels are likely to dock
at the port, without having to stop by the monopoly route held by
Singapore over the past few centuries. The Melaka Gateway will provide
China a foothold of permanent presence in Malacca Straits and would
allow the area to be kept under constant surveillance. This would also
provide them opportunity also to monitor all other traffic and possibly
enforce unlawful maritime control regimes thereby, effectively shrinking
the manoeuvering space for US and Indian Navies.
It has increased its conventional and nuclear submarine patrols in
the IOR since 2009. It has exploited the opportunity of deployments in
anti-piracy operations off the Somalia coast to maintain its presence in
the IOR as well as test and train its ability to deploy its navy in distant
waters sending even nuclear submarines into Indian Ocean.
Thus, it is clearly evident that China is highly dependent on the
choke point of Malacca Strait apart from others in the Indian Ocean
Region for its resources. While on one hand this shows its limitations
on oceanic imports, on the other hand its attempts to modernization of
the PLAN, establishment of bases in the IOR along with forward
presence submarine capabilities, is indicative of China seeking to secure
the routes of supply.
Thus, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located close to these critical
maritime choke points is an extremely valuable geopolitical asset for
India that provides it with huge geographical and strategic advantage in
the Indian Ocean Region. The significance of these islands lies in the
fact that the southernmost island of the chain is just 90 km from
96 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Indonesia. This location of these islands allows India to play into China’s
psyche by creating an Indian version of the Western Pacific’s first-
island chain. Yet successive Indian governments have been slow to act,
even after appreciating the importance of these islands and declaring
their intention to develop them. They continue to treat these islands as
a distant outpost rather than leveraging their unique location at the very
center of one of the most strategic stretches of ocean space.
Over the past decade, in spite of having declared our intention to
beef up the infrastructure, bare minimum action was initiated. The 21st
century change in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region demands
a change in the Indian Maritime Strategy and the need to focus on
developing these islands as a strategic asset. On a positive note, it is
heartening to see a change in the strategic thinking and re-evaluation of
the government policies towards these islands. The present Indian
government has awakened to the likelihood of a profound Chinese
engagement in the Indian Ocean.
Acknowledging the strategic importance of ANI and appreciating
the Chinese Indian Ocean strategy, Prime Minister Modi has taken the
initiative and is paying a considerable amount of attention to the overall
maritime security of India and development of ANI in particular.
However, the government needs to push the bureaucracy to fast forward
decision-making for projecting both, soft and hard power into the region
and signal China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy about its willingness
to counter any misdemeanour.
Andaman & Nicobar Islands is located over 1200 km east of the
Indian mainland. The topography of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
has a typical character with the presence of 572 islands and islets,
spread over a length of 720 km in a broken chain which form
geologically a part of the land mass of South East Asia including,
North East India, Myanmar, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Only
37 of these islands are inhabited. This island chain can be classified
into two groups of islands with the North Andaman, Middle Andaman,
South Andaman and Little Andaman forming the Andaman group, and
Great Nicobar, Car Nicobar, Nancowry, Katchal and Chowra forming
the Nicobar group. This archipelago of 572 islands covers an area of
8249 square kilometres.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands have a coast line of 1962 kms
and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Islands is 6 lakh sq.
kilometers amounting about 28 per cent of the EEZ of the country. The
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 97
EEZ of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is known to provide vast
scope for exploitation of the fishery resources in the Islands. The huge
advantage thrown up by these islands provides India with tremendous
economic potential for tourism, fisheries, forests and to enable India to
add about 30 per cent of its additional EEZ which needs to be exploited.
However, the remoteness of ANI makes them susceptible to
conventional threats in general and non-conventional threats in particular.
Although the present geopolitical and security environment in the region
does not indicate any major immediate conventional threat, this could
change. Regular incursions by Chinese Naval ships and submarines in
these waters along with their attempt to enhance influence in the region
remain a potential cause of concern and will only increase. China
could exploit the logistic support established by it through its ‘String of
Pearls’ along the length of the Indian Ocean Region to plan mischief in
the uninhabited islands of ANI in the not-so-distant future.
The immediate challenges confronting these islands emanate from
non-conventional threats such as poaching of marine and forest
resources, illegal migration, arms smuggling and natural disasters in
particular earthquakes and tsunamis. The increase of illegal human
trafficking, drug trade, spread of terrorism, extremism and smuggling
requires to be curbed by strengthening the security establishment and
boosting local trade. Numerous islands are devoid of human presence
which makes them vulnerable to narcotics smuggling, intrusion by
foreign vessels, and other incursions. There is an urgent requirement to
give India a stronger physical foothold in the region. The Ten Degree
Channel is about 80 nautical miles wide requiring a close watch to be
kept over the movement of ships and military vessels that pass through
these waters. Surveillance in the southern group of islands is a major
challenge due to lack of road infrastructure and communication facilities.
Moreover, construction activity is restricted to just about six months a
year due to heavy rainfall. The pace of development is extremely slow
and needs to be handled with a strategic perspective at Delhi.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths
India’s aspirations of furthering its economic, political and military
interests in the Indian Ocean Region/ the Asia-Pacific region, especially
in the presence of an assertive China which is progressively becoming
more active in the region, can be realised through the Andaman and
98 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Nicobar Islands. It is high time India seizes this opportunity to develop
the islands as a hub or a ‘spring board’ for power projection on priority.
The ever increasing Chinese influence in the littorals can be counter
balanced by the Indian push towards development of Andaman and
Nicobar Islands using the ‘Sagar Mala’ initiative.
A combination of geographical location straddling the choke point
of Malacca Straits at a distance of over 1200 km from the Indian
mainland and the 750 km North to South spread of the makes ANI a
valuable geo-political asset in the 21st century by playing a crucial role
in the maritime competition of the region.
The EEZ of ANI has significant potential for growth and
development of fishing and mining of undersea resources so crucial to
the economy of the nation.
Location and potential for development of tourism are important
strengths of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Close proximity to the
busiest international trade routes of other South East Asian countries
along with intrinsic natural and rich sources assists in leveraging the
‘Act East’ policy.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands has the potential of being
developed as a container transhipment port, for the international/ national
ships passing through the Ten Degree Channel.
These islands could provide multiple military options for India to
keep the busiest sea lanes under surveillance and for power projection.
Development and strengthening of military infrastructure in Andaman
and Nicobar Islands can provide the potential to balance the grave
uncertainties surrounding China’s maritime intentions and influence in
the Indian Ocean. These islands have the potential to balance the Chinese
influence through tracking Chinese and other extra regional powers
movements and keeping these under surveillance.
The islands provide an ideal setting for progressing jointness in
the Indian Armed Forces.
Weaknesses
Isolation from the mainland, dispersed islands, environmental constraints
including sensitivities towards Tribal Reserves, National Parks and
Wildlife sanctuaries lead to consequent limited availability of land are
the major factors inhibiting development of ANI in its entirety.
All developmental activity in ANI including defence infrastructure
and tourism has to be sensitive to ecological fragility.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 99
Application of environmental restriction similar to that of the
mainland to these unique islands is a major constraint in availability of
land and infrastructure development
Another major weakness is that the existing force deployment and
infrastructure as also organizational perspectives including jointness
are inhibiting the capability building and development of full force
potential of the Andaman and Nicobar Command. This is a major
organizational weakness.
Non-availability of proper telecommunication and poor air and sea
connectivity impacts economic and strategic development activities
which ultimately lead to non-availability of a proper industrial base.
Andaman and Nicobar Islands face greater challenges to their
internal security through non-conventional threats such as illegal
migration from littoral states of the Bay of Bengal, poaching of marine
and forest resources, arms and narcotics smuggling through uninhabited
islands and natural disasters
Strategic Options and Policy Recommendation
Long Term Strategic Options
The Chinese initiatives outlined above, demands an urgent shift in the
strategic thinking of India to Act Eastwards and develop the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands in order to secure the SLOCs, exploit the Chinese
weakness in Malacca and force projection as and when required. The
available time frame of about five years or so, when the Chinese
modernization plan is likely to be in the advance stage of fructifying,
will not permit the holistic development of the islands – economic and
infrastructure development and allocation of additional defence
resources. As developing the islands will be a long drawn effort, India
needs to leverage its ability to influence the regional countries, in
particular with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia
among other littorals both politically and militarily to limit the Chinese
challenge – basically to buy time to build up the islands to a credible
deterrence level.
Broad Policy Recommendations
As India’s power and influence grows in the Indian Ocean Region as
well as the global level, the government and its national security
policymaking have to keep pace with fast changing geopolitical
100 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
environment and harness the potential of Andaman and Nicobar Islands
to protect its larger interests.
The wide gap between the ambition to develop these islands and
the ground reality requires to be bridged through a strong political will,
strategic vision, effective leadership and focused attention.
Policy initiatives must include practical and developmental
orientation towards environmental and tribal issues for overall strategic
development of the islands. Long-term strategy for sustainable
development is the need of the hour.
There is an urgent need to enhance connectivity in its entirety –
Air Link, Shipping including ports/ ships and Communication.
Develop the long awaited Container transshipment port as a strategic
asset, irrespective of economic/ environmental considerations.
Make the islands self-sustaining as far as possible, through development
of Tourism, Fisheries, Agriculture, small-scale industries based on local
inputs. Tourism, fisheries and exploitation of sea based resources in the
EEZ is to be encouraged on priority.
The likelihood of escalation of current non-conventional threats to
conventional threat in future should be the underlying theme of
enhancing the security of these islands.
Threat assessment and corresponding force allocation should be a
joint decision at the level of Chiefs of Staff Committee for the Joint
Command and approved by Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
Entire resources in terms of force levels, maintenance, infrastructure
and funds for these resources are to be allocated separately to HQ
Andaman and Nicobar Command.
The strategic importance of these islands that stand sentinel astride
the major SLOCs and choke point of Indian Ocean Region demands
that the Andaman and Nicobar Command be given the priority it
warrants. The current force levels are inadequate for the task allotted.
A lot more is required to be done to unlock the potential of its location.
The government needs to provide it with the much needed bare minimum
force-levels and infrastructure at a rapid pace, if it wants to leverage
the Command as a pivot to secure the sea lanes and counter China’s
strategic moves in region.
Conclusion
It is true that India has traditionally been grappling with land based
threats and has always had a north and west ward looking philosophy.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 101
The concept of ocean based strategy was absent from the Indian strategic
thinking. However, now it’s ‘Act East’ policy has begun to mature. In
this overstretched strategically important space of the Indian Ocean
Region, India is located at the tri-junction of Western, Southern and
Southeast Asia. It enjoys a strategic centrality, dominating the Indian
Ocean Region and its SLOCs making it the biggest stake holder in the
region. Therefore, India has self-interest in the security of this geo-
strategic maritime area.
While India cannot stop China from entering into the Indian Ocean,
it needs to strengthen its strategic assets. It needs to focus on a holistic
development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands through a combination
of strategic investments and increasing military strength in the Andaman
and Nicobar Command to counter China. The Chinese forays in to the
Indian Ocean should be taken as a wake-up call in terms of Indian
preparedness in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. If India fails to use
its geographic advantages in the region, it will face an emboldened
PLAN. The geostrategic position of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
makes them central to any Indian response to rising Chinese influence
in the Indian Ocean Region. Fortifying the Andaman-Nicobar Islands
would be the first step toward a more robust Indian Ocean strategy.
The significance of developing these islands, therefore, cannot be
overemphasized especially in the fast developing maritime dynamics in
the region. India must take advantage of its geography, specifically of
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
(Based on and includes excerpts from the book Strategic Vision
2030 – Security and Development of Andaman and Nicobar Islands
Coauthored by Air Marshal P. K. Roy and Commodore Aspi Cawasjee
published by Vij Publications as a part of research at USI, India.)
102 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Nature and Implication ofRadhakrishnan’s Idealism
Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan is fully devoted to the traditions of absolute
idealism. He draws sustenance from Upanisads, Vedanta, Tagore and
Gandhi on the one hand, and Pluto, Plotinus, Bradley and Whitehead
on the other. He has the rare virtue of being well versed in the great
traditions of both the east and the west. He has the intellectual calibre
to be at ease with the two traditions, and to evolve a philosophy of
synthesis. But his fundamental convictions are deeply rooted in Indian
traditions. The seminal notions of his own philosophy are generally
derived from the ancient Indian philosophy – particularly from the
Vedântic tradition, but he has a knack of presenting such ideas into
idioms and models of western thought. C.E.M. Joad, in his book
Counter attacks from the East, describes Radhakrishnan’s metaphysical
standpoint as “the function, the unique function which Radhakrishnan
fulfils today is that of a liaison officer. He seeks to build a bridge
between the traditional wisdom of the east and the new knowledge and
energy of the west.”1 He began his intellectual career with a firm
determination to expound the justification of ethical life of Hinduism.
He has refuted the charge that Hinduism bristles with contradictions at
the metaphysical plane and has also shown that the mystical flights of
Hinduism are not necessarily negation of worldly life. He has his eyes
turned both on Sreyas and Preyas – the transcendent beyond and the
mundane here and now.2 He remarks that “Hinduism is a movement,
not a position; a process, not a result; a growing tradition, not a fixed
revelation. Its past history encourages us to believe that it will be found
* Dr. Sanjay Kumar Shukla, Associate Professor, Philosophy Department, Ewing
Christian College, Gaughat, Allahabad-211003 (Uttar Pradesh).
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 103
equal to any emergency that the future may throw up, whether in the
field of thought or of history.”3 Its theme is unity amidst plurality and
diversity. For him Hinduism has a comprehensive character because it
believes in a variety of interpretations for reality and thereby offers a
counterpoise to sectarian prejudices and fanatical intolerance.4
Radhakrishnan could discover identity of fundamental spiritual and
moral principles in Hinduism and other religions of the world.
The philosophy of Radhakrishnan represents the synthesis of
Advaita Vedanta and Bradley’s philosophy of absolute idealism. He
takes up the monistic character of former that reality is one, and endorses
the latter view that everything is a necessary aspect of the one organic
whole. His philosophy can be described as a philosophy of ‘monistic
idealism.’ The metaphysical idealism is a prominent trait of his
philosophy for two reasons:
1. The ultimate reality is spiritual in nature.
2. It believes that there is a spiritual ideal towards which the
entire world process is progressing. An idealist, in this sense,
is a teleologist who believes in the ultimate meaning and
purpose of the universe.
He has made a serious effort to demonstrate that the ultimate nature
of the universe is spiritual, and that unless the spiritual sense is
awakened, man’s life will remain chaotic – a life of anguish and evil.
He finds absolute idealism to be most convincing and he declares “the
system which plays the game of philosophy fairly and squarely, with
freedom from presuppositions and with religious neutrality, ends in
absolute idealism.” The absolute (Brahman) is the pure, alone and
unmanifest, nothing and all thing, that transcends any definite form of
expression and yet is the basis of all expression, the one in whom all is
found and yet all is lost. Radhakrishnan also adheres to the conceptual
distinction between God (Isvara) and the Absolute (Brahman).
Samkaracarya maintains that God as the supreme personal spirit is
lower than the Absolute, the former is called the lower Brahman
(Aparabrahman) as distinguished from the latter, which is called the
higher Brahman (Parabrahman). The lower Brahman continues to exist,
so long as the world continues to exist.5 For Radhakrishnan the naive
distinction of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ to the spiritual realms shows the
pathetic attempt of the human mind to incorporate the notions of feudal
and despotic society in the domain of transcendent. He maintains that
“God is the definitization of the Absolute in reference to the values of
the world,” is more plausible statement although that may offend the
104 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
theistic position. If ultimate reality is the impersonal Absolute, of whom
nothing positive can be predicated, what value can we attach to the
concept of a personal God? Radhakrishnan’s reply is that the personal
God does answer to certain intense needs. “We cannot worship the
Absolute whom no one had seen or can see, who dwells in the light that
no one can approach unto.”6 The finite mind can picture the Absolute
only in the form of God. The conception of a personal God is the
fusion of the highest logical thought with the deepest religious
conviction. The supra-personal and the personal representations of the
real are the absolute and the relative way of expressing the one reality.
“Absolute and God” are not mutually exclusive concepts, rather they
are related. The Absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God, and God is
the Absolute from the cosmic point of view.”7
Radhakrishnan maintains that the main function of a philosophical
inquiry is to provide the explanation of the universe. The explaining
principle has to be ultimately real because it has to work as the basis
for everything real. In conceiving the nature of ultimate reality he leans
heavily on the Vedânta. The Advaita Vedânta conceives the ultimate
reality as the Brahman, which is the logical prius of the universe. The
naturalists might assert at this juncture that there is no need of positing
any super-natural or spiritual principle for explaining the universe
because everything can be easily explained naturally. Radhakrishnan
condemns the naturalistic standpoint as “it looks upon the world as a
sort of an automatic machine which goes on working in a blind
haphazard way. It reduces the temporal world to unconscious forces,
makes life, consciousness and value mere by-products. It believes that
the world machine needs only to be taken to pieces to be
comprehended.”8 He, therefore, asserts that the naturalistic explanation
fails to appreciate the nature of ultimate reality as any principle which
tries to explain it is bound to be a spiritual principle. The Absolute is
conceived by Radhakrishnan as “pure consciousness, pure freedom and
infinite possibility.” Whereas the first two characters have been
described, more or less, in the Vedantic manner, the third character has
been explained in terms of Hegelian idealism. The Absolute is pure
consciousness, because consciousness is the most ineffable and the
constantly existing phenomenon. We cannot think of any stage of
existence without relating it to consciousness. It is an infinite possibility
because infinite worlds could arise or manifest from it; the universe is
only one possibility of the Absolute. It is pure freedom because its act
of actualising a possibility is not determined by anything, it is a free
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 105
act. It could have created a world different in every detail from that
which is actual. The Absolute is free infinite spirit and its nature is
changeless, eternal and completely perfect. It is the whole of perfection
while everything else is imperfect. There may be degrees of perfection
but the wholly perfect is the Absolute. For Radhakrishnan the Absolute
is beyond all its expressions. He says: “Pure being which is the Absolute
can only be indicated. It can be alluded to but not described.”9
II
Radhakrishnan’s owes allegiance to Advaitic metaphysics which has
subtle differences regarding Absolute and God. Samkarâcârya makes
such distinction on the basis of transcendental (Pârmârathika Drsti)
and empirical point of view (Vyâvahârika Drsti). Radhakrishnan does
not subscribe to the distinction between Absolute and God on the basis
of these two points of view of Vedânta. He feels that in order to explain
the universe it is necessary to think of a principle that would account
for the order and purpose of the universe. Like Whitehead,
Radhakrishnan also believes that one cannot account for the dynamic
and creative character of the universe if the Primary Being is also not
conceived as creative. He feels, like Whitehead, that there has to be a
principle, a God – a non-temporal and actual being – by which the
indeterminates of creativity can be transmuted into a determinate
principle. This shows that the Divine Intelligence – the creative power–
has to be conceived as intermediary between the Absolute Being and
the cosmic process. This shows that, unlike Samkarâcârya,
Radhakrishnan is not prepared to reduce God to unreality by making it
a product of mâyâ (mâyopâdhika) and ignorance (avidyâ). The real as
infinite possibility is the Absolute, but when we limit the Absolute to
its relation with that possibility which has actually been realized in the
form of creation, then the Absolute appears as God. God actualizes the
possibility of creation through supreme intelligence and wisdom. God
loves, creates and rules us. Creation, redemption and judgment are
different names for the fact of God.10 The clarification regarding the
relation between God and creation by him is deeply influenced with
‘Process Theodicy’ of Whitehead. Radhakrishnan, like him, endorses
the organic relationship between God and the world as it is literally
impossible to detach God from the world. If the universe is truly creative
then God must also remain constantly creative. God also grows with
the universe by giving it a constant direction towards the goal which it
106 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
seeks to attain. There remains an ‘unrealized residuum’ in God
throughout the process of creation, which makes him transcend the
universe. Perhaps in the end this unrealized residuum would vanish,
but then the purpose of this creation would be complete, God then will
recede into the background of Absolute. Hence, the beginning and the
end are limiting conceptions, and the great interest of the world centres
in the intermediate process from the beginning to the end.11
If the world is the actualisation of one of the infinite possibilities
then it is an accident of the Absolute. The accidental nature of the
world is philosophically significant in Radhakrishnan’s thought as:
1. It succeeds in maintaining the monistic character of the real
and also its free nature.
2. It enables Radhakrishnan to emphasize the distinction between
the creator and the created.
3. Although the world is an accident but at the same time real
also. It is accidental because it is an accidental actualisation
of one of the infinite possibilities of the Absolute, it is real
because it is the Absolute’s accident.
Radhakrishnan describes the world in terms of certain
characteristics:
A. It is an ordered whole that means nature is a system of
relationship intimately inter-dependent.
B. There is a tendency towards a greater interaction or inter-
relatedness between the organism and its surrounding
environment.
C. World is expressed in terms of matter, life and mind as grades
of experience. They are all expressions of reality, yet they
express the reality in their own ways.
D. The world is dynamic in nature. Nature is always active, never
satisfied with the levels it has achieved, it always aspires to
other levels. This gives rise to a doctrine similar to that of
emergent evolution. Radhakrishnan’s famous expression
‘unpredictable novelties occur’ points out that there must
emerge new qualities at every moment of creation. If the world
is continuously changing then it can be only divided in phases
and not in parts. He says: “We donot have realms or spheres
of being, but only modes or phases of activity. The process of
nature is one, supple and continues, and not a constructive
series of static entities with fixed attributes.”12
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 107
In his essay on ‘Radhakrishnan’s Metaphysics and Ethics,’ Charles
Moore remarks: “His theory is that which any sound absolute idealism
must hold, namely that the Absolute is the only ultimate and complete
reality and the empirical world is clearly a secondary reality, relative
and dependent, but that the empirical world is not for that reason
unreal.”13 In fact Radhakrishnan insists that if the philosophy of
Samkarâcârya rationally interpreted, cannot be regarded as an outright
repudiation of the worldly reality. In his defence of this assertion he is
led to examine the concept of Mâyâ. He believes that the doctrine of
Mâyâ, like the negative description of the Brahman, has been employed
by Indian thinkers with a definite purpose. The purpose is to “denote
the distance between time and eternity, between appearance and reality.”
Mâyâ signifies the “fragility of the universe.”14 the phenomenal character
of the empirical self and the world answering to it. Mâyâ does not
mean that the empirical world, with the selves in it, is an illusion, for
the whole effort of the cosmos is directed to and sustained by the one
Supreme Self. The implication of Mâyâ doctrine is not only that the
nature of the Absolute is indefinable but his relation with the empirical
world is equally indefinable. There is another aspect of this doctrine to
which Radhakrishnan has often drawn attention. This is the aspect of
mystery, which appeals to the poetic and imaginative side of human
nature. The Absolute is the “ideal home of infinite possibilities.”15 It
simply suggests the inability of human mind to fathom the mystery.
“Mâyâ does not imply that the world is an illusion or is non-existent
absolutely. The world is a delimitation distinct from the unmeasured
and immeasurable. But why is there this delimitation? The question
cannot be answered so long as we are at the empirical level.” The
theory of Mâyâ is only a continuation of the effort to distinguish the
highest reality from lower grades of reality, to imprint upon the human
mind the difference between the absolute and the conditioned truth.
Hence, the aim of conceiving Mâyâ is practical – to transfer attention
from that which is transitory to that which is the source of all values.
Radhakrishnan has made attempt to respond to two puzzling
questions. A. the question with regard to the ‘why’ of creation and B.
the question regarding the nature of creator. It is in response to the
second question that he has introduced the concept of God in his
philosophy and he tries to utilize the Vedântic concept of Mâyâ. It is
described as the creative power of God. God is Absolute, viewed from
the point of the view of the world. It appears to be God from the view
point of one possibility that has been actualised. Radhakrishnan, while
108 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
responding to the first question that is the ‘why’ of creation, takes the
clue from Upanisadic thought. In the Upanisad creation has been
described as the Lilâ of the Absolute. Lilâ is described as a joyful and
sporting game in which certain limitations are imposed upon oneself
just for the sake of joy. Radhakrishnan also maintains that creation is
Lilâ, but he adds that it is real. He has to face here logical difficulty. If
creation is a real Lilâ, then it follows that creation is necessary to the
Absolute, and in that case, the free character of the reality is affected.
In reply to that it has to be accepted that it is difficult to appreciate at
this point a clear-cut distinction between ‘necessity’ and ‘accident;’ but
according to Radhakrishnan, such a distinction is unwarrented in the
context of reality. Therefore, it can be safely stated that “it is in the
nature of the Absolute to grow into the world – the world is the
affirmation of the Absolute.”16 In that sense creation is necessary, but it
is not necessary for the Absolute to have this very creation, and therefore
creation is an accident. Radhakrishnan, suggests that the etymology of
the word ‘Brahma’ also supports, this view, as it is derived from ‘Brh,’
which means ‘to grow.’ The question as to why the Absolute limits
itself..... is irrelevant. For, there is no such thing as the infinite which
was previously infinite and then transformed itself in the finite. “We do
not have the infinite and the finite, God and the world, but only the
infinite as and in the finite, God as and in the world.”17
III
It is in fitness of things to analyse now the nature of the man as we
have already discussed about the Absolute, God and the ontic status of
world. Radhakrishnan tries to remain faithful to the Indian tradition,
and as such, is convinced about the ultimate spirituality of man. But he
is also aware of the fact that man is a biological-psychological being
determined by his instincts, drives and motives. Truly speaking man is
a peculiar combination of egoism and self-transcendence, of selfishness
and universal love. Radhakrishnan maintains that the physical or
biological aspect of man also has a reality, but that it does not contradict
the ultimate spiritual nature of the soul. Radhakrishnan pointed out that
there are two aspects of man – one that leads the scientist to describe
man in his own scientific way, and the other that transcends the capacity
of scientific analysis. It is not proper to characterise these aspects of
man in the terminology of ‘body’ and ‘soul,’ because that gives the
impression that the soul represents only such characters that are clearly
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 109
absent in the body. It is better to call these two aspects as the finite and
the infinite aspects of man. The finite aspects are by and large aspects
of the body, but even the bodily aspects of man give the evidence of
the presence of the spirituality in them. Man unlike other aspects of
Nature, has the capacity to reflect and to plan his move. This is what
Radhakrishnan means by the expression ‘self-transcendence.’ Man can
go beyond himself, can aspire to heights much beyond his ordinary
reach. For him the finite aspects of man are those aspects that are
determined by empirical or environmental conditions. In a general way,
the bodily self can be described as representing this aspect of man.
There is a constant influx of stimuli from the environment and the
behaviour and the character of the individual can strictly be determined
in terms of the responses that the individual makes to these stimuli. But
the bodily aspect, although real, is only a stage that has to be
transcended. Radhakrishnan remarks that man’s awareness of his finitude
and temporality means his consciousness of eternity. “Man’s inability
to achieve perfect contentment in the finite, his unquenchable longing
for consummate happiness may be taken as indicative of his supernatural
destiny.”18
The true nature of self is revealed by the capacity of self-
transcendence. The infinite aspect of man lies in his spirituality. The
word ‘spiritual’ stands for something higher than the ‘empirical.’ In the
empirical domain a distinction is made between the ‘subject’ and the
‘object,’ but in the spiritual realm such kind of duality is ultimately
transcended or obliterated. Self-consciousness refers to the infinite aspect
of man and it gives to an individual a distinct personality. Thus, by
calling man a spiritual being Radhakrishnan means that he is a self-
conscious person who is able to unite all his experiences and activities
in his act of self-consciousness. It is on account of this capacity of
unification that he can foresee his future and make plans for spiritual
growth. He described this as an aspect of the Divine. The very fact that
we are dissatisfied with our present status and there is constant striving
or spiritual urge to attain greater heights shows that we bear the Divine
spark within ourselves. In fact, all our spiritual activities, aesthetic or
moral or religious are expressions of the fact of kinship between man’s
nature and Divine nature. Radhakrishnan frequently refers to the great
intuitive (mystical) experiences of the prophets like Jesus, Buddha,
Zoraster and Mohammad, and asserts that these clearly show that we
are capable of experiencing the Divine. The very longing of limited
and finite creature like man for liberation (Moksa) is itself an evidence
110 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
of the presence of spirituality within him. Yet another very convincing
proof of man’s Divine nature is the fact that even the most immoral and
wicked person can also be reformed. The history of evolution is the
history of gradual unfoldment of spiritual capacities latent in man.
Hence, Radhakrishnan feels that the true nature of man consists in
spirituality and which is, in a sense, akin to Divine nature.
Freedom is considered to be one of the most important
characteristics of the spiritual man. It is generally considered as freedom
of choice, but Radhakrishnan’s treatment of freedom is more
comprehensive than this; it includes this meaning and adds, something
more. Freedom implies a particular metaphysical status of man, that is
the soul (self) is metaphysically free. It simply means that the nature of
self is not determined by any extraneous factor. He can create original
works of art, build structures, express his creative genius in art, music
and science. Freedom also means that man is free to choose his own
course of life and action, it means that the future of man depends to a
great extent on man himself. Radhakrishnan believes in the doctrine of
Karma. One may raise a doubt here by saying that the law of Karma is
the determining factor of a life, and as such soul’s tendencies and states
are after all determined.
Radhakrishnan dispels this doubt in a simple and straightforward
manner:
1. He says that karma and freedom are not incompatible with
each other because the karmas are karmas performed by the
self. Freedom is self-determination and being determined by
one’s own karma is nothing but self-determination.
2. He pointed out that there are two aspects of Karma – a
retrospective aspect that has a connection with the past and
the prospective aspect that has its influence on the future.
Radhakrishnan has made a very pertinent observation in this context:
“The cards in the game of life are given to us, we do not select them.
They are all traced to our past karmas, but we can call as we please,
lead all suit we will, and as we play we gain or lose and that is
freedom.”19 He also believes in doctrine of rebirth. He is well aware
that it is difficult to understand the mechanism of rebirth fully, but an
awareness of the unfulfilled urges and tendencies in the purposive set-
up of the universe compels us to think about some possible forms of
life after death just only to provide yet another opportunity for the
realization of the unrealized urges. There is a logical nexus between
the doctrine of Karma and the doctrine of Punarjanma and Liberation
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 111
(Moksa) is considered to be the supreme value or ideal of human life in
Purusârtha. Liberation is freeing oneself from the cycle of repeated
birth and death and for this reason doctrine of rebirth has to be admitted.
The most general ground for rejecting a belief in rebirth is that there is
no evidence of anybody having any memory of the previous birth. But
Radhakrishnan remarks that lack of memory about the past birth is not
an adequate ground for rejecting the belief in rebirth. No body has any
memory of his existence in his mother’s womb, but that does not mean
that it is not a state of existence.
IV
Man is a finite – infinite being. Even in his finite embodied existence
his spirituality asserts itself. This shows that the ‘being’ of man is a
continuous march towards the realization of the higher spiritual state.
Moksa is conceived as a state free from suffering or a state of bliss – a
state in which one is able to realize one’s true nature. Radhakrishnan
also conceives this state more or less in a similar manner, but his
conception of the ultimate human destiny bears the mark of his own
metaphysical predilections, and therefore appears refreshingly new and
original. For him so long as man is in the embodied state he cannot
attain his ultimate destiny. The first aspect of his destiny would be
freedom from the embodied existence. But although that may make
him free, that will not put an end to creation; and so long as cosmic
process does not come to an end, complete unity will not be established.
Therefore, the final aspect of his destiny must be the realization of his
unity at the end of the cosmic process. “The destiny of the human soul
is to realize its oneness with the Supreme.”20 This can be also described
as self-realization, because it is the fullest expression of the higher
nature of the self. The infinite aspect of the self bears the mark of the
creator (Divine) and reminds the self perpetually of his real nature. The
attainment of this state opens before the self the possibility of a new
kind of experience – the experience of the Universal – of the One
which expresses itself everywhere. Faint glimpses of such an experience
can be found in artistic or aesthetic or ethical sensibility. One of its
clearest examples is in the mystical experience of gifted saints and
seers. In the realization of unity one feels the presence of one spirit in
all minds, lives and bodies, and therefore, the life of the self becomes
almost as comprehensive as the universe itself. Radhakrishnan seems
to be impressed by ancient Indian concept of Jivanmukta, but describes
it in his own peculiar way. The liberated individual is the Jivanmukta
112 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
as he does not have any passion or attachment left for the worldly
possession, and as such acts in a selfless and disinterested manner and
works simply for the good of others. The Advaitic tradition believes
that the ‘Jivanmukta’ becomes ‘Videhmukta’ as soon as he is free from
the fetters of the body which, as a result of the momentum generated
by the forces of karma, has continued to exist even after the attainment
of liberation by the self. According to Radhakrishnan this is not necessary
course of action. He feels that even when an individual has attained
liberation, his task is not complete; he has now to play a part in the
liberation of others.
It is not necessary for the liberated individual to be fully free from
rebirth. He lives and moves in the world for the liberation of others and
for that purpose it becomes essential for him to assume different bodily
forms. The only thing is that he has become finally free from the
bondage of love and passion for life and fear of death. Hence, even
when an individual is liberated, he does not become free from the
cosmic process till others are liberated. The world process will reach
its final goal when every individual will realize Divinity. Therefore, the
ultimate human destiny is not individual liberation (Mukti) but universal
liberation (Sarvamukti). There is a very interesting issue regarding
liberation that whether individuality of the individual is lost or
individuality is retained in that state. For Radhakrishnan realization is
realization of one’s true nature, and in that sense it cannot be denial of
individuality. Moreover, even after attaining liberation, an individual
has to stay as an individual in the world and has to work for the
liberation of others. This also depicts that the individuality of the
individual is not obliterated. This can be further proved on the ground
that the individual after liberation realizes Divinity, but the individual
does not become the Supreme – the identity of the two is not established
in an objective manner. How can man attain the ultimate human destiny?
It is the serious question which is well responded by Radhakrishnan.
He maintains that one must begin with a faith – a faith in religious
experience, because that alone is capable of making man realize his
spirituality. It is called an experience because it produces an objective
awareness – an apprehension of the real coupled with an enjoyment – a
sort of an inner satisfaction. It is called religious because of its peculiar
nature – a uniqueness that cannot be reduced to any other forms of
experience. Its peculiarity consists in its attempt to discover eternal
truths, in its effort to raise the life-spirit to some higher spiritual level.
It is a quest for the emancipation of mankind from the compulsions of
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 113
finite existence. Radhakrishnan asserts that one must have a faith in the
reality and significance of such experiences. We witness that now-a-
days it has almost become fashion to dismiss all talks about such
experiences as purely imaginative or nonsensical. He remarks that
“However much we may quarrel about the implications of this kind of
experience, we cannot question the actuality of such experience itself.”21
Radhakrishnan further pointed out that “The witness to this spiritual
life is borne not only by the great religious teachers and leaders of
mankind, but by the ordinary man in the street in whose inmost being
the well of the spirit is set asleep. In our normal experience events
occur which imply the existence of a spiritual world.”22 He further
remarks, “when we experience the illumination of new knowledge, the
ecstasy of poetry, the subordination of self to something greater; family
or nation, the self-abandonment of falling in love, we have faint glimpses
of mystic moods.”23
Radhakrishnan furnishes the characteristics of religious experience
as:
1. It is an experience; that means firstly that it is not something
extra-ordinary or supernatural, secondly that every man is
capable of it, and thirdly that it involves an awareness of
objective kind.
2. It is an integral and undivided consciousness which
distinguishes it from ordinary experience. In ordinary
experience the duality of the subject and the object is always
maintained, but in religious experience such kind of distinction
is obliterated. In the fullness of felt life and freedom the
distinction of the knower and the known disappears.
3. It is autonomous in character in so far as it is an independent
function of the mind. It is not in any way determined by
extraneous factors, rather its inspiration are inner and
spontaneous.
4. Religious experience is inward and personal, and here
Radhakrishnan seems to be deeply impressed by Whitehead’s
‘Religion in the making.’ It is an experience developed in the
human inwardness, it is a life being lived in subjectivity.
5. The peculiarity of this experience is that it somehow shows an
attitude of complete indifference towards worldly possession.
This experience shows an intense dissatisfaction with ‘the
finiteness of the finite and the transiency of the transient,’ and
therefore, constantly aims at the attainment of perfection.
114 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
6. Religious experience, Radhakrishnan remarks, is the total
reaction of the whole man to the whole reality. It involves the
whole of the subject, and the reaction of him in the experience
is not towards any particular aspect of the reality, but to the
reality as a whole “The privacy of the individual self is broken
into and invaded by the universal self which the individual
feels his own.”24 Radhakrishnan further remarks that “it is a
vision which is the precious possession of the soul coming out
in life on every side.”25 Here ‘on every side’ signifies that it is
not mere knowing or feeling, rather it is a total reaction of the
total man including the intellectual, moral and aesthetic aspects
of the complete man.
7. This kind of experience brings peace and equanimity of mind.
It is “a positive feeling of calm and confidence, joy and strength
in the midst of outward pain and defeat, loss and frustration.”26
8. Religious experience is the most certain and the most ineffable
possession of man’s life. But, this certitude and ineffability
can neither be demonstrated or proved. Radhakrishnan uses
the expressions ‘self-established,’ ‘self-evidencing,’ ‘self-
luminous’ etc. to describe the nature of such an experience. Its
certitude is not based on rational argumentation, the experience
itself is “pure comprehension, entire significance, complete
validity. It comes with a constraint that brooks no denial.”27
9. We come to realize the element of mysticism in religious
experience. Deep intuition is utter silence. Through silence we
‘confess without confession’ that the glory of spiritual life is
inexplicable and beyond the ken of speech and mind. It is the
great unfathomable mystery and words are treacherous.
Religious experience is treated as mystical because the rational
and scientific ways of understanding realize their limitations
and this prompts us to go beyond that transcends the rational
and scientific understanding. This shows that there is a hidden
capacity in man to go beyond himself. If this capacity is
sufficiently developed, man can extend his consciousness far
beyond his egoistic nature – possibly to universal consciousness
or altruism. It is mystical only because it is not completely
comprehensible, and yet it is a real aspect of man’s life
constituting the essence of all his activities.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 115
V
The deep sense of mystery regarding the Absolute’s manifestation in
the finite world is reflected in Radhakrishnan’s theory of intuition.
“The rationality of the world,” he says: “is transparent to the intellect,
but its mysteriousness can be grasped only by intuition.” This brings us
near to the perennial issue in epistemology regarding the contrast
between intellectual knowledge of reality and immediate awareness of
it. By establishing the relationship between intuition and intellect on a
more satisfactory basis, Radhakrishnan has tried to remove a serious
limitation in orthodox Advaita Vedanta. This has been nicely pointed
out by P.T. Raju in these words: “The Vedantins, following
Samkara........... came to the conclusion that Âtman and Brahman were
beyond intellect and could only be directly experienced through intuition.
But they did not take the trouble to show clearly that this direct
experience is a form of knowledge involved in and presupposed by the
discursive knowledge of the intellect, and the intellect is not opposed
to the higher experience but is absorbed in it and completed by it.”28
Radhakrishnan rarely uses the word ‘intuition’ to designate ‘mystical
awareness,’ rather he prefers the term ‘integral experience.’ Intuition
must not only be accepted as one of the ways of knowledge, but it must
also be regarded as a form of thought. But if we want to know things in
their uniqueness, in their indefeasible reality, we must transcend
discursive thinking. The emphasis is here on ‘transcending’ rather than
‘abandoning’ discursive thought.
Man’s awareness is, broadly speaking, of three kinds – the
perceptual, the logical and the intuitive; or to put it in Indian parlance
– manas or the sense mind, Vijòâna or logical intelligence and ananda
or spiritual intuition. All the three belong to the human consciousness.
Those who exalt intuition at the expense of other modes of knowledge
often begin with the mistaken belief that the mind is a conglomeration
of separate ‘faculties.’ But “the human mind does not function in
fractions. We need not assume that at the sense level there is no work
for intuition or at the level of intuition there is no function for intellect
to perform. When intuition is defined as integral insight, the suggestion
is that the whole mind is at work in it.” The emphasis on the totality of
the knowledge process brings Radhakrishnan’s theory of intuition very
close to the philosophical basis of Gestalt psychology. Like Wertheimer
and Kaffka, he insists upon the all-inclusive nature of the act of
‘perception’ being used in the widest sense. “All dynamic acts of
116 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
thinking,” he says: “whether in the game of chess or a mathematical
problem, are controlled by an intuitive grasp of the situation as a
whole.”29 It therefore becomes necessary “for any coherent philosophy
to take into account observed data, rational reflection and intuitive
insight. All these should be articulated in a systematic way.”
Radhakrishnan sees no conflict between intuition and reason, as he
often uses the phrase ‘rational intuition.’ Intuition, if not adequately
supported by the intellect, will “lapse into self-satisfied obscurantism.”
Intuition must never be used “as an apology for doctrines which could
not or would not be justified on intellectual grounds.”30 Radhakrishnan
agrees with the views of Vedic saints and seers that in genuine intuition
“the mind must first be set free from anxiety and desire,” there must be
“adequate inward purity and self-mastery,” and the soul must first be
“shaped into harmony with invisible realities.” Intuition demands
“continuous creative effort” and is often the “result of a long and
arduous process of study and analysis.” It has been described by men
of deepest insights as “self-establishing, self-evidencing and self-
luminous.”31 Far from being of doubtful authenticity, intuition can offer
“pure comprehension, entire significance and complete validity.” Hence,
Radhakrishnan asserts that intuition is “higher than the discursive process
from which it issues and on which it supervenes.”
Radhakrishnan’s epistemological study is nothing but an exploration
into the possible sources of knowledge – Sense-experience, Intellectual
Cognition and Intuitive Apprehension and their relative merits and
demerits. Sense-experience is the source through which we know the
sensible qualities or external features of the object. The inadequacy of
sense experience is that it cannot provide true knowledge of the reality
and other limitation is that it is not always reliable. The senses can
deceive us and the examples of erroneous perceptions are illusion and
hallucination. Intellectual cognition is knowledge obtained by a process
of analysis and synthesis. The data supplied by the senses are analysed
by the intellect and the new synthesis is perceived. The knowledge
supplied by it is not only indirect but also symbolic. Intellectual cognition
is also unable to furnish the knowledge of reality for several reasons:
1. Intellectual deliberation rests on the presupposition of the
duality of the subject and the object, and therefore, the non-
dual – the Absolute cannot be known through this process.
2. Intellect moves in the realm of relations only and relations
presuppose multiplicity. Reality is One, and therefore above
multiplicity and relations.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 117
3. Intellect is not primary or original or it works on the data
supplied by sense-experience.
4. Intellect or cognition is merely an aspect of our mental life;
feeling and willing are other aspects that being equally
important. A complete comprehension of reality will be possible
only when all these aspects are taken into account and satisfied.
Intuitive apprehension is the direct realization of its object. The
duality between knower and known is completely destroyed and here it
is knowing by becoming. The object known is seen not as an ‘object
outside the self, but as a part of the self.’ Intuition has certain advantages
over sense-impression and intellectual deliberations. Sense experience
can explore only external or superficial aspects of the object, whereas
intuition can apprehend its essence. Senses are liable to error and sense-
experience being fallible in nature, but intuition is infallible and self-
evident. Intellectual cognition is also not infallible or not free from
doubt. Its main tool is ‘analysis’ and so it fails to grasp the ‘whole’
nature of objects, while intuition fathoms the nature of reality.
Radhakrishnan maintains that this must not lead us to suppose that
intellect and intuition are quite opposed to each other. In fact intuition
needs intellect for the expression, elaboration and justification of its
result. Intellect, on the other hand, presupposes intuition without which
its deliberations cannot start. The function of intellect is ‘analysis’ but
there must be something to be analysed and that something must be a
whole. The whole as a whole can be grasped by intuition alone and that
gives to intuition its primacy.
Radhakrishnan has conceived intuition, more or less, in Bergson’s
way. Intuition has the directness, immediacy and unity of instinctive
knowledge and consciousness of the intellect. It is direct and immediate
because it deals with the objects themselves and not with their signs or
symbols. Intuition is self-evident because it does not need the support
of anything else for its truth and validity. It gives a very intimate
knowledge or insight about the object because it is knowing by
becoming. Radhakrishnan has made a very pertinent observation
regarding the nature of intuition that “Intuition is only the higher stage
of intelligence, intelligence rid of its separative and discursive
tendencies. While it liberates us from the prejudices of the understanding,
it carries out intellectual conclusions to a deeper synthesis. Instead of
being an unnatural and mysterious power, it is a deeper experience,
which by supplementing our narrow intellectual visions, amplifies it.
Intuition is not an appeal to the subjective whims of the individual, or a
118 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
dogmatic faculty of conscience, or the uncritical morbid view of the
psychopath. It is the experience which devout souls have in moments
of spiritual exaltation or religious devotion.”32
VI
Radhakrishnan has firm conviction that “any ethical theory must be
grounded in metaphysics, in a philosophical conception of the relation
between human conduct and ultimate reality. It is just because the
ethical ideal is grounded in values it cannot be indifferent to the nature
of reality which is the ultimate source of all values.” Are our values
merely empirical accidents, creations at best of the human mind, or do
they reveal to us an order of being which is more than merely human, a
spiritual reality which is the source of significance of what happens in
the temporal process?”33 But if ethics is dependent upon metaphysics,
and if Radhakrishnan accepts absolute idealism as the most satisfactory
metaphysical theory, is he not driven to deny the value of morality in
the ultimate sense? If the impersonal Brahman is the sole reality, can
we assign any fundamental significance to question of ethical conduct
which, after all, concern only finite beings living in a finite world?
Radhakrishnan brushes aside all such sceptical questions by pointing
out that the spiritual plane is higher than the moral plane. As life
emerges from matter, as mind emerges from life, and as a sense of
value emerges from mind, so does God’s consciousness emerge out of
a sense of values. Salvation is rising from ethical individualism to
spiritual universalism. This means that morality can be regarded as a
precondition of spiritual perfection, but cannot be equated with it. He
observed that the ethical life is an indispensable condition for the
attainment of perfection, and thus for the transcendence of the ethical
process itself.34 Just as the empirical world is not negated by the fact
that the Absolute transcends the finite, so also the ‘historical process’
which is the basis of ethical conduct is not nullified by the fact that in
the highest spiritual experience we rise above the ‘terms of reference’
applicable to that process. In a sense, morality survives even after
complete personal salvation. The freed soul “no longer has any object
to aim at, since he has achieved all,” and yet he works for the welfare
of the world.
Radhakrishnan, like Gandhi, is highly influenced by ‘Niskâma
Karmayoga’ of Bhagvad Gitâ. He asserts that “detachment of mind and
not renunciation of the world is what is demanded of us.” True
detachment consists in “the refusal to identify ourselves with the separate
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 119
ego,” in the abandonment of selfish interests, unreal objectives. 35
Extreme asceticism, manifested in self-mortification, rigorous celibacy,
and other stern ideals, is simply a declaration of war against the life-
process. Deeply influenced by Gandhi, he regards non-violence which
is only an aspect of love as the most comprehensive and universal
criterion of ethical life, and like Plato and Spinoza, he asserts that we
cannot be good unless we are “in love with goodness.” Forgiveness,
sacrifice, tolerance, pacifism and patience are only manifestations of
the single principle of love. Unlike Gandhi, however, Radhakrishnan
emphasizes that this principle must harmonize with the grace and charm
of life. Refinement, happiness, elegance and poise must blend with
love and righteousness. Material comforts are not to be derided and the
fruits of civilization, including those offered by science and technology
are to be greatly welcomed.
Radhakrishnan, like Kant, accepts freedom of will as a postulate
of morality. A world of ideas and values cannot be built upon blind
impersonal necessity. He formulates and expounds a comprehensive
theory of freedom. It is the key to the growth of human creativeness.
There are two approaches to the problem of freedom. The individualists
and liberals have interpreted freedom as absence of restraint. Hegel
maintained spirit to be self-contained freedom and Radhakrishnan
adheres to the Hegelian notion of freedom. “The freedom which human
beings desire is not the unreal, negative or absence of restraint, but the
real positive freedom to use to the full one’s natural endowments of
physique and brain.” He too endorses the Kantian-Spencerian concept
of freedom that one can enjoy his freedom only to the extent that he
does not infringe upon the equal freedom of others.
Radhakrishnan, like Tagore, believes that formidable challenges
are damaging the very fabric of modern civilization and spiritual
humanistic ethics. He dreams of a future civilization of man with a
universal orientation – sarvâtmabhâva. He pointed out that racial
chauvinism with the degrading cult of dictatorship and the barbaric
worship of military power and capital accumulation are the dark
consequences of the allegiance to narrow loyalties. In the true Gandhian
spirit, Radhakrishnan pledges his faith in the victory of the spirit or
Âtman over the formidable constellations of force, tyranny and
aggression. The Ptolemic ethnocentric patriotic approach to civilization
has to be replaced by a Copernican universalistic approach. Universalism
will be the basis of the future ideal civilization. A crusade for imposing
the criteria of one’s own civilization is fascistic and doomed to failure.
120 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
What is essential is a greater realization of the fundamental moral and
spiritual values of the east and the west. A psychic transformation
brought about by the spiritual discipline (tapas and yoga), broadening
integral thinking involving all aspects of mind, will and emotions will
bring into being a recreated world. Modern life is besieged with a
complicated predicament. The human being is subjected to diverse
types of psychological anxieties, discords, neuroses and grave
insecurities. Religion, for him, is a potent technic for the rehabilitation
of the disturbed life. He would press for the application of the religious
spirit of tolerance, love and genuine charity in all walks of life. Religion
signifies the quest for truth and apprehension of the unity of existence.
Radhakrishnan is an exponent of religious humanism. Humanism in the
west appeared as a reaction against scientific naturalism and theological
Ecclesiasticism. It exalted social and moral values and pleaded for the
solidarity of man, which is praiseworthy. But Radhakrishnan points out
two basic inadequacies in western humanism:
1. It sets the moral and natural elements in man’s being and
disposition in sharp opposition.
2. It lacks spiritual foundation as it has no place for life-
transcending and life-transforming righteousness.
Radhakrishnan, on the contrary, believes in relating values to spiritual
foundations.36 He, being a spiritual humanist, is repelled by the societarian
stress in Marxism. Instead of the dialectic of tension and struggle he pleads
for a reconciling spiritual harmony.37 A philosophy of spiritual humanism
must lead to the acceptance of the theory of a world community. The world
to be born in the future must be a cosmopolitan one. He thinks that a spirit
of religious humanism alone can provide the foundation for genuine
fellowship and co-operation. He maintains that “religious or spiritual
humanism seems to be the most powerful political instrument for peace
which the world has ever seen. Treaties and diplomatic understandings
may restrain passions but they do not remove fear. The world must be
imbued with a love of humanity. We want religious heroes who will not
wait for the transformation of the whole world but assert with their lives, if
necessary, the truth of the conviction – one earth one family.”38 The destiny
of the world consists in the transformed lives of men and women and their
redemption from sins, illusions and ignorance. This demands an education
for the purpose of the realization of spiritual freedom.
The political thought of Radhakrishnan may be said to constitute
the reinforcement of the school of “individualistic idealism.” He is an
individualist in his pre-eminent occupation with the renaissance of the
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 121
moral and spiritual values of man. He is also an individualist in his
quest for the spiritual equality of all human beings and in the assertion
of the technics of rational education for the elevation of man towards
increasing recognition of the values of liberty, reason, progress and
fellowship. Hence, amidst the pervasive gloom of political predicaments,
economic dislocations and social imbalances, Radhakrishnan’s quest
for the religion of the spirit reveals that he is thoroughly rooted in the
Indian philosophic tradition of absolute idealism.
Notes and References
1. Joad, C.E.M., Counterattacks from the East, George Allen and Unwin
Ltd. London, 1933, p. 38.2. Radhakrishnan, S., The Hindu View of Life, George Allen and Unwin
Ltd. London, 1928, p. 79.3. Ibid, pp. 129-30.4. Radhakrishnan, S., Eastern Religions and Western Thought, Oxford
University Press, 1939, pp. 307-08.5. Radhakrishnan, S. An Idealist View of Life, George Allen and Unwin
Ltd., London, 1923, p. 333.6. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Volume II, George Allen and Unwin
Ltd. London, 1923, p. 649.7. Radhakrishnan, S., An Idealist View of Life, p. 345.8. Ibid, p. 314.9. Radhakrishnan, S., The Recovery of Faith, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
London, 1956, p. 87.10. Radhakrishnan, S., An Idealist View of Life, p. 338.11. Ibid, p. 340.12. Ibid, p. 225.13. Moore, Charles A., Radhakrishnan’s Metaphysics and Ethics in Volume
on Radhakrishnan in the Library of Living Philosophers edited by Paul
Arther Schilpp, Tudor Publishing Company, 1952, p. 302.14. Radhakrishnan, S., Eastern Religions and Western Thought , p. 27.15. Radhakrishnan also remarks, however : “He is the ceaseless creative
activity which actualises everything.” This would mean that the Absolute
is not the ‘ideal home’ but the ‘actual source.’16. Radhakrishnan, S., The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy,
Macmillan and Company, London, 1920, p. 443.17. Ibid. p. 442.18. Schilpp, P.A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, Tudor
Publishing Company, New York, 1952, p. 142.
122 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
19. Radhakrishnan, S., The Hindu View of Life, p. 75.20. Radhakrishnan, S., Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 96.21. Radhakrishnan, S., An Idealist View of Life, p. 93.22. Radhakrishnan, S., Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 61.23. Radhakrishnan, S., An Idealist View of Life, p. 93.24. Ibid, p. 92.25. Radhakrishnan, S., Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy
p. 305.26. Radhakrishnan, S., An Idealist View of Life, p. 93.27. Ibid, pp. 92-93.28. Raju, P.T., Radhakrishnan and Indian Thought in volume on
Radhakrishnan in the Library of Living Philosophers edited by Paul
Arthur Schilpp, Tudor Publishing House, New York, 1952, p. 536.29. Radhakrishnan, S., An Idealist View of Life, p. 149.30. Radhakrishnan, S., The Spirit in Man in Contemporary Indian Philosophy,
S. Chand & Company Ltd., New Delhi, 1982, p. 486.31. Radhakrishnan, S., An Idealist View of Life, p. 92.32. Radhakrishnan, S., Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy,
p. 439.33. Radhakrishnan, S., An Idealist View of Life, p. 69.34. Moore, Charles, A., Radhakrishnan’s Metaphysics and Ethics in Volume
on Radhakrishnan in the Library of Living Philosophers , p. 288.35. Radhakrishnan, S., Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 101.36. Radhakrishnan maintains that “Religion is a challenge to replace the
world of power by that of spirit. Spiritual awareness and social efficiency
are not only consistent but also complementary. Fellowship and service
spring from spiritual sources. Altruism is not a substitute for adoration
from which it arises.”37. Radhakrishnan, S., Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 268.38. Radhakrishnan, S., Kalki or The Future of Civilization, 2nd edition,
Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 1949, p. 64.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 123
The Political Frame of the Bhagavadgita
1. Introduction
The context of the dialogue in the Bhagavadgita is in-war discussion
when the Great War (Mahabharata) has just begun according to the
epic Mahabharata, in which the Bhagavadgita is embedded. It is an
in-war discussion and not a pre-war discussion as many think. In the
epic Mahabharata, the war between the Pandavas and the Kauravas
was a yajña, i.e. rana-sattra (Mahabharata 3.242.14), ranayajña
(Mahabharata 5.57.12 & 5.154.4) and sastrayajña (Mahabharata
5.139.29). In our understanding war is not only a political action but
also a collective institutional action. So, the discussion of the
Bhagavadgita is framed by this ranayajña context, which is a political
frame. As the Great War (Mahabharata) was taken as ranayajña and in
the yajña mantras have to be recited, the verses of the Bhagavadgita
are the analogue of the mantra recitation in ranayajña for the growth
of the form (rupasamrddhi)1 of the collective political institutional
action and political institutional actuality that was going on.
2. The Compositional Style
The Bhagavadgita is a deceptively simple text. The author of the
Bhagavadgita utilized, to develop the compositional structure of the
Bhagavadgita, a simile given in Mundaka Upanisada 2.2.3-4: “Having
taken the bow furnished by the Upanisadas, the great weapon – and
* Dr. Binod Kumar Agarwala is Professor, Department of Philosophy and Dean,
School of Humanities, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong – 793022
(Meghalaya), Mobile No. 09436111478; [email protected]
124 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
mounted in it arrow rendered pointed by constant meditation and having
drawn it with the mind fixed on the Brahman, hit good looking youth,
at that mark – the immortal Brahman. The pranava is the bow, the
atman is the arrow and the Brahman is said to be its mark. It should
be hit by one who is self-collected and that which hits becomes, like
the arrow, one with the mark, i.e. Brahman.” This simile, with some
modification, is used by the author of the Bhagavadgita as the
compositional structure of the text. The modification is that for the
author of the Bhagavadgita the mounted and drawn arrow points to the
mark and hits it when it divides equally the bow circle and balances
them equally. This means that the two halves of the various bow circles
of chapters and verses are evenly balanced. So, one has to read the text
of the Bhagavadgita like an archer trying to hit the mark by bow (of
the text) and arrow (of consciousness, which is the self). Interpreter has
to join the opposite ends of the text of the Bhagavadgita just as the
archer joins the opposite ends of bow by mounting the pratyañca (the
bow string) to the loose end. The text of the Bhagavadgita has to be
understood as a circle balanced and drawn tight and bisected in the
middle by the aiming arrow to hit the meaning (laksa, laksartha). This
is how the Bhagavadgita is composed and needs to be read.
The readers of the Bhagavadgita have found themselves in the
situation of Sita svayamvara where either they could not lift the bow
or found themselves unequal to the task of mounting the bowstring on
the loose end of the bow. Needless to say that none of the commentators
ever succeeded in mounting the arrow of thought on the bow of the
Bhagavatgita to draw it back to aim to hit (viddhi) the mark (laksa).
It is needless to speak of ordinary readers, when even the ones of the
caliber of Samkara, Ramanuja, Abhinavagupta could not do so.
Modern Indian scholars like D. D. Kosambi, Ambedkar, S. D.
Pendse, G. V. Ketkar, G. S. Khair and P. L. Bhargava, and western
scholars like Humboldt, Holtzmann, Hopkins, Richard Garbe and his
pupil Rudolph Otto could not even lift the bow of the text of the
Bhagavadgita, as it was too heavy for them like the bow of Siva. They
suggested breaking it into parts like original core and latter additions
and interpolations so that they can lift the smaller piece of it called the
original core or Ur-Gita. Sankara(?),2 Ramanuja and Abhinavagupta,
even though lifted the whole of bow of the text of the Bhagavadgita,
could not mount pratyañca (the bow string) to the loose end and
produced only sectarian commentaries. These traditional thinkers were
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 125
not interested in interpreting the Bhagavadgita in its own terms. They
had their own philosophy and, hence, merely tried to reconcile the text
of the Bhagavadgita with their own philosophies, by misconstruing the
syntax of verses and semantics of terms.
The topic introduced in the first chapter of the Bhagavadgita is
not on the surface. It is informed in the text itself, at least nine times
that the message of the Bhagavadgita is a hidden message. The teaching
of the Bhagavadgita is described variously as secret (4.3), ‘know-how
of administration, secrets of administration’ (9.2), ‘hidden knowledgeable
resolve’ (10.38), ‘the most secret song of adhyatma’ (11.1), ‘the most
secret instruction’ (15.20), ‘knowledgeable resolve more secret than
the secret one’ (18.63), ‘the greatest of all secrets’ (18.64), the ‘ultimate
secret’ (18.68), and ‘supreme secret’ (18.75). The Bhagavadgita was
firmly rooted in the Brahmanical tradition, where the speech of deities
is nether direct nor immediate; it is always indirect and mediated.3
3. The Balanced Contrast
So, to understand the topic of the Bhagavadgita we have to understand
its first chapter keeping in view its compositional style as mentioned
above. The first chapter of the Bhagavadgita contains 47 slokas which
form a bow circle with the mounted and drawn arrow passing between
the two lines of the 24th verse, which is the middle verse, dividing and
balancing the two equal halves of 23 verses each, pointing to the target
(laksa) of the discussion or the laksartha, i.e. the meaning of the chapter
aims at.
The first half of the chapter presents the individualist outlook of
Duryodhana in upbeat mood, but the second half represents the clannish
tribal outlook of Arjuna in a mood of despondency. It is because of the
second part that the first chapter is traditionally named as
Arjunavisadayoga meaning Arjuna’s yoga (a balanced relation which
is neither samyoga ‘joining’ nor viyoga ‘separation’) with visada
(depression/dejection/despondency).
In the first chapter of the Bhagavadgita verse 2 Samjaya informs:
“Having seen the army of the Pandavas drawn up in battle-array, king
Duryodhana then approached his teacher and spoke (these) words.” In
the next seven verses from 1.3 to 1.9, Duryodhana speaks. It is important
to note that in his speech, Duryodhana, the representative of Kaurava
clan introduces the members of his army and opposite army either by
126 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
name or by definite description identifying an individual warrior.
Duryodhana is not only quite modern in his description of persons and
use of language but also he is individualist in his social outlook. He is
participating in the forceful settlement (samgramam) with modern
individualist outlook.
But it is also depicted that in the process of introducing the heroes
in the two armies, individually Duryodhana could not see the institution
(organization) that army is, or the collectivity that the army is, for it
was for him just a power of individuals collected and protected by one
individual (balam bhismabhiraksitam, balam bhimabhiraksitam in 1.10),
which is consistent with his modern individualist outlook.
To emphasize the individualist outlook of Duryodhana in the first
half of the chapter, it is further heightened in verses 1.12 to 1.18,
where individualism is carried to the extreme of not only separately
identifying individual persons, but also individually identifying the conch
shells by name, blown by the individual warriors.Vedavyasa, through
these seven verses put in the mouth of Samjaya, has intensified the
modern individualist outlook of Duryodhana. Apart from the extreme
modern individualist outlook, what this passage shows is the upbeat
mood of the warriors assembled there, indicating that individualism is
in upbeat mood.4 But this upbeat mood also indicates the enthusiasm
of all the warriors who have assembled in the battleground to fight.
But when Arjuna, representing Pandavas, who were not a real
clan, looked at the army on both sides he saw only relations, mostly
tribal relations, of birth and alliance. It is put in the mouth of Samjaya
in the Bhagavadgita 1.26-27. Later a similar statement is put in the
mouth of Arjuna himself in Bhagavadgita 1.33-34.The repetition of list
of relations by birth and alliance first through the mouth of Samjaya
as a third person description of what Arjuna saw and then through his
own speech in first person is very significant. The author of the
Bhagavadgita through repetition is trying to emphasize this fact
regarding what Arjuna saw. This is made more emphatic, by making
Arjuna refer to the people assembled to fight as svajana (own-people)
four times in four different verses: 1.28, 1.31, 1.37, and 1.45. Arjuna
merely saw his own kinsmen related by birth or alliance.5 So, this fact
that Arjuna is tribal and clannish in his social outlook is important in
understanding and interpreting the Bagavadgita, as it underlies the
confusion of Arjuna and makes him dharmasammudhacetah ‘confused
in mind regarding dharma’. Similarly, the long list of warriors by name
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 127
or definite description through the mouth of Duryodhana is put
deliberately by the author of the Bhagavadgita and it is meant for
recognizing the principle operative implicitly in the mind of Duryodhana
as it is put in contrast to what Arjuna saw when he looked at the same
warriors. The contrast highlights that Duryodhana is not seeing warriors
on both sides as related by birth or alliance, but as individuals. This
fact is also important for interpretation of the Bhagavadgita. So the
contrast is between the modern individualist outlook of Duryodhana
and the primitive clannish and tribal outlook of Arjuna.
It is surprising that it is the representative of Kaurava clan, i.e.
Duryodhana who is already attuned in his thinking unawares for the
advanced kind of social outlook that is opposite to what he really
represents. He represents Kaurava clan or the Kuru tribe. In contrast
Arjuna’s despondency is as much for the relatives as much it is for the
death of old social order he is familiar with, i.e. clan and tribe.6 The
significance of the opening scene of the dialogue in the first chapter is
that it dramatically highlights through the words of the two protagonists
–Arjuna and Duryodhana – the conflict of social outlook, i.e. the outlook
of social order of clans and tribes based on relation through birth or
alliance, and the outlook of yearning for a modern individualist social
order without depending on relation through birth or alliance.7 The
manner in which the two kinds of concerns – concern for social order
of clans based on relation through birth or alliance, and concern for
individualist social order without depending on relation through birth
or alliance – are introduced highlight another contrast.
The forty-seven verses of the first chapter are divided equally by
the twenty-fourth verse, which is the middle verse. The first twenty-
three verses are written with a view to represent the upbeat mood of
Duryodhana and Arjuna, with both the protagonists bristling with
enthusiasm to fight. And in the context of this upbeat mood the theme
of concern for the modern individualist social order without depending
on relation through birth or alliance is brought in implicitly. Will it be
realized? Can it be realized? There is an enthusiastic hopeful outlook
of expectation of realizing a social world in future. But from verse
twenty-five onwards the upbeat mood all of a sudden gives way to
despondency of down cast Arjuna, who starts lamenting the possible
demise of people related to him by birth and alliances, and thereby
demise of social order of clans and tribes based on relations of birth
and alliance etc. Can the decline be arrested? Can the demise be stopped?
128 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Here there is no hope but despondency. But Krsna will find both the
expectation of a social order based on modern individualist outlook as
unjustified as the despondency at demise of tribes based on clannish
and tribal outlook. In chapter 16, Krsna will tell us regarding the
horrendous consequences of modern individualist outlook, which he
identifies as the outlook of those who are born with demoniac-destiny
(asuri-sampad) and will tell us regarding the inevitability of passing
away of that social formation which has come into being in time in
chapters 8 through 11 having introduced the general principle in 2.27.
4. The Middle Position
So what is the way out? The middle verse of the chapter of 47 verses,
i.e. 24th verse is telling: “O descendant of Bharata, Hrishikesa (Krishna)
thus addressed by Gudakesa (Arjuna) stationed that excellent chariot
between the two armies…” The verse tells as much about placing of
the physical chariot in the middle of the two physical armies, as it tells
about the placing of the entire carriage of discussion in the middle of
the two conflicting visions of the social order: the modern individualistic
social order without depending on relation based on birth or alliance
presented in upbeat mood and the outlook of the social order of clans
and tribes based on relations through birth or alliance presented in the
mood of despondency.
The middle position, between the modern individualistic social
formation and the old tribal formation, is what is advocated and
elaborated in every detail in the entire Bhagavadgita. That middle
position is the advocacy of socio-political formation based on institutions
and practice of institutions, a theory, which is available neither through
modern individualistic outlook nor through old tribal and clannish
outlook. This middle position of socio-political institutional formation
requires a way of thinking different from both modern thought as well
as tribal thought, which is elaborated in the entire Bhagavadgita.
Ratha ‘chariot’ from the very beginning of the Vedic thought was
used to refer to dynamic practice of institution, i.e. yajña. The later
Vedic literature exploits the simile of yajña as ratha to elaborate various
internal arrangements of the yajña.8
Therefore,when it is stated in the middle verse, i.e. 24th verse of
the first chapter of the Bhagavadgita, which consists of total 47 verses,
that Krsna stationed that excellent chariot between the two armies, it
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 129
is an indication that the Bhagavadgita has a lakca (goal) of expounding
the theory of socio-political institutions, institutional actions, and
institutional revision which has its roots in Rgveda, in which institution
was conceived of as purusa (person) for the first time in the entire
annals of mankind.
What the Bhagavadgita aims at is the theory of socio-political
institutions, which has its roots directly in the Rgveda. From the very
first recorded word preserved by mankind for the posterity, the entire
concern of the Rgveda to the last word is to theorize about the institution
as a person. Rgveda 10.191.4, which is the concluding mantra of the
entire theorizing from the beginning to the end, implies that the one
common socio-political institution as person be reflected in the buddhi
of all people, which is advocated by the Bhagavadgita too as this
commonality of presence of institutional person in all people’s heart is
one of the necessary conditions of the being of manifest institution as
person and also man’s participation in it by way of performance of
institutional action, i.e. action properly vested (samnyasta) on the
institution as person.
It is interesting to note that in the epic Mahabharata, social
organization before Mahabharata (the Great War) was that of clan and
tribe, based on relations through birth and alliance. Kurus (Kauravas),
Pañcalas, and Vrsnis etc. were such clans and tribes. All such clans
and tribes were wiped out at the end of the war, except Vrsnis who
annihilated themselves completely by internal fight later. Only Pandavas
survived annihilation, but they survived as persons organized together
as an institution. But they were not organized together as modern
individuals held together by the supreme force of one of them; they
were organized together guided by Krsna as an institutional person and
that institutional organization survives even after their departure from
the world to be manned by the survivors. What the Mahabharata
portrays and shows is that the period was in confusion regarding dharma
because the tribal formation with its conception of dharma based on
birth and alliance is going out and the contours of the dharma, which
is independent of social organization based on birth and alliance, which
is emerging from the womb of the future, is not yet clear. It is the
Mahabharata (Great War) that settles the confusion, because the victory
was of the party that stood under the guidance of Krsna for the social
formation based on the sovereignty of sui generis institution.
130 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
5. The Balanced Errors
Since the erroneous outlooks of Duryodhana and Arjuna, which were
respectively the individualist outlook and clannish tribal outlook, were
presented in equally balanced contrast in the two equal halves of the
first chapter divided by the middle verse, i.e. 24th verse, to give an
indication of the error in thinking of the two protagonists in the first
chapter, the author, i.e. Vedavyasa, deliberately puts erroneous statements
equally balanced in the mouth of the two protagonists, i.e. Duryodhana
and Arjuna. These errors are not inadvertent errors of some copyist, as
these are entrenched errors, which cannot be eliminated by revision of
some words here and there. In the two consecutive verses 1.10 and
1.11 two errors are put by Vedavyasa in the mouth of Duryodhana in
the first part of the chapter. The compositional style of Vedavyasa
demanded that to indicate the error of Arjuna’s thinking the author
must put erroneous statements in the mouth of Arjuna in the second
half of the chapter in consecutive verses. So, Vedavyasa has deliberately
put errors in the mouth of Arjuna in three consecutive verses 1.35-37.
6. The First Two Errors
Duryodhana makes the first two errors. The two verses 1.10 & 11 of
the Bhagavadgita put deliberately in the mouth of Duryodhana are the
most obviously incongruous and erroneous in the entiretext: “This power
(or army) of ours protected by Bhisma is inadequate, whereas that
power (or army) of theirs which is under the protection of Bhisma is
adequate. And therefore do you all, occupying your respective positions
in the several divisions of the army, protect Bhisma only.”9
Bhisma was leading an army of eleven aksauhini, while Bhima
was leading an army of seven aksauhini, where an aksauhini consists
of 21870 elephants, 21870 chariots, 65610 horses, and 109350 foot-
soldiers. Therefore, commentators have obviously noticed the
incongruity of Duryodhan’s claim that the army of his own led by
Bhisma is inadequate, whereas the army of Pandavas, which is under
the leadership of Bhima, is adequate.
Similar reasons are available for noticing the error of Duryodhan’s
utterance in 1.11. Bhisma had the boon from his father that he will die
only if he himself wishes. No one can kill him. It was precisely for this
reason that he was chosen to lead his army by Duryodhana despite his
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 131
old age and yet in 1.11 Duryodhana orders all to protect only Bhisma
(bhismam evabhiraksantu). This was a greater error than that of 1.10.
This greater error of Duryodhana, put deliberately by Vedavyasa cannot
be eliminated. The old age of Bhisma was emphasized in the very next
verse 1.12 where he is referred to as kuruvrddhah pitamahah “the old
kuru, the grandfather.”
Both 1.10 and 1.11 are erroneous as spoken by Duryodhana, but
as sentences of Vedavyasa these state the truth. When Duryodhana
introduced the members of the army in verses I.3-9 he identified them
in the modern way as individuals. That is to say that Vedavyasa depicts
Duryodhana in the first chapter of the Bhagavadgita as having a modern
individualist outlook. But it is also depicted that in the process of
introducing the heroes in the two armies individually, he could not see
the institution (organization) that army is, for it was for him a power
of individuals collected and protected under one individual (balam
bhismabhiraksitam, balam bhimabhiraksitam) and yet he expected to
win in the forceful settlement of social organization (samgramam),
when he had no conception of institutional arrangement of social
organization. Yet he expected to win in yuddha to create a collective
power, under the supremacy and protection of one individual, i.e.
Duryodhana himself, when he had no conception of institution that
army is. So, inspite of the numerical superiority he realized that behind
the smaller power protected by Bhima, there is something extraordinary
in the person of Krsna, which Duryodhana had witnessed already, when
he tried in vain to arrest Krsna when Krsna went to Kaurava court with
peace mission, which of course he can’t fathom as he was blind to the
institutional personality of Krsna, Duryodhana failed because there was
no way he could arrest the person that is institution. He had seen the
tejas, the capacity of the institutional personality of Krsna for impelling
and moving people, without understanding or accepting what this
personality of Krsna is. The author Vedavyasa puts across this truth
through the first error of Duryodhana.
Krsna himself represents the abstract person of the institution in
general in the Bhagavadgita, and this is represented as divinity
(aisvarya) of Krsna in the language of the Bhagavadgita. In 11.43
when it was stated regarding the visvarupa of Krsna by Arjuna that
‘(for) your equal exists not; whence another, superior to you, even in
the three worlds (you are) imageless manifest-being (being of unequalled/
unprecedented influence?’10 He was rephrasing the Patanjali’s definition
132 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
of isvara, which as per definition, is unrivalled by any superior or
equal power just like the sovereign conceived by Jean Bodin in the
beginning of modern period in Europe. But the difference is that in
Vedic thought in general and the Bhagavadgita in particular what is
unrivalled by any superior or equal power is the abstract institution as
person in general and not any human person as it was in Jean Bodin.
That’s why aisvarya is neither sovereignty of human person nor so-
called people’s sovereignty, rather it is the sovereignty of imageless
(abstract) manifest-being (manifest in existing institution as immanent
in it but unmanifest otherwise) of the institution which is person in
general. Krsna’s aisvarya, i.e. sovereignty of Krsna as invisible dark
institutional personality in general, is one of the central themes of the
Mahabharata. The narrative develops the flaw in the character of
Duryodhana, which is his opposition to Krsna Vasudeva, his blindness
to Krsna’s aisvarya, his blindness to sovereignty (=aisvarya) of sui
generis institutional person in general that Krsna is. But Duryodhana
had witnessed Krsna’s aisvarya when he tried to arrest Krsna, but he
cannot understand this abstract institution as person in Krsna and his
aisvarya (=sovereignty), which is the source of strength of the army
under the protection of Bhima. Hence, Duryodhana is afraid of the
army protected by Bhima. It is this unknown fear of Duryodhana that
is highlighted by his error in 1.10. Behind the explicit error of
Duryodhana is his error of non-recognition of Krsna’s aisvarya, which
is making him fearful enough to commit a different but explicit error.
The author Vedavyasa puts across this truth through the first error of
Duryodhana in I.10. Without the presence and recognition of this error
and recognition of what is behind the error in 1.10 there is no question
of ever understanding the development of the argument of Vedavyasa
in the Bhagavadgita from the first to last verse.
The error of Duryodhana in verse 1.11 highlights a different but
related truth of Vedavyasa. Duryodhana made his army
bhismabhiraksitam (protected by Bhisma) in the yuddha (battle)
precisely because, as mentioned before, he cannot be killed by anybody,
as he had the boon from his father to die at his own wish. So, for him
yuddha (battle) is not samgramam, i.e. forceful settlement of institution.
That view he cannot have as gramam (settlement) involves setting up
of institutions, but of which Duryodhana has no inkling, as he is modern
individualist in outlook. For him yuddha (battle) is primarily to kill the
recalcitrant opponents to establish the superiority of one’s own individual
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 133
power to subdue and control all to make them accept the superiority of
his power. Since, essence of yuddha (battle) for Duryodhana is not
samgramam, i.e. forceful right settlement; rather it is killing or getting
killed, he is haunted by the fear, despite the knowledge of the boon,
that may be Bh sma will be killed in the battle and hence, he makes the
error of ordering everyone in his army to protect only Bh sma. This is
the truth regarding Duryodhana that Vedavyasa highlights through this
second error of the former in 1.11.
This is a common error that has led many commentators to claim
that the Bhagavadg ta justifies killing in battle. For example Ambedkar
claims that Krishna offers a philosophic defense of war and killing in
war in the Bhagavadg ta.11 Vedavyasa was far sighted enough to take
care against such misreading of what he advocates. For him war itself
is a practice, but a practice at a limit point, where solidarity and reason
of institutional practice is about to break or broken. It is an ambiguous
point. So, war is a practice, where every other way of practice like the
practice of dialogue has failed, to restore institutional practice. So it
has its own dharma as practice. Its dharma, its essence, and its ideation
have nothing to do with killing or being killed. It is an accidental extra
added in the situation of war, to the ideation of war. Killing and getting
killed is only an accidental contingency in samgramam ‘the forceful
right settlement.’ Plato also accepts this point in his Republic where he
makes Socrates refute Polemarchus by claiming that the justice of war
is not in hurting the enemy but in setting enemy right with force.12 This
idea is presented in the Bhagavadgita in the figure of Bh sma in the
first chapter, who cannot be killed as he is portrayed as someone who
can die only if he himself wishes. If essence of war is to kill and be
killed, then Bh sma being the commander of one army is a logical
contradiction in war. What this contradiction is meant to highlight is
that killing and be killed, dying and causing death is not the dharma
of war. In the first chapter itself, the presence of Bh sma in the war was
underlined through the two errors of Duryodhana as mentioned above.
His presence in the war is mentioned thrice by Duryodhana in 1.8,
1.10, and 1.11 as if the author is underlining this fact as relevant to
understanding the Bhagavadgita. The author also draws attention of
the readers to the old age of Bh sma by making Samjaya refer to
Bh sma thrice: in 1.12 as kuruvrddha pitamah (elderly kuru the
grandfather), in 1.25 by name Bh sma, and in 1.26 as pitamahan
(grandfather). Author wants to emphasize Bh sma’s presence in war
134 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
even more, so that there is no misunderstanding that Bh sma’s presence
in the war is incongruous if Duryodhana and Arjuna’s understanding of
the essence of war is taken as correct. So, Arjuna also acknowledges
Bh sma’s presence in war twice in 1.34 as pitamahah (grandfather) and
in the beginning of chapter 2 in 2.4 by name. When the presence of
Bh sma, who can die only if he himself wishes, in war is emphasized
it is meant to discount the idea that killing is essential to war or that
killing is dharma of war. Then what is dharma of war? The dharma
of war is not to kill or harm the opponent, but to set him right by force,
to use force to restore practice, to use force to prevent him from breaking
the practice. Yuddha is samgramam, i.e. forceful settlement. Even when
Bh sma could not be killed, he could still be forced out of the war for
settlement of the issue, but not for settling the scores as mentality of
many critiques of the Bhagavadg ta makes it out to be. Unless one
grasps this second error of Duryodhana, how can a reader ever grasp
how the argument of the Bhagavadgita is going to be developed by
Vedavyasa.
7. The Fourth Error
The fourth error presented in the first chapter of the Bhagavadgita is
put in the mouth of Arjuna by Vyasa to indicate how wrong Arjuna is
in his argument. The fourth error is present in the verse 1.36: “O
Janardana, what delight shall be ours after killing the sons of
Dhritasashtra? On killing these felons, sin only will take hold of us.”13
Vasisthasmrti III. 16 says: “One who sets fire, gives poison, attacks
with weapon in hand, plunders the property, dispossessed others of
their territory as well as of their women, i.e. does these six are evil-
doers atatayinah.” With regard to such a heinous criminal, the
Manusmrti VIII, 350-351 says: “Whether he be a teacher, an infant, an
old man or a much learned brahmin, if he comes as a criminal (atatayi),
one should kill him without any consideration. There is no sin in killing
a criminal (atatayi).” Now, in the light of the story of the Mahabharata,
the Kauravas, had committed not one but all the six heinous crimes.
The error of Arjuna is that even when he recognizes the atatayinah and
uses the appropriate term to refer to them and yet he says papam
evasrayed asman hatvaitan atatayinah “on killing these felons, sin
only will take hold of us.” The action in which there is no sin he is
associating sin.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 135
The error of Arjuna in 1.36 is that where it is appropriate (dharma)
to kill, i.e. atatayinah, he is not thinking of killing. This error is
deliberately put by Vedavyasa to highlight and to draw attention of
readers to the contrasting error of Arjuna that where it is not appropriate
(dharma) to associate killing, i.e. with yuddha or samgramam, there he
is all the time thinking of killing and getting killed. Even though essence
of yuddha is samgramam ‘forceful right settlement’ and killing or getting
killed is not its essence (dharma), Arjuna is associating killing and
getting killed with yuddha just like Duryodhana.
The error of Arjuna in 1.36 is also meant to bring out very erroneous
nature of his thinking regarding dharma, his violation of some
fundamental principle of activity of thinking per se, which is preventing
him from thinking correctly about dharma.
8. The Third and the Fifth Errors
The third and the fifth errors deliberately put by Vedavyasa in the
mouth of Arjuna are present hidden in the Bhagavadgita 1.35 and
1.37. In 1.35 Arjuna is speaking to Krsna: “These, O slayer of Madhu,
even if they kill me, I do not wish to kill, even for the sake of dominion
over the three worlds; how much less, for the sake of the earth.”14 In
1.37 also Arjuna is speaking to Krsna: “We had then better not slay our
own kinsmen, the sons of Dhritarashtra; for, how can we be happy, O
Madhava, after slaying our own people?”15
In these two verses Arjuna addresses Krsna as Madhusudana and
Madhava respectively. Both the addresses for Krsna in the mouth of
Arjuna are erroneous as these are two names of Visnu according to
Visnusahasranamastotram. There is no story in Indian literature in
which Krsna ever killed the demon Madhu. It was Visnu who killed
demons Madhu and Kaitabha. Visnu in his Hayagr va avatara, i.e.
manifestation in human form with the head of a horse, had performed
this feat. Santiparva of Mahabharata (XII.335.1-69) states that the
demons Madhu and Kaitabha stole the Vedas from Brahma. Visnu, in
his manifestation as Hayagr va, killed them, and retrieved the Vedas. In
the above verse under consideration Arjuna addressing Krsna as
Madhusudana is erroneous as Krsna’s identity with Visnu is not known
to Arjuna yet in the Bhagavadg ta, which will be revealed to him in
10.21 when Krsna will state: “of the adityas I am Visnu.”16 Arjuna in
the Bhagavadg ta did not know about Krsna’s previous births till 4.4
136 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
where he asks Krsna: “Your birth is later, and the birth of Vivasvat was
earlier; how am I to understand that you told this Yoga in the
beginning?”17 and was told about previous births of Krsna in the
Bhagavadg ta not before 4.5. So, Arjuna could not have addressed
Krsna as Madhusudana in the first chapter of the Bhagavadgita on its
own terms and yet the author has made Arjuna address Krsna in that
way in verse 1.35. Similarly, Madhava along with Madhusudana is
also the name or epithet of Vi snu according to
Visnusahasranamastotram. According to Sankaracarya’s commentary
on it, Madhava means the Consort (dhava) of Ma, i.e. Mahalaksmi.
But the correct meaning of Madhava is one who is fit to be known
through Madhu-Vidya. Hence, once again without knowing the identity
of Krsna with Visnu, Arjuna could not have used Madhava to address
Krsna.
In these five verses, where errors are present, what gesture does
Vedavyasa make? Through his gesture Vedavyasa is giving indication
of the erroneous nature of the individualistic power based conception
of social formation thought by Duryodhana and also giving indication
that the thinking of Arjuna based on tribal social formation and its
dharma is not tenable any more.
In the Bhagavadg ta the two errors made by Duryodhana are
deliberately put by Vedavyasa only to indicate the line of thought not
taken by Krsna. Duryodhana’s thinking is not engaged in the dialogue
by Krsna except in chapter 16 briefly and has no further role to play
than the negative role of prohibition of the individualist thinking. But
the errors of Arjuna are more significant, as Arjuna is the interlocutor
in the dialogue with Krsna and Arjuna’s erroneous thinking has to be
removed by Krsna for which Krsna is indulging in dialogue with Arjuna
to make him participate in the war, which has arrived and in the midst
of which Krsna finds Arjuna armed and prepared, but suddenly and
unexpectedly unwilling to fight due to his erroneous thinking.
Verse 1.35 is ambiguous because of the following reasons. As
statement by Arjuna it means “These, O Krsna, even if they kill me, I
do not wish to kill, even for the sake of dominion over the three
worlds; how much less, for the sake of the earth.” But as a composition
of Vedavyasa, this shows some lack in Arjuna, which is making him
think of only killing in the war even though the dharma of war does
not have any essential involvement of killing. And he is not thinking
of killing where killing is dharma, i.e. killing the felons in the next
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 137
verse, i.e. 1.36. Vedavyasa is giving indication of what Arjuna is lacking
by making Arjuna address Krsna as Madhusudana.
Apart from meaning destroyer of Madhu Madhusudana is literally
one who assents to and promises madhu, i.e. the Vedic madhu vidya,
which Arjuna lacks and which is now required for Arjuna, which Krsna
will impart to Arjuna. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad II.v.1-19, and the
Chandogya Upanisad III 1-5 describe Madhu-vidya or ‘Honey-skill
(know-how)’ where the imagery of bees, beehive, honey, and the flower
from which the honey comes is described to create the enthusiasm of
the self. It is this imagery of bee, beehive and honey, which in later
literature, specifically in pañcaratra literature developed into a beehive
conception of institution as person.
9. Madhu-Vidya or ‘Honey-skill (or Honey Know-how)’
Arjuna is in need of this Madhu Vidya to recover his self, as he at this
stage, i.e. in first chapter, is under the sway of his ahamkara, i.e. ego.
The significance of madhu vidya is that it is the skill to make the self
of the institution in time (kala) to be present in the heart of all, as is
indicated in the pañcaratra literature. Madhu Vidyâ refers to knowledge
of abstract internal as well as external public institution, which is like
a beehive. So the specific skill that Arjuna lacks due to Ahamkara, and
which lack is indicated by his erroneous address to Krsna as
Madhusudana, is the skill of keeping the reflection of the institutional
person in the heart and buddhi required for performance of institutional
action.
Since Visnu as Madhava is graspable through Madhu Vidya, Arjuna
needs Madhu Vidya. Since Madhu Vidya is actually the skill in grasping
by buddhi the institutional person it is indicated by Vedavyasa, through
the error of Arjuna, that to grasp Visnu by buddhi Arjuna has to have
Madhu Vidya, because from the very beginning of the Vedic literature
Visnu is recognized as yajña puruca, i.e. institution as person. In
Satapatha Brahmana the expression yajño vai visnuh, i.e. identification
of yajña with Visnu, is repeated not less than 50 times e.g. 1.1.2.13,
5.2.3.6, 5.4.5.1 etc. In Kaus taki Brahmana 4.2, 1.8, 18.14 and in
Aitareya Brahmana 1.3.4 the identification of yajña and Visnu is
repeated. In the Bhagavadg ta Arjuna does not know the identity of
Krsna as Visnu or yajña purusa, i.e. institution as person in the first
chapter to be able to address him as Madhava. The identification of
138 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
yajña, i.e. institution, with Krsna will be made known to Arjuna when
Krsna speaking in first person will say in 9.16: “I am kratu, I am yajña,
I am svadha, I am aucadha, I am mantra, Myself the butter, I am fire,
I the act of offering.”18
It is the knowledgeable resolve of a collective institutional person,
which is imparted to Arjuna later. Bhagavatg ta 13.13-16 confirms
this.
Bhagavatg ta 13. 13 says: “With hands and feet everywhere, with
eyes and heads and mouths everywhere, with ears everywhere, that
exists enveloping all.”19 This verse is crystallizing the institution as
person. This is a description of a corporate institutional person, which
incorporates many human beings in it like the bees in the beehive.What
the verse 13.13 of the Bhagavadg ta is describing is a collectivity,
which is institution as person.
The verse 13.14 of the Bhagavadg ta says: “Shining by the gunas
(strands of prakrti) of all the senses, (yet) without the senses; unattached,
yet supporting all; devoid of gunas but enjoyer of gunas.”20 This verse
reinforces the conception of institution as person. What it is describing
is the functions of the institution as person to further crystallize the
idea of institution as person. The institution as person does not have
any of the senses as human being as person has. How does the institution
as person then manifests with functions/workings/actions of senses? It
is because the institution as person manifests with functions/actions of
senses without having corporeal senses, the institution as person is
called the foremost and greatest person, which surpasses all human
persons. Institution in this crystallization is just an arrangement of
actions of senses spread over space and time divested of the corporeality
of senses, which belong to individual human beings who are members
of the institution. According to 13.14 of the Bhagavadg ta, the institution
as person manifests with functions of senses without having corporeal
senses. Hence, the institutional person is asaktam, because it does not
require indriyartha sannikarsa to exhibit functions of senses. The
indriyartha sannikarsa or matrasparsa will take place in the individual
human being who is member of the institution, but acquiring of prama
through pramana will be attributed to the institution as person.The
institutional person is sarvabhrc ‘supporting all,’ i.e. ‘filling all.’ The
institutional person is nirgunam ‘without strands of prakrti (nature)’
and it is because of this that it has no corporeal senses as these are
evolutes of strands of prakrti (nature). But the institution as person
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 139
even when devoid of strands of prakrti (nature), it is gunabhoktr ‘enjoyer
of gunas’ in the sense that it enjoys the functions/actions of gunas as
it manifests with functions/actions of senses even without having
corporeal senses. Here it must be kept in mind that it is the institution
as person, which is jñeyam ‘fit to be knowledgeably resolved’ which is
being explained.
The verses 13.15-16 of the Bhagavadg ta say: “Without and within
(all) existents, the unmoving as also the moving, from being subtle that
is without being knowledgeably actionably resolved; and far away and
near is that, And undivided, yet remaining divided as it were in beings;
filler of existents, too is that, fit to be knowledgeably resolved; grasping
and properly orienting to generate.”21 These verses are presenting the
institutional person. So the affirmation and promise of the madhu vidya
indicated by Vedavyasa through the erroneous address of Arjuna for
Krsna was fulfilled in the Bhagavadg ta.
The western tradition has criticized the beehive conception of
society as an advocacy of instinctive stratified static society. But
Vedavyasa developed, without stating it explicitly, the beehive
conception of institution as person, taking it over from Sruti and
pañcaratra texts, without any instinctive static stratification like the
system of four-fold varna and without any essential involvement of
static varna dharma rather developed it based on sasvata dharma so
that institution as person is ever manifesting with its changing forms in
accordance with sasvata dharma as pointed out earlier. The conception
person, which is institution as beehive is developed removing the defect,
which later western thinkers thought is present in it, but Vedic thinkers
developed the conception of person, which is institution as beehive, in
such a way that like beehive it is full of madhu, which is rasa, with
sweet taste, so that the institution is simultaneously rasa l la, as
recognized in pauranik literature and Vaisnava tradition, so that
institutional action becomes mere effortless enjoyable play rather than
drudgery of a work. Hence, this rasa played an important role in the
Vedic natya sastra, which depicted the protagonist (patra) playing his
or her institutional role performing institutional action exhibiting various
rasa, as if collected by various bees from various flowers to be presented
through actions on the stage. An attempt will be made to develop the
conception of person, which is institution as beehive functioning
according to the sa svata dharma as expounded in the
Bhagavadg talater.22
140 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
References
Agarwala, Binod Kumar. (2016). Thought of Bhagavadgita and Savarna in
Contemporary Dalit Discourse: An Alternative Understanding of the Legacy
of Ambedkar Part 1: Understanding Contemporary Dalit Discourse. Madhya
Bharati, Vol.70, January – June. Pp. 229-271.
Ambedkar, B. R. 1987. Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar-Writings and Speeches. Vol
3. First Edition. Compiled by Vasant Moon. Department of Education.
Government of Maharastra.
Smith, Brian K. 1985. Gods and Men in Vedic Ritualism: Toward a Hierarchy
of Resemblance. History of Religions. Vol. 24, No. 4 (May).
Thapar, Romila. 1984. From Lineage to State:social formations in the mid-
first millennium B.C. in the Ganga Valley. Bombay: Oxford University
Press.
(Notes)
1 As stated in Aitareya-Brahmana I. 13, Yâska in Nirukta 1.16 and Gopatha
Brahmana 2.2.6.2 Sìankaracarya did not write any commentary on the verses of the first
chapter and the first ten verses of the second chapter of the Bhagavadg ta.
His commentary begins with the 11th verse of the second chapter.3 The Gopatha Brahmana 1.1.1, 1.1.7, 1.1.39, 1.2.21, 1.3.19 and 1.4.23;
Satapatha Brahmana 14.6.11.2 (=Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 4.2.2)
states:paroksapriya iva hi deva bhavanti pratyaksadvisah // “The deities
indeed love, as it were, the indirect/mediated [names], and hate the direct/
immediate [names].” Cf. Taittirîya Brahmana 3.12.2 also.4 The “modern” is an analytic category and not a temporal category for the
author, and “individualism” is one of the elements of modern outlook.
Hence, for him Protagoras was quite ‘modern’ in his outlook and
individualist in his ethico-political views, and so is Duryodhana as depicted
by Vedavyasa in Bhagavadgita in particular and Mahabharata in general.5 The relations of birth and alliance can characterize both family and a
tribe (or clan). The difference in family and tribe is that family as a unit
exists with its relations of birth and alliance in a larger society in which
other kinds of relations like the relation of citizen with citizen and citizens
with their representatives, subjects’ relation to sovereign etc. obtain. But
if the entire society is based on only relations of birth and alliance then it
is a tribe. The claim is that Arjuna recognized only tribal relations and no
other relations and, hence, he was not thinking of family but of tribe.6 The similar conclusion was reached by Romila Thapar much earlier on
historical consideration of Post Mauryan period. She treats the
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 141
Mahabharata War as a major time marker. It marks the end of an epoch.
Kshatriya rulerships are about to make way for the monarchical states of
the middle Ganga valley. “The intensive sorrow of the battle at Kurukshetra
is not merely at the death of kinsmen but also at the dying society . . .”
Thapar (1984): p. 141.7 Ajuna was not standing for the emerging practice. It was Krsna who was
standing for the emerging social practice. If we follow the narrative of
Mahabharata the real conflict was between Duryodhana and Krsna to
shape the emerging practice.8 Cf. Kamhaka Samhita (the Samhita of katha sakha) XXXIV.17: 47.16;
XXIII.6: 82.13; Krsnayajurvediya Taittiriyasamhita II.5.6; Maitrayani
Samhita III.6.9: 73.14; Pañcavimsa Brahmana - Tanya Mahabrahmana
XVI.1.13; Aitreyabrahmana II.37; Jaiminiya Brahmana I.129,130 (of
the Samaveda). Brian K. Smith writes, “Perhaps the most common image
for the sacrifice as vehicle is that which compares the ritual to a chariot
(ratha). In Kaus taki Brahmana the sacrifice is a “chariot of the gods”
(devaratha), the introductory and concluding rites the two matching sides:
“He who makes them equal to one another, just as one can make a
journey as desired by driving a chariot with two sides, so safely he
reaches the world of heaven” (7.7). Similarly, the Agnihotra sacrifice
should be performed after sunrise, according to one authority, so that it
will be like a chariot with both wheels: “Day and night are the wheels of
the year; truly, with them he goes through the year. If he offers before
sunrise, it is as if one were swiftly to make a journey with [a chariot
with] both wheels” (Aitareya Brahmana 5.30).” Smith (1985: p.294. He
also gives a note on the same page fn.4: “For the sacrifice as chariot, cf.
Pañcavimsa Brahmana 16.1.13, where the sacrificial fees (daksinas) are
likened to “internal fastenings” (slesmas); Pañcavimsa Brahmana 8.5.16,
where the chants (samans) are said to be “reins” (rasmi); Aitareya
Brahmana 2.37, comparing the recitations (sastras) to the “inner reins”
(antara rasmi); and esp. Jaimn ya Brahmana 1.129-30, where an elaborate
metaphor links the parts of the sacrifice to the parts of a chariot.”9 aparyaptam tad asmakam balam bhismabhiraksitam / paryaptam tv idam
etesam balam bhimabhiraksitam // ayanesu ca sarvesu yathabhagam
avasthitah / bhismam evabhiraksantu bhavantah sarva eva hi //10 na tvatsamo ‘sty abhyadhikah kuto ‘nyo; lokatraye ‘py apratimaprabh ava11 Ambedkar (1987): p 361.12 Plato, Republic, 334a ff.13 nihatya dhartarastran nah ka pritih syaj janardana /papam evasrayed
asman hatvaitan atatayinah//14 etan na hantum icchami ghnato ‘pi madhusudana / api trailokyarajyasya
hetoh kim nu mahikrte //
142 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
15 tasman narha vayam hantum dhartarastran sabandhavan / svajanam hi
katham hatva sukhinah syama madhava //16 adityanam aham visnur17 aparam bhavato janma param janma vivasvatah / katham etad vijaniyam
tvam adau proktavan iti //18 aham kratur aham yajñah svadhaham aham ausadham /mantro ’ham
aham evajyam aham agnir aham hutam //19 sarvatahpanipadam tat sarvatoksisiromukham/sarvatahsrutimal loke
sarvam avrtya tisthati //20 sarvendriyagunabhasam sarvendriyavivarjitam /asaktam sarvabhrc caiva
nirgunam gunabhoktr ca //21 bahir antas ca bhutanam acaram caram eva ca /suksmatvat tad avijñeyam
durastham cantike ca tat //avibhaktam ca bhutesu vibhaktam iva ca sthitam
/bhutabhartr ca taj jñeyam grasisnu prabhavisnu ca //22 The present author presented a paper entitled “Dharma in The
Bhagavadg ta” in a National Seminar on The Concept of Value in the
Contemporary Perspective, organized by Centre for Advanced Study,
Department of Philosophy, University of Allahabad, Allahabad-211002,
February 21-22, 2015, wherein he has argued that it is generally believed
that Bhagavadgita offers a philosophic defence of varna dharma but this
is an unfounded believe and has shown that Bhagavadgita advocates
sasvata/sattvata dharma, which is distinct and different from varna
dharma and this sasvata/sattvatadharma was elaborated extensively in
that paper. Also Cf. Agarwala (2016).
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 143
Quest for Academic Autonomy and theMaking of Public Intellectuals: SomeReflections on Martha Nussbaum’sHumanity Project
Abstract
The institution of public intellectualism in the democratic societies has
been a great ‘conscience-creator and shaper.’ First, Public Intellectualism
helps in consolidating the local aspirations and beliefs that guides the
society and political society to ‘govern’ constructively. Secondly, it
helps to bring changes in the ‘non-accommodative’ attitudes and
aspirations of people and establishes an ‘informed-debate’ over the
issues of common-concern.
The paper aims to examine Martha Nussbaum’s efforts to overcome
the crises of humanity as explicated in her two seminal texts – Cultivating
Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) & Not for Profit: Why
Democracy Needs the Humanities (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2010). Nussbaum asserts that science and technology can lead a
* Vaibhav Shah, Assistant Professor, English, Centre for Learning Future,
Ahmedabad University, GICT Building, Central Campus Navrangpura,
Ahmedabad-380009 Gujarat, India, E-Mail- [email protected],
Mobile - +91-9638885400.
** Ravi Saxena, Assistant Professor, Political Science, School of Law, SVKM’s
NMIMS (Deemed to be University), V. L. Mehta Road, Vile Parle West,
Mumbai-400-056, Maharashtra, India, E-Mail- [email protected] Mobile-
+91-9601908840.
144 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
democratic country to economic advancement; but to make it qualitative
and comprehensive living, it is imperative to create a decent world
culture which is possible by extensive study of humanities.
The last section of the paper attempts to critically evaluate the
functioning of ‘public-intellectualism’ in India in recent past. The
research method used in the paper is qualitative, normative and historical
in nature.
Key Words: Public Intellectual, Higher Education, Humanities,
Integrated Learning, Tolerance.
I
Since the past few decades, there has been an immense debate over the
characteristics of intellectuals and the kind of roles performed by them
in both academic and public sphere. Despite the claims of their different
and distinctive categories, most of the critics agree that intellectuals
strive to bring changes in the society by means of critical discourses or
active participation in revolutionary movements. The role of an
intellectual, as an agent of change in public sphere, is a product of the
discourse of enlightenment. The enlightenment project is an enquiry
into the truth about nature, man, and society for the progress of mankind.
This belief mobilizes a public intellectual to take up the task of
“transformation of consciousness by the dispelling of prejudice and the
spread of theoretical truth.” (Crick 128). This paper offers an inquiry
into the discourse of academic autonomy for the contemporary
intellectuals in Martha Nussbaum’s humanity project.
In the bio-bibliographical introduction of Nussbaum in Norton
Anthology of Theory & Criticism, a noted characteristic of her writing
has been pointed out which asseverates that she “differs from many
contemporary theorists in the accessibility of her writing. She deploys
philosophical concepts without jargon, determined to convey to a general
readership how theory contributes to making a good society.” (Leitch
2304). Most of the theorists are obscure in their writing, and hence,
their discourses are limited to the interest-field of a few experts who
specialize in that domain and can reciprocate. It becomes difficult for
lay persons to understand their conceptual frameworks and writings.
Nussbaum, on the other hand, is more lucid in her analysis and is
palatable to commoners (here ‘commoners’ refers to those common
people who do not theorize as opposed to the so-called ‘intellectuals’).
These two dichotomous positions of intellectuals i.e. ‘intellectual for
intellectual’ and ‘intellectual for commoner’ impel the introducer to
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 145
represent Nussbaum as the one who pulls out philosophical thought out
of the academic realm and brings it to public domain. In order to
communicate to commoners, she renders her intellectual discourse in
plain language through mundane and quotidian illustrations and
references. Doubtless to say, what propels this classification of
intellectuals is the usage of rhetoric that makes a discourse
comprehensible (or incomprehensible!) in the public domain. This brings
us to another important question pertaining to the role of rhetoric in an
intellectual discourse – to what extent can rhetoric be justified? Rhetoric
is justified so long as it aims at persuading the target audience and
reacts to a specific situation i.e. rhetorical situation which is defined as
“the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create
rhetorical discourse.” (Bitzer 1). This essay, therefore, seeks to argue
that Nussbaum’s project to reinstate the humanity programs from their
peripheral status across universities and schools is both persuasive and
responsive to a critical situation which is both ‘rhetorical’ and
‘philosophical.’ The latter term is an extension of Bitzer’s ‘rhetoric
situation’ by Crick. By raising a question: “whether philosophers,
scientists, or artists merely reflect qualities of their situations or whether
they act as agents of change,” Crick examines two positions of Richard
Rorty who on the one hand suggests ‘leftist academics’ to give away
with theory and participate actively in class struggle and on the other
hand, advocates pragmatism “that would treat theory as an aid to
practice” (134). Adhering to the latter position of Rorty, Crick
conceptualizes the notion of “philosophical situation” which takes
Bitzer’s idea of ‘rhetorical situation’ to a much wider setting and all the
three considerations i.e. exigence, constraints, and audience as espoused
by Bitzer are recontextualized in a broader sphere of philosophical
situation:
First, an exigence is no longer limited to a particular event in a
restricted time and place, such as Roosevelt’s reaction after Pearl
Harbour, but expands to include problems that face an entire culture
within historical time, such as Dewey’s long-term effort to construct
a working ideal of democratic life. Second, constraints are likewise
broadened from specific persons, events, objects, and relations to
include things like public institutions, governing bodies, religious
beliefs, economic relations, historical forces, communal norms,
and ethnic identities… the important qualities of a public (audience)
are the habits of thought and behaviour it relies upon to maintain
community life and confront problems when they arise.
(Crick 134)
146 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Crick thus in formulating his theory of philosophical situation offers
a comprehensive insight of the possible role of a public intellectual. He
asserts that public intellectual addresses the socio-historical problems
faced by public and responds to his philosophical situation “by producing
a work that conceptualizes and provides direction for solving
longstanding and pervasive problems and are then successful in helping
change the habits and practices of a public”(138). However, there is an
epistemological difference in the way rhetoric is mediated by the
intellectuals. Though both rhetoric and philosophical situations follow
persuasion model to bring change, the former is practiced at macro
level and the latter attempts to incite the micro level persuasion.
Another explanation of intellectuals which Edward Said posits in
his The Representations of an Intellectual assigns them much larger
responsibilities:
The attempt to hold to a universal and single standard as a theme
plays an important role in my account of the intellectual. Or rather
the interaction between universality and the local, the subjective,
the here and now. (xiii)
Said’s idea of universality and its relation with local matters offers
a broader definition of the nature of intellectuals for whom seeing
beyond the obvious is equally important as responding to any critical
situation. They must interrogate the implicit issues like the spirit of
nationalism, ideology of corporates and ruling parties, and prejudiced
behaviour towards a particular class, race, caste, gender or community
that are generally hidden beneath the surface of specific situations.
Thus an intellectual, in questioning covert issues, strives to adhere to
universal principals which proclaim that “all human beings are entitled
to expect decent standards of behaviour concerning freedom and justice,
and that deliberate or inadvertent violations of these standards need to
be testified and fought against courageously” (Said 12-13). The seminal
prerequisites of freedom and justice for living a decent life necessitate
any intellectual to participate in a kind of struggle to challenge the
hegemonic structures in a society. In order to substantiate this argument,
Said turns to Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, who classifies the
two types of intellectuals – ‘traditional’ and ‘organic.’ In the ‘traditional’
category, Gramsci puts teachers, priests and administrators who have a
tendency to compromise with their existing environment and “continue
to do the same things from generation to generation” (Said 4). The
organic intellectuals, on the other hand, actively participate in the society
as an agent of change. Such transformations are made possible through
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 147
their dynamic engagement in the spheres of both production and
distribution of knowledge, which albeit, is facilitated by power and
control acquired by them as representatives of specific groups or
institutions. Said argues that such intellectuals’ enterprises are
conditioned by the survival of such groups and institutions in a given
period of time. “As the institutions either rise or fall in ascendancy, so
too do their organic intellectuals” (67).
This brings to the fore Said’s classification of public intellectuals
(individual) as professional and amateur. At the core of this attempt
lies an urgent need of autonomous intellectual who can work
independently without succumbing to the academic, institutional and
political pressures that impose restrictions on organic intellectuals.
However, Said’s account of professional intellectuals defies this very
notion of autonomy by representing them as ‘uncontroversial,’
‘unpolitical’ and ‘objective’ (74). This is possible only in the event of
adopting a neutral attitude by public intellectuals when, in reality, they
are expected to challenge the accepted norms or conventions for the
sake of humankind. Said, in expounding the professional behaviour of
intellectuals, describes four kinds of pressures that challenge the
‘ingenuity’ and ‘will’ of intellectuals, namely specialization (in one’s
domain of knowledge), expertise (certified by authority), and inevitable
drift towards power and authority in its adherents. These pressures
have decisively led intellectuals to a state of insensitivity to pressing
issues of our time. As a counter to this professional attitude of
intellectuals which fail to overcome the selfish motif of rewards and
profits, the notion of ‘amateur’ intellectual is advanced by Said:
The intellectual today ought to be an amateur, someone who
considers that to be a thinking and concerned member of a society
one is entitled to raise moral issues at the heart of even the most
technical and professionalized activity as it involves one’s country,
its power, its mode of interacting with its citizens as well as with
other societies (82-83).
Said’s vision of amateurs evokes a much larger responsibility for
intellectuals which is not merely confined to the conventional role
assigned to them (i.e. reacting to a particular event or a situation) but
goes beyond by making them act in accordance with the moral and
ethical demands of our own time. This also engenders a significant
debate between the ‘method’ and the ‘end’ of the public discourse. As
has been stated earlier that the discourse of some intellectuals is too
vague to be understood, and hence, it gets relegated to the periphery of
148 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
public domain. This might be the case because of their over-emphasis
on the method rather than the larger goal of being accessible to the
wide range of people. Amateur intellectuals are more interested in the
ends rather than the complex methods as their discourses, which
essentially incorporate the moral attitude in professional behaviours
and for this very reason, aim to reach the masses unambiguously for
fruitful rendering of their ideas.
Another role of public intellectual can be perceived in Alcoff’s
proposition of three models of public intellectuals: permanent critic or
Socratic gadfly, popularizing intellectual and public theorist. By
permanent critic or Socratic gadfly model, Alcoff means a kind of
intellectual for whom the “only way to retain credibility is to be
incessantly critical” (525). The other extreme model ‘public theorist’
includes an intellectual who is capable of doing theory in public domain.
Quoting Foucault’s example of his concept of discipline as the principle
mode of political control and his analysis of power structures in society,
Alcoff asserts that “intellectuals should be theorists and critics who are
simultaneously engaged in teaching and learning” (533). Between these
two extremes, Alcoff puts popularizing model of intellectuals who take
theory or knowledge which is produced in academic sphere out and
places it before the masses in simple and comprehensible manner as
opposed to nuanced and ambiguous academic discourse. In order to
substantiate her position, she cites an example of Nussbaum’s Cultivating
Humanity by referring to her book as “more accessible treatise that
makes an educational and ethical case for multicultural curricular reform,
using contemporary classroom examples combined with considerations
drawn from Nussbaum’s scholarly area of expertise in ancient Greek
philosophy” (529).
Nussbaum’s project on humanity can be discerned as an attempt of
a public intellectual who not only reacts to a critical situation which
she refers to as a time of “the silent crisis” because of the drastic
negligence of liberal arts courses and programmes in universities and
schools across the globe but also acts as an amateur, in Said’s term, by
advancing a more profound and decisive role of humanities in inculcating
democratic values in humans as the citizens of the world. Needless to
say, Nussbaum’s erudite scholarship and her diversified interest areas
like moral philosophy, law, public policy, international development
and literature are key instruments in rendering such an influential critique
of present-day attitude towards humanities programmes and reinforcing
the capabilities like critical thinking, approaching world problems as a
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 149
cosmopolitan citizen and sympathetic imagination of the predicament
of ‘others’ to create a decent environment for living.
II
In a 2004 article “A Manifesto for the Humanities in a Technological
Age,” authors perceive a significant downfall of humanities programmes
and hold universities responsible for their unremitting interests in
material gains which have led to the imbalance between professional
courses and that of liberal arts. Another article which was published in
2010 in the same magazine offers a more point-blank question: “Can
the Humanities Survive the 21st Century?” The anxiety of the author in
raising this question is so deepened that what follows is an appalling
and eye-opening claim:
What has happened is that the center of gravity at almost all
universities has shifted from the humanities that the most pertinent
answer to the question “Will the humanities survive in the 21st
century?” is not “yes” or “no,” but “Who cares?” (Donoghue,
2010)
It is this predicament of humanities in present scenario that Martha
Nussbaum is impelled to address as “the silent crisis.” In her book
“Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs Humanities,” she calls for the
attention of all (be they academicians, policy makers, students or anyone
else who cares for education) to the unwanted precipitation of such
crisis as she remarks:
We are in the midst of a crisis of massive proportions and grave
global significance. No, I do not mean the global economic crisis…
I mean a crisis that goes largely unnoticed, like a cancer, a crisis
that is likely to be, in the long-run, far more damaging to the
nature of democratic self-government: a worldwide crisis in
education (Nussbaum 1-2).
One of the factors responsible for this crisis, as Nussbaum avers,
is an arrant negligence of the skills that are prerequisites for the survival
of a healthy democracy. Policy makers’sole focus is the pursuit of
short- term gains which they can obtain by introducing applied skills
perfectly suitable for the making of profit. As a result, humanities and
arts which are considered as ‘useless frills,’ are rapidly replaced by so
called applied skills in the curriculum across US and abroad.
Concomitantly, such reforms have drastically affected the mindset of
parents and children who feel that a degree in liberal arts cannot bring
150 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
them enough financial security as promised by professional programmes.
Nussbaum envisages this crisis as a potential threat to the future of
democratic countries and warns:
If this trend continues, nations all over the world will soon be
producing generations of useful machines, rather than complete
citizens who can think for themselves, criticize tradition, and
understand the significance of another person’s sufferings and
achievements. The future of the world’s democracy hangs in the
balance (Not for Profit 2).
What lies at the center of this threat is Nussbaum’s critique of
material attitude of nations in their pursuit of economic growth and
total dismissal of those qualities that “connect person to world in a
rich, subtle, and complicated manner.” (Not for Profit 6). The desire
for material advancement which is closely tied with the gross national
product per capita calls for a crucial role of science and technology in
the development of a nation? Nussbaum makes a point here by arguing
that though one should not have any objection to either of these two
goals that nations aspire in order to develop; other skills which largely
emanate from the discipline of humanity and which are equally important
should not be given out at any cost in the process of economic growth.
The reason why such skills should not be discarded, as stated by
Nussbaum lies in the vital role they play in shaping the democratic
future of a nation and in creating “a decent world culture capable of
constructively addressing the world’s most pressing problems” (Not for
Profit 7).
The skills or abilities which Nussbaum suggests for the cultivation
of humanity include: the ability for critical self-examination and thinking
critically about one’s own society, culture and tradition; the ability to
approach the problems of the world as a cosmopolitan citizen; the
ability to empathize with others and understand their predicaments as
one’s own. Such abilities help an individual transcend the local matters
and face the problems as a citizen of the world. In order to develop
such abilities in individuals; Nussbaum proposes several changes in the
curriculum in both school and university level of education across the
globe. However, the changes which she suggests are not fully related to
the subject matter but to the method of teaching and learning which
needs to be refurbished in order to be evolved as a citizen of the world.
Nussbaum, in substantiating her thesis of curricular change, takes the
help of classical thinkers and educationists who emphasized on such
reforms in past and are relevant to modern democracies as well. By
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 151
reflecting upon the works of Plato, Diogenes, Cicero, Rousseau,
Pestalozzi, Froebel, Alcott, Mann, Dewey, Tagore and Winnicott;
Nussbaum not only offers a critical appraisal of present day education
model which demands a significant alteration but also undertakes an
exhaustive study of certain colleges and universities of US where
proposed reforms in curriculum and pedagogy are already in vogue.
These abilities, as stated above, belong to liberal arts courses and
therefore Nussbaum insists universities and policy makers to pay equal
attention to them. The first ability which is mentioned as critical self-
examination refers to Socratic way of ‘examined life’:
This means a life that accepts no belief as authoritative simply
because it has been handed down by tradition or become familiar
through habit, a life that questions all beliefs and accepts only
those that survive reason’s demand for consistency and for
justification. Training this capacity requires developing to reason
logically, to test what one reads or says for consistency of reasoning,
correctness of fact, and accuracy of judgment (Cultivating Humanity
9-10).
Socratic mode of thinking allows pupils to question everything they
perceive and not accept anything which is not logically justified. This
emphasizes the role of Philosophy in the intellectual growth of an individual
as logic and reasoning are the core components of Philosophy discipline.
Socratic inquiry aims to unveil the layers of ignorance for the establishment
of truth and justice. However, in a system where students are supposed to
regurgitate the text books in order to pass an exam or qualify for a selection
process for higher education, Socratic model turns out to be a myth only.
Here, obviously, the context is Indian education system which offers no
scope of self-reflexivity for learners which is possible through the critical
examination of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ They are not encouraged to think in an
alternative or unconventional way because it cannot lead them to score
good grades or percentiles in their exams. Moreover, teachers also are not
ready to move beyond their traditional realm of pedagogy as noted by
Nussbaum:
Notice that part of the issue is content, and part is pedagogy. Curricular
content has shifted away from material that focuses on enlivening
imagination and training the critical faculties toward material that is
directly relevant to test preparation. Along with the shift in content has
come an even more baneful shift in pedagogy; away from teaching
that seeks to promote questioning and individual responsibility toward
force-feeding for good exam results (Not for Profit 134).
152 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Socratic examination method, on the other hand, requires a deeper
level of commitment from teachers by paying close attention on each
and every individual; who also, in turn, must ensure an active
participation in the class. Thus, it goes without saying that in order to
introduce Socratic model of thinking in the present educational system,
the entire structure as it exists now needs to be radically reconstructed.
Moreover, as Nussbaum notes, Socratic argument is challenged by two
powerful opponents: conservatives and postmodernists. While
conservative opposition holds a skeptical attitude, suspecting that such
an argument may subvert the traditional values; postmodernists reject
the whole notion of truth and objectivity which Socratic argument aims
for. Such oppositions against Socratic argument apparently decelerate
the efforts to bring change in the system. However, having refuted both
the claims, Nussbaum insists that Socratic argument is a necessary tool
to get away with prejudices and secure justice for every individual.
The ability to approach the pressing problems of our time as a
citizen of the world comes second in Nussbaum’s vision for the
cultivation of humanity. She lists certain problems viz. economic,
environmental, religious and political which are faced by almost all the
nations of the world and hence cosmopolitan in their scope. She argues
that such problems can be addressed only when one is able to surpass
one’s local loyalties and think in a global context. Therefore, Nussbaum
calls for all the schools, colleges, and universities of the world to
“cultivate in students the ability to see themselves as members of a
heterogeneous nation” (Not for Profit 80). To train people as members
of a pluralistic culture, it is required to sensitize them to the history and
character of the diversity of individuals, groups, and communities of
one’s own nation as well as those that exist outside. Such training will
have two fold advantages: first, it will nurture an attitude of mutual
respect between/among citizens, and second, they will be able to develop
a sensitive and empathetic belief towards the other religions, nations,
genders, class, and cultures which they are not the part of. Nussbaum
proposes several reforms in the curriculum for the inculcation of world
citizenship attitude by asking for “the construction of basic required
courses of a “multicultural” nature; the infusion of diverse perspectives
throughout the curriculum; support for the development of more
specialized elective courses in areas connected with human diversity;
and, finally, attention to the teaching of foreign languages, a part of the
multicultural story that has received too little emphasis.” (Cultivating
Humanity 70).
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 153
The third ability i.e. to empathize with others can be conceived of
as an extension of world citizenship attitude. The spirit of mutual respect
and capacity to recognize others naturally brings in the feeling of
empathy as well. Nussbaum posits that such capability is made possible
through the ‘narrative imagination’ provided by the disciplines like
literature and art. One important reason why Nussbaum turns to literature
and arts for the cultivation of humanitarian capabilities is that they
provide alternative ways of understanding reality. The complex human
situations and characters that are difficult to be observed and predicted
in real life are easily made perceptible and hence comprehensible in
literature through the narrative imagination it offers. What is central
here to the argument of Nussbaum is Aristotle’s famous claim that
literature shows us “not something that has happened but the kind of
things that might happen.” (Cultivating Humanity 92).
Not only that narrative imagination simplifies the complicated
human nature in real world but also helps to develop a more
sophisticated and non-parochial approach to ‘other’ persons. The
quintessential example here is, Nussbaum’s rendering of a nursery rhyme
‘twinkle twinkle little star” which she considers as a beginning of the
story telling. It does not generate a feeling of fear or disgust for other
entities like a star or any other creature but rather creates a kind of
curiosity and desire to know more about ‘others.’ This feeling of wonder
connects children with their inner life against the material world they
are part of which in turn develops a spirit of compassion:
Narrative imagination is an essential preparation for moral
interaction. Habits of empathy and conjecture conduce to a certain
type of citizenship and a certain form of community: one that
cultivates a sympathetic responsiveness to another’s needs and
understands the way circumstances shape those needs, while
respecting separateness and privacy (Cultivating Humanity 90).
Thus, arts and literature enact a pivotal role in framing a civic
imagination which propels the citizens to act in accordance with
democratic values. While tragedies make them vulnerable to the kind
of misfortunes they might face in future, they also learn the lessons of
sufferings which are essential for their future participation in politics.
One who is able to make sense of the sufferings of others will not use
them as object of manipulation and instead build up an environment of
compassionate coexistence with fellow citizen.
However, in conceiving the multicultural trend in literature which
refers to a proper recognition of the diversity of humans and cultures,
154 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Nussbaum observes the emergence of an anti-humanist view – ‘identity
politics’ which she alarmingly declares as dangerous for the democratic
values of any nation. ‘Identity Politics’ as she avows, is a rapidly
growing approach that gives preference to one’s own (local) group be
it religious, ethnic or based on class, gender or sexuality over the
notion of world citizenship. Nussbaum claims that much teaching of
literature in current academy is instigated by this very ideology of
identity politics thereby ignoring the mutual human requirements and
concerns that provide the basis of compassion and respect. The prime
goal of identity politics is to present the citizen group as a “market
place of identity-based interest groups” who strives to achieve power
positions and perceives difference as a kind of attitude which needs to
be affirmed rather than understood as Nussbaum comments:
An especially damaging consequence of identity politics in the literary
academy is the belief, which one encounters in both students and
scholars, that only a member of a particular oppressed group can
write well or, perhaps, even read well about the group’s experience.
Neither individuals or groups are perfect in self-knowledge, and a
perceptive outsider may sometimes see what a person immersed in
an experience fails to see (Cultivating Humanity 111).
This observation of Nussbaum clearly states that such practices
only increase the ideological gaps between/among groups leading to
more conflicts and battles. Instead, literature and arts should be
instruments of reading diverse cultures and their complexities for the
fuller understanding of fellow humans who coexist with us. Thus, all
the three abilities discussed above are essential for a sound democratic
culture. However, Nussbaum notes that nowadays, there is an increased
popularity of vocational courses in universities and schools that aim to
develop the professional skills of undergraduates and graduates in order
to ensure better jobs. The rise of ‘vocationalism’ has significantly
reduced the liberal arts courses which is not a good sign for future
democracy. that a quality life requires a fine balance of vocational
skills and humanitarian abilities.
III
Considering the argumentative analysis in the last two parts of the
paper, it seems imperative to get back to the basic research questions
this paper tries to problematize. In the modern neoliberal times when
the idea of citizenship also imbibes the transformation of human beings
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 155
as ‘human resource,’ it becomes imperative to look back to choose the
future prudently. In such times when states are the economic guardians
of the interests of the capitalists, one must not forget the prospective
implications of the adoption of the belief of ‘transformation of the
social being into economic being.’ Liberal states have, generally and
globally, agreed upon the fact to give primacy to economic development
and claim that economic development is a pre-requisite to socio-cultural
development, and social justice at large as well. This claim needs a
close inquiry. How far these claims could prove, particularly in
developing nations like India and Brazil, that the economic reform
process could substantially prove itself as a panacea to social ills and
helped in the eradication of poverty and human miseries. In this context,
Martha Nussbaum’s extensive explanation in support of cultivating
humanities deserves to receive a considerable thought.
Universities in India, in the name of modern education system,
have adopted the courses that have a capacity to be run as ‘self-financed
courses.’ These self-financed courses come mostly from those areas of
study which guarantee employment. And this reversed the situation in
university system in India where one hardly finds the proactive presence
of the departments of Humanities, Social Science and Languages,
especially in the newly established (including the private UGC-
recognized) universities. The modes of research in such universities
have also undergone a deleterious transformation. Normative research
got a back seat and empiricism is appreciated. Old departments of
humanities, social science and languages in the state or central
universities are searching for good students. But, unfortunately all this
is continuing and remains as an unattended problem. University
authorities consider that it’s the socio-economic change that took place
with the opening up of Indian market that is responsible for it, and they
hardly can do anything in this regard.
How to deal with it? Is there any need to revive the sense of
relevance of humanities subjects in the post-modern contemporary times?
Have these subjects the capacity to contribute to human empowerment
in this so-called post-human, post-truth world? All these complex
questions necessitate a series of serious debates and discussions. How
far the growing insensitivity towards social values is conducive to
bring about a healthy community life can be reduced and removed
through the meaningful dissemination of such subjects of humanities in
university set-up requires an urgent re-look. In what ways can a
harmonious human growth be attained? Nussbaum, in her Humanities
156 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Project, deals with such questions and relates it to the role and utility
of humanities in preparing good public intellectuals that would work as
a catalyst to social justice in any given society.
Ramchandra Guha an influential public intellectual of present-day
India claims that the Right in India has no intellectuals worth mentioning,
even though it is the Right-wing political party that is in power (1). In
this narrative, Guha tries to indicate the inherent relationship between
intellectuals and power-structures. As Congress dominated the power-
position in India, it also settled the intellectual discourse for a long
time. But, to Guha there seems no intellectual in sight from the Right
wing. Guha has been an eminent public intellectual of India with a
sharp understanding of issues around. It seems that Guha’s comments
are merely journalistic as they are not well researched revelling only in
gross generalizations and simplicisms without showing any attempt on
his part to apply objective critical insights to hegemony exerted by
either the Right or the Left or the Congress. Guha in his write-up takes
another critically untenable position by proposing and concluding, again
without logic, that it may be a failure of ‘patronizing of intellectuals’
by the Right-wing party in power but there is no dearth of Right-wing
intellectuals in India. But even a public intellectual like Guha, at times,
may make errors of interpretation, or self-consciously misinterpret the
public issues. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that public intellectuals,
like Guha and many others, have been successful in bringing the ‘critical
thinking’ mode to social explanations. Irrespective of this contribution
by such intellectuals, due to their limited readership, Indian situation is
quite peculiar in this sense. This brings the public intellectual debate to
another plane where one may ask a rather uncomfortable question –
Can the personalities, myths, morals and the issues confronting the
growing middle class be considered the cornucopia of ‘public-
intellectualism’ in India? Intellectuals have this tendency to appropriate
this terrain of personalities and myths, morals, mores and middle-class-
realities. All is grist that comes to the mills of public intellectualism in
India!
Romila Thapar, in her recent take on public intellectualism
denounced the Right in bringing down the level and integrity of ‘public-
debate’ in India in the last twenty years specially. To her, academia has
been a responsible institution for such downfall. Indian university system
is conducted on the ideological lines and this led to such a downfall of
intellectual public debate in India. She alleges the governments in general
and the current government in particular is interfering in setting the
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 157
course structure for universities in India. This, according to her, took
place on ideological lines. Here it seems that Thapar becomes the
victim of her own intellectual exposition. It has been the left that
dominated the intellectual discourse and academia in general in India
after the independence till now. She herself has been the member of the
various such committees that directly and indirectly influences the
university curricula. One may wonder as to how this interference could
be allowed considering the prominent presence of academic leaders
and intellectuals like Thapar herself! Governments do play with the
education systems. But, it cannot sustain if the intellectual dissemination
has been a profound process in academia. Many intellectuals were
found political in their intellectual functions and failed the possibility
to establish ‘public-intellectual’ debate in India. Amartya Sen, to a
great sense, could reach to appeal this ‘public-debate;’ otherwise
academia could not penetrate his intellectual rigor and become the
victim of its own trajectories. Martha Nussbaum’s thesis on public
intellectual debate deals with the issue from a Western perspective and
leaves enough space ‘unexplained’ in Indian case of public
intellectualism. Here, in India, institutions, processes and personalities
of past that reflect a relationship between intellectualism and public
good have always been timeless and are still followed and debated.
Works Cited
Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Does the public intellectual have intellectual
integrity?” Metaphilosophy, vol. 33, no. 5, 2002, pp. 521-534, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/24439434. Accessed 5 May 2016.
Bitzer, Lloyd F. “The rhetorical situation.” Philosophy & rhetoric, 1992,
pp. 1-14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237697. Accessed 5 May 2016.
Crick, Nathan. “Rhetoric, philosophy, and the public intellectual.”
Philosophy and Rhetoric vol. 39, no. 2, 2006, pp. 127-139, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/20697141. Accessed 27 May 2016.
Davidson, Cathy N., and David Theo Goldberg. “A manifesto for the
humanities in a technological age.” Chronicle of higher education vol.
50, no. 23, 2004, pp. B7.
Donoghue, Frank. “Can the humanities survive the 21st century?” The
Chronicle of Higher Education, vol. 5, 2010.
Leitch, Vincent B., and William E. Cain, eds. The Norton anthology of
theory and criticism. WW Norton & Company, 2010.
158 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Nussbaum, Martha C. Cultivating humanity. Harvard University Press,
1998.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Not for profit: Why democracy needs the humanities.
Princeton University Press, 2010.
Said, Edward W. Representations of the Intellectual . Vintage, 1994.
Guha, Ramchandra. “In absentia: where are India’s conservative
intellectuals?” The Caravan: A journal of politics & culture, 2015, https:/
/www.caravanmagazine.in.
Thapar, Romila, et al. The public intellectual in India. Aleph in association
with The Book Review Literary Trust, 2015.
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 159
Configuring Kibithoo as an Entrepot inIndia-China Border Trade
Introduction
Border is the gateway to growth and development in the trajectory of
contemporary economic diplomacy. It is a new mode of interaction
which entails de-territorialized economic cooperation and free trade
architecture thereby making the spatial domain of territory secondary
in the global economic relations. Taking a cue from this, both India and
China looked ahead to revive their old trade routes in order to restore
cross-border ties traversing beyond their political boundaries.
The reopening of Nathula1 trade route was realised as a catalyst in
generating trust and confidence between India and China. Subsequently,
the success of Nathula propelled the academia, policy makers and the
civil society to rethink the model in the perspective of Arunachal Pradesh
as well. So, the question automatically arises here should we apply this
cross-border model in building up any entrepot in Arunachal Pradesh?
In this context, Kibithoo2 which has immense potentiality is configured
as an entrepot in India-China border trade based on historical as well
as geoeconomic and strategic considerations.
* Dr. Jajati K. Pattnaik ([email protected]) is an Associate Professor,
Department of Political Science, Jomin Tayeng Government Model Degree
College, Roing (Lower Dibang Valley District), Arunachal Pradesh. He was a
Visiting Scholar at the Gulf Studies Programme, School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
160 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
Historical Backdrop
Kibithoo was a natural passage between Tibet and India’s North East
Frontier Tract 3during the British colonial period. The Mishmi tribes of
upper Lohit had regular trade links with the Zayul district of Tibet.
The Mishmis carried musk ponds, hides, skins, furs, Mishmi coats,
loincloths, barks and roots for dyes and drugs-getheon (an
odoriferous root), manjeet (madder)and Mishmi teeta in lieu of
cattle, brass-pipes, gongs, wollen goods, copper vessels and beads
for ornaments from Tibet. Similarly, Tibetans also paid regular
visits to Lohit to procure and barter their goods with the Mishmis,
Zakhrings and Meyors (Choudhury 1978). It was quite well known
that other tribes such as Monpas, Nyishis, Galos, Adis, Mishmis,
Membas and Khembas living in the North Eastern Frontier Tract
had also booming trade relations with Tibet.
The 1962 war brought fissures in Sino-Indian relations and as
a consequence, the cross-border trade went in total oblivion.
However, the changing contours of global economic order in the
recent past drove both India and China to accord primacy to free
trade and connectivity, thereby making the territorial space
secondary in their bilateralism. In this context, the reopening of
Kibithoo route was thought necessary in order to establish the old
ties and reconnect the lost linkages.4 As Shantanu Kri, Chief Editor
of a local weekly, The Lohit Mirror observed, ‘It is time to open
the curtain. The reopening of Kibithoo route shall not only enhance
the economic cooperation between the two neighbours but it shall
provide an opportunity to both sides to understand the social,
political and cultural values of the people more passionately. It
might also pave the way to improve mutual trust between the two
countries. India and China are the world’s most populated nations.
Both of them are beset with inherent problems like unemployment,
poverty, inequality, illiteracy and poor health care in their respective
borderlands. Opening the borders for trade could be an important
tool to alleviate poverty in the underdeveloped regions of both the
borderlands.’5
Thus, lifting the artificial barrier will definitely benefit both
the countries economically considering that both the countries have
good roads upto the borders. India has the advantage of favourable
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 161
geographical condition for trade than its counterpart. The region
is also peaceful and does not have any underground outfits to
sabotage the trade link. Therefore, India should consider reopening
Kibithoo as a vi tal t rade route without prejudging the
circumstances.6
Map of Border Trade Locations, Government of Arunachal Pradesh.
Source: http://aruntrade.gov.in/html/btcmap.htm
Geo-Economic Importance
Kibithoo is important from geo-economic perspective being most
conveniently placed in the entire Himalayan mountain range. It is situated
at an altitude of 4,070 feet above sea level as compared to Nathula
Pass which lies at an altitude of 14,400 feet above sea level. Even in
Arunachal Pradesh, low elevated mountain range of Kibithoo enjoys
geo-economic advantages over Bumla, Taksing, Mechuka, Monigong
162 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
and Gelling to be developed as an all weather road corridor to Tibet
Autonomous Region, Sichuan and Yunnan of China.7 Kibithoo as an
entrepot will be as useful as Nathula pass because this route will provide
not only access to Tibet but also to Yunnan as well. This route has
greater potential than Nathula, thereby reducing distance to Kunming
which is at the heart of China’s southward bridgehead stratagem.8 Thus,
India and China should at first develop Kibithoo-Kunming highways
and then undertake developing Stilwell Road (Ledo- Nampong –
Shindbwiyang-Bhamo – Muse-Ruili and Kunming) and BCIM Highways
(Kolkata-Dhaka-Sylhet-Silchar-Moreh-Tamu-Mandalay-Muse–Ruili and
Kunming). India should expand multiple trade routes along different
Highways in order to tap the Southwestern and Western Chinese
markets.9
Kibithoo as an entrepot would be more beneficial in terms of land
connectivity corridors as compared to the Stilwell road.10 On the other,
if Kibithoo entrepot project is taken up, then it would provide shorter
and faster access to the Indian industries to tap the South western and
South Eastern Chinese markets, and it would create adequate space for
the emergence of industrial clusters i.e. Guwahati- Tezpur- Jorhat-
Dibrugarh-Tinsukia Digboi- Margherita in Assam; Dimapur, Kohima
and Mokokchung in Nagaland and Itanagar- Ruksin- Pashighat- Roing-
Tezu- Hawai in Arunachal Pradesh. As Lt. General John Mukherjee
(Retd.) of the Eastern Command, said: ‘Tezu – Hayuliang – Walong –
Dichhu pass – Rima is the shortest route to mainland China and offers
tremendous potential to both Look and Act East for the entire region
provided the Indian Government wishes to do so.’11 Portraying a
comparative perspective, he observed that ‘the Stilwell Road has only
limited potential and that too only with Myanmar – there is also the
necessity to resolve the insurgency on both the Indian and Myanmar
sides of the border failing which movement would not be
feasible. Further, the Government needs to open Bomdila, Asafila/
Longju, Manigong, and Gelling routes for cross-border trade in due
course of time. The bottle neck to opening the routes is the bad relations
with China, border disputes and permission of both Governments.’12
Kibithoo as an Entrepot would provide easy access to National
Waterway II13 (Sadiya-Pandu-Dhubri) route on the river Brahmaputra
and the latter would be highly beneficial in terms of cost efficiency for
the movement of cargo and coverage of distance as compared to the
road corridors. Sadiya is only 345 kilometers from Kibithoo and the
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 163
cargo from Lower as well as Upper Assam can be transshipped through
Dhubri-Pandu-Sadiya inland route and then be transported through
Tezu- Hayuliang –Walong- Kibithoo land route on its way to Rima,
Chengdu and Kunming in China. It is quite pertinent to mention here
that India’s longest road bridge - Dhola- Sadiya (Bhupen Hazarika
Setu)14 could be a game changer in India’s cross-border trade vis-à-vis
China as a major transport corridor connecting the eastern region of
Arunachal Pradesh with that of Upper Assam.15 The ‘historic’ opening
of the Dhola-Sadiya bridge has given a ray of hope to the people of
Arunachal Pradesh in general and the people of the districts of Lower
Dibang Valley and Dibang Valley in particular. This is one of the major
developments of the Government of India’s initiative of ‘Act East Policy.’
These districts of Arunachal have already had the taste of investment
of corporate houses in hydro-power and related infrastructures. They
are hoping for such major investments by other corporate houses soon
to bring in development.”16
He also added: “In general, the development has broken the myth
that the Government of India is reluctant to develop Arunachal Pradesh
considering the nature of its relationship with China. Optimistically, it
is a positive sign for both the countries to cement the age-old ties and
move ahead. The 1962 hangover can be laid to rest. The onus is on
both the countries to open up avenues of trade and opening of cultural
centres and exchanges for mutual benefit.”17 Conversely, the
commissioning of country’s longest rail cum road bridge – Bogibeel18
would also prove to be a catalyst for cross-border trade reinforcing the
pace of inter-state connectivity between Upper Assam and Arunachal
Pradesh through the ongoing Trans -Arunachal highways.19
Strategic Significance
Kibithoo as an entrepot would counter Chinese penetration into the
region while reinforcing India’s strategic significance along the
McMahon line. It is pertinent to mention here that China has already
built up several infrastructure projects across the international boundary
including opening up a new highway link to Medog - “Tibet’s Nyingchi
prefecture” which is nearer to India’s land border in Arunachal Pradesh
(Krishnan 2013).
Thus, India should move forward to construct a 2000 kilometer
Frontier highway along the international boundary from Mago Thimbu
164 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
(Tawang) to Vijaynagar (Changlang) covering Upper hill areas of East
Kameng, Upper Subansiri, West Siang, Upper Siang, Lower Dibang
and Anjaw Districts for the development of its frontier territory and
build multiple trade corridors prioritizing the most viable- Kibithoo
corridor. As the Union minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju,
who represents the Aruncahal West parliamentary constituency said
‘India has all the right to create critical infrastructure in its area.’ He
added ‘We are at freedom to construct highway in our territory. We are
not harming neighbours interest. We have to develop our territories,
especially those areas which are neglected for too long time. We are
going to develop our own region’ (Singh 2014).Conversely, Shubir
Bhaumik, a prominent foreign policy watcher from Northeast remarked,
‘The frontier highway was long overdue and did not happen because of
muddle headed defence strategists who felt keeping infrastructure poor
in Arunachal Pradesh was a good way to slow down a possible Chinese
advance in the event of a war. It should be developed but not only for
defence purposes. It should have suitable arteries emanating from it
longitudinally to facilitate border trade with Tibet, much as the Nathula
pass was reopened to facilitate Sikkim-Tibet border trade. Once the
Chinese allow border trade with Arunachal Pradesh on a large-scale, it
serves to dilute their strident position about Arunachal Pradesh being
southern Tibet and weakens their claims.’20 So, the development of
Kibithoo as an entrepot would give chance to both India and China to
switch their priorities from security to trade or economic collaborations
based on sustainable engagement paradigms. In this context, Nathula
model may be emulated in Aruncahal Pradesh in order to boost trade and
commerce across the political boundaries. As Chinese scholar Kuei-hsiang
Hsu remarked: ‘China and India began to see signs of healthy progress in
border talks in 2003. Both countries smoothed the way for a friendly
relationship by agreeing to put aside border disputes and concentrate on
economic cooperation first. While there was some tug-of-war over the
reopening of Nathula, economic considerations, finally drove both
countries to come to terms with each other. China recognized India’s
sovereignty over Sikkim and India recognized Tibet as a part of Chinese
territory in exchange’ (Kuei-hsiang 2016).
Conclusions
Notwithstanding its potentialities, the development of Kibithoo as an
entrepot in India-China border trade is still in a conceptual stage, although
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 165
it has many backers at the civil society level. No such proactive step has
yet been initiated by the political machineries due to the Chinese
controversial position over the McMahon line. Hence, the need of the
hour is to break the India-China jinx over the boundary row and grab the
opportunities through cross-border collaborations. And if trade booms
up it may draw a different landscape in the bilateral relationship between
the two nations. That’s why, proactive and sustained dialogues have to be
made for economic engagement between India and China going beyond
the McMahon line.
India and china are emerging as global economic powers. And if
they cooperate with one another, it shall benefit both the countries.
China needs India to expand its trade in south Asia and India on the
other hand requires goodwill of the Chinese to penetrate into South
East Asia. If India opens up the Kibithoo route for trade and China
reciprocates in similar manner, it may herald a new relationship between
the two nations. As Kiren Rijiju, Union Minister of State for Home
Affairs, Govt. of India stated in the Lok Sabha, ‘China has to agree.
We can not enforce anyone. There has to be mutual consent, then
border haat can be set up. Without cooperation from the other country,
no trade can take place in any border haat’ (AT 2016).
On the other, in the event of unveiling any concrete measure for
such cross-border ventures, the road map should be crafted by roping
in all the stakeholders on board for a meaningful action. While mapping
their impending outcomes, Kibithoo should not be treated as a mere
land bridge or gateway; rather the potentialities of Arunachal Pradesh
should be harnessed in order to augment the export basket of our country
vis-à-vis China. Otherwise, Arunachal Pradesh would be a dumping
ground for the Chinese products which in turn would adversely affect
India’s long-term economic interest. What is required at this stage is
joint Indo-China effort to transform this spatial boundary into geo-
economic opportunities for the win-win situation of all the stakeholders
or else, it would remain purely a wishful thinking or rhetoric submission.
Notes
1. Nathula (Sikkim) is a trading point in Indo-China border which formally
got started on 6 July 2006 (Pattnaik 2016).2. Kibithoo/Kibithu is the easternmost administrative circle of India falling
under Anjaw District of Arunachal Pradesh in Indo-China border. It is
230 kilometers from Tezu, the District Headquarters of Lohit.
166 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
3. The North East Frontier Tract, consisting of three administrative units
(Central and Eastern Section, The Lakhimpur Frontier Tract and the
western section) was formed through Foreign and Political Department
Notification of 1914 by separating hill areas inhabited by various tribes
from the then Darrang and Lakhimpur districts of the province of
Assam as stipulated under Assam Frontier Tracts Regulations, 1880. The
North Eastern Frontier Tract became North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)
in 1954. NEFA was renamed as Arunachal Pradesh with a Union territory
status on 20 January 1972 and it became a full-fledged state of Indian
Union on 20 February 1987 (Luthra 1993; Kri 2010).4. Interviewed local persons to elicit views on cross-border trade at Tezu,
Headquarters of Lohit district on 16 February 2016.5. Noted the response given by Shantanu Kri against open ended
questionnaire on 15 February 2016.6. Ibid.7. Observed during my field visits to Nathula (Sikkim), and Kibithoo as
well as Upper Hill areas of Arunachal Pradesh several times during
December-January (2015-2016).8. Derived from an electronic mediated response given by Subir Bhaumik
against e-mailed questionnaire on 28 February 2016.9. Ibid.
10. The Stilwell Road covering a distance of 1726 kilometers starts from
Ledo in Assam (India) and passes through Nampong in Arunachal Pradesh
(India) and Bhamo in Myanmar before reaching Kunming in China. The
road covers 61 km in India, 1033 km in Myanmar and 632 km in China.
(Data collected during my field visits to Ledo-Nampong sector of Stilwell
Road on 29 -30 November 2015).11. Elicited from an electronic mediated response given by Lt. General John
Mukherjee against e-mailed questionnaire on 28 November 2015.12. Ibid.13. Brahmaputra River was declared as national waterway–II in 1988 covering
a distance of 891 kilometre from Dhubri to Sadiya in Assam. The Inland
Waterways Authority of India (IWAI) provides terminal services in key
locations for loading and uploading of cargo at Dhubri, Jogighopa, Pandu,
Silghat, Neamati and Dibrugarh. IWAI is developing Pandu port at
Guwahati as a multimodal transport corridor to cater to the interests of
whole Northeast (MDONER).
DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2 167
14. India’s longest bridge, Dhola-Sadiya, which was built over Lohit, a
tributary of the Brahmaputra river in the Tinsukia district of Assam
bordering Arunachal Pradesh, was inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra
Modi on May 26, 2017. The bridge, spanning over 9.15 km, connects
Dhola in the south bank and Sadiya in the north bank of the river.15. Obtained from my field visit to Dhola-Sadiya sector during my field
visits on 21 March 2016.16. Collected an electronic mediated response from Rajiv Miso, a local
academic on May 29, 2017.17. Ibid.18. India’s longest rail cum road bridge, Bogibeel is situated 17 km away
from Dibrugarh in upper Assam and spanning over 4.94 km will connect
NH - 37 on the south bank of river Brahmaputra with that of NH - 52 on
the north bank of Brahmaputra (ET 2015).19. The ongoing Trans-Arunachal Highway traversing 1811 kilometre would
connect Tawang in the western sector of Arunachal Pradesh with Kanubari
in its Eastern sector further linking it with NH-52 near Akajan on the
right side of Bogibeel Bridge in Assam. The Highway would connect
major places like Tawang, Bomdila, Nechipu, Seppa, Sagalee, Yupia,
Yazali, Ziro, Daporijo, Along, Pasighat, Roing, Tezu, Mahadevpur,
Bordumsa, Namchik, Changlang, Khonsa, Longding and Kanubari in
Arunachal Pradesh and would strengthen the intra-state arterial linkage
in the state (A Note 2008).20. Drew from an electronic mediated response from Shubir Bhaumik against
e-mailed questionnaire on 18 February 2016.
References
“A Note on Trans Arunachal Highways,” 13 March 2008, http://
www.arunachalpwd.org/pdf/Status-of-Trans-Arunachal-Highway-and-2-
Lane-connectivity.pdf (accessed on 15 February 2017).
“Bogibeel Bridge’s Girder Cost May Escalate by Rs. 300 Crore: HCC,”
Economic Times, 9 August 2015.
Choudhury, S. Dutta (ed.) (1978): Gazetteer of India: Lohit District,
Itanagar: Government of Arunachal Pradesh, pp. 162-163.
Ministry of Development of Northeastern Region (MDONER Undated):
“Inland Waterways in NER,” http://www.mdoner.gov.in/content/inland-
waterways-ner (accessed on December 2016).
168 DIALOGUE, Volume-19 No. 2
“No Border Haats with China in Arunachal: Govt.,” Arunachal Times, 11
May 2016.
Kuei-hsiang, Hsu, “Impact of opening up Sikkim’s Nathula on China-
India Eastern Border Trade”, http://www.mtac.gov.tw/mtacbooke/upload/
09411/0202/2.pdf
Krishnan, Ananth, “China Opens New Highway near Arunachal Pradesh
Border,” Hindu, 1 November 2013.
Luthra, P.N. (1993): Constitutional and Administratative Growth of
Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, pp. 9-13.
Pattnaik, Jajati K. (2016): “Look East Policy and India’s Northeastern
Region: Status of Trade and Connectivity” in Gurudas Das and C. Joshua
Thomas (Eds.) Look East to Act East Policy: Implications for India’s
Northeast, London: Routledge India, pp. 218-219.
Singh, Bikas, “Despite Chinese Concern, India to Go Ahead with its
Plan of Construction of Frontier Highway in Arunachal Pradesh,”
Economic Times, 18 October 2014.
Kri, Sokhep (ed.) (2010): State Gazetteer of Arunachal Pradesh, Volume
I, Itanagar: Government of Arunachal Pradesh, 2010. pp. 1-2.