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Did Indian capital controls work? Ila Patnaik Ajay Shah National Institute of Public Finance and Policy March 11, 2011 Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy) Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 1 / 49

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Page 1: Did Indian capital controls work? · Intricacy of Indian capital controls RBI SEBI FIPB / DIPP CBDT FII FVCI NRI Others (Int. org., FDI) LISTED EQUITY UNLISTED EQUITY DEBT Source:

Did Indian capital controls work?

Ila Patnaik Ajay Shah

National Institute of Public Finance and Policy

March 11, 2011

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 1 / 49

Page 2: Did Indian capital controls work? · Intricacy of Indian capital controls RBI SEBI FIPB / DIPP CBDT FII FVCI NRI Others (Int. org., FDI) LISTED EQUITY UNLISTED EQUITY DEBT Source:

Outline

1 Motivation2 India’s capital controls

International comparisonsThe regulatory framework

3 A System Under Strain, 1998-2008Phase 1: Pegging with sterilised interventionPhase 2: Emphasis on capital controls

4 Did the controls achieve their macroeconomic and financial stabilityobjectives?

Our approachWas India able to hold down the magnitude of capital inflows?Was India able to uphold the exchange rate regime?Was India able to achieve financial stability?

5 Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 2 / 49

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Motivation

What can we learn from India?

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 3 / 49

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Motivation

India in the financial crisis

What can we learn from the Indian experience?India has long had an extensive system of administrative controls.India fared relatively well in the global crisis.Can we juxtapose these two facts to conclude that controls madeIndia more resilient?

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 4 / 49

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Motivation

Did the system of controls actually work?

To carefully answer this question we ask three questions:1 Did the capital controls regime succeed in limiting inflows?2 Did it preserve India’s exchange rate and monetary policy regime?3 Did it assure financial stability?

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 5 / 49

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India’s capital controls

Elaborate system of administrative capital controls

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 6 / 49

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India’s capital controls International comparisons

International comparison of capital controls

Chinn and Ito (2008) score based on IMF’s Annual Report onExchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).4 categories are considered:

1 presence of multiple exchange rates2 restrictions on current account transactions,3 capital account transactions4 requirement of surrendering export proceeds

The index for capital account openness is the first standardizedprincipal component of these four categories.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 7 / 49

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India’s capital controls International comparisons

India and her peers

Country Openness Score (2008)India -1.13Brazil 0.99South Africa -1.13South Korea 0.18Turkey -1.13BSST average -0.27

China -1.13Russia -0.09Source: Chinn and Ito (2008)

India is much less open than most other major emerging markets likeBrazil, South Korea and Russia, and about as closed as China.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 8 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

The regulators involved

1 Ministry of Finance (for portfolio investment)2 Ministry of Industry (for foreign direct investment)3 Reserve Bank of India4 Securities and Exchange Board of India5 Forward Markets Commission6 Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority7 Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 9 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

System of capital controls

b. Circulars

c. Notifications

d. Judiciary

e. AAR Ruling

a. Rules

LEGEND

Tex t in Red

Text in Brown

Text in Cyan

Text in Black + Bold

Requires GoI Approval

Requires Parliamentary Approval

Establishing Act

Powers

Regulatory Body

Government of India

DIPP/FIPB

Finance Act

IT Act

IT Act

CBDT

Press Notes

RBI SEBI FMC IRDA PFRDA

RBI Act SEBI Act FCRA IRDA

Insurance Act

PFRDA

b. Notification

c. Circulars/Clarifications

d. Master Circular

b. Circulars

c. Guidelines

d. SAT/Supreme Court [Individual]

e. SEBI Ruling [Individual]

b. Notification a. Regulationa. Draft regulations

a. Regulation

a. Regulation

a. RegulationBanking Regulation Act

RBI Act

FEMA FCRA

IT ActPFRDA

SEBI Act

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 10 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

No single manual

Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999Regulations, notifications, circulars, master circulars of ReserveBank of IndiaNotifications of Ministry of FinanceRules differ according to asset class: listed equity, unlisted equity,debt, derivatives and foreign investmentRules differ according to investor class: Individual investors,foreign corporations and non-resident Indians are treateddifferently under the law from broad based funds, charitable trustsor university endowment funds.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 11 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

Intricacy of Indian capital controls

RBI SEBI FIPB / DIPP CBDT

FII FVCI NRI Others(Int. org., FDI)

LISTED

EQUITY

UNLISTED

EQUITY

DEBT

Source: Ministry of Finance Working Group on Foreign Investment,2010.Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 12 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

FEMA

The Foreign Exchange Management Act and its regulations provideNo appeals mechanismNo indication of time limits for permissions or denialNo obligation to provide reasons for denial of permissionDecisions for publication not made public.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 13 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

Chracteristics of the system

Overlapping, sometimes contradictory rulesRegulatory arbitrageLack of transparency

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 14 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

Listed equity: FII

Listed equity has the most liberal regime:FIIs are allowed investment in listed equity under the portfolioinvestment scheme subject to specified investment ceilingsapplicable to listed or unlisted equity.There is a ceiling of 10 percent for each FII or sub-account.The investments of all FIIs and sub-accounts in a given firm arecapped at 24/98 percent.

All manner of intricacies. Example:

“If a sub-account belongs to an individual or foreigncorporation (as opposed to a broad based fund, charitabletrust or university fund, endowment, foundation or proprietaryfund of a registered FII), then the limit is 5 percent.”

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 15 / 49

Page 16: Did Indian capital controls work? · Intricacy of Indian capital controls RBI SEBI FIPB / DIPP CBDT FII FVCI NRI Others (Int. org., FDI) LISTED EQUITY UNLISTED EQUITY DEBT Source:

India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

Listed equity: FII

Listed equity has the most liberal regime:FIIs are allowed investment in listed equity under the portfolioinvestment scheme subject to specified investment ceilingsapplicable to listed or unlisted equity.There is a ceiling of 10 percent for each FII or sub-account.The investments of all FIIs and sub-accounts in a given firm arecapped at 24/98 percent.All manner of intricacies. Example:

“If a sub-account belongs to an individual or foreigncorporation (as opposed to a broad based fund, charitabletrust or university fund, endowment, foundation or proprietaryfund of a registered FII), then the limit is 5 percent.”

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 15 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

Listed equity: FVCI

Foreign venture capital funds (FVCI) are allowed to invest up toone-third of their funds in specified forms of listed equity.

All manner of intricacies. Example:

“Foreign venture capital funds may invest in IPOs ofventure capital undertaking where the shares are proposed tobe listed, debt or debt instruments of venture capitalundertakings where the foreign VC has already made aninvestment by way of equity and preferential allotment ofequity shares of a listed company subject to a lock-in periodof one year.”

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 16 / 49

Page 18: Did Indian capital controls work? · Intricacy of Indian capital controls RBI SEBI FIPB / DIPP CBDT FII FVCI NRI Others (Int. org., FDI) LISTED EQUITY UNLISTED EQUITY DEBT Source:

India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

Listed equity: FVCI

Foreign venture capital funds (FVCI) are allowed to invest up toone-third of their funds in specified forms of listed equity.All manner of intricacies. Example:

“Foreign venture capital funds may invest in IPOs ofventure capital undertaking where the shares are proposed tobe listed, debt or debt instruments of venture capitalundertakings where the foreign VC has already made aninvestment by way of equity and preferential allotment ofequity shares of a listed company subject to a lock-in periodof one year.”

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 16 / 49

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India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

Non Resident Indians

Non-resident Indians (NRIs) are allowed restricted investment inlisted equity through the Portfolio Investment Scheme up to 5percent of the total paid value of shares issued by an Indiancompany subject to an aggregate 10 percent cap for all NRIsinvesting in that organization.NRIs are prohibited from purchasing shares of chit funds, nidhicompanies or companies involved in agricultural, plantation, realestate or farm house construction as well as those dealing inTransfer of Development Rights.NRIs are allowed unlimited investment in unlisted equity, includingthrough private placement, but only on a non- repatriable basis.

All manner of intricacies. Example:

Regulation 5(4) and Schedule 5, Paragraph 2(1A)(i) and 2(2). Paragraph 2(1A)(i)allows unlimited NRI purchase of the shares of domestic mutual funds on arepatriation basis. Paragraph 2(2) allows the same on a non-repatriation basis.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 17 / 49

Page 20: Did Indian capital controls work? · Intricacy of Indian capital controls RBI SEBI FIPB / DIPP CBDT FII FVCI NRI Others (Int. org., FDI) LISTED EQUITY UNLISTED EQUITY DEBT Source:

India’s capital controls The regulatory framework

Non Resident Indians

Non-resident Indians (NRIs) are allowed restricted investment inlisted equity through the Portfolio Investment Scheme up to 5percent of the total paid value of shares issued by an Indiancompany subject to an aggregate 10 percent cap for all NRIsinvesting in that organization.NRIs are prohibited from purchasing shares of chit funds, nidhicompanies or companies involved in agricultural, plantation, realestate or farm house construction as well as those dealing inTransfer of Development Rights.NRIs are allowed unlimited investment in unlisted equity, includingthrough private placement, but only on a non- repatriable basis.All manner of intricacies. Example:

Regulation 5(4) and Schedule 5, Paragraph 2(1A)(i) and 2(2). Paragraph 2(1A)(i)allows unlimited NRI purchase of the shares of domestic mutual funds on arepatriation basis. Paragraph 2(2) allows the same on a non-repatriation basis.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 17 / 49

Page 21: Did Indian capital controls work? · Intricacy of Indian capital controls RBI SEBI FIPB / DIPP CBDT FII FVCI NRI Others (Int. org., FDI) LISTED EQUITY UNLISTED EQUITY DEBT Source:

A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 1: Pegging with sterilised intervention

Phase 1: Pegging with sterilised intervention

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 18 / 49

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A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 1: Pegging with sterilised intervention

Share of foreign exchange reserves in reserve moneyin Phase I

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

5060

7080

9010

0

Per

cen

t

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 19 / 49

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A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 1: Pegging with sterilised intervention

Market Stabilisation Scheme

In January 2004, Reserve Bank of India ran out of governmentbonds.Sterilisation bonds called the “Market Stabilisation Scheme”bonds were issued.Proceeds from the sale of bonds were sequestered in a separateaccountInterest cost of these bonds was shown explicitly as an on-budgetcost.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 20 / 49

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A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 2: Emphasis on capital controls

Phase 2: Emphasis on capital controls

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 21 / 49

Page 25: Did Indian capital controls work? · Intricacy of Indian capital controls RBI SEBI FIPB / DIPP CBDT FII FVCI NRI Others (Int. org., FDI) LISTED EQUITY UNLISTED EQUITY DEBT Source:

A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 2: Emphasis on capital controls

Example 1: Hindering foreign borrowing

In 2004, a capital control was introduced upon this borrowing, wherethe interest rate paid by the borrower was capped. For loans of amaturity between three to five years, this ceiling was set to 200 basispoints, and for loans of a maturity of above 5 years, this ceiling was setto 350 basis points.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 22 / 49

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A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 2: Emphasis on capital controls

Example 2: Hindering venture capital

Tax pass-through for all venture capital was restricted to ninesectors: poultry, dairy, nanotechnology, biofuels, hotels andhospitality, seed research, etc.Permissions for opening FVCI bank accounts granted by the RBIwere tied to requirements such as investment in only the ninesectors mentioned for tax-pass through treatment in the IncomeTax Act.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 23 / 49

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A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 2: Emphasis on capital controls

Example 3: SEBI registration

SEBI did not register investment managers as FIIs even if theyotherwise met SEBI’s norms for registration, if the investmentmanager was owned or substantially owned by NRIs.There is no explicit provision in SEBI regulations on this.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 24 / 49

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A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 2: Emphasis on capital controls

Example 4: Automatic route

In certain situations, India had placed foreign investment on an“automatic route”.Meetings needed to be held by the RBI to approve the same.Inflows were controlled by not holding meetings for automaticroute investments for many months. control inflows.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 25 / 49

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A System Under Strain, 1998-2008 Phase 2: Emphasis on capital controls

Example 5: Restrictions on offshore derivatives

The term ‘participatory notes’ (PNs) refers to the market for OTCderivatives on Indian underlyings that trades offshore.The book runners on this market are registered FIIs in India, andthey lay off the risk of their overall book using transactions on theonshore market.These overseas transactions are outside the jurisdiction of theIndian authorities.In October 2007, the Indian authorities restricted registered FIIsfrom their transactions overseas on this market.

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 26 / 49

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Did the controls deliver?

Did the controls deliver?

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 27 / 49

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Did the controls deliver? Our approach

Belief that large capital inflows would lead toasset price boomsimprudent lending,currency mismatchesinteract with the pegged exchange rate to distort monetary policy

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 28 / 49

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Did the controls deliver? Our approach

Objectives of capital controls

modify the magnitude of capital flowshelp maintain the dollar peghelp improve financial stability

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 29 / 49

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Did the controls deliver? Our approach

Approach

We face an identification problem: We observe the treatment (Indiawith a certain strategy for capital controls), and we observe theoutcomes. We ask:

1 Did policy makers in India achieve the desired goal using thetreatment?

2 How did India fare compared to other emerging markets which didnot have the treatment (i.e., whose controls are generally not asrestrictive as in India)

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 30 / 49

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Did the controls deliver? Was India able to hold down the magnitude of capital inflows?

Magnitude of capital inflows

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

−2

02

46

8

Per

cent

to G

DP

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

−2

02

46

8Net capital inflowCurrent account deficit

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Did the controls deliver? Was India able to hold down the magnitude of capital inflows?

Impact of restrictions on foreign borrowing

Quarter ended Foreign curr. borr. Other capital inflows TotalJun 2006 3,978 6,747 10,725Sep 2006 1,760 6,100 7,860Dec 2006 4,049 6,766 10,815Mar 2007 6,316 9,487 15,830

Jun 2007 6,944 8,754 15,698Sep 2007 4,217 29,007 33,224Dec 2007 6,240 23,399 29,639Mar 2008 5,209 22,815 28,024

Restrictions impacted the composition but not the magnitude of flowsin that period. For a very short time.

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Did the controls deliver? Was India able to hold down the magnitude of capital inflows?

Comparison against other emerging markets

4

6

8

10India Brazil Emerging and developing economies

Net Capital Inflows(In percent of GDP)

-2

0

2

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (proj.)

Source: IMF, WEO database.

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Did the controls deliver? Was India able to uphold the exchange rate regime?

Rupee flexiblity

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

24

68

10

Ann

ualis

ed v

olat

ility

(P

er c

ent)

23 May '03 23 Mar '07

1.97

3.93

8.82

4.74 years 3.84 years 3.95 years

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 34 / 49

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Did the controls deliver? Was India able to achieve financial stability?

The credit boom

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

010

2030

Year

−on

−ye

ar g

row

th in

rea

l ter

ms

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Did the controls deliver? Was India able to achieve financial stability?

Rupee flexibility and currency risk

Period Daily INR/USD Average currency riskvolatility of firms

1 April 1993 to 17 February 1995 0.16 5.89917 February 1995 to 21 August 1998 0.93 0.54021 August 1998 to 19 March 2004 0.29 3.75319 March 2004 to 31 March 2008 0.64 2.066

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Did the controls deliver? Was India able to achieve financial stability?

Lehman and money markets

510

15

Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov

Call moneyRepoReverse repo

Death of Lehman

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 37 / 49

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Did the controls deliver? Was India able to achieve financial stability?

Asset price boom

Rank Country Lowest Highest Ratio1 Taiwan 5316.87 9809.88 1.852 Malaysia 781.05 1516.22 1.943 Chile 7074.51 15618.38 2.214 Israel 526.97 1189.04 2.265 Philippines 1388.15 3873.50 2.796 Argentina 839.93 2351.44 2.807 Korea 719.59 2064.85 2.878 Turkey 15922.44 58231.90 3.669 Russia 6378.83 26196.44 4.11

10 Brazil 17604.00 73517.00 4.1811 Indonesia 668.48 2830.26 4.2312 India 1388.75 6287.85 4.5313 China 1011.50 6092.06 6.0214 Peru 2493.81 23789.75 9.54

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)Did Indian capital controls work? March 11, 2011 38 / 49

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

MoF Working Group

“While regulators should have the freedom to formulate policiesspecified in the law, applying policies to individual entities must beconsistent, uniform, and transparent.

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

High capital inflows → higher rupee flexibility

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Reducing dollar borrowing

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Foreign debt: More liberal on dollar denominated debt

Dollar denominated : Companies other than financialintermediaries are eligible to borrow in foreign currencies within avariety of stipulated limits without prior approval. Companyborrowing is capped at USD500 million under the automatic routewith detailed restrictions on end-use, maturity and price.

Year Stock of ECB (USD billion)2000-01 23.32006-07 41.12007-08 62.3

Rupee denominated : FII’s allowed to invest. There are caps on allIndia, all FIIs, total stock of rupee denominated corporate bonds:

Period Cap (USD billion)Till Jan 2009 6Till Sept 2010 15From Sept 24, 2010 20

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Foreign debt: More liberal on dollar denominated debt

Dollar denominated : Companies other than financialintermediaries are eligible to borrow in foreign currencies within avariety of stipulated limits without prior approval. Companyborrowing is capped at USD500 million under the automatic routewith detailed restrictions on end-use, maturity and price.

Year Stock of ECB (USD billion)2000-01 23.32006-07 41.12007-08 62.3

Rupee denominated : FII’s allowed to invest. There are caps on allIndia, all FIIs, total stock of rupee denominated corporate bonds:

Period Cap (USD billion)Till Jan 2009 6Till Sept 2010 15From Sept 24, 2010 20

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

India’s policy direction: MoF Working Group

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Big ideas

Capital controls should be seen as an integral part of financialregulationAll our thinking about good governance, as applied in financialregulation, is relevant for capital controls.“While regulators should have the freedom to formulate policiesspecified in the law, applying policies to individual entities must beconsistent, uniform, and transparent.”

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

A case for changes in the foreign investor regime

The report finds evidence thatDistinctions between different classes of investors creates lack oftransparency, uncertainty and violates rule of law.Prevention of money laundering laws and Know Your Client normsrequire a fresh set of rules.

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Recommendations of WG

Legal process: Applelate tribunal, public consultation,transparency, certainty, real time access to the law.Qualified foreign investor: Single window for portfolio investment,registration with DP. Possible for a retail investor to be QFI is shesatistifies KYC norms.Outflows into equity: Entities structuing and offering equity ratedproducts should register with SEBI.Debt: Numeric caps on rupee denominated corporate debtremoved or replaced with percentage caps.

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Budget 2011 announcements

Increase in FII investment in cap corporate bonds from USD 20billion to USD 40 billionAllow foreign retail investors to invest in Indian mutual funds

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Conclusion

The importance of the Indian experience in the capital controls debateis huge. India is almost the only ’evidence’ of a large country whosehistorical experience of capital controls and high growth make the casefor capital controls. The Indian experience should have importantlessons for other countries.

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Current thinking on reforms of India’s capital controls

Thank you.

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