"did they teach you how to lie yet?" (may 27, 2009; revised 9/09)

8/14/2019 "Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?" (May 27, 2009; Revised 9/09)

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DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?

Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal,

and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman

By GuyMontag425 feralfirefighter.blogspot.comMay 27, 2009 [last updated 9-08-09]

Marie Tillman (wife), Mary Tillman (mother), Rich Tillman (brother),

Kevin Tillman( brother), Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father)

we have all been betrayed. It isnt just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they

betray all of us. We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. in yourheart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. we knew they [Pat &

Kevin] could die or they could come back wounded But we neverthought that they would

use him the way they did

-- Mary Tillman, House Oversight & Reform Committee Hearing (4-24-07)

I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was

merely that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that courage could destroy one

man while flight could make another man king.

-- James Webb, The Emperors General (1999)

They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington. Yeah, I called

my pa last night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days,

now. Did they teach you how to lieyet?-- James Webb, A Country Such As This (1983)


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Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal,

and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman

we have all been betrayed. It isnt just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they betray all of

us. We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. in your heart they are yourkids and you turn them over, and we trusted. we knew they [Pat & Kevin] could die or they couldcome back wounded But we never thought that they would use him the way they did


I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was merely that Iwas young. I had never seen with such clarity that courage could destroy one man while flight could

make another man king.


They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington. Yeah, I called my pa lastnight and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach

you how to lieyet?

-- James Webb, A Country Such As This(1983)


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TABLE OF CONTENTSPDF Page

Memorial Day Letter to Senator James Webb (May 25th

2009) 4

Senate Armed Services Committees May 15th

2008 Confirmation Hearing: 10

Senate Armed Services Committees June 2nd 2009 Confirmation Hearing [Postscript 9/09]: 19

General Wallaces Review of Tillman Fratricide (2007): 29

House Oversight & Reform Committees Tillman Fratricide Hearings (2007-2008): 35

April 3rd

2008 Letter to Senator James Webb: 43

Notes from James Webbs Novels -- 1978 to 1991: 51

APPENDICES:

A: General McChrystalResponsible for Fratricide Investigation & Notification to Family:

O perational & Administrative Chain of Command for Tillmans Unit DoDIG 1

Appendix D: Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification Process DoDIG 3

Appendix C: Fratricide Investigation Process [Postscript 8/09 DoDIG 6.

B: General McChrystals Early Knowledge of Tillman Fratricide Confirmation:

Appendix B: Chronology DoDIG

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification & Notes Guy Montag

IG Gimble Testimony Waxman 4/07

Sworn Statement of General McChrystal Jones 15-6

General Abizaid Testimony DoDIG, Waxman 8/07

Interview of LTC Bailey & CSM Birch Jones 15-6

C: General McChrystal Declines to Appear at Waxman Hearing: www.oversight.house.gov

D: General McChrystals Misleading P4 Memorandum:

P4 Concerning Information on CPL Tillmans Death McChrystal

Is Military Integrity a Contradiction in Terms? www.johntreed.com

E: General McChystals Fraudulent Silver Star Citation:

Appendix E: Silver Star Award Process DoD IG

Appendix F: Silver Star Award Details DoD IG Appendix G: Justification Submitted to Support Silver Star DoD IG

Valorous Award Witness Statement (PFC ONeal) www.oversight.house.gov

Discussion - Silver Star Award (p.53-59) DoD IG

F: General McChrystals Testimony at June 2nd

2009 Confirmation Hearing [Postscript, 8-29-09]:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DoDIG: Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, Inspector General Department of Defense,

Report Number IPO2007E001, 3-26-07 http://defencelink.mil/home/pdf/Tillman_Redacted_Web_0307.pdf

ones 15-6: CPL Tillman AR 15-6 Investigation, BG Gary M. Jones, 12-28-04

(http://www.rmda.belvoir.army.mil/rmda/rmdadocuments/ERR%20DOCUMENTS/Tillman-15-6_Investigations.pdf

Waxman 4/24/07: Oversight Committee Holds Hearing on Tillman, Lynch Incidents (oversight.house.gov)

Waxman 8/01/07: The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew (oversight.house.gov)
http://www.oversight.house.gov/http://www.oversight.house.gov/http://www.johntreed.com/http://www.johntreed.com/http://www.oversight.house.gov/http://www.oversight.house.gov/http://www.rmda.belvoir.army.mil/rmda/rmdadocuments/ERR%20DOCUMENTS/Tillman-15-6_Investigations.pdfhttp://www.rmda.belvoir.army.mil/rmda/rmdadocuments/ERR%20DOCUMENTS/Tillman-15-6_Investigations.pdfhttp://www.oversight.house.gov/http://www.johntreed.com/http://www.oversight.house.gov/


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LETTER TO SENATOR JAMES WEBB

Marine and LT Jim WebbVietnam 1968

Pat and Kevin Tillman -- just before entering Iraq, March 2003


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They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington. Yeah, I called my pa last night and

he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how to lie

yet?

-- James Webb, A Country Such As This (1983)

Memorial Day 2009

Senator James Webb,

Five years ago on Memorial Day weekend, five weeks after he was killed in Afghanistan, Pat

Tillmans parents were finally told their son was probably killed by friendly fire.

This Memorial Day weekend, the Senate Armed Services Committee has scheduled General

Stanley McChrystals confirmation hearing for June 2nd. Chairman Carl Levin and Senator

John McCain dont foresee any problem with his confirmation.

However, Pat Tillmans parents believe McChrystal played a central role in the cover-up oftheir sons fratricide. Pat Tillman Sr. said, "I do believe that guy participated in a falsified

homicide investigation. Mary Tillman said, "Itis imperative that Lt. General McChrystal be

scrutinized carefully during the Senate hearings."

I believe the Senate Armed Services Committee should postpone General McChrystals

confirmation and take a closer look at McChrystals central role in the Armys handling of Pat

Tillmans fratricide.

Five years ago, Pat Tillmans family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty

of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Armys highest rank, and

handed his fourth star.

. . .

Congress and the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from close

scrutiny and protected him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up

of Pat Tillmans fratricide:

Lastyear, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a secret review of General

McChrystals role in the Armys handling of the Tillman fratricide. On May 15th 2008 the

Senate Armed Services Committee met in executive (closed) session to considerMcChrystals nomination. On May 22th 2008, General McChrystal was unanimously

confirmed by the Committee and promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.

Last year, I spoke with you on the Diane Rhem NPR radio program (May 27 th 2008; at 40:56).

You said he went through a fairly thorough review of that process [what happened in the

aftermath of his death] at the request of the Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services

Committee [Senator Levin]. the Army knew that this was a friendly fire incident fairly


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quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied

otherwiseIm not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain

of command, how it was handled publicly You cannot help but still feel angry about how his

death was used.

I share your anger about how Pat Tillmans death was used. But, I dont understand why you

were unable to determine where responsibility for that decision really lies to cover upTillmans fratricide. I doubt youactually conducted a fairly thorough review of General

McChrystals role. General McChrystal was the central figure in the Armys cover up of

Tillmans friendly fire death. McChrystal received confirmationof Tillmans fratricide within

two days, had the responsibility to tell the family, made the decision not to tell the family about

fratricide, and he approved the misleading Silver Star award.

. . .

On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren presented the findings of General

William Wallaces review of the previous Tillman investigations. General McChrystal

received no reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. Instead, General

Wallace singled out General Kensinger as the scapegoat responsible for the public believing

the Army covered up the Tillman fratricide.

However, Secretary Geren and General Codys defense of McChrystal doesnt hold up under

scrutiny. General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was

scapegoated! That is, General McChrystal was responsible to inform the family about

friendly fire, failed to inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner, failed to

inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide

investigation, and (arguably) made false official statements.

. . .

During 2007, Congressman Waxmans House Oversight & Reform Committee conducted an

investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman fratricide. However, Congressman

Waxmans Committee appeared to conduct a half-hearted investigation.

Chairman Waxmans decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only look up the

chain of command took the focus off General McChrystal. The Committee permitted General

McChrystal to decline to appear and they neverinterviewed him later. After raising

questions about the Silver Star, they didnt look into McChrystals role in approving the Silver

Star with a fraudulent citation, justification and altered witness statements. The Committee

never questioned the timeliness or misleading contents of General McChrystals P4 memo

. . .

The Senate Armed Services Committee June 2nd confirmation of General McChrystal will be

the final layer of the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillmans death.


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During the April 24th 2007 Congressional hearing, Mary said,

Congress is supposed to take care of their citizens. Pat died for this country,

and he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked. It is not perfect.

No one has ever said that. But there is a system in place to allow for it to work, and

your job is to find out what happened to Pat.

In your 1983 novel,A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith argued: And no, the

military isnt just fine. The point is, it isnt corrupt. Its a system with human failures.

But when human failures systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-

command (to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of

Defense) up to and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single

institution in this country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army leadership,

Congress, White House and the mainstream media.

Perhaps Senator Rowland, in your novel, Something to Die For, hit the nail on the head:

How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before

the days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their

knees before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized

politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before

they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.

* * *

Across the room my mothers father, B.H. Hodges, stares out at me as he has done in every

office I have occupied for more than twenty years. Defiant he was, and tragic too. He was a fighter, a

lonely champion of lost causes who himself lost everything because of the causes he championed.

-- James Webb, A Time to Fight (2008)

Four decades ago, you were drawn into the Herrod case. A Marine patrol was accused of

killing sixteen Vietnam Villagers. Herrod, the patrol leader and veteran of five months, had

been found not guilty. Yet Sam Green, a black eighteen year old with eleven days in Vietnam

had been convicted even though no testimony had been presented that he had actually killed

anyone. From Robert Timbergs The Nightingales Song:

The case continued to bedevil Webb .He wanted to help Green, but wasnt sure

what he could do. He joined forces, pro bono, to try to get the conviction

overturned in a civilian court. The secretary [of the Navy] declined to act. About

two weeks later, in August 1975, Webb received a telegram : TRAGIC

CONCLUSION SAM GREEN DESTROYED HIMSELF.


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He had never met Green, spoken to him only once by phone, but he had committed

himself to clearing his name. He felt helpless, his sense of futility laced with

outrage. Isnt any of this going to come out right? Green was dead, but Webb

couldnt let the case go. He filed an appeal asking that Greens dishonorable

discharge be upgraded to honorable. Webb personally argued the case before the

board.

In December 1978, eight years after the shootings and three years after Greens

suicide, Webb wrote to Mrs. Green: At last, Sams name is cleared. He explained

that her sons discharge had been upgraded to a general discharge. This is small

solace, I know, wrote Webb, I only regret we were unable to do more for him

sooner.

. . .

I never met Pat Tillman. I never really knew anything about him until a year and a half after

his death. But, Ive taken the cover-ups of his death a bit personally the last few years. Why?

I feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman. Im not in his league, but I was an Airborne Ranger

and an autodidact and a bit of maverick. And Ive always had outrage forinjustice and rooted

for the underdog.

Ive been bedeviled by the Tillman case. For five years, I havent been able to let the case go.

I hoped this could be one small cause I might be able to make a difference with all the other

shit going on the past few years. It would be nice if this letter of mine would make a

difference.

. . .

For thirty years your books have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty, and betrayal.

Re-reading your books, I noticed many parallels between your books and the story of Pat

Tillmans death. On April 3, 2008, I sent your office a letter asking you to become an

advocate in the Senate for Mary Tillmans struggle for the truth about her sons death (I doubt

my letter made it past your gatekeeper Gordon Peterson).

I believed you would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:

The Tillmans are of Scots-Irish descent. Military service was prevalent and respected

in the Tillman family. Mary Tillmans uncles were at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a

Marine, and her father was a Marine during the Korean War. Mary wrote, From thetime I was very little, I was aware of my fathers pride in being a Marine. When I was

three years old I would stand between my parents, feet digging into the soft leather

ofthe big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps Hymn at the top of my lungs.

Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother wrote,

Pat was honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about the actions

taken in the aftermath of his death. Honor, integrity, dignity; those werent just


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adjectives in Pat Tillmans life; they were his life. Pat Tillman was the embodiment of

loyalty and commitment. He was such a loyal person. He always wanted to do right

by the people who mattered to him.

Similarly, inA Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, If nothing ever works

out all the way, and if all things change, whats left? Your family and your friends and

your values, thats whats left. Andyour duty to them. Theyre the only importantthings in life. And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong

or right or anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to

survive the judgment of the ages.

Five years ago, Pat Tillmans family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty

of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, promoted to

the Armys highest rank, and handed his fourth star.

But, perhaps you were right years ago in your novel, A Sense of Honor, when CPT Lenahan

said, I guess thats what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor and loyalty

are traps with no reward.

. . .

I feel you owe a duty to Pat Tillman and his family. A duty to place a hold on General

McChrystals nomination and stop his confirmation on June 2nd.

Yeah, that could be a lost cause. Youd piss off a lot of people. But, at least you would give

Mary Tillman the small solace of knowing there is one man of integrity in the Senate willing to

stand as her advocate. Someone willing to be a lonely champion of lost causes Perhaps

you need to take a long look at the picture staring at you from your office wall?

Youve been a hero to me for three decades, since I was a teenager, through my years as an

Airborne Ranger LRRP, to the present day as a firefighter. I havent always agreed with your

positions on the Vietnam War, etc. But Ive never before doubted your integrity. Ive always

trusted your sense of honor.

Id like to think that after three years in Congress you havent yet learned the lesson your

grandmother Hodges asked of you decades ago when you first worked in Washington DC,

Did they teach you how to lieyet?

Sincerely,

******

*********************

*********************


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2008 SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

CONFIRMATION OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL

It went up to the two-star level and the two-star took it right up to the four-star level. Basically

we came to USASOC when everything opened up and now all of a sudden, okay, its sort

of like, Here is the steak dinner, but were giving it to you on this garbage can cover. You

know, You got it, you work it.

-- General Yellen, Deputy Commander SOCOM

How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the days ofmultimillion-dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees before the monied

temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics that cause them to await thewisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash fromthe get-go, myths to feed the public.

-- James Webb, Something to Die For (1991)


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2008 SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE


On May 11th 2009, Defense Secretary Gates nominated Gen. Stanley McChrystal as the new

commander of the Afghanistan War. The Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee,

Senators Carl Levin and John McCain, dont foresee any problem with McChrystals promotion

to four-star general. His confirmation hearing is scheduled for June 2nd

.

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "We feel terrible for what the Tillman family went

through, but this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by

outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing

by Gen. McChrystal."

However, Pat Tillmans parents believe McChrystal played a central role in the cover-up of theirsons fratricide. Pat Tillman Sr. said, "I do believe that guy participated in a falsified homicide

investigation. Mary Tillman e-mailed AP, "Itis imperative that Lt. General McChrystal be

scrutinized carefully during the Senate hearings."

Mary Tillman has harshly criticized the actions of General McChrystal, especially regarding his

Personal For (P4) memo sent on April 29th

2004 (ostensibly to alert President Bush against

making embarrassing public statements about Tillmans heroism or his Silver Star):

In her book Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Mary wrote:

Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death, he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement [P4 memo]

indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by

fratricide unless forced to do so.

And shortly after General Wallaces findings were released in July 2007, Mary said:

"That memo [P4] is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is

writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can script

the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is saying we need

to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass themselves, IF thecircumstances of Pat's death should become public

He should be saying 'We're going to have to put a hold to the Silver Star and we're going

to have to notify the family [of suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if he

was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a way that they can continue this false,

elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious.

. . .


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Last year, on May 27th

2008, I spoke briefly with Senator Webb on NPR radio during The

Diane Rhem Show. Webb spoke of a recent review of the handling of the Tillman fratricide:

I think what happened in the aftermath of Pat Tillmans death was really tragic.

I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the Chairman

of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] and the bottom ...

I talked to his father years ago when my book Born-Fighting came out.

What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that this

was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a

ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, and his own brother, which had served

with him, it was kept from him until the ceremony took place.

Im not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of

command, how it was handled publicly, but it was really wrong.

Someone like me has to have a tremendous amount of respect for what Pat Tillman did interms of stepping forward among other things. You cannot help but still feel angry about

how his death was used.

I was surprised to learn of Senator Webbs review. Although I was familiar with Congressman

Henry Waxmans (House Oversight & Reform Committee) hearings on the Tillman fratricide, I

was unaware that any sort of Senate review had also been conducted.

When I attempted to follow up to find out more about the Senate review, I was stonewalled by

Senator Webbs Military Legislative Aide Gordon Peterson:

Regarding your questions about the radio interview, Im not in a position to elaborate. I

did not participate in the review that Senator Webb mentioned and have no information to

provide to you. The senators involvement occurred in his capacity as a member of the

Senate Committee on Armed Services. I checked with Senator Webb, and he has nothing

more to add to what he said last week. If you have any additional questions you should

contact a representative for the Committee -- Gary Leeling, 202 224-9339. He is out of

the office until next week.

To my regret, I never followed up with Gary Leeling (Legal Counsel for Senator Carl Levin). I

was very busy with life (and had just spent far too much time on the Tillman case) and figured I

was just getting blown off.

A year later, after General McChrystals nomination as the new commander of the Afghanistan

War, I finally realized Senator Webbs review was for aprevious Senate confirmation of General

McChrystal. On May 15th 2008 the Senate Armed Services Committee met in executive

(closed) session to consider McChrystals promotion. On May 22th 2008 General McChrystal

was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.

. . .


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I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the Chairman of

the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] Im not sure where responsibility for

that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of command, how it was handled publicly You

cannot help but still feel angry about how his death was used:

I share Senator Webbs angerabout how Pat Tillmans death was used. But, I dont

understand why Webb was unable to determine where responsibility lay for the decisionto cover-up Tillmans friendly fire death. I doubt Senator Webb actually conducted a

fairly thorough review of how the Army handled Tillmans fratricide.

General McChrystal played a key role in the Armys cover up of Tillmans friendly fire

death. McChrystal received confirmationof Tillmans fratricide within two days, had the

responsibility to inform the family, yet made a decision not to tell the family about

fratricide, and he approved a misleading Silver Star recommendation (no mention of

fratricide, altered witness statements by someone in the approval chain, and inaccurate

assertions in the citation and supporting narrative)

What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that this was a

friendly fire incident fairly quickly,:

COL Nixon said it took a considerable time to get the truth. General Abizaid told

Congress, But it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as the 29th of April,

and that on the 28th

of May [36 days later] we conclusively stated it was fratricide in

terms of fratricide investigations, by the way, thats not a slow investigation. Thats a

fast investigation.

Yet, there was nothing potential or suspected about Tillmans fratricide. The troops

on the ground immediately knew it was friendly fire. Confirmationof Tillmans

fratricide was passed up the chain of command to McChrystal just two days after

Tillmans death by the first investigating officer!

On the 23rd

, the day after Tillmans death, CSM Birch was 70% sure and LTC Bailey

was certain it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating officer, confirmed

Tillmans fratricide just twodays after Tillmans death (not five weeks), and immediately

passed that information up the chain of command to LTC Bailey who told Col. Nixon:

And certainly, by the next day [24th] when we did the investigations, I [ Bailey]

confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, Sir, I

want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews in fact, that was, I guess,

the next day. So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and

said, Sir, Im certain. Im sure. And then I called [Nixon]. I think it was the 24th.

(p. 53). (Note that General McChrystal was next in line in the chain of command,

followed by Abizaid at CENTCOM).


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Its puzzling that the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that Nixon was told of

suspected fratricide on the 23rd, but told McChrystal onlyof Tillmans death, which

McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid. Yet, McChrystal testified in General Jones 15-

6 that he was told of possible fratricide by Nixon about a day [23rd

] or two [24th

]

after the incident. No more than three days later [25th]. Which account is correct?

Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).

In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd, and updated Abiziad with

confirmation on the 24th

. This information surely went up to the Secretary of Defense

and the White House.

they did not tell the family,:

General McChrystal said in his Jones 15-6 statement: there was a conscious decision on

who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know all the facts. I

believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because we did not want to give

them some half-baked finding. Then, he immediately contradicted himself, saying: I

did not know there was a decision not to tell the family. They had another [son] in the

firefight.

. . .

When General Cody was asked why McChrystal couldnt have just called Tillmans

family about potential fratricide he replied, in the casualty reporting business we do

not encumber the JSOC commander [McChrystal] with all of that thats done by theregiment and doneby the Army through SOCOM. Secretary Geren added, So it was

General Kensingers responsibility.

However, if you look at Appendix D: Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification

Process (p.80, DoD IG report), youll see that McChrystals Chief of Staff was

responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USASOC after learning of

friendly fire.

Its also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew about

fratricide no later than the 25th

and yet did not send a supplementary casualty report asrequired by regulations (this finding is not included in the DoD IG Report conclusions).

General Wallace asserted that McChrystal acted reasonably and quickly when he

alerted his higher headquarters about the fratricide investigation. Secretary Geren said

General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted, through his

P4 his chain of command.


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During the Waxman Hearing, General Abizaid said: General McChrystal did exactly the

right thing. He sent a timely message [P4] in a timely fashion through the most secure

channels

Yet, there was nothing timely about McChrystals P4 memo! Secretary Geren implies

that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th

, then sent the P4 to alert his

superiors. However, on April 23

rd

(NLT 25

th

), COL Nixon told McChrystal aboutprobable fratricide and the 15-6 investigation. How can waiting six days to send a P4 be

considered quickly?

they allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, :

General McChrystal approved the Silver Star recommendation package and sent it on to

Secretary of the Army Brownlee without telling him about Tillmans fratricide. At

Tillmans memorial service, a Navy SEAL friend spoke of Tillmans heroic death that

using an account that was given to him by the Army.

Secretary Geren was asked why McChrystal received no punishment after being held

accountable in the DoD IG report for inaccurate Silver Star award information. Secretary

Geren replied that McChrystal reasonably and appropriately presumed the Silver Star

packet presented to him for his signature was accurate. He said that McChrystal was

aware it was friendly fire when he approved the award and that he had no reasonable

basis to call into question the recommendations that came up endorsed by the

commanders in the field

But wouldnt General McChrystal have a reasonable basis to question a Silver Star

package which contains no mention of friendly fire since he had been informed of

confirmed fratricide?

General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman deserved

the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG found he did not directly, or clearly, state these four

factors in the award recommendation. (And if McChrystal only knew what was in the

recommendations, merely signed off on the paperwork, how could he know about these

four factors!)

. . .

And Secretary Geren disregarded the DoD IG review which found General McChrystal

accountable for inaccurate and misleading assertions contained in the award

recommendation package and accountable for not notifying the award processing

channels [Secretary of the Army] that friendly fire was suspected to ensure that the

recommendation was considered based on accurate information.

Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention of friendly

fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said this was done


16/63

somewhere in the approval chain but refused to speculate who was responsible. It

appears that COL Nixon, Nixons XO, and/or General McChrystal were involved.

The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little resemblance to reality and

were carefully and misleading edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire without

actually coming out and saying it.

Overall, it doesnt appear that Senator Webb and the Armed Services Committee did a thorough

job of reviewing McChrystals role in the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide. I dont see how

they could confirm General McChrystal given his role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans fratricide.

. . .

But the Senate Armed Services Committee wasnt alone in its failure to scrutinize General

McChrystals role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillmans fratricide. It appears thatCongress and the senior leadership of the Army had previously acted to shield General

McChrystal from close scrutiny and protect him from punishment for his actions:

On July 31st

2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren presented the findings of General William

Wallaces review of the previous Tillman investigations. General McChrystal received no

reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. Instead, General Wallace singled

out General Kensinger as the scapegoat responsible for the public believing the Army covered up

the Tillman fratricide.

However, Secretary Geren and General Codys defense of McChrystal actions dont hold up

under scrutiny. General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was

scapegoated! That is, General McChrystal was responsible to inform the family about friendly

fire, failed to inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner, failed to inform the

acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide investigation, and

(arguably) made false official statements.

And General Wallaces review disregarded the Department of Defense Inspector Generals (DoD

IG) findings that McChrystal was accountable for an inaccurate Silver Star recommendation

package (e.g. altered witness statements, misleading and inaccurate assertions in the citation and

narrative) and his failure to inform the Secretary of the Army of Tillmans fratricide before the

Secretary approved the award.

. . .


17/63

Over the course of 2007, Congressman Waxmans House Oversight & Reform Committee

conducted an investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman fratricide.

But the Committee held a half-hearted investigation into the handling of the Tillman fratricide.

The Committee allowed themselves to be stonewalled and didnt follow-up on points raised in

the first hearing about McChrystals P4 memo and the fraudulent Silver Star award.

Chairman Waxmans decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only look up the

chain of command seemed designed to exclude important figures like COL Nixon and General

McChrystal.

Its particularly puzzling the Committee failed to interview General McChrystal. McChrystal

was the key link in the chain of command between Col. Nixon and General Abizaid, wrote the

misleading P4 memo, approved the false narrative of the Silver Star, and decided not to notify

Tillmans family about his friendly fire death. Yet, the Committee permitted General

McChrystal to decline to appear at their hearing.

Chairman Waxman said much of our focus will be on the P4 memo that General McChrystalsent. Yet the Committee never questioned the timeliness of General McChrystals P4 memo

sent on the 29th (Although McChrystal was informed ofconfirmedfratricide on the 24th

he

decided not to inform the Tillman family). And the Committee never took a hard look at the

contents of McChrystals P4 memo. If read carefully, the memo was anything but forthright.

After raising questions about the Silver Star during their first hearing, the Committee didnt look

into McChrystals role in approving the Silver Star package that contained a fraudulent citation,

justification and altered witness statements. The Committee never tried to determine just who

falsified the Silver Star witness statements.

The Committees Final Report says pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific

information makes it impossible to assign responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal

Tillmans and Private Lynchs cases Well, I think General McChrystal certainly was

responsible for much of the misinformation in the Tillman case.

. . .

Ive argued that Congress and the senior leadership of the Army acted to shield General

McChrystal from close scrutiny and protect him from punishment for his central role inorchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillmans fratricide.

(Why? Perhaps members of Congress dont want to beseen badgering military leadership or

they are afraid of being Ollie Northed by a decorated senior general? Perhaps the House

leadership put out the word to give General McChrystal a free pass because he is considered

indispensable to the War effort? Ultimately, Congress probably just doesnt care about the

Tillman family. They just want to bury the cover-up of Pat Tillmans fratricide).


18/63

. . .

I believe the Senate Armed Services Committee should delay General McChrystals

confirmation hearing. And the Committee should take a second look at McChrystals conduct

during the aftermath of Tillmans fratricide . As Mary Tillman said this past week in an e-mail

to the AP, "Itis imperative that Lt. General McChrystal be scrutinized carefully during the

Senate hearings."

If the Senate Armed Services Committees confirms General McChrystal on June 2nd

, their

action will be the final layer upon the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillman s

fratricide.

Five years ago, Pat Tillmans family was handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty of

justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Armys highest rank, and

handed his fourth star.


19/63

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES


(JUNE 2nd 2009)

we have all been betrayed. It isnt just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they

betray all of us. We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. in yourheart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. we knew they [Pat & Kevin]could die or they could come back wounded But we never thought that they would use him the

way they did


I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was merely

that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that courage could destroy one man while

flight could make another man king.


They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington. Yeah, I called my palast night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did

they teach you how to lieyet?-- James Webb, A Country Such As This(1983)


20/63


21/63

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES


(JUNE 2nd

2009)

Summary of Newspaper Coverage of Senate Hearing:

Note: This section is largely edited & rearranged quotes from various newspapers articles,

with no specific annotation provided. My following response was written hastily after the

hearing. [Postscript 9-01-09: My response has been updated using the transcript of the

Senate Hearing now available from the Armed Services Committee website.]

. . .

Unless new information on General McChrystals role in the Tillman episode emerges

between now [5-26-09] and his confirmation hearing, the question is not expected to figure

heavily in the Senate debate, Congressional officials said. Congressional officials said

senators would have to explain why they confirmed him then [May 2008] but were

challenging his qualifications now to receive a fourth star and take over the Afghan

mission absent new disclosures.

In his firstpublic testimony before a congressional committee, McChrystal testified about

his handling of the aftermath of Tillmans death. Yesterday's hearing was the first to

address such concerns, because the Senate held a closed executive [secret] session last

spring [5-15-08] to confirm McChrystal in his current position as director of the Pentagon's

Joint Staff

Note: Its curious that both Chairmen Levin and McChrystal both mentioned this secret

hearing at the beginning of their remarks:

From Chairman Senator Levins opening remarks (p. 3 transcript) You

[McChrystal] may want to address the Tillman matter in your opening

statement. Both subjects were discussed in executive session of the Armed

Services Committee last year in connection with your nomination to your current

position as director of the Joint Staff.

From General McChrystals opening remarks (p. 10 transcript): You gave me the

opportunity to discuss in detail one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in

closed session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as

Director of the Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any

additional questions you may have.


22/63

Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to avoid the allegation they

were keeping the existence of the hearing secret? The night before the 6-02-09 hearing, I

spoke briefly with Gary Leeling (legal counsel for Levin). He implicitly confirmed the

existence of the hearing, but would say nothing further in response to my questions except

it was in executive session.

The senators didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly three-hour hearing,

and the Senate is expected to confirm him as early as Thursday. Mary Tillman said, "I

think more effort should have been made on the part of the committee to find out more

about his true nature, his true character and his true actions in terms of the detainee abuse

and Pat's situation.

On PBSs NewsHour, David Corn commented:

And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I

thought seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think,

hot-button issues. You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausibleexplanation, but, again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that

Democrats and Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan

. . .

Mary Tillman criticized Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the ranking Republican on the

committee, who questioned McChrystal on Tuesday, for "playing dumb" by not following

up on McChrystal's explanations.

She also says she declined a personal invitation from McCain to submit questions to him to

ask at Tuesday's confirmation hearing. Mary Tillman says she was put off by McCain's

public endorsement of McChrystal and did not want her questions used as part of theconfirmation process.

"If the Army chain of command didn't know what happened to Pat, why did it present us

with a false story" at the memorial service? Tillman asked. "That is not an error; that is not

a misstep; that is deliberate deception. "What's very disturbing is that Senator McCain

himself was present at Pat's memorial and I would think he would be outraged that he was

not told ahead of time or that he was lied to like everyone else. Did he know all along?"

. . .

Sen. Jim Webb said he had been contacted by members of the Tillman family whenMcChrystal's nomination Afghanistan was announced. Sen. James Webb, a Virginia

Democrat who has championed the Tillmans family case, returned to the topic late in the

hearing during a heartfelt exchange in which the Senator chastised the Army for its initial

incorrect reports that Corporal Tillman was killed in an insurgent ambush, and not by fire

from his own Ranger unit.
http://topics.cnn.com/topics/Stanley_McChrystalhttp://topics.cnn.com/topics/Stanley_McChrystal


23/63

Note: Senator Webb has never spoken with Mary Tillman. Mary has spoken only with

Gordon Peterson (Webbs Military Affairs staff assistant). I mentioned in the previous

chapter how Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the 2008 Hearing. As

a gate keeper, he probably never passed on my letters to Senator Webb.

Sen. Jim Webb pressed McChrystal, prompting the general to agree that the Army had

failed the Tillman family, "You failed to properly notify the family of the investigation and

the inaccuracies," "You have not been on the record, and I don't know how you feelabout it."

. . .

General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more

sinister than "mistakes" made to honor the famous GI. "They were well-intentioned" but

created "doubt and the sense of mistrust.. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive,"

he said.

McChrystal said the Army's handling of the case "produced confusion at a tragic time, and

I'm very sorry for that." "I was a part of that, and I apologize for it.. "I would do this

differently if I had the chance again," "There is nothing we can do to automatically restore

the trust which was the second casualty. "We failed the family. And I was a part of that."

He earlier expressed his "deepest condolences" to Tillman's family and fellow rangers.

. . .

McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but

that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scotts 4/29/04 15-

6?] before coming forward with that information [sending P4?]. "It was a well-intendedintent to get some level of proof before we went out," he said.

Within days of the incident, McChrystal approved a Silver Star for Tillman, signing off on

a citation praising his valor "in the line of devastating enemy fire. Asked whether he

believed that Tillman earned the Silver Star before his death, Sir, I absolutely do. I did

then; I do now I don't believe that the circumstance of death detracts from the courage

and commitment of his contribution.

My own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure

that I compared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes. They were well

intentioned, but they created, they added to the doubt and the sense of mistrust. And wedidn't get it right. McChrystal said the Silver Star citation was "not well written" and

could have left the impression that Tillman was not killed by fratricide.

What we have learned since is, it is better to take your time, make sure you get

everything right with the award, and not rush it. And I'm very sorry for that, because I


24/63

understand that the outcome produced a perception that I don't believe was at all involved,

at least in the forces that were forward.

. . .

Mary Tillman says she neither accepts nor believes McChrystal's apology

"McChrystal was lying," she said of his comments Tuesday. "He said he didn't know for

certain Pat was killed by fratricide. That isn't true in and of itself, but the fact is, it doesn'tmatter whether he knew it for certain." Army protocol at the time required families to be

told of possible fratricide, whether or not it had been confirmed, she said.

"The whole point was to lie to the public," Tillman's mother Mary told ESPN.

. . .

My Response to General McChrystals Testimony :

1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and the 15-6 investigation

after returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on

about April 23rd

:

Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22ndof April I arrived back into Afghanistan from

a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd, and I was informed, at that

point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and that

they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that. (p.18 transcript)

But during the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatarwhen I was told,

about a day or two after the incident NLT the 25th...". [OK, that matches the 23rd

,but was he in Qatar or Afghanistan?].

During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him

of CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatarin a meeting .... he received nodetails and did not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to

believe McChrystal didn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together inQatar on the same day! Or, Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.] And during his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on

about the 23rd, Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been

killed in combat and that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told

no details or heroic?]


25/63

But the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told of

possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the"death" of Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's

"death". [But McChrystal said on Tuesday hearing he was told of fratricide on the

23rd

! McChrystal either failed to tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about

not being informed about it. And Nixon lied about telling McChyrstal aboutTillmans death and/or McChrystal lied about Nixon telling him only of death.]So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about

suspected fratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General and

before Congress. A look at their IG interviews would be illuminating and resolve

this question [Scott Laidlaw at AP got these interviews through FOIA, but I haventseen them].

2.) McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly

fire, but that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scotts

4/29 15-6] before coming forward with that information [sending P4]:

And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review [CPT Scotts 15-6]

before we went forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some

level of truth before we went up. (p. 18 transcript)

There was neveranything speculative or potential or "suspected" about Tillmans

friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew immediatelywhat had happened. On the 23rdword was passed up 70% sure by the CSM to

LTC Bailey and on to COL Nixon. And on the 24th

, the initial investigating officerCPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation(Im certain, Im sure) to LTC Bailey,who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was nextin the chain of command).

McChrystal knew of confirmed FF just twodays after Tillmans death! (If this

isnt some level of proof, what is?) Or, are we to believe Nixon never toldMcChrystal of confirmation during the following days they were working together

on the Silver Star package?

McChrystals outcome of an initial review refers toCPT Scotts 15-6 Final

Report dated April 29th. Isnt it curious the 29

ths the same date as McChrystals

P4? And further, that Nixon only officially appointed Scott on the 29th

as well?Why? Perhaps, McChrystal could say he just got some emerging evidence andstarted the investigation afterhe approved the Silver Star on the 29th? And then

CPT Scotts April 29th 15-6 report literally disappeared!

3.) McChrystal said that he sent his P4 message to inform his chain of command that he

believed friendly fire was a possibility before the memorial service which in retrospect


26/63

looks contradictory. (After the Wallace report came out, McChrystal was praised by the

Secretary of the Army for acting "reasonably and quickly" by sending his timely P4

memo to alert his superiors on the 29th)

:

I also sent a message informing my chain of command that we believed it was fratricide,

and we did that when we were told there were going to be fairly high-profile memorialservices. And when I sent the message, the intent entirely was to inform everyone up

my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised. (p. 18 transcript).

During the hearing McChrystal said he was told of suspected fratricide and the 15-6

investigation on the 23rd

. Yet he didnt send out his P4 until the 29th

? How is

waiting six days considered timely? [and as I pointed out, he actually had verbalconfirmation of fratricide on the 24th!] Of course, in reality McChrystal told

Abizaid on the 23rd, and then it was passed onward to the Secretary of Defense and

White House.

And notice that McChrystal wasnt concerned about Tillmans family beingsurprised. He wrote in his P4, I felt it was essential that you received this

information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing

statements by our countrys leaders which might cause public embarrassment if thecircumstances of Corporal Tillmans death become public. (P4 Memo)

Note the if not when it becomes public. And how is sending the P4 on the 29th

as soon as we detected it when McChrystal said he was told on the 23rd?

Further, McChrystal wasnt concerned with correcting the Silver Citation he hadjust forwarded to the Secretary of the Army the previous day and that had already

been approved.

4.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only signed

off on the Silver Star and had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation that

came up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand

knowledge of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.:

But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with the officers (ie Nixon,

Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman's actions on a whiteboard to satisfy

himself that Tillman's actions merited a Silver Star!:

I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who recommended it [Silver Star].

and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the geometry of the battlefield, and I

queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his actions warranted that, even

though there was a potential that the actual circumstances of death had been friendly

fire. (p. 18 transcript)


27/63

General McChrystal was in Afghanistan with the Ranger officers discussing what

happened! McChrystal lead the Silver Star approval process! McChrystal wasnt

removed from the process. He didnt just sign off on a piece of paper that justdropped onto his desk! He was intimately involved with the process.

Potential friendly fire. As previously mentioned, all the Ranger officers andMcChrystal had been told of confirmed friendly fire on the 24 th!

5.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't read

it close enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:

my own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure

that I compared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes. (p. 48transcript). in retrospect, they [Silver Star and P4 memo] look contradictory,because we sent out a Silver Star that was not well writtenand, although I went through

the process, I will tell you now I didnt review the citation well enough to capture or, I

didnt catch that if you read it, you can imply that it was not friendly fire. (p.18transcript)

Absolute bull. The IG report discussion section (Appendix E) on the Silver Star

concluded that anyone reading the citation would assume Tillman was killed by

enemy fire: we concluded that an uninformed reader could reasonably infer that

CPL Tillman had been killed by enemy fire although a careful review of the

narrative and citation show no direct assertion that he was killed by enemy fire. Asa result, the narrative justification and citation were misleading. (p.55 IG report)

In fact, Maj. Hodne even said that he edited the narrative to ensure it didn't

mention friendly fire!: Maj.[Hodne] testified that he carefully prepared thenarrative to avoid stating that the enemy had killed CPL Tillman and distinctly

remembered removing a phrase asserting that CPL Tillman died by enemy fire.

(p.51 IG report).

And the witness statements were altered by "someone in the approval chain" (i.e.

Nixon, McChrystal, and/or Kauzerlich). PFC[ONeal] stated that he did not signthe valorous award witness statement .. also pointed out parts he knows he did not

write and parts that were not accurate. Sgt [Weeks?] also pointed out parts thatwere inaccurate, in that he was unable to see CPL Tillmans actions from his

location. IG Gimble preferred not to speculate as to who was responsible while

testifying before the House Oversight Committee in April 2007.! we were notable to identify the specific drafter. (p.53 IG report).

General McChrystal should not be confirmed as a four star general. First, he's got to learn

how to prevaricate better (or follow General Meyers or Secretary Rumsfelds examplefrom the April 2007 House hearing of simply saying, I dont recall). Or, he shouldve

just stuck to his story. Don't change it, keep it simple. McChrystal's testimony yesterday


28/63

at the Senate hearing shows that he and/or General Abiziad lied during their testimony

before Congress.

Yesterday's Senate hearing was just the final layer of fertilizer upon the high mound of

Army and Congressional "investigations" of Tillman's death. The hypocrisy of the

Senators is disgusting. It's a travesty of justice that Pat Tillman's family were handed atarnished Silver Star, while General McChrystal will be confirmed, promoted to the

highest rank in the Army, and handed his fourth star.

And its a further travesty that Thom Shanker, Washington Pentagon Reporter for TheNew York Times, had the initial version of this book the week before the hearing and did

nothing with it, especially since he had just written a May 26th

article clearing GeneralMcChrystal of any wrongdoing in the handling of the Tillman case!

[For more information, see my 9-04-09 letter sent to the NYT Public Editor Clark Hoyt,

Lies, Denials, Dissembling, Distortions Borne Out by Facts If Not the Truth]


29/63

GENERAL WALLACES REVIEW OF

THE TILLMAN FRATRICIDE

INVESTIGATIONS


30/63

GENERAL WALLACES REVIEW

OF TILLMAN FRATRICIDE

On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Peter Geren announced the findings of the

seventh investigation into Pat Tillmans friendly fire death. General Wallace had

reviewed the previous investigations and examined the conduct of ten officers.

[I was unable to locate a copy of his findings, entitled Executive Summary, Army Action

DoDIG Report Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick D. Tillman (undated).]

Secretary Geren denied there was a conspiracy to deceive the public. He said, There

was a perfect storm of mistakes, misjudgements, and a failure of leadership

General McChrystal received no reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman

fratricide. However, General Wallace disregarded the findings of the Department of

Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) review which found General McChrystal





Instead, General Kensinger was singled out as the scapegoat responsible for the public

believing the Army covered up Tillmans fratricide. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren

said: General Kensinger failed in his duty to his soldiers, and the results were a calamity

for the Army He failed in his duty to inform the family about the friendly fire incident

in a timely manner ,failed to inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of

command] of the fratricide investigation andmade false official statements.

. . .

During the question and answer period of the press conference, Secretary Geren and

General Cody defended General McChrystals handling of the Tillman fratricide.

However, their defense of McChrystal doesnt hold up under examination. In fact,

although Kensinger was culpable, I believe General McChrystal was guilty of exactly

those same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!


31/63

1.) General Wallace asserted that McChrystal acted reasonably and quickly when he

alerted his higher headquarters about the fratricide investigation. Secretary Geren said

General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted, through his P4

his chain of command :

Response:

There was nothing timely about McChrystals P4 memo! Secretary Geren

implies that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th

, then sent the

P4 to alert his superiors.

However, on April 23rd

(NLT 25th

), COL Nixon told McChrystal aboutprobable

fratricide and the 15-6 investigation. How can waiting six days to send a P4 be

considered quickly? And on the 24th, McCrystal received fratricide confirmation

from Nixon.

A P4 is not the most timely or secure fashion to send a message. How about

simply picking up the telephone?

I want to emphasize there was nothing potential or suspected about Tillmans

fratricide. Confirmationof Tillmans fratricide was passed up the chain of

command to McChrystal just two days after his death by the first investigating

officer!:

The Army leadership claimed they waited to inform the Tillman family of fratricide

until they were sure of the facts. COL Nixon said it tooka considerable time to

get the truth. General Abizaid testified before Congress, But it is clear that allalong fratricide was called as early as the 29 th of April, and that on the 28th of May

we conclusively stated it was fratricide in terms of fratricide investigations, by

the way, thats not a slow investigation. Thats a fast investigation.

Yet, the day after Tillmans death, on the 23rd

, CSM Birch was 70% sure and

LTC Bailey was certain it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating

officer, confirmedTillmans fratricide just twodays after Tillmans death (not five

weeks), and immediately passed that information up the chain of command to LTC

Bailey who told Col. Nixon:

And certainly, by the next day [24th

] when we did the investigations, I [ Bailey]

confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, Sir,

I want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews in fact, that was, I

guess, the next day. So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back

to me and said, Sir, Im certain. Im sure. And then I called [Nixon]. I think


32/63

it was the 24th

. (p. 53). General McChrystal was next in line in the chain of

command, then Abizaid.

However, the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that Nixon was told ofsuspected fratricide on the 23rd, then told McChrystal onlyof Tillmans death,

which McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid. Yet, McChrystal testified in

General Jones 15-6 that he was told of possible fratricide by Nixon about a

day [23rd

] or two [24th

] after the incident. No more than three days later [25th

].

Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).

In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd

, and updated Abiziad with

confirmation on the 24th. Five weeks later the Army announced Tillman

probably died from friendly fire!

2.) When asked why McChrystal couldnt have just called Tillmans family about

potential fratricide, General Cody replied that in the casualty reporting business we do

not encumber the JSOC commander with all of that thats done by the regiment and

done by the Army through SOCOM. Secretary Geren added, So it was General

Kensingers responsibility.

Response:

However, if you look at Appendix D: Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin

Notification Process (p.80, DoD IG report), youll see that McChrystals Chief of

Staff was responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USAOC after

learning of friendly fire.

Its also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew

about the fratricide by the 25th

and yet did not send the required report as required

by regulations (this finding is not included in the IG Report conclusions).

Furthermore, McChrystal himself told General Jones that there was a consciousdecision on who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know

all the facts. I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because

we did not want to give them some half-baked finding. Shortly afterwards, he

contradicted himself, saying I did not know there was a decision not to tell the

family. They had another [son] in the firefight.


33/63

3.) Another reporter asked why McChrystal received no punishment after being singled

out in the DoD IG report for inaccurate Silver Star award information. Secretary Geren

replied that McChrystal reasonably and appropriately presumed the Silver Star packet

presented to him for his signature was accurate. He said that McChrystal was aware it was

friendly fire when he approved the award and that he had no reasonable basis to call into

question the recommendations that came up endorsed by the commanders in the field

Response:

Secretary Geren disregarded the DoD IG review which found General McChrystal





Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention offriendly fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said

this was done somewhere in the approval chain (That would be COL Nixon,

General McChrystal, or Nixons XO. The IG did not establish who bore

responsibility for these alterations).

The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little resemblance to reality

and were carefully edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire without actually

coming out and saying that.

General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman

deserved the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG found he did not directly, or clearly,

state these four factors in the award recommendation. And if McChrystal only

knew what was in the recommendations, how could he know about these four

factors!

Wouldnt General McChrystal have a reasonable basis to question a Silver Star

package which contains no mention of friendly fire after he had been informed of

confirmed fratricide?

. . .

Overall, General Wallaces review was merely the final layer of the Armys cover-up of

the handling of Pat Tillmans fratricide. A cover-up of the cover-up. Although Wallace

singled out General Kensinger as a scapegoat, its clear that General McChrystal was

guilty of failing to inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner, failing to


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inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide

investigation, andthat he made false official statements.

The senior leadership of the Army acted to protect General McChrystal from punishment

and shield from close scrutiny his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly fire

death


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HOUSE OVERSIGHT & REFORM COMMITTEES

TILLMAN FRATRICIDE HEARINGS

Patrick Sr. and Kevin TillmanCongressional Hearing, April 2007

Mary TillmanCongressional Hearing, April 2007


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THE HOUSE OVERSIGHT & REFORM COMMITTEES

TILLMAN FRATRICIDE HEARINGS

On April 24th 2007, the House Oversight and Reform Committee held the Hearing on

Misleading Information from the Battlefield. During the hearing, questions were raised about

General McChrystals P4 memo and the altered witness statements in Tillmans Silver Star

award package.

Pat Tillmans brother, Kevin, testified:

The handling of the situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of

missteps, inaccuracies and errors in judgment which created the perception of

concealment. Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is takenis not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep.

Discarding an (15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an

error in judgment. These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of

concealment. This is concealment

Following the hearing, Chairman Waxman decided to lookup the chain of command and

determine what the top officials at the White House and the Defense Department knew about

Tillmans fratricide.

On August 1st 2007, the Committee held their second (and last) hearing, The Tillman

Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew. Chairman Waxman said

Much of our focus will be on a Personal For [P4] message that MG McChrystal sent on

April 29th2004. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and three retired generals (Meyers,

Abizaid, and Brown) testified. General Kensinger evaded a subpoena, but was later interviewed.

General McChrystal was invited, but declined to appear, and was never interviewed by the

Committee.

Mary Tillman wrote in her book Boots on the Ground by Dusk:

General Brown, retired generals Meyers and Abizaid, and Rumsfeld have great

difficulty remembering what they knew and when they knew it. Someone sitting next tome whispers, They have collective amnesia. we were not happy with the hearing at

all. We had spent weeks helping getting questions prepared and sending information.

The Republicans on the committee were at best indifferent Most of the Democrats

disappointed us as well. They were not prepared and they didnt think on their feet. We

expected more from Congress.


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During the hearing, General McChrystal received praise from the generals for his handling of the

Tillman fratricide:

General Meyers said, When I learned that General McChrystal had initiated an investigation

that was good for me. I knew his integrity We will learn the truth.

General Brown said I have talked to General McChrystal several times and the actions of

Corporal Tillman certainly would warrant a Silver Star.

General Abizaid said General McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and in a timely

manner. and so again General McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a timely

message in a timely fashion through the most secure channels.

. . .

Following their second hearing, the Committee conducted non-transcribed interviews in closed

session with the White House communications staff. These officials said they could not recallwhen they learned about the fratricide or when the President learned. In addition, the Committee

reviewed documents from the White House and Department of Defense, and interviewed six

additional general officers.

A year later, on July 14th 2008, the Committee finally issued their report Misleading

Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes. Their report concluded:

The pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes it

impossible for the Committee to assign responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal

Tillmans and Private Lynchs cases

. . .

The House Oversight & Reform Committee appeared to hold a half-hearted investigation into the

handling of the Tillman fratricide. After raising questions about the Silver Star award during

their first hearing, they didnt probe further into the false narrative of the Silver Star package

and altered witness statements. The Committee never took a hard look at the timing, contents,

and forthrightness of McChrystals P4 memo. Its particularly puzzling the Committee failed to

interview General McChrystal and closely scrutinize despite his central role in the handling ofTillmans fratricide:

1. Chairman Waxman decided to lookup the chain of command and determine what the top

officials at the White House and the Defense Department knew about Tillmans fratricide:


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Response:

Why did Congressman Waxman narrow the scope of his investigation to only lookup

the chain of command? McChrystal was the key link in the chain of command between

Col. Nixon (Ranger Regiment) and General Abizaid (CENTCOM), he wrote the

controversial P4 memo, approved the false narrative of the Silver Star citation, and madethe decision not to notify Tillmans family about his friendly fire death.

The Committee invited McChrystal to testify, but he declined to appearshortly

before the hearing. (The Committee didnt need to invite an active duty general, they

could compel him to testify!) And if for whatever reason McChrystal wasnt able to

appear in August, why didnt the Committee follow up and interview him sometime

during the following year until their report was issued?

2. During the Waxman Hearing, General Abizaid said: General McChrystal did exactly the

right thing. He sent a timely message [P4] in a timely fashion through the most secure channels

and it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as the 29th of April, and that on the

28th

of May we conclusively stated it was fratricide in terms of fratricide investigations, by

the way, thats not a slow investigation. Thats a fast investigation. :

Response:

There was nothing timely about McChrystals P4 memo supposedly alerting his chain

of command! General Abizaid says that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on

the 29th

, then immediately sent his P4 to alert his superiors.

However, on April 23rd

(NLT 25th

), COL Nixon told McChrystal aboutprobable

fratricide and the 15-6 investigation (and fratricide was confirmedon the 24th). How was

waiting sixdays to send a P4 considered timely or quickly? And, a P4 is not the

most timely or secure fashion to send a message. How about simply picking up the

telephone to ensure an important message gets through?

And, Id like to emphasize there was nothing potential or suspected about Tillmans

fratricide. Confirmationof Tillmans fratricide was passed up the chain of command to

McChrystal just two days after his death by the first investigating officer!:

Army leadership claimed they waited to inform the Tillman family of fratricide until they

were sure of the facts. COL Nixon said it tooka considerable time to get the truth.

Yet, the day after Tillmans death, on the 23rd

, CSM Birch was 70% sure and LTC

Bailey was certain it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating officer,

confirmedTillmans fratricide just twodays after Tillmans death (not five weeks), and


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immediately passed that information up the chain of command to LTC Bailey who told

Col. Nixon (General McChrystal was the next link in the chain of command):

And certainly, by the next day [24th

] when we did the investigations, I [ Bailey]

confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, Sir, I

want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews in fact, that was, I guess,the next day. So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and

said, Sir, Im certain. Im sure. And then I called [Nixon]. I think it was the 24th.

(p. 53).

However, the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that Nixon was told of suspected

fratricide on the 23rd

, then called McChrystal on the 23rd

and informed him only of

Tillmans death, which McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid while they were at a

meeting in Qatar. McChrystal testified in General Joness 15-6 that he was told of

possible fratricide about a day [23rd] or two [24th] after the incident. No more than

three days later [25th

].

Someone is lying about what they knew when; Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all).

In actuality, General McChrystal timely notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd

, then updated Abiziad on the 24th

with

confirmation of fratricide. Yet, five weeks later the Army announced that that Tillman

probably died from friendly fire!

3. Chairman Waxman said Much of our focus will be on a Personal For message that MGMcChrystal sent on April 29th2004. General Abizaid testified that General McChrystal

reported the incident in a forthright and timely fashion.

Response:

Chairman Waxman never focused on the content of McChrystals P4 memo. If you

carefully read it, the memo was anything but forthright. As Mary Tillman said in an

interview (8-10-07) with Mike Fish:

"That memo is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is writing

fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can script theSilver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is saying we need to

keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass themselves, IF the

circumstances of Pat's death should become public He should be saying 'We're going

to have to put a hold to the silver star and we're going to have to notify the family [of

suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if he was innocent, but he is not. He is


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trying to find a way that they can continue this false, elaborate story of theirs. And the

fact that he is off the hook is atrocious."

And Mary wrote in her book Boots on the Ground by Dusk:

Not only is he [General McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Patsdeath, he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement

[P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat

was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so.

John R. Reed does a hilarious job of tearing apart the P4 memo point-by-point in his

article Lessons to Be Learned from Pat Tillmans Death. For example,

McChrystal is absolutely certain about Tillman deserving the Silver Star, which

normally requires a highly subjective assessment. However, he has to await the outcome

of an investigation to determine whether Tillman was killed by friendly fire, which was a

no brainer in this case. Apparently, public-relations efforts like awarding dubious medals

require virtually no investigation or thought, but revealing unattractive truth, well, we

gotta do a whole formal 15-16 investigation before such an unnatural act.

Heres s few of my additional comments on the P4 memo:

It is anticipated that a 15-6 investigation nearing completion will find that it is highly

possible that CPL Tillman was killed by friendly fire:

How is it nearing completion when Scotts 15-6 was a Final Report? (And how was

it nearing completion when Nixon officially started the 15-6 on the 29th

?) Scotts

report concluded friendly fire; highly possible means definitely. Of course, in

reality, General McChrystal was told of probable friendly fire on the 23rd

and confirmed

fratricide on the 24th!

If McChrystal is waiting for the completion of the 15-5 investigation, wouldnt it make

sense to wait until it is complete to forward the Silver Star package?

I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order

to preclude any unknowing statements by our countrys leaders which might cause public

embarrassment ifthe circumstances of CPL Tillmans death becomes public:

Note the if. Not when! And McChrystals concern is for embarrassment of his bosses,

not to ensure his family knows or that the Secretary of the Army knows before approving

the Silver Star!


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Why did McChrystal send the P4 memo on the 29th

? Well, on the 29th

CPT Scott

submitted his 15-6 Final Report concluding friendly fire. Its interesting to note that

COL Nixon officially appointed Scott on the 29th (even though Scott began work on

the 23rd

). Perhaps Nixon was creating a paper trail to show friendly fire wasnt suspect

"did they teach you how to lie yet?" (may 27, 2009; revised 9/09)

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