digest in pol rev

7/30/2019 Digest in Pol Rev

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SELF-EXECUTING AND NON-SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS

Oposa v. FactoranG.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Davide, Jr., J.

Facts:

The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents,filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and tocease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timberlicense agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but theyare also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerationalresponsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presentedscientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwiseknown as the greenhouse effect.

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest

stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants haveexhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea tocancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

Issue:whether petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation or

impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrysvital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth

Held:Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a

balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history,

is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to abalanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony ofnature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the precedingsection of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the peopleand instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under theDeclaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not followthat it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Sucha right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less thanself-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners theadvancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As amatter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they areassumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in thefundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless therights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by

Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. SandovalPrepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido


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the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing uponthe state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, theday would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, butalso for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earthincapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to

refrain from impairing the environment. A denial or violation of that right by the other whohas the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause ofaction. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done withgrave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, thefull protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSISG.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

Bellosillo, J.

Facts:The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization

program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986,decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares ofthe Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two biddersparticipated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51%of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of RenongBerhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by RenongBerhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managerscheck to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and

that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with RenongBerhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issues:whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-

executing; whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony

Held:A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the

1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself andbecomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that whichsupplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, isself-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of theright conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they canbe determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no languageindicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executingconstitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise ofpowers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for theprotection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguardsaround the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to orprescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does notrender such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a



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constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is notnecessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on thesubject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise ofconstitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does notnecessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a

different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended tooperate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and thefunction of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislativebody. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce aconstitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandateof the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needsno further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very wordsthe provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the

Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of thePhilippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but alsoto the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciencesand letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial ofPhilippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912,a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant eventswhich have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, andconcessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to bemade between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosenover the former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on

Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist fromselling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid ofManila Prince Hotel at P44 per share and thereafter execute the necessary agreements anddocument to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts anddeeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Taada v. AngaraG.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Panganiban, J.

Facts:This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade

Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondentsacting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.

Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated withexporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflectedin the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused byWTO.



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Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restrictsand impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino Firstpolicy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue:whether or not the WTO agreement is in conflict with Art. II sec. 19, and Art. XII, sec.

10; whether or not sovereignty is absolute

Held:The principles in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing. They are used by

the judiciary as aids or as guidelines in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by thelegislature in its enactments of laws. They are not sources for causes of action.

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts thegenerally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheresto the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. Bythe doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles ofinternational law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta suntservanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a meremoral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered asabsolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as whenPhilippines joined the UN it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept ofsovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As todetermine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicialinquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction asWTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, itshould not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the onlyviable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development ofinternational trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction.

Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Furthermore, the treaty is in harmony with the generally accepted principles ofinternational law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the amity with allnations. The deliberation and voting of the senate, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave itsconsent to the WTO agreement, thereby making it a part of the law of the land.

PEOPLES INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION

Santiago v. COMELECG.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

Davide, Jr., J.

Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent COMELEC aPetition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by PeoplesInitiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for

Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;



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3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assistPetitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on thedates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement forPeoples Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended toinstitutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other

volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitutiongranted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shallbe conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, asrequired in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over thecountry, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signaturesaffixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gathersignatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be firstfixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people ofthe electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as thePetition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general andlocal circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended areSections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of theConstitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987Constitution embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from theaforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limit.

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people,and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters inthe country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

The petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, andMaria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the followingarguments:

(1)The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can onlybe implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; infact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating ConstitutionAmendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on ConstitutionalAmendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiativeon the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provideany subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberateomission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution wasleft to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in thelaw in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a singleword in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision onconstitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to aseparate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in printmedia. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendmentsbecause the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.



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(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct ofinitiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise ofthe right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by theConstitution to pass the implementing law.

(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revisionthereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore,outside the power of the peoples initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither theCOMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realignedfunds for the purpose.

Issue:

Is R.A. No. 6735 adequate to cover the system on initiative on amendments to theConstitution?

Held:

No. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed bythe people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum ofthe total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must berepresented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. Noamendment under this section shall be authorized within five years followingthe ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five yearsthereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannotoperate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendmentwhich bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressionalaction.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article onAmendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and TransitoryProvisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (ProposedResolution No. 332). That section reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___Section ___of the Constitution.

Indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII ofthe Constitution is not self-executory.



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Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Thosewho answer the question in the affirmative point to R.A. No. 6735. But is R.A. No. 6735 a fullcompliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of theexercise of the right? A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act

does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system ofinitiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in wholeor in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by anylegislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is herebyaffirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That wordis neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative andreferendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silentas to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution isconfined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to d irectly

propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution through the systemofinitiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative onamendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems ofinitiative, andthat Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentageof the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the othersystems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative onthe Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the

proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the casemay be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of theConstitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said

paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved orrejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;c.2 the proposition;c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; andc.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100)words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of thepetition. (Emphasis supplied).

The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,amended or repealed only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (SubtitleII) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative onthe Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrustof the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A.No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to theConstitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of



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things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directlypropose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on nationaland local laws.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms

xxx xxx xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposingamendments to the Constitution;a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a nationallegislation; anda.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact aregional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.(Emphasis supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitleon initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

While R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details inthe implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation therebygiving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system ofinitiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, theAct provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents ofthe petition;

(b)The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votesfor its approval;

(d)The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters forthe petition;

(b)The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocationof the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d)The formulation of the proposition;



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(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g)The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the localgovernment unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have

been obtained;

(h)The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to theregistered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k)The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No.6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution inSection 2; (b) defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of thethree systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the process by which theproposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d)reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign thepetition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or theparamount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the systemof initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendmentsto the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannotbe cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as maybe necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in aLatin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the ruleare as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of theConstitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of

the Constitution;(3) Delegation to the people at large;(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions,to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no.5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that thedelegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth thereinthe policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a



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standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which thedelegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one whichdefines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the publicagency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is tobe effected.

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No.6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation

of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

Issue:Is COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the

conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, void?

Held:Yes. The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the

exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitutionthrough the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance onthe COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, forthe laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under(a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is

authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.

Issue:Did the COMELEC act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in

entertaining the Delfin petition

Held:Yes. Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No.

6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the totalnumber of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% ofthe registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the requirednumber of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the

purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures.Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELECResolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. Therespondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of theactions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300,for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petitionwas merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than amere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996,the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to filetheir memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction orwith grave abuse of discretion.

IS VATICAN A STATE?

Holy See v. RosarioG.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

Quiason, J.

Facts:



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A piece of real property was acquired by the Holy See by way of donation from theArchdiocese of Manila. The purpose was to construct the official place of residence of thePapal Nuncio. Later, the Holy See sold the property on condition that it will evict the squatterstherein. For failure to comply with the condition, the Holy See was sued. It moved to dismisson the ground of state immunity.

Issue:

whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regardingselling a lot to a private entity is concerned

Held:Yes.There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and

firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, withoutits consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the neweror restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to publicacts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problemsinvolving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatisesand the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in

characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act juregestionis or an act jure imperii.

Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private partycannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logicalquestion is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course ofbusiness. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular actor transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity,or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken forgain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a

real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A weremade for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or theApostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. Thedonation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to constructthereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign toacquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation andmaintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate andentered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from thecivil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating toprivate immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoyholds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity isprovided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized asregards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewiseclothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It



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merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almostimpossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by theMemorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the departmenttasked with the conduct of the Philippines foreign relations, the Department of ForeignAffairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the

Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exemptfrom local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomaticmission or embassy in this country. The determination of the executive arm of governmentthat a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a politicalquestion that is conclusive upon the courts. Where the plea of immunity is recognized andaffirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not toembarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the countrys foreignrelations.

CONCEPT OF AN ASSOCIATED STATE

Province of North Cotabato v. Govt of the RP Peace Panel

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:

On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP),represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process(PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandumof Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF TripoliAgreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro

Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestraldomain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamorodefined as the present geographic area ofthe ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and MarawiCity, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM inthe 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its owninstitutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE asassociative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that itsprovisions requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall take effect uponsigning of a Comprehensive Compact.

Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel therespondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, aswell as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters ofpublic concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded fromthe BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008,directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signingthe MOA-AD.

Issue:whether or not the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new

legislation and constitutional amendments

Held:



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Yes. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessarychanges shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down asunconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the Presidents authority to proposeconstitutional amendments. Because although the Presidents power to conduct peacenegotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief,and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementing eventhose policies that require changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement

them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that bodywere assumed as a certainty.

Issue:whether or not there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of

public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of allits transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including publicconsultation under RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

Held:Yes. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify

the exercise of the peoples right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peaceagenda:

a) EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is repletewith mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for aprincipal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conductregular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, andrecommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society;

b) RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before anyproject or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those thatmay call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, isimplemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally andunilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could

pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number ofinhabitants from their total environment;

c) RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineationof ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free andprior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples(ICC/IP).

Issue:whether or not the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Held:Yes. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the

pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. Thefurtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and inexcess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary,and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtualrefusal to perform the duty enjoined.

Issue:whether or not the MOA-AD is unconstitutional



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Held:Yes. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its

specific provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associativerelationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the conceptpresupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way toindependence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereofinconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is

amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-ADestablishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to thegovernment peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that thenecessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such aguarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of theconstituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the peoplethemselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensurethe outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference withthat process.

Issue:

whether or not the GRP can invoke executive privilege

Held:No. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the

official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III ofthe Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all itstransactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.

The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,while the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information

even if nobody demands.

The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency thepower to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement orcompromise.

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establishdurable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilitiesto the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Freeassociations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determinationa peoplespursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of anexisting state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes theform of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme ofcases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups isnot explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority.

The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve anddefend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her



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to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. Aslong as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the properprocedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need notbe construed as an unconstitutional act.

Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateraldeclaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly

addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that communityby its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimentalto the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only inpeculiar circumstances.

IS SOVEREIGNTY ABSOLUTE?Taada v. Angara

see p. 3

WHAT COMPRISES THE NATIONAL TERRITORY?

Magallona v. ErmitaG.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011

Carpio, J.

Facts:R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with the terms of the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratifiedon February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline, optimized the location ofsome basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories such asthe Kalayaan Island Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whoseislands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers or legislators assail theconstitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments contending that the lawunconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, thus subjecting thesewaters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.Petitioners have contended that these passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shallexpose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.

Issue:whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into

archipelagic waters

Held:

No. R.A. 9522 is constitutional and consistent with the Philippines national interest.Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the countrys maritime zones, the law alsoallows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritimezones and continental shelf.

The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippinesas affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power thatextends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth ordistance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage



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will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over watersand air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.

Furthermore, due to the absence of its own legislation regarding routes within thearchipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage, the Philippines has no choicebut to comply with the international law norms. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS III,which grants innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject

to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise, thus, the right of innocentpassage, being a customary international law, is automatically incorporated in the corpus ofPhilippine law. If the Philippines or any country shall invoke its sovereignty to forbid innocentpassage, it shall risk retaliatory measures from the international community. With complianceto UNCLOS III and the enactment of R.A. 9522, the Congress has avoided such conflict.

Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the compliance to UNCLOS III through theR.A. 9522 will not expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.As a matter of fact, if the Philippines did not comply with the baselines law, it will find itselfdevoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zonesand continental shelf is measured and which will produce two-fronted disaster: (1) openinvitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters andsubmarine areas around the archipelago and (2) it shall weaken the countrys case in any

international dispute over Philippine maritime space. Such disaster was avoided through theR.A. 9522.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATE

Senate v. ErmitaG.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project aswell as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing toinvestigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. Theinvestigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and militaryofficials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he andsome of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters thatneed immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, thesenate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangementswere already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effectimmediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executivedepartments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executiveprivilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such otherofficers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and suchother officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executiveprivilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National SecurityAdviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may bedetermined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congresswithout first securing the presidents approval. The department heads and the militaryofficers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to exceptthemselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnelattending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifyingbefore legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were



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relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464sconstitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties ofCongress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in theimplementation of laws.

Issue:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house ofCongress, valid and constitutional?

Held:

EO 464 is unconstitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of ArticleVI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investingeither House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the endthat it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so farincidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry

with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislativefunction. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence ofinformation respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is notinfrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the otherhand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with thelegislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the LegislativeInquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only inthe application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refersonly to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid oflegislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, hecan be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of

legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in thequestion hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be consideredas pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power toconduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may beused for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, theobjective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials underSection 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation ofpowers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannotfrustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands forinformation. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for departmentheads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exemptby the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may beexempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on herbeing the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equalbranch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement thento secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in thequestion hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, theappearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid oflegislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department



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head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, eitherby the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads areimplementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not asimperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department headsmust give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in

keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request theirappearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is inaid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory.

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

USA v. GuintoG.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990

Cruz, J.

Facts:The private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in

Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barberservices in the said base.

On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange,U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw.Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar. Valencia had been a concessionaire insideClark for 34 years; del Pilar for 12 years; and Tanglao for 50 years.

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents,who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area,which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). Thelatter, through its representatives, petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouseexplained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result ofthe February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating this concession, then knownas the NCO club concession, and the expiration of the contract had been extended from June30, 1986 to August 31, 1986. They further explained that the solicitation of the CEbarbershop would be available only by the end of June and the private respondents would benotified.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and theindividual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for thebarbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminaryinjunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminaryinjunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States ofAmerica, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as officialemployees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.

Issue:whether the case must be dismissed on the ground that the action was in effect a suit

against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability



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Held:The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article

XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles ofinternational law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the

international community.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally acceptedprinciples of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, asaccepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law ofevery civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society ofnations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to complywith these principles in its relations with other states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on thejustification given by Justice Holmes that there can be no legal right against the authoritywhich makes the law on which the right depends. There are other practical reasons for theenforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the

local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habetimperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. Acontrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, unduly vex the peace ofnations.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent,it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedlyperformed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment againstsuch officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them,the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formallyimpleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the groundthat it has been filed without its consent.

The doctrine is sometimes derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonestybecause of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simplyinvoking its non-suability.

The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Expressconsent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when thestate enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.

The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,under which the Philippine government consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyedclaim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basisof civil action between private parties. When the government enters into a contract, it isdeemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of itssovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when thegovernment files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by thewill of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. Not all contracts enteredinto by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be madebetween its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for the filing of a complaint by thegovernment, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relieffrom the defendant.



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In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law onstate immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereofprovides as follows:

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power andauthority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use,operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the

rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and airspace adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provideaccess to them or appropriate for their control.

The United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to haveimpliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietaryor private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign orgovernmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

The individually-named petitioners in this case were acting in the exercise of theirofficial functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant andthereafter testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected withthe Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of

preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting thoseguilty of such acts. It cannot be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficialcapacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows thatfor discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleadedfor acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicablelaw and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarilymean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consentto be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to besued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff thechance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may beheld liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the acceptedforms of consent.

Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if heis so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears toregulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only tothe Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.

PACTA SUNT SERVANDA

Taada v. Angarasee p. 3

RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

Province of North Cotabato v. Govt of the RP Peace Panelsee p. 10



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YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES

CIVILIAN SUPREMACY CLAUSE

IBP v. Zamora

G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000Kapunan, J.

Facts:Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,

then President Estrada directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with eachother for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventingor suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of theMarines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonableperiod only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petitionseeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void andunconstitutional.

Issues:whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the

armed forces is subject to judicial review; Whether or not the calling of the armed forces toassist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civiliansupremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,

invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in hiswisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamationof martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court mayreview the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent

provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armedforces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power todeclare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powersand provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intentto grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to callout because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power tosuspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, bothof which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individualfreedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power todetermine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner toshow that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition failsto discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that thereexists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, thecivilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of theConstitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civiliansupremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for



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civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrolsat all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake thecivilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with thehead of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marineswas incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian

position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols doesnot destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY

Oposa v. Factoransee p. 1

ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 127930 December 15, 2000Kapunan, J.

Facts:Miriam college has found its school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing

Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) contents of the September-October 1994 issue Obscene,vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid ofall moral values. Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members ofthe editorial board, author, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr.Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee to inform them that there areletters of complaint filed against them by members of the Miriam Community and aconcerned Ateneo grade five student that had been forwarded to the Discipline Committee

for inquiry and investigation and required them submit a written statement in answer to thecharge/s on or before the initial date of hearing, but none of the students submitted theirrespective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the RegionalOffice of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), which they contested, thathad jurisdiction over the case. Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their writtenanswers. In response, the lawyer for the students submitted a letter to the DisciplineCommittee reiterating his clients position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them.

The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, theDiscipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committees report, imposed disciplinarysanctions upon the students. The students were suspended, expelled, dismissed, and onewas not allowed to attend her graduation.

Issue:

whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the complaints against thestudents

Held:Yes. Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be read in a manner as not to

infringe upon the schools right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, weshould not construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students to freespeech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act tomean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he



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or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class work or involvesubstantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel.It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenanceof a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like thepower to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of

higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.

University of San Agustin, Inc. v. CAG.R. No. 100588 March 7, 1994

Nocon, J.

Facts:The present case involves third year Nursing students who failed to meet the retention

policy of the school, that is, minimum grade of 80% in any major Nursing subject and in twominor subjects. As a consequence, the school refused to re-admit them.

Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael

Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of SanAgustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last twosemesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain gradesof not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II with Related Learning Experience).

Its persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their fieldof study and finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the city and nearbyareas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residencyrequirement. Thus, they filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of IloiloCity, to command petitioner USA to re-admit them.

Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners,

Dean Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, RhodoraAzucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred privaterespondents from finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admitthem as being in pursuance of the schools policy that only students with grades of at least80% in any major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, areallowed enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were duly informed andforewarned of their below 80% performance rating.

To buttress petitioners stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the EducationAct of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose their fieldof study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation, except incases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2)thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic groundswho shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study andresearch.

Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of actionfor mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of thelatter which has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty tore-admit them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing publicfunctions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USAenjoys the right to academic freedom.



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Issue:whether or not the students can compel the school to allow them to complete their

course

Held:No. Every school has a right to determine the students it should accept for enrolment.

It has the right to judge the fitness of students. Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987

Constitution instructs that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higherlearning. Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right ofthe school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfarecalls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice ofstudents. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in agrudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purposes and nullify its intent.

Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.G.R. No. 103142 November 8, 1993

Vitug, J.

Facts:Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., is a BS Criminology student at the Perpetual Help College of

Rizal (PHCR) He was elected Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Supreme StudentCouncil. Until September 1991, he was the hold-over PRO and the acting Secretary of thestudent council. In this capacity, he was asked by the Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr.Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would implement, among other things, a 20%tuition fee increase for the school year 1991-1992. Manuelito refused to sign the resolution;instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow officers.

The school administration circulated a memorandum to the effect that Manuelito hadbeen dropped from PHCRs list of students. On even date, a letter from Registrar Necy Buenwas received by Manuelito, informing him that PHCR was voiding his enrollment for the first

semester of 1991-1992 because of the following deficiencies:

Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECSMemorandum No. 80, S. 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;

No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course;

Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;

Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22) which are docketed in theregistration card.

Beginning 05 September 1991, Manuelito was no longer allowed to enter the schoolpremises. He forthwith sent a letter to the DECS informing the latter of the matter. Thepetitioner claims that the real reason why PHCR has voided his enrollment as a senior

graduating student had been because of his active participation in opposing PHCRsapplication for tuition fee increase with the DECS.

On October 15, 1991, Director Rosas of the DECS issued an order addressed to thePresident of PHCR, that pending the resolution of his case the above named student be re-admitted to classes and be allowed to take all examinations that they have missed pendingfinal resolution of this case/issue.

But, PHCR did not comply with the directive.The court however, issued a preliminarymandatory injunction ordering and directing PHCR to re-admit the petitioner for enrollment,



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and the same was interdicted by PHCRs motion for clarification that indeed would requirefactual assessments that have yet to be conclusively passed upon. Hence, he filed the instantpetition for mandamus praying for his re-admission as a senior grad student.

Issue:whether or not PHCRs act of voiding his enrollment is valid.

Held: Yes. The private respondent, on the other hand, invoke academic freedom indropping the petitioner from its roll of students. It argues that the petitioner has only beenallowed to enroll conditionally during the first semester of school year 1991-92 pending thecompletion of his remedial classes in CMT, in which he failed.

Admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the school and thatsuch an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student. In

Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong, the Supreme Court cited with approval theformulation made by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the essential freedoms subsumed in the termacademic freedomencompassing not only the freedom to determine . . . . on academicgrounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught, but likewise whomay be admitted to study. We have thus sanctioned its valid invocation by a school in

rejecting students who are academically delinquent, or a laywoman seeking admission to aseminary, or students violating School Rules on Discipline.

Like any other right, however, academic freedom has never been meant to be anunabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly.An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of theCivil Code, that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance ofhis duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

The earlier ruling of the SC in Alcuaz vs. PSBA (that enrollment of a student is asemester-to-semester contract, and that the school may not be compelled to renew thecontract) has already been abandoned by recognizing instead the right of a student to beenrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. The contract between the

school and the student, imbued, as it is, with public interest, is not an ordinary contract.In this instance, it would seem that the principal reason forwarded by the privaterespondent in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students was his failure to completesome remaining units in the CMT course. He was unceremoniously dropped from the rollwhen the semester was about to end some time in October. He took special training duringthe semestral break (which was the most reasonable time to comply), and he was able topass it, but PHCR still refused to give him that accreditation, insisting that he by then hadceased to be a student of PHCR.

The punishment of expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate to his having hadsome deficiencies in his CMT course. Indeed the DECS itself is conceding to the grant of theinstant petition. The circumstances lend truth to the petitioners claim that the privaterespondent has strongly been influenced by his active participation in questioning PHCRsapplication for tuition fee increase.

There remains, however, an administrative determination, to be yet resolved withfinality by the DECS, i.e., whether the petitioner really deserves to be in senior class, as heclaims, or has a number of school deficiencies to overcome, as the respondent schoolcounters. Hence, the issuance of a writ ofmandamus at this time would not be warranted. Awrit ofmandamus to issue, a petitioner should, on the one hand, have a clear legal right tothe thing demanded, and there should be, upon the other hand, an imperative duty ofrespondent to perform the act sought to be mandated. The Supreme Court, not being a trierof facts, must remand this matter to the DECS for its own evaluation and final determination.



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UP Board of Regents v. CAG.R. No. 134625 August 31, 1999

Mendoza, J.

Facts:Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India andholder of a Philippine visitors visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoralprogram in Anthro

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