digested pfr

7/28/2019 Digested Pfr

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1. Tenchavez vs. EscaoG.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)

Tenchavez vs. Escao

FACTS:

Vicenta Escao, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948,

before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However,

the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already

estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint

for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of Extreme cruelty, entirely

mental in character. A decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued in open court by the said

tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had several children with him and, on1958, acquired American Citizenship.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on

31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao whom he charged

with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her

affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,

decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in

damages. Vicentas parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughters acts, and

counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escao is valid and binding upon courts of the

Philippines.

2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaos parents were sufficient in form.

RULING:

1. No. Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez marriage remain existent and undissolved under the

Philippine Law. Escaos divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine

Law to which Escao was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escao, like her

husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties,

deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a

decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willfu

infliction of injury upon the husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public

policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.


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2. No. Tenchavez charge against Vicentas parents are not supported by credible evidence. The

testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely

conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez own letters written before the suit had

begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the

absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and

with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused

them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.

2.Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:Petitioner Alice Reyes (Filipino) and private respondent Richard Upton (American) were married in Hong Kong. After

they divorced in Nevada USA, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioners business in

Ermita, Manila is conjugal property and the he be declared to have management over the conjugal partnership.

Petitioner moved for the dismissal because the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment in the divorce

proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no

community property.Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the

prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy.

ISSUE:Is respondent estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made

in the divorce proceedings that they had no community property.

HELD:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are

covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy

and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided

they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from

the marriage from the standard of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing

to use in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by

the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercises jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does

not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged

conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private

respondent and still subject to a wifes obligation under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be justified. Petitioner


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should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.

The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be

discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

3. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera Case DigestPilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

174 SCRA 653

Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private

respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The

marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila.

Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three

and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in

Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart

since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on

the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property

before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two

complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said

respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another

man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civi

action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the

annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.

Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted

except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant

of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must

have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action

Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is stil

subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact


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that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is

admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private

respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of

persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to

commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he

filed suit.

4. Republic vs Orbecido III on November 12, 2010

Article 26 of the Family CodeDivorce

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of

Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a

daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Ciprianos wife

left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discoveredthat his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from

his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She

Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article

26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the

same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was

denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC.

HELD: In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroadby the alien spouse capacitating the

latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid

marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized

alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin


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requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano,

the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from

remarrying.

5. Llorente vs. CA 345 scra 592 Nationality PrincipleLorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war,

Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was

naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his

wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship.

Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together

for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his propertyto Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The

RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of

whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are

entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against

absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided

that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by

Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic

validity of Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The

deceased is not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity

since he was a foreigner.

6. G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)


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Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate

children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who

survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate

and properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of

partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according

to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be

governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate

childrens successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in

accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law

cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states

said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his wil

should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will,which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas

law, which is the national law of the deceased.

Bellis vs Bellis

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he

divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three

legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of

his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate

children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they

have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be

applied.


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ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the

illegitimate children.

HELD:The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law,

being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and

that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic

validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under

Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent

in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the

amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity

to succeed.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the

amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be

regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever mayhe the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Procedural Facts:

Case filed in Court of First instance of Manila, which overruled Petitioners opposition approving the

executors final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the

Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not

provide for legitimes.

Substantive Facts: Amos G. Bellis, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S. A died testate. His wil

was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He left the bulk of his testate to his

legitimate children resulting in the impairment of the legitime of his other heirs (illegitimate children).

Issue: Which law shall apply in executing the deceaseds will Texas law or Philippine law?

Held:


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The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and

that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic

validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under

Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Reasoning:Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent

in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the

amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity

to succeed.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the

amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be

regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may

he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

11. People vs. BayotasG.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994FACTS

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova

was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by

Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the

National Bilibid Hospital Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992

dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its

comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not

extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General

relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the

purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor Genera

arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes

both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the

Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a crimina

case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should

die before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUE

Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability

HELD

The ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil

liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal,

as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate


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civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the

outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not

even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory

authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto,

the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the courts

pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment

of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that every person criminally liable for a

felony is also civilly liable. In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accusedpending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.

Death dissolves all things.

xxx

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as

the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the

accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising

from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the samemay also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor

may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of

the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either

against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation

upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil

action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to itsextinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the

statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal

case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any

apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas

extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

12. Prudential Bank v. IAC

FACTS

(1) On August 8, 1962, Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. ofJapan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan

(2) To effect payment for said machineries, Phil. Rayon applied for a commercial letter of creditwith the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. By virtue of said application,the Prudential Bank opened Letter of Credit No. DPP-63762 for $128,548.78


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(3) Against this letter of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho which were all paid by thePrudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd.

(4) Two of these drafts were accepted by Phil. Rayon through its president, Anacleto R. Chi, whilethe others were not.

(5) Upon the arrival of the machineries, the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping documents toPhil. Rayon which accepted delivery of the same.

(6) As condition imposed by Prudential on Phil. Rayon to take delivery of the machineries, itexecuted, a trust receipt covering all machineries, which was signed by Anacleto R. Chi in his

capacity as President of Phil. Rayon, in favor of Prudential.(7) At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two sureties who, by the

very terms and conditions thereof, were to be jointly and severally liable to the Prudential Bankshould Phil. Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nisshoand paid for by Prudential Bank. Anacleto Chi signed this form.

(8) Phil. Rayon was able to take delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at itsfactory site.

(9) Sometime in 1967, Phil. Rayon ceased business operations. On December 29, 1969, itsfactory was leased by Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200,000.00 . The leasewas renewed on January 3, 1973. On January 5, 1974, all the textile machineries in thedefendant-appellant's factory were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300,000.00

(10) The obligation of Phil. Rayon arising from the letter of credit and the trust receiptremained unpaid and unliquidated. Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trustreceipt yielded no result. Hence, the present action for the collection of the principal amount ofP956,384.95 against Phil. Rayon and Anacleto R. Chi.

RTC Decision

(1) Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. to pay Prudential the sum of P153,645.22, the amount reflected inthe Drafts presented to Phil Rayon for payment, with interest at 6% per annum

(2) Insofar as the amounts involved in the drafts not presented to Phil. Rayon, the same nothaving been accepted by defendant Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc., plaintiff's cause of action

thereon has not accrued, hence, the instant case is premature.(3) Insofar as defendant Anacleto R. Chi is concerned, the case is dismissed.

IAC Decision

RTC affirmed in all respects

Issues

(1) Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make PhilippineRayon liable thereon; (NO)

(2) Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt; (YES)(3) Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable with Philippine Rayon for the

obligation sought to be enforced (NO) and if not, whether he may be considered a guarantor;(YES) in the latter situation, whether the case should have been dismissed on the ground oflack of cause of action as there was no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties. (NO)

Ratio

Issue 1


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A letter of credit is defined as an engagement by a bank or other person made at the requestof a customer that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliancewith the conditions specified in the credit. 11 Through a letter of credit, the bank merelysubstitutes its own promise to pay for one of its customers who in return promises to pay thebank the amount of funds mentioned in the letter of credit plus credit or commitment feesmutually agreed upon. In the instant case then, the drawee was necessarily Prudential. It wasto Phil. Rayon that the drafts were presented for payment. In fact, there was no need foracceptance as the issued drafts are sight drafts. (Parties have in fact agreed that the drafts

were sight drafts) Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law lists when presentment for acceptance must be

made. Under this provision, sight drafts do not require presentment for acceptance. even if these were not sight drafts, thereby necessitating acceptance, it would be the petitioner

- and not Philippine Rayon - which had to accept the same for the latter was not the draweePresentment for acceptance is defined an the production of a bill of exchange to a drawee foracceptance.

Issue 2

By this arrangement a banker advances money to an intending importer, and thereby lends the

aid of capital, of credit, or of business facilities and agencies abroad, to the enterprise offoreign commerce. Much of this trade could hardly be carried on by any other means, andtherefore it is of the first importance that the fundamental factor in the transaction, the banker'sadvance of money and credit, should receive the amplest protection. Accordingly, in order tosecure that the banker shall be repaid at the critical point - that is, when the imported goodsfinally reach the hands of the intended vendee - the banker takes the full title to the goods atthe very beginning; he takes it as soon as the goods are bought and settled for by hispayments or acceptances in the foreign country, and he continues to hold that title as hisindispensable security until the goods are sold in the United States and the vendee is calledupon to pay for them. This security is not an ordinary pledge by the importer to the banker, forthe importer has never owned the goods, and moreover he is not able to deliver the

possession; but the security is the complete title vested originally in the bankers, and thischaracteristic of the transaction has again and again been recognized and protected by thecourts. Of course, the title is at bottom a security title, as it has sometimes been called, and thebanker is always under the obligation to reconvey; but only after his advances have been fullyrepaid and after the importer has fulfilled the other terms of the contract.

As stated in National Bank vs. Viuda e Hijos de Angel Jose, 22 trust receipts:. . . [I]n a certain manner, . . . partake of the nature of a conditional sale as provided by theChattel Mortgage Law, that is, the importer becomes absolute owner of the importedmerchandise as soon an he has paid its price. The ownership of the merchandisecontinues to be vested in the owner thereof or in the person who has advanced payment,until he has been paid in full, or if the merchandise has already been sold, the proceeds of

the sale should be turned over to him by the importer or by his representative or successorin interest.

Under P.D. No. 115, otherwise known an the Trust Receipts Law, which took effect on 29January 1973, a trust receipt transaction is defined as "any transaction by and between aperson referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in thisDecree as the entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or securityinterests' over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to thepossession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the entruster of a signeddocument called the "trust receipt" wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated


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goods, documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose ofthe goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster theproceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trustreceipt or the goods, instruments themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, inaccordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trusts receipt, or for other purposessubstantially equivalent to any one of the following: . . ."

Issue 3

the obligation of Chi is only that of a guarantor. This is bolstered by the last sentence whichspeaks of waiver of exhaustion, which is ineffective because the space therein for the partywhose property may not be exhausted was not filled up.

Under Article 2058 of the Civil Code, the defense of exhaustion (excussion) may be raised bya guarantor before he may be held liable for the obligation. Petitioner likewise admits that thequestioned provision is a solidary guaranty clause, thereby clearly distinguishing it from acontract of surety.

It, however, described the guaranty as solidary between the guarantors; this would have beencorrect if two (2) guarantors had signed it. The clause "we jointly and severally agree andundertake" refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability

existing between themselves. It does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both ofthem on the one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the liability describedunder the trust receipt. Elsewise stated, their liability is not divisible as between them, i.e., itcan be enforced to its full extent against any one of them

Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the institution of an action against a guarantor. InSouthern Motors, Inc. vs. Barbosa, 34 this Court stated:

Although an ordinary personal guarantor - not a mortgagor or pledgor - may demandthe aforementioned exhaustion, the creditor may, prior thereto, secure a judgment againstsaid guarantor, who shall be entitled, however, to a deferment of the execution of said

judgment against him until after the properties of the principal debtor shall have beenexhausted to satisfy the obligation involved in the case.

Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in the trust receipt plus all the accessoriesthereof including judicial costs; with respect to the latter, he shall only be liable for those costsincurred after being judicially required to pay.36 Interest and damages, being accessories ofthe principal obligation, should also be paid; these, however, shall run only from the date of thefiling of the complaint. Attorney's fees may even be allowed in appropriate cases.

SC Decision

(1) Declaring private respondent Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. liable on the twelve drafts in questionand on the trust receipt, and ordering it to pay petitioner:

a. the amounts due thereon in the total sum of P956,384.95 as of 15 September 1974

with interest thereon at six percent (6%) per annum from 16 September 1974 until it isfully paid, less whatever may have been applied thereto by virtue of foreclosure ofmortgages, if any;

b. a sum equal to ten percent (10%) of the aforesaid amount as attorney's fees; andc. the costs.

(2) Declaring private respondent Anacleto R. Chi secondarily liable on the trust receipt andordering him to pay the face value thereof, with interest at the legal rate, commencing from thedate of the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19312 until the same is fully paid as wellas the costs and attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00 if the writ of execution for theenforcement of the above awards against Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. is returned unsatisfied.


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13. Padua vs. Robles 66 SCRA 485digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: The citation of the case was a negligent act, homicide through reckless imprudence filed to

driver Romeo Punzalan and defendants - appellees as subsidiary liable, which give rise to two

separate liabilities, namely (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability

arising from civil negligence or so called culpa aquiliana.

Issue:Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and independent

liabilities.

Held: It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that anegligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent

kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising

from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from

each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and

substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article

2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission,

which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may

recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid

an amount in one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in

the second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been

paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the

case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the

amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher

amount

14. Yakult Phils. v. CAG.R. No. 91856, October 5, 1990

Gancayco, J.


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Facts:

In 1982, five-year old Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street,

Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its

employee, Larry Salvado. The latter was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to

slight physical injuries in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila. In 1984, acomplaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against

Yakult and Salvado in RTC Manila. A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants

Yakult and Salvado to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff sums for actual expenses for medica

services and hospital bills, attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.

Issue:

whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there

was no reservation to file a separate civil action

Held:

Yes. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal

action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it

separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

x x x

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before

the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the

offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

The civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action

unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or

institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. It is also provided that the reservation of the right

to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its


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evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make

such reservation. In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the

right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the

criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the

evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case

was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.

15 Beltran vs. People et alArticle 40FACTS:In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of

marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that

Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran

In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a

warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the crimina

case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not

be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the

RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar.

HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential

elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for

declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be

considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the

civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution

would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or

innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a fina

judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for

declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for

purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.

In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can

adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his

marriage void.


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With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be

declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the

beginning is not a defense.

16.

digested pfr

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