BAYOT v SB

Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them.

On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law.

Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

 

G.R. No. 86899-903 May 15, 1989

173 SCRA 409 - Deloso vs Sandiganbayan

 This petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the

Sandiganbayan which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso

(accused in the criminal cases) from his position as provincial governor of 

Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.

Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local

elections of November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a

certain Juan Villanueva filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him

of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act

3019) for issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased by the

Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the

Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any

agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by the latter,

thereby, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.

Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the

 January 18, 1988 local elections.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely.

HELD

It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner

to the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his

services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly

extending beyond his entire term.

 The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an elective public officer

under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90)

days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service

Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the

circumstances of this case.

 The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons

and not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The preventive suspension was limited to 90 days. After,

may assume office.

LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

233 SCRA 163

Petitioner: Marcelino Libanan

Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN and Agustin B. Docena

Ponente: J. Vitug

FACTS:

Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections.

He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified

replacement of a deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said

body.

In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their respective public position and office

for ninety (90) days.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed

shall affront the petitioner’s right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the

people of Samar as their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no

longer exist.

Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed

while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly

elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer

charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.

The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office

is "a public agency or trust," and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which

petitioner invokes.

Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYAN’s decision is affirmed.

Berona v Sandiganbayan

Petitioners were public officers and employees of the Provincial Health Office of Bangued, Abra (Health Office). Dr. Demetrio Beroa (Dr. Beroa) was Provincial Health Officer II, Dr. Romulo Gaerlan (Dr. Gaerlan) was Provincial Health Officer I, Aurie Viado-Adriano (Viado-Adriano) was resident auditor and Vida Labios (Labios) was an accountant. Petitioners were among the seven[if !

supportFootnotes][3][endif] charged for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23521. The accusatory portion of the Information reads in part:x x x, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of their official functions, and through bad faith, conspiring and confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously release to Alexander Siddayao, the total amount of P99,987.77 representing payment for the improvement of the Main Health Center in Malibcong, Abra when in fact, said Alexander Siddayao is not the labor contractor for the project, resulting to the non-payment of the salaries due the laborers who worked for the completion of the above-said project, causing them undue injury.When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty. On 30 April 1999, the prosecution filed an Amended Motion to Suspend the Accused Pendente Lite pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 (Section 13). The motion sought the suspension of petitioners from any public office which they may be occupying pending trial.After the pre-suspension hearing held on 6 July 1999, the Sandiganbayan suspended the petitioners from office for 90 days. The Sandiganbayan held that

preventive suspension is mandatory under Section 13 upon the courts finding that a valid information charges the accused for violation of RA 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving public funds or property or fraud on government. The Sandiganbayan observed that a preliminary investigation was duly conducted before the filing of the Information, which the Sandiganbayan found sufficient in form and substance. The first Resolution ordered thus:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Dr. Demetrio Beroa, Dr. Romulo Gaerlan, Aurie Viado, Esther Barbero and Vida Labios are hereby suspended as Provincial Health Officer II, Provincial Health Officer I, Resident Auditor, Cashier and Accountant, respectively, all of the Provincial Health Office of Bangued, Abra, and from any other public office which they may now or hereafter be holding for ninety (90) days from receipt of this resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Director, Department of Health, Region I, San Fernando, La Union for the implementation of this suspension. He is requested to please inform this Court of his action thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.The suspension of the accused shall be automatically lifted upon the expiration of the ninety (90) day period from the implementation of this resolution (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354; Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383).SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]

In the second Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Hence, this petition.

The IssuePetitioners would now have this Court strike down the first and second Resolutions as supposedly rendered with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that at the time of their preventive suspension they were no longer holding the positions they were occupying when the transactions, subject of the Information in Criminal Case No. 23521, happened.During the pendency of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Beroa resigned from the Health Office on 27 March 1995. He ran and won as the Municipal Mayor of Pilar, Abra. Dr. Gaerlan resigned from the Health Office and briefly engaged in private practice. He re-joined the government service, but no longer at the Health Office. Viado-Adriano became resident auditor of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Bangued, Abra. Labios obtained an appointment as accounting clerk in the Provincial Government of Abra.The only issue posed for resolution is whether Section 13, which qualifies the public officer as incumbent, applies to petitioners since they are no longer occupying the positions they held when they were charged under RA 3019.

The Courts RulingThe petition is bereft of merit.This issue is neither new nor controversial. In a long line of cases,[if !supportFootnotes][5]

[endif] we have rejected the same arguments petitioners now raise. As in previous cases resolving the same issue, the answer will not change.The Information charged petitioners under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Section 13 of the same law reads:SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid Information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement, and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the government.Section 13 is so clear and explicit that there is hardly room for any extended court rationalization of the law. Section 13 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution under RA 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving public funds or property or fraud on government. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no ifs and buts about it.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]

The purpose of a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information. The court can then have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] In this case, the Sandiganbayan had determined the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted

for that purpose. Hence, petitioners suspension is unquestionably mandatory.Suspension pendente lite applies to any office the officer might be currently

holdingPetitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan has no legal basis to suspend them because they are presently occupying positions different from those under which the Information charged them. We have long settled this issue. In Libanan v. Sandiganbayan,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] the petitioner similarly claimed that the order of suspension, based on his indictment as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, could no longer attach to him, as he was already the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. Rejecting his thesis, the Court explained:In Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by Governor Deloso who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was already occupying the office of governor and not the position of municipal mayor that he held previously when charged with having violated the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the suspension of then Cavite Mayor Bayot was also sustained even as he was charged for acts committed as government auditor of the Commission on Audit.The Court reiterated this doctrine in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]

in this wise:The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service. It applies to a Public High School Principal; a Municipal Mayor; a Governor; a Congressman; a Department of Science and Technology (DOST) non-career Project Manager; a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The term office in Section 13 of the law applies to any office which the officer might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office in relation to which he is charged. (Emphasis supplied)Suspension pendente lite prevents the accused from committing further acts of

malfeasance while in officePetitioners other contention that there is no longer any danger that petitioners would intimidate prosecution witnesses since two of the latters witnesses had already completed their testimonies in court is also untenable. Equally futile is their claim that Dr. Beroas suspension would deprive his constituents in the Municipality of Pilar the services and leadership of their highest elected municipal official to the greater detriment of public service.These reasons cannot override the mandatory character of Section 13. The possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or hamper their prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. Another is to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. Thus, we held in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] that -x x x, the fact that petitioners preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor. Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, thus rejecting the view expressed in one case that members of the legislature could not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of representation.The period imposed by the Sandiganbayan is also in accord with our previous rulings limiting to 90 days the period of preventive suspension under Section 13.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]

Section 13 reinforces the principle that a public office is a public trust. Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses, tampering with documentary evidence, or committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. Petitioners last feeble argument that the prosecution evidence is weak misses the point. They lose sight of the fact that preventive suspension is not a penalty. The accused public officers whose culpability remains to be proven are still entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature which the court will pass on after a full-blown trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 8 September 1999 and 4 February 2000 issued by the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23521.SO ORDERED.

Talaga v Sandiganbayan

Criminal and administrative complaints were filed by Elan Recreation, Inc. (ELAN) against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaints alleged that petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Lucena, had unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants.[2]

On May 23, 2003, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon

recommended the dismissal of both the criminal and administrative complaints. [3]

However, the Ombudsman approved the dismissal of the administrative case but denied the dismissal of the criminal case.

As a result, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the filing of three criminal charges for violation of R.A. No. 3019:

 

1.              Criminal Case No. 27737. For causing undue injury to complainants when petitioner as mayor of Lucena City vetoed an ordinance granting a local franchise to the complainants to operate bingo games in the city;

 

2.              Criminal Case No. 27738. For giving unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting to Sy Bang a local franchise to operate bingo games in the city; and

 

3.              Criminal Case No. 27739. For causing undue injury to complainants when petitioner closed down their bingo operations temporarily. (Emphasis supplied)

 

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation[4] questioning the finding of the Special Prosecutor. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman.

 

On May 17, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to quash the three informations.[5] On February 9, 2004, the Sandinganbayan issued a Resolution[6] quashing the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 27737 and 27739. However, it sustained the Information in Criminal Case No. 27738. In the said Resolution, respondent referred Criminal Case No. 27738 back to the Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the latter to conduct further preliminary investigation to determine the possible liability of the members of the City Council which passed Ordinance No. 1963 in said case.[7]

An Amended Information[8] and Second Amended Information[9] were filed by the prosecution in the Sandiganbayan. The first included the members of the City Council of Lucena City (City Councilors), as additional accused, while the Second Amended Information (Information) alleged conspiracy between petitioner and the City Councilors. Over the opposition[10] of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan admitted both amended informations.[11]

On February 21, 2005, petitioner and the City Councilors filed a Motion to Quash[12] the Information on the ground that there is no valid information on which the Sandiganbayan has a finding of probable cause because the second amended informations allegations do not constitute an offense, there being no violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 771 as it has no applicability to bingo operations and P.D. No. 771 has been superceded by P.D. No. 1869 and R.A. No 7160. The Sandiganbayna denied[13] the petition and it likewise denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[14]

 

On June 29, 2005, petitioner and the City Councilors were arraigned in Criminal Case No. 27738 and all pleaded not guilty.

 

On July 5, 2005, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend the Accused

 

Pendente Lite.[15] Petitioner and his co-accused filed an Opposition[16] to the motion. Thereafter, respondent ordered the suspension of the petitioner and his co-accused, to wit:

 

x x x x

 

WHEREFORE, the prosecution's motion for suspension pendente lite is hereby GRANTED, and accused Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., Godofredo V. Faller, Danilo R. Zaballero, Salome S. Dato, Simon N. Aldovino, Wilfredo F. Asilo, and Aurora C. Garcia are hereby directed to CEASE and DESIST from further performing and/or exercising the functions, duties, and privileges of their positions as City Mayor, and City Councilors of Lucena City, respectively, or any other positions they may now or hereafter be holding effective immediately upon receipt hereof and continuing for a total period of ninety (90) days.[17]

 

Petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari with an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on November 9, 2005 enjoining public respondents from implementing the suspension of petitioner.[18]

 

Assailing his suspension, petitioner alleges:

 

I

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IN ABDICATION OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO RESOLVE A JUDICIAL CONTROVERSY, IT IS MINISTERIAL DUTY TO ISSUE A PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER AGAINST THE PETITIONER AND THERE ARE NO IFS AND BUTS ABOUT IT.

 

II

ASSUMING THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS MANDATORY, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER AS SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, WHICH FORMS THE BASIS OF THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THE GROUND THAT IT IMPINGES UPON THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE JUDICIARY.

 

 

III

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF HEREIN PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE EXISTS NO VALID INFORMATION UNDER WHICH PETITIONER STANDS CHARGED.[19]

The petition is devoid of merit.

Petitioner argues that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when in imposing the sanction of suspension, it only relied on the mandatory provision of Section 13 insensate to the weight and cogency of the peculiar circumstances of the case before it.[20] Moreover, petitioner argues that the bare reliance of respondent on Section 13 without calibrating the weight of diverse and dueling evidence pertinent to the issue of appropriateness of ordering his suspension is a clear abdication of respondent's constitutional duty to exercise its judicial function.[21] In addition, petitioner contends that respondent should have looked into the environmental circumstances of the case and thus it was unwarranted to apply the presumption in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan[22] that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both.

 

Petitioner asks this Court to first look into the circumstances of the case and thereafter determine the propriety of issuing a suspension order. The Court could not be more explicit than its ruling in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan,[23] thus:

 

Petitioners would now have this Court strike down these resolutions because supposedly rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court will not do so. In no sense may the challenged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical, oppressive, egregiously erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. On the contrary, in promulgating those resolutions, the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear command of the law and what it calls a mass of jurisprudence emanating from this Court, sustaining its authority to decree suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Indeed that the theory of discretionary suspension should still be advocated at this late date, despite the mass of jurisprudence relevant to the issue, is little short of amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the Highest Court of the land.[24]

 

x x x x

 

While petitioners concede that this Court has almost consistently ruled that the preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory in character, they nonetheless urge the Court to consider their case an exception because of the peculiar circumstances thereof. They assert that the evils sought to be avoided by separating a public official from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated -- e.g., to preclude the abuse of the prerogative of (his) office, such as through intimidation of witnesses,or the tampering with documentary evidence -- will not occur in the present situation where:

 

1. The Project has been canceled.

2. (Their) ** official duties no longer pertain, in any manner, to the prequalification of contractors dealing with NPC. Neither are they now involved in any bidding for or awarding of contracts, ** it (being) emphasized (in this connection) that they were merely designated as ad hoc members of the Committee without additional compensation for their additional duties.

3. All the relevant documentary evidence had been either submitted to the Ombudsman or to the Honorable Sandiganbayan.

They conclude that their preventive suspension at this point would actually be purposeless, as there is no more need for precautionary measures against their abuse of the prerogatives of their office.

The arguments are not new. They have been advanced and rejected in earlier cases. They will again be so rejected in this case.

 

The Courts pronouncements in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, are germane:

 

x x x The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the

grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.[25]

(Emphasis supplied)

 

Ineluctably, the theory of petitioner that environmental circumstances of the case should first be explored has no leg to stand on.

 

Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, provides:

 

Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. (Emphasis supplied)

In Beroa v. Sandiganbayan,[26] the Court explicitly ruled:

 

Section 13 is so clear and explicit that there is hardly room for any extended court rationalization of the law. Section 13 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution under R.A. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving public funds or property or fraud on government. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no ifs and buts about it.

 

As early as Luciano v. Mariano,[27] the Court has set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension, to wit:

x x x x

 

(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it

uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in the contrary case.

 

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation, the act for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in the Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the act upon determination of the pendency in court or criminal prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the merits.[28] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 

Stated differently, the purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.[29] In this case, respondent had determined the validity of the Information when petitioner filed his Motion to Quash. The hearings or proceedings held thereon, in effect, constituted a pre-suspension hearing. Respondent has followed the dictates of the law.

 

This brings the Court to petitioners third assigned error that there is no valid Information under which petitioner stands charged.

 

In effect, petitioner is stating once again that the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense. Petitioner is holding on to a thin straw in claiming that the Information is fatally defective since it failed to allege that petitioner by enacting and approving Ordinance No. 1963 had caused injury to any party, whether the government or private party, an essential element in the crime charged.

 

The Information reads:

 

That on or about June 5, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Lucena City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused RAMON TALAGA , JR., being the City Mayor of Lucena, Quezon and GODOFREDO V. FALLER, VICTOR U. PAULO, DANILO R. ZABALLERO, SALOME S. DATO, SIMON N. ALDOVINO, WILFREDO F. ASILO, PHILIP M. CASTILLO, AURORA C. GARCIA, ROMANO FRANCO C. TALAGA, being members of the City Council of Lucena City, while in the performance of their official and/or administrative functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, with evident bad faith and/or manifest partiality, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping such other, give unwarranted benefit to Jose Sy Bang of Lucena City, by then and there, in conspiracy with each other, by enacting and approving Ordinance No. 1963, series of 2000

dated June 5, 2000 granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of Presidential decree No. 771. (Emphasis supplied)

 

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioner is charged, provides:

 

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

 

x x x x

 

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the law does not require that the information must allege that the acts in question caused injury to any party, whether the government or private party. The presence of the word or clearly shows that there are two acts which can be prosecuted under Section 3: First, causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, and, Second, giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantages or preference. Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,[30] the Court ruled that violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of the following facts:

x x x x

1.              His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.[31]

 

Section 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court provides the guideline for the determination of the validity or sufficiency of allegations in an information, to wit:

SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison detre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.[32]

Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges against him. The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with the City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits, namely, granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of existing laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.

Finally, petitioners second assigned error deserves scant consideration. The validity of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019 may no longer be put at issue, the same having been repeatedly upheld by this Court. [33] Basic is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.[34]

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions - including preventive suspension should be acknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgement.[35] As earlier mentioned, the court must first determine

the validity of the information through a pre-suspension hearing. But once a proper determination of the validity of the information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.[36]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, there being no showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of October 3, 2005, preventively suspending the petitioner for ninety (90) days. The Temporary Restraining Order dated November 9, 2005 is lifted.

 

SO ORDERED.