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Automated Vehicles – the good, the bad and the ugly! Sebastian Rohr, CISA/CISM/CISSP Digital Security Risks to Transport Infrastructure

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Automated Vehicles

– the good, the bad and the ugly!

Sebastian Rohr, CISA/CISM/CISSP

Digital Security Risks to Transport Infrastructure

Who am I? Sebastian Rohr, CEO of accessec GmbH

08.02.2018 2

• Product- / Production Security• Secure Automotive Networks & Backends

• Chief Security Advisor @ Microsoft• Security Strategy for SME/Corporations

• Started career in (IT-) Security @ Siemens• Security Research @ Fraunhofer SIT

OECD Workshop, Paris

Roadway Security & Safety! My secured castle!

OECD Workshop, Paris

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Well, not anymore, Ladies & Gentlemen

OECD Workshop, Paris Page 4

New architectures are needed!

OECD Workshop, Paris Page 5

Automotive Networks

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OECD Workshop, Paris

Vehicles today are “moving data-centers”– with lots of vulnerable interfaces!

GSM/UMTS/LTE,

WiFi, Bluetooth

Interfaces:

OBD

Tire Pressure Monitoring

EV Charging

Car-2-X Communication

Immobilizer

Remote Keyless Entry

E/E, ECU Security:

Tachograph

ChipTuning

Function Activation

USB

Lightning GPS,DAB,

TMC,RDS

Infotainment

Picture source: https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/de/automotive-security/Page 8OECD Workshop, Paris

And unfortunately, they are exploited as we speak…

Vehicle hack using a car gadgetYoutube: “Corvette hacked through text message” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdARgh4K0wc

Jeep Cherokee HackYoutube: “Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me inIt”

Page 9OECD Workshop, Paris

And why is that so?

Page 10

• Absence of incentive for securing the „product“ (car) alone

• Absence investment in security infrastructure of roadways either

• Absence of regulative pressure (who needs security?)

Good example: GDRP!

Lots of awareness created on board level

Significant effort put into protecting data and endusers (finally)

Suggestion:

Move forward to establish international

„minimum security requirements“ for autonomous vehicles

And why is that so?

Page 11

• Absence of incentive for securing the „product“ (car) alone

• Absence investment in security infrastructure of roadways either

• Absence of regulative pressure (who needs security?)

Good example: GDRP!

Lots of awareness created on board level

Significant effort put into protecting data and endusers (finally)

Suggestion:

Move forward to establish international

„minimum security requirements“ for autonomous vehicles

When will we start?

08.02.2018 12

Sebastian Rohr, CISA/CISM/CISSP

CEO & Founder

accessec GmbH

[email protected]

+491715580066

OECD Workshop, Paris