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Diplomacy, Precrisis Communication, and War Shuhei Kurizaki Texas A&M University October 17, 2011

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  • Diplomacy, Precrisis Communication, and War

    Shuhei Kurizaki

    Texas A&M University

    October 17, 2011

  • 1 Book Project

    2 Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    3 The Model

    4 Equilibria

    5 Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    6 Diplomacy and the Risk of War

    7 Conclusion

    8 APPENDIX

  • Project on Diplomacy

    Diplomacy is a primary form of “Politics Among Nations”

  • Project on Diplomacy

    Diplomacy is one of the oldest political institutions designed topreserve order in the international society (Hedley Bull 1977).

  • Project on Diplomacy

    Diplomacy has evolved as a set of mechanisms for conflictresolution as an alternative to military might(Hans Morgenthau 1973).

  • Project on Diplomacy

    IR scholarship has sidestepped the study of diplomacy

  • Project on Diplomacy

    Ultimate Goal

    Bring diplomacy back into the IR literature, and establish the study ofdiplomacy as a full-fledged social scientific literature.

  • Book Project

    When Diplomacy Works

    This book offers the first comprehensive theory of diplomacy and itsrole in international disputes

    Emphasizes theoretical foundations, but offers historical andstatistical materials

    Diplomacy is an institutional response to bargaining failure

    Diplomacy is a new addition to the “Correlates of War”

  • Book Project

    Three classes of diplomatic mechanisms

    Cheap-talk communication in pre-crisis diplomacy

    Communication

    Pre-crisis diplomacy

    Conflict of interests Diplomatic demands

  • Book Project

    Three classes of diplomatic mechanisms

    Cheap-talk communication in pre-crisis diplomacy

    Diplomatic negotiation in international disputes

    Negotiation

    Diplomatic negotiation

    Military threats Diplomatic demands

  • Book Project

    Three classes of diplomatic mechanisms

    Cheap-talk communication in pre-crisis diplomacy

    Diplomatic negotiation in international disputes

    Diplomatic manipulation in military crises

    Manipulation

    Crisis diplomacy

    Military threats Outbreak of war

  • Diplomacy, Precrisis Communication, and War

    Shuhei Kurizaki

    Texas A&M University

    October 17, 2011

  • 1 Book Project

    2 Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    3 The Model

    4 Equilibria

    5 Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    6 Diplomacy and the Risk of War

    7 Conclusion

    8 APPENDIX

  • Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    Informational Origin of War

    War occurs when political or military information is privateinformation

    States have incentives to misrepresent their private information

    Incomplete information gives rise to the risk-return trade-off

    A positive probability of war

  • Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    One “solution” to incomplete information is to let them talkbefore crisis bargaining

    Diplomacy offers institutional solutions to the informationalcause of war

  • Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    The Byzantine Empire

    Aftermath of the fall of the Roman empire and military deficit

    Turned to various manipulative tactics and information

    Bureau of Barbarians, the first intelligence agency

  • Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    Italian city-states during the Renaissance

    The system of resident, permanent embassies

    To stabilize and facilitate communication among governments

    The fear of invasions by the Ottoman Empire and others

    To overcome mutual mistrust and enhance collective security effort

  • Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    Cardinal Richellieu

    “Continuous” diplomacy

    Forestall potential frictions or tensions

    Professional diplomats & first ministry of foreign affairs

  • Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    Scholars of IR also have envisioned this informational“solution” as a key function of diplomacy

    Hans Morgenthau

    A main task of diplomacy is to determine one’s foreign policyobjectives in light of the military capability (Prudence). . . and to assess objectives and motivations of other nationsand their military capability.

  • Conventional Wisdom

    Rationalist Approach

    Informational problem in pre-crisis communication

    Pessimistic conclusions

  • Conventional Wisdom

    Cheap-Talk Diplomacy (Fearon 1995)

    This “solution” is impossible

    Diplomacy is ineffective: No info. credibly conveyedDiplomacy is irrelevant: No effect on crisis behavior

    Common wisdom for a long time

  • Conventional Wisdom

    Recent formal models

    Institutional arrangements permit:

    Only limited communication (Sartori, Ramsay)

    Full communication only under grim-trigger (Guisinger and Smith)

    When informative, always increases the risk of war

    Only exception is Trager (2010)

  • Two Puzzles

    Credibility of diplomatic communication

    Puzzle: Architects and theorists all envisioned diplomacy as aninformation-revelation device. Are they wrong about that?

  • Two Puzzles

    Diplomacy and the risk of war

    Puzzle: Diplomacy has been used for hundreds of years, and many stateshave invested significant resources to keeping diplomatic institutions. Ifdiplomacy is dangerous, why keep it?

  • My Contributions

    In this paper . . .

    Use the same analytical focus of the previous models

    Generalize the previous models

    Refine the analysis

    Find new, improved answers.

    Provide better understanding on the role of diplomacy.

  • 1 Book Project

    2 Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    3 The Model

    4 Equilibria

    5 Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    6 Diplomacy and the Risk of War

    7 Conclusion

    8 APPENDIX

  • The Model, overview

    State 1 and State 2 are in a dispute over some good of size vi > 0,for i = 1, 2

    Resist

    1

    Surrender

    2pv1 – c1(1 – p)v2 – c2

    (v1, 0)(0, v2)Status quo

    Attack

  • The Model, overview

    Before the crisis, State 2 sends a cheap-talk messagem ∈ {resist, surrender}

    Resist

    1

    Surrender

    22

    m {r, s}

    pv1 – c1(1 – p)v2 – c2

    (v1, 0) (0, v2)Status quo

    Attack

  • The Model, overview

    Stage game is indefinitely repeated with δ ∈ (0, 1).

    Resist

    1

    Surrender

    22

    m {r, s}

    pv1 – c1(1 – p)v2 – c2

    (v1, 0) (0, v2)Status quo

    Attack

  • 1 Book Project

    2 Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    3 The Model

    4 Equilibria

    5 Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    6 Diplomacy and the Risk of War

    7 Conclusion

    8 APPENDIX

  • Equilibrium: Trigger Strategy

    Normal Phase

    S2 maintains normal diplomatic relations with S1.

    Punishment Phase

    S1 suspends diplomatic relations with S2, so ignores m

    Lasts for N periods

    N = 0 (Fearon 1995)N = 2 (Sartori 2002)N = ∞ (Guisinger & Smith 2002)

    Diplomatic normalization occurs if S2 plays the equilibrium strategyduring diplomatic punishment.

  • Equilibrium: Two Cases

    Babbling Equilibria

    Diplomacy conveys no meaningful information

    Crisis behavior is not influenced

    Risk of war remains the same as in the game without diplomacy

    Basis for coercive diplomacy

    Informative Equilibria

    Diplomacy conveys no meaningful information

    Diplomacy can increase the risk of war

    Diplomacy can decrease the risk of war

    Basis for the “peace by peaceful means”

  • Babbling Equilibria

    S2 randomizes its diplomatic messages

  • Babbling Equilibria

    No information is conveyed

    Crisis behavior not influencedSame ex ante risk of war as in the game without diplomacy

  • Babbling Equilibria

    Diplomatic mechanisms “turned off”

    Equivalent to one-shot game ⇔ δ = 0=⇒ Conventional wisdom holds only in the absence of diplomaticinstitutions

  • Informative Equilibria

    Information conveyed

    Deception equilibrium: Commitments are partially revealedSincere equilibrium: Commitments are fully revealed

  • Informative Equilibria

    Diplomacy affects crisis behavior

  • Informative Equilibria

    Threats to break off diplomatic relations induce truth-telling

    Babbling equilibria constitute the Nash (reversion) threat

  • Informative Equilibria

    Describe how diplomatic communication and representation cometogether to form diplomatic institutions.

    Use the informative equilibria to ask

    Question about the informativeness of diplomacy and itsconditionsQuestion about its effect on the risk of war

  • 1 Book Project

    2 Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    3 The Model

    4 Equilibria

    5 Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    6 Diplomacy and the Risk of War

    7 Conclusion

    8 APPENDIX

  • Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    Credibility of Diplomacy and Equilibrium Types

    ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩

    Diplomacy is not credible in the babbling equilibria

    Diplomacy is partially credible in the deception equilibrium

    Diplomacy is fully credible in the sincere equilibrium

    Credibility conditions � Equilibrium condition

  • Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    Equilibrium Condition: Common Discount Factor

    Let δ = c2G(κ(r))(1−p(1−G(κ(r))))(w2(H)−w2(D1)) .

    ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩

    Babbling equil exist if δ = 0

    Deception equil can exist if 0 < δ < δ

    Sincere equil can exist if δ ≥ δ

  • Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    Minimum discount factor δ to sustain the sincere equilibrium.

    0 2 4 6 8 10

    0.0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1.0

    Suspension duration, N

    Min

    imum

    del

    ta, δ

    p = 0.1

    p = 0.3p = 0.5

    p = 0.7

  • Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    Equilibrium Condition: Punishment Duration

    Let N = ln(δ−ζ(1−δ))ln(δ) − 1.⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩

    Only Babbling equil exist if N = 0

    Deception equil can exist if 0 < N < N

    Sincere equil can exist if N ≥ N

    where ζ = G(κ∗)c2

    (1−p(1−G(κ∗)))(π(C)−π(D))

  • Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    Minimum punishment length to sustain the Sincere Equilibrium

    0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

    02

    46

    810

    1214

    Capability ratio, p, and Discount factor, δ

    Min

    imum

    sus

    pens

    ion,

    N

    δ, c=0.2δ, c=0.4δ, c=0.6p, c=0.2p, c=0.4p, c=0.6

  • Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    Diplomatic Suspensions in Europe, 1820-1915

    Suspension duration Frequency (%)(year)

    1 350 (41.8)2 160 (19.1)3 61 (7.3)4 55 (6.6)5 33 (3.9)6 19 (2.3)7 15 (1.8)8 14 (1.7)9 9 (1.1)10 13 (1.6)> 10 102 (12.2)Total 837 (100)

    Average 5.36 yearsMedian 2 years

  • 1 Book Project

    2 Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    3 The Model

    4 Equilibria

    5 Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    6 Diplomacy and the Risk of War

    7 Conclusion

    8 APPENDIX

  • Risk of War: Informational Effect

    Pacifying (deterrent) effect

    Diplomatic communication, when informative, always reduces theprob that S1 attacks:

    1 − G (λ∗) ≥ 1 − G (κ∗d) > 1 − G (κ∗s ).

    Resist

    1

    Surrender

    22

    m {r, s}

    pv1 – c1(1 – p)v2 – c2

    (v1, 0)(0, v2)Status quo

    Attack

  • Risk of War: Commitment Effect

    War-risking (commitment) effect

    Diplomatic communication generally increases the probability thatS2 resists if attacked:

    1 − F (β∗) > 1 − F (γ∗).

    Resist

    1

    Surrender

    22

    m {r, s}

    pv1 – c1(1 – p)v2 – c2

    (v1, 0) (0, v2)Status quo

    Attack

  • Risk of War: Net Effect

    Diplomatic communication is designed to deter aggression,but its process creates a new commitment for State 2.

    Deterrent effect vs. Commitment effect.

    No analytical account of how these countervailing effectsbalance out to affect the overall probability of armed conflict.

    Whether the deterrent effect dominates the commitmenteffect depends on parameter conditions.

    → Nonlinearity

  • Risk of War: Numerical Approach

    Parameters Cutoff points Risk of war EquilibriumN δ c1 c2 p κ α β ωs,d ωb2 .9 .1 .1 .518 .193 .139 .139 .695 .691 Sincere2 .9 .1 .1 .800 .069 .110 .459 .503 .472 Deception5 .6 .1 .1 .364 .275 .099 .099 .654 .690 Sincere5 .6 .1 .1 .890 .053 .406 .704 .281 .090 Deception1 .9 .4 .4 .350 .211 .010 .611 .307 .306 Deception1 .9 .4 .4 .440 .910 .037 .037 .087 .247 Sincere1 .9 .4 .4 .500 .145 .165 .744 .219 .182 Deception

    2 .8 .1 .2 .344 .291 .187 .187 .576 .606 Sincere2 .8 .1 .2 .750 .122 .493 .525 .417 .558 Deception

    Risk of war is red if ωs,d < ωb or

    Pr(war |informative) < Pr(war |babbling)

  • Risk of War: Numerical Approach

    0.36

    0.44 0.35 0.34

    wb

    0.89 0.35 0.59

    Example: N=2, = 0.9, c1 = c2 = 0.4

    wb

    wb

    Example: N=5, = 0.6, c1= c2 = 0.1

    Example: N=2, = 0.8, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.2

    0.60

    wb

    Example: N=1, = 0.9, c1 = c2 = 0.4

    0.80

    Functional form 4 Functional form 3

    Functional form 1 Functional form 2

    0

    0 0

    01

    1 1

    1

    Four functional forms linking diplomacy, power, and war

  • Risk of War: Semiparametric Approach

    Why empirics?

    Use statistical analysis to supplement the theoreticalambiguity.

    No unique prediction available (theoretically)

    Not a test of a point prediction, rather an exploration of thedata to refine the prediction

    To single out a unique ceteris paribus structure in the data, Iuse GAM to let the data “speak” for themselves about thefunctional form.

  • Research Design

    What Exactly Are We Looking For?

    Not the probability of war w/ and w/out diplomacy.

    The impact of credible diplomatic communication on war.

    Communication is credible in the informative equilibrium.

  • Research Design

    Empirical Challenge

    Measuring credible diplomatic precrisis communication

    Hard to know whether precrisis communication took place for eachcrisis case.

    Important sources of information are social networks with localofficials in the host governmentDinner parties, receptions, balls very crucialNewspapers or news wires do not pick up any of this

  • Research Design

    Empirical Challenge

    Measuring credible diplomatic precrisis communication

    Hard to know if communication was credible.

    Hard to know if a message was received and taken seriouslyHard to know if any given observation (of MIDs) belongs tothe informative equilibria, not the babbling equilibria.

  • Research Design

    Empirical Solution

    Use resident diplomatic missions as a proxy measure

    The device for reliable diplomatic communication

    Limit the empirical domain to European powers (plus the OttomanEmpire and U.S.)

    1815-1914: Before communication revolutions (telegrams, jetliners)

    Anecdotal evidence suggests this proxy is good until WWI (orperhaps today)

  • Model Specification

    Dependent variable(s): Use of force in MIDs

    coded as a “1” if both sides, A and B, use forcecoded as a “0” otherwise

    Independent Variables

    Diplomatic representation B → A before MIDResides in the capital at the rank of Chargé d’Affaires orabove.If the position is vacant, absent, located in other states, orconsulate coded as a “0”Interacted with p, balance of power

    Controls

    Diplomatic representation A → B before MIDInteracted with pOther factors that influence diplomatic exchange

  • Risk of War: Semiparametric Specification

    Force = f1(cap. ratio× A → B) + f2(cap. ratio × B → A)+ f3(cap. ratio) + β4A → B + β5B → A+ Σki=6βixi + a + ε,

    fi (·): Smooth function to estimateβi (·): Linear coefficient to estimateB → A: Diplomatic representation B to A (dummy)A → B: Diplomatic representation A to B (dummy)Σki=6xi : Set of controls

  • Risk of War: Semiparametric Approach

    0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

    0.0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1.0

    Capabilities Ratio

    Pro

    babi

    lity

    of A

    rmed

    Con

    flict

    Diplomatic Mission A to B

    0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.00.

    00.

    20.

    40.

    60.

    81.

    0

    Capabilities Ratio

    Diplomatic Mission B to A

  • 1 Book Project

    2 Informational Origins of Diplomacy and War

    3 The Model

    4 Equilibria

    5 Credibility of Diplomatic Communication

    6 Diplomacy and the Risk of War

    7 Conclusion

    8 APPENDIX

  • Conclusion

    Precrisis communication is much more informative than previouslysuggested.

    Defender’s credible precrisis communication reduces the risk of warroughly by 20% unless capabilities ratio is excessively skewed

    Overall pacifying effect does not reject the war-risking effect ofthe commitment trap

    Model and data here do not answer two questions:

    Causal mechanism — Chapter 6Diplomacy increases the risk of war if a militarily weakchallenger uses it

  • Conclusion . . .

    Big Picture

    Diplomacy is not just the message that is sent, or the act of sendinga message

    . . . rather an equilibrium in which such communication gainscredibility due to

    Expectations of repeated diplomatic interactionExpectations of diplomatic break down

    Diplomacy is more effective as an instrument of statecraft thanpreviously believed.

  • Thank you!

  • Policy Implications

    Barack Obama’s commitment to diplomacy“It is important . . . to talk to . . . enemies. In fact, that’swhere diplomacy makes the biggest differences.”

    Presidential debateClinton: “I believe in coercive diplomacy”McCain: “This is dangerous. It isn’t just naive; it’s dangerous”

  • The Model: Information, Beliefs, and History

    Two-sided incomplete information.

    Both player’s valuations are drawn from F (·) and G (·) eachperiod.

    S1 updates its belief about v2, upon hearing S2’s diplomatictalk about its intention.

    S1’s belief-updating at t is contingent on a history ht

    Two kinds of history are relevant for history-dependent beliefs:

    1 A history htC that induces the “normal” phase at t, where S2’sfailure to honor her commitment has not been detected in theprevious N periods.

    2 A history htDN that invokes the “punishment” phase, whereS2’s failed commitment has been detected at t − N.

  • Babbling Equilibrium

    Proposition 1 (Cheap-talk diplomacy)

    There always exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where in everyperiod each type of S2 announces anything or randomizes between“m = r” and “m = s,” and S1 attacks if v1 ≥ λ∗ or maintains thestatus quo if v1 < λ

    ∗, where λ∗ = [1−F (γ)]c1p+(1−p)F (γ) .

  • Sincere Equilibrium

    Proposition 2 (Sincere equilibrium)

    There exists a set of fully separating equilibria in stationarystrategies, in which:

    all types with v2 ≥ α make a threat (m∗ = r) and resists ifattacked

    all types with v2 < α make no threat (m∗ = s) and surrenders

    if attacked

    as long as S2 has an honesty reputation. Given the dishonestyreputation, players play the babbling equilibrium

  • Sincere Equilibrium

    Sincere Equilibrium

    If δ ≥ δ, the following strategies and beliefs constitute a perfect Bayesianequilibrium in trigger strategies. Providing hC , S2 announces that it willresist (i .e.,m = r) and resists when attacked if v2 ≥ α∗, and announcesm = s and surrenders when attacked if v2 < α

    ∗. Upon receiving m = r ,S1 believes that S2 always resists and attacks if v1 ≥ κ∗(r), while uponreceiving m = s, S1 believes that S2 never resists and hence attacksalways. Providing hDN for N = {1, 2, . . . ,∞}, both states play thebabbling equilibrium.

  • Deception Equilibrium

    Proposition 3 (Deception equilibrium)

    There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in stationary strategiesin which S2 types are partitioned into three subsets provided thatS2 has a reputation for honesty

    v2 ≥ β make a threat and resist if attackedv2 ∈ [α, β] make a threat but surrender if attackedv2 < α make no threat and surrender

    Given the dishonesty reputation, players play the babblingequilibrium

  • Deception Equilibrium

    Deception Equilibrium

    If δ < δ, the following strategies and beliefs constitute a perfect Bayesianequilibrium in trigger strategies. Given hC , S2 plays: all types withv2 ≥ β∗ announce that m = r and resist if attacked; types withv2 ∈ [α∗, β∗] say m = r but surrender if attacked; and types withv2 < α

    ∗ say m = s and surrender if attacked. Upon receiving a messager , S1 believes that S2 will resist with probability (1− F (β∗))/(1− F (α∗))and attacks if v1 ≥ κ∗(r); upon receiving s, the posterior belief is zeroand hence S2 always attacks, where κ

    ∗(r) = ψ c1p . Given hDN , both statesplay the babbling equilibrium.

  • Lemma 1: Non-existence of a “false-positive” equilibrium

    Another type of the equilibrium diplomatic message is not possible:

    Lemma 1: Another type of informative equilibria

    There is no PBE in which S2 falsely says m = s but actually resists ifattacked.

  • Research Design: anecdotal evidence

    Telecommunication would invalidate diplomatic representation as aproxy measure

    Impact of telecommunication

    Queen Victoria opposed to upgrading British legation at Rometo the status of an embassy in 1876 since telegraphy hadrendered the expensive embassy obsolescent.

    Impact of telegraphy was limited before WWI.

    In 1860 the British MOFA instructed its diplomatic missionsnot to use telegrams unnecessarily since its cost is prohibitivelyhigh

    Embassies as primary communication tool until after WWI

    Receiving declaration of war by cable from Austria in 1914,Serbian PM Pas̆ić suspected the telegraph was a practical joke.Only a few hours later when the air-raid of Belgrade began didhe discovered that that was not a joke.

  • Data Collection

    For testing the prediction, data collection just completed.

    For each dyad involving European powers (and OttomanEmpire), gathered data on existence and rank of diplomaticrepresentatives of both directions for each year in 1815-1913

    Utilized the automated text analysis and 15 undergrads

    Source: Almanach de Gotha

    Augments existing data sets with five-year interval by Singerand Small (1966) and Reşat Bayer (2006)

  • Independent Variable

    Independent variable: Existence of diplomatic communication

    coded as a “1” if

    Chargé d’affairesMinister or EnvoyAmbassador

    coded as a “0” if

    ConsulsOther titlesNo evidence of diplomatic exchange

    coded as a “-9” if

    MissingOther titles

  • Model GAM GAM ProbitIndependent variable Resident mission Diplo. relations Resident mission

    s(A → B× cap. ratio) 1.500(7.181)∗∗ 1.500(7.107)∗∗s(B → A× cap. ratio) 1.500(4.020)∗ 1.500(3.981)∗s(cap. ratio) 4.186 (0.899) 4.360 (0.828)cap. ratio −1.129(0.324)∗∗A → B 0.058 (0.041) 0.074 (0.041) 1.473 (0.484)B → A −0.092(0.034)∗∗ −0.095(0.034)∗∗ −0.522(0.197)∗∗Alliance 0.126 (0.096) 0.127 (0.097) 0.396 (0.287)Major power A -0.050 (0.071) -0.056 (0.071) -0.230 (0.197)Major power B −0.170(0.072)∗ −0.173(0.073)∗ −0.600(0.224)∗∗Joint democracy -0.010 (0.133) -0.011 (0.133) -0.115 (0.447)ln(peace years) −0.054(0.017)∗∗ −0.053(0.017)∗∗ −0.154(0.052)∗∗ln(distance) -0.022 (0.028) -0.021 (0.028) -0.093 (0.087)Contiguity 0.011 (0.068) 0.012 (0.068) 0.012 (0.203)Intercept 0.713(0.237)∗∗ 0.684(0.237)∗∗ 0.763 (0.838)Adjusted R2 0.123 0.123 0.117Deviance explained 16.2% 16.3% −193.8†GCV score 0.205 0.205 47.79‡

  • Probit estimates of diplomacy and war

    0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

    0.0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1.0

    Capabilities Ratio

    Pro

    babi

    lity

    of F

    orce

    Diplomatic Mission A to B

    0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.00.

    00.

    20.

    40.

    60.

    81.

    0

    Capabilities Ratio

    Diplomatic Mission B to A

    Book ProjectInformational Origins of Diplomacy and WarThe ModelEquilibriaCredibility of Diplomatic CommunicationDiplomacy and the Risk of WarConclusionAPPENDIX