diplomacy studies

A Natural History of Diplomacy

Chapter 3 of the book manuscript in progressWhen Diplomacy Works

Shuhei Kurizaki

Preliminary draftComments welcome

October 6, 2011

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University. E-mail:[email protected].

Contents

1 Evolution of Diplomatic Institutions: A Historical Sketch 2

2 First Documented Diplomatic Practice: Amarna Diplomacyin Ancient Near East 3

3 Beginning of Diplomacy: Ancient Greece 5

4 Stasis of Diplomacy: Ancient Rome 8

5 Byzantine Diplomacy: Middle Ages 11

6 The Italian System: Renaissance Diplomacy 15

7 The French System: 17th & 18th Centuries 20

8 Spread and Institutionalization: 19th Century 28

9 Decline of Diplomacy? 20th Century and Beyond 32

10 Back to the Future? The 21st Century & Beyond 37

11 Conclusion 38

A Natural History Chapter 3

This chapter lays the groundwork by establishing facts about the originsand characteristics of diplomatic practices and institutions, which allows us todraw some descriptive inference about how diplomacy works in internationaldisputes. To do so, this chapter reconstructs a natural history of diplomacythrough the discussion of pivotal historical events and turning points in theevolution of its institutions and practice.1

A brief narrative of the historical and strategic context of the developmentof diplomacy serves a couple of purposes. First, it provides us common groundand vocabulary to explore the phenomena in a simplified and scientific way.In particular, it helps us establish the fact that the diplomatic institution hasbeen developed as a consequence of political leaders reaction to the strategicand political environment. It also illustrates that norms and patterns areself-enforcing as political leaders and rulers have maintained and reproducedthem for quite a long time. This will be especially helpful for those who arenot familiar with the variations of the institutions and functions of diplomacythroughout history.

Second, the reconstruction of a natural history of diplomacy also provides aset of stylized facts of diplomacy. Stylization helps us identify general ways inwhich diplomacy is commonly pursued in most international disputes. Whilenatural history exhibits enormous complexity, stylization is the process oftransforming this complexity into simplicity. I call this exercise a natural his-tory because this chapter attempts to (i) document some direct observationsof diplomatic activities and its institutions without any specific theoreticalconceptions and then (ii) searches for some structure in the stylized facts tosee how main diplomatic mechanisms can be summarized according to severaltypes of functional forms observed in the historical experience.2 Only throughthis process, can we understand how to begin to ask empirical questions thatmust be explained. As Sherlock Holmes advices a young inspector from Scot-land Yard at the crime scene, It is a capital mistake to theorize in advanceof the facts.3 King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 43) elaborate on this point:

Where possible, analysts should simplify their descriptions onlyafter they attain an understanding of the richness of history and

1The term natural history refers to the scientific study of things in the natural world,which can encompass the broad range of natural-scientific disciplines depending on thecontext and the historical period. Its methodology primarily involves direct observation andcollection as well as classification of species into the taxonomic schema. Its lesser emphasison theoretical foundations or analytical rigor is distinctive from natural philosophy whichcorresponds to the modern-day mainstream natural sciences.

2This latter task is taken up in the next chapter on Diplomacy Games.3A. Conan Doyle. 1904. The Adventure of the Second Stain. Strand Magazine 28

(December): 1-16.

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culture. . . . [R]ich, unstructured knowledge of the historical andcultural context of the phenomena with which they want to dealin a simplified and scientific way is usually a requisite for avoidingsimplifications that are simply wrong.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is not to provide a comprehen-sive review on the historical evolution of diplomatic institutions. There areother excellent works with more comprehensive treatments of the history ofdiplomacy.4 Rather, I draw heavily on the empirical literature on the historyof diplomacy as well as the English school and other related European IRscholarship. My description of the natural history here omits many importantaspects of diplomacy that are not directly relevant to international disputes orconflict resolution. In what follows in this chapter, I disaggregate the histor-ical evolution of diplomatic institutions into several historical periods. Eachaccount of the historical period identifies some significant inherited institu-tional feature(s) of modern diplomacy. It also describes a strategic probleminternational, domestic or bothbehind the emergence of each function.

1 Evolution of Diplomatic Institutions: A His-

torical Sketch

The style and functions of diplomacy have evolved over the course of history.The changes in political order, economic environments, technological advance-ments have all had profound impacts on the way political leaders conducteddiplomacy. For example, modern telecommunication techniques and the im-proved jetliners have drastically improved the mobility and altered the wayactors behave in international politics. Reflecting on the experience of secretalliances in the nineteenth century and their roles in the expansion of WorldWar I, the importance of transparency in diplomatic processes in the collec-tive decision making among states has been recognized since the end of theWar. These two examples illustrate how political, economic, and technolog-ical changes may create the need for a particular institutional arrangementor function of diplomacy, which in turn may constitute the strategic logic forthe creation of a given set of diplomatic institutions. Hence, it is importantto consider how and why the existing diplomatic intuition and practice cameforth in international relations.

4For the excellent overview of historical evolution of diplomacy, see Anderson (1993),Hamilton and Langhorne (1995), Nicolson (1954), and Nicolson (1963). For more detailedaccount of a specific historical stage in history, see the works cited in the relevant subsectionsbelow.

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While the history of diplomacy exhibits a great deal of variability, the ba-sic functions of diplomacy and their machinery have not changed. Indeed, thecentral features of diplomatic institutions have survived the fundamental shiftsin the order and structure of international politics such as the surge of nation-alism and democracy and the incorporation of non-European countries in theinternational system. They also survived catastrophic events such as the GreatWars and the wane and wax of hegemons. Writings by diplomatic theoristssuch as Richelieu, Callie`res, Wicquefort, Nicolson, and others, reveal that vir-tually nothing has changed over the last several centuries with regard to thebasic functions of diplomacythe maintenance of communication channels,the conduct of negotiation, the provision of political intelligence, and politicalmanipulations behind the scene. Two decades ago, Hedley Bull (1977, 171)wrote: The remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, . . . andstages of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic pro-cedures that arose in Europe in another age is today one of the few visibleindications of the enduring relevance of diplomatic institutions. Because ofits remarkable stability, the diplomatic system is sometimes referred to as themaster-institution of international relations (Wight 1978, 113).

2 First Documented Diplomatic Practice: Amarna

Diplomacy in Ancient Near East

While the norms and practice of modern diplomacy have taken shape betweenthe period of Renaissance Italy (in the 15th century) and the creation of theWestphalian system (in the 17th century), the rudimentary form of what weknow today as diplomacy existed ever since the first social communities and po-litical collectives emerged and interacted with each other. As Nicolson (1963,2) notes, The origins of diplomacy lie buried in the darkness preceding whatwe call the dawn of history, the available evidence suggests that the earli-est recorded diplomatic activity took place about 3400 years ago between theEighteenth Dynasty of Egypt (New Kingdom) and other great powers in theancient Near East.5

A series of cuneiform clay tables, collectively called Amarna Letters,were first discovered and unearthed by a local farmer in 1887 (and succes-sively by archaeologists) at Tell el-Amarna, the ruin of the palace of KingAmenhotep IV located in the dynastic capital of the Ancient Egyptian New

5Great powers in the Late Bronze Age (the 16th to 12th centuries BC) include Mittani,Babylonia, Hatti, Assyria, and Mittani.

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Kingdom.6 The archive contains more than 350 letters. About 50 of the lettersare diplomatic correspondences between the Egyptian dynastic power and theneighboring Great powers in the ancient Near East for the thirty-year periodbeginning from final regnal years of Amenhotep III to the first regnal year ofTutankhamun in the 14th century BC. The correspondences discussed a vari-ety of issues such as inter-dynastic marriage, trade issues, alliance questions,and legal problems, among other (Cohen and Westbrook 2000).7

These diplomatic documents on cuneiform tables indicate that diplomaticnegotiations were going on some 3400 years ago between the Egyptian king-dom and the Hittite kingdom where they had severe conflict of interests andthey were competing for the control in the Near East region. The nineteenthdynasty of Egypt and the Hittite Kingdom of Anatolia engaged in intermittentarmed conflict for about fifty years. The military rivalry culminated in the thedirect clash of two rival kingdoms in 1274 BC in Kadesh (also Qadesh), a cityon the frontier between the two kingdoms. The Battle of Kadesh took placewhen Pharaoh Ramesses II attempted to seize control of the colonial territoryof modern-day Syria in order to remove the military influence of Hittite. Hisimperial army clashed with Hittite King Muwatallis. No decisive victory wasachieved by either side. This is one of the best documented battle in the An-cient Near East, although historical accounts vary on which side had the upperhand in this battle. Ramesses II and Muwatallis concluded a peace treaty af-terwards in which they agreed on the exchange of political refugees and asylumseekers, mutual military assistant, the mutual territorial inviolability, and theinter-dynastic marriage of a daughter of Muwatallis and Ramesses II.

This treaty is said to be the oldest recorded treaty in history. What theAmarna letters signify is that what we today call diplomatic missions weredeployed by political leaders to conduct diplomatic negotiations from thevery beginning of the recorded history of international relations. Hence, asBerridge, Keens-Soper and Otte (2001, 108) note, the practice of sendingagents abroad for specific purposes, sometimes for lengthy periods, is as oldas commerce, suspicion, rivalry and war, reaching back thousands of years toancient Mesopotamia.

Yet, the fact that this treaty was concluded about sixteen years after theBattle indicates the difficulty in reaching an agreement. It may also suggestGreat powers in the ancient Near East also experienced the great difficulty

6For the detailed discussion of the diplomatic activities between the great powers in theancient Near East (known as Amarna diplomacy), see Cohen and Westbrook (2000) andessays therein as well as Cohen (2001), Lafont (2001), .

7Other than diplomatic correspondence, the letters also included intelligence documentsent to the Egyptian dynasty from Egypts Canaanite empire.

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of communication that more recent diplomatic missions experienced in theabsence of jetliners or telecommunication. Not only does it take time fordiplomatic envoys to travel, but also exchanging missions would have involveda great deal of uncertainty as to the safe reception of diplomatic messages. Thisinherent difficulty and risk involved in diplomatic exchange many centurieslater leads to the institutionalization of diplomatic agents and embassies aswell as their special status such as diplomatic immunity. Sir. Harold Nicolson(1963, 6) wrote From the very first, . . . , it must have become apparent thatsuch negotiations would be severely hampered if the emissary from one sidewere killed and eaten by other side before he had had time to deliver hismessage. The practice must therefore have become established even in theremotest times that it would be better to grant to such negotiators certainprivileges and immunities which were denied to warriors.

The question still remains as to how rigorous the Amarna diplomatic sys-tem was. Some scholars argue that the Amarna letters indicate evidence of afully fledged diplomatic system (Cohen 1995, 264), particularly because thelaws of hospitality provided protection immunity for diplomatic envoys atthe time. Other scholars, however, are skeptical about this view, arguing thatthe Amarna diplomacy was rudimentary and it did not carry a full-fledged sys-tem (e.g., Wight 1977). Berridge (2000), for example, argues that the Amarnaletters provides the evidence that the Amarna system lacked the adequateimmunity system. First, the laws of hospitality was an exclusive privilegerather than diplomatic immunity. Second, the letters also indicate that theattempt to grant immunity to envoys of hostile powers failed. The ruler ofByblos complained to Pharaoh that when he sent a messenger to the mayor ofBeirut, who had seized his property, he bound him (EA 116) (Berridge 2000,214). Third, although diplomatic envoys were allowed to return home with-out the permission of their hosts in the modern system, this was not the casein Amarna diplomacy (Berridge 2000). In particular, the Egyptian dynastywas notorious for the frequent denial of such permissions during the Amarnaperiod (Holmes 1975). A recent study corroborates the non-existence of legaldiplomatic immunity in the ancient Near East, although there existed somedegree of the inviolability of diplomatic envoys (Cohen 2001; Elgavish 2000).Nevertheless, Amarna diplomacy had a system in its own right, and its systemwas adequate to the strategic needs faced by political leaders of the times.

3 Beginning of Diplomacy: Ancient Greece

The origin of diplomacy: Another root of modern-day diplomacy canbe traced back to the ancient Greek city-states. In particular, the English word

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diplomacy is derived from the Greek verb diploun which means fold inEnglish and also from diplomas which means folded documents (Inoguchi1989).8 This is because what we would now call diplomacy in the age of an-cient Greece was the city-states practice of mutually recognizing the safety ofpassage of their own citizens outside of the sphere of their influence. In the ageof ancient Greece, travel documents, passes, and carriage bills were sealed on ametal plate, folded, and sewed up together in a peculiar way. Such a documenton a metal plate was called diplomas and this term over time has becomealso to mean official documents. Nicolson notes that res diplomatica, whichinitially meant the vocation that examines and interprets official documents,came to indicate what we now know as diplomacy, the management of inter-governmental affairs.9 This indicates that one of the fundamental functions ofdiplomacy at the time is the medium of communication between governmentauthorities via diplomas.

Diplomatic practice: Diplomatic practice in ancient Greece departed fromthe norms and customs commonly observed in the history of diplomacy. Thefirst and foremost notable deviation is the system of public oratory. Greek citystates frequently exchanged oral messages rather than written documents likethe cuneiform clay tables utilized in Amarna diplomacy of the ancient NearEast. This practice is said to reflect their democratic norms and traditions.The Greeks also emphasized the importance of publicity and transparency inthe conduct of diplomacy.

Therefore, the primary task of diplomatic envoys in the Greek city-stateswas not just to convey the message but to make an oral argument on behalf oftheir own city either in front of the walls of a foreign city-state or in a publicdebate at a public assembly to justify the home citys position (Adcock andMosley 1975; Jonsson and Hall 2003; Nicolson 1963). Therefore, they were notexpected to get her information regarding the city-states which they visited orto write any reports on their return; instead, all that was expected of them wasthat they should make a magnificent speech (Nicolson 1963, 8). This practiceof public oratory in ancient Greece war rather as if the principal skill expectedof a British ambassador to the United States was to produce a fine forensicperformance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Hamilton

8Other studies that discuss the origins and uses of the term diplomacy include Constanti-nou (1996), Sharp (1999). Adcock and Mosley (1975) provides a more detailed treatmentof practice, methods, institutions, and instruments of diplomacy in ancient Greece. Seealso Cohen (2001), Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, Ch.1), Mosley (1971), Mosley (1973),Nicolson (1963), and Wolpert (2001).

9According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term diplomacy was first used tomean the management of international relations in 1796.

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and Langhorne 1995, 9-10). Therefore, the public assembly selected envoysfrom those who had dignified attitude and appearance as well as loud voice,in addition to the ability to engage in logical and inventive argumentation.Most agreements reached by diplomatic envoys were signed only after consul-tation with, and ratification by, public assemblies on their return. Herodotusdescribes the Persian king Cyrus the Great scoffing the Greek practice of pub-lic oratory (Cohen 2001, 31). Thucydides, too, implies the ineffectiveness ofpublic over private diplomacy (Thucydides IV, 22).

Perhaps the most famous episode of envoys in ancient Greece pleading thecause of their city before the popular assemblies was Thucydides account ofThe Melian Dialogue (Thucydides 1972). This is the story where the hege-monic city-state Athens demanded Melos (a colony of Sparta) to surrender.The Athenian envoys argued that Melos should submit to the demand becauseMelos is weaker not only than Athens who controls the sea but also weakerthan other islanders. In response to a Realpolitik argument, the Melian com-missioners, appealing to the justice and moral that are embodied in the Laws ofNations, argued that they should not be forced to surrender just because theyare weak.10 Thucydides documented many other episodes and provided crucialinformation concerning the diplomatic practice in ancient Greece. Thucydidesstory-telling indicates that diplomatic missions, such as the Athenian envoysto Melos, were dispatched so frequently that their exchange of missions werefairly institutionalized.

The second departure from the common historical pattern is the role playedby the proxenos. A proxenos is a local citizen who voluntarily functioned asa consul of other city states, rather than a diplomatic mission sent by othercities. If the need for consular business arose in a foreign city-state, then aresident of that local city was given the title of proxenos by the city-statewhich it represented. This system was developed because the Greeks did notregard diplomacy as a distinct function of government and hence lacked for-mal institutions of diplomacy such as resident envoys or permanent embassies(Mosley 1971, 320; Wolpert 2001, 74).

The third anomaly is a prohibition of the exchange of elaborate gifts bydiplomatic envoys to prevent bribery or the appearance of bribery. Adcockand Mosley (1975, 164-5) report two instances involving Athenian diplomaticenvoys to Persia receiving gifts. In one instance, the matter was raised in thepublic assembly on their return home. In another, the envoy was accused ofaccepting imprudently lavish gifts and was condemned to death after his re-

10Note that this dialogue actually took place at the closed-door meeting of the Councilof the Melians despite the fact that diplomatic negotiation among Greek city-states werenormally conducted publicly through the debate.

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turn home as diplomatic missions were expected to observe certain proceduresand etiquette at court.

Finally, diplomatic immunity or safe conduct was not guaranteed in an-cient Greek diplomacy. While in the ancient Near East the inviolability, if notlegal immunity, was guaranteed to some extent, this was not the case withancient Greece. The safe conduct was not an automatic or general right of thediplomatic envoys, despite the fact that heralds were regarded as agents of thegods and were sacrosanct (Adcock and Mosley 1975, 229). Moreover, safe pas-sage and physical security may not be guaranteed during wartime. Athenianand Spartan diplomatic envoys were executed during the Peloponnesian War(Adcock and Mosley 1975, 153-4). Both Athens and Sparta executed envoyssent by Darius I of Persian (Cohen 2001, 32).

Although the Greek diplomatic practice witnessed anomalies in variousaspects and may not contribute to the liner progress of the institutional de-velopment of diplomacy, some of the Greek features are commonly observedin diplomatic activities across time and space. For instance, while the publicconduct of diplomacy may constitute a deviation from the historical norm,Nicolson (1963, 7) notes that the Athenian practice of choosing as their diplo-matic envoys the finest orators, the most plausible forensic advocates seemsto still remain intact today. Moreover, the tradition of public oratory also in-dicates that diplomatic communication and negotiation were carried out withthe power of reason and language rather than naked force in the ancient NearEast and ancient Greek diplomacy. This creates a stark difference with whatwe witness with the Roman empire.

4 Stasis of Diplomacy: Ancient Rome

The ancient Roman civilization stands out in many respects in the history ofinternational politics. The most notable is its extended sphere of influence andits longevity in the hegemonic status. Ancient Rome also marks a turning pointin the history of diplomacy in that it contributed very little to the developmentof diplomatic institutions and practice during its millenarian history (Hamiltonand Langhorne 1995, 12; Nicolson 1954). The lack of advancement madeby the Romans is remarkable given the fact that the Romans contributedso much to the social and political systems. This includes Roman law, theinstitutions of Christianity, standing professional military and each one ofthem has profoundly affected European civilization.11

11For a more comprehensive treatment of diplomacy in the Roman world, see Campbell(2001), Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, 1), Nicolson (1954) and Nicolson (1963).

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This is not to say, however, that Rome did not use diplomacy at all. Rather,the Romans did not regard diplomacy as an important instrument of state-craft and maintaining its supremacy; they used it as a means of transactingdaily business and this may be why it was the methods of managing legal orcommercial business primarily between its provinces. As for the managementof its international relations, however, the Romans barely relied on diplomacy.In fact, ancient Rome is one of the few leading states with the hegemonic sta-tus which did not utilize diplomacy in the establishment or the maintenanceits supremacy. The most important leverage that the Romans used in foreignpolicy was a strong military and their superiority in war. This was noted bythe ancient Greek historian Polybius, who said The Romans rely on force inall their undertakings, and consider that having set themselves a task theyare bound to carry it through (Campbell 2001). Romes rise to primacy inItaly was mainly due to its military strength and war-fighting ability, ratherthan diplomacy (Campbell 2001, 4).12 Hence, it is natural that the Romansrecognized that overwhelming military strength could be an instrument in pre-serving peaceful conditions (Campbell 2001, 2). It is within this context thatFlavius Vegetius Renatus, a military scientist in ancient Roman, said in histextbook on military science that, Those who seek peace must prepare forwar. During the autocratic rule of the Roman Empire, with the standing,professional army stationed in various provinces, it was able to use the threatof force for the purpose of coercive diplomacy (Campbell 6). Harold Nicolsonnotes that owing to the fault of masterfulness . . . they [the Romans] sought toimpose their will, rather than to negotiate on a basis of reciprocity (Nicolson1954, 14).

To be sure, the manner in which the Romans utilized diplomacy varieddepending on the system of government (Campbell 2001). During the RomanRepublic, the Senate was in charge of foreign affairs, and the power of theSenate includes the power to conduct war as well as to send and receive diplo-matic representatives.13 The Roman Republic adopted diplomatic proceduresand practices that resembled those developed in ancient Greece. Envoys, orlegatus, also reported to the Senate on their return, where the result of diplo-matic agreements were either sanctioned or declined. This sort of ratificationprocedure was necessary because the instruction given to envoys by the Sen-ate was not detailed, and, consequently, some degree of latitude and discretion

12However, Campbell (2001) claims that this does not mean that Rome ruled Italy onlythrough conquest and fear. Rather, instead of destruction and annexation, Rome ofteninduced communities to become allies

13A diplomatic agent appointed and accredited to the Senate is called Legatus. The termsused for the diplomatic missions of the Pope, Papal Legate, has its root in legatus.

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was granted to envoys themselves. Despite the latitude granted to envoys, un-like the Greek practice of selecting public oratory on the basis of its forensicability, the Senate did not consider the relevant experience or qualification ofenvoys. This was partly because the Senate often chose its own members asa diplomatic envoy. Diplomatic contact therefore remained a non-specialist,part-time pursuit by men who had no training, no proven aptitude for diplo-macy, and often perhaps little time to prepare (Campbell 2001, 8). In fact,the Romans did little to create an expert body of trained diplomats. And thereis little evidence that the Romans improved on the Greek system (Nicolson1954).

To add to the ad hoc nature of Roman diplomacy, most of diplomatic ac-tivities were in response to contingent situations which spontaneously arosewithin or beyond the provinces. Hence, problems were dealt with, and every-thing was seemingly negotiated, on the spot often by provincial governors ormilitary commanders, even though their staff lacked no training in diplomacy.Further, it was not unusual that the provincial governors staff was limitedmainly to his family and friends. This became more common during the Ro-man Empire when a crisis developed in the East as the Sassanid Empire ofPersia was expanding its influence (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 13).

The importance of diplomacy further declined after the Republic was over-thrown and replaced by the Empire after the 50-year period of civil wars.As the Roman Republic transformed into the Roman Empire, the Senate,too, metamorphosed from the primary governing authority with the decision-making power to an advisory council. While the Senators continued enjoyingtheir privileged status, the Senate was deprived of its power in the dictatorialdecision making and marginalized to a mere symbolic role. Since the RomanEmpire did not establish the alternative procedures of diplomacy, the inca-pacity of the Senate meant that the Roman Empire was not equipped withany central institutions to manage its foreign affairs other than the emperorhimself.

Nevertheless, the difference between two regimesthe Republic and theEmpireseems to be a matter of degree. There were no designated institutionsfor the conduct of foreign policy either in the Roman Republic or the RomanEmpire. And yet, as Nicolson (1954, 19-22) writes, even during the Republicanregime, the Romans were too dictatorial to appreciate diplomatic niceties,and diplomatic envoys from abroad were treated with varying degrees ofcontumely reflecting the self-confidence and its military superiority. Thereis no shortage of episodes corroborating these claims. For one, the Romansoften issued a peculiar form of ultimatumthey set a time limit to negotiationswith a threat. When Macedonian envoys arrived at Rome in 197 b.c., they

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were informed on arrival that, unless the negotiations resulted in agreementwithin sixty days, they would be regarded as spies and deprived of diplomaticstatus (Nicolson 1954, 21). For another, the Romans developed the practice ofincluding the hostage clause in treaties as a commitment device. The Romansdemanded that hostages be delivered from conquered tribes and nations at theconclusion of surrender agreements. If the terms were violated, the hostageswere immediately arrested and treated as prisoners of war (Nicolson 1954,21-2).

Besides the decline of the Senate, the fundamental factor that contributedto the Romans overwhelming reliance on the military in the conduct of foreignpolicy was its colonial approach. According to Nicolson, once ancient Romeachieved its supremacy, its foreign relations with neighboring countries wereconducted from a colonial and administrative, rather than diplomatic, pointof view. As noted above, diplomatic transactions were dealt with by militaryauthorities. Hence, it is natural that the Romans approaches were thoseof the legionary and the road-maker rather than those of the diplomatists(Nicolson 1963, 9-10). These approaches reflected the Romanss belief that itis their duty to impose the Pax Romana by crushing the opposition and bysparing only those who surrendered to their dominance (Nicolson 1954, 17).The second potential reason for the underdevelopment of diplomacy is the lackof equal powers (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 13).

The immediate cause of the fall of the Roman Empire has been a greatsource of scholarly interests, and the consensus on this issue is that the heavyreliance on its military capability in managing its international relations hadleft the Empire overstretched, undermining its governing effectiveness. It isironic that one of the main reasons for the inactiveness of diplomacy was alsothe decisive driving force behind the decline of its supremacy and eventuallyits fall.

Inheriting the successors declined military capability, the East Roman Em-pire could not afford to rely on its military and hence had to rely on diplomacyin order to maintain its territorial integrity. Because of its constant effort tosupplement its weakened military with the engagement in diplomacy, the EastRoman Empire made a marked contribution to the development of diplomacy.Its practice and institutional characteristics are known as Byzantine diplo-macy.

5 Byzantine Diplomacy: Middle Ages

The next turning point in the development of diplomacy occurred with the fallof the Roman Empire. While Byzantine diplomacy is known for its ceremonial

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and sublime aspect as well as its manipulative and cunning conduct of foreignpolicy, these traits are products of Byzantiums rational response to its unfa-vorable strategic setting. Specifically, because the East Roman (or Byzantine)Empire was not able to rely on the overwhelming military capabilities, theEmpire had to resort to diplomacy to achieve two goals. One is to maintainits security by mitigating the risk of war with neighboring powers.14 Anotherwas to maintain its imperial status inherited from the Roman Empire. Theprimary challenge to the Byzantine Empire was to maintain the status quo re-lations between itself and an array of surrounding countries that were posingthe threat of invasion from almost all quarters. However, the only resourcethat the Byzantine empire possessed was the legitimacy inherited from thelate Roman Empire as the imperial status.15

Diplomatic Manipulation: In order to supplement the deficiency of thestrong military, Byzantium devised several strategies in the conduct of diplo-macy. The key strategy behind such diplomatic efforts that the rulers ofByzantium adopted involved (1) awe and sublime rather than terror or fear,(2) flattery and bribery, and (3) intelligence. These strategies were generallydesigned to manipulate the international security environment by adjustingthe incentive structures of the relevant players and by acquiring relevant in-formation.

The most evident example of the first strategy of awe and sublime is theconversion of the Empire to Christianity, which rendered the Roman Emperora conjugation of divine power (religious) and secular (political) power. Withthis arrangement, the Byzantine Empire became not only the center of theworld (due to its inherited hegemonic status) but also the representative ofGod. As a consequence, all other political leaders and rulers were forced tobe positioned inferior to the Empire, and those who attack the Empire mustexpect the wrath of God because it was superior to every authority on earth,the only one on earth which the Emperor of all has established (Hamiltonand Langhorne 1995, 15). This tactic can be thought of as a peculiar form ofdeterrence. It utilized the hierarchical or authoritative structure embedded inChristianity to disincentivize foreign countries from challenging Byzantium.To enhance the effectiveness of this disincentive strategy, the Byzantinerulers expanded their constituents by converting the pagans to the Christian

14The neighboring rivals included the Slavs, the Turks, the Arabs, and the Germansamong others.

15For a more comprehensive treatment of Byzantine diplomacy, see essays in Shepard andFranklin (1992). See also Hamilton and Langhorne (1995), Neumann (2005), and Nicolson(1963).

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faith (Nicolson 1963, 10).While this concentricity tactic also had the side-effect of providing the reli-

gious basis to the diplomatic method, it was essentially part of the larger diplo-matic strategynamely, to overwhelm visiting envoys with flashy displays.Hence, the overarching theme of the procedure and practice of Byzantine diplo-macy was to impress foreign visitors by displaying the physical appearance ofabsolute superiority, luxury, and wealth. This included the Byzantine practiceof confining foreign envoys on their mission to Constantinople in fortresseswhere they could not learn anything but to be impressed with displays of mil-itary might (Bull 1977, 164). Other aspects of the Byzantian rulers carefulattempt to maintain the physical signs of their unique superiority in evidenceinclude sumptuous imperial architecture, the luxurious feast, and acrobaticentertainment (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 15).16

It is in this context that the luxurious ceremonial protocol arose as the stan-dard of diplomatic practice and that Byzantine diplomacy became primarilyknown for its sublime aspect. The Byzantine influence on ceremonial proce-dure of diplomacy was passed on to Venice and Genoa (who were Byzantiumsfriendly allies due to their commercial connections), which in turn spread thetradition as the Italian System of diplomacy to the rest of Europe beyond theAlps (see the following section for these dissemination processes). A record ofdiplomatic protocol, the Libro Ceremoniale, was kept by Renaissance Venice,which detailed the exact ceremonies performed for each visiting dignity. Thisserved as a manual for the ritual treatment of future guests.

The second diplomatic tactics involved flattery and bribery. Bribery andflattery played a crucial role in the Empires diplomatic efforts in alliance for-mation and power balancing, as they allowed the Byzantine empire to directlyinfluence the incentive structure of the frontier tribes and nations. In partic-ular, this type of strategy involved the purchase of the support of neighboringpowers, and the provocation of rivalry among neighboring despots by playing

16Another reason why sublime, pompous practices were largely shaped by the Byzantiansand Venetians is that diplomatic envoys at the time were self-funded. This left merchants asbeing sole viable candidates for diplomatic envoys, because they were able to finance theirmissions from trade (Nicolson 1954, 25) and because they had experience of foreign travelsfrom long-distance Mediterranean trade. However, there are several problems in employingmerchants as diplomatic representatives. First, because merchants generally traveled incaravans, they were also too slow for the transmission of urgent messages. Second, nomerchants were willing to take a dangerous and lengthy mission; while they could conducttrading business instead. Hence, making money was likely to be too much of a distraction(Nicolson 1954; Wicquefort 1997). Third, the employment of merchants was likely to beregarded as an insult by the prince to whom they were sent (Wicquefort 1997, 50). As asolution to these problems, the Byzantine diplomacy associated honor and symbolic valuesto diplomatic missions.

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them off each other in order to weaken them (Nicolson 1963, 10). A relatedstrategy involved hostage-taking. Members of the ruling families would rou-tinely be requested to stay on in Constantinople. The Byzantians inherited thispractice from the Romans use of hostages as a treaty-enforcement device.17

The third diplomatic tactics was intelligence. The first two strategies ofadjusting rival powers incentive structure were possible only if the Byzantineemperors were fully informed about the preferences, intention, and capabil-ities of the targeted neighboring countries. This elevated the collection andorganization of information to the utmost importance.

Importance of Intelligence: Considering the serious deficiency of militarycapability, the diplomats were not expected to play the role of messengersor orators; rather their primary task was to collect and report relevant in-formation on the political situation of neighboring countries as well as thestrategic and power relations among them. That is, Byzantine diplomacyprimarily functioned as the acquisition and assessment of intelligence infor-mation. Recall that in the ancient Near East, the primary role of diplomatswas conveyance of messages between political leaders as they were conductingdiplomatic negotiation, and that diplomats of Greek city-states were primar-ily public debaters. Hence, it is worth emphasizing that diplomacy had notfully developed its informational function until the Byzantine Empire system-atically assigned intelligence activities to their diplomats. The informationalrole of diplomats at this stage of the development of diplomacy was not com-pletely separated from the role of espionage or spy. Because the primary taskexpected of diplomats was to discover the secrets of the courts where he re-sides, a French diplomatic theorist Abraham de Wicquefort, who witnessedthe Congress of Westphalia (Keens-Soper 2001b, 88), once referred to an am-bassador as an honorable spy (Wicquefort 1997).18 Until the Modern Agean ambassador simultaneously played the roles of both a diplomat and a spy.These aspects are reflected in the governmental agency for Byzantine diplo-macy, Skrinion Barbaron (Bureau of Barbarians), which is a ministry in chargeof foreign affairs. While Skrinion Barbaron managed both diplomatic affairsand intelligence activity, since its primary task effectively assimilated that ofintelligence agencies, it is considered as the first intelligence agency in history

17The similar practice of taking family members of the nobles as hostages was institutedby some of historys notable dictators including the Tokugawa shogunate, the feudal militarydictatorship of Japan during the Edo period (1603-1868), and King Louis XIV of France.

18This phrase also appear in the work of another a French diplomatic theorist Francoisde Callie`res, who served Louis VIX as his courtier (Callie`res 1983, 80).

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(Antonucci 1993).19

The informational role of diplomacy is occasionally emphasized through-out history, as it helps political leaders avoid the expenses of unwarrantedwars. Intelligence gathering and assessment concerning the preferences, inten-tions, and military capabilities of potential enemies were the principle toolsof the Byzantine diplomacy, and it saved Byzantium from the cost of war.The Byzantine Empire hardly won a military victory in the last 150 yearsbefore the fall of Constantinople in 1453 as it became increasingly deficientin fighting capabilities. As theorists recently put it, diplomacy functionedas a way to determine whether the issue at hand was critical enough to fightfor (Guisinger and Smith 2002, 176), and this characterization of the infor-mational function of diplomacy was exactly the Byzantine Empires answerto its strategic environment. After all, unlike its predecessors, diplomacy, notmilitary, was Byzantiums greatest strength.

6 The Italian System: Renaissance Diplomacy

Perhaps the most documented period in the development of diplomacy is Re-naissance Italy, in which the rudiments of what we today know as diplomacyfirst began to take shape. In particular, the most important innovation inthe development of diplomatic institution took place in the Italian city-statesduring this period. That is, the practice of exchanging resident ambassadorsemerged and widely spread among northern Italian city-states in the first halfof the fifteenth century, and the practice was institutionalized and becamenormal across the peninsula in the second half of the century. Harold Nicol-son refers to this system of resident ambassadors as the Italian System, whichlater diffused throughout the rest of Europe over the following centuries.20

Strategic Environment and the Treaty of Lodi: The Renaissance wasunderway in Italy roughly from the 14th century. During about the sameperiod, Italy was constantly menaced by persistent military conflict, with Ital-ian city-states engaging in power struggles for the hegemonic control of the

19The modern-day equivalent of a ministry of foreign affairs was first established by Car-dinal Richellieu in the eighteenth century.

20The history of Renaissance diplomacy is still dominated by a single book published over ahalf century agoGarrett Mattinglys (1955) Renaissance Diplomacy. Mattinglys accountsof Renaissance diplomacy are taken to be standard, or even conventional wisdom. Yet,essays in Frigo (2000) challenges many of Mattinglys theses. For example, the developmentof resident permanent embassies did not emerge as an assertion of sovereignty as Mattinglyclaims; rather, they emerged from concerns over sovereignty and legitimation (Fubini 2000).

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peninsula. After an extended period of antagonism and constant warfare ina precarious society, the city-states were awakened by the fall of ByzantineEmpire in 1453 to the external threats.21

While the fall of the Byzantine Empire strongly signaled the imminentrisk of the expanding influence of the Ottoman Empire, the Italian city-stateswere poorly equipped for war against the Turks. The size and capacity ofItalian city-states were nothing comparable to those of the Ottoman Empire.In particular, because the source of power and prosperity of most of the citystates was derived from commercial activities rather than traditional politicalauthority, they typically lacked the standing army and had to turn to theprecarious support of mercenaries. The stark military deficiency facing theOttoman Empires standing army was exactly the same challenge that theByzantine Empire was confronted with. Hence, in addition to mercenaries,they sought to supplement their weak military with diplomacy (Nicolson 1963,31). The long years of incessant rivalry and power struggle among the northernItalian city-states during the first half of the fifteenth century also contributedto their vulnerability to external threats. Italy was also harassed by France,as the House of Valois had developed its territorial ambitions towards Italyafter successfully unifying the territory of France.

Under the threats posed by the Turks and the French, it is natural thatItalian city-states then sought out for a system of mutual defense or collectivesecurity as their strategy to fend off the external threats and thus turned todiplomatic efforts to manage their alliances. A year after the collapse of theByzantine Empire, five great powers in Renaissance Italyincluding Venice,Milan, Papacy, Naples, and Florencecame to peace and concluded the Treatyof Lodi in 1454. This Italian League is a series of treaties effectively agreedon non-aggression and mutual defense between them.22 With the initiatives ofCosimo de Medici of Florence and Francesco Sforza of Milan, this treaty put anend to the period of fluctuating realignments and warfare between city-states,including the wars of Lombardy between Milan and Venice.23

21For a more detailed description of the politics and international relations in the back-ground of the emergence of Renaissance Diplomacy, see Hale (1957), Mallett (1994), andMattingly (1955). For a brief overview, see Anderson (1993, Ch.1) and Hamilton andLanghorne (1995, Ch.2).

22The Treaty of Lodi was primarily concluded between Venice and Milan to compromisepeace after the thirty-year period of wars of Lombardy started in 1425. The treaty allowedother Italian states to join the Italian League of peace. Florence, a Milanese ally, was thefirst to enter the league, followed by Aragonese Naples and the Papal states. By the end of1455, all five Italian great powers, along with other smaller powers such as Lucca, Mantua,Bolona, and Ferrara, formed the so-called Italian League. See Fubini (1995) and Ilardi(1959) for the discussion of the Italian League.

23Niccolo` Machiavelli, who was born in Florence soon after the the Lodi treaty was signed,

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This treaty ushered in forty years of peace on the Italian peninsula, form-ing a new but unstable equilibrium, without any major fighting among thesegreat powers, significant territorial changes, or large alternations in the relativepositions among them (Mattingly 1937, 432). This peace was built on the del-icate balance of power maintained through constant adjustment of diplomacy.The Renaissance blossomed under the peace and stability brought about bythe Treaty. It was under this peace equilibrium that Italian city-states es-tablished the system of resident ambassadors to maintain their non-aggressionprinciples.

Resident Ambassadors as a Stable Communication System: Therewere two challenges faced by Italian city-states to establish this system ofbalance of power.24 First, because the Italian city-states had been in theprolonged warring period prior to the Peace of Lodi, they had to begin withovercoming the mistrust and security dilemma that hindered any cooperationand coordination among them. Some sort of assurance arrangements wasneeded to accomplish this. Second, this unstable equilibrium of peace amongformer enemies hinged on the delicate balance of power between them. Thecity-states, consequently, put a great premium on accurate information, orwhat Mattingly (1937, 432) refers to as diplomatic alertness on the changingstrategic outlook. The survival and prosperity of the Italian city-states hingedon astute calculation of risks and strategic behavior, accurate intelligence onthe foreign political events was crucial. That is, they needed a fire-alarm thatwould transmit the alarm when any power threatened to upset the balance(Mattingly 1937, 432).

It is against this strategic background that city-states in Renaissance Italycame to institute a stable and efficient network of communication and infor-mation transmission. The diplomatic machinery that they devised to do thisjob was the system of resident ambassadors at permanent embassies in foreigncity-states. It is natural that a system of resident embassies were establishedto meet the demand for stable and efficient communication because the prac-tice of dispatching resident envoys had become very common during the firsthalf of the fifteenth century. Soon after the Treaty of Lodi was concluded,Francesco Sforza dispatched his first resident ambassador in 1454, followed by

refers to Francesco Sforza, the duke of Milan, in his book, The Prince, as an example ofgood governance and use of mercenary.

24For more detailed discussions on the practice of diplomacy beyond the resident ambas-sadors during the Renaissance, see Bull (1977, Ch.7), Frigo (2000), Fubini (1995), Ilardi(1959), Mallett (2001), Mattingly (1955), and Nicolson (1954, Ch.2).

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other Italian city-states one after another exchanging resident envoys.25 In anutshell, resident ambassadors were expected to be fire-alarms.

For the forty years following the Treaty of Lodi, the Italian League utilizedthe communication system consisting of the network of resident ambassadorsand successfully maintain the balance of power among them. Therefore,the role played by ambassadors residing in the capital of foreign countrieswas as essential as the standing army in the management of the internationalsystem of Northern Italy. And it was through this process that the residentambassador and permanent embassies were established as a key component ofdiplomatic machinery. Because this type of diplomatic machinery was estab-lished by Italian city-states, Harold Nicolson calls it the Italian system ofdiplomacy.

Resident ambassadors and permanent embassies were unprecedented incharacter. Indeed, the system of diplomatic envoys in ancient Greece were onan ad hoc basis and dispatched to carry out a particular mission with a spe-cific issue. Similarly, the diplomatic messengers carrying the Amarna lettersin the ancient Near East were also selected on a temporary basis.26 Spo-radic exchanges of diplomatic missions on the ad hoc basis were inadequateamong great powers in Renaissance Italy.27 As the frequency and durationof ad hoc embassies intensified, it became clear that it is more practical andmore cost-efficient to appoint a resident ambassador to remain at a frequentedforeign court. As the external affairs of great powers became increasingly en-meshed in their alliance network with shifting preferences and changing mil-itary tensions among them (along with the changing security outlook), theconduct of occasional diplomacy on the ad hoc basis became increasingly diffi-cult (Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte 2001, 108). As the duration of embassiesbecame longer, the opportunities for gathering valuable information becamemuch greater (Queller 1967, 88). Although information acquisition by resi-dent ambassadors was a very imperfectly developed process, its importance

25It is tempting to conclude that the unstable equilibrium of peace among the Italiancity-states after the Treaty of Lodi caused the first exchange of resident ambassadors. Infact, there exist an alternative account of the first resident ambassador, which claims thatFrancesco Sforza was the first to send a resident ambassador to Genova in 1455, followingthe conclusion of the Treaty. Yet, according to Mattingly (1937), the available documentindicates that the first documented resident ambassador was actually dispatched in 1375 byMantua to Milan. By the time the Treaty of Lodi was concluded a half-century later, theexchange of resident ambassadors was already considered as normal, or at least desirable,between city-states with alliance ties (Mattingly 1937, 432).

26However, there is evidence that a same person tended to be selected as a diplomaticmessenger in the ancient Near East because of the language necessity.

27For the circumstance in which the resident embassy was invented and spread, see Queller(1967, 82-83).

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was great in the absence of more technologically advanced means such asjetliners, telecommunication, and news-networks (Queller 1967, 82-8).28 Theemployment of occasional missions had given way to permanent missions.

The Italian system of diplomacy was gradually adopted in other parts ofEurope, and over time constituted a foundation for the modern diplomaticsystem. The irony is that one of the documented catalyst in the spread of thisdiplomatic machinery to the north of the Alps came when the peace of Lodicollapsed as the Italian city-states were once again thrown into the menace ofwarfare by the invasion of Charles VIII of France in 1494.29 When CharlesVIII invaded Italy, Pope Alexander VI opposed it by forming the Holy League(or, the League of Venice) with the help of the Holy Roman Emperor Max-imilian I, Ferdinand of Aragon (Spain), and his Italian allied states, Veniceand Milan, and subsequently repelled the French invasion. The formation ofthe Holy League was successful partly due to the outstanding performanceof Spanish resident ambassadors representing Ferdinand at various Europeancourts (including Rome, Venice, London, Brussels, and Vienna). Impressedwith this success, European monarchs came to realize the utility of residentambassadors and permanent embassies, spreading the Italian system of diplo-macy throughout the rest of Europe in the 16th century (Elliott 2002). By theonset of the Thirty Years War in 1618, the spread and formation of residentambassadors and permanent diplomacy was largely complete, and nearly allEuropean powers maintained permanent diplomatic representatives with allother powers in the sphere of their interests (Mattingly 1955; see also Keens-Soper 1973).30

It was the Byzantines who taught the diplomatic practice to Venice, andthe Venetians in turn set the pattern for other city-states in Italy (Nicolson1963, 24). Byzantians utilized intelligence in its diplomatic manipulation. Ital-ians then perfected the system of the acquisition and transmission of politicalinformation in coping with the changing security outlook. Over centuries,the Italian system spread throughout Europe in the sixteenth century, and asWiseman (2005, 411) puts it, resident ambassadors and permanent embassiesgave the modern diplomacy its signature. The Thirty Years War had thedisastrous effect upon European diplomacy because ambassadors were proneto forget that their function was to make peace, which was envisioned in the

28For example, it took one French ambassador two and a half months to travel from Paristo Stockholm in the early 18th century (Nicolson 1954, 59).

29Charles VIIIs excuse of invasion was that he inherited Naples from the House of Anjou(Angio` in Italian).

30Note, however, that because the European courts during this age were not stationarybut mobile, resident ambassadors who were sent to a court did not reside at a permanentembassy but they traveled along with the court to which that they was accredited.

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Italian System. Many of them instead ended up engaging in espionage andsubversion.

7 The French System: 17th & 18th Centuries

If Renaissance Italy gave birth to the modern diplomatic system, France in the17th and 18th centuries perfected it. Absorbing the Italian system of residentambassadors, a distinctively French approach to diplomacy emerged aroundthe conclusion of the treaty of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years Warin 1648 (Keens-Soper 1973, 490). While the Italian system is chiefly char-acterized as a mechanism for information acquisition and transmission, whatHarold Nicolson (1954) refers to as the French System puts emphasis onthe art of negotiation and the principles of raison detat. To be sure, Frenchdiplomacy in these centuries differed little from its predecessors of RenaissanceItaly and Byzantine Empire in that the responsibility for political and militaryinformation as well as diplomatic manipulation through bribery and ceremo-nial rituals still played a significant role (Roosen 1970, 316). Nevertheless,the French system carried the evolution of diplomatic institution into a newphase where the art of negotiation was established as one of the diplomaticmechanisms (Keens-Soper 1973, 490; see also Keens-Soper 2001a, 109-113).

The French system of diplomacy was first formulated by Cardinal Richelieu,who served Louis XIII during the Thirty Years War and wrote TestamentPolitique (Nicolson 1954, 52).31 Richelieus influence on diplomatic thoughtand practice was pivotal in the emergence of the French system, which was thenlater analyzed and stylized by Francois de Callie`res, who served as a diplomatduring the reign of Louis XIV and published The Art of Diplomacy in 1716(Keens-Soper 2001a, 107; see also Keens-Soper 1973, 486-487).32 As Frenchpower reached its culmination during the reign of Louis XIV in the second-half of the seventeenth century, its language and culture also had profoundinfluence on the European courts. With the help of French supremacy, its

31Richelieus Testament Politique is based on notes and dictations, and considered to becomplied after his death (1642). The fist publication of the work was by a press in Ams-terdam in 1688. The English translation along with the commentary is furnished by Hill(1961), which I relied on for this study. Henry Bertram Hill. 1961. The Political Testamentof Cardinal Richelieu: the Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections. Madison: Uni-versity of Wisconsin Press. According to Keens-Soper (2001a, 106), Callie`res The Art ofDiplomacy enjoyed a European reputation throughout the 18th century and was consideredessential reading in the training of diplomats for a substantial period of time until the 19thcentury, along with Wicquefort (1997)s The Embassador and His Functions.

32For a more complete treatment of diplomatic theory advanced by Callie`res, see Keens-Soper (2001a, 1973).

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influence on diplomatic practice and institution became so predominant thatit became the model for all European countries for three centuries until 1919(Nicolson 1954, 53).

Strategic Environment: What did motivate Richelieu to devise distinc-tively unique approach to diplomacy? What did elevate the French system tothe model of modern diplomatic system? The 17th century was a period whenfully sovereign states were emerging in the midst of other types of politicalcapacities with substantial, albeit declining, influence; yet the authority of theolder universalist institutions and ideas, such as the Papacy and the Holy Ro-man Empire, were called into question (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 67-8).

The Papacys influence had been declining ever since the end of the me-dieval period, and so had the medieval principles of the universalitythe prin-ciples for the world order, which was sustained by the authority that unifiedthe legitimacy of the Roman Empire (secular, political authority) and the au-thority of the Christian faith (Catholic, in particular as the divine authority).The Holy Roman Empire never achieved this principle of universality, as ithad separated control of the church from control of the government (Kissinger1994, 57). This imperial failure led to fragmentation of both the Empire andEurope. On the one hand, this failure led to a fractionated Europe, whereFrance, Great Britain, and Spain did not accept the imperial authority. Onthe other hand, the Empires inability to unify the secular and religious au-thority eventually led to the Protestant Reformation, which invokes a series ofreligious conflicts and the initiation of the Counter-Reformation. Along withthe Counter-Reformation movement, the Holy Empire Emperor Ferdinand IIof Habsburg also initiated an oppression campaign against Protestants to re-vive Catholic universality. This was partly a religious act and partly a politicalmaneuver to establish the imperial dominance in Central Europe, which even-tually triggered the Thirty Years War (Zeller 1961, 59).

The Habsburgs initiative in this religious campaign also posed a geograph-ical threat to France.33 For Richelieu (in the first-half of the 17th century),the preeminance of Habsburg Austria was a threat to Frances national secu-rity, since it was encircled by the Habsburg influence on all quarters (Kissinger1994, 59-60). In the south, there is Habsburg Spain. In the north, the Nether-lands was dominated by Spain. In the east, both Alsace and Lorraine wereunder the influence of the Holy Roman Empire. Most of the city-states inNorthern Italy were also under the influence of Spain. For Louis XIV (in thesecond-half of the 17th century), however, the emergence of the Holy Roman

33For the details of French diplomacy and its relationship to religious warfare in thesixteenth century, see Jensen (1974, 1985).

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Empire as the dominant power on the European Continent was a threat forhis aspiration for glories, since the fate of the Holy Roman Empire woulddetermine Frances capability of the eastward expansion (Kissinger 1994, 58;Zeller 1961, 207). Richelieu therefore sought to prevent Habsburg dominationof Europe by exploiting the religious conflict generated by the Reformation inorder to weaken the influence of the Holy Roman Empire.

French System and the Art of Negotiation: What we know today as theFrench system is a rational response to the strategic environment that Frenchrulers, Richelieu in particular, faced in the midst of the turbulence in the first-half of the seventeenth century. The first distinctive feature of the Frenchsystem is the art of negotiation. Richelieu was the first to establish that theart of negotiation constitutes a permanent feature of diplomatic mechanisms.He argues that diplomacy (based on the system of a broad and comprehensivenetwork of resident ambassadors) must do more than the collection and trans-mission of information, political manipulations, and the conduct of ceremonialritualsthese were standard diplomatic practices in Renaissance Italy and theByzantine Empire. In his Testament Politique, Richelieu opens the chapter onthe continuous negotiation in diplomacy by noting that States receive somuch benefit from uninterrupted foreign negotiations . . . it is absolutely nec-essary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly orsecretly, and in all places, even in those from which no present fruits seemlikely (Hill 1961, 94).

Richelieus emphasis on the use of diplomacy in the management of inter-national relations seems to stem from his beliefs in reason. He writes thatreason ought to be the torch which lights the conduct of both princes andtheir states (Hill 1961, 72). His adherence to reason also echoes his preferencefor diplomacy over the use of force or coercion, and in Testament Politique heargues that It is much more expedient to lead men by means by which im-perceptibly win their wills than, as is more the practice, by those which coercehim (Hill 1961, 72). Although his explanation of the utility of negotiations isextensive, its essence can be stated in a quite simple way: through negotiationsone can obtain a better outcome (Hill 1961, 99-101). That is, the rationalityof negotiation is such that states are more likely to secure an agreement thatall the parties to an issue are better off than unilaterally imposed settlementsthrough military coercion. In the language of bargaining theory, negotiationoutcomes are Pareto-superior to any imposed settlement through coercion orwarfare. Hence, the rationality is derived not from the mere desirability of ne-gotiated settlements or their normative value, but from the inefficiency of mil-itary instruments as reliance on force is a costly and risky business. Callie`res

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is more blunt on this point, as he considers war as an expensive and wastefulinstrument, or a deesse bien hideuse [hideous goddess] (Keens-Soper 1973,497). He claims that a small number of [diplomats] with a small expense dofrequently as much service as standing armies would be able to do (Callie`res1983, 73), while force begets more conflict rather than appeases (Keens-Soper1973, 503).34 Although the origin of Richelieus preference is beyond the scopeof this chapter, his adherence to reason and prudence developed in the cru-cible of the tragic consequence of the Thirty Years War. The series of religiouswars expanded to Continent-wide power struggles, entangling European majorpowers. In its aftermath, the War devastated Central Europe and Germanylost almost one third of its population (Kissinger 1994, 59).35

There are two machineries of diplomatic negotiation that Richelieu spelledout in his argument for its utility. First, the most obvious fact about a ne-gotiation is that it is about the art of concession and counter-concession, ortrading of concessions (Kissinger 1994, 744). Callie`res chapter on negotiation,therefore, reflects this view of Richelieu: if diplomacy is to work, compromise isessential, and hence it is a political necessity that states must act by persuasionand by appeal to other states true value of moderation (Keens-Soper 1973,503). This principle implies that if a concession offer is divulged to the public,the negotiation may have to be abandoned to avoid a domestic repercussion(Nicolson 1954, 76). Furthermore, if negotiations remain private, negotiatorscould remain both rational and courteous and, thus, it is much easier to makeconcessions in private than in the presence of watchful eyes. This gives a riseto the rationale for secrecy in diplomatic negotiation, and it seems that thisrationale was well recognized by Louis XIV whose abiding principle was thatnegotiation must remain as confidential as possible (Nicolson 1954, 61). Nicol-son (1954, 76) also notes that M. Jules Cambon, perhaps the best professionaldiplomatist of this century, wrote, The day secrecy is abolished, negotiationof any kind will become impossible.

Second, observe that what is distinct about Richelieus calls for diplomaticnegotiation is its emphasis on the continuation of conducting negotiations withforeign countries. He notes that diplomacy should be ceaselessly pursuingachievement of agreement on all outstanding questions (Berridge 2001, 74).

34Richelieu also writes that The payoffs from continuous diplomacy are very uncertain,but they must not be ignored (Hill 1961, 100). As I shall demonstrate in Chapter 5,diplomatic negotiation does not carry much information compared to military coercion. Yet,as Richelieu claims, uncertainty surrounding diplomatic negotiation should not encouragebargainers to forego the agreement that diplomacy can produce, which often is Paretoimprovement of imposed settlement through coercion.

35Bueno de Mesquita (2006, 31) notes that the War killed about half of the Germanpopulation.

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That is, at the most fundamental level, the art of negotiation also involves fineadjustment of conflicting interests and frictions. An important implicationof Richelieus call for continuous negotiations is that it marks the advent ofpeacetime diplomacy. Diplomacy of predecessors by its nature was the ex postmanagement of problems in foreign relations. On the other hand, Richelieusdiplomatic strategy behind continuous negotiations is the ex ante measuresfor the prevention of those problems from emerging. Hence, success of suchcontinuous negotiations in peacetime diplomacy may not be readily visible.36

Yet, Richelieu once again resorts to the inefficiency of coercion in justifyinghis emphasis on continuous negotiations: Even if [negotiation] does no othergood on some occasions that gain time, which often is the sole outcome, itsemployment would be commendable and useful to states, since it frequentlytakes only an instant to divert a storm (Hill 1961, 99). For this reason, hecontinues, it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiateceaselessly, either openly or secretly, and in all places, even in those from whichno present fruits seem likely (Hill 1961, 94). Hence, state leaders sometimesbuy time and continue negotiation at the expense of costly delay in order todivert a dramatic confrontation. Such a maneuver was evident in HenryKissinger and Richard Nixons handling of a crisis that could have been asecond Cuban crisis (Kissinger 1979, 651).

Rationalism and Raison dEtat : The second distinctive feature of theFrench system is raison detat, or the national interest, which replaced themedieval tradition of universal moral values as a guiding principle of foreignpolicy. After the collapse of the medieval doctrine for governance, the emergingsovereign states needed an alternative justification or legitimacy in Europeanpolitics. Against this historical background, Richelieu promulgated that raisondetat, or national interest, would take precedence over any other ideologies orprejudices (Nicolson 1954, 51). Hence, he notes, If national interest demandedan alliance with an obnoxious, even with a heretic, State, then no feelings ofwhat one liked or what one disliked, should be permitted to blur that necessity. . . . In moments of danger one should choose ones allies, not for their integrityor charm, but for their physical or even geographical value (Nicolson 1954,51). In fact, in the menace of religious conflict, Richelieu allied with the

36This also implies that continuous negotiations and peacetime diplomacy, therefore, con-tains the elements of patience. In his words, Different nations have different characters,some quickly carry out what they have in mind, while others walk with fee of lead. . . . itis necessary to be content with little in the hope of getting more later. For this reason itis wise to negotiate painstakingly with them in order to give them time, and to press themonly when they are ready for it (Hill 1961, 97).

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Ottoman Empire.The policy of balance of power is a natural choice of a grand strategy for

Richelieu, given the principles of raison detat along with his desire of main-taining an equilibrium within Christendom (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995).This explains why France did not intervene in the Thirty Years War until thelast decade of the War when Spain invaded French provinces of Champagneand Burgundy and threatened Paris in 1636. Instead, Richelieu resorted todiplomacy to manage the crisis situation after the War erupted in order to seeka balance of power within Christendom. Richelieus emphasis on prudencegiven the raison deetat was most evident in forming an alliance not only withCatholic states but also Protestant states in order to counter-balance againstthe Habsburgs of Spain and Austria. In particular, he was actively involvedin the diplomacy behind the Danish and Swedish intervention into the Waragainst the Habsburgs. (see also Berridge 2001, 72).37 Richelieus pursuitof the balance of power is a natural corollary of his emphasis on continuousnegotiations rather than hasty sanctions. In this regard, he writes that Itis prudent to hold down the external threat and opponents force with yourallies, by putting your hand in your pocket and not on your sword (quotedby Kissinger 1994, 62-3). The balance of power first was a fact of politicalpractice; later it became a principle or system of Europe for three centurieswith several interruptions by warfare.38

The primary machinery of raison detat and the balance of power wasrationalism or his belief in the power of reason. The success of the balance ofpower requires the ability to calculate power relationships with mathematicalprecision and constant adjustment to the changing circumstances (Kissinger1994, 63). While theoretically possible, these theoretical requirements forsuccessful balance of power is difficult to attain realistically. Moreover, a morechallenging requirement for the secrets of successful balance of power strategyis the requirement of common knowledge among powers, where ones strategicassessment of the nature of the equilibrium must harmonize with that of otherpowers. Without common knowledge, the equilibrium may not be achieved.Yet, Richelieu regarded it possible to construct a logic that requires thatthe things that is to be supported and the force that is to support it shouldstand in geometrical proposition to each other (quoted by Kissinger 1994, 63).

37I should add that some argue that the poor economic condition and his problematicrelationship with its own military were also responsible for Richelieus reliance on diplomacy,as he could not rely on French military strength alone to attain the raison deetat that heperceived. See for example, Berridge (2001, 72).

38Major warfare in Europe in this time period include the War of the Grand Alliancein the late 17th century, the French Revolutionary Wars in the late 18th century and theNapoleonic Wars in the early 18th century.

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This conviction is based on his firm beliefs in the power of reason. Richelieubegins the chapter on the importance of reason by the declaration that humanbehavior is a rational process:

Common sense leads each one of us to understand that man, havingbeen endowed with reason, should do nothing except that whichis reasonable, since otherwise he would be acting contrary to hisnature, [. . . ] It further teaches us that the more a man is great andconspicuous, [. . . ] the less he ought to abuse the rational processwhich constitutes his being. (Hill 1961, 71)

Richelieu was acutely sensitive to the posssibilities of language as an in-strument of power (Elliott 1991, 30). His belief in the power of reason ledhim to establish the Academie Francaise, which was an explicit recognition ofthe power of language, of the superiority of eloquence and reason over nakedforce (Elliott 1991, 134). Callie`res also notes that the pursuit of state inter-ests habitually came to rely on force in the absence of intelligence or prudence(Keens-Soper 1973, 499; Keens-Soper 2001a, 113). Kissinger (1994, 63) notesthat Richelieus conviction in reason puts him in the intellectual company ofrationalists like Descartes and Spinoza, who thought that human action couldbe scientifically charted.

Professionalism and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The third dis-tinctive feature of the Fench system of diplomacy was professionalization. Bythe time the Westphalia Treaty was concluded in 1648, court diplomacy de-clined and professional diplomats gradually took over the business of diplo-macy, which led to the emergence of an autonomous profession of diplomacy,or diplomatic corps. By the 18th century, the extraterritoriality of diplomatshad been legally recognized. Like the military and judiciary, diplomats grad-ually acquired their own distinct characteristics and methods of work (Keens-Soper 2001a, 109). With the emergence of professional diplomats, by the timeCallie`res published The Art of Diplomacy in 1716, roughly between the endof the Thirty Years War and the French Revolution, diplomacy emerged as aprinciple and institution of order, something comparable to a national standingarmy (Keens-Soper 2001a, 122). As Callie`res insisted, diplomacy is a neces-sary, unavoidable, activity essential to the well-being of a state and deservingof recognition as a separate profession (Keens-Soper 1973, 499; Keens-Soper2001a, 113).

The professionalization of diplomatic services was facilitated by the es-tablishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) by Richelieu in 1626.Although the first minister of foreign affairs was appointed in 1589 when Henry

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III of France assigned Louis de Revol, one of his four cabinet members, the re-sponsibility of managing his relationships with foreign countries, foreign-policydecision-making and the management of diplomatic services were disorientedas the task of diplomacy had been allocated between different bureaucratic or-ganizations (Nicolson 1954, 52).39 The establishment of MOFA concentratedthe responsibility of diplomacy such as formulation of policy and the control ofdiplomatic agents. This was also Richelieus rational response to the problemof moral-hazard arising from the latitude and discretionary power granted todiplomatic missions. Since in the absence of the electric telegraphy diplomaticcorrespondence traveled no faster than a good rider and a fleet of horse, itwas not practical to deliver and receive diplomatic messages back and forthbetween two capitals every time an offer and a counter-offer was made in anegotiation.40 Before the communication revolution with the construction ofrailways, steamships, and telegraphy in the mid 19th century, therefore, diplo-matic missions typically were given a large, if not full, degree of discretionarypower representing its government, which is reflected in the title of extraor-dinary or plenipotentiary (Anderson 1993, 118; Hamilton and Langhorne1995, 132).41

The greater the latitude and discretion granted to diplomatic missions, thegrater was likely to be discrepancies between their sanction in foreign nego-tiation and their home governments will and instructions. Richelieu insistedthat diplomatic missions should never exceed their instructions, since doing sowould give a rise to uncertainty about whether an agreement signed would beratified and implemented. To enhance the effectiveness of diplomacy, Richelieuconcentrated diplomacy to a single ministry, so that each party to a diplomaticnegotiation would know if the other party really presented sovereign authorityof the sending country (Nicolson 1954, 52).

39The post (i.e., the secretary of state for foreign affairs) was succeeded later by Richelieuand Colbert (under Louis XIV) among others.

40According to Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, 131-2), in the nineteenth century, theaverage travel time between the United States to Paris was two months; a month betweenLondon and St. Petersburg; at least three weeks between London and Constantinople;the best record of travel time from Vienna to London was one week. Furthermore, on itsinaugural run in 1883 the Orient Express traveled between Paris and Constantinople in 81hours (3.5 days). The improvement of the network of railroad improved its travel time to67 12 hours in 1889.

41Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, 131) provide the following historical anecdote to il-lustrate the discretion granted to envoys in that age. An American mission dispatched toParis to negotiate the purchase of New Orleans and the adjacent territory was authorized tospend 10 million dollars. When France offered the whole Louisiana territory for 15 milliondollars, the American mission did not feel it necessary to request a further instruction fromWashington.

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The past glories of Louis XIVs reign and the successes of French diplo-macy during the 18th century gave the French foreign ministry great prestige(Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 74). By the beginning of the 18th century, themajor powers all had such officials, who came to be known as foreign ministersor secretaries of state for foreign affairs. As part of his Westernization of theRussian government, Peter the Great also established a MOFA on the Frenchmodel(Craig and George 1995, 11).

Towards the end of the 17th century, as Louis XIV of France replaced theHabsburg of Spain as the leading power, French power reached its culmina-tion along with its diplomatic system. The impact of the French system on themethod and practice of European diplomacy was so profound that French grad-ually replaced Latin as the language of diplomacy during these two centuries(Roosen 1970, 206). While French diplomats used French on their treatiesin the 17th century, it was at the negotiations at Utrecht in 1714 followingthe War of the Spanish Succession that the Imperial diplomats first employedFrench in the agreements which they concluded with France. Thereafter, theFrench language, along with the French system, was adopted by Europeanpowers as the standard diplomatic procedure (Zeller 1961, 206).

8 Spread and Institutionalization: 19th Cen-

tury

If the modern diplomatic institution was molded by Renaissance Italy andcompleted in the 17th and 18th centuries as the France system, it was con-solidated by the 19th century diplomacy. On the European continent, theConcert of Europe was the manifestation of the French system of peacetimediplomacy. Beyond Europe, the spread of the system of sovereign-state (estab-lished by the Westphalia Treaty) was the catalyst of the promulgation of theEuropean diplomatic system in non-European states. The diplomatic systemwas recognized to be the foundational mechanism for international relations bythe Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Congress of Vienna was a turning pointnot only because the diplomatic system was formalized, but also it also setout the Concert of Europe which induced a long peace of the 19th century.

Consolidation and The Concert of Europe. Towards the end of theNapoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century, European powers in the al-lied coalition against Napoleon were seeking a new system for internationalorder. The coalition began to extend their collective effort beyond the victoryof the Napoleonic wars and design the balance of power system because, in

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the aftermath of devastation of the wars in the 18th and 19th centuries, theybelieved that the collision in the war would not produce the peace that wouldlast (Kissinger 1994, 74-9). Consequently, European powers used a series ofgreat power congresses at Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), Laiback(1821) and Verona (1822) following the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to achieve(1) the containment of revolution, (2) the maintenance of stability of the Eu-ropean equilibrium of power, and (3) re-establishment of the ancient regime(Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 90-2). The resulting system of the balance ofpower lasted until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 with severalinterruptions with warfare such as the Crimean War (185-1856). Hence, theConcert of Europe emerged as the wartime allied coalition against Napoleonand it was extended to the peacetime diplomatic system.

Above all, the Concert of Europe was a clear manifestation of what Riche-lieu envisioned as continuous negotiations in the pursuit of stability of anequilibrium between the Europe powers (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 71;Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte 2001, 72) As one of the earliest successfulexamples, the Concert of Europe helped to consolidate the French system ofdiplomacy. Under this equilibrium, the nineteenth century witnessed the con-tinuation of the trend in the evolution of diplomatic institutiona consolida-tion of the network of diplomatic representation between European countries(Anderson 1993, 103).

Spread and New Challenges. The nineteenth century also witnessed theexpansion of the geographical scope of European diplomacy not only withinbut also beyond the European continent. The growth of European colonial in-fluence in Africa and Asia as well as the grow of international trade began tobring non-European countries into the European diplomatic system (Anderson1993, 106). Since the commercial origin of the expansion of European system,European relationship to the rest of the world (including the United States)was still largely an economic one based on the increasing volume of interna-tional trade. Consequently, the diplomatic representation in non-Europeancountries was born out of the demand for promotion and protection of trade.As a result, the establishment of diplomatic relations did not necessarily leadto an exchange of governmental representatives, as political relations were verymuch subordinate to commercial one Anderson (1993, 107-9). For example,France tried to save money by accrediting the consul-general in Japan also ascharges affaires in the mid nineteenth century, and Great Britain also hesi-tant to establish full diplomatic representation for the trading purpose and sothe British consuls in Greece, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria also functionedas diplomatic representation (Anderson 1993, 107-9; Hamilton and Langhorne

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1995, 110). This practice was quite common at that time, and there was asharp growth of European consular representation in non-European, especiallyAsian, countries.

The expansion of the European colonial influence and commercial tradealso led to the expansion of the European system of territory-based sovereignty.This movement from a (semi-)feudal society to a sovereign state was typicallyaccompanied by the accreditation and recognition of the diplomatic represen-tatives of European countries. This was because the creation of diplomaticrelations was a conventional procedure to commence the formal recognitionand integration in the international society (Strang 1991, 152). 42 The moststriking aspect of the expansion of the European diploamtic system is that inthe process of transition, no countries formally repudiated the system; theyall accepted its rules and practice, although the process may not have beensmooth with some tensions in some instances.43

However, some difficulty arose in the establishment of diplomatic relationswith non-European countries. One of such difficulties faced by political leadersis that those newly incorporated countries often did not share the customs orculture of European countries.44 Since European countries generally enjoyedthe homogeneity of their historical and cultural background, the Europeandiplomatic system functioned well with the implicit reliance on such unwrit-ten shared norms. Yet, newly integrated non-European countries do not sharearistocratic ethos and culture, on which European diplomatic system, the cer-emonial procedures and precedence protocols in particular, was based. Rulesof games are generally implicit but common knowledge in a society withhomogenous cultural, historical, and political background; in a heterogenoussociety, however, rules are not common knowledge unless they are explicitlycodified.

42For a more detailed analysis of the spread of diplomacy to the non-Western world, seeBull and Watson (1984, esp. 1-9), Nicolson (1954, Ch.4), Sofer (1988), Strang (1991), andWatson (1982, Ch.11).

43The noticeable exceptions to this rule was the rejection of the European system ofdiplomacy by the two superpowers in the post-WWII era: the United States and the SovietUnion. Their animosity towards diplomacy eventually led to the equilibrium of fear asthe new world order induced by overwhelming military capabilities and to the decline ofdiplomacy in the twentieth century.

44Other difficulties concerned the legitimacy of the local governments and the politicalinstability of the region. In Asia, for example, the local political powers were reluctant toopen their countries to foreign influences. Moreover, political structures and social valuesin China was not easily be reconciled with the sovereignty principle which emphasizes theconcept of the equality of sovereign powers along with clearly defined territorial boundaries(Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 110).

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Institutionalization and standardization. To cope with the problem ofnon-European countries not being accustomed to the implicit rules and norms,diplomatic leaders moved on to formally codifying the practices and proceduresof diplomacy. These gave rise to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and, overa century later, Vienna Conventions in 1961 and 1963 that codified the rulesof the diplomatic game in the face of a massive entry of

diplomacy studies

Documents

beginning of diplomacy

developmentof diplomacy

renaissance diplomacy

byzantine diplomacy

stasis of diplomacy

decline of diplomacy

natural history chapter

whilenatural history