disarmament and international security committee · foreign military intervention a brief history...

1

Disarmament and International Security

Committee London International Model United Nations

21st Session | 2020

2

DISEC

London International Model United Nations 2020

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION LETTER 4

Introduction to the Committee: 7

TOPIC A: Foreign Military and Private Military

Intervention in Internal Conflicts 9

Introduction 10

Definitions 12

Timeline of Events 12

Discussion of the problem 14

Bloc Positions 26

Questions a Resolution should answer: 28

Further reading 28

Bibliography 30

TOPIC B: Taking Action to Mitigate Hybrid Threats from

Non-State Actors against Member-States 34

Introduction 35

Definitions 36

Timeline of Events 38

Discussion: Mitigating Hybrid Threats 41

Bloc Positions 46

3

DISEC


Questions a Resolution should answer: 50

Further Reading 51

Bibliography 52

4

DISEC


Dear Delegates,

This past year we have witnessed a variety of events unravelling, though

the themes remain the same: intervention, armed groups, biological

threats, cyber and electronic warfare, refugees and displaced people, and

the rise of non-state actors. These are all crucial international security

threats. At the same time, however, more research bodies, practitioners,

and policy-makers have begun showing interest in addressing these

threats collectively, by pooling their resources and sharing existing

knowledge. This is also greatly prioritised at the United Nations.

For this very reason, we thought of taking the opportunity to introduce

topics that are interdisciplinary in nature, whereby delegates across

various disciplines will have the opportunity to contribute in their own

respective field. Above all, however, we hope this will be a rather

interesting simulation, in the spirit of LIMUN 2020. As such, we look

forward to warmly welcoming you to DISEC in February!

Petros, Matheus, Lise - DISEC Chairs, LIMUN 2020

INTRODUCTION LETTER

5

DISEC


Director - Petros Petrikkos

I am a PhD candidate at the University of Nicosia in Cyprus, specialising in

International Security, in a blend of International Relations and

Cybersecurity. I hold a MSc in Conflict Studies from the London School of

Economics and Political Science and a BA (Hons) in International Relations

from Queen Mary, University of London. As an International Security

geek, I read a lot about hybrid warfare, conventional and irregular

threats, as well as cyber-threat intelligence. In my free time, I write,

compose and listen to music, travel, and try to explain to people what my

PhD is about #PhDLife. DISEC is a very fun committee to be in, as it is

one of the first committees I had the chance to participate as a delegate

about 10 years ago as a high school student (yes, I am getting old; yes, I

still do MUN). We all look forward to having you at LIMUN!

Assistant Director - Lise Theunissen

I am a law student at the KU Leuven. Next to my master thesis on

‘Harmonisation of private international law in the African Union’, my focus

is on European and International Public law. Originally from the KULMUN

Association in Belgium, I gained most experience in the UK circuit notably

chairing OxIMUN and CUIMUN. In 2018 I participated as a delegate to

LIMUN. In my free time, I enjoy sailing in rather extreme weather

conditions, travelling whilst trying out the local language and food and

improving my eloquence and coaching skills through inspirational

speeches. As one would expect from a DISEC chair, I look forward to

challenging every delegate equally, ensuring a high quality of debate and

empowering the committee.

6

DISEC


Assistant Director - Matheus Santos

I am currently an MSc in Comparative Politics student at the London

School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), where I also completed a

BSc in International Relations. Having done MUN since 2011, I have

participated in it through a variety of roles: delegate, chair, secretary-

general, and MUN Director at the LSE. Beyond academics and MUN, I love

reading books and generally trying to learn as much as possible. I also

enjoy weightlifting and powerlifting, as well as traveling whenever

possible. I look forward to meeting all of you in LIMUN 2020!

7

DISEC


Introduction

to the

Committee:

The Disarmament and International

Security Committee (DISEC), also

known as the General Assembly’s First

Committee, is primarily concerned with issues of peace and international

security.

Oftentimes this includes the themes of disarmament, weapons of mass

destruction, addressing issues of nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, and

to ensure cooperation among its member-states in order to alleviate

potential threats and to mitigate existing threats within the international

arena1.

DISEC is one of the most powerful and influential GA committees. Unlike

the Security Council, whose membership is restricted to a few, it provides

a hub for discussion of critical security issues. This is accessible to all UN

member-states by default. With the failure of the League of Nations, it

became rather clear that international institutions required a reliable

discussion forum on disarmament and security issues of the day. As such,

1 See the General Assembly of the United Nations, “Disarmament and

International Security Committee”, available at

https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/index.shtml


8

DISEC


DISEC also regularly cooperates with other UN bodies to tackle

international security and disarmament issues. For instance, DISEC is

required to work with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and

the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament2.

3

2 More information on the UN Disarmament Commission can be found

here; more information on the Conference on Disarmament can be found

here.

3 Retrieved from: www.futureforeignpolicy.com/the-future-of-uk-military-intervention/

https://www.un.org/disarmament/institutions/disarmament-commission/

https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument

https://www.futureforeignpolicy.com/the-future-of-uk-military-intervention/

9

DISEC


TOPIC A: Foreign Military

and Private Military

Intervention in Internal

Conflicts

10

DISEC


Introduction

The issue of foreign intervention in armed conflicts has been one of the

most debated and sensitive security issues in recent history. From the

Rwandan Genocide in 1994 to the Syrian Civil War, it poses unique

challenges and opportunities for the international community to address

in order to better handle international responses to civil wars.

At the heart of this topic is the tension between two principles: promoting

security and human rights across the world and respecting state

sovereignty. If states are meant to respect each other’s autonomy

regarding internal issues, what place is there for foreign militaries in

helping to protect the rights and security of populations that may be at

risk because of the actions of their own governments?

Moreover, interventions with a non-humanitarian basis frequently occur.

There is a lacking international framework for such interventions due to

the emphasis on humanitarian responsibilities in the debate on foreign

military interventions. However, this makes international coordination

regarding when such interventions are justified and what principles should

be upheld upon their occurrence all the more important.

In addition to the issue of foreign intervention, there is the issue of

private military intervention. More than 10% of the military deployed by

the United States in the Iraq War were mercenaries, in other words

employees of private military and security companies (hereinafter:

PMSCs). During the Iraq War, mercenaries provided services extremely

similar to services a national soldier would provide4 (Foreign Policy

4 See Foreign Policy Research Institute (2006) “Private Military Companies and the

Future of War” at www.fpri.org/article/2006/04/private-military-companies-and-the-

future-of-war/

https://www.fpri.org/article/2006/04/private-military-companies-and-the-future-of-war/


11

DISEC


Research Institute, 2006). This is an example of the grey zone that often

can be found between military intervention by sovereign states and

military intervention by private companies.

DISEC is in a prime position to address these issues. Although lacking in

enforcement powers, its wider membership can bring in the voices of

many more states beyond those in the Security Council. Coupled with its

security agenda, the committee’s discussions and resolutions will thus

facilitate addressing this issue in a representative yet pragmatic manner.

12

DISEC


Definitions

● Mercenary: An employee of a private military and security

company.

● Private Military and Security Company (PMSC): A private

company which supplies combat and security services as a

commercial activity.

● Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A global commitment to protect

populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and

crimes against humanity through a series of military and non-

military measures.

Timeline of Events

Foreign Military Intervention

Late 1986 - present - Somali Civil War. This long-lasting conflict

involved numerous international interventions with and without UN

mandates. It is a prime example of the difficult nature of intervening in

internal conflicts, especially those involving failed states.

April 1994 to July 1994- Rwandan Genocide. The Rwandan Genocide,

which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, was crucial in placing the

debate of the role of the international community in internal conflicts at

the center of the global security agenda.

September 2005 - 2005 World Summit. All members states present in

the summit declare their support for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

doctrine.

March 2011 - NATO forces commence their military intervention in

Libya. This intervention was one of the early tests of the R2P doctrine. Its

13

DISEC


crucial role in the death of Gaddafi raised concerns of the use of R2P for

regime change and imperialism.

July 2011 - Beginning of the Syrian Civil War. Intervention in this

conflict was blocked several times in the United Nations Security Council.

However, numerous states have conducted military operations in the war,

including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Israel, and

others.

2017 - Rohingya Crisis. Actions against the Rohingya people that was

largely behind their mass migration created renewed debate on the role of

the international community in intervening due to the internal

circumstances of states.

Private Military Intervention

20 October 2001 - Entry into force of United Nations Mercenary

Convention UNGA Resolution 44/34 of 4 December 1989 adopted the

International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and

Training of Mercenaries.

7 April 2005 - Establishment of United Nations Working Group on

the Use of Mercenaries A special mechanism set up by the United

Nations Human Rights Council with the Human Rights Resolution 2005/2

on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and

Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination. The

mandate consists in the following: monitoring and studying the activities

of PMSCs and their impact on human rights5..

5 See the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2019) on the working group on mercenaries and private military companies at

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/WGMercenariesIn

dex.aspx

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/WGMercenariesIndex.aspx


14

DISEC


12 July 2011 - The United Nations pursues control on PMSCs

The UN Working Group on Mercenaries urged the international

community to regulate PMSCs. A motion for a resolution was submitted to

the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. However,

nations which use PMSCs extensively were reluctant to adopt a legally

binding resolution. PMSCs had been guilty of armed and sexual violence

with impunity and there was a lack of accountability mechanisms between

PMSCs and governments6.

Discussion of the problem

Foreign Military Intervention

A Brief History of the Topic

Humanitarian Interventions

As discussed above, the United Nations has traditionally held conflicting

principles. One is its commitment to international security, its core

mission. The other is its protection of the sovereignty of member states.

In recent decades, these two principles have been in growing tension.

This can best be attributed to a series of events that could arguably have

been prevented through international interventions, perhaps the most

notable being the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Moreover, the development

of new thinking about the relationship between these two principles on

the part of UN leadership and heads of states was pivotal in re-thinking

the tension between these two principles.

6 See the Global Policy Forum (2011) on PMSCs and the UN at

https://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/50225-pmscs-a-the-un.html


15

DISEC


This was expressed in the 2005 global commitment to the Responsibility

to Protect. It is traditionally split into three pillars, as described by the

United Nations Association of the United Kingdom:

Pillar I emphasises a state’s obligations to protect all populations within

its own borders. Pillar II outlines the international community’s role in

helping states to fulfil this obligation. Pillar III identifies the international

community’s responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian,

peaceful or coercive means to protect civilian populations where a state

manifestly fails to uphold its obligations. (UNA-UK, n.d.)

Under this commitment, states acknowledged their responsibility in

protecting populations against governments that carry out genocide, war

crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. States’

sovereignty is thought to come with responsibilities to not commit such

crimes against their own people. Therefore, states’ execution of these

crimes effectively ends the relevant state’s sovereignty and justifies

international interventions of both a military and non-military nature by

foreign governments to protect those that fall victim to the state’s

actions.

Since 2005, the Responsibility to Protect was put to the test in numerous

cases. In 2011, NATO states supported rebels through airstrikes,

justifying their operations by arguing that Gaddafi was about to commit

mass murder of unarmed civilians. However, NATO’s key role in the

overthrow of Gaddafi raised questions of the practical reality of R2P.

Specifically, worries that R2P was a hollow justification for interventions

seeking self-interested regime change were put at the centre of the

discussion of interventions.

Such worries were made clear in attempts to seek United Nations Security

Council support in interventions in Syria. Throughout the civil war, the

16

DISEC


Security Council blocked numerous military and non-military measures

aimed at addressing the use of chemical weapons7. However, this did not

stop Russia from playing a pivotal military role in the conflict and NATO

from conducting airstrikes against ISIS and providing supplies and ground

support for allies. There is hence still a gap between the existence of a

formal international framework and the reality of states’ actions regarding

internal conflicts. The support or lack thereof of the former does not

always determine the outcomes of the latter.

Non-Humanitarian Interventions

Non-humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts is not a recent

development. The UN has previously created mandates for international

intervention in internal conflicts, such as in Somalia in the 1990s. States

have also persistently had a military presence in civil wars not under a UN

mandate, a clear challenge to the United Nation’s effectiveness in

determining the nature of international security.

However, in the past few decades, the number of civil wars in the world

has risen sharply8. They have become a major feature of the international

security landscape. Beyond this rising prevalence, two points emphasise

the importance of civil wars to states’ foreign policy agendas. Firstly,

internal conflicts often have spill-over effects for neighbouring countries.

These include illegal arms trades, rising populations of refugees, and the

threat of the expansion of the internal conflict. Neighbouring states

therefore have a significant interest in the outcomes of internal conflicts.

Secondly, civil wars pose unique opportunities for states seeking

favourable foreign policy outcomes. From the backing of sympathetic

groups in the conflict to the opportunity of weakening a historically hostile

7 BBC (2018) “Syria: Does Russia Always Use a Veto at the UN Security Council?” Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-43781954

8 See Sebastian Von Einsiedel (2017) “Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of

Armed Conflict”, p. 2.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-43781954

17

DISEC


organisation, states often have a vested interest in taking active military

roles in internal conflicts.

The prominence of failed states has also been a particularly distinctive

feature of the recent history of internal conflicts. A failed state is one

whose chief political body is incapable of maintaining order in its

territories and incapable of performing other basic functions of a state9.

They tend to be characterised by persistent internal conflicts over long

periods of time. These conflicts are often of an intractable nature, posing

a serious challenge to the international community in promoting security.

Numerous international treaties and frameworks guide states’ conduct in

war, ranging from the Geneva Conventions to the United Nations Charter

itself. The United Nations Security Council is also capable of authorising

interventions that would promote international security. However, non-

humanitarian interventions often operate outside of existing international

legal frameworks due to their frequent clash with the protection of states’

sovereignties and exclusion from the Responsibility to Protect. This poses

a serious challenge to the United Nations. States must consider if any

additional mechanisms should be put in place to further specify when

non-humanitarian interventions should be permitted and whether any

additional principles or frameworks should be created in conditioning

states’ policies in such interventions.

Themes of the Topic

Delegates discussing this topic should make several thematic

considerations.

Firstly, there is the question of when both humanitarian and non-

humanitarian interventions are justified, if at all. States generally agree

9 For a detailed definition, see Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d.) “Failed State” available at

https://www.britannica.com/topic/failed-state

https://www.britannica.com/topic/failed-state

18

DISEC


on the fundamental principles of the Responsibility to Protect, but its

practical reality raises numerous issues. At the same time, when should

interventions with non-humanitarian purposes be permitted?

There are several key points to be made here:

● If states should protect populations against genocide, crimes

against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing under R2P,

when exactly should intervention take place? Some argue that

interventions are justified when these crimes, or even additional

ones, have begun to take place, while others believe that pre-

emptive interventions are a more adequate response. The latter

view poses a problem: will pre-emptive interventions not encourage

unnecessary military action? The case of Libya is worth considering.

Intervention was claimed to prevent mass murder from taking

place, yet it is not clear the extent to which this was the case, nor if

Gaddafi would target unarmed civilians at all. A formal framework

should specify exactly when an intervention should take place.

● When are non-humanitarian interventions justified? Beyond seeking

United Nations Security Council authorization, currently the chief

legitimising force of such interventions, there are numerous

possibilities that delegates can consider: whether an intervention is

aiding an established government against rebel organisations, the

possibility of an intervention bringing an end to the relevant internal

conflict, whether an intervention would be coherent with the UN’s

aim to promote international security, among other considerations.

It is also worth considering that civil wars that are intervention-free

may potentially be resolved more quickly than those with

substantive foreign military intervention10.

● How should humanitarian and non-humanitarian principles for

intervention avoid being a hollow cover for power expansion in the

10 See Edward N. Luttwak (1999) “Give War a Chance”, Foreign Affairs, 78(4), pp.36-44.

19

DISEC


international system? There is no doubt that states often pursue

favourable outcomes to internal conflicts, something that the

support of international law would facilitate. What mechanisms can

be put in place to address this issue? Some argue, for instance, that

the UNSC should have UNGA approval of any given intervention,

with some even hoping to make the UNGA the primary decision-

maker regarding international interventions.

● At the same time, how can the international community avoid the

possibility of power struggles and conflicting interests among great

powers preventing an intervention that should take place? In Syria,

for example, UN-backed action was largely blocked due to the

deadlock in the United Nations Security Council. At the moment, P5

disagreement in the United Nations Security Council is enough to

prevent legal intervention in cases where genocide, ethnic

cleansing, crimes against humanity, or war crimes may be taking

place.

Secondly, upon the occurrence of foreign military intervention, the

following should be considered:

● How can the humanitarian objectives of an intervention be best

promoted? Given the inherent complexity of intervention, involving

a myriad of variables, how can the international community best

ensure that interventions are effective in their humanitarian

purposes?

● There is also the issue of what principles should guide interventions

that are non-humanitarian in nature or not under a UN mandate.

This can involve responsibilities in the rebuilding or long-term

recovery of a region after an internal conflict, humanitarian

guidelines, rules regarding the arming of non-state actors, and

others.

20

DISEC


Private Military Intervention

Situation of the context

Traditionally military intervention is associated with sovereign states.

What is more, security is considered a fundamental element of

government. However, since the 1990s PMSCs have become increasingly

involved in providing military and security services11. This notably

includes logistics services, training, operational support and staffing. The

global private military and security industry is estimated to be of $100

billion in the global market. PMSCs are rather diverse when it comes to

nationality, experience and know-how.

As an illustration, Sierra Leone hired Executive Outcomes to train and

assist its troops to counter the Revolutionary United Front uprising.

Following the Dayton Peace Accords, the Bosnians hired PMSCs to advise

and train their soldiers. In the 1990s every international civilian police

officer sent abroad by the United States was an employee of DynCorp.

When confronted with the possible extinction of a kind of rhino in the

Democratic Republic of Congo, WWF asked PMSCs to make an offer to

train and protect the park rangers. Even more importantly, during the

Iraq War the 140.000 United States troops were assisted by an estimated

number of 41.000 mercenaries. This became a point of discussion when

employees of the PMSC Blackwater were killed and when mercenaries

were involved in the maltreatment of detainees in the Abu Ghraib

prison12.

Principal instrument: United Nations Mercenary Convention

11 See Ulrich Petersohn (2017) "Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Military Effectiveness, and Conflict Severity in Weak States, 1990–2007." Journal of

Conflict Resolution 61(5), pp. 1046-1072.

12 See Foreign Policy Institute (2006)

21

DISEC


The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and

Training of Mercenaries was adopted on 4 December 1989 by the United

Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/34 and entered into force on 20

October 200113.

It should be noted that nations with an important and strong military,

such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Japan,

France and India, have not ratified the Convention until present14.

United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries

The Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating

Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-

Determination was set up in July 2005 by Resolution 2005/2 of the

Commission on Human Rights. It is the successor to the mandate of the

Special Rapporteur on the Use of Mercenaries, which had existed since

1987. The Working Group is formed of five independent experts with a

balanced geographical representation.

Since 2005, the Human Rights Council has extended the mandate of the

Working Group several times, most recently in 2016 for a period of three

years by means of Resolution 33/4. Through this Resolution, the Human

Rights Council15:

● invited the Working Group to continue the work already done by

previous mandates on strengthening the international legal

framework for preventing and penalising the recruitment, use,

financing and training of mercenaries;

13 The International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing

and Training of Mercenaries can be consulted here:

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Mercenaries.aspx.

14 Consult Article 1 of the convention for the full definition on mercenaries (ibid).

15 See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2019)

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Mercenaries.aspx

22

DISEC


● invited the Working Group to continue to monitor mercenaries and

mercenary related activities in all their forms and manifestations, as

well as PMSCs in different parts of the world;

● invited the Working Group to continue to study and identify sources

and causes, emerging issues, events and trends concerning

mercenaries and mercenary related activities and their impact on

human rights, in particular the right of self-determination of the

population.

In carrying out its mandate, the Working Group shall16:

● forward communications to governments and other actors on

specific allegations of human rights violations involving mercenaries

and mercenary-related actors or PMSCs;

● conduct country visits to examine the impact of mercenaries,

mercenary-related actors or PMSCs on the enjoyment of human

rights in the country concerned and report to the Human Rights

Council on the findings of the visit, including concrete and

constructive recommendations to the government and other actors

to address areas for improvement;

● submit an annual report to the Human Rights Council and the

General Assembly on activities under the mandate and on specific

thematic issues related to mercenaries, mercenary activities, and

PMSCs.

Advantages

There are three primary advantages for states to rely on the assistance of

PMSCs.

First of all, PMSCs guarantee flexibility. They have the capacity to rapidly

mobilise military forces as there are no political decision-making factors

16 Ibid.

23

DISEC


which might cause delay. What is more, they can be as rapidly dissolved

as they were mobilised once their service is no longer necessary. In

addition to that, PMSCs have few limitations with regards to the

nationality of their employees. For instance, Global Risk Strategies hired

employees from Fiji which served in East Timor and in the Middle East17.

Furthermore, PMSCs are often highly specialised and provide services of a

diverse nature. As their recruiting databases are for the vast majority

composed of retired military and police officers, they can easily recruit

employees with a specific needed experience. National armies, on the

contrary, have more difficulties recruiting personnel with highly

specialised experience18.

Last but not least, PMSCs are financially motivated. Whilst national armies

serve for their country, PMSCs work for profits. When a national army can

no longer guarantee reinforcement, it is a viable solution to replace

national troops by PMSCs troops and, hereby, guarantee further

engagement19 (Piatek, 2017).

Issues

There are two main issues related to private military intervention.

The first issue is the absence of legal clarity regarding private military

interventions. The traditional subjects of the laws of war are militaries of

sovereign states. As a result, PMSCs and its employees have a rather

ambiguous legal status. When they do not act under government

instructions, mercenaries have neither the capacity of combatants nor of

non-combatants. Needless to say, this entails potential important risks for

mercenaries. For instance, they will not fall under the prisoner of war

status in case of capture. What is more, mercenaries do not fall under

17 See Foreign Policy Research Institute (2006)

18 See Allison Stranger Mark Eric Williams (2006) “Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security”, Yale Journal of International Affairs, 2(1), pp. 4-19.

19 Jaroslaw Piatek (2017) "Privatisation of Security: Private Military Contractors Serving

Governments." Polish Political Science Yearbook 46(2), pp. 118-131

24

DISEC


military justice systems. When they violate laws, especially in locations

where institutions and enforcement mechanisms are weak, there is much

ambiguity on their accountability20 (Cameron, 2013). As an example,

employees of DynCorp involved in sex trafficking and prostitution whilst

being deployed in the Balkan region were merely fired without any further

consequences21.

The other principal issue regarding private military intervention is of a

political nature. As stated above, security is considered a fundamental

element of government. However, when nations hire PMSCs in addition to

their national military, the political process is not as transparent, and the

executive branch of government is advantaged over the legislative

branch. What is more, the ability of PMSCs or even foreign governments

to influence the political process increases. Furthermore, PMSCs have a

negative effect on national militaries as they recruit national soldiers

away. Last but not least, PMSCs increasingly start taking over tasks which

are traditionally of a public nature. As a result, the connection between

professional militaries and public service is weakened22.

Future developments

Regarding the future evolution of private military intervention, there is a

worst-case and best-case scenario. In the worst case, PMSCs could

become the unleashed dogs of war in a quest to weaken democratic

control of military and security as a public service. In the best case,

PMSCs could become the frontrunners of a societal group of global private

military professionals in a quest to promote order and economic growth in

20 Vincent Cameron (2013) Privatising War: Private Military and Security Companies

under Public International Law. Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

21 See Foreign Policy Research Institute (2006). 22 Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (2007) Private Military and Security Companies:

Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag Für

Sozialwissenschaften.

25

DISEC


less stable regions of the world. Needless to say, the future evolution of

private military intervention is situated in the grey area of potential

scenarios between the worst- and best-case scenario23.

As PMSCs respond to market demand on a global level, individual states

are not able to counter the potential risks which pose private military

intervention. It is crucial to cooperate on a global level with all actors

involved, including states, PMSCs and NGOs, in order to create legal,

professional and ethical standards on the use of PMSCs24.

In the private sector many allege to embrace such standards and suggest

they would strengthen the legitimacy of PMSCs, lower risks and solve

operational inefficiencies caused by a market with many different

standards. However, the primary consumer the United States is currently

lacking in the discussion, as its government believes that standards would

undermine the flexibility of the sector25.

23 See Kupert (2013). 24 Jose L. Gómez del Prado (2012) “The Role of Private Military and Security Companies

in Modern Warfare - Impacts on Human Rights” The Brown Journal of World Affairs.

25 See Foreign Policy Research Institute (2006).

26

DISEC


Bloc Positions

Blocs will have to effectively navigate both parts of this topic: foreign

military and private military intervention. Agreement between states on

one sub-topic does not necessarily entail agreement on the other. The

bloc positions below mainly relate to foreign military intervention. A note

is included regarding potential positions on private military intervention.

NATO states

Generally, NATO states have been far more supportive of interventionist

policies than other blocs, backing interventions in a wider range of cases,

especially under the R2P doctrine. For instance, NATO conducted military

operations in Libya in 2011, and NATO P5 states have usually supported

interventionist resolutions regarding Syria in the United Nations Security

Council.

However, although more supportive of R2P and of interventions more

generally, they have also been reluctant in many cases about committing

significantly to interventions. Largely due to experiences in Iraq and

Afghanistan, NATO has not committed to full-blown military interventions

involving the large-scale use of ground troops. Interventions so far have

been of a more limited nature, usually involving special forces and

airpower.

Russia and China

Russia and China have been far more wary of attempts to conduct UN-

backed interventions. They are particularly worried about the excessive

use of R2P to support self-interested interventions. Their use of veto

power was instrumental in blocking United Nations Security Council

measures in Syria, something likely to have been at least partly

motivated by the events in Libya in 2011.

27

DISEC


However, that is not to say that Russia is anti-interventionist. Russia had

a significant military presence in Syria and played a major role in

fortifying Assad’s position in the conflict, despite the lack of United

Nations Security Council support in its actions. China has had a relatively

less interventionist agenda. However, with its rising military and economic

power, it may have an interest in guarding its ability to have a presence

in internal conflicts in the future.

Medium and Small “Global South” States

Such states have a distinct non-interventionist view of the topic, mainly

fuelled by anti-imperialist concerns. Moreover, mostly unlike Russia and

China, they also often do not have a practically interventionist foreign

policy in other countries nor the means to execute one.

Yet, they still have humanitarian concerns. States such as Brazil, for

instance, have expressed the importance of R2P as long as it considers its

abuse and misguided use. For this bloc, the humanitarian concerns that

gave rise to R2P must be considered with great care alongside the reality

of power politics.

Private military intervention

As stated above, several nations with an important and strong military,

such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Japan,

France and India, have not ratified the United Nations Mercenary

Convention.

For delegates, it is crucial to research whether their country has signed

the Convention and whether it relies on PMSCs for military interventions.

28

DISEC


Questions a Resolution should answer:

❖ When are humanitarian and non-humanitarian foreign military

interventions in internal conflicts justified? How would any potential

guidelines relate to R2P? How would guidelines relate to the current

mandate of the United Nations Security Council?

❖ Upon the occurrence of foreign military intervention, what political,

military, and humanitarian principles should intervening states

follow?

❖ How can DISEC further promote the work of the UN Working Group

on Mercenaries?

❖ How can political transparency and legal clarity be better

guaranteed when states rely on PMSCs?

❖ How can cooperation with all actors involved in private military

intervention, including states, PMSCs and NGOs, in order to create

legal, professional and ethical standards on the use of PMSCs be

ensured?

Further reading

● Activities, reports and news regarding the United Nations Working

Group on the Use of Mercenaries: www.business-

humanrights.org/en/conflict-peace/special-initiatives/un-working-

group-on-the-use-of-mercenaries;

● Amnesty International’s discussion of principles that should be

upheld by states intervening in Syria:

https://www.amnestyusa.org/6-key-points-for-military-

intervention-in-syria/

https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/conflict-peace/special-initiatives/un-working-group-on-the-use-of-mercenaries



https://www.amnestyusa.org/6-key-points-for-military-intervention-in-syria/

https://www.amnestyusa.org/6-key-points-for-military-intervention-in-syria/

29

DISEC


● A discussion of the application to the Syrian Civil War of potential

principles states should uphold while intervening under R2P:

https://www.sipri.org/node/409

● Pingeot, Lou. “Dangerous partnership: Private Military & Security

Companies and the UN” Global Policy Forum (2012). [online]

www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_Dangerous_Partnership_Full

_report.pdf;

● UNA-UK’s overview of the Responsibility to Protect:

https://www.una.org.uk/r2p-detail

https://www.sipri.org/node/409

https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_Dangerous_Partnership_Full_report.pdf



30

DISEC


Bibliography

Legislation

● United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 44/34 adopting the

International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing

and Training of Mercenaries, New York, 4 December 1989;

● United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights

Resolution 2005/2: The Use of Mercenaries As a Means of Violating

Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to

Self-determination, 7 April 2005;

Books and journals

● Ayoob, M. “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty.” The

International Journal of Human Rights, 2002;

● Bakker, C. and Sossai, M. Multilevel Regulation of Military and

Security Contractors: The Interplay between International,

European and Domestic Norms. Oxford Portland, Or: Hart, 2012.

Studies in International Law v. 38. Web.;

● Cameron, V. (2013) Privatising War: Private Military and Security

Companies under Public International Law. Cambridge and New

York, NY: Cambridge University Press;

● Cotton, Sarah K. Hired Guns: Views about Armed Contractors in

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. Web.;

● General Assembly of the United Nations (no date) “Disarmament

and International Security (First Committee)” [online]

https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/index.shtml;

● Gómez del Prado, J. L. (2012) “The Role of Private Military and

Security Companies in Modern Warfare - Impacts on Human


31

DISEC


Rights”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs [online]:

www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/51834-the-role-of-private-military-

and-security-companies-in-modern-warfare-impacts-on-human-

rights.html;

● Jäger, T. and Kümmel, G. (2007) Private Military and Security

Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects. Wiesbaden:

VS Verlag Für Sozialwissenschaften;

● Kuperman, A. (2013) “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? -

Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign.” International Security;

● Luttwak, E. N. (1999) “Give War a Chance.” Foreign Affairs, 78(4):

36-44.

● Major Goddard, S. “The Private Military Company: A Legitimate

International Entity Within Modern Conflict” University of New South

Wales (1987). [online]

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/pmc-

legitimate-entity.pdf;

● Morgan, R. "Professional Military Firms under International Law."

Chicago Journal of International Law 9.1 (2008): 213-45;

● Pape, R. “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian

Intervention.” International Security, 2012;

● Paris, Roland. “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural

Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention.” International

Peacekeeping, 2014;

● Petersohn, U. (2017) "Private Military and Security Companies

(PMSCs), Military Effectiveness, and Conflict Severity in Weak

States, 1990–2007." Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(5): 1046-

1072;

● Piatek, Jaroslaw. "Privatisation of Security: Private Military

Contractors Serving Governments." Polish Political Science Yearbook

46.2 (2017): 118-131;

https://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/51834-the-role-of-private-military-and-security-companies-in-modern-warfare-impacts-on-human-rights.html



https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/pmc-legitimate-entity.pdf

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/pmc-legitimate-entity.pdf

32

DISEC


● Pingeot, Lou. “Contracting Insecurity: Private military and security

companies and the future of the United Nations” Global Policy

Forum (2014). [online]

www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/PMSC_2014_Contrac

ting_Insecurity_web.pdf;

● Pingeot, Lou. “Dangerous partnership: Private Military & Security

Companies and the UN” Global Policy Forum (2012). [online]

www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_Dangerous_Partnership_Full

_report.pdf;

● Stranger, A. and Williams, M. E (2011) “Private Military

Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security” Yale

Journal of International Affairs, 2(1): 4-19;

● Tesón, Fernando. “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention.”

Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas,

2003.

● Von Einsiedel, S. (2017) “Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature

of Armed Conflict”. Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for

Policy Research.

Online sources

● Business & Human Rights Resource Center. UN Working Group on

the use of mercenaries. [online], www.business-

humanrights.org/en/conflict-peace/special-initiatives/un-working-

group-on-the-use-of-mercenaries;

● Encyclopaedia Britannica. Failed State [online].

https://www.britannica.com/topic/failed-state;

● Foreign Policy Research Institute (2006) “Private Military Companies

and the Future of War” [online],

www.fpri.org/article/2006/04/private-military-companies-and-the-

future-of-war/;

https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/PMSC_2014_Contracting_Insecurity_web.pdf

https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/PMSC_2014_Contracting_Insecurity_web.pdf








33

DISEC


● Global Policy Forum (2011) “PMSCs & the UN” [online],

www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/50225-pmscs-a-the-un.html;

● BBC (2018) “Syria: Does Russia Always Use a Veto at the UN

Security Council?” [online] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-

43781954.

● The Responsibility to Protect in Detail [online],

https://www.una.org.uk/r2p-detail;

● United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner

(2015). Preliminary findings by the United Nations Working Group

on the use of mercenaries on its official visit to Tunisia – 1 to 8 July,

2015 [online],

www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=

16219;

● United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner

(2019) “Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of

violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of

peoples to self-determination” [online],

www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/WGM

ercenariesIndex.aspx.



https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16219

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16219



34

DISEC


26

TOPIC B: Taking Action to

Mitigate Hybrid Threats

from Non-State Actors

against Member-States

26Picture from Strategy International at

https://strategyinternational.org/hybrid-warfare-the-comprehensive-

approach-in-the-offense/

https://strategyinternational.org/hybrid-warfare-the-comprehensive-approach-in-the-offense

https://strategyinternational.org/hybrid-warfare-the-comprehensive-approach-in-the-offense

35

DISEC


Introduction

Technological advances today are increasingly problematic for

international security. Despite the several benefits this may contribute to

health, well-being, as well as public management and safety, the highly

technical environment actors engage in breeds an equally highly volatile

arena for non-state actors to engage in hybrid warfare27. With limited

collective action against hybrid threats, more awareness must be raised in

order to understand how the international community and its citizens are

prone to attacks.

Hybrid warfare is much harder to react against, simply because it is often

untraceable. Not only that, but the fact that the actors involved may not

necessarily utilise conventional force, justifying an assault against hostile

entities engaged in hybrid warfare becomes increasingly difficult28. This

type of warfare is often launched to further policy-oriented goals. Just like

General Clausewitz once said, war is simply “the continuation of politics

by other means”29.

This Study Guide provides definitions, addresses the methods actors may

engage in hybrid warfare, and sets the scene for member-states with

regards to the topic. It must be emphasised that some countries may

seek to utilise hybrid threats for their own benefit, to either fight off other

hostile entities, or to further a political objective and to shape

international events and public opinion. On the other hand, there are

member-states who simply wish to guard themselves against such

dangers.

27 See Singer, P.W. and Friedman, A. (2014) Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What

Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press 28 See Miani (2016) “Beyond Crimea? Hybrid War in Asia”, Available at http://affiliate-

network.co/2016/05/beyond-crimea/.

29 Carl von Clausewitz (1940) On War. New York, NY: E.P. Dutton and Co., LTD.

http://affiliate-network.co/2016/05/beyond-crimea/

http://affiliate-network.co/2016/05/beyond-crimea/

36

DISEC


Finally, there is the question of non-state actors: Do they act

independently? Are they state-sponsored? Do they have an objective

outside the norms of the international community? These groups are

growing in importance within matters of international security. Some

actors have no clearly defined territory - they are transnational in nature.

Member-states should therefore account for threats coming from these

groups. This is a hybrid combination of threats. This is war.

Definitions

● Hybrid warfare: Begins at the interval of cybersecurity threats and

other conventional, irregular, and electronic forms of attacks30.

Such attacks often have fixed, strategic targets, including critical

infrastructure, corporations, and national/governmental bodies.

● Non-State Actors: Non-state actors are non-governmental

entities. Their affiliation to states is not particularly clear, as some

may have an allegiance to a government, whereas others may even

launch attacks within the territory of a state. They often present

challenges and obstacles to the existing order, ranging from

moderate to extreme. State-sponsored actors, on the other hand,

have a clearly identified state affiliation. They are supported by

governments to launch attacks on hostile entities. This often

includes other states, but also non-state entities.

● Cybersecurity: This is the collective methods employed to protect

hardware, software, electronic, and critical infrastructure systems

within cyberspace. Such methods essentially prevent the

unauthorised hijacking of personal data online.

30 J.K. Wither, J.K. (2016) “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare”, Connections, 15(2), pp.

73-87

37

DISEC


● Malware: Malware or “Malicious software” are cyber tools utilised

by attackers seeking to penetrate systems for a variety of reasons.

Malware range from spy tools to software that steals or corrupts

data. The sole purpose of malware is to infiltrate and harm

information systems.

● Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs): These threats, often

employed by highly specialised and technical groups, are designed

to gain unauthorised access to information systems for cyber-

espionage. APTs are capable of remaining undetected in networks

for extended periods of time and are often difficult to trace. Several

APTs have been linked to different states and state agencies. As a

result, APTs have often targeted hostile states and businesses.

38

DISEC


Timeline of Events

There are no clearly identified nor major events we can include in an

exhaustive list for this topic. Instead, we are providing certain key events

that might be of interest for delegates to explore the way hybrid threats

have evolved throughout the world. It must be emphasised that these

events are ongoing, though smaller-scale operations that have already

taken place and are linked to these events will be mentioned in the

timeline. It will become more evident that these are all linked to certain

political events.

2006: Israeli Invasion of Lebanon Israeli forces began raiding South

Lebanon in 2006, in an attempt to eliminate Hezbollah. Nonetheless,

Hezbollah was able to intercept Israeli communications, down Israeli

aircrafts using sophisticated cyber and electronic attacks31. Despite

Israel’s superiority, it was widely perceived at the time that Hezbollah’s

defensive left Israel redundant in the hybrid warfare battlefield.

2007: Estonian Cyber Attacks Companies, the state, and private

individuals in Estonia were targeted in a wave of systematic cyber

attacks, threatening critical infrastructure and political stability32. At the

end of these attacks, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of

Excellence was established in Tallinn.

2010: Stuxnet Worm Virus This super-worm virus was distributed on

critical infrastructure systems and industry-led projects. It is widely

31 Alex Deep “Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques” Available at

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-war-old-concept-new-techniques 32 See Economist (2010) “War in the Fifth Domain” Available at

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2010/07/01/war-in-the-fifth-domain. Also in Ionela Maria Ciolan (2014) “Defining Cybersecurity as the Security Issue of the Twenty-First

Century: A Constructivist Approach”, The Public Administration and Social Sciences

Review, 1(12) pp. 120-136.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-war-old-concept-new-techniques

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2010/07/01/war-in-the-fifth-domain

39

DISEC


believed that the attack was caused by US-Israeli-led attackers, which

subsequently inflicted critical damage on Iran’s nuclear programme33.

2011 - Ongoing: Hybrid Warfare in the Middle East Several hybrid

attacks have been recorded in the area. The ongoing Syrian Civil War

since 2011 has involved of a plethora of state and non-state actors. It has

also encouraged increased espionage. The Islamic State itself came to

prominence due to its use of hybrid assaults launched against non-

combatants, organisations, militaries, and governments34. In 2011, the

Iranian government took down US RQ-170 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(UAV) drone that was spying on Iranian airspace35. The way this was

done is still disputed today: Iran supports it achieved this via its

cyberwarfare unit and APTs. The United States claims its drone was shot

down.

2010 - 2013: Cyber-espionage Operations Exposed Whistle-blowers

Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden both began releasing classified

cables of high-level operations on illegal cyber-espionage by the United

States. Manning was originally employed by the US Military as an

intelligence analyst, whereas Snowden had worked for the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). Their

actions in revealing sensitive information through platforms such as

WikiLeaks (as well as the platform itself) have been heavily criticised and

defended alike.

2014 - Ongoing: Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine Attacks launched in

Crimea and the Eastern Ukrainian territories under conflict and dispute

aided by campaigns of fake news on social media platforms, as well as

33 N. Anderson (2012) “Confirmed: US and Israel Created Stuxnet, Lost Control of It”

[online] https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-stuxnet-lost-control-of-it/

34 S. Jasper and S. Moreland (2014) “The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does that Matter?” Available at https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-islamic-state-is-a-

hybrid-threat-why-does-that-matter

35 See Peterson and Farmarazi (2011)

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-stuxnet-lost-control-of-it/

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-stuxnet-lost-control-of-it/

40

DISEC


diplomatic quarrel. Campaigns of misinformation on both sides further

exacerbate tensions and divisions.

2016 - Ongoing: Hybrid Warfare in South China Sea Conflict in

South China Sea dates back several years. The territory, being disputed

by several actors for different reasons36 constitutes a great political power

projection game. Through a combination of conventional, electronic and

cyber warfare, as well as online propaganda on all sides, the South China

Sea is an ongoing issue on multiple fronts. A more sophisticated attempt

by China to exploit the disunity within the ASEAN bloc in South East Asia

may equally put ASEAN governance into further jeopardy37.

December 2018: Chinese DNS Hijacking in the EU Poor, outdated

security protocols and a lack of proper infrastructure had allowed Chinese

hackers to hack the credentials of Cypriot diplomats38. This gave them

access to sensitive and confidential EU reports on key policies over

migration, the economy, security, and defence39.

April 2019: Sea Turtle MITM Attack An espionage man-in-the-middle

(MITM) attack left most of the Middle East and other areas exposed.

Target areas were ministries of defence and foreign affairs, as well as

private companies. The attack was only spotted recently40.

36 These actors include Indonesia, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei,

Malaysia, Cambodia, Singapore, and Thailand. 37 See Miani (2016). Also see C. Aoi (2018) “Introduction ‘Hybrid Warfare in Asia: Its

Meaning and Shape’”, The Pacific Review, 31(6) pp. 693-713.

38 The National Herald (2018) 39 See D.E.Sanger and S. Elanger (2018) “Hacked European Cables Reveal a World of

Anxiety about Trump, Russia and Iran” Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/european-diplomats-cables-

hacked.html

40 F. Bussoletti (2019).

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/european-diplomats-cables-hacked.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/european-diplomats-cables-hacked.html

41

DISEC


41

Discussion: Mitigating Hybrid Threats

A Brief History of the Topic

It is practically impossible to imagine today’s world without the use of

technology. From electrical appliances to information systems, technology

has helped us evolve in a number of ways throughout the years. Same

goes for warfare and existential threats. Despite technological advances,

41 U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Charlene Moler, 7th Mobile Public Affairs

Detachment, available at

https://www.army.mil/article/201352/commanding_in_multi_domain_for

mations

https://www.army.mil/article/201352/commanding_in_multi_domain_formations

https://www.army.mil/article/201352/commanding_in_multi_domain_formations

42

DISEC


the rise of new security methods equally endangers policy, states,

companies, and societies.

As seen in the timeline above, a major disturbance that led to the

institutionalisation of action and policy groups against hybrid threats was

the cyber attacks incident in Estonia. From there on, institutions, states,

and private corporations began taking decisive measures to mitigate

threats.

The extent to which an organisation is willing to commit to securing its

assets and communications varies from company to company, from state

to state, and from individual to individual. People will always acknowledge

an acceptable risk factor. After all, if an attacker truly wishes to intercept

and maliciously hijack or damage another entity, they will find a way.

Alarmingly, nothing is impenetrable.

However, hybrid threats and warfare are by no means new concepts. At

its heart, a hybrid threat is the product of a combination of conventional

and irregular warfare methods. Traditional, large-scale European

militaries in previous centuries, for instance, have been using mixed

tactics in strategically disabling communications, spying on the enemy,

and intercepting and mapping out movement on the battlefield42.

The new methods in security studies in surveillance, warfare, and

communications, however, shows that technology has been shaping and

guiding this process. The Cold War and its aftermath saw the rise of non-

state actors. These actors have been violent, armed, or equipped with

tools that enable them to transit traditional state boundaries and engage

42 H. Frank (2007) Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War. Arlington, VA:

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, pp. 20-22

43

DISEC


in the transnational domain, launching their own initiatives and

unbalancing the international status quo.

Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are clear examples of this behaviour

transnational non-state actors may present. Others, as in the case of

state-sponsored actors like Hezbollah, have been the extended arms of

governments that enable them to launch offensives around the world.

Themes of the Topic

For the purpose of analysis, we recommend delegates split up their

findings into different thematic sections. We wish to see some analysis on

the following:

Economic Implications Different countries’ economies solely rely on the

services sector. Attacking critical infrastructure and hijacking valuable

information from the services sector (financial/banking, sales, real estate,

retail, hotels, education, computer services, energy and communication,

to name a few) can bring a country down to its knees. Attackers will often

look at these services and critical infrastructure first. It is a priority and a

great responsibility of all member-states to protect their infrastructure.

Fear, (in)Security, and International Security Excess security may

create insecurity. Being spied on or having personal and/or sensitive

national information hijacked creates fear and instability. The mere

thought of losing access to our offline and online lives poses a

considerable threat to political stability within member-states. Stealing

sensitive information from the public and private sectors can act as a

domino effect. The rise of digital surveillance systems has been an issue

of several decades ago. It is important, then, to understand the science

44

DISEC


behind this, as well as the technological implications for international

security43.

Mitigation and Prevention Finally, the key theme to this topic is about

coming up with ways of mitigating, or if possible, preventing any type of

hybrid threat or attack. This is particularly challenging. It involves

expertise at both the technical and policy levels of member-states. As

such, member-states should always be utilising mixed personnel that can

communicate on both technical- and policy-related goals.

Types of Hybrid Threats/Attacks44

Fake news & ‘deep fake’ Fake news greatly threatens policy. The rise of

social media, blogs, and unmonitored forums that publish a plethora of

opinionated pieces with questionable analysis (very often, there is no

analysis presented at all) jeopardises the democratic process, as well as

international security. ‘Deep fake’ is also an innovative method, in which

human images are artificially synthesised, in order to recreate facts and

distort information in new ways. AI technology may help perpetrators

come up with fake official statements in video footage that can cause

diplomatic episodes, or in more severe cases, war and insecurity45.

Man-in-the-middle (MITM) This type of attack is hard to trace and

upon discovery, it is not easy to identify for how long the attacker has

been infiltrating for. What makes this a hybrid attack rather than a mere

cyber threat is the distortion of information. MITM often involves a

43 See D. Lyon. (1994) The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. Minneapolis,

MN: University of Minnesota Press.

44 We provide examples of key types of threats, though this is a non-

exhaustive list.

45 O. Shwartz (2018) “You Thought Fake News Was Bad? Deep Fakes Are Where the

Truth Goes to Die” Available at

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/12/deep-fakes-fake-news-truth

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/12/deep-fakes-fake-news-truth

45

DISEC


‘mediator’ that makes the victims believe that they are regularly

communicating with one another, when in fact their communication is

monitored and possibly altered46 (Callegati et al: 2009). If the attack is

launched between two states, then it can cause a diplomatic crisis.

Malware attacks As mentioned earlier, malicious software can have a

catastrophic impact on a target. This is exacerbated when used in

combination with other attacks.

Attacks on power grids and stations Targeting critical infrastructure

also means cutting off power resources. This is a semi-conventional type

of attack that immediately affects a target’s external communication and

supplies. It is a primary defence area. This may involve a combination of

cyber attacks, as well as the physical destruction of stations and resource

points.

Human factor Last but not least, no one should ever underestimate the

element of human error. Carelessness, not following the appropriate

security protocols, as well as openly sharing confidential or classified

information always puts security at risk. Information leakage can be

contained by installing monitoring tools on devices that essentially surveil,

and if necessary, wipe out all data upon exposure or breaching of security

protocols. Nonetheless, there are considerable questions on how this

balances out against privacy and data protection47.

46 See Callegati et al (2009), pp. 78-81.

47 A brief on corporate concerns with newer legislation on data privacy and security by A. Burt (2019) “New Laws on Data Privacy and Security Are Coming. Is Your Company

Ready?” Available at https://hbr.org/2019/07/new-laws-on-data-privacy-and-security-

are-coming-is-your-company-ready

https://hbr.org/2019/07/new-laws-on-data-privacy-and-security-are-coming-is-your-company-ready

https://hbr.org/2019/07/new-laws-on-data-privacy-and-security-are-coming-is-your-company-ready

46

DISEC


Bloc Positions

Collective hybrid attacks against member-states from one specific region

to another take place far more often than against individual states. This is

primarily because hybrid attacks and their pattern can be split up into

different blocs. Nonetheless, this does not strictly mean that there are

‘whips’ that bind each country directly to each bloc. Individual countries

may as well go beyond the interests of their bloc, provided they are

sticking to national strategy, having their own interests at heart.

As such, for this committee, we suggest the following blocs:

NATO & EU Allies

The European Union has set up common defence and security policy

agendas, encouraging its member-states to boost their cyber capabilities,

develop stronger cybersecurity national strategies, and even contribute

towards new intelligence schools48.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has rather similar objectives to the

EU, though it takes hybrid warfare much more seriously. Various

definitions on hybrid threats exist, though this Study Guide assumes a

similar one that NATO already incorporates, due to its interdisciplinary

take on conventional, cyber, and electronic threats49.

48 See K. Lavinder (2018) “Greece and Cyprus Build New Intelligence School, While Other Southern EU Countries Collaborate on Drones, Missile Systems, and Underwater

Defence” Available at https://www.southeusummit.com/europe/greece-cyprus-build-

new-eu-intelligence-school-while-other-southern-eu-countries-collaborate-on-drones-missile-systems-and-underwater-defence/

49 This does not mean this Study Guide promotes nor does it affiliate itself with any NATO mission statement. It is purely using the definition for the purpose of providing an

easy explanation on hybrid threat research. See NATO’s relevant mission statement

(2019) at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm

https://www.southeusummit.com/europe/greece-cyprus-build-new-eu-intelligence-school-while-other-southern-eu-countries-collaborate-on-drones-missile-systems-and-underwater-defence/



https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm

47

DISEC


NATO member-states, as well as EU members share a number of common

defence and security policy-oriented goals and capabilities. A good

example is the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid

Threats (also known as Hybrid CoE).

Transnational Actors in the Levant and the Gulf

Transnational entities are often non-state or state-sponsored. Such actors

are sometimes labelled as non-violent but hostile, armed, or violent

transnational entities. In some cases, different states identify them as

transnational terrorist organisations, which fosters a legal implication and

a duty to respond in order to preserve one’s state’s best interests.

Lebanon’s Hezbollah, armed and funded by the Islamic Republic of Iran, is

a great example of how an organisation is able to develop branches in

several countries across the world. Hezbollah, together with Iran’s Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps are both utilised as hybrid proxies to further

Shi’a identity and Iranian transnational political objectives50.

On the other hand, there are private and state-sponsored Private Military

Companies (PMCs) that often act as the state’s extended arm of coercion.

Characteristically, both US and Russian PMCs have been present in Syria

and the Levant during war time, plundering and fighting over territorial

and resource control51. The problem with regulating and controlling PMCs

is that it is exceedingly difficult to monitor their actions during war time,

which is the exact time when they engage in these activities.

50 W. Fulton (2013) Iran’s Global Force Projection Network: IRGC Quds Force and

Lebanese Hezbollah. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

51 See how this is portrayed by different media, in Tass Russian News Agency (2019) and

Klein (2019). Also see Liner (2018).

48

DISEC


These uneasy alliances between governments and other actors put both

the state and the non-state actor on the same boat. Particularly through

APTs, some states also sponsor the e-militia wings of certain

organisations. Recently, these transnational entities have hijacked the

domain of several countries, notably in the Middle East52. Essentially,

delegates should be aware that this bloc can be made up of states that

favour the work of transnational actors. States as such may find

themselves present in other blocs as well.

South Asia and the ASEAN Network

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) often works together

towards common policy objectives, with a growing interest in common

defence and security policies. Hybrid warfare in the region upsets

maritime, legal, and grand strategy goals53. As such, the ASEAN, just like

the EU and other regional blocs, seeks to engage in dialogue and regional

economic, social, and security cooperation.

On the other hand, China’s cyber capabilities and boosted

communications infrastructure sparks concerns on the global arena. It

uses a combination of psychological and cyber warfare to assert its

dominance in the region. The telecommunications company giant,

Huawei, is a great example of this potentially hybrid threat, as different

states perceive it as a cyber-espionage entity. It functions as a

telecommunications service provider, whilst supporting the Chinese

military’s communications units54. The South China Sea dispute feeds

further into this, with electronic, surveillance, and cyber threats in the

region looming onto the geopolitical game. The South China Sea region is

52 See A. Greenberg (2019) “Cyberspies Hijacked the Internet Domains of Entire

Countries” Available at https://www.wired.com/story/sea-turtle-dns-hijacking/ 53 See Aoi (2018).

54 S. Miracola, S. (2018) “Chinese Hybrid Warfare” Available at

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/chinese-hybrid-warfare-21853

https://www.wired.com/story/sea-turtle-dns-hijacking/

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/chinese-hybrid-warfare-21853

49

DISEC


disputed among Indonesia, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia,

Brunei, Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand55.

Eurasia

Some member states in Eastern Europe, Russia, as well as in the

Caucasus and Central Asia may be grouped together under common

hybrid defence practices. This is particularly true for members of the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russia, however, also

launches its own hybrid warfare game in Central Asia. In the case of

Afghanistan, Russia and others have allegedly armed different groups in

the region, in order to engage in hybrid warfare and to weaken the

Western Alliance between the Americas and Europe56.

Latin America

The region has recently observed environmental destruction, economic

impoverishment, and mass protests. Simultaneously, several

interventions in Latin America by a plethora of actors, including the United

States, have attempted to destabilise the region and exploit its resources.

Characteristically, state-sponsored cyber- and electronic- attacks in

Venezuela, in particular, are trending57. Venezuela, while being a leading

supplier of oil, it also mines minerals such as nickel and other valuable

resources.

55 There are several disputes amongst each country. For instance,

Indonesia, China, and Taiwan have their own exclusive territorial dispute

near the Natuna Islands. Not necessarily everyone has a dispute with one

another, though we have listed all countries affected by the territorial

dispute to a certain extent.

56 M. Sazonov (2017) “Afghanistan as an Example of Kremlin’s Hybrid Warfare - Why Russia is Arming the Taliban” Available at https://icds.ee/afghanistan-as-an-example-of-

the-kremlins-hybrid-warfare-why-russia-is-arming-the-taliban/.

57 Tricontinental – Institute for Social Research (2019).

https://icds.ee/afghanistan-as-an-example-of-the-kremlins-hybrid-warfare-why-russia-is-arming-the-taliban/

https://icds.ee/afghanistan-as-an-example-of-the-kremlins-hybrid-warfare-why-russia-is-arming-the-taliban/

50

DISEC


Chile and Peru, on the other hand, have had their own issues over the

former suffering from cyber attacks on the banking sector, and the latter

being subject to military espionage58. Though Latin American countries

might have their differences, there is a need for growing digital security

cooperation in the region, as all countries having an underdeveloped

infrastructure are exposed. This exposure puts all of these countries at

risk collectively59.

Questions a Resolution should answer:

❖ How should member-states collaborate on boosting security and

existing infrastructure to protect against hybrid threats?

❖ Should there be restrictions in place to contain these threats at the

state level?

❖ How could member-states disseminate information to their own

citizenry regarding protection from these threats?

❖ What are the methods of cyberespionage and how (if so) can these

be mitigated or effectively prevented through governmental policy?

❖ What is the economic impact on member-states following a hybrid

attack? How does this frame the global economy as a matter of

international security?

58 See F. Iturrieta, F., D. Sherwood and C. Osterman (2018) “Bank of Chile Trading Down after Hackers Rob Millions in Cyberattack”, Reuters, Available

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-banks-cyberattack/bank-of-chile-trading-down-

after-hackers-rob-millions-in-cyberattack-idUSKBN1J72FC. Also see BBC News (2015) “Peru Recalls Ambassador to Chile over ‘Military Espionage’” Available at

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31784336. 59 Contxto (2019) “Cyber Attacks in Latin America – The Growing Need for Digital

Security” Available at https://www.contxto.com/en/informative/cyber-attacks-in-latin-

america-the-growing-need-for-digital-security/.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-banks-cyberattack/bank-of-chile-trading-down-after-hackers-rob-millions-in-cyberattack-idUSKBN1J72FC

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-banks-cyberattack/bank-of-chile-trading-down-after-hackers-rob-millions-in-cyberattack-idUSKBN1J72FC

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31784336

https://www.contxto.com/en/informative/cyber-attacks-in-latin-america-the-growing-need-for-digital-security/

https://www.contxto.com/en/informative/cyber-attacks-in-latin-america-the-growing-need-for-digital-security/

51

DISEC


❖ What are the vulnerable sectors? Why are they vulnerable as such?

Further Reading

● Useful resources, archived case studies, as well as theoretical

contributions to hybrid warfare as a concept can be found at the

Hybrid CoE’s official website at https://www.hybridcoe.fi/;

● Buchanan, B. (2017) The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust,

and Fear Between Nations. London: Hurst & Company;

● On policy, contested concepts like terrorism, and the use of social

media and technology: Seib, P. (2017) As Terrorism Evolves:

Media, Religion, and Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press;

● Lyon, D. (1994) The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance

Society. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press;

● A case study - Iranian Hybrid Warfare and APTs

https://wavellroom.com/2019/07/13/iranian-hybrid-warfare-

military-response-deterence-options/;

● Archives from NATO Essential Reads on Hybrid Threats

http://www.natolibguides.info/hybridwarfare;

● A financial analysis on hybrid warfare

https://www.ft.com/content/ffe7771e-e5bb-11e9-9743-

db5a370481bc;

● An additional read, featuring the profiling of various cyber tools

armed groups and non-state actors may have at their disposal:

Ullah, H.K. (2017) Digital World War: Islamists, Extremists, and the

Fight for Cyber Supremacy. Padstow: Yale University Press;

● Small Wars Journal, an open access platform on security studies has

some great analytical pieces like this one

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-strategy-of-hybrid-

https://www.hybridcoe.fi/

https://wavellroom.com/2019/07/13/iranian-hybrid-warfare-military-response-deterence-options/

https://wavellroom.com/2019/07/13/iranian-hybrid-warfare-military-response-deterence-options/

http://www.natolibguides.info/hybridwarfare

https://www.ft.com/content/ffe7771e-e5bb-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc

https://www.ft.com/content/ffe7771e-e5bb-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-strategy-of-hybrid-warfare

52

DISEC


warfare. Please note that these entries are heavily cited and usually

written by academics, thus are rather reliable for information

purposes.

Bibliography

● Anderson, N. (2012) “Confirmed: US and Israel Created Stuxnet,

Lost Control of It” [online] https://arstechnica.com/tech-

policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-stuxnet-lost-control-of-

it/;

● Aoi, C. (2018) “Introduction ‘Hybrid Warfare in Asia: Its Meaning

and Shape’”, The Pacific Review, 31(6): 693-713.

● BBC News (2015) “Peru Recalls Ambassador to Chile over ‘Military

Espionage’” [online] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-

america-31784336;

● Burt, A. (2019) “New Laws on Data Privacy and Security Are

Coming. Is Your Company Ready?” [online]

https://hbr.org/2019/07/new-laws-on-data-privacy-and-security-

are-coming-is-your-company-ready;

● Bussoletti, F. (2019) “Is Iran’s APT34 Behind the Sea Turtle Cyber

Espionage Campaign?” [online]

https://www.difesaesicurezza.com/en/cyber-en/is-irans-apt34-

behind-the-sea-turtle-cyber-espionage-campaign/;

● Callegati, F., Cerroni, Wa., and Ramilli, M. (2009) “Man-in-the-

Middle Attack to the HTTPS Protocol”, IEEE Security & Privacy

Magazine, 7(1): 78–81;

● Ciolan, I.M. (2014) “Defining Cybersecurity as the Security Issue of

the Twenty-First Century: A Constructivist Approach” The Public

Administration and Social Sciences Review, 1(12): 120-136;

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-strategy-of-hybrid-warfare

53

DISEC


● Clausewitz, C.V. (1940) On War. New York, NY: E.P. Dutton and

Co., LTD;

● Contxto (2019) “Cyber Attacks in Latin America – The Growing

Need for Digital Security” [online]

https://www.contxto.com/en/informative/cyber-attacks-in-latin-

america-the-growing-need-for-digital-security/;

● Deep, A. (2015) “Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques”

[online] https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-war-old-

concept-new-techniques;

● Economist (2010) “War in the Fifth Domain” [online]

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2010/07/01/war-in-the-fifth-

domain;

● Frank, H. (2007) Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid

War. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

● Greenberg, A. (2019) “Cyberspies Hijacked the Internet Domains of

Entire Countries” [online] https://www.wired.com/story/sea-turtle-

dns-hijacking/;

● Fulton, W. (2013). Iran’s Global Force Projection Network: IRGC

Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah. Washington, DC: American

Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

● Iturrieta, F., Sherwood, D., and Osterman, C. (2018) “Bank of Chile

Trading Down after Hackers Rob Millions in Cyberattack” [online]

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-banks-cyberattack/bank-

of-chile-trading-down-after-hackers-rob-millions-in-cyberattack-

idUSKBN1J72FC;

● Jasper, S. and Moreland, S. (2014) “The Islamic State is a Hybrid

Threat: Why Does that Matter?” [online]

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-islamic-state-is-a-hybrid-

threat-why-does-that-matter;

● Klein, M. (2019) Private Military Companies – A Growing Instrument

in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy Toolbox. Finland: Hybrid CoE

54

DISEC


[online] https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-

content/uploads/2019/06/HybridCoE_StrategicAnalysis_3_2019.pdf

;

● Lavinder, K. (2018) “Greece and Cyprus Build New Intelligence

School, While Other Southern EU Countries Collaborate on Drones,

Missile Systems, and Underwater Defence” [online]

https://www.southeusummit.com/europe/greece-cyprus-build-new-

eu-intelligence-school-while-other-southern-eu-countries-

collaborate-on-drones-missile-systems-and-underwater-defence/;

● Linder, A. (2019) “Russian Private Military Companies in Syria and

Beyond” [online] https://www.csis.org/npfp/russian-private-

military-companies-syria-and-beyon;

● McGuffin, C. and Mitchell, P. (2014) “On domains: Cyber and the

Practice of Warfare” International Journal, 69(3): 394-412;

● Miani, L. (2016) “Beyond Crimea? Hybrid War in Asia” [online]

http://affiliate-network.co/2016/05/beyond-crimea/;

● Miracola, S. (2018) “Chinese Hybrid Warfare” [online]

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/chinese-hybrid-warfare-

21853;

● North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2019) “NATO’s Response to

Hybrid Threats” [online]

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm;

● Peterson, S. and Faramarzi, P. (2011) “Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US

Drone, Says Iranian Engineer” [online]

https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-

East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-

engineer;

● Sanger, D.E. and Elanger, S (2018) “Hacked European Cables

Reveal a World of Anxiety about Trump, Russia and Iran” [online]

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/european-

diplomats-cables-hacked.html;

55

DISEC


● Sazonov, M. (2017) “Afghanistan as an Example of Kremlin’s Hybrid

Warfare - Why Russia is Arming the Taliban” [online]

https://icds.ee/afghanistan-as-an-example-of-the-kremlins-hybrid-

warfare-why-russia-is-arming-the-taliban/;

● Schwartz, O. (2018) “You Thought Fake News Was Bad? Deep

Fakes Are Where the Truth Goes to Die” [online]

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/12/deep-

fakes-fake-news-truth;

● Singer, P.W. and Friedman, A. (2014) Cybersecurity and Cyberwar:

What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press;

● Tass Russian News Agency (2019) “US Private Military Companies

Plunder Syrian Oil Facilities” [online]

https://tass.com/world/1070821;

● The National Herald (2018) “Hacked by China, Cyprus Said to be

Cyber Sieve Giving Up EU Data” [online]

https://www.thenationalherald.com/224282/hacked-by-china-

cyprus-said-to-be-cyber-sieve-giving-up-eu-data/;

● Tricontinental - Institute for Social Research (2019) “U.S. and Allies

Wage ‘Hybrid War’ Against Venezuela” [online]

https://medium.com/@tri_continental/u-s-and-allies-wage-hybrid-

war-against-venezuela-fb9441c7ef4c;

● Wither, J.K. (2016) “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare”, Connections,

15(2): 73-87.

https://tass.com/world/1070821

disarmament and international security committee · foreign military intervention a brief history...

Documents