disaster, conflict and social crisis research
TRANSCRIPT
DISASTER, CONFLICT AND SOCIALCRISIS RESEARCH NETWORK
NEWSLETTER
Vol. 14, N°. 51, September 2013 – December 2013 http://www.dcscrn.org/
COORDINATOR’S REPORT
Nina Blom [email protected]
Dear Members, Colleagues and Followers of the Disas-ter, Conflict and Social Crisis Research Network,
I am glad to be able to present to you this 51st DCSCRNNewsletter.
On behalf of the DCSCRN Coordinating Committee, Iwould like to send New Year’s greetings to all of you.The beginning of a new year invites most of us to makewishes for the new year – hoping that things that we dealwith will become just slightly better.
This does of course lead me to make the very simplewish of 2014 with less disasters, social crises, and con-flicts, which I believe that we probably all can agree on.This is obviously a bit naïve since the matter is verymuch out of the hands of us both as scholars and aspractitioners. So, a more achievable wish would be tostrengthen the research and documentation on mattersconcerning these severe events. Through research wecan contribute just a little bit on making societies bet-ter suited to handle disaster events – both by gatheringknowledge as well as making theoretically informed re-flections on disaster processes and the like.
In the Coordinating Committee of our research network,an excellent term has been discussed in the last months,that of next practices. If we as researchers deal with thenext practices of handling disastrous incidents instead oftrying to strive for the best practices, we acknowledgethe dynamic and evolving character of practices in rela-tion to crises and conflicts. I believe this is necessarysince the character of problems that we are dealing withis under constant change.
The number of natural disasters has always been an is-sue, though it is widely recognized that climate changeimpacts on the magnitude of natural disasters and willcontinue to influence severe weather phenomenona inthe future. The number of technological disasters canbe seen as a product of the ongoing extension of com-plex systems and modes of production. Unforeseen so-cial crises also appear, lately ones related to sudden col-lapse of financial stability, with an extensive influence onthe growing proportion of social despair.
Among the many contributions in this newsletter you canread about different scholars’ approaches to some of theincidents that research must take into account and dealwith. These are gathered in the extended abstracts ofsome of the presentations made on our biannual con-ference in Turin, Italy within the European SociologicalAssociation (ESA) back in August (p. 3). The presenta-tions that you can read deal e.g. with the consequencesof the debt crisis in southern Europe, concerning prob-lems of crime, discrimination, and new kinds of povertyand exclusion. Further abstracts concern new technolog-ical systems, crises concerning the decline in natural re-sources as well as terrorism. New causes of social crisesare described, and well known are scrutinized too, andnovel ways of dealing with these matters are discussed.Among the presentations you will also find suggestionsfor dealing with technical solutions such as surveillanceand social media.
I wish you a pleasant reading.
Best regards,
Nina Blom AndersenDCSCRN Coordinator
Contents of this issue
COORDINATOR’S REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
EDITOR’S NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
DCSCRN WEB MANAGER NOTE . . . . . . . . . 2
FROM DCSCRN MEMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ANNOUNCEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
THE DCSCRN ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER . . . 28
1
EDITOR’S NOTE
Antti [email protected]
Dear Members and Colleagues of the DCSCRN,
Welcome to the December edition of the DCSCRNNewsletter, which covers the period September 2013 –December 2013.
As Nina noted above, the focus of this issue will be withlast autumn’s 11th ESA Conference in Turin, Italy. Wehave first collected all the available extended abstracts ofthe papers presented in Turin, starting from p. 3. Then,from p. 24, you will find photographs taken during theconference. We hope this coverage is interesting bothfor those attended and those who could not make it thistime. The usual contents such as announcements, papercalls, and reports about other conference events are alsopresented in this issue.
I want to wish you a pleasant reading and Happy NewYear. Yours,
Antti Silvast
DCSCRN WEB MANAGER NOTE
Antti Silvast ([email protected])
New members
The DCSCRN received no new membership applicationsbetween September 2013 and December 2013. Anyonewho wants to be kept informed of events and currentissues regarding our themes can register with the net-work free of charge by following the instructions at http://www.dcscrn.org/membership/become-a-member. Welook forward to welcoming new colleagues on board!
The up-to-date list of all 255 members can be viewed athttp://www.dcscrn.org/membership/members.
FROM DCSCRN MEMBERS
In Memoriam: William Anderson
William Anderson one of the prominent and admired USdisaster scholars died suddenly on December 29 whenholidaying in Hawaii.
Bill was one of the early Ph.D.’s from Ohio State Uni-versity when the Disaster Research Center was locatedthere. His doctoral dissertation was on the 1964 Alaskaearthquake and his later work included a study of floodsin Ohio which led him to identify the concept of a “disas-ter subculture”. He was one of the first to write about therole of the military in disaster and in 1970 published oneof the first social science studies of tsunami warnings.He also co-authored – with Russell Dynes – a study ofthe 30th of May movement in Curacao.
After teaching at Kent State and Arizona state whereone of his students was Ron Perry, another distinguishedscholar in our field, Bill moved to the National ScienceFoundation where he was responsible for 26 years offunding US disaster research.
From June 1999 to June 2001, he served as senior ad-visor in the Disaster Management Facility in the Infras-tructure Division at the World Bank while on leave fromthe NSF.
In 2010 Bill was awarded the Charles Fritz award bythe International Research Committee on Disasters fora lifetime contribution to Sociology of Disaster. Bill wasknown for the quite supportive way he dealt with schol-ars at all levels and he was respected, admired and lovedby his colleagues.
A personal note
I first met Bill when he was a discussant for the first pa-per I ever presented in the disaster field. His criticismwas sensitively thorough and constructive and he mademe feel welcome to what for me then was virgin terri-tory. I got to know him better when we both attended theWorld Congress in Sweden in 1982 and we have beenfriends ever since.
Joe Scanlon ([email protected])
Disability and Disaster Networking
With some colleagues at University College London, Iam trying to set up an informal network of people basedin EU institutions who are researching this topic. Theycould be disaster researchers with an interest in dis-ability, or disability researchers who are interested inemergencies and disasters. The idea of networking is,initially, to share publications and find out about eachother’s work and future plans; but in the long term itcould lead to joint research projects and more formalpartnerships. If anyone is interested, please contact me.
John Twigg ([email protected])
2
RESOURCES
Books, articles, reports, and recent studies by DCSCRNmembers and colleagues. Book prices reflect prices atthe time of survey. The DCSCRN cannot guarantee theprices informed. Prices are as stated in US dollars, Eurosor UK pounds.
Extended Abstracts: European Sociological As-sociation (ESA), 11th Conference, ‘Crisis, Cri-tique and Change’, Turin, Italy, 28-31 August2013
The DCSCRN is publishing here all the available ex-tended abstracts from our sessions in the 11th ESA con-ference. The entries were edited by the coordinator andnewsletter editor in correspondence with the authors andwe thank everyone for their efforts. As a result, wenow present you with nine papers about various differentfacets of disaster, financial and social crisis, and conflict.A few further abstracts are in their final stages of writingand will be published in due time in the next issue of thenewsletter in April.
For more information about the papers, please corre-spond directly with the authors. All papers express theopinions of the authors and not necessarily those of thecoordinators, of the coordinating committee, or of thenewsletter editor of the DCSCRN.
Economic Crises and Crime
By Joanna Tsiganou1 ([email protected])
Many crime and economy specialists, political analystsand media commentators have much too often insistedon the strong relationship between economic crises andthe volume of crime. In the proposed paper I intend toshow that the relationship between economic crises andlevels of criminality needs further empirical verification.The data available suggest that although the volume of“street crime” (that is mainly, thefts, burglaries and rob-beries) seems to increase in the middle of financial crisesat an international level, strong empirical evidence toprove the linear or the causal character of the above men-tioned relationship is missing. On the contrary the Greekexperience suggests that economic crises alone do notincrease the volume of crime, because criminal behav-ior has mainly moral that is cultural connotations, as thevalue system is considered to be an important determi-nant of behaviour. Although Greece has been undergo-ing one of the most severe economic crises of its history
1Dr., Director of Research, The Greek National Centre for SocialResearch – EKKE
during the past 3-4 years, criminal activity or law offend-ing behavior does not unquestionably result from eco-nomic parameters alone. Neither the increased povertyhas “produced” more crime, nor does the country live ina state of violence and anomic chaos.
The issue of crime rates under conditions of economiccrises, poverty, deprivation and austerity is of vast impor-tance among crime specialists, political analysts and me-dia commentators. I do not intend to navigate through allrelevant theoretical discussions that attempt to connecteconomic crises and crime2 but only to repeat the com-mon assumption especially among econometric studiesthat adverse economic conditions, from unemploymentand poverty to income inequality and a sense of relativedeprivation, are linked to a growth in crime, especiallyin property and violent offences.3
There exist various explanations as to how economicfactors impact upon levels and patterns of crime. Un-employment, for example, is thought to strengthen thetemptation to offending, but also to enhance the emer-gence of other positive correlates of crime such as lackof education and housing. It might thus be reasonableto assume that the financial crisis of the first decadeof the 21st century triggered off reactions in propertyand violent crimes in countries hit by the economic tor-nado. Moreover, within the context of the United Na-tions Global Pulse initiative on monitoring the impactof crisis on vulnerable populations and on investigat-ing the possible effects of economic stress on crime, itwas concluded that whether in times of economic cri-sis or non crisis, economic factors play an importantrole in the evolution of crime trends. Out of a total offifteen countries examined, statistical modelling identi-fies an economic predictor for at least one crime typein twelve countries suggesting some overall associationbetween economic changes and crime. Both visual in-spection of data series and statistical modeling suggestthat in eight of the eleven ‘crisis’ countries, changes ineconomic factors were associated with changes in crimeleading to identifiable crime ‘peaks’ during the time ofcrisis. Violent property crime types such as robbery ap-peared most affected during times of crisis, with up to
2See indicatively Quinney R., (1977) : “Class State and Crime– On Theory and Practice of Criminal Justice”, David McKay, NewYork, USA. Also, Cantor D., Land K.C., (1985) : “Unemploymentand crime rates in the post - world War II United States : A Theoret-ical and Empirical Analysis”, American Sociological Review, τόμος50, no 3, pp. 317 – 332. Levitt S.D., (2004) : “Understanding whycrime fell in the 1990s: Four factors that explain the decline and sixthat do not”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, τόμος 18, no1, pp. 163-190. Deflem M., (2011) : “Economic Crisis and Crime”,Emerald Group Publishing, UK.
3See Xenakis S. & Cheliotiς L. (2012): “The Politics ofCrime and the Financial Crisis in Greece”, ESC Newsletter(http://www.escnewsletter.org), Issue 2 / 2012.
3
two-fold increases in some contexts during a period ofeconomic stress. In some contexts, increases in homi-cide and motor vehicle theft were also observed. Thesefindings are consistent with criminal motivation theory,which suggests that economic stress may increase theincentive for individuals to engage in illicit behaviors.In no case where it was difficult to discern a peak incrime was any decrease in crime observed. As such theavailable data do not support a criminal opportunity the-ory that decreased levels of production and consumptionmay reduce some crime types such as property crime,through the generation of fewer potential crime targets.4
However, such being the case, the relationship betweeneconomic recession, on the one hand, and levels and pat-terns of crime, on the other, has yet to receive sufficientattention. Examining the Greek case as an example ofa country in a deep economic crisis, it is revealed thatthat the economic recession coupled with severe auster-ity measures may not be associated with a wide rangeof typically acknowledged criminal behaviours. TheGreek case rather exhibits the means and ways politicshave infused perceptions on the connection between cri-sis and crime the same way it has shaped the financialcrisis itself. It is true that Greece, even before the cri-sis suffered from high levels of income inequality andpoverty. With the imposition of austerity, unemploymentrose from about 7% in 2008 to over the 25% in 2012 andhas reached a peak of about 30% in 2013. Living stan-dards also have dropped sharply particularly from late2010 onwards. Nevertheless, despite the common ten-dency of political media to reflect on the relationship be-tween the economic deprivation and ‘a new crime wave’especially in property and violent offences I tend to dis-agree with such strong relationship suggestion betweenfinancial crises and crime.
Considering this issue from a broader perspective includ-ing the historical dimension one has to admit the follow-ing:
It is true that within the context of the ongoing finan-cial crisis in Greece, public fears about property andviolent crime appear to have risen often in associationwith heightened concerns about illegal immigration intothe country and related offending.5 It is also true thatthese sentiments have been fuelled by public discoursethat refers to police-recorded crime statistics showing asignificant growth (30-40%) in thefts, burglaries and rob-beries during the past 2-3 years. Yet, immigrants are of-
4UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime): GIVASFinal Report: “Monitoring the Impact of Economic Crisis on Crime”,2011.
5I agree to this point with Xenakis S. & Cheliotiς L., in (2012):“The Politics of Crime and the Financial Crisis in Greece”, ESCNewsletter (http://www.escnewsletter.org), Issue 2 / 2012.
ten over-represented in proportion to their share of thegeneral population, and the fact that immigrant offend-ers follow the law-offending patterns of the indigenouspopulation is seldom, if ever, addressed.6 Thus, senti-ments of punitiveness are running high, still remainingincompatible with the actual levels and patterns of crim-inal victimization. On the other hand volumes have beendevoted to the questioning of the validity of police andother official crime records and/or statistics. In fact thereare multiple reasons why police-recorded crime statisticsneed to be treated with particular caution when used as aproxy for actual crime rates. These range from attitudesof reporting, attitudes of recording and the systematicover-policing of immigrant and other vulnerable socialcommunities.
At the same time the annual National Survey on Cor-ruption in Greece provides enough evidence supportingthe arguments that a) the phenomenon has been vastlypresent and before the present crisis, b) that the totallevels of corruption have been stabilized in this coun-try throughout the years of crisis and c) that the totalamounts of money spent for corruption have been de-creasing from 2010 onwards which of course may be ex-plicable also in terms of austerity7.
As for the connection between economic crisis and theemergence of anomic phenomena, aspects of disobe-dience, violence and even organized political violence,strong empirical evidence to support such a connection islacking. On the contrary according to the data providedby a pilot survey conducted in Athens by the Greek Na-tional Centre for Social Research in 2012, in the midstof austerity measures, shows that various forms of dis-obedience as the refusal to pay taxes considered unfair,physical attacks against politicians and symbolic acts ofrage are followed and/or approved only by the 9-10% ofthe Greek public. It is not valid to assume that the nonpayment of the annually imposed income tax by the 30%of the Greek population is symbolic. It is actually prag-matic due to income deprivation. Of course the majority(54%) of Athenian public feel that we live in a societywithout rules, 78% think that the Laws are not properlyand justly implemented, 57% believe that the unfair rulesshould not be followed, and 86% believe that meritoc-racy is absent. However, people have become less toler-ant as 95% believe that the guilty should pay and 83%feel that injustice is nowadays greater and this is some-thing they can no longer tolerate. At the same time theyfeel insecure and far from certain for their future (79%).
6Tsiganou J., et al., (2010): “Immigration and Criminality: Mythsand Realities”, Athens, EKKE.
7National Survey on Corruption in Greece , 2011. Also, KourakisN., Spinelli K., Zagoura P., (eds), 2012 : “Transparency and the com-bating of Corruption”, Athens, Sakkoulas.
4
It is to be noted that although the Greek public has be-come more suspicious and reserved, social solidarity isstill exhibited in various forms. At the same time peoplefeel (48%) that despite the economic crisis people try tohelp each other.
Concluding this brief review it is suggested that the rela-tionship between crime and the financial crisis may benon-linear, irregular and complex, as the Greek expe-rience bears witness. Also it is important to note thatthe process of ‘identification’ of a period of ‘crisis’ or ofan ‘impact’ on crime is highly subjective. In addition,the suggestion of the existence of a period of economicdownturn and an impact on crime by use of economet-ric tools alone is unable to identify whether economicchanges are causal of crime changes or to take accountof changes in other factors that may also impact uponcrime levels. Research is still needed in order to validatesuch remarks.
The Identity of Excluded in Times of Fiscal Austerityin Greece: Perceptions and Experiences of Discrimi-nation in Employment
By Katerina Iliou1 ([email protected])
The present economic crisis in Eurozone sets Greece inthe center of international interest as far as economicbreakdown and social unrest is concerned. Trends in un-employment in South European countries outline a pes-simist ground for present and future workforce. At timewhen the present study was conducted 23.1% of Greekpeople were officially recorded as unemployed, while inMay 2013 unemployment reached 27.6%. The imple-mentation of fiscal austerity policies and the enforce-ment of overwhelming taxation measures contribute toa greater risk of poverty for 21.4% of the Greek pop-ulation. Under these circumstances old and new socialgroups have to cope with exaggerated inequalities in em-ployment.
This paper includes results from a survey conducted bythe National Centre for Social Research in collabora-tion with the “Manpower Employment Organization”2
during 2012. Research was part of PROGRESS (2007-2013) - The European Union Programme For Employ-ment and Social Solidarity. Quantitative data were col-lected with a questionnaire. Sample design focusedon two main groups: a) Members of Vulnerable So-cial Groups, who were selected proportionally in LocalEmployment Promotion Centers of “Manpower Employ-ment Organization” throughout Greece (N=1280) and
1Greek National Centre for Social Research - EKKE2The public national institution for: a) promotion of employment,
b) employment insurance and c) vocational education and training.
b) members of the general population as control groupin the prefecture of Attica (applying snowball method)(N=306).
Vulnerable Social Groups (VSGs) were specified ac-cording to the Record of Vulnerable Social Groupsheld officially by the “Manpower Employment Organi-zation”. In the sample 16 vulnerable social groups arerepresented. However, the majority are “Immigrants”(35%), “People with disabilities” (19%), “Long termunemployed over 45 years old with low qualifications”(16%), and “Roma/Other special cultural groups” (10%).
Regarding the socio-demographic characteristics of thetwo groups one major difference between them is that72.7% of members of Vulnerable Social Groups haveGreek citizenship as opposed to 98.4% of general popu-lation. VSGs also report lower levels of educational andprofessional skills (such as “computer efficacy”, “flu-ency in English”, “fluency in Greek” and “level of ed-ucation”). Also, members of VSGs are unemployed fora longer period of time than members of control group.
First we focus on how individuals perceive discrimina-tion in contemporary Greek labor market. Discrimina-tion is considered either: a) as social threat or b) aspersonal threat of exclusion from employment. Socialthreat refers to a general perception of discrimination feltby members of social groups and it constitutes a ratherabstract threat. In this case we study individuals’ esti-mates about the extent of discrimination in general (inGreek labor market nowadays). Personal threat refersto a self-directed threat that arises from personal experi-ence of discrimination and it constitutes a rather realisticthreat. In this case we study individuals’ estimates ofdiscrimination based on relevant personal experience invarious conditions of employment.
Analysis shows that social threat is considerably per-ceived since Means of answers of total sample reveal thatdiscrimination problems in Greek labor market exist “toa great extent”. Discriminations are indicated mostly in“Hiring”, “Dismissals”, and “Terms of conditions of em-ployment”, but also in “Taking full advantage of staff andpromotions” and “Wages”. What is more, the majority(55%) have experienced discrimination at least once inthe process of hiring for a vacancy (depicting aspects ofPersonal threat). Most persons attribute discriminationto their “age” (26%), their “gender” (14%), their “nation-ality” (13%) and their “place of origin” (12%) (see Fig-ure 1). As source of discrimination they recognize their“employers” (16.8%), their “managers” (10.5%) and toa lesser extent their “colleagues” (8%) (see Figure 2).The greatest share of respondents (17.2%) did not reactat all to the discrimination. The rest coped with discrim-ination by “verbal reactions” (16.9%), while very fewappear to follow official legal processes (such as “filing
5
Figure 1: Attributions of discrimination
Figure 2: Source of discrimination
a complaint to the Labor Inspectorate” or “filing a law-suit”).
Further analysis focuses on the research hypothesis thatmembership in a devalued social group may increaseperceptions and experiences of discrimination. In con-trast to this hypothesis, analysis (running Independentsamples t-tests) shows that non members of VSGs ex-press higher perception of Social threat compared tomembers of VSGs. However, our hypothesis is verifiedas far as Personal threat is concerned. Comparison ofanswers between members and non members of VSGs(applying Chi-square statistical criterion) highlight thatmembers of VSGs report personal experience of dis-crimination in “hiring” and “previous jobs” more thanexpected. They also appear to be victims of discrimina-tory behavior more than expected by their employers andtheir colleagues.
In order to find out which factors contribute to predic-tion of Social and Personal threat of exclusion from la-bor market we test four separate Models (running Mul-tiple Regression Analysis with Stepwise method forloading of independent variables). In Models 1 and 2we test which factors (“Group membership”3, “Socio-
3Concerning being vs. not being member of Vulnerable SocialGroups.
economic conditions”4, “Occupation processes”5) con-tribute to prediction of Social threat (i.e. perception ofdiscrimination) in general. In Models 3 and 4 we testif the same factors contribute to prediction of Personalthreat (i.e. experience of discrimination). In a few words,analyses show that “group membership” is the main fac-tor that contributes to prediction of Social and Personalthreat of exclusion from employment. However, vari-ous “Socio-economic conditions” and “Occupation pro-cesses” also contribute to perception and experience ofdiscrimination6.
Drawing from above, we attempt to identify the excludedfrom labor market by focusing on perceptions of Socialand Personal threat of exclusion. Two different groupsare tested: Members of Vulnerable Social Groups andmembers of general population as control group. Inagreement with our hypothesis, members of VSGs ap-pear to be in disadvantage, since they report higher lev-els of Personal threat of employment exclusion (statingpersonal experience of discrimination).
Nevertheless, in contrast to our hypothesis, non membersof VSGs tend to express higher levels of Social threat(reporting high levels of discrimination in general). Suchfindings, highlighting that although members of VSGsappear to be the victims of discrimination, non memberstend to report discrimination to a higher extent, can beexplained in different ways. First, it may be an outcomeof economic crisis in Greece that inflates social dissatis-faction and emphasizes social inequalities. However, weshould also consider that in times of fiscal austerity newsocial groups are at risk of deterioration of their socialstatus or even poverty. Second, it could be explained asan outcome of the meaning of “discrimination”. In thiscase members of general population may view discrimi-nation in labor market in a more general way (when theinterviewer sets the question) including nepotism, cor-ruption and in-group favoritism. In this case we should
4Concerning “Age”, “Marital status”, “Citizenship”, “Educa-tion”, “Employment”, “Sector of economy in employment” and“Salary”.
5Concerning “Change of many employers”, “Total time of em-ployment”, “Job satisfaction” and “Total time of unemployment”.
6In detail: a) Model 1 shows that “non members of VSGs”,“Greek citizens”, persons with “low salary”, “low job satisfaction”and “long-time unemployed” tend to express higher levels of dis-crimination in general in labor market. b) Model 2 shows that “nonmembers of VSGs”, “Greek citizens”, persons with “low salary”,“low job satisfaction”, “working in public sector”, and “long-timeunemployed” tend to express higher levels of frequency of discrimi-nation in general. c) Model 3 shows that “members of VSGs”, “mar-ried” persons, with “low salary”, “low job satisfaction” and “changeof many employers” tend to report higher levels of personal experi-ence of discrimination in hiring. d) Model 4 shows that “membersof VSGs”, persons with “low job satisfaction”, and “change of manyemployers” tend to report higher levels of personal experience of dis-crimination in previous jobs.
6
consider formulating an open question for the definitionof “discrimination” in future questionnaires. Third, thiscould be an outcome of sample design. Findings mayreflect views of VSGs located in public institutions suchas the Manpower Employment Organization that cannotbe generalized. For example, immigrants who represent35% of present sample, are only such immigrants thathold official papers of stay. At the same time, social sci-entists often face up problems of access to populationssuch as paperless immigrants. However, specific pub-lic institutions should be used with caution and propermethodological questioning.
Last, but not least, the present paper highlights that groupmembership is not a sufficient factor for predicting So-cial and/or Personal threat of exclusion from labor mar-ket. Perception of discrimination in general as well aspersonal experience of discrimination are multi-factorialphenomena involving not only affiliations with groups,but also socio-economical conditions and processes.
The Institutional Framework on Combating Discrim-ination in the Greek Labour Market under the Im-pact of the Economic Crisis
By Nikos Sarris1 ([email protected])
This article examines the implementation of the anti-discrimination legislative framework in Greece, partic-ularly after the incorporation of Directives 2000/43/ECand 2000/78/EC2 through Law 3304/20053. It fur-ther aims to document the efficacy of implementing thelegislative provisions concerning discrimination both ingeneral and especially on the labour market, particularlywithin a period of economic crisis. This short analysisis based on data from Greek Ombudsman’s (GO) annualreports, Eurobarometer surveys and the 5th Round of theEuropean Social Survey. The GO’s data present citizencomplaints, in other words reported experience of dis-
1Researcher, Greek National Centre for Social Research - EKKE2The Directives on racial and ethnic equality (2000/43/EC) and
employment equality (2000/78/EC) serve a dual purpose: a) the for-mation of a framework for combating discrimination on the groundsof racial and ethnic origin, disability, religion or belief, age or sexualorientation in the EU member-states and b) the establishment of bod-ies and mechanisms in the EU states in order to monitor the imple-mentation of the legislation discussed and to promote and encourageequal treatment.
3Law 3304/2005 incorporates Directives 2000/43/EC and2000/78/EC and provides for the protection against discriminatorytreatment due to racial or ethnic origin (employment and training,education, social protection, including social security and healthcaresocial benefits, membership and participation in employees’ and em-ployers’ organizations, access to goods and services, including hous-ing), religious or other convictions, disability, age and sexual orienta-tion (for the sectors of employment and training). The aim is to forma general framework for combating discrimination.
COMPLAINTS FOR
DISCRIMINATION
(by discrimination
ground)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Ethnic origin 3.7% 3.8% 3.5% 4.5%
Racial origin 53.7% 67.9% 47.3% 58%
Disability-reasonable
adjustments
25.9% 26.4% 24.5% 17%
Age 13% 1.9% 22.8% 15.2%
Sexual orientation 3.7% - 1.8 % 3.5%
Religious beliefs - - - -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 1: Citizens’ Complaints for Discriminations cov-ered by Law 3304/2005 (2009-2012). Source: GreekOmbudsman’s Annual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
crimination while the other surveys stamp the populationperception of discrimination.
Following Law 3304/2005, the Greek Ombudsman is thespecialized body, to which citizens may appeal in casesof experiencing discriminatory treatment on the groundsof racial or ethnic origin, religious or other beliefs, dis-ability, age or sexual orientation. Drawing from theGO’s annual reports, it is observed that during the lastfour years there is a steady number of complaints filedby citizens who have experienced discriminations andask the GO to intervene and apply the principle of equaltreatment. More specifically, 54 cases were examined bythe GO in 2009, 53 in 2010, 57 in 2011, and 112 in 2012.In Table 1 the respective percentages concerning all dis-crimination grounds covered by Law 3304/2005 are pre-sented. The main reason citizens appeal to the GO overtime is discriminations on the grounds of ethnic or racialorigin at a rate steadily over 47%.
The Greek Ombudsman’s interventions regarding gen-der discrimination is of equal importance, particularlyafter the passing of Law 3896/2010, which widens GO’scompetencies on gender discrimination in the workplacein both public and private sectors. With Law 3896/2010the legislature institutionally enhanced the role of GOas a body for monitoring and promoting the principle ofequal treatment between men and women in employmentand extended the Authority’s duties regarding equal op-portunities for men and women. Table 2 presents casesby form of unequal treatment on the grounds of genderor marital status for years 2009-2012.4 The majority ofcomplaints related to terms and conditions of employ-ment, which rose to 72.89% in 2010, while during last
4The numbers in the table are referred as such in each one of theannual reports of the Greek Ombudsman and are obviously basedon citizen cases that were examined in each specific year. The totalnumber of each year is 250-300 cases. See http://www.synigoros.gr/
7
Distribution of cases 2009 2010 2011 2012
Employment terms and
conditions
39.13% 72.89% 47.83% 40.81%
Access to employment 20.29% 18.64% 4.35% 0.82%
Termination of
employment
relationship
23.19% 5.08% 41.74% 30.20%
Wages 11.59% 3.39% 0.87% 4.08%
Professional/Staff
development
4.35% - 3.48% 2.04%
Professional/Vocational
training
1.45% - 1.74% 0.41%
Table 2: Cases of unequal treatment on the ground ofgender for 2009-2012. Source: Greek Ombudsman’sAnnual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
two years there was a rapid increase of complaints re-garding terminations of employment relationships. Thiscould be mainly due to the increase of flexible forms ofemployment and the change of scenery within the labourmarket, brought about by a series of legislative interven-tions imposed by the memoranda5 and applicable laws.
According to the Eurobarometer survey, in 2012 citizensin Greece believed that most forms of discriminationthey were asked about are (very and fairly) widespreadin their country. Findings are presented in Figure 1. Themost commonly reported form of discrimination is eth-nic origin by 70%, followed by sexual orientation (beingbisexual, gay or lesbian) by 65%, gender identity (beingtransgender or transsexual) by 64%, disability by 53%,age (being over 55 years old) by 43%, religion or beliefsby 37%, gender by 23% and age (being under 30 yearsold) by 15%.
Comparing discrimination rates in Greece with the EU-27 mean (Figure 2), it is noticed that rates are higherin Greece on the grounds of ethnic origin (70% versus56% in EU-27), disability (53% versus 46% in EU-27),sexual orientation (65% versus 46% in EU-27), and gen-der identity (64% versus 45% in EU-27). On the otherhand, lower rates of discrimination are observed on thegrounds of gender (23% versus 31% in EU-27), whereasthey are more or less equally high when it comes to dis-crimination on the grounds of age (for both persons over
5Since May 2010, the euro area Member States and the Interna-tional Monetary Fund (IMF) have been providing financial supportto Greece through an Economic Adjustment Programme in the con-text of a sharp deterioration in its financing conditions. The aim isto support the Greek government’s efforts to restore fiscal sustain-ability and to implement structural reforms in order to improve thecompetitiveness of the economy, thereby laying the foundations forsustainable economic growth. Memoranda are the international con-ventions between the Greek government and the board of creditors.
Figure 1: Very and fairly widespread types of discrimi-nation in Greece. Source: Eurobarometer 77.4. Discrim-ination in the EU in 2012 – Results for Greece
Figure 2: Types of discrimination in Greece and the EU.Source: Eurobarometer 77.4 Discrimination in the EU in2012
55 years old and persons under 30 years old) and religionor beliefs.
On the other hand, by collating Eurobarometer 2012findings for Greece with the findings of 2009, as they arepresented in Figure 3, it is observed that citizens’ per-ceptions about discrimination on the grounds of ethnicorigin (71% in 2009 and 70% in 2012) and sexual ori-entation (64% in 2009 and 65% in 2012) remain steady.However, there is a decrease in other types of discrimina-tion, rather impressive especially when it comes to gen-der discrimination (from 49% in 2009 to 23% in 2012).
Figure 3: Comparative longitudinal data of discrimina-tion in Greece. Source: Eurobarometer 2012 and 2009,Discrimination in the EU
8
Figure 4: Factors that are perceived to put job applicantsat a disadvantage in Greece and the EU. Source: Euro-barometer 77.4, Discrimination in the EU in 2012
Discrimination however is also prominent in workplaces.Job candidates’ certain characteristics may in most casesact as determinants for their selection or not by prospec-tive employers. Asked “when a company wants to hiresomeone and has the choice between two candidateswith equal skills and qualifications, which of the fol-lowing criteria may, in your opinion, put one candidateat a disadvantage”, respondents in Greece consider thecandidate’s age, specifically being over 55 years old, asthe primary criterion of discrimination in the labour mar-ket (54%). This is followed by disability (48%) and thecandidate’s look (manner of dress or presentation, 47%).The candidate’s skin colour or ethnic origin (43%) andhis/her psychical appearance (size, weight, face, etc,42%) are also believed to be significant grounds of dis-crimination. Age over 55 years old is at the top (54%)when EU-27 is concerned, followed by the candidate’slook (45%) and disability (40%). Figure 4 presents indetail the criteria which could put a candidate at a dis-advantage in the labour market, as well as response ratesfor Greece and the EU.
According to the European Social Survey’s (ESS) 2011data, the proportion of respondents who identify them-selves as members of groups that are subject to discrim-ination amounts to 7.5% in Greece, whereas the respec-tive average across the 27 participating countries is 6.5%.The most commonly reported grounds of discriminationin Greece are nationality by 35.5%, colour or race by29.1% and age by 11.3%. On the other end we find dis-crimination due to sexual orientation and disability, bothamounting to 2.5% (see figure 4). These data are in ac-cordance with the outcomes of the Eurobarometer’s sur-vey, as well as data from the Greek Ombudsman basedon citizens’ complaints filed with the Authority.
Regarding Greece despite any gaps of Law 3304/2005,there is today a comprehensive anti-discrimination leg-islative framework, which has been recently enhanced
Figure 5: Grounds of discrimination in Greece.Source: ESS Data, Results of 5th Round,http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
with Laws 4074/2012 and 4097/2012; these laws incor-porate into the Greek legislation directives and interna-tional conventions, thus increasing the level of protec-tion. Looking closely into the application of legislation,it could be argued that complaints regarding discrimina-tions on the grounds of religion or beliefs and sexual ori-entation are still quite limited. A greater effort needs tobe made in this area by the state, in order to raise publicawareness and in order for citizens to learn their rights.According to the Eurobarometer survey, in Greece thereis a relatively stable view regarding discriminations dueto ethnic origin and sexual orientation, whereas a de-crease is documented on other grounds, especially re-garding gender discrimination. Discrimination on theground of nationality remains the basic ground of dis-crimination in Greece, as the ESS findings also suggest.Out of the ten proposed grounds of discrimination, thereis a decrease in six, nationality rates remain stable, andrates are higher for the remainder three.
Discriminations seem to be more intensified in the labourmarket, where all rates are higher. Age discrimination(being over 55 years old) appears as the most promi-nent ground of unequal treatment. Discrimination out-side working life is seen as occurring less often. Theeconomic crisis has also increased discriminations, par-ticularly in the labour market and mainly due to flexibleforms of employment and the change of scenery, broughtabout by a series of legislative interventions.
The primary duty of the Greek state is to raise cit-izens’ awareness and to disseminate information re-garding anti-discrimination legislation. Raising publicawareness on discrimination issues is an important tool,which will ultimately be used to combat them. Develop-ing social dialogue among government, the civil societyand social partners could constitute a significant step ofprogress.
9
The Demographics of Poverty in Selected Mediter-ranean Countries
By Dionyssis Balourdos1 ([email protected])
Aim
The use of demographic variables is an essential partof any analysis of poverty. However, we cannot yet befully satisfied with the analysis and understandings of therole of demographic factors that influence poverty. Thispaper focuses on three factors related to demography,which have been shown to have an impact on poverty:fertility, age and household size and composition.
Theoretical considerations
In social science literatures there are partial theoreticalpieces, each one contributing to the understanding of thepoverty and demography connection. I shortly considerthree suitable perspectives.
The individualization perspective: Ulrich Beck2 assumesthat poverty is not a fixed condition, a personal or groupfeature, but rather it is an experience or a stage in the life-course. It is not necessarily associated with a marginalposition in society, but reaches well into the middle class(erosion of middle class).
The family stress perspective was developed with the aimto verify the effect of financial loss during the GreatDepression.3 The perspective assumes that poor fami-lies face significant economic pressure as they struggleto pay bills and are forced to cut back on the costs ofdaily living. This economic pressure, coupled with otherstressful life events, creates stress which is manifested indepression and hostility in poor parents. These behav-iors are reflective on marital and parenting relationshipswhich may be detrimental to their children and otherhousehold dependents.
The Second Demographic Transition perspective refersto changes in family structure, delayed marriage, post-poned and more rare childbearing, cohabitation, higherrates of abortion and divorce, lower fertility-below re-placement and more non-marital childbearing. Overall,the recent recession is likely to have some depressing ef-fects on childbearing and push period fertility rates thatare often considered too low, to a slightly lower level inmany countries.
1Research Director, Greek National Centre for Social Research -EKKE
2Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Lon-don: Sage (German original 1986).
3Elder, G. H., Jr. (1974). Children of the Great Depression: So-cial change in life experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
!!
2 !
from 19.6% to 21.8%. In Malta and Cyprus the risk of poverty rate is lower than the European mean.2
F igure 1. A t risk of poverty rate, selected countries 2005-2011
F igure 2 shows that by 2011, some of the biggest declines in TFR occurred in the countries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Spain's fertility rate fell from 1.46 in 2008 to around 1.36 in 2011. -year fertility rise stopped around 2008 as the economic crisis hit, and started to slide in 2011. In Cyprus and Portugal in 2011, the TFR was 1.5, just above 1.3, considered by
- To see such a change in trend so soon after the start of recession is remarkable. It seems that, changes in fertility partially follow changes in the economy, with an average lag of less than two years. F igure 2. E conomic recession and fertility: Mediter ranean countries 2002-2011
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! !
16.4 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.3 16.9
19.6
20.5 20.3 20.1
19.7 20.1
21.4
19.7 19.9 19.7
19.6 19.5
20.7
21.8
18.9
19.6 19.8
18.7 18.4 18.2
19.6
16.1 15.6 15.5
15.9 15.8 15.1
14.5 13.9 14.0
14.8 15.0 15.3 15.0 15.4
19.4
18.5 18.1 18.5 17.9 17.9
18.0
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
At r isk of poverty rate
Year
1.26
1.31 1.32
1.34 1.37
1.39 1.39 1.38 1.36
1.28 1.30
1.33
1.40 1.41
1.51 1.52 1.51
1.42
1.27 1.29
1.33
1.32
1.35
1.37
1.42 1.41 1.41 1.40
1.47
1.44
1.40 1.40
1.36 1.33
1.37
1.32 1.36
1.46 1.47
1.50 1.51
1.54 1.56
1.60 1.59 1.60
1.57
1.45
1.48
1.38 1.39
1.44 1.43
1.49 1.49 1.50 1.49
1.42 1.45 1.46
1.51
1.44
1.35
1.24
1.29
1.34
1.39
1.44
1.49
1.54
1.59
1.64
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E U 27
Spain
Series brake
Malta Italy
Portugal!
Total fertility rate
Year
Figure 1: At risk of poverty rate, selected countries2005-2011. Source: Eurostat
Selected empirical findings
Macro level studies generally conclude that increase inrelative poverty is due to higher levels of fertility. Mi-cro level studies find that poor households tend to havelarger families and that their children are raised in ‘lowerquality’.4
As Figure 1 shows, strict income policy seems to havehad a strong impact on relative poverty in Greece, Spainand Portugal. For example, in Greece relative povertyincreased from 20.1% in 2008 to 21.4% in 2011 while inSpain during the same period it increased from 19.6% to21.8%. In Malta and Cyprus the risk of poverty rate islower than the European mean.
Figure 2 shows that by 2011, some of the biggest de-clines in total fertility rate (TFR)5 occurred in the coun-tries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Spain’s fertility ratefell from 1.46 in 2008 to around 1.36 in 2011. Greece’sfell from 1.51 to below 1.42. It seems that a ten-yearfertility rise stopped around 2008 as the economic crisishit, and started to slide in 2011. In Cyprus and Portugalin 2011, the TFR was 1.5, just above 1.3, considered bysome scholars as marking a level of ‘lowest-low’ fertil-ity. To see such a change in trend so soon after the startof recession is remarkable. It seems that changes in fer-tility partially follow changes in the economy, with anaverage lag of less than two years.
Concerning the relationship between poverty and fer-tility we find that low fertility is associated with highpoverty rates and this is actually the trend in all Mediter-ranean countries except Malta and Cyprus which have
4The cost for raising children includes the direct financial costse.g. housing, health care, education, child care, but also the indirector opportunity cost, of the mother’s time spent in child care (oftenmeasured using estimates of the woman’s earning power, or potentialwage rate, in the labor market).
5The term Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is used to describe the totalnumber of children the average women in a population is likely tohave, based on current birth rates throughout her life. The TFR re-quired for replacement is currently considered to be around 2.1 chil-dren per woman.
10
!!
2 !
from 19.6% to 21.8%. In Malta and Cyprus the risk of poverty rate is lower than the European mean.2
F igure 1. A t risk of poverty rate, selected countries 2005-2011
F igure 2 shows that by 2011, some of the biggest declines in TFR occurred in the countries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Spain's fertility rate fell from 1.46 in 2008 to around 1.36 in 2011. -year fertility rise stopped around 2008 as the economic crisis hit, and started to slide in 2011. In Cyprus and Portugal in 2011, the TFR was 1.5, just above 1.3, considered by
- To see such a change in trend so soon after the start of recession is remarkable. It seems that, changes in fertility partially follow changes in the economy, with an average lag of less than two years. F igure 2. E conomic recession and fertility: Mediter ranean countries 2002-2011
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! !
16.4 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.3 16.9
19.6
20.5 20.3 20.1
19.7 20.1
21.4
19.7 19.9 19.7
19.6 19.5
20.7
21.8
18.9
19.6 19.8
18.7 18.4 18.2
19.6
16.1 15.6 15.5
15.9 15.8 15.1
14.5 13.9 14.0
14.8 15.0 15.3 15.0 15.4
19.4
18.5 18.1 18.5 17.9 17.9
18.0
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
At r isk of poverty rate
Year
1.26
1.31 1.32
1.34 1.37
1.39 1.39 1.38 1.36
1.28 1.30
1.33
1.40 1.41
1.51 1.52 1.51
1.42
1.27 1.29
1.33
1.32
1.35
1.37
1.42 1.41 1.41 1.40
1.47
1.44
1.40 1.40
1.36 1.33
1.37
1.32 1.36
1.46 1.47
1.50 1.51
1.54 1.56
1.60 1.59 1.60
1.57
1.45
1.48
1.38 1.39
1.44 1.43
1.49 1.49 1.50 1.49
1.42 1.45 1.46
1.51
1.44
1.35
1.24
1.29
1.34
1.39
1.44
1.49
1.54
1.59
1.64
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E U 27
Spain
Series brake
Malta Italy
Portugal!
Total fertility rate
Year
Figure 2: Economic recession and fertility: Mediter-ranean countries 2002-2011. Source: Eurostat
!!
3 !
Concerning the relationship between poverty and fertility we find that low fertility is associated with high poverty rates and this is actually the trend in all Mediterranean countries except Malta and Cyprus which have low fertility rates and poverty levels below the EU mean (F igure 3).
We also find that the differences in poverty between the two sexes are not so high. In general females show higher rates than men. Concerning the risk of poverty with respect to age we observe that in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta the child risk of poverty rate is significantly higher than the risk of poverty rate of the aged, while in Cyprus the opposite is observed. Generally, the elderly and children feature among the core groups with a higher than average poverty risk, compared to people of working age or to total population.3
F igure 3. A t risk of poverty rate and fertility in E U countries, 2011
Household structure and size
We assume that better educated women are motivated to increase their labor market attachment and postpone childbearing due to fear of putting their career progress at risk. According to mainstream theory they face higher opportunity costs than those with low income potential. In contrast, among the women with lower education,
welfare system. However, during the recession, as the welfare systems generosity has been exhausted and the unemployment rates are high, the possible
childbearing decision. It is tempo that matters and the average age of first births is expected to increase further. As data extracted from Eurostat show, in 2011 two types of households face higher risks of poverty:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 Ibid.
Bulgaria Romania
Spain Greece
Lithuania Italy Latvia
Portugal Poland
Estonia
EU 27 United Kingdom
Germany Malta Belgium Ireland
Cyprus France Sweden Hungary Finland
Luxembourg Slovenia
Denmark Slovakia Austria Netherlands Czech Republic
y = 8.3651x2 - 31.77x + 44.84
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10
At r isk of poverty rate
Total fertility rate
Figure 3: At risk of poverty rate and fertility in EU coun-tries, 2011. Source: Eurostat
low fertility rates and poverty levels below the EU mean(Figure 3).
We also find that the differences in poverty between thetwo sexes are not so high. In general females showhigher poverty rates than men. Concerning the risk ofpoverty with respect to age we observe that in Spain,Italy, Portugal and Malta children’s risk of poverty rateis significantly higher than the risk of poverty rate of theelderly, while in Cyprus the opposite is observed. Gen-erally, the elderly and children feature among the coregroups with a higher than average poverty risk, com-pared to people of working age or to total population.
Household structure and size
My paper assumes that better educated women are mo-tivated to increase their labor market attachment andpostpone childbearing due to fear of putting their careerprogress at risk. According to mainstream thinking, theyface higher opportunity costs than those with low incomepotential. In contrast, among the women with lower edu-cation, childbearing could become a ‘strategy’ if there isenough financial support from the welfare system. How-ever, during the recession, as the welfare systems’ gen-erosity has been exhausted and the unemployment ratesare high, the possible loss of a man’s income is a centralfactor in couples’ childbearing decision. It is the ‘tempoeffect’ that matters and the average age of first births isexpected to increase further.
As data extracted from Eurostat show, in 2011 two typesof households face higher risks of poverty:
• Single-adult households (that is, single parents withdependent children, or without children); and
• Households with a greater number of children.
Poverty among single-person households can be higherthan in two-adult households, where income pooling canfacilitate responses to income shocks if they affect oneof the two individuals.
Also, single-adult households are often composed ofyoung, unemployed persons or elderly pensioners, bothof who face higher risks of poverty. Women are espe-cially at risk since they are over-represented both amongsingle-parent households (in several European states,more than 80 percent of all single-parent households areheaded by women) and among single-adult households,since elderly female pensioners are more likely to livealone than elderly men.
Risk of poverty among lone parents is lower in Cyprus(12.3%) and is over 30 percent in Portugal, Italy, Greeceand Malta. Child poverty has been associated with loneparent households, which are often headed by women,and therefore already at a disadvantage in terms of earn-ings, partly since the income available to support thechild is limited. We also find that poverty risks forsingle-adult households are significantly higher acrossthe selected countries and the EU average, whether thehousehold includes children or not, compared to two-adult households with or without children. This cannotbe attributed to a decrease in family size, as all the ex-amined countries have a high average family size. Onthe contrary, it may be stated that as the share of peopleliving in single households has grown in these countries,growing poverty risks for larger parts of the populationis observed.
Besides, according to recent statistical data, the risk ofpoverty is high for immigrants from a non EU country(Third Country Nationals): the risk of poverty followsan increasing trend during the period 2008-2011, in allcountries and the EU average. In 2011, the rate is higherin Greece (46.3%), Spain (43.2%), Cyprus (36.3%) andPortugal (35.3%).
Material deprivation rate provides an estimate of the pro-portion of people whose living conditions are severelyaffected by a lack of resources and varies significantlyamong Member States. In Greece, Italy and Cyprus theindicator of severe material deprivation rate is high, es-pecially for women. Besides, in 2011, the share of per-sons declaring that they were having great difficulty in‘making ends meet’, is higher in Greece (25.6%), Cyprus
11
(25.1%), and Portugal (19.2%). It seems that for Spainand Malta monetary poverty is the dominant indicatorwhile in Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal the non mon-etary aspects of poverty6 are of great significance.
Conclusions
• Population trends are more sensitive to the eco-nomic cycle than might be expected, althoughshowing some time lag.
• People are postponing starting families (tempo ef-fect), as the average age of first births rises and firstbirths are decreasing more than later births in somecountries, suggesting also that people are postpon-ing starting families.
• The central point for the countries hit hardest by therecession is the sustainability of male income andthe uncertainty of this factor postpones the child-bearing decision.
• Low fertility is a feature for countries with low GDPand high poverty rates.
• Gender has a limited effect on poverty while agehas an enlarged effect.
• The household types most at risk of poverty weresingle parents with dependent children, single el-derly people and single females, while children areamong the new risk groups.
• The examined Mediterranean countries are neitherequally affected by the crisis nor do they face sim-ilar population characteristics and household struc-ture. The situation is dramatic for those whoare monetary poor, feel poor and are materiallydeprived (basically Greece and Portugal but alsoSpain and Italy).
The following figure is very important, showing that notonly the composition but also the population size mat-ters.
6Non-monetary poverty can be described by a host of indicators,related to the enforced lack of a combination of items that depictmaterial living conditions: durable goods, housing facilities and de-terioration etc.
!!
5 !
-Sex has a limited effect on poverty while age has an enlarged effect -The household types most at risk of poverty were single parents with dependent children, single elderly people and single females, while children are among the new risk groups. -The examined Mediterranean countries are neither equally affected by the crisis nor do they face similar population characteristics and household structure. The situation is dramatic for those who are monetary poor, feel poor and are materially deprived (basically Greece and Portugal but also Spain and Italy).
The following figure is very important, showing that not only the composition but also the population size matters.
F igure 4. The size of the poor population and the poverty rate across
European countries, 2011*
M alta
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Estonia
Slovenia
Latvia
L ithuania
C roatia
I reland
F inland
Slovakia
Denmark
Bulgaria
Austria
Sweden
Hungary
Czech Republic
Portugal
Belgium
Greece
Netherlands
Romania
Poland
Spain
Italy
U . K .
F rance
Germany
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
At r isk of poverty rate
* Bubbles showing the size of the poor population
Figure 4: The size of the poor population and the povertyrate across European countries, 2011. Source: Eurostat
The Social Acceptability of Surveillance Technologiesin Pre-emptive Security: Towards a Democratizationof Risk Management Strategies
By Elvira Santiago1 ([email protected]),Sara Degli Esposti2 ([email protected]) &Vincenzo Pavone3 ([email protected])
Over the past ten years, in the face of global terrorism,nuclear proliferation, and transnational organized crime,new approaches to safeguard national and personal secu-rity have emerged. As a result of the spatial and temporalunpredictability of criminal actions and of their globalrepercussions, a safer society is often pursued throughthe implementation of security policies that increasinglyrely on the deployment of surveillance-oriented securitytechnologies (SOSTs). A surveillance-oriented securitytechnology is a technology which collects informationabout the general population to monitor their activitiesin order to tackle a security problem. These technolo-gies rely on ubiquitous surveillance and interconnecteddata exchange systems to identify malicious behavioursand stop - or even prevent – criminal activity from oc-curring. However, while any real improvement of publicsecurity has to be demonstrated on a case by case basis,SOST systems are based on a mass blanket surveillanceapproach. The high level of monitoring and control towhich ordinary citizens are subject, as a result of the im-plementation of SOST systems, is interpreted by somesociology scholars as evidence of the transformation ofour Western societies into surveillance societies (Lyon1994; SSN 2006; Lyon 2007).
Although the role played by the shifting nature of secu-rity risks and the national reactions to security threatshave been studied (Kroener and Neyland 2012), little
1IPP-CSIC, Spain2The Open University, UK3IPP-CSIC, Spain
12
work has been done on how the public perceive the mas-sive and often indiscriminate development and deploy-ment of SOSTs (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2010). Thespecific characteristics of these new technologies and thecontroversy around their acceptability increase the de-bate about the validity of the distinction between subjec-tive and objective risks and highlight the need for newrisk management frameworks and theories.
To tackle security problems surveillance measures areoften implemented throughout Europe without acknowl-edging cultural and social differences. Diverging na-tional understandings, political traditions and institu-tional settings may affect the way these technologies areperceived, implemented and managed. So far decisionson matters concerning security and privacy have left es-sential questions regarding public opinion unanswered:What are acceptable security technologies in Europe,what are not and why? How do citizens interpret therelationship between privacy and security? How do Eu-ropeans diverge in their privacy and security perceptionsand why?
Where security measures and technologies involve thecollection of information about citizens, questions ariseabout whether and to what extent their privacy has beeninfringed. This infringement of individual privacy issometimes seen as an acceptable cost of enhanced se-curity. Similarly, it is assumed that citizens are will-ing to trade off their privacy for enhanced personal se-curity in different settings. This common understandingof the security-privacy relationship, both at state and cit-izen level, has informed policymakers, legislative devel-opments and best practice guidelines concerning securitydevelopments across the EU.
The security-liberty trade-off is problematic for at leastthree reasons. First, liberty and security are presentedas abstract categories, instead of enacted social practicesemerging from the interaction between people and theirsocial and institutional context. Second, the debate onsecurity and liberty is framed as a zero-sum game, inwhich the trade-off acts as a rhetorical device to reducepublic opposition to a mere problem of making the nec-essary sacrifice for the sake of national security. Third,studies adopting the trade-off approach are empiricallynarrow, because they require citizens to assess the intro-duction of new security technologies using a predeter-mined conceptual approach, which frames security andprivacy as interchangeable goods right from the start.
However, an emergent body of work questions the valid-ity of the security-privacy trade-off (Pavone and DegliEsposti 2010). This work suggests that the trade-offmodel over-simplifies the reactions of citizens to secu-rity measures, especially when they embed surveillancefunctionalities. The reliance on the trade-off model may
make invisible to those who design, produce and managethe technology more complex issues underlying privacyconcerns and public scepticism towards the adoption ofnew security measures.
In response to these developments, the SurPRISEProject, funded under the EU 7th Framework Pro-gramme, organises large scale participatory events,called citizen summits, with the aim of re-examining therelationship between security, privacy and surveillancefrom a lay public’s perspective. SurPrise, which is anacronym, stands for “Surveillance, Privacy and Secu-rity: A large-scale participatory assessment of criteriaand factors determining acceptability and acceptance ofsecurity technologies in Europe”. One of the aims of theproject is to identify factors affecting SOSTs’ acceptabil-ity and investigate if citizens see a trade-off between se-curity and privacy and how this affects their acceptabilityperceptions. By ‘acceptability’ we mean that a technol-ogy is capable of being endured, because it is tolerable,adequate and conforms to approved standards from pub-lic’s point of view, nor necessarily from a technical orlegal perspective.
In order to study SOSTs’ acceptability and identify itsantecedents we relied on three types of academic litera-tures: science and technology studies (STS), risk analy-sis studies, and privacy and security studies. The follow-ing list presents the factors selected as considered mostlikely to influence SOSTs’ acceptability:
1. ‘Familiarity with SOSTs’ (Slovic et al. 1986) and‘General attitude towards SOSTs: Technology De-tractors vs. Supporters’, (Gaskel et al. 2005) com-ing from STS literature;
2. Perceived Intrusiveness and Perceived Effective-ness’, (Sanquist et al. 2008); ‘Temporal, Spatial andSocial Proximity’ (Bickerstaff et al 2006; Irwin et al1999; Moffat et al 2004); ‘Perceived Level of Secu-rity Threat’ (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Huddy etal. 2002), and the variable ‘Trade-off Model’ (San-quist, 2008), from Risk studies;
3. ‘Institutional Trustworthiness’ (Tensey andO’Riordan, 1999; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000),from both STS contextual approach and thesocio-cultural perspective in Risk studies;
4. ‘Substantive Privacy Concerns’ (Clarke, 1997;Pavone, Degli Esposti and Santiago 2013) inferredfrom privacy studies.
This theoretical framework represents the base for thedevelopment of the survey design and of the correspond-ing questionnaire that will be used during the citizen
13
summits to collect people’s responses. Questions will bedisplayed on a large screen and people will be able to an-swer by means of clickers. Before the event, summit par-ticipants will receive a booklet containing informationabout three specific SOSTs: Smart Closed-Circuit Tele-vision (CCTV); Cyber surveillance using Deep PacketInspection (DPI); and Smartphone Location Tracking.During the event citizens will also watch short docu-mentaries films presenting these same technologies andwill have the chance of discussing with fellow partici-pants. Citizen summits with about 200 participants willbe held in Italy, Spain, Norway, Germany, United King-dom, Switzerland, Austria, and Denmark between Jan-uary and March 2014.
References
Bickerstaff, K.; Simmons, P. Pidgeon, N. (2006). Publicperceptions of risk, science and governance: main find-ings of a qualitative study of six risk cases. Understand-ing risk working paper.
Clarke, R. (1997). Introduction to Dataveillance and In-formation Privacy, and Definitions of Terms, last version7th August 2006. URL: http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Intro.html
Gasckell, G.; Eyck, T. et al. (2005). Imagining nan-otechnology: cultural support for technological innova-tion in Europe and the United States. Public Understand-ing of Science, vol. 14: 81-90.
Huddy, L.; Feldman, S.; Capelos, T. and Provost, C.(2002). The consequences of Terrorism: Disentanglingthe effects of personal and national threat. Political Psy-chology, vol. 23(3):485-509.
Irwin, A.; Simmons, P. and Walker, G. (1999). Faulty en-vironments and risk reasoning: the local understandingof industrial hazards. Environment and Planning, vol.31:1311-1326.
Johnson, E. J.; and Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, general-ization and the perception of risk. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, vol. 45:20–31.
Kroener, I. and D. Neyland (2012). New technolo-gies, security and surveillance. Routledge Handbook ofSurveillance Studies. K. Ball, K. Haggerty and D. Lyon.London, Routledge International Handbooks.
Lyon, D. (1994). The electronic eye: The rise of surveil-lance society. Minneapolis, University Of MinnesotaPress.
Lyon, D. (2007). Surveillance, Security and Social Sort-ing. International Criminal Justice Review, 17(3): 161.
Moffatt, S.; Boeldke, B.; and Pless-Mulloli, T. (2004).Local environmental concerns among communities inNorth-East England and South Hessen Germany: the in-fluence of proximity to industry. Journal of Risk Re-search, vol. 6:125-144
Pavone, V. and S. Degli Esposti (2010). Public as-sessment of new surveillance-oriented security tech-nologies: beyond the trade-off between privacy andsecurity. Public Understanding of Science, DOI:10.1177/0963662510376886.
Pavone, V., Degli Esposti, S. and Santiago, E.(2013). Deliverable 2.2: Draft Report on Key Factors,28/02/2013. URL: http://surprise-project.eu/
Sanquist, T. F., Mahy, H. et al. (2008). An ExploratoryRisk Perception Study of Attitudes Toward HomelandSecurity Systems. Risk Analysis: An International Jour-nal, vol. 28(4): 1125-1133.
Siegrist, M and Cvetkovich, G. (2000) Perception ofHazards: The Role of Social Trust and Knowledge. RiskAnalysis, 20: 713-720.
Slovic, P.; Fischhoff, B.; and Liechtenstein, S. (1986).The psychometric study of risk perceptions. Risk Eval-uation and Management. New York, London, PlenumPress, pp. 3-24.
SSN (2006). A Report on the Surveillance Society. A re-port for the Information Commissioner’s Office. LondonUK, Surveillance Studies Network.
Tansey, J. and O’Riordan, T. (1999). Cultural theory andrisk: a review. Health, Risk and Society 1(1): 71-90.
Negotiating the Future of International Peace (orWar) Under Conditions of Natural Resource Scarcityand Global Climate Change
By Tracey Skillington1 ([email protected])
The following presents a brief assessment of a number ofrecent policy statements on the security implications ofclimate change before offering a critical appraisal of howinclinations towards democratic peace might be main-tained in the face of intensifying competition betweenstates for diminishing stocks of natural resources. Froma Rawlsian perspective, the motives necessary to recog-nize and act upon obligations of justice are becoming in-creasingly strained by the depletion of global reserves ofresources like gas, oil, fish, water and minerals.2 Princi-
1Dr., University College Cork, Ireland2For John Rawls (1971:11), ‘justice as fairness’ is best under-
stood as the product of a hypothetical agreement among the freemembers of a self-guiding ‘society of peoples’ like a nation statewhose future flourishing depends upon the continued availability ofsufficient supplies of essential natural resources, amongst other ele-ments.
14
ples of justice are widely assumed to operate more effec-tively within bounded political communities (e.g., nationstates) where interpersonal ties and historically groundedmodels of justice and solidarity predominate. What istaken for granted in this instance is the notion that issuesof justice can continue in some way to be ‘contained’within the borders of distinct sovereign political com-munities and extended only minimally to include certain‘duties of assistance’ to the peoples of other states.
What require greater sociological investigation are thosemechanisms that currently restrict prospects for a greaterresource sharing and simultaneously encourage anti-cosmopolitan tendencies towards inter-state rivalry andoccasionally, conflict over diminishing stocks of re-sources worldwide. Arguably, the core element miss-ing is a more practically oriented principle of ‘co-responsibility’ (Apel 1993: 9) for the deepening hu-manitarian effects of global climate change – crop fail-ure, drought, flooding, leading to a greater incidenceof disease, hunger, and mass displacement. Notionsof ‘our common future’ (e.g., Bruntland Report 1987)have circulated in international political debate on cli-mate change for more than three decades. Yet until re-cently, this discourse has not provoked any serious effortto cosmopolitanize the law of peoples or extend spheresof resource justice across sovereign borders in a mannerthat maximizes opportunities to secure a minimum of re-sources for all the peoples of this world. If anything, wehave seen an intensification of state communitarian rea-soning. With the long-term resource supplies of boundedpolitical communities seen as under increasing threat, amilitary defense of diminishing reserves is presented bymany of the larger political powers as a legitimate ‘cli-mate change security measure’.
In a Report to the European Council on Climate Changeand International Security (March 2008), the EuropeanCommission urges the Council to establish a ‘preventa-tive security policy’ capable of responding effectively tothe threats greater natural resource conflict will pose tothe EU in the future. ‘Entire regions’, it argues, may bedestabilized by a ‘politics of resentment between thosemost responsible for climate change and those most af-fected by it’. Threats to international security are mostlikely to emerge where governance capacity at the statelevel is overstretched and unable to manage the physicalimpacts of climate change. Where this occurs, civil un-rest, inter-communal violence, mass migration, and po-litical instability become increasingly probable. In its2010 Climate Change Adaptation Report, the US De-partment of Homeland Security echoes many of the con-cerns of the European Commission when it explains howas a ‘threat multiplier’, climate change may trigger ‘or-ganized insurrections due to increased resource scarcity,
weakening states, and widening economic inequalities’conditions that in severe cases are likely to ‘breed ex-tremism and terrorism’ (p.3).
International Alert has identified forty-six states with acombined population of 2.7 billion people, where cli-mate change and water-related crises produce a highrisk of violent conflict. In a further fifty-six states, 1.2billion people, they estimate, are likely to experiencevarious forms of climate-induced political instability inthe decades ahead. The United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) (2012) notes how at least eighteenof the most violent conflicts in the last two decadeshave been fuelled by natural resource distribution, notonly those centred on ‘high value’ resources like dia-monds, gold, or oil but also more regular and increas-ingly scarce resources like fresh water. Figures pro-duced by The Robert S. Strauss Center (Social Conflictin Africa Database 2011) support the concerns of the UNand point to a sharp rise in the incidence of hostilitiesin areas vulnerable to climate-related hazards, includ-ing Chad, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique wherea high prevalence of drought and over-intensive resourceexploitation all contribute to social unrest in regions pre-dicted to lose upwards of 75% of their arable lands in thedecades ahead. Implicit in this policy discourse on thesecurity implications of climate change is the notion thatwar, in certain circumstances, is a legitimate responseto perceived threats to a community’s resource reservesand given the inevitability of shortages amongst manyclimate vulnerable states in the future, highly likely.An ‘uncomfortable paradox’ (Beck 2008:131) emergesalongside the institutionalization of a liberal democraticregime that in principle supports global peace and soli-darity under conditions of resource scarcity and growingclimate adversity but in practice, also offers legitimationoccasionally to its opposite – war - as a ‘just’ responseto acts of resource aggression.3
It is crucial that current models of democratic peace be-gin to take on board the reasonableness of the larger po-litical powers’ justificatory claims for war in a resourcechallenged world. In particular, strategic denials of thefact that states are interdependent in their reliance uponcertain resources subject to redistribution (e.g., a fish-ing commons or more fundamentally, the earth’s atmo-
3Ulrich Beck (2003:454) explains how the institutionalization ofan ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ must maintain a critical pur-pose particularly in relation to current expressions of a burgeoningwar mentality on issues like the future resource security of the com-munities of this world. The ‘ambivalent transitional co-existence’ ofa lingering ‘national gaze’ on climate adversities, for instance, withmore cosmopolitan visions of our common future is more the prod-uct of a persisting lack of reflexivity in the self-understandings of thenational perspective of states, the latter of which gives rise to bla-tant moral asymmetries and radical inequalities of opportunity in thecontext of globally sustained climate risks.
15
sphere, see Vanderheiden (2008) and perhaps in time,water). The relevant community to deliberate on such is-sues is international, not national or regional in isolation,especially when we take into consideration the various‘spillover effects’ of the escalating ‘race for resources’.As communitarians have argued (e.g., Walzer 1994),norms that grant persons control over matters of commonconcern should coincide with the communities of whichthey are a part. Applying this reasoning to the issue ofresource scarcity, the latter is a matter of ‘common con-cern’, one that is international in scope and, therefore,transcends the exclusive jurisdiction of individual nationstates. If basic resources are to be preserved both nowand into the future, then all within this globally extendedcommunity must abide by the principles of a peace-ful and cooperative cosmopolitan scheme of distribu-tive justice to ensure humanity’s common survival (seeUN General Assembly Resolution 65/159, December 20,2010 ‘Protection of a Global Climate for Present andFuture Generations of Humankind’). As Vanderheiden(2008) warns, a self-interested ‘race to the bottom’ in cli-mate policy, even by one nation, can undermine overallcommitments to an inter-generational justice. The ques-tion then is how can we improve prospects for a prin-cipled cooperation on resource distribution amongst the‘global commons’?
According to Delanty (2013), what are required are sub-stantial socio-cognitive shifts in self-understanding andways of thinking about our common membership of‘world risk society’ (Beck & Levy, 2013). It is aboutactivating cosmopolitan learning potentials in the searchfor solutions to problems that eventually will threatenall of humanity. The sheer scale and speed of resourcedepletions today require the full range of our principle-reflexive capacities to adjust to new global realities andopen up the space of the political to new possibilitiesfor global peace under changing ecological conditions.Arguably, the best way to ensure perpetual peace is totrans-nationalize procedures for peace building (Bohman2012). The latter may take the form of multiple deliber-ative procedures (legal, political and public procedurescoordinated by one, globally elected steering commit-tee) that debate the conduct of resource wars from multi-ple angles and perspectives and establish, on the basis ofongoing discussion, a new set of requirements for a ‘justglobal peace’ and ongoing democratic compromise.
References
Apel, K. O. 1993. ‘How to Ground Universalistic Ethicsof Co-Responsibility For the Effects of Collective Ac-tions and Activities?’, Philosophica. 52 (2): 9-29.
Beck, U., 2003. ‘Toward a New Critical Theory With aCosmopolitan Intent’. Constellations. 10, 4. 453-468.
Beck U., 2008: Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge:Polity.
Bohman J., 2012. ‘Jus Post Bellum as a DeliberativeProcess: Transnationalizing Peacebuilding’. Irish Jour-nal of Sociology, 20, 1, 10-27.
Delanty, G., 2013. ‘The Prospects of Cosmopolitanismand the Possibility of Global Justice’, Journal of Soci-ology, Special Issue on Globalization and Cosmopoli-tanism (forthcoming) 49, 4.
European Commission, 2008. Climate Change andInternational Security. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf
European Commission, 2012. Developing a EuropeanUnion Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since2008 and next steps, http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/join_2012_19.pdf
Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice. Harvard: HarvardUniversity Press.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2009:From Conflict to Peace-building: The role of natural re-sources and the environment. http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf
UN General Assembly Resolution 65/159, December 20,2010 ‘Protection of a Global Climate for Present and Fu-ture Generations of Humankind’
UN Report of the World Commission on Environmentand Development. Our Common Future (Bruntland Re-port), 1987. See: http://conspect.nl/pdf/Our_Common_Future-Brundtland_Report_1987.pdf
Vanderheiden, S. 2008. Atmospheric Justice: A PoliticalTheory of Climate Justice. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
Walzer M., 1977. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Ar-gument with Historical Illustrations. New York: BasicBooks.
White House, 2009: US National Security. Arctic Pol-icy Report (National Security Presidential Directive-66(NSPD). https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm
16
“Social Attractors”: A Tool for Reading Shifts inGender Relations in Disaster Contexts
By Christopher Lyon1 ([email protected])
Socially marginalised groups may suffer undue harm duetheir exclusion in society, suggesting that at least partof the solution rests in finding ways of recognising theirvoices. Drawing on recent work in social-ecological sys-tems resilience by the late Ken Hatt on concept of socialattractors, this extended abstract shows how the attractorconcept may also be used to make visible marginalisedgroups in disaster scenarios. Following an explanationof the concept, two examples from gender and disasterliterature are used to illustrate how this might work. Ed-ward Said’s contrapuntal approach to unequal relation-ships provides an additional conceptual anchor.
Theory of resilience and social attractors
Ken Hatt’s 2012 paper2 describes a useful way of doingthis. Hatt integrates insights from the study of ecolog-ical systems to provide a better understanding of socialsystems dynamics in social-ecological systems (SES) re-silience. SES resilience thinking sees the natural andhuman worlds as dynamic systems where human andnon-human elements interact in complex processes ofgrowth, change, and renewal at different scales of timeand space. Social attractors are the things around whichpeople’s perspectives (discourses) and actions (socialpractices) are formed. People’s discourses and relatedsocial practices enable or constrain certain types of ac-tion around a given issue, to positive or negative feed-back into the social system (society). Formulating a so-ciety as a system of discourses and practices creates adynamic map of the groups, key issues, and viewpointsthat drive people’s actions. Importantly, it helps to showhow different social practices interact with others in asystem of feedbacks that act to maintain or transform thesociety.
To illustrate the social attractor approach, Hatt describesthe scenario of development around an austere lake-side cottage community in rural Québec, Canada. Here,the system of ecological attractor of the lake and so-cial attractors (nature, conservation, property) define cer-tain discourses around social practices (boating, sep-tic/toilets, farming, electricity). Through a simple equa-tion, he shows how the interaction between groups, dis-courses, and practices results in positive or negative
1School of the Environment, University of Dundee, Dundee,Scotland
2Hatt, Ken. 2012. ‘Social Attractors: A Proposal to Enhance “Re-silience Thinking” About the Social’. Society & Natural Resources26(1):30–43.
feedbacks. For example, he explains, “as the commit-ment to nature increases, the use of and support forpower boats decreases. . . [and] conservation increases”.
Recognising the discourses and practices ofmarginalised groups as activities that feedback intothe larger social system makes these groups visible asactors in the analysis of disaster. The links betweendiscourses around the attractor and the consequent socialpractices are important. These connections reveal thefeedback effects of the practices into the particularitiesof the functioning of a given social (-ecological) systemand show how the actions of each group influence thewhole. Considered with Edward Said’s contrapuntalapproach to postcolonial relationships, such an approachhelps us understand the role of marginalised groups indisaster settings.
Link to contrapuntal approach
Edward Said3 borrowed the contrapuntal concept frommusic theory to describe a way of reconceptualising therelationship between colonised and coloniser society asone of hybridisation and relationship, like the way a mu-sic is made of the sounds of different instruments. Saidwrites,
No one today is purely one thing. Labels likeIndian, or woman, or Muslim, or Americanare not more than starting points, which if fol-lowed into actual experience for only a mo-ment are quickly left behind. . . survival in factis about the connections between things.
Applying Said’s approach to disaster accounts for therole of marginalised groups as part of the system ofdisaster that also includes privileged groups. In turn,this allows disaster to be understood holistically andbeyond the valuable but narrow focus on the mostmarginalised. Just as people are more than just vulner-able, the discourses around which people mobilise arealso not singular. Therefore, whichever group is consid-ered marginalised or vulnerable in a scenario may mo-bilise around similar or unrelated attractors to those con-sidered to have privilege and in addition to those cen-tred on notions of difference or “contestation”. It is notenough to say that this group or that is vulnerable or priv-ileged without also looking for the places where they aremore equitable. By reading disaster contrapuntally andseeking out the social attractors, the complex ways inwhich marginalised people are both impacted by and alsocontribute to shaping the outcomes for their communitiesmay be revealed.
3Said, Edward. 1994. Culture and Imperialism. 1st VintageBooks ed. New York: Vintage Books.
17
Figure 1: Hurricane Katrina (drawing on Luft 2008)
Reading social attractors in gender and disaster
Rachel Luft4 examines the intersections of class, race,and gender in her account of a series sexual assaultswithin a large relief organisation operating in the Hur-ricane Katrina impacted New Orleans area. The organi-sation, Common Ground (CG), although emerging froma call from local members, drew on mostly white andsometimes middle-class volunteers who travelled fromlocations throughout the United States. A popular drawwas an initiative that positioned volunteering as an alter-native spring break for university students. During thecourse of relief efforts a number of mostly white menassaulted a number of white women within CG.
However, the gendered and racialised discourse that sub-sequently emerged within the organisation around thesexual assault attractor saw it both advise against thepractice venturing alone into the nearby mostly Blackneighbourhood and fail to mention the internal rapes tonewly arrived volunteers. Figure 1 shows how a negativefeedback was created that ultimately served to reinforcethe intersectional racialised, sexualised, and colonial so-cial relations extant in the American South as they werereflected in the relationship between largely white reliefvolunteers and local recipients of relief and rebuildingefforts. However, despite these problems, the organisa-tion did much productive work and the women and menwithin the organisation still worked together. Recognis-ing but moving beyond intersectionality in accountingfor the experience of the marginalised is therefore neces-sary, especially if the goal of progressive social transfor-mation is to be achieved.
In contrast, an example of a positive disaster feedbackresulting in social transformation is provided by LynnHorton’s5 study of Haitian women and women’s or-
4Luft, Rachel E. 2008. ‘Looking for Common Ground: ReliefWork in Post-Katrina New Orleans as an American Parable of Raceand Gender Violence’. NWSA Journal 20(3):5.
5Horton, Lynn. 2012. ‘After the Earthquake: Gender Inequalityand Transformation in Post-disaster Haiti’. Gender & Development20(2):295–308.
Figure 2: Haiti Earthquake (drawing on Horton 2012)
ganisations after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. TheHaitian social context and recent history has resulted inthe marginalisation and poor treatment of women on anumber of levels, including state sanctioned rape usedto threaten women activists and leaders, and the exclu-sion of women from male dominated roles in civil so-ciety as well as the foreign-dominated the aid and de-velopment sectors. Here, women’s discourse in the im-mediate aftermath of the earthquake centred on “survivaland basic needs” and, positioning themselves as “moth-ers and caretakers” around the social attractor of chil-dren and other women. Children may have lost par-ents, and women tended to be worse off and prostitu-tion or violence were risks. Haitian women formed acommittee to ensure dangers such as the bodies of vic-tims were removed from the area so it could be madesafe for children. In the longer-term, these women’s or-ganisations shifted their focus to more strategic issues ofeducation, police, and justice reform aimed addressingwomen’s structural inequalities in Haitian society andpolitics. Thus, as Figure 2 shows, the social attractorsof women and children led to a positive feedback wherelocal women collectively acted to provide aid after theearthquake and empowered local women as a force forchange within the legal, political, and social attractors inHaiti.
These accounts each reveal examples of how social at-tractors contribute to negative and positive feedbacksinto the overall system of a community facing disaster.Horton’s example in particular shows how marginalisedgroups, in her case women, might contribute positivelynot only in helping with disaster recovery, but in movingtoward progressive social change. However, these kindsof account are incomplete if they are understood with-out reference to the other groups in relationship to themincluding those understood to have a normative privi-lege, as a contrapuntal approach would have. Relational,or contrapuntal, analysis of the experiences of non-marginalised and marginalised is inclusive, and whencombined with a social attractor approach, presents a
18
more nuanced systemic picture of the social aspects ofdisaster than approaches that focus on single issues.
Conclusion
The social attractor concept as a systems-based approachfor understanding the contribution of marginalised com-munities toward disaster recovery shows the relationshipbetween the discourses around which groups coalesce,and how these translate into social practices that feed-back into the overall social system. In Luft’s study, thegendered feedbacks from the discursive practice of sex-ual assault were racialised and had negative consquencesfor both CG’s members and its relationship with the sur-rounding community, yet did not ultimately negate thebenefits CG brought the locality. Used here, the socialattractor approach reveals the complex and sometimesambiguous nature of intersectional disaster settings. InHorton’s study, a positive shift in gendered relation-ships occurred as the hurricane instigated collective ac-tion among women that was at first focussed on protect-ing women and children, which sustained and developedinto political change. More broadly, demonstrating thevalue of marginalised groups as capable actors in disasterrecovery and how disaster can be mobilised to promotelonger-term social progress, the social attractor approachmay help reduce marginalisation.
Models of Governmental Crisis Communications andInformation Management
By Elena Gryzunova1 ([email protected])
The term crisis designates an unexpected perceived dis-ruption of a social unit which threatens its basic struc-tures, integrity, reputation or survival, shatters the life-worlds of people by challenging the public sense ofsafety, legitimacy or fundamental values and norms, andrequires critical decisions under time pressure, uncer-tainty, complexity and increased attention.
The aim of this study is to analyze the role of informa-tion and communications in governmental crisis man-agement, and to explore major factors that make cri-sis communications and information management func-tional or dysfunctional. The research presents new per-spectives on the status of citizens as productive actors ofcrisis management.
Governmental crisis communications and informationmanagement can be represented for clarity as a systemwhich consists of two subsystems. Here, the subsystem
1PhD in sociology, MGIMO-University, Moscow, Russia
F igure 1: Model of information blockage
1.1. Information processing: lack of reliable external resources, slow flow of internal information, groupthink !!!
1.2. Coordination: hierarchy, command and control, top level overload
!!!
2.2. Citizen involvement: formal control of participation, civil self-organization is suppressed
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: slow decision-making, approval of operative decisions on top level
2.1. Information dissemination: denial, lack of risk communication, information vacuum
2. External cr isis communication subsystem: dysfunctional strategy of information blockage
Figure 1: Model of information blockage
of internal decision-making applies mechanisms of in-formation processing and coordination between differ-ent units of a crisis management team. The subsystemof external crisis communications includes not only ex-change of information but also crowdsourcing and cit-izen involvement in crisis management. By models Iunderstand different functioning procedures of the gov-ernmental crisis communications and information man-agement system which depend on three major factors: 1)goal setting, 2) crisis type, and 3) level of citizen involve-ment.
Goal setting
The government often chooses misguided crisis commu-nications strategies and tactics not by ignorance but inorder to reach divergent goals, not (only) crisis manage-ment. Conflicting goals can damage the whole system,not only crisis communications but decision-making aswell. The hypothesis is proved by developing models ofinformation blockage and information manipulation thatcan be easily illustrated by real-life cases.
The information blockage strategy is aimed not onlyat crisis management but also at hiding evidence andavoiding open discussion which leads to misuse ofthe system’s mechanisms (Figure 1). The classicalexample of this model is Chernobyl disaster (USSR,1986) crisis management. In 1990 the Soviet govern-ment admitted that mistakes in information manage-ment had destructive social and political effects whichthreatened legitimacy of local and central government(Postanovleniye. . . , 1990). We may even suppose thatthe Chernobyl crisis was among the many factors thatcontributed to the Soviet Union breakdown.
The information manipulation strategy (Figure 2) is cho-sen to gain political advantage or make a profit out of acrisis which leads to opportunistic decision-making andcrisis-escalating “victimization” (Altheide, 2009, p. 45-46) tactics. For example, to draw on critical scholarship,the US discourse of the war on terror after 9/11 could of-
19
1.1. Information processing: preconceived analysis, ignoring some risks & crisis factors, exaggerating others !!!
F igure 2: Model of information manipulation
2.1. Information dissemination: victimization, discourse of fear, new propaganda
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: opportunistic decisions
1.2. Coordination: lack of coordination between agencies, latent rivalry, post-crisis hierarchization
2.2. Citizen involvement: symbolic supportive
watch", some forms are suppressed
2. External cr isis communication subsystem: dysfunctional (crisis-escalating) strategy of fear management
Figure 2: Model of information manipulation
fer one case study. Sociologist D. Altheide (2011), whoapplies symbolic interactionism to consider how the ter-rorist threat was presented in the mass media, argues that“the terrorist attacks on the United States on September11, 2001 were strategically used by officials to justifyvarious domestic and international actions” (p. 270).
Crisis type and the level of citizen involvement
The second hypothesis of my study was as follows:employment of crowdsourcing and citizen participationmakes the crisis communications and information man-agement system more effective because the crisis is suc-cessfully managed by using more resources with less in-put. However, at the same time, this statement is onlypartly accurate. Citizen participation can be dysfunc-tional as well, and the possibility to crowdsource de-pends on a social response to crisis.
In the basic classification of a crisis by the disaster soci-ologist E. Quarantelli (1993) there are two crisis types.Conflict crises (confrontation and malevolent acts) di-vide the society because there is a group which triesto aggravate the crisis situation. Consensus crises likenatural, biological and technological disasters, on thecontrary, unite the society in the attempt to overcomethe crisis situation. However, not all crisis types fit thisclassification. We can also add polemic crises (Freund,1976) which provoke discussion and correspond to com-plex structural crises in systems (political, social, cul-tural, economic, and ecological) and institutions. Dif-ferent crisis types require specific communication andinformation management strategies.
During conflict crises use of crowdsourcing can lead tocrisis escalation in forms of aggression or psychologicaltrauma. There is also a problem of using crowdsourcedinformation because social media contain rumors andmalevolent propaganda. Traditional mass media may op-pose the government and take the other side of the con-flict as well. The prescriptive model of conventional in-
F igure 3: Model of conventional information management for conflict cr ises!
!"
2.1. Information dissemination: risk & threat communications, quick response, winning media loyalty, newsfield domination, opposing manipulation
2.2. Citizen involvement: public dialogue on issues (not on acute stage)
1.1. Information processing: issues evaluation, conflict analysis, monitoring of psychological threats, info-superiority assessment, sense-making
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: strategic decisions centralized, operative ones made on lower levels
1.2. Coordination: combination of network and hierarchy, situational hierarchical structure
2. External cr isis communication subsystem: speaking with one voice, getting feedback
Figure 3: Model of conventional information manage-ment for conflict crises
!F igure 4: Model of integrated crowdsourced and conventional information management for consensus crises
"!
1.1. Information processing: integration of traditional & crowdsourced information, crisis mapping, citizen science & community-based risk assessment
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: crowdsourced information & citizen knowledge enhance decision-making
1.2. Coordination: situational flexible coordination with other organizations & volunteers; web-resources for crowdsourcing & network-building !!
2. External cr isis communication subsystem: openness, voice of citizens as both transmitters & receivers
2.1. Information dissemination: not only officials but also citizens as communicators (community leaders, bloggers); discourse of consolidation
2.2. Citizen involvement: creating attractors (culture, web-resources, open scientific projects) for constructive self-organization & participation of citizens
Figure 4: Model of integrated crowdsourced and conven-tional information management for consensus crises
formation management which suits this crisis type is rep-resented in Figure 3. The case study of Russian informa-tion policy in 2000-2004 during terrorist threat crisis andmilitary campaign in the North Caucasus shows that thetactics applied by the government consisted of: framingthe counterterrorist operation and distinguishing it fromwar; soft power media relations to win media loyalty;monitoring of psychological threats, opposing disinfor-mation, manipulation and trauma; and a discourse of re-newal (Gryzunova, 2012).
For consensus crises, on the contrary, consolidation andconstructive self-organization are natural. In this casecitizen participation and crowdsourcing are not onlycost-effective practices to overcome a crisis, but they canalso increase solidarity and represent new chance for de-velopment. Integrated crowdsourced and conventionalinformation management model (Figure 4) means thatcitizens participate in crisis management as equal actors.They are involved in the information processing in formsof crisis mapping and “citizen science” (McCormick,2012). Technological and legal tools are required to in-tegrate official and crowdsourced information. Disastersite volunteering demands citizen-institutional coordina-tion of activities including special web-resources and
20
mobile applications. Citizens also participate in exter-nal communication not only as receivers of informationbut also as crisis communicators themselves (communityleaders or socially responsible online bloggers called cit-izen journalists). In this model the government supportscitizen participation by creating attractors for construc-tive self-organization.
We can look at Hurricane Sandy disaster managementas an example close to the model. Before the crisisthere was the call of President Barack Obama to promotevolunteering culture and self-organization practices, fol-lowed by creation of University for volunteers (Hand-sOn University) and of governmental Corporation forNational and Community Service (CNCS) in 2009. Atthe acute crisis stage the authorities showed good co-ordination (regardless of political parties during Pres-idential race), cooperated with volunteer organizationsand networks through CNCS and ad hoc, used geospa-tial platforms, including FEMA GeoPlatform, online re-source for informing, network-building and crowdsourc-ing which was launched in August, 2012. At the post-crisis stage FEMA used crowdsourcing for creating amap of fuel scarcity (together with a mobile applicationcalled "Waze") and damage assessment. The authoritiesalso cooperated with volunteers in relief operations.
In polemic crises there are different opinions how tosolve a crisis based on specific knowledge and differ-ent interests. All of them should be represented and in-tegrated in participative decisions. The model of pub-lic dialogue facilitation and knowledge management isproposed to solve this kind of crises. A new commu-nication culture of open public dialogue should be cre-ated. Thus decision-making becomes the result of ne-gotiations (Van Santen, Jonker, Wijngaards, 2009) andknowledge sharing. First of all, the government shoulddetect social problems and corresponding opinion or in-terest groups. As long as crisis communications resem-ble negotiations between them, there should be a struc-ture within the government that is responsible for theirfacilitation and mediation. Coordination of crisis man-agement activities can be done through public dialoguewhere all opinions are represented or through partici-patory crowdsourced problem-solving. If the dialogueis facilitated, networks of interests are transformed intonetworks of knowledge sharing(see Figure 5).
The model can be illustrated by nuclear policy dialogueand crowdsourcing in Russia (1999-2006). Nuclear in-dustry provokes issues and crises which are transsys-tem by consequences (affecting ecological, economical,political, health systems, etc.) and polemic by the so-cial response. The society-government nuclear policydialogue included: meetings between Russian ecologi-cal network, experts, governmental and municipal struc-
F igure 5: Model of public dialogue facilitation and knowledge management for polemic crises
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: decisions through
negotiations, balance of interests & citizen knowledge networks
1.2. Coordination: through public dialogue (discussion, negotiations, citizen jury or council) & participatory problem-solving
2. External cr isis communication subsystem: based on new communication culture of open public dialogue space
2.1. Information dissemination: negotiations between groups & networks; supra-communicative practices of facilitation & mediation
2.2. Citizen involvement: development of participatory democracy & civil society institutions that further constructive self-organization
1.1. Information processing: detection of problems & opinion (interest) groups; creation of multiple think tanks; knowledge management; sense-making
Figure 5: Model of public dialogue facilitation andknowledge management for polemic crises
tures, participatory decision-making, and creation of Mi-natom’s (now Rosatom’s) citizen council. The initia-tive of the dialogue was actually put forward by Rus-sian ecological activists (Mironova, 2003). However,the governmental agencies and enterprises used the di-alogue and crowdsourcing space to manage a crisis innuclear industry when CEO of a governmental nuclearplant “Mayak” was accused for severe ecological dam-age to Techa River and contiguous area during the years2001-2004 (the prosecution was stopped in May 2006due to the amnesty granted by the Parliament on its100-year anniversary). Knowledge management eco-logical program “Techa-2006” (formally connected toKyshtym disaster of 1957) financed by Rosatom and“Mayak” was aimed at crowdsourcing of citizen projectideas for ecological, social and information policy in theregion. From the crisis management perspective it notonly helped to collect and realize useful ideas but alsoswitched the attention of ecological and civil rights or-ganizations to cooperative project management insteadof protest activity.
References
Altheide, D. (2011). Creating fear: transforming terror-ist attacks into control and consumption. In: K. Doveling(Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and MassMedia (pp. 259-272). New York: Routledge.
Altheide, D. (2009). Terror Post 9/11 and the Media.New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
Freund, J. (1976). Observations sur deux catégories dela dynamique polémogène; de la crise au conflit (Obser-vations of two categories of polemic dynamics: from acrisis to a conflict). Communications, No. 25.
Gryzunova, E. (2012). Crisis communication under ter-rorist threat: a case study of Counterterrorist operation
21
in Chechnya. Proceedings of the ECREA 2012 Confer-ence. Istanbul.
McCormick, S. (2012). After the cap: risk assessment,citizen science and disaster recovery. Ecology and soci-ety, Vol. 17 (4).
Mironova, N. (2003). Obshestvo-Pravitelstvo: strategiyaperegovorov (Society-Government: strategy of negotia-tions). In: Ekologiya i prava cheloveka (Ecology andhuman rights). Chelyabinsk: ChelGU-CEPR (pp. 160-176).
Postanovleniye Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 25 aprelya1990 g. [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSRof 25 April, 1990] (1990). Moscow.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1993). Community crises: an ex-ploratory comparison of the characteristics and conse-quences of disasters and riots. Journal of Contingenciesand Crisis Management, Vol. 1 (2).
Van Santen W., Jonker C., Wijngaards N. (2009). Cri-sis decision making through a negotiation mental model.Proceedings of the 6th International ISCRAM Confer-ence. Gothenburg.
The Dark Side of Interaction in Socio-technical Sys-tems1
By Chiara Bassetti2 ([email protected]), Emanuele Bottazzi3 ([email protected]) & Roberta Ferrario4 ([email protected])
Interaction seems to be responsible in manifold waysfor accidents and disasters (e.g., Perrow 2008; Vaughan1999; Mattewman 2012). Interpersonal interaction mayhelp in mitigating crises, but it can also pave the wayto catastrophes. We delineate some peculiar ways inwhich this can be true and propose that interaction is afatal attraction. That is to say, people prefer to maintainand sustain interpersonal interaction, and are attracted toit, as an end per se. This is crucial in socio-technicalsystems, intended as complex and technologically denseenvironments, whose functioning is strongly dependent
1A previous version of the paper, “Fatal attraction. Interactionand crisis management in socio-technical systems”, has been pre-sented at the 29th EGOS Colloquium, July 4-6, 2013, Montreal,Canada.
2Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, ConsiglioNazionale delle Ricerche, Trento & Department of Sociology, Uni-versity of Trento
3Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, ConsiglioNazionale delle Ricerche, Trento
4Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, ConsiglioNazionale delle Ricerche, Trento
upon the exchange of information, and where both ar-tificial and human agents, and their relations and inter-actions, play a central role (cf. e.g. Suchman, 2002).In such systems, the fact that interaction calls for fur-ther interaction could have fatal consequences. This isbecause, besides the interacting subjects, other relevantelements, such as specific inter- and infra-organizationalends and goals, are in place. The present contribution– result of an interdisciplinary effort (sociology, philos-ophy, AI) – is mainly theoretical, yet some empiricalcases, stemming both from fieldwork and documentaryanalysis, are taken into consideration. They mainly serveas examples of application of our approach. The paperreflects on interpersonal interaction and its force of at-traction, introduces the notion of Recognized EpistemicField (REF), and considers the role they all play in socio-technical systems’ crisis management.
Interpersonal interaction is a process involving subjects.Conceiving subjects entails, for us, considering them ashaving an Epistemic Field (EF), i.e., an ensemble of at-titudes: intending to go to the movies, believing that it israining, etc. When subjects are interacting, they regardthe other participants (as well as themselves) as havingan EF too. This is what, in a sense, allows interaction it-self: on such a basis, in fact, participants are oriented to-wards the construction and mutual recognition of a com-mon ground of/for the interaction, i.e., an epistemic fieldwhich is recognized as shared. What we call RecognizedEpistemic Field is, simultaneously, a by-product and arequirement of interpersonal interaction. In our account,situated and co-constructed sense making, has, among itsbasic elements, reference points (RP). Dan’s putting anitem on the counter and Alex picking it up and scanningcreates an RP in their interaction. With this RP in force,it would be awkward, for instance, if Alex, right after,ran away instead of doing the checking out. When peo-ple create an RP by mutually recognizing it through in-teractional moves and reply moves, they mark that pointin the REF. That is, they have reached an “interperson-ally valid definition of the situation” (Garfinkel 2008).By an ongoing confirmation through recognition, REFemerges as an interactional co-construction and achieve-ment. A REF, basically, is a regarded-as-shared map ofthe ongoing interaction that allows coordination (objec-tivity is more a requirement than a feature of interaction).
The REF as an ongoing interactional accomplishmentsituated in a local environment is fundamental for co-ordination and triangulation5, that are in turn crucialin complex socio-technical contexts. REF’s boundaries
5The notion of triangulation is partially inspired by Davidson(2001). Here is to be intended as taking place between two (or more)interactants and the environment (with its artefacts, tools, etc.). Inother terms, intersubjective coordination is achieved leveraging onthe features of the surrounding environment and –at the same time–
22
are the boundaries of coordinated action-in-interaction.What is not marked in the REF does not exist, so tospeak, with respect to the —positive and negative— endsof the socio-technical system: what has not been agreedupon and “marked” in the REF is not available as ameans for reaching such ends through situated interac-tion, and this may led to catastrophe. Furthermore, insocio-technical systems, coordination has to be main-tained also with the relevant elements of the environ-ment; the system’s ends go beyond the per se end ofinteracting, and the latter can therefore cause problems.Some examples in this sense are given by the detailedanalysis of two empirical cases: the crash of an Air-France Airbus in 2009 (Table 1), and the incursion thatoccurred in 2001 on Milan Linate Airport’s runaways.
On such a basis, finally, we propose some indications forimproving crisis management in socio-technical system.Such guidelines refer both to human agents’ possible ed-ucation, and to artificial agents’ design. On the one hand,we single out which extra-ordinary modality, or “style”,of action-in-interaction is more suited for dealing withcritical situations in complex organizational contexts.First, even if at the detriment of interpersonal interactionper se, though not to the point of misfiring interaction,REF needs to be periodically doublechecked by partici-pants, like in the sequence of the Air France case that hadlead indeed to a temporary realignment of the copilots’REF (Table 1, Excerpt #1). Participants should thus re-sist the attraction of interaction, increase “dis-preferred”moves and, in some sense, search for impasses – that is,they should neither take agreement for granted, nor getcaught too deeply in the entrainment that characterizesmost of interpersonal interaction. Monitoring the REF iscrucial, at least with respect to those aspects that are mostrelevant both in systemic terms, such as organizational(positive) goals and (negative) ends, and at the situatedlevel of the material environment and its artefacts. Suchan extra-ordinary control over reciprocal perspectives re-quires an equally extra-ordinary interaction: more “frail”than the ordinary one; less oriented towards agreement,as well as interactional continuity and stability; prone todis-preferred moves and local impasses for the sake ofthe goals of the socio-technical system.
Secondarily, not only mutual coordination, but also thetriangulation with the environmental elements that arerelevant to the socio-technical system’s ends is funda-mental. To illustrate this we introduce the Linate Airportcase: on 8 October 2001, a Cessna collided with a Scan-dinavian Airlines Flight, which was preparing to take off.
the relevant (for the purpose at hand) features are singled out and rec-ognized by means of interaction itself (cf. also Liberman 2013: ch.1).
Excerpt #102:08:03 R: You can possibly pull it a little to the left.
02:08:05 B: Sorry, what?
02:08:07 R: You can possibly pull it a little to the left.
We’re agreed that we’re in manual, yeah?
02:08:19 B: What I call in manual er, no we’re in
computed.
Excerpt #202:10:10 The stall warning sounds.
02:10:11 R: What’s this?
Excerpt #302:10:51 The stall alarm begins to sound: “Stall,
stall” + cricket continuously.
02:10:55 R: Damn it!
02:10:56 B: TOGA.
02:11:00 R: Above all try to touch the lateral controls as
little as possible eh.
02:11:03 B: I’m in TOGA, eh?
02:11:06 R: (3.00) Damn it, is he coming or not?
02:11:07 Plane reaches maximum altitude. With
engines at full power, the nose pitched
upward,it moves horizontally for an instant
and then begins to sink back toward the
ocean.
Table 1: Air France Airbus Crash. Elaborated fromOtelli (2011) and BEA (2012).
The Cessna was instructed to taxi along taxiway R5, andthen to the main taxiway; instead, the pilot taxied alongtaxiway R6, crossing the main runway where the Scandi-navian airbus was passing. This error was primarily dueto the bad communication by the air traffic controller onthe ground, and to the copresence of an old and a newsignalling systems. On the one hand, the controller wasnot aware of the permanence of old signs, while, on theother hand, the pilot did not know about their dismissaland used them as a reference. When communicatinghis position after taxing, the pilot made reference to S4(old sign), but the controller did not take into accountthis mismatch, assuming the pilot was where instructed(R5). In the accident, 118 people were killed. Even inthis case, both pilot and controller behaved as more con-cerned with the interaction per se rather than on the con-tent of such interaction. Furthermore, the ambiguity dueto the double signalling system undermined the triangu-lation with the environment, and thus prevented the con-struction of a mutually recognized, “valid” definition ofthe situation.
Sometimes, and we reach the third and last issue, con-sidering artefacts as subjects, thus capable to contributeto the REF, may be helpful. It is not by chance that,in the Air France case, the interactional sequence of re-
23
triangulation and realignment which got closest to solvethe crisis and prevent the tragedy contained the follow-ing turn: “It says we’re going up, so descend”. Unfortu-nately, however, it seems that a cultural tendency towardstechnology and technological artefacts is emerging thatgoes in the opposite direction: indifference and/or over-ruling. This, moreover, appears to pertain not only tocommon sense culture, but also professional, expert andorganizational ones, as the empirical cases show.
On the other hand, we should also acknowledge that hu-mans interact in technologically dense environments, inwhich artificial devices surely play a role in interaction,but are not regarded as genuinely active participants.Take for instance the case of the Air France flight: Whydid the co-pilots ignore the warning that was being pro-posed again and again? Because, whereas the onboardcomputer was signalling the stall, they could not recog-nize the situation they were in as a stall and, not beingable to really interact with the computer (asking expla-nations or confirmations, providing the reasons of theirsayings or doings), they just ignored it. They had un-derstood that the computer was giving a warning alarm,they had understood that the computer was warning thembecause it “believed” they were in stall, but they couldnot understand why the computer “believed” it, and thecomputer could not explain why, nor acknowledge theproblem.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop artificial agents ableto play an active role in interaction, that is, able to repre-sent, reason and communicate about: the socio-technicalsystem as a whole and in its components, the environ-ment in which the system is immersed, and most of all– and this is the point we would like to make here – theinteraction itself. The latter includes many aspects, suchas the rules of the particular kind of interaction, the rolesthat various agents play in the interaction, the dynamicsof the interaction, the attitudes of the interactants (as theycan be inferred by their ongoing sequential conduct), andthe REF that is reached at various stages of the interac-tion. To capture these aspects is for sure not an easytask, but a last claim we would like to make is that ap-plied ontology (cf. Guarino 2009), intended as a tech-nique in Knowledge Representation in AI, could havea key role. The ontological approach is grounded on afoundational analysis of the context at hand, aimed atmaking explicit the meaning of the terms used to expressthe concepts. The result of the analytical work is theconstruction of axiomatic models, expressed in a formallanguage, which are implementable in artificial agents.The conceptual primitives of such models are anchoredin common sense and therefore understandable by hu-man agents. The copresence of these two elements mayfoster the achievement of a system-level communication.
Keywords: Interaction, Socio-technical systems, Rec-ognized Epistemic Field, Crisis
Acknowledgements
C. Bassetti and R. Ferrario are supported by the VisCoSoproject grant, financed by the Autonomous Province ofTrento through the “Team 2011” funding programme.Emanuele Bottazzi is supported by the STACCO projectgrant, financed by the Autonomous Province of Trentothrough the “Post-doc 2011” funding programme.
References
BEA (2012). Final report: On the accident on 1st June2009.
Davidson, D. (2001) Subjective, Intersubjective, Objec-tive. OUP.
Durkheim (1912/1995). Les formes élémentaires de lavie religieuse. (1912). The Elementary Forms of theReligious Life. Translated by Karen Fields. Free Press(1995).
Liberman (2013). More Studies in Ethnomethodology.SUNY Press.
Garfinkel, H. (2008). Toward a sociological theory ofinformation. Paradigm.
Guarino, N., Oberle, D., Staab, S. (2009). What is anontology? In Staab, S., Studer, R. (eds.), Handbook onOntologies, Second Edition:1–17. Springer Verlag.
Matthewman, S. (2012). Accidentology. Interna-tional and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences,1(2):193–215.
Otelli, J. (2011). Erreurs de pilotage: Tome 5. Alti-presse.
Perrow, C. (2008). Normal Accidents. PUP.
Suchman, L. (2002). Practice-based design of informa-tion systems: Notes from the hyperdeveloped world. TheInformation Society, 8(2), 139–144.
Vaughan, D. (1999). The dark side of organizations. An-nual Review of Sociology, 25:271–305.
ESA’13 Photographs
On the following pages, you will find photographs takenat the DCSCRN sessions in ESA’13 at the University ofTurin, Italy. All together, we have received more than 50pictures from our friends and colleagues and we thankeveryone very much for their efforts and help. This
24
newsletter can of course only present a small selection ofthe pictures. The photos here were taken by Dr. NicholasPetropoulos (except for Figure 1, which was taken byAntti Silvast). Please follow our web site dcscrn.org formore publications of the photographs in the future.
New publications
Jelle Groenendaal who is a doctoral student in Nijmegenin the Netherlands and Joe Scanlon have published twomore articles about the role of ordinary people in emer-gencies. They teamed up when Joe was invited to lec-ture on that subject by the Amsterdam-Amstelland firedepartment which has been studying ways to integratethe real first responders (ordinary people) into the subse-quent response by personnel from emergency agencies.
• Scanlon, Joseph and Jelle Groenendaal (2013)“PHASE ONE: BYSTANDERS. Focusing on ‘ordi-nary people’ – the ‘first’ first responders” NaturalHazards Observer, November pp: 9-11
• Scanlon, Joseph and Jelle Groenendaal (2013)“WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, ORDINARY CITI-ZENS RESPOND: IT’S TIME TO MAKE THEM
PART OF THE PLAN” Royal Canadian Mounted Po-lice Gazette, Vol. 75 No. 1 pp: 30-31
Joe also has a chapter in a book on medical ethics whichis now in press and is scheduled to come out early nextyear. The chapter flows from an invited lecture he gaveat a conference on medical ethics in Geneva two yearsago.
• Scanlon, Joseph (2014) “Ethical Issues in HealthCommunications: Strategies for the (Inevitable)Next Pandemic” in Dónal P. O’Mathúna, BertGordijn and Mike Clark, Eds. Disaster Bioethics:Normative Issues When Nothing is Normal. PublicHealth Ethics Analysis, Vol. 2 pp: 77-93
The thrust of Joe’s article (which won’t surprise anyonein the disaster field) is that transparency is the best pol-icy but there are ethical questions including questionsabout privacy and the behaviour of medical profession-als. He has noted that in 1918 during the second anddeadly wave of pandemic influenza there was a contin-ual attempt to downplay the extent of the threat. Thiswas sometimes almost amusing as the same issue of anewspaper stating the flu was not serious would carryfive to seven obituaries of persons who died from theflu. For example an article in the Kingston Daily Stan-dard on November 7, 1918 was headlined "INFLUENZA
IS NOT ALARMING” while assuring readers there was no
Figure 1: From left to right: Nikos Petropoulos, Mu-rat Balamir, Nina Blom Andersen, Barbara Lucini, andElena Gryzunova.
Figure 2: Erna Danielsson and Jörgen Sparf
Figure 3: Ivano Scotti
25
Figure 4: Karin Erdberg
Figure 5: Vincent Ialenti
Figure 6: Elvira Santiago
Figure 7: Arho Toikka
Figure 8: Christopher Lyon
Figure 9: Audience in the sessions
26
cause for alarm but went on to mention there were sev-eral hundred cases in the city and that the hospitals werebeginning to experience a strain.
Joe Scanlon ([email protected])
Conference report: Transformation in a Chang-ing Climate, University of Oslo, Norway, June2013
The highly unique and excellent Transformation in aChanging Climate conference, held at the Universityof Olso in June was organised by Professor KarenO’Brien and Linda Sygna, and aimed at understandingand enabling social transformation in the face of climatechange. As such, it would be of great interest to thosepersons and organisations engaged with social changeand disaster. Unlike a standard academic conference,this one used an ‘open space’ facilitation format andincluded both academics and practitioners from variouscircles. This meant for example, that paper sessions wereorganised around ‘speed talks’ of not more than five min-utes, after which the audience and speakers could con-gregate around each other freely to engage in deeper dis-cussion. People were also free to leave sessions and con-versations to join others. Participants were thus able toengage with topics much more deeply that would be pos-sible in a standard question and answer format. In turn,this helped to build new networks and insights, makingthe conference itself a transformative experience, point-ing toward an active means of mobilising science andpractice for climate adaptation. The next conferences inthis series are scheduled for the Stockholm ResilienceCentre in Sweden in 2015, and the University of Dundee,Scotland in 2017.
More information may be found at the following URLs:
• http://www.sv.uio.no/iss/english/research/news-and-events/events/conferences-and-seminars/transformations/about/index.html
• http://www.stockholmresilience.org/21/research/research-news/6-27-2013-transformation-in-a-changing- climate.html
Christopher Lyon ([email protected])
ANNOUNCEMENTS
Call for Papers: International Journal of MassEmergencies and Disasters – Special Issue onNordic Research on Disasters, Crises and otherRelated Topics
Guest editors
• David M. Neal, Oklahoma State University
• Erna Danielsson, Mid Sweden University
• Roine Johansson, Mid Sweden University
Brief background
The International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Dis-asters is the longest publishing journal related to topicsrelated to disasters. Henry Quarantelli established thejournal and became its first editor. The first issue, pub-lished in March 1983, was based upon a 1980 conferenceon Family and Disaster held at Rosersberg Slott, Swe-den. Jan Trost and Örjan Hultåker of Uppsala Univer-sity served as guest editors. Since that time, IJMED haspublished a number of papers related to Nordic disasterissues by Nordic researchers.
This special issue provides an opportunity to put currentNordic themes, perspectives and ideas into one volume.
Manuscript parameters
We are soliciting manuscripts related to Nordic Researchwith a focus on disasters, crises and other related topics.
• About 7,000 words.
• Research carried out by Nordic researchers with apriority on crises within the Nordic countries.
• Empirical papers preferred but theoreticalmanuscripts considered.
• Empirical papers can be qualitative, quantitative, ormixed method.
• Manuscripts should have a social science focus.
• May be interdisciplinary among social sciences.
• May be interdisciplinary using social and naturalsciences.
• Manuscripts must be submitted by May 1, 2014,and written in English.
27
• Initial reviews should be completed by October 1,2014. Final revisions will be completed by Decem-ber 31, 2014.
• Publication is scheduled for the March 2015 Issue(Volume 33, #1)
• Submit manuscripts to this address:[email protected].
• Please attach only one copy of the manuscript.
• Please identify that this submission is for the NordicResearch issue.
• All manuscripts will use the double blind reviewprocess.
• Please follow formatting and citation requirementsfound at this web address: http://www.ijmed.org/article-submission/.
• If you have any questions, please contact Dave Nealat [email protected].
Roine Johansson ([email protected])
THE DCSCRN ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER
This is the periodic electronic newsletter of the Disas-ter, Conflict and Social Crisis Research Network (DC-SCRN). The purpose of the DCSCRN is to promote thestudy, research and analysis of “natural”, “technologi-cal” and “social” disasters with a view to contributingto the development of disaster resilient European com-munities, and preventing or mitigating the human, eco-nomic, social, cultural and psychological effects of crisesand disasters.
The DCSCRN Electronic Newsletter is published threetimes a year (April, August, December). The previouslypublished newsletters are downloadable at the network’swebpage: http://www.dcscrn.org.
Announcements of conferences, book, film, and CD-ROM reviews, reportage on conferences, disaster di-aries, brief articles on best or worst practices in disas-ter prevention and recovery, commentaries on disastersand crises, human interest stories relevant to disasters,etc. should be sent electronically to the editor, Antti Sil-vast ([email protected]) no later than the first ofthe month of publication. Contributions to the newslet-ter should preferably be written in a concise format (½-1page long maximum) in order to make reading compre-hensive albeit focused. Ideas should be referenced (Au-thor, year), but there is no need for a complete referencelist.
Relevant contributions from the field of disaster, conflictand crisis research, as well as from applied disaster, con-flict and crisis management practice, are most welcome!
All “signed” texts express the opinions of the authors andnot necessarily those of the coordinators, the editor or ofthe DCSCRN.
Nina Blom Andersen, DCSCRN Coordinator
Antti Silvast, DCSCRN Vice Coordinator and E-Newsletter Editor
28