discourse on metaphysics: gottfried wilhelm leibniz

8/6/2019 Discourse On Metaphysics: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

1/30

Copyright Jonathan Bennett

Square [brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small dots enclose material that has

been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional

bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to

grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought.

The division into sections is Leibnizs; the division of some sections into paragraphs isnot. Leibniz wrote brief summaries of the 37 sections of this work, but did not include

them in the work itself. Some editors preface each section with its summary, but that

interrupts the flow. In this version the summaries are given at the end.

First launched: July 2004

* * * * * * * * *

Discourse on Metaphysics

by G.W. Leibniz

1. The most widely accepted and sharpest notion of God that we have can be expressed

like this:

God is an absolutely perfect being;

but though this is widely accepted, its consequences havent been well enough thought

out. As a start on exploring them, let us note that there are various completely different

ways of being perfect, and that God has them all, each in the highest degree. We also need

to understand what a perfection is. Here is one pretty good indicator: a property is not a

perfection unless there is a highest degree of it; so number and shape are not perfections,

because there cannot possibly be a largest number or a largest thing of a given shape -

that is, a largest triangle, or square, or the like. But there is nothing impossible about thegreatest knowledge or about omnipotence [here = greatest possible power]. So power

and knowledge are perfections, and God has them in unlimited form. It follows that the

actions of God, who is supremely - indeed infinitely - wise, are completely perfect. This is

not just metaphysical perfection, but also the moral kind. His moral perfection, so far as it

concerns us, amounts to this: the more we come to know and understand Gods works,

the more inclined we shall be to find them excellent, and to give us everything we could

have wished.

2. Some people - including Descartes - hold that there are no rules of goodness and

perfection in the nature of things, or in Gods ideas of them, and that in calling the things

God made good all we mean is that God made them. I am far from agreeing with this. If

it were right, then God would not have needed after the creation to see that they were

good, as Holy Scripture says he did, because he already knew that the things in question

were his work. In saying this - And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it

was very good (Genesis 1:31) - Scripture treats God as like a man; but its purpose in

doing this appears to be to get across the point that a things excellence can be seen by

looking just at the thing itself, without reference to the entirely external fact about what

caused it. Reinforcing that point is this one: the works must bear the imprint of the

workman, because we can learn who he was just by inspecting them. I have to say that the

1


2/30

contrary opinion strikes me as very dangerous, and as coming close to the view of the

Spinozists that the beauty of the universe, and the goodness we attribute to Gods works,

are merely the illusions of people who conceive God as being like themselves.

Furthermore, if you say as Descartes did that things are good not because they match

up to objective standards of goodness, but only because God chose them, you will

unthinkingly destroy all Gods love and all his glory. For why praise him for what he hasdone, if he would be equally praiseworthy for doing just the opposite? Where will his

justice and wisdom be,

if there is only a kind of despotic power,

ifreasons place is taken by will, and

if justice is tyrannically defined as what best pleases the most powerful?

[Leibniz here relies on his view that it is through reason that we learn what things are

good.] And another point: it seems that any act of the will presupposes some reason for it

- a reason which naturally precedes the act - so that Gods choices must come from his

reasons for them, which involve his knowledge of what would be good; and so they

cannot be the sources of the goodness of things. That is why I find it weird when

Descartes says that the eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry, and therefore also the

rules of goodness, justice, and perfection, are brought about by Gods will. Against this,

they seem to me to be results of his understanding, and no more to depend on his will

than his intrinsic nature does.

3. Nor could I ever accept the view of some recent philosophers who have the nerve to

maintain that Gods creation is not utterly perfect, and that he could have acted much

better. This opinion, it seems to me, has consequences that are completely contrary to the

glory of God. Just as a lesser evil contains an element of good, so a lesser good contains

an element of evil. To act with fewer perfections than one could have done is to act

imperfectly; showing an architect that he could have done his work better is finding fault

with it. Furthermore, this opinion goes against Holy Scriptures assurance of the goodnessof Gods works. That goodness cannot consist simply in the fact that the works could

have been worse; and here is why. Whatever Gods work was like, it would always have

been good in comparison with some possibilities, because there is no limit to how bad

things could be. But being praiseworthy in this way is hardly being praiseworthy at all. I

believe one could find countless passages in the Holy Scriptures and the writings of the

Holy Fathers that support my opinion, and hardly any to support the modern view to

which I have referred - a view that I think was never heard of in ancient times. It has

arisen merely because we are not well enough acquainted with the general harmony of the

universe and of the hidden reasons for Gods conduct; and that makes us recklessly judge

that many things could have been improved. Furthermore, these moderns argue - subtly

but not soundly - from the false premiss that however perfect a thing is, there is always

something still more perfect. They also think that their view provides for Gods freedom,

through the idea that if God is free, it must be up to him whether he acts perfectly or not;

but really it is the highest freedom to act perfectly, in accordance with sovereign reason.

For the view that God sometimes does something without having any reason for his

choice, besides seeming to be impossible, is hardly compatible with his glory. Suppose that

God, facing a choice between A and B, opts for A without having any reason for

preferring it to B. I see nothing to praise in that, because all praise should be grounded in

2


3/30

some reason, and in this case we have stipulated that there is none. By contrast, I hold that

God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified.

4. The love that we owe to God, above all things, is based (I think) on our grasp of the

great truth that God always acts in the most perfect and desirable way possible. For a

lover looks for satisfaction in the happiness or perfection of the loved one and of his

actions. Friendship is wanting the same things and not-wanting the same things. And I

think it will be hard to love God properly without being disposed to want what he wants,

even if one had the power to get something different. Indeed, those who are not satisfied

with what God does strike me as being like malcontent subjects whose set of mind is not

much different from a rebels. These principles lead me to maintain that loving God

requires a certain attitude to everything that happens to us through his will: not merely

accepting it patiently because one has no alternative, but being truly satisfied with it. I am

saying this about the past; for we should not be quietists about the future, stupidly waiting

with folded arms for what God will do, as in the fallacy of what the ancients called the

argument for idleness. In so far as we can judge what God wants, in a general way, we

should act in accordance with that, doing our very best to contribute to the general good,and in particular to adorning and perfecting the things that concern us - what is close to

us, within reach (so to speak). The outcome may show that God did not in this instance

want our good will to have its effect, but it doesnt follow that he did not want us to do

what we did. On the contrary, as he is the best of masters, he never asks more than the

right intention, and it is up to him to know when and where good intentions should

succeed.

5. So it is enough to be sure of this about God: that he does everything for the best, and

that nothing can harm those who love him. But to know in detail his reasons for ordering

the universe as he has, allowing sin, and granting his saving grace in one way rather than

another, is beyond the power of a finite mind, especially one that has not yet attained the

delight of seeing God. Still, some general remarks can be made about how God goes

about governing things. Thus, we can liken someone who acts perfectly to an expert

geometer who knows how to find the best construction for a problem; to a good architect

who exploits the location and the budget for his building to the best advantage, not

allowing anything nasty, or less beautiful than it could be; to a good head of a household,

who manages his property so that no ground is left uncultivated or barren; to a clever

special-effects technician in the theatre, who produces his effect by the least awkward

means that can be found; or to a learned author, who gets the largest amount of subject-

matter into the smallest space he can. Now, minds are the most perfect of all things,

occupying the least space and thus providing the least hindrance to one another because

they dont take up space at all; and their perfections are virtues. That is why we should besure that the happiness of minds is Gods principal aim, which he carries out as far as the

general harmony will permit. Ill say more about this later.

The simplicity of Gods ways relates to the means he adopts, while their variety,

richness or abundance relate to ends or effects. These should be in balance with one

another, as the money for putting up a building has to be balanced against its desired size

and beauty. Admittedly, whatever God does costs him nothing - even less than it costs a

philosopher [here = scientist] to invent theories out of which to build his imaginary

3


4/30

world - for God can bring a real world into existence merely by decreeing it. But in the

exercise of wisdom by God or a philosopher there is something analogous to the cost of

a building, namely the number of independent decrees or theories that are involved. For

Gods creative activity to be economical is for it to involve very few separate decrees; for

a scientific theory to be economical in its means is for it to have very few basic principles

or axioms. Reason requires that multiplicity of hypotheses or principles be avoided, ratheras the simplest system is always preferred in astronomy.

6. Gods wishes or actions are usually divided into the ordinary and the extraordinary. But

we should bear in mind that God does nothing that is not orderly. When we take

something to be out of the ordinary, we are thinking of some particular order that holds

among created things. We do not, or ought not to, mean that the thing is absolutely

extraordinary or disordered, in the sense of being outside every order; because there is a

universal order to which everything conforms. Indeed, not only does nothing absolutely

irregular ever happen in the world, but we cannot even feign [= tell a consistent fictional

story about] such a thing. Suppose that someone haphazardly draws points on a page, as

do people who practise the ridiculous art of fortune-telling through geometrical figures. Isay that it is possible to find a single formula that generates a geometrical line passing

through all those points in the order in which they were drawn. And if someone drew a

continuous line which was now straight, now circular, now of some other kind, it would

be possible to find a notion or rule or equation that would generate it. The contours of

anyones face could be traced by a single geometrical line governed by a formula. But

when a rule is very complex, what fits it is seen as irregular. So one can say that no matter

how God had created the world, it would have been regular and in some general order.

But God chose the most perfect order, that is, the order that is at once simplest in general

rules and richest in phenomena - as would be a geometrical line whose construction was

easy yet whose properties and effects were very admirable and very far-reaching. These

comparisons help me to sketch some imperfect picture of divine wisdom, and to saysomething that might raise our minds to some sort of conception, at least, of what cannot

be adequately expressed. But I dont claim that they explain this great mystery of

creation on which the whole universe depends.

7. Now, because nothing can happen that is not orderly, miracles can be said to be as

orderly as natural events. The latter are called natural because they conform to certain

subordinate rules - ones that are not as general and basic as Gods fundamental creative

decrees - which we call the nature of things. This nature is only a way in which God

customarily goes about things, and he can give it up if he has a reason for doing so - a

reason that is stronger than the one that moved him to make use of these subordinate

maxims in the first place.General acts of the will are distinguished from particular ones. Using one version of

this distinction, we can say that God does everything according to his most general will,

which conforms to the most perfect order that he has chosen; but that he also has

particular wills, which are exceptions (not to the most general of Gods laws, which

regulates the whole order of the universe, and to which there are no exceptions, but) to

the subordinate maxims I have mentioned, the ones that constitute nature. Any object

of Gods particular will is something he can be said to want. But when it comes to the

4


5/30

objects of his general will - such as are actions of created things (especially rational ones)

which God chooses to allow - we cannot say that God wants them all, and must make a

distinction. (1) If the action is intrinsically good, we can say that God wants it, and

sometimes commands it, even if it doesnt happen. (2) But an action may be intrinsically

bad, and only incidentally good because later events - especially ones involving

punishment and reparations - correct its wickedness and make up for the bad with some tospare, so that eventually there is more perfection overall than if this bad thing had not been

done. In a case like that we must say that God allows the action but not that he wants it,

even though he goes along with it because of the laws of nature that he has established and

because he sees how to derive from it a greater good.

8. It is quite hard to distinguish Gods actions from those of created things. Some believe

that God does everything, and others suppose that he only conserves the force he has

given to created things, allowing them to decide in what directions the force shall be

exercised. We shall see later on what truth there is in each of these. Now since actions

and passions properly belong to individual substances (actions are actions of subjects), I

have to explain what such a substance is. This much is certain: when several predicates areattributed to the same subject, and this subject is not attributed to any other, it is called an

individual substance. For example, we call John a substance because we can attribute to

him honesty, intelligence, and so on; but we do not call his honesty a substance because,

although we can attribute predicates to it (His honesty is charming, and surprising) we

can attribute it to something else, namely to John. In contrast, John cannot be attributed to

anything else.

But that explanation is only nominal - all it does is to relate our calling a thing a

substance to other facts concerning what we say about it. Beyond that, we need to think

about what it is for something to be truly attributed to a certain subject - e.g. what it is for

honesty to be a property of John. Now it is certain that all true predication is founded in

the nature of things, and when a proposition is not identical, that is, when the predicate isnot explicitly included in the subject as in The man who governs Somalia governs

Somalia, it must be implicitly included in it. This is what philosophers call in-esse [being-

in] when they say that the predicate is in the subject. So the subject term must always

include that of the predicate, so that anyone who understood the subject notion perfectly

would also judge that the predicate belongs to it. We can therefore say that the nature of

an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is

sufficient to include, and to allow the deduction of, all the predicates of the subject to

which that notion is attributed. An accident, on the other hand, is a being whose notion

doesnt involve everything that can be attributed to the subject to which that notion is

attributed. Thus Alexander the Greats kinghood is an abstraction from the subject,

leaving out much detail, and so is not determinate enough to pick out an individual, and

does not involve the other qualities of Alexander nor everything which the notion of that

prince includes; whereas God, who sees the individual notion or thisness of Alexander,

sees in it at the same time the basis and the reason for all the predicates which can truly be

said to belong to him, such as for example that he would conquer Darius and Porus, even

to the extent of knowing a priori (and not by experience) whether he died a natural death

or by poison - which we can know only from history. Furthermore, if we bear in mind the

interconnectedness of things, we can say that Alexanders soul contains for all time traces

5


6/30

of everything that didand signs of everything that will happen to him - and even marks of

everything that happens in the universe, although it is only God who can recognise them

all.

9. Several considerable paradoxes follow from this, amongst others that it is always

untrue that substances are entirely alike, differing only in being two rather than one. It also

follows that a substance cannot begin except by creation, nor come to an end except by

annihilation; and because one substance cannot be destroyed by being split up, or brought

into existence by the assembling of parts, in the natural course of events the number of

substances remains the same, although substances are often transformed. Moreover, each

substance is like a whole world, and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole universe,

which each substance expresses in its own fashion - rather as the same town looks

different according to the position from which it is viewed. In a way, then, the universe is

multiplied as many times as there are substances, and in the same way the glory of God is

magnified by so many quite different representations of his work. It can even be said that

each substance carries within it, in a certain way, the imprint of Gods infinite wisdom and

omnipotence, and imitates him as far as it is capable of doing so. For it expresses (thoughconfusedly) everything that happens in the universe - past, present, and future - and this is

a little like infinite perception or knowledge. And as all the other substances express this

one in their turn, and adapt themselves to it - that is, they are as they are because it is as it

is - it can be said to have power over all the others, imitating the creators omnipotence.

10. The ancients, as well as many able teachers of theology and philosophy a few centuries

ago - men accustomed to deep thought, and admirable in their holiness - seem to have had

some knowledge of the things I have been saying, and to have been led by that to

introduce and defend substantial forms. These are much sneered at today, but they are not

so far from the truth, nor so ridiculous, as the common run of our new philosophers

suppose. I agree that these forms have no work to do in explaining particular events, and

thus no role in the details of physics. That is where our scholastics [= mediaeval Christian

philosophers influence by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas being the most famous example]

went wrong, and the physicians of the past followed them into error: they thought they

could invoke forms and qualities to explain the properties of bodies, without bothering to

find out how the bodies worked - like settling for saying that a clocks form gives it a

time-indicative quality, without considering what all that consists in - that is, what

mechanisms are involved. Actually, that might be all the clocks owner needs to know, if

he leaves the care of it to someone else.

But this misuse and consequent failure of forms shouldnt make us reject them.

Metaphysics needs a knowledge of them, so much so that without that knowledge - I

maintain - we could not properly grasp the first principles of metaphysics, and could notraise our minds to the knowledge of immaterial natures and the wonders of God.

However, important truths need not be taken into account everywhere. A geometer need

not worry about the famous labyrinth of the composition of the continuum [that is, the

puzzles that arise from the idea that a line has no smallest parts]; and the huge difficulties

to be found in trying to reconcile free will with Gods providence need not trouble a moral

philosopher, still less a lawyer or politician; for the geometer can do all his proofs, and the

politician can complete his plans, without getting into those debates, necessary and

6


7/30

important though they are in philosophy and theology. In the same way a physicist can

explain his experiments - sometimes using simpler experiments he has already made,

sometimes proofs in geometry and mechanics - without needing to bring in general

considerations belonging to another sphere. And if he does go outside his sphere, and

appeal to Gods co-operation, or to some soul or spiritual principle or other thing of that

kind, he is talking nonsense, just as much as someone who drags large-scale reflectionsabout the nature of destiny and our freedom into an important practical deliberation.

Indeed men often enough unthinkingly make this mistake, when they let the idea of what is

fated to happen tangle their thoughts, and sometimes are even deterred by that idea from

some good decision or some important precaution.

11. I know I am putting forward a considerable paradox in claiming to rehabilitate the

ancient philosophy, in a way, and to re-admit substantial forms when they have been all

but banished. But perhaps you wont just brush me off if you realize that I have thought a

lot about the modern philosophy, that I have spent much time on experiments in physics

and proofs in geometry, and that for a long time I was sure that these entities [substantial

forms] are futile. Eventually I had to take them up again - against my will, as though byforce - after my own researches made me recognize that thinkers these days do less than

justice to St. Thomas and to other great men of his time, and that the views of scholastic

philosophers and theologians contain much more good stuff than people suppose,

provided they are used relevantly and in their right place. I am convinced, indeed, that if

some exact and thoughtful mind took the trouble to clarify and digest their thoughts, in the

way the analytic geometers do, he would find them to be a treasure-house of important

and completely demonstrable truths.

12. Picking up again the thread of our reflections, I believe that anyone who thinks about

the nature of substance, as I have explained it above, will find that there is more to the

nature of body than extension (that is, size, shape, and motion), and that we cant avoid

attributing to body something comparable with a soul, something commonly called

substantial form - though it has no effect on particular events, any more than do the souls

of animals, if they have them. It can be proved, indeed, that the notion of size-shape-

movement is less sharp and clear than we imagine, and that it includes an element that

belongs to imagination and the senses, as do - to a much greater degree - colour, heat, and

other such qualities, which we can doubt are really there in the nature of external things.

That is why qualities of such kinds could never constitute the basic nature of any

substance. Moreover, if there is nothing but size-shape-movement to make a body the

thing that it is, then a body can never persist for more than a moment because bodies

constantly gain and lose tiny bits of matter. However, the souls and substantial forms of

bodies other than ours are quite different from our thinking souls. Only the latter knowtheir own actions; and they dont naturally go out of existence, but last for ever and

always retain the foundation of the knowledge of what they are. This is what makes them

alone liable to punishment and reward, and what makes them citizens of the republic of the

universe, of which God is the monarch. It also follows that all other creatures must serve

them. I shall say more about that later.

13. The foundations that I have laid down give rise to a big problem, which I must try to

solve before moving on. I have said that the notion of an individual substance involves,

7


8/30

once and for all, everything that can ever happen to it; and that by looking into that notion

one can see in it everything that will ever be truly sayable of the substance, just as we can

see in the nature of a circle all the properties that are deducible from it. But this seems to

destroy the difference between contingent and necessary truths, to rule out human

freedom, and to imply that all the events in the world - including our actions - are

governed by an absolute fate. To this I reply that we have to distinguish what is certainfrom what is necessary. Everyone agrees that future contingents are assured, because God

foresees them; but we dont infer from this that they are necessary. You may say:

But if some conclusion can be infallibly deduced from a definition or notion, it is

necessary. And you contend that everything that happens to a person is already

included implicitly in his nature or notion, just as a circles properties are contained

in its circle; so you are still in trouble.

I shall now resolve this problem completely. To that end, I remark that there are two kinds

of connection or following-from. One is absolutely necessary, and its contrary implies a

contradiction; such deduction pertains to eternal truths, such as those of geometry. The

other is necessary not absolutely, but only ex hypothesi, and, so to speak, accidentally. It

doesnt bring us to It is necessary that P, but only to Given Q, it follows necessarily that

P. This is contingent in itself, and its contrary does not imply a contradiction. This

second kind of connection is based not purely on ideas and on Gods understanding

alone, but also on his free decrees, and on the history of the universe. Let us take an

example. Since Julius Caesar will become the permanent dictator and master of the

Republic, and will overthrow the freedom of the Romans, these actions are comprised in

his perfect or complete notion; because we are assuming that it is the nature of such a

perfect notion of a subject to include everything, so that the predicate can be contained in

the subject. It could be put like this: it is not because of that notion or idea that Caesar will

perform the action, since that notion applies to him only because God knows everything.

You may object: But his nature or form corresponds to that notion, and since God hasimposed this character or nature or form on him, from then on he must necessarily act in

accordance with it. I could reply to that by bringing up the case of future contingents:

they have as yet no reality except in Gods understanding and will, yet since God has

therein given them that form in advance, they will nevertheless have to correspond to it.

So I could counter-attack by challenging you to choose between two options, each of

which you will find uncomfortable: either (1) say that future contingents are really

necessary, and not contingent, or (2) say that God does not know them in advance. But I

prefer to resolve difficulties rather than excusing them by likening them to other similar

ones; and what I am about to say will throw light on both of the above problems. Applying

now the distinction between different kinds of connection, I say that whatever happens in

accordance with its antecedents is assured but is not necessary; for someone to do thecontrary of such an assured outcome is not impossible in itself, although it is impossible

ex hypothesi that is, impossible given what has gone before. For if you were capable of

carrying through the whole demonstration proving that this subject (Caesar) is connected

with this predicate (his successful power-grabbing enterprise), this would involve you in

showing that Caesars dictatorship had its foundation in his notion or nature, that a reason

can be found there - in that notion or nature - why he decided to cross the Rubicon rather

than stop at it, and why he won rather than lost the day in the battle at Pharsalus. You

8


9/30

would be discovering that it was rational and therefore assured that this would happen,

but not that it is necessary in itself, or that the contrary implies a contradiction. (In a

somewhat similar way it is rational and assured that God will always do the best, although

the idea of his doing what is less perfect implies no contradiction.) What you discovered

would not be something whose contrary implies a contradiction because, as you would

find, this supposed demonstration of this predicate of Caesars is not as absolute as thoseof numbers or of geometry. It presupposes (you would find) the course of events that

God has freely chosen, and that is founded on (1) his primary free decision, which is

always to do what is most perfect, and, on the basis of that, (2) his decision regarding

human nature, namely that men will always (though freely) do what seems the best. Now,

any truth which is founded on this sort of decision is contingent, even though it is certain,

because decisions in no way alter the possibility of things. And (to repeat myself) although

God is sure always to choose the best, that doesnt stop something less perfect from being

and remaining possible in itself, even though it wont happen - for what makes God reject

it is its imperfection, not its being impossible which it is not. And nothing is necessary if

its opposite is possible.

So we are well placed to resolve these kinds of difficulty, however great they may

seem (and in fact they are equally serious for everyone else who has ever dealt with this

matter). All we need is to bear in mind that each such contingent proposition has reasons

why it is so rather than otherwise - or (to put the same thing in other words), that there is

an a priori proof of its truth which makes it certain, and which show that the connection of

its subject with its predicate has its foundation in the nature of each; but that this proof is

not a demonstration of the propositions necessity, because those reasons for its truth are

based only on the principle of contingency or of the existence of things, that is, on what is

or what appears the best among a number of equally possible things. Necessary truths, on

the other hand, are based on the principle of contradiction, and on the possibility or

impossibility of essences themselves, without any regard to the free will of God or ofcreated things.

14. Now that we have some grasp of what the nature of substances consists in, I should

try to explain their dependence on one another, and the active and passive aspects of their

goings-on. Well, firstly, it is very evident that created substances depend on God, who

conserves them and indeed produces them continuously by a kind of emanation, just as we

produce our thoughts. For God considers from every angle the general system of

particular events that he has thought fit to produce in order to manifest his glory, turning it

on all sides, so to speak. And as he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways

- for no aspect escapes his omniscience - each view of the universe, as though looked at

from a certain viewpoint, results in a substance which expresses the universe in just that

way, if God sees fit to actualize his thoughts by producing such a substance. And as Gods

view is always correct, so too are our perceptions; where we go wrong is in our

judgments, which are our own. I said above, and it follows from what I have said here,

that each substance is like a separate world, independent of every other thing except God.

So all our phenomena - all the events that occur in us - are simply consequences of our

being. These events maintain a certain order in conformity with our nature, or with the

world which is in us, so to speak, and this enables us to set up rules which we can use to

guide our conduct, and which are justified by their fit with future events; so that often we

9


10/30

can judge the future by the past without falling into error. That would give us a basis for

saying that these phenomena are veridical [= that they tell the truth], without bothering

about whether they are external to us, or whether others are aware of them too. Still, it

emphatically is the case that the perceptions or expressions of all substances correspond

with one another, in such a way that each one, by carefully following certain principles or

laws that it has conformed to, finds itself in agreement with others which do the same - aswhen several people agree to meet together in some place on a certain day, and succeed in

doing this. For them all to express the same phenomena their expressions dont have to be

perfectly alike; it is enough that they are correlated - just as a number of spectators think

they are seeing the same thing, and do in fact understand each other, even though each

one sees and speaks according to his point of view. Now it is God alone (from whom all

individuals continuously emanate, and who sees the universe not only as they do but also

completely differently from them all) who is the cause of this correspondence in their

phenomena, and brings it about that what is particular to one is public to all. Without that

there would be no connection between them.

This gives us a basis for saying that no particular substance ever acts on or is acted on

by another particular substance. The sense in which this is true is far removed from

common usage, but it is good nevertheless. Bear in mind that what happens to each

substance is a consequence of its idea or complete notion and of nothing else, because that

idea already involves all the substances predicates or events, and expresses the whole

universe. In reality nothing can happen to us except thoughts and perceptions, and all our

future thoughts and perceptions are only the consequences - contingent ones - of our

preceding thoughts and perceptions. So if I could command a clear view of everything that

is happening or appearing to me right now, I would be able to see in it everything that will

ever happen or appear to me. And it would not be prevented, and would still happen to

me, even if everything outside of me were destroyed except for God. But when we have

perceptions of a certain kind, we think that they come from outer things acting on us; andI want to look into what this belief is based on, and what truth there is in it.

15. I neednt spend long on this. All I need just now is to reconcile what is said as a matter

of metaphysics with what is said in everyday talk, which I do by saying that we rightly [or:

reasonably] attribute to ourselves the phenomena that we express more perfectly, and

attribute to other substances what each expresses best. So a substance which expresses

everything as every substance does, and is in that metaphorical sense infinitely

extended, comes to be limited by the more or less perfect manner of its expression. This

gives us a notion of how substances obstruct or limit one another; and consequently we

can say that in this sense they act on one another, and are obliged to adjust themselves to

one another, so to speak. What follows is the reason why this way of speaking, though

not correct as a matter of strict and basic metaphysics, is nevertheless reasonable, or right

in its own way. It can happen that a change which raises the expression of one substance

lowers that of another. Now, a particular substance has power in expressing well the glory

of God, and in doing that it is less limited. And each thing, when it exercises its power,

that is to say when it is active, changes for the better, and extends itself, in proportion to

how active it is. So when a change occurs which affects several substances (and actually

all changes touch them all), I believe we can properly say that one that immediately

passes to a higher degree of perfection or to a more perfect expression exercises its power

10


11/30

and acts; and one that passes to a lesser degree shows its weakness and is acted on. I

hold also that every action of a substance which has perception signifies some pleasure,

and every passivity [= every instance of being-acted-on] involves some sadness, and vice

versa. It can easily happen, though, that a present advantage is destroyed by a greater evil

later on; which is why we can sin when we are active or exerting our power and enjoying

doing so.

16. My remaining task is to explain how it is possible that God should sometimes have

influence on men or on other substances by an out-of-the-ordinary or miraculous

concourse. [Leibnizs word concours can mean co-operation, or (more weakly) going-

along-with or permitting. He here ties it to influence (French), suggesting that in these

cases God acts upon men and other substances, though that is not his considered view

about what happens.] This question arises because whatever happens to created

substances is purely a consequence of their nature, which seems to imply that nothing

extraordinary or miraculous can happen to them. Remember, though, what I said above

about the place of miracles in the universe: that they always conform to the universal law

of the general order, even though they over-ride subordinate rules and are in that senseout of the ordinary. And since each person and each substance is like a little world which

expresses the larger world, anything that happens within a substance belongs to the

general order of the universe, which is indeed expressed by the essence or individual

notion of that substance. Yet an extraordinary action by God on a single substance,

though it does conform to the general order, can still be called miraculous. This is why if

we include in our nature everything that it expresses, nothing is supernatural to it, because

it extends to everything - because an effect always expresses its cause, and God is the true

cause of substances. But the powers and the limits of our nature come (as I have just

explained) from the facts about what it expresses more perfectly; and for that reason

what it expresses more perfectly belongs to it in a particular manner. Many things are

beyond the powers of our nature, indeed of all limited natures.So in order to make this easier to grasp, I say that what marks off miracles and the

extraordinary concourse of God is that they cannot be foreseen by the reasoning of any

created mind, however enlightened, because no such mind can rise to having a clear view

of the general order. On the other hand, everything that is called natural depends on less

general rules which created things can understand. In order, then, to have not only

meanings but words that are above reproach, it would be good if we linked certain modes

of speech with certain thoughts in the following way. We can use our essence to stand

for something including all that we express however imperfectly; and in that sense, our

essence has no limits, and can rise to anything, because it expresses our union with God

himself. We can use our nature or our power to designate what is limited in us, that is,

to designate the more-perfectly-expressed fragment of all we express; and anything that

surpasses the nature or power - in this sense - of any created substance is supernatural.

17. Having several times mentioned subordinate rules, or laws of nature, I think it would

be good to give an example. Our new philosophers standardly employ the famous rule that

God always conserves the same quantity of motion in the world. This is indeed most

plausible, and in days gone by I thought it to be beyond doubt. But I have since realised

where the mistake lies. It is that M. Descartes and many other able mathematicians have

11


12/30

believed that the quantity of motion, that is to say the speed at which a thing moves,

multiplied by its size, exactly equals the moving force which it exerts; or, geometrically

speaking, that forces are directly proportional to speeds and bodies.

Now it is rational that the same force should always be conserved in the universe.

Here are reasons for the two halves of that thesis. As regards the addition of force:

Looking carefully at the observable facts, we can clearly see that perpetual mechanicalmotion doesnt occur; because if it did the force of a machine, which is always slightly

lessened by friction and so must soon come to an end, would be restored, and

consequently would increase of itself without any input from outside. As regards the loss

of force: We also observe that a bodys force is lessened only to the extent that it gives

some of it to adjacent bodies, or to its own parts in so far as they have their own

independent motion.

So the new philosophers were right about the conservation of force. Where they

went wrong was in this: they thought that what can be said offorce could also be said of

quantity of motion. But in order to show the difference between force and quantity of

motion, I make an assumption: that a body falling from a certain height gains enough force

to rise back up again, if its direction carries it that way, unless it is prevented.

For example, a pendulum would return exactly to its starting position unless the resistance

of the air and other little obstacles did not slightly lessen the force it had acquired. I shall

also make this assumption: that as much force is necessary to raise a one-pound body A to

the height of four fathoms, as to raise a four-pound body B to the height of one fathom.

All this is accepted by our new philosophers. It is clear, then, that body A, having fallen

four fathoms, has acquired exactly as much force as has body B which has fallen one

fathom. For body B, when it has completed its fall, has the force needed to climb back up

to the start (by the first assumption), and so has the force to carry a four-pound body (its

own body, that is) to the height of one fathom ; and, similarly, the body A, when it has

completed its fall, has the force needed to climb back to its start, and so has the force tocarry a one-pound body (its own body, that is) to the height of four fathoms. Therefore

(by the second assumption) the forces of these two bodies are equal. Let us now see

whether the quantities of motion are the same on the one side as on the other. Here they

will be surprised to find that there is a very great difference. For Galileo has demonstrated

that the speed acquired in As fall is double the speed acquired in Bs, although the height

is quadruple. So let us multiply body A (= 1) by its speed (= 2), and the resultant quantity

of motion = 2. On the other hand, multiply the body B (= 4) by its speed (= 1), and the

resultant quantity of motion = 4. Therefore the quantity of motion of body A at the end of

its fall is half that of body B at the end of its fall, yet their forces are equal. So quantity of

motion is clearly different from force, QED.

This shows how force should be calculated from the size of the effect it can produce -for example by the height to which a heavy body of a particular size and type can be

raised, which is very different from the speed it can reach. To double the speed you must

more than double the force. Nothing is simpler than this proof. M. Descartes got this

wrong through putting too much trust in his thoughts, even when they were not properly

mature. But I am amazed that his followers have not since recognised this mistake. They

are, Im afraid, starting to resemble some of the Aristotelians whom they mock, getting

into their habit of consulting their masters books rather than reason and nature.

12


13/30

18. This point about how force differs from quantity of motion is of some importance, not

only [1] in physics and in mechanics for discovering the true laws of nature and rules of

motion, and indeed for correcting some practical errors that have glided into the writings

of certain able mathematicians, but also [2] in metaphysics for understanding its principles

better. What follows illustrates point 2. Motion, if one considers only what it strictly

consists in just in itself (namely, change of place), is not an entirely real thing; whenseveral bodies change their relative positions, those changes in themselves do not settle

which of the bodies should be said to have moved and which to have remained at rest. (I

could show this geometrically, if I wanted to interrupt myself to do so.) But the force or

immediate cause behind those changes has more reality to it; there is an adequate basis for

ascribing it to one body rather than to another, and that is our only way to know to which

body the motion mainly belongs. Now, this force is something different from size, shape,

and motion, and this shows us that - contrary to what our moderns have talked themselves

into believing - not everything that we can conceive in bodies is a matter of extension and

its modifications.

So here again we have to reintroduce certain beings or forms which the moderns

have banished. And it becomes more and more apparent that although all particular natural

events can be explained mathematically or mechanically by those who understand them,

the general principles of corporeal nature and even the somewhat less general principles

of mechanics belong to metaphysics rather than to geometry, and have to do with certain

indivisible forms or natures, as the causes of appearances, rather than with corporeal or

extended mass. This line of thought could reconcile the mechanical philosophy of the

moderns with the caution of some intelligent and well-intentioned people who fear, with

some reason, that we might be endangering piety by moving too far away from immaterial

beings. In case that remark is too compressed, I shall now - down to the end of this

section - amplify it. On the one hand, my position enables us to agree with the moderns

that in scientifically explaining physical events we can proceed as though we werematerialists, appealing to nothing but material bodies and their properties. On the other

hand, we are saved from outright materialism (and thus from the risk of sliding into

atheism, which materialism brings with it), by my views about what is needed to complete

the physics of bodies. (1) I hold that the laws governing the behaviour of bodies involve a

concept of force that cannot be extracted from the concept of body; so it is sheerly

additional to anything the materialists are comfortable with; and it points in the direction

of immaterial beings as what might contain or exert the forces. (2) I hold that after we

have established all the laws of matter, there remains the question Why are these the laws

of matter?, and that the only tenable answer is Because God chose that they should be.

19. As I dont like to judge people harshly, I shant make accusations against our new

philosophers who claim to expel final causes from physics; but still I cant deny that the

consequences of this view seem to me dangerous. [The final cause of an event is what it

was for, what goal it was aimed at, what intention it was done with. Its efficient cause is

what makes it happen, causing it from behind, as it were. A tidal wave might have as its

efficient cause an under-sea earthquake; and if it had a final cause, it might be to punish

the people in a sinful coastal city.] It is especially dangerous when it is combined with the

view I refuted in section 2 of this Discourse, which seems to go as far as to eliminate

purposes altogether - from theology as well as from physics - as if Godacted without

13


14/30

intending or aiming at any end or good! Against this, I hold that it is to final causes that

we should look for the principle [= ultimate explanation] of all existent things and of the

laws of nature, because God always aims at the best and the most perfect.

I freely admit that we may go wrong in trying to work out what Gods ends or

purposes are; but that happens only when we want to limit them to some particular design,

thinking he had only some single thing in view, whereas in fact he takes account ofeverything all at once. So for example it is a great mistake to think that God made the

world only for us, although it is true that he did make it - all of it - for us, and that there is

nothing in the universe which does not touch us [Leibniz uses the same verb here as when

saying in section 15 that all changes touch all substances], and which is not also adjusted

to fit the concern he has for us, in accordance with the principles laid down above. So

when we see some good effect or some perfection that happens or follows from the works

of God, we can safely say that God intended it. We sometimes fail to act well, but not

God: He doesnt do things by accident. This is why, far from risking exaggeration in this -

like political observers who go to absurd lengths in attributing subtlety to the designs of

Princes, or like literary commentators who look for too much learning in their author - one

could never over-state the complexity of thought that this infinite wisdom involves. On no

subject do we run less risk of error, so long as we only make affirmations, and avoid

negative propositions which limit the designs of God. Everyone who sees the admirable

structure of animals is led to recognise the wisdom of the creator of things; and I advise

those who have any feelings of piety, and indeed of true philosophy, to avoid saying - as

do certain self-proclaimed free-thinkers - that we see because we happen to have eyes, but

not that the eyes were made for seeing. If one seriously maintains these views which hand

everything over to the necessity of matter or to some kind of chance (although each of

these must seem ridiculous to those who understand what I have explained above), one

will have trouble recognising an intelligent author of nature. For an effect must correspond

to its cause; indeed, the best way to know an effect is through its cause. If you introduce asupreme intelligence as the organiser of things, it doesnt make sense to go on to explain

events purely in terms of the properties of matter, without bringing in the organizing

intelligence. It would be as though, in explaining a great princes victory successful siege,

a historian were to say:

It was because the small particles of gunpowder, released by the touch of a spark,

shot off fast enough to impel a hard, heavy body against the walls of the place,

while the particles making up the strands of copper in the cannon were so densely

interwoven that they were not pulled apart by that speed;

instead of showing how the conquerors foresight made him choose the appropriate time

and means, and how his power overcame all obstacles.

20. This reminds me of a beautiful passage by Socrates in Platos Phaedo, which agrees

splendidly with my views on this point, and seems to have been aimed straight at our over-

materialist philosophers. This agreement made me want to translate it, although it is a little

long. Perhaps this sample will stimulate someone to make available to us many other

beautiful and solid thoughts to be found in the writings of this famous author. [At this

point there is a gap in Leibnizs manuscript, into which, he wrote, The passage from

Platos Phaedo where Socrates ridicules Anaxagoras, who introduces mind but does not

make use of it, is to be inserted. He had included an abridged version of that passage in

14


15/30

another of his writings a few years earlier. That version constitutes the remainder of this

section. It is Socrates who speaks.]

* * * * *

I once heard someone reading from a book that he said was by Anaxagoras, containing

these words: All things were caused by an intelligent being which set them out and

embellished them. This pleased me greatly, for I believed that if the world was caused byan intelligence, everything would be made in the most perfect possible manner. That is

why I believed that someone wanting to explain why things are produced, and why they

perish or survive, should search for what would be most suitable to each things

perfection. So such a person would only have to consider, in the thing he was studying,

whether himself or in something else, what would be the best or most perfect. For

someone who knew what was most perfect would also know what would be imperfect, for

the knowledge of either is knowledge of the other.

Considering all this, I rejoiced at having found an authority who could teach me the

reasons for things: for example, whether the earth is spherical or flat, and why it is better

that it should be one way rather than the other. I expected also that in the course of saying

whether or not the earth is at the centre of the universe, he would explain to me why its

position is the most suitable for it to have. And that he would tell me similar things about

the sun, the moon, the stars, and their movements. And finally that after having told me

what would be best for each thing in particular, he would show what would be best over-

all. Filled with this hope, I lost no time in acquiring Anaxagorass books and whipping

through them; but I found nothing like what I had been reckoning on: to my surprise, I

found him making no use of the idea of the governing intelligence that he had put

forward, that he had nothing more to say about the embellishments and the perfection of

things, and that he brought in an implausible notion of ether. Its as though someone

were to say at the outset that Socrates acts with intelligence, and then move on to

explaining the particular causes of Socratess actions thus: Socrates is seated here becausehe has a body composed of bone, flesh and sinews, the bones are solid but they are

separated at joints, the sinews can be stretched or relaxed - all that is why the body is

flexible, and, rounding out the explanation, why I am sitting here. Or as though someone,

wanting to explain our present conversation, appealed to the air, and to the organs of

speech and hearing and such things, forgetting the real causes, namely that the Athenians

thought it better to condemn than to acquit me, and that I thought it better to remain here

than to escape. If I had not had that thought - if I had not found it more just and

honourable to suffer the penalty my country chooses to impose than to live as a vagabond

in exile - I swear these sinews and bones would long ago have put themselves among the

Boeotians and Megarans! That is why it unreasonable to call these bones and sinews

causes. Someone might say that without bones and sinews I could not do what I do, andhe would be right; but the true cause is different from a mere condition without which the

cause could not be a cause. Some people offer as their whole explanation of what holds

the earth in its place the movements of bodies surrounding it; they forget that divine

power sets everything out in the most beautiful manner, and do not understand that the

right and the beautiful join forces to form and maintain the world. [end of Phaedo

excerpt]

15


16/30

21. Well now, since Gods wisdom has always been recognised in the detail of the physical

structure of certain bodies, especially animals and plants, it must also be shown display

itself in the general economy of the world and in the constitution of the laws of nature.

That is so true that this wisdom can be seen in the general laws of motion. Here is how. If

there were nothing to a body but extended mass, and motion were only change of place,

and if everything should and could be deduced with geometrical necessity from thosedefinitions alone, it would follow (as I have shown elsewhere) that a tiny body upon

bumping into an enormous stationary body would give it the same speed as it itself had,

without losing any of its own. And a number of other rules which, like this one, are

completely contrary to the formation of a system, would have to be admitted. But a

system is provided by the decision of the divine wisdom to conserve always the same total

force and direction. I even find that some natural effects can be demonstrated twice over,

first through efficient causes, and then through final causes - for example by bringing in

Gods decision to produce his effect always in the easiest and the most determinate ways.

I have shown this elsewhere, in explaining the rules of reflection and refraction of light,

about which I shall say more presently.

22. It is good to point this out, in order to reconcile those who hope to explain

mechanically how the parts of an animal are initially inter-woven and what machine they

compose, with those who explain that same structure through final causes. Both are good,

both can be useful, not only for admiring the great workmans ingenuity but also for

making useful discoveries in physics and medicine. Authors who go these different ways

ought not to heap abuse on each other as they sometimes do. For I see that those who

focus on explaining the beauty of divine anatomy make fun of others who think that such a

beautiful variety of organs could have come from a seemingly chance motion of certain

fluids; they call such people rash and profane. The latter, on the other hand, call the others

simple and superstitious, and liken them to the ancients who accused of impiety the

physical scientists who maintained that thunder is produced not by Jupiter but by somekind of matter in the clouds. It would be best to combine the two approaches, because - if

I may use a down-to-earth example - I recognise and praise a workmans skill not only by

showing what designs he had in making the parts of his machine, but also by explaining the

tools he used to make each part, especially when those tools are simple and cleverly

devised. God is such a skillful worker that he could produce a machine a thousand times

more ingenious than those of our bodies, using only various quite simple fluids that were

devised so that ordinary laws of nature were all it took to arrange them in the right way to

produce so admirable an effect; but that doesnt alter the fact that none of this would

happen if God were not the author of nature. Explanations in terms of efficient causes are

deeper and in some way more immediate and more a priori [= more truly explanatory],

but for the details of events such explanations are hard to come by, and I believe that our

scientists usually fall far short of achieving them. By contrast, the way of final causes is

easier, despite which it often enables us to conjecture important and useful truths, truths

which the other more physical route - that is, the way of efficient causes - would have

taken ages to reach. Anatomy provides substantial examples of this. I also think that Snell,

who first formulated of the rules of refraction, would have been a long time finding them if

he had tried to come at them first by way of efficient causes, which would put him in need

of discovering how light is formed. Instead of that, he seems to have followed the method

16


17/30

the ancients used for reflection of light, which is in fact that of final causes. They looked

for the easiest way to get a ray of light from one point to another by reflection in a given

plane (assuming that this is the way nature was designed), and this led them to the

discovery that the angle of incidence always equals the angle of reflection. M. Snell, I

think, more ingeniously applied this to refraction. [Leibniz here gives an extremely cryptic

and unclear statement of what Snell discovered about how light is bent when it passesfrom one medium to another, e.g. from air to water; and he says that it implies that light

always follows] the easiest or anyway the most determinate route from a given point in

one medium to a given point in another. [Leibniz is taking it for granted that the concepts

of easiest and most determinate somehow involve final causes.] (M. Fermat came at the

matter in the same way, though without knowing of Snells work.) M. Descartes tried to

demonstrate this same theorem in terms of efficient causes, but his demonstration is

nowhere near as good; and there is room to suspect that he would never have found the

theorem by his method if he had not been told in Holland of Snells discovery through

final causes.

23. I have thought it appropriate to emphasize a little the relevance to bodies of finalcauses, incorporeal natures and an intelligent cause, so as to show that these have a role

even in physical science and mathematics. I have wanted to do this because it may (on the

one hand) clear contemporary physics of the charge of impiety that has been levelled at it,

and (on the other) raise the minds of our philosophers from purely material considerations

to thoughts of a nobler kind. Now it is appropriate to return from bodies to immaterial

natures, and in particular to minds; and to say something about the means that God

employs enlighten them and to act on them. There is no doubt that here too there are

certain laws of nature, which I will be able to discuss more fully elsewhere. For the

moment it will be enough to say a little about ideas [sections 23-7], about whether we see

all things in God [section 29], and about how God is our light [section 28].

I should point out that many errors arise from the misuse of ideas. For example,some ancient and modern philosophers have based a very imperfect proof of God on the

natural assumption that when we reason about something we have an idea of it. The

proof goes like this:

[1] I can think about God, so

[2] I have an idea of him.

[3] this idea involves his having all perfections, and

[4] existence is one of the perfections.

Therefore

[5] God exists.

The defect in this is its move from 1 to 2. We often think of impossible absurdities - for

example of the highest speed, or of the largest number, or of [a certain geometrical

impossibility] - and the ideas involved in such thinking are in a certain sense false, in

contrast with true ideas of things that are possible. So we can boast of having an idea -

that is, a true idea - of a thing only when we are assured of its possibility. So the above

argument falls short. Still, it does at least prove that God necessarily exists if he is

possible. That is a significant result, because it attributes to God something that is not

true of most things. It is indeed an excellent privilege of the divine nature to need only its

possibility or essence in order actually to exist.

17


18/30

24. To understand the nature of ideas better, I must say a little about the different kinds of

knowledge. When I can pick a thing out from among others, but cannot say what marks it

out from them, my knowledge of it is confused. In this way we sometimes know vividly,

without being in any way in doubt, whether a poem or a painting is good or bad, because

it has a certainje-ne-sais-quoi which pleases or displeases us. But when I can explain the

criteria I am going by, my knowledge is clear. An assayers knowledge is clear like this;he can distinguish true from false gold by means of certain tests or marks which make up

the definition of gold.

But the clearness of knowledge is a matter of degree, because the notions entering

into the definition usually need to be defined in their turn, and are known only confusedly.

But when everything that comes into a definition or an item of clear knowledge is known

clearly, right down to the primary notions, I call that knowledge adequate. And when my

mind takes in, clearly and at once, all the primary ingredients of a notion, it has intuitive

knowledge of it. This is very rare; most human knowledge is only confused, or

suppositive. [Leibnizs use of his invented word suppositif in section 25 shows that his

thought is this: an item of knowledge to which this term applies involves a notion or idea

which one supposes to be firmly included in ones conceptual repertoire; this contrasts

with consciously bringing the idea to mind and seeing thatone has it in ones repertoire.]

It is also worthwhile to distinguish nominal definitions from real ones: I call a

definition nominal when we can still doubt whether the notion defined is possible.

[Leibniz gives a complex geometrical example.] This shows that any reciprocal property

[= any statement of necessary and sufficient conditions] can serve as a nominal

definition; but when the property shows the things possibility, it makes a real definition.

[The source of nominal is the Latin nomen, name; the source of real is the Latin

resemble, thing. A nominal definition, Leibniz holds, tells you only about the meaning of

a word, whereas a real definition informs you about the thing.] Now as long as we have

only a nominal definition, we cannot be sure of the consequences that we draw from it,because if it conceals some contradiction or impossibility it could also have opposing

consequences. This is why truths do not depend on names, and are not arbitrary as some

new philosophers have believed.

A final point: real definitions differ considerably from one another. When possibility is

proved only by experience, the definition is merely real and nothing more - as with the

definition of quicksilver, which we know to be possible because we have encountered a

fluid that is an extremely heavy yet fairly volatile. But when the thing can be shown to be

possible a priori - that is, without help from experience - as when the definition shows

how the thing could be generated, then the definition is both real and causal. And when a

definition takes the analysis the whole way down to the primary notions, without assuming

anything that itself requires an a priori proof of its possibility, the definition is perfect, oressential. [In this section and elsewhere, vivid translates the French clair, and clear

translates the French distinct. These are usually rendered as clear and distinct

respectively, but the first of those is nearly always a flat mistranslation (though not in the

second sentence of section 37). The French word clair primarily means vivid, bright,

strongly present to consciousness, so that Descartes can say that ones awareness of an

intense pain is clair, and bright light is lumire claire - even if it is dazzling and in no way

clear. That is why Leibniz can say in this section, as Descartes did before him, that

18


19/30

somethings presence to the mind can be at once confused and vivid - not confused and

clear! Once clear has been freed from that misuse, it becomes available as a good

translation for the French distinct.]

25. Let us get clear about suppositive knowledge. When I think of a thousand, I often do

so without contemplating the idea - as when I say that a thousand is ten times a hundred,

without bothering to think what 10 and 100 are, because I suppose I know, and see no

immediate need to stop to think about it. On those occasions, my thought that a thousand

is ten times a hundred is suppositive. In cases like that, I relate to the idea in the same

way as I do in a thought in which there lurks an impossibility. Even if in a given case the

relevant idea is all right, and does not involve an impossibility, I cannot learn that this is so

by suppositive thinking. So it can easily happen, and indeed quite often does, that I am

mistaken about a notion which I suppose or believe I understand, when in fact it is

impossible, or at least incompatible with the others to which I join it; and whether I am

mistaken or not, this suppositive manner of conceiving is the same.

26. To get a good grip on what ideas are, be warned of an ambiguity. Some people take

an idea to be a form or differentia [= aspect or property] of a thought; so that we havethe idea in our mind only when we are thinking of it, and whenever we think of it again,

we have different but similar ideas of the same thing. Others, however, seem to take an

idea to be the immediate object of a thought, or to be some kind of permanent form, which

continues to exist even when we are not contemplating it. I side with the latter group, and

here is why. Our soul always possesses the ability to represent to itself any nature or form

when the occasion for thinking of it arises. This ability is permanent, even though the

individual thoughts in which it is exercised come and go. And I believe that this ability of

our soul, when it expresses some nature, form, or essence, is properly called an idea of the

thing; and it is in us - always in us - whether or not we are thinking of the thing. For our

soul always expresses God and the universe, and all essences as well as all existences.

That requires our soul to have ideas of all those things at all times, which it can do only if

ideas are abilities rather than individual mental or events or aspects or properties of such

events.

This fits in with my principles, for nothing naturally enters our mind from outside; and

it is a bad habit of ours to think of our soul as receiving messenger species, or as if it had

doors and windows. We have all these forms in our mind and indeed always have had;

because the mind always expresses all its future thoughts, and is already thinking

confusedly of everything it will ever think clearly. We could not be taught something

unless we already had the idea of it in our mind, the idea being like the matter out of which

the thought is formed.

Plato understood this very well, when he put forward his doctrine of reminiscence.The latter is very sound, provided we take it in the right way - cleansing it of the error

about pre-existence, and not imagining that if a soul takes in and thinks about something

now it must at some earlier time have clearly known and thought about it. He also

confirmed his opinion by a beautiful experiment. He introduces a small boy whom he

gradually leads to an acceptance of very difficult geometrical truths about

incommensurables, without teaching him anything, only asking him an orderly sequence of

suitable questions. This shows that our souls have virtual knowledge of all these things;

19


20/30

that to grasp truths they need only to have their attention drawn to them; and thus that our

souls at least have the ideas on which those truths depend. They might even be said to

possess these truths, if we consider the truths as relations between ideas.

27. Aristotle preferred to compare our souls to as-yet blank tablets which could be written

on, and he held that there is nothing in our understanding that doesnt come from the

senses. This squares better with everyday notions, as Aristotle usually does (unlike Plato,

who goes deeper). Ordinary usage does sanction these doctrines or rules of thumb, in the

spirit in which people who follow Copernicus still say that the sun rises and sets. Indeed, I

often find that we can give them a good sense in which they are not merely passable or

excusable, but entirely true; in the way in which (as I have already remarked in section

15) it can truly be said that particular substances act on each other, and that we receive

knowledge from outside by the agency of the senses. in this same sense. But when we are

pursuing precise metaphysical truths, it is important to recognise how much our soul

contains and how independent it is of other things. These - its extent and its

independence - go infinitely further than plain folk imagine, although in ordinary talk we

attribute to the soul only what we are most plainly aware of, only what belongs to us inone special manner, because there is no point in going any further. Still, it would be good

to choose specific terms for each way of talking, so as to avoid ambiguity. So those

expressions that are in our soul whether conceived or not, can be called ideas; but those

that are conceived or formed in a consciously self-aware manner can be called notions,

or concepts. But in whatever way we take the term notion, it is always false to say that

all our notions come from the so-called external senses. For my notion of myself and of

my thoughts, and therefore of being, substance, action, identity, and many others, come

from an internal experience.

28. Now in strict metaphysical truth God is the only external cause that acts on us, except

God alone, and he alone communicates himself to us directly in virtue of our continual

dependence. Therefore no other external object touches our soul and directly triggers our

perceptions. So it is the continual action of God upon us that enables us to have in our

souls ideas of all things. Here is how that happens. All effects express their causes, and

so the essence [= intrinsic nature] of our soul is a particular expression, imitation or

likeness of Gods essence, thought and will, and of all the ideas contained in it. So we can

say that God alone is our immediate external object, and that we see all things through

him. When we see the sun and the stars, for example, it is God who gave us the relevant

ideas and who conserves them in us; and who by his ordinary concurrence, following the

laws he has established, brings it about that we actually think of them when our senses are

suitably disposed. God is the sun and the light of souls, the light which lighteth every man

that cometh into this world [John 1:9]; and this is not a new opinion. In addition to HolyScripture and the Fathers, who have always been more for Plato than for Aristotle, I

remember having sometimes noticed that many people in the time of the Scholastics held

that God is the light of the soul, or, as they used to say, the active intellect of the rational

soul. The Averroists twisted this the wrong way, but others have taken it in a manner

worthy of God and capable of raising the soul to knowledge of its true good.

29. However, I dont share the opinion of some able philosophers who seem to maintain

that our ideas themselves are in God and not at all in us. In my view this comes from their

20


21/30

having partly grasped but not yet having thought through the points I have just been

making about substances and about the whole extent and independence of our soul -

points which imply that the soul contains everything that happens to it, and expresses God

(and with him all possible and actual beings) as an effect expresses its cause. Anyway, it is

inconceivable that I should think with someone elses ideas! Furthermore, when the soul

thinks of something it must actually come to be in a certain state, and it must havecontained in advance not only a completely determinate passive power of coming to be in

that state, but also an active power in virtue of which its nature has always contained signs

of the future production of this thought, and dispositions to produce it when the time

comes. And all this - the passive power, and the active power which includes the forward-

looking signs and the disposition - has wrapped up in it the idea involved in the thought.

30. As regards Gods action on the human will, there are a number of quite difficult issues

which it would be tedious to pursue here. Here in outline is what we can say. In his

ordinary concourse with our actions, God merely follows the laws he has established; that

is to say, he continually preserves and produces our being in such a way that our thoughts

occur spontaneously and freely in the order laid down by the notion of our individualsubstance, in which they could be foreseen from all eternity. Furthermore, he determines

our will to choose what appears to us the best, yet without necessitating it. He does this

by decreeing that our will shall always tend towards the apparent good, thus expressing or

imitating the will of God to the extent that this apparent good has (as it always does have)

some real good in it. I comment now on without necessitating it. Absolutely speaking,

our will is in a state of indifference, as opposed to necessity: it has the power to do

otherwise, or to suspend its action altogether, each alternative being and remaining

possible. It is therefore up to the soul to take precautions against being caught off its

guard by events that come into its ken; and the way to do this is to resolve firmly to be

reflective, and in certain situations not to act or judge without mature and thorough

deliberation.It is true, however, and indeed it was settle from all eternity, that a particular soul will

not employ this power to pause, reflect, deliberate on some particular occasion. But

whose fault is that? Does the soul have anyone to complain of except itself? Any

complaint after the fact is unfair if it would have been unfair before. But would it have

been decent for this soul, just before sinning, to complain against God as if he were

determining it to sin? What God determines in these matters cannot be foreseen, so how

could a soul know that it was determined to sin unless it was already doing so? It is simply

a matter of not choosing to; and God could not have set an easier or fairer condition than

that; and accordingly judges do not look for the reasons that led a man to have an evil

intent, but concern themselves only with how evil it is.

But perhaps it is certain from all eternity that I shall sin? Answer that yourself:

perhaps not! And instead of dreaming on about what you cant know and cant learn from,

act according to your duty, which you do know. But how does it happen that this man

will certainly sin? The reply is easy: it is that otherwise it wouldnt be this man. For God

sees from all time that there will be a certain Judas whose notion or idea, which God has,

contains that future free action. That leaves only the question of why such a Judas, the

traitor, who in Gods idea is merely possible, actually exists. But no reply to that question

is to be expected here on this earth, except that in general we should say: Since God found

21


22/30

it good that Judas should exist, despite the sin which he foresaw, this evil must be repaid

with interest somewhere in the universe; God will extract some greater good from it; and

the bottom line is that this course of events - the actual one that includes the existence of

this sinner - will turn out to be the most perfect out of all the possible ways things could

have gone.

But while we are journeying through this world we cannot always explain theadmirable economy of that choice; we must settle for knowing it without understanding it.

And at this point it is time to acknowledge the richness and unfathomable depth of the

divine wisdom, and not to look for a detailed account of it - an account that would be

infinitely complex.

It is quite clear, though, that God is not the cause of evil. Mans soul been possessed

by original sin ever since he lost his innocence, but that was not the start of it. Even

before that, all created things - just because they were created - were intrinsically limited

or imperfect in a way that makes them capable of sin and of error. Saint Augustine and

others have held that the root of evil lies in nothingness, and I think that this should be

taken as saying what I have just said: namely, that evil comes from the lacks and limits of

created things, which God graciously remedies by the degree of perfection that he is

pleased to give. This grace of God in both its ordinary and its extraordinary versions [see

sections 6 and 16], varies in how deep and wide it goes. But it is always enough not only

to save a man from sin but also to secure his salvation, as long as he uses his own

resources to combine himself with that grace. It is not always sufficient to overcome a

mans inclinations; if it were, his inclinations would have no effect on anything, and he

would no longer be responsible for anything. That kind of sufficiency belongs only to

absolutely effective grace, which is always victorious, whether through itself or through

the combination of circumstances.

31. Finally, Gods graces are purely gifts, and creatures have no claim on them. We cant

fully explain how God chooses to distribute them by appealing to his foreknowledge(whether absolute or conditional) of how men are going to act in the future; but we must

not think of them as absolute or arbitrary decrees for which there are no rational

grounds.

As for Gods foreknowledge of our faith or good works: it is quite true that God has

chosen only those whose faith and charity he foresaw, foreseeing that he would endow

them with faith. But the old question comes up again: Why will God make a gift of faith or

of good works to some people and not to others? A difficulty about this arises from the

fact that grace is effective in a man only to the extent that he brings something of himself

to it. Although to act well a man needs to be stimulated to the good, and converted, he

must also then do it by means of his own resources, and men vary in what their inner

resources are, corresponding to how they vary in what grace is given them. So included in

Gods knowledge is not only his foresight of faith and of good deeds, but also his foresight

of what a man himself will contribute towards them - his natural dispositions in that

direction. It seems to many thinkers that we could say this: God sees what a mans natural

dispositions will be, and thus what he w

discourse on metaphysics: gottfried wilhelm leibniz

Documents