discursive ethics in ecosystems valuation and ... · tion, and communicative settlements of various...

ELSEVIER Ecological Economics 16 (1996) 95-107

ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

Methodological and Ideological Options

Discursive ethics in ecosystems valuation and environmental policy

Sabine U. O'Hara * Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, iVY 12180, USA

Received 22 February 1994; accepted 19 August 1995

Abstract

Discursive ethics has its origin in the Frankfurt School of critical theory. As an applied ethic it is also associated with practical philosophy. In this paper discursive ethics is discussed as a conceptual and practical framework for ecosystems valuation and environmental policy. The discussion focuses on three main strengths of discursive ethics: (1) it offers an integrated process for ecosystems valuation; (2) it offers a decision-making framework for responding to uncertainty and risk and the reality of action-in-indeterminacy; (3) it offers a process for deconstructing common valuation concepts and identifying conditions for their critical reconstruction. The theoretical discussion is followed by a case study example which illustrates the usefulness of discursive ethics in identifying valuation biases hidden behind disciplinary assumptions and conceptual norms. These include cultural norms of rationality, information biases which consider "hard facts" over "soft values", and disciplinary valuation biases which distinguish between "hard" and "soft" expert contributions. As the case study illustrates, a successful application of discursive ethics in ecosystems valuation and environmental policy demands sensitivity to such underlying biases. Beyond its policy relevance discursive ethics may also offer a framework for an extended peer discourse through which new foci in research and education can be identified.

Keywords: Discursive ethics; Ecosystems valuation; Environmental policy; Public discourse

1. In t roduc t ion

The need for improving information and assessment of ecosystems values to aid public and private decision-makers has been recognized for decades. The 1990 report of the U.S. EPA Science Advisory Board, for example, recommended that the agency focus its attention on developing ". . . improved methods to value natural resources and to account for

* Tel.: ( + 1-518) 276-8095; fax: ( + 1-518) 276-2235.

long-term environmental effects in economic analy- s is" (U.S. EPA SAB, 1990). A 1958 report of the U.S. Subcommittee on Standards and Evaluation of Water Resources states: "The problem of evaluating, from a public viewpoint, the extent to which a project (policy) accomplishes the aim of satisfying human needs and desires presents a major difficulty at the outset, because there are no common terms in which all effects of a project (policy) are normally expressed" (U.S. Subcommittee on Standards and Evaluation, 1958, p. 6).

Both statements call for a research agenda which

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focuses on evaluating the interface between human economic systems and their ecosystems context. Yet this is not an easy task. The emergent properties of co-evolving human societies and ecosystems processes make it difficult to assess or evaluate them. In addition, ecosystems values and the assessment of policy measures to reflect their value are interdisciplinary in nature. Thus it becomes essential to com- municate disciplinary assumptions and conceptual frameworks. For ecologists the valuation focus may be on ecosystems functions and services. Ethicists, sociologists or psychologists may focus on the intrin- sic value of ecosystems, their effects on human health or social structures, their aesthetic contributions, or their significance for future generations. For economists, ecosystems' productive services or value expressed in consumer preferences may form the basis for evaluation. I Such disciplinary differences are reflected in identifying valuation criteria as well as valuation methods.

This paper offers an approach to ecosystems valuation and policy assessment which is expressly cross-disciplinary. It is based on Jiirgen Habermas' concept of "discursive ethics." The discussion of discursive ethics focuses on three main contributions it has to offer: (1) an integrated approach to ecosystems valuation, (2) a contextual framework for considering uncertainty and risk, and (3) a basis for identifying operative valuation biases and conditions for their critical reconstruction. Following a theoretical discussion the contributions of discursive ethics are illustrated by a case study of roundtable discussions conducted to identify environmental policy priorities for New York State. This process makes explicit implicitly held valuation biases reflected in the identified policy goals.

2. What is discursive ethics?

Discursive ethics refers to a process of uncoerced and undistorted communicative interaction between

See, for example, the U.S. EPA Ecosystems Valuation Forum (1993) which includes naturalist/recreational services, ecological services, scientific services, aesthetic services, utilitarian services, cultural, symbolic, moral, and historic services of ecosystems.

individuals in open discourse (Apel, 1973; Haber- mas, 1983; Wellmer, 1986). There are many exam- ples of discursive processes suggestive of discursive ethics, though few have given recognition to the theoretical framework on which they are based. Ex- amples include conflict resolution, dispute mediation, and communicative settlements of various kinds. Many have been successful at generating consensus among participants at least on part of their agenda. Discursive ethics presupposes no norms other than the acceptance of a reasoned, reflective, and practical potential for discourse: that is, the mutual recognition and acceptance of others as response-able sub- jects (Habermas, 1983, pp. 92-93). This mutual recognition and acceptance constitute its ethical quality.

Discursive ethics has its theoretical roots in the Frankfurt School of critical theory associated with philosophers like Horkheimer, Adorno, and Weber. It shares the Frankfurt School's critical view of the Enlightenment's conception of instrumental reason and rationality. This reason, once liberating and em- powering, has become rigid and constraining, particularly in its institutionalized forms of bureaucracy and social control. Despite this criticism, discursive ethics also sees untapped potential in modern con- sciousness. This potential rests in the possibility of the life world itself (Lebenswelt to use Habermas' term) becoming increasingly conscious. The life world is the context in which cultures, social rela- tions, and individuals are formed and interact. The growing awareness of the life world, freed from normative constraints of unthinking conformity, forms the basis not only for instrumental, but also for communicative reason.

Discursive ethics seeks to give expression to this communicative reason. The rationality or reason expressed in a discourse among a diverse group of participants goes beyond a socio-technologicaily or individualistically determined instrumental rationality. It views reason as inseparably linked to and informed by the human experience of a social, cultural, and ecological life world which constitutes the context of human experience. This life world context includes the bio-physical world, albeit expressed in the human voices of discourse participants.

The acceptance of reasoned communication as the sole normative prerequisite of discursive ethics places

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it in the tradition of Kant. Reasoned discourse tran- scends metaphysical, empirical or any other normative preconditions of a deontological ethic. Ulrich (1989) considers it one of the main achievements of modern philosophy that discursive ethics offers a practical advancement to Kant 's Transcendental Phi- losophy. However, the taste of Kantian universaliza- tion which smacks of an acontextual, ahistoric, ho- mogenization that views tradition and rationality as opposites, has also provoked criticisms of discursive ethics (Benhabib, 1986; Gould, 1988; Leonard, 1990). Habermas' response is that the reasoned discourse simply offers a procedural framework to re- solving arguments or establishing principles. It does not attempt to determine universal principles for either individual conduct or social arrangements (Habermas, 1979; Bernstein, 1983). Dryzek offers a similar perspective. He argues:

".. .consensus on what is desirable based on a reciprocal understanding of the accepted legitimate (if different) opinions and conceptual frameworks of other actor(s) is possible in the absence of a shared commitment to the ultimate reason why it is desirable .... Even failing this kind of consensus, simple compromise between different views is defensible to the extent it is reached under communicatively rational conditions." (Dryzek, 1990, p. 17)

We may not agree on fundamental moral principles, but may still be able to reach agreement on moral aspects of practical issues. Discursive ethics is a communicative process in which discourse participants share their concerns, expecting mutual acceptance and respect for their positions. It is not a process of isolated individuals engaging in thought processes, universally accepted or otherwise. Discur- sive ethics can neither take place in isolation nor can it be purely theoretical. It needs to be practiced, and in its practical dimension it is undeniably political. Ulrich writes:

ronmental policies among all those affected by them." (Ulrich, 1989, p. 134) 2

An ethical discourse, therefore, has to be con- cerned with the conditions which make it first possible. 3 It cannot be satisfied with political content alone, but rather broadens the ethical focus of politics from content to process. Ulrich writes:

" I t cannot be the purpose of an ecological ethic to conclusively define environmental quality based on content criteria like systems of social indicators attempt to do, but instead it should work toward an institutional and methodological opening of processes which form ecological policy decisions .... Viewed in this way the ecological crisis points ulti- mately to the functional weaknesses of existing democratic decision-making processes. There is a deep connection between our political culture and the way we deal with nature. Ecological questions have in essence to do with our overcoming techno- cratic models of environmental policy which reduce them to technical control systems of environmental processes, and with showing instead more courage for ecological democracy." (Ulrich, 1989, p. 135)

Not just the what but the how is important. Existing socio-economic and political structures determine existing ecological valuation structures and resulting policy decisions. Who comes to the table and whose voices are expressed in the discourse are therefore essential to the ethical character of the discourse process.

This points to another dimension of discursive ethics. Since access to the discourse table shapes the discourse process itself, discursive ethics offers the potential for making visible the hidden normative assumptions, behaviors, and motivations which influence de-facto decision-making and valuation processes. Discourse as descriptive ethics does not aim at establishing ethical norms or at seeking to identify conditions for ethical judgment, but simply acknowi-

"Such a discursive ethic of rationality does not simply stick to formalities; rather it has concrete practical consequences wh ich - - i n the context of ecological ques t ions- -can be seen in the ethically based desire to create and secure fairer and uncoerced conditions for communication regarding envi-

2 Quotes taken from German texts were translated by the author.

3 A discussion of the institutional conditions for a communicatively rational process would exceed the focus of this paper. For further reading see Dryzek's extensive discussion of discursive rationality as social choice mechanism (Dryzek, 1990).

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edges that people are ethically motivated, just as they are socially, culturally, economically, or ecologically motivated. As Enderle, 1989 points out, descriptive ethics simply recognizes ethics as part of reality. Operative ethical criteria, therefore, are not only evident in a public policy discourse, but in the valuation debates of experts as well. The very selection process of valuation criteria, intra- and interdisciplinary debates about accepted versus unacceptable criteria and procedures, or the relative and absolute importance assigned to selected criteria are all expressions of normative presuppositions. This does not mean that descriptive ethics treats values as arbitrary or idiosyncratic. Rather it considers them to be expressions of a broader set of values. Any discourse, therefore, must remain critically aware of its contextual condition. Regional or disciplinary identities and standards which are likely to facilitate consensus need to be recognized as such instead of being mistaken for broadly accepted norms. And a broadly based discourse whose participants hold nothing in common but the reciprocal acceptance of differing opinions and conceptual frameworks must recognize the obstacles which stand in the way of reaching even partial consensus. Both must be aware of the broader socio-cultural norms which shape their position.

3. Why discursive ethics?

The explicitly contextual character of discursive ethics distinguishes it from more familiar assessment methods. In his extensive discussion of economic and political systems and their ability to address environmental policy needs Dryzek considers the "ecological circumstances" of human valuation and decision-making. He describes this ecological context as being characterized by complexity, non-re- ducibility, variability, uncertainty, collectiveness, and spontaneity (Dryzek, 1987, p. 33). Effective environmental policy and valuation methods must consider these characteristics. The following discussion of discursive ethics is limited to three points related to these characteristics: (1) the capacity of discursive ethics to offer an integrated approach to evaluating complex and interconnected ecosystems; (2) its potential for addressing uncertainty and risk and (3) its

potential for moving beyond common valuation and policy concepts to reconstruct contextual influences of the valuation process.

3.1. Integrating ecosystems valuation

Different disciplines bring distinctly different conceptual frameworks to the task of ecosystems valuation and resulting policy assessments. Most economists have focused on assigning market value to well-defined resources or functions of environmental media. The standard economic view is that human-induced environmental problems have their roots in the existence of negative externalities and market failures. To remedy the problem, therefore, one needs to internalize the diverging private and social costs which result in the suboptimal allocation of resources. This is in fact the task of environmental policy.

To assess social costs and benefits a variety of market-based methods have been offered such as estimating travel costs, recreational expenditures, or the replacement costs of a resource itself (Siebert, 1981; Chua-Eon, 1993; Smith and Desvousges, 1993). Critics of these methods have argued that it is inadequate to capture the environment's consump- tive, productive, absorptive, and sustaining functions in its market value (Boulding, 1971; Daly and Cobb, 1989; Bormann and Kellert, 1991; Ekins and Max- Neef, 1992). To address this inadequacy, concepts of option, existence, and future value of environmental resources have been added (Tietenberg, 1988; Pearce and Turner, 1990; Tisdell, 1991) Methods to assess these additional value categories include hedonic pricing (Brookshire et ai., 1993; Murdoch and Thayer, 1993), various types of Contingent Valua- tion (Eberle and Hayden, 1991; Harris et al., 1989), different approaches to discounting and the assessment of safe minimum standards (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Bishop, 1978; d'Arge et al., 1982; Krutilla, 1993). While there are vast differences between these methodologies, their commonalities are evident as well. With the exception of safe-minimum standards, even expanded economic valuation methods remain firmly embedded in the very conceptual framework which causes the inadequate representation of ecosystems qualities and functions in the first place. This does not simply refer to the fact that economic

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valuation assigns monetary value, but to the broader valuation biases it carries. To illustrate these biases, consider the common distinction between productive and sustaining functions. According to this distinction, productive functions yield output, are quantifi- able and have monetary value, while sustaining functions yield " informal" support, are qualitative and free. The former warrant support while the latter merely require attention when their neglect impacts the more important productive functions.

The valuation methods of natural science are based on physical instead of monetary units. Ecologists' conceptual framework is also generally less determined by human definitions of usefulness and more by ecosystems requirements. However, natural scientists often share with economists a notion of scientific inquiry which seeks to compartmentalize, ana- lyze, and maintain a value "neutral" distance from the "object" of inquiry. 4 This very model of scientific analysis is what economics as a social science has sought to emulate. The common mode this model offers for assessing ecosystems functions is to ana- lytically dissect component parts of the whole into sub-components and functions rather than viewing them as mutually defining and interdependent. As many have argued, this mode of inquiry and its implicit qualification of " rea l " knowledge as distanced observation versus empathetic intuition is not only inadequate to address complex ecosystems functions but is in fact at the root of human induced ecological problems (Daly, 1978; Griffen, 1978; Merchant, 1980; Hardin, 1986).

While systems modeling has sought to capture the interactions of complex systems, it has to cope with another separation problem, namely that of operating within disciplinary bounds. Each discipline comes with its own conceptual framework which translates into different variables, different pathways, and different normative judgements. Systems modeling also faces the tension between operationality (simplifica- tion) and realism (complexity). Overcoming these challenges of disciplinary integration and empirical

4 The fact that many of these sustaining functions are provided by the so-called informal sector (traditionally through women's work) or by nature itself has been the focus of feminist critique (Shiva, 1989; Mies, 1993; O'Hara, 1995b).

relevance requires more than the integration of measures, scales, and time frames. It requires that disciplinary blindspots, assumptions, and value judgements are exposed and considered in the model itself.

In contrast, discursive ethics offers an integrated valuation approach in which criteria and functions are considered simultaneously. With its integrated approach to valuation, discursive ethics can also offer a conceptual framework for an expressly interdisciplinary dialogue. Its main contribution lies in its potential for uncovering disciplinary differences in value judgements frequently hidden behind "value neutral" abstract methodologies. Munda et al. (1994), for example, point to the model designer's value judgement in selecting and weighting criteria in qualitative multicriteria models. Straus (1979) suggests a discursive process about model design to expose disciplinary blindspots and normative assumptions which easily enter the model itself irrespective of its application. To use Ulrich's phrase, discursive ethics exemplifies an ethic critical of "normative fundaments" (Grundlagenkritische Ethik; Ulrich, 1990). Ulrich's view that " i t is ethics (if anything) which can link ecology and economy" (Ulrich, 1989, p. 129) might thus be restated: it may well be the complexity of our ecological problems which can link ethics and economics as well as ethics and science.

3.2. Discursive ethics and uncertainty

The challenge of ecosystems valuation is exacer- bated by the fact that the ecological problems it seeks to address demand not only assessment but action. As ideas and theories are transformed into technology and markets at ever increasing speed, an adequate response system is needed to address the effects of this transformed knowledge. At the same time complexity and emergent properties of human economic and ecological systems force us to recognize how little we know, much less control. Funtow- icz and Ravetz (1993, p. 742) write, " w e can fruit- fully invert Latour's metaphor, and think of nature as reinvading the lab" (and, one might add, including the computer lab). The question of how we might deal with the risks and uncertainties posed by nature's "re-invading" our human-made worlds confronts us

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with the limits of complex systems models, economic optimization or cost-benefit-based policy analyses. Not only do such methods typically con- tribute to a technically reduced concept of "rational- i ty" and "objectivity," they also convey an illusion of knowledge and control. Science may not be able to deliver the facts for calculating maximum sustainable yields or least-cost alternatives. Instead, the complementarity of emergent socio-ecological systems may confront us with the limits to distant "external" scientific analysis and rational choice. 5

This does not mean, however, that scientific method and rigor are obsolete. Rather, scientific method and rigor must be reformulated for the new context. This requires first that we acknowledge what we don't know. Ludwig writes, "Magic can be replaced by science only if we scientists (and I might add economists and academics of whatever couleur) admit our limitations and confess our impotence." (Ludwig, 1993, pp. 555-556). Secondly, we need to systematize our admitted ignorance in order to convey the kind of risk and uncertainty our decisions must address. Funtowicz and Ravetz offer a system- atization in the " N U S A P " system (Numeral Unit Spread Assessment Pedigree) which distinguishes between technical, methodological and epistemologi- cal levels of uncertainty, ranging from inexact to unreliable to "border with ignorance." Thirdly, new assessment methods need to be added to our standard repertoire.

Discursive ethics can make at least two important contributions here. One stems from its contextuality and acknowledgement of the life world (Habermas' Lebenswelt). Decisions under uncertainty are a fact of life. There are numerous situations in which humans make decisions which escape a rational choice

framework. Yet in doing so we include many criteria from scientific facts and economic costs to historical, cultural, and ethical ones. Humans are more than rational choice decision-makers. They are moral agents embedded in social and ecological contexts. Intergenerational resource allocation and intergenerational equity and their implications for sustainability are a case in point (d'Arge et al., 1982; Norgaard and Howarth, 1993; Howarth, 1995). Intergenera- tional (as well as present) allocation and distribution questions are not simply economic or ecological, they are ethical. Valuable insights can be gained from research focused on what rules guide human decision-making under uncertainty, and how such rules evolve over time and in changing socio-economic and ecological contexts. Discursive ethics un- derstood as descriptive ethics offers one approach to this task.

The second contribution of discursive ethics is to offer a conceptual and methodological framework for an extended peer discourse. This discourse needs to take place on all levels from disciplinary, to interdisciplinary, to the broadest-based public participation. Socio-ecological complexities cannot be ade- quately addressed in disciplinary isolation, but rather require discourse in what Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) call "extended peer communities" (see also Dryzek, 1987, 1990). Such discourse around conceptual and methodological questions is not unprece- dented as for example in the Methodenstreit of German economists in the 19th century. 6 However, this debate is tellingly called "fight of methods" and not discourse. It fell short of a discursive ethics process in that it deteriorated to a fight among experts which failed to include the wider circle of those affected by, but defined as "external" to, the peer group of experts.

5 An example of complementarity is the risk of climate change. The implementation of policies to prevent climate change also prevents certainty about the form the risk of climate change might have taken had it been allowed to occur. Scope and irreversibility of climate change make it at the same time impossible to treat this risk as a temporary problem which can be eliminated through the continued pursuit of the "puzzle solving" paradigm of a Kuhnian normal science (Kuhn, 1962). The risk of climate change and similar large-scale ecological problems has been compared to a social analogy of the Heisenberg principle studied in quantum mechanics (Green, 1992; Jaeger, 1993).

3.3. Deconstruction and reconstruction

Discursive ethics provides a framework for the reconstruction of a deconstmcted life world, analyti-

6The Methodenstreit was personified by the antagonists Schmoller and Menger. Schmoller's historic school favored an inductive, holistic, historic-ethical approach to economics. Menger 's analytical school favored an unhistoric, individualistic, universal approach and deductive methods.


cally dissected into functional components and held external in standard valuation methods. It also offers a framework for the deconstruction of accepted assessment and decision-making processes and thus existing power structures. As Apel (1973) argues, the practice of science (economics, engineering, medicine or any other highly trained, highly privi- leged group of experts) presupposes a metascientific rationality exclusively open to the community of experts. Dryzek writes:

"Now, given the complicity of technologists in the control of both human and nonhuman nature, one might claim that any such group is party to the instrumental domination of individuals and objects external to it ..... one task for communicative rational- ization becomes the destruction of such privilege and its implicit hierarchy." (Dryzek, 1990, p. 13)

This is a decisive difference between discursive ethics and Popper's model of the open society (Dryzek, 1990). As long as discourse remains limited to experts who represent the mainstream of disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) thinking, the discourse process may simply reinforce biases of the status quo as familiar definitions of critical rationality remain unchallenged. In contrast, an expanded discourse can serve to expose the quasi-democratic character of an exclusive peer review process which limits itself to a predetermined agenda, accepted methods, and select communication rules. 7 The ethic of a discursive ethics therefore finds expression not just in the conduct of the process, but in who is invited to the table. A reassesment of valuation criteria and methods takes place in the very selection process of discourse participants. 8 This offers a process which considers

7 For an extensive critique of the power asserted by a science closed to public scrutiny and participation as it relates to setting its agenda, sharing information and selecting participants of the assessment process, see Ravetz (1990).

g An important question that cannot be addressed in this article is that discurisve ethics also requires attention to the institutional conditions and processes in which a discursive forming of ethics can take place. Educational and institutional conditions which allow for an open and informed public discourse to be practiced are essential both for the forming of valuation and policy and for its transformation into political action (see, e.g., Feyerabend, 1980).

more than simply diversity, but includes especially those who usually go unheard, are un- or under-rep- resented, or considered outside the accepted mainstream. Discursive ethics thus offers the possibility for a democratic reconstruction of a deconstructed valuation framework.

Since ethical discourse rests upon the mutual respect and acceptance of participants it is decisive how contributions of participants are evaluated. Both the knowledge of experts and the knowledge of those affected by valuation and policy decisions are valid. The prejudging of contributions into categories like relevant/irrelevant, educated/uneducated, or knowl- edgeable/ignorant has all too often excluded contributions of women, minorities or indigenous peoples even when they have been given a place at the table (Shiva, 1989; Salleh, 1990). Such distinctions over- look the importance of the knowledge of those whose expertise is based on the intimate knowledge of a local environment, is immersed and empathetic knowledge. 9 Strengthening rather than weakening a diversity of knowledge can be an important counter- force to the homogenizing pressures of an expanding global market, and thus a valuable contribution discursive ethics has to offer global and local sustainability goals, l0

This requires, however, that the implicit biases of a discourse process based on language are recognized. Discourse holds the danger of perpetuating the biases and expectations of verbal expression. Discur- sive techniques have been criticized by those who contend the dominance of male, educated, rational structures of thought and reasoning over those less rational, articulate, and empathetic. Language itself may pre-empt an ethical process when its expressions are narrowed. The shortfall of a discursive process in ecosystems valuation is not, as some might argue, the fact that it is based on language as a human expression which is in and of itself anthro- pocentric. Rather what is decisive is how language is

to For a discussion of mainstream economics as homogenizing force which contributes to elimination of socio-diversity, see O'Hara (1995a).

9 For a discussion of empathetic and local knowledge as opposed to distanced objectivist knowledge, see Keller (1983), Shiva (1989), Hekman (1992), and Peet and Peet (1994).


used and how it gives voice to both nature and humans. Discourse can indeed be used to identify the breadth and depth of relevant valuation criteria, but its relevance can also be pre-empted if existing communication biases are perpetuated. At the same time a discursive process of mutual respect and acceptance also offers the possibility of what Nel Morton has called a "listening into being" (Morton, 1985). It is the power of being listened to and having the expression of one's insights and experience vali- dated even if not shared in a discursive process.

While it may not be easy for all of us to cope with the messiness of an open discursive ecosystems valuation process, this messiness is where its power lies. It is the democratization of a valuation and policy process which not only integrates research and context, but offers the inclusion of numerous, vastly diverse and potentially conflicting life worlds. There is no longer only one life-world admitted, one conceptual framework shaping the valuation process, but multiple ones. For academia this can result in an important and fruitful process of identifying a broad- ened, applied, and relevant research agenda.

4. A case study example

The following describes a discursive process of Environmental Round Tables sponsored by the New York State Council of Churches. These roundtables were conceived as a real discursive process, not as theoretical experiments. A diverse group of people was invited to discuss urgent environmental policy issues confronting New York State both as a region and as part of the global community. This case study example is of interest for two reasons: First, while replicating much (although not all) of the diversity of American society, the ecumenical church differs from other institutions in that it stands for the explicit inclusion of values in the public debate. Its metaphor of "Caring for Creation" offers the broadening of the public discourse beyond scientific reason and data to include its moral dimensions and narrative expressions. This inclusion may be much needed as science based policy is faced with growing public skepticism. Oelschlaeger (1994) writes: "There are no solutions for the systemic causes of the ecocrisis, at least in democratic societies, apart from religious

narrative" (p. 5). The ecumenical church i1 has a 25-year history of broadly defined ecological concerns under its issue area of eco-justice which explicitly links ecological and social issues. Secondly, in this time of disillusionment and mistrust of institutions of all kinds the church may have a particularly important institutional role to play in bringing questions of ecosystems valuation and environmental policy into the public debate. Americans identified the church as one of the two institutions they trust most, the other being the military (Ford Foundation Pro- ject, 1989). Three questions are pursued in the following discussion of this particular discourse example: (1) What are the operative norms in a value conscious discourse process? (2) How is information evaluated in this process? (3) How are expert and non-expert contributions evaluated among diverse participants?

4.1. Process description

All participants had some known interest or direct involvement in environmental issues although the scope of this involvement varied greatly. Participants came from non-governmental environmental organizations, the private sector, government agencies, education, religious and charitable organizations, and included both professionals and volunteers. A common denominator was residency in New York State and varying degrees of involvement in churches or groups with religious affiliation. Participants were invited to focus on how the whole of their experience (scientific information, religion, personal experience) informed their view of and valuation of the functions the natural environment performs. They were further asked to identify possible changes necessary to preserve valued ecosystems functions, and to indicate the role the church might play in facilitat- ing such changes. The group identified two main ways for incorporating values and affecting change: education and policy. Twelve of the initial 25 participants agreed to continue dialogue over the following

I I The ecumenical church consists of the mainline protestant denominations such as the American Baptist, United Methodist, Presbyterian, UCC, African Methodist Episcopal, AME Zion, Korean Methodist and Orthodox churches. Many church councils are also linked to interfaith organizations.


months to draft a document which would establish guidelines for environmental policy in New York State reflective of the values and changes identified in the initial discourse (NYSCoC Eco-Justice Pro- ject, 1993). The Council of Churches again served as facilitator of the follow-up discourse.

4.2. Process observations

1. What are the operative norms in a value-conscious discourse? Agreement was quickly reached that the document should stress the importance of both economic and ecological needs. Participants' values seemed to serve to identify and overcome tensions between individual aims and their social and ecological context. Thus consensus on broad ecological and socio-economic concerns was easily reached. The document reads: "We seek harmony between economic development and environmental steward- ship." Or "We do need economic development in our state, but this development must be environmen- tally sustainable. Economic interest cannot be the sole criterion for determining our well-being." Eco- nomic concerns were generally expressed in terms of " jobs ," "meeting peoples basic needs," or "the lack of social responsibility," rather than in monetary considerations. A tax on one-time-use products, for example, generated considerable discussion about the discriminatory nature of such a measure rather than eliciting general disagreement with taxes as a valid measure to achieve environmental compliance. Throughout the document economic and ecological concerns are interwoven. Justice and equity, the preservation of bio-diversity and the worth of nature "...even apart from its usefulness to human beings" are affirmed as necessary components of a successful policy agenda.

Following these general concerns the document lists three issue areas identified as "critical" for New York's public policy agenda: waste, energy, and resource management. As the document shifts from general statements to specific issues the group's explicitly ethical value orientation moves into the background while scientific fact and rationality come to the fore.

2. How is information evaluated? As the issues addressed became more concrete, an underlying dis-

tinction between information of a higher and of a lower order became evident. So-called "hard facts" dominated expressions of emotion, values, or even experience. Discussion of the document's "Critical Areas" revealed an extensive level of knowledge and familiarity with the issues on the part of some participants. These differences in "factual information" became progressively more influential the more detailed the document's focus. Under "waste management," for example, agreement was easily reached on general priorities such as waste reduction, re-use, and recycling before end treatment and disposal. Yet considerable discussion revolved around the question whether or not to include waste incineration as a viable option of end treatment. The compromise reached stated that while incineration should not be specifically excluded, "end treatment and disposal methods must not pose disincentives to the above stated management priorities." Similar discussions took place on nuclear energy. While some participants with considerable expertise were not willing to give up nuclear energy as a viable option, others were strongly opposed. The compromise reached was that the document would not explicitly address nuclear energy at all. As a result, the document emphasizes the need to reduce energy con- sumption, increase efficiency and develop "alternative energies," but remains vague on specific energy sources. In each of the specific issue discussions an unspoken prioritizing of contributions took place: "You just argue from your emotions, your opinion, or even your limited personal experience; I argue from my professional expertise." Assertions of values or emotions (e.g., fear) were generally taken up in discussing uncertainty, risk and risk control, and tended to result in a compromise rather than a change in positions.

3. How are e x p e r t / n o n - e x p e r t contributions evaluated? As the above discussion shows, distinctions of expert and non-expert contributions re- mained firmly in place. Legitimate forms of knowledge are associated with career (particularly if it is technical or scientific) and education, not necessarily with personal affectedness or direct experience. In addition, another expert/non-expert issue surfaced: there appeared to be "hard" and "sof t" experts whose expertise was evaluated differently. With re-


spect to ethical or value questions there was markedly less distinction between the expert contributions of theologians or ethicists and other non-expert contributions than in matters of scientific or technical information. While in discussions of social or ecological ethics occasional theological or philosophical disagreements among the experts in the field emerged, it appeared much easier for the "non-experts" to assert their opinion regarding a particular position or wording in the document. A remark like "this makes me feel uncomfortable" in response to a value oriented formulation was taken as much more valid and relevant than if made in response to a concern about the safety of a particular waste treatment or energy alternative. Scientists, engineers, or health professionals carried more pre-eminent weight than theologians or those working in social fields. This calls for caution toward Oelschlaeger's opti- mism regarding the role religion could play in developing values which would advance environmental- ism as a political force. Religion and religious people too are shaped by culture and the predominant cultural value of rationality and factual knowledge ad- vanced by science and technology. ~2 This, however, points all the more to the responsibility of the "experts" to enter the value debate among themselves and within an enlarged interdisciplinary context to both clarify the contextual nature of knowledge and to advance a public discourse in which scientific knowledge becomes communicable rather than ex- clusionary.

In the case described, discursive ethics proved a viable method for identifying ecosystems values and reaching consensus on an environmental policy agenda. The discourse process also served to identify operative hidden value distinctions and their impact on ecosystems valuation and policy. This illustrates that critical awareness of such underlying valuation processes on the part of the facilitator, or, indeed, some of the discourse participants, is critical to the

12 The point made by White (1967), however, that it is religion which shapes society's fundamental values, and thus impacts social, political, and economic processes has to be taken cau- tiously as well. Religious values and their interpretation and practice are not devoid of socio-cultural, political, and historical contexts.

interpretation of the discourse process. Without such awareness discursive ethics runs the risk of failing in its task, and being co-opted to reinforce existing valuation and power structures. As Dryzek points out, discourse needs to remember its connection with critical theory which requires the multifaceted and relentless critique of criteria, practices, and institutions (Dryzek, 1990, pp. 220-221).

5. Conclusions

The need for a more integrated approach to ecosystem valuation has long been recognized. Par- ticularly, methods which focus on the interaction between humans and ecosystems are needed. Such methods must be based on a conceptual framework which offers connection rather than separation, integration rather than isolation, and contextuality rather than reduction. Global ecological problems confront us with high uncertainty, high risk, and emergent properties. These characteristics push the limits of standard assessment methods. In fact, in assessing policies to address such problems, the commonly assigned categories of "hard fact" versus "soft values" are inverted (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993): The soft facts we have to base our decisions on make it imperative that we recognize the importance of hard values: i.e., a firm ethical base guiding valuation and decision-making processes. Discursive ethics offers a conceptual framework for considering valuation and decision-making processes within the complexities of their life world. This allows for the inclusion of facts and values in an integrated valuation process, the uncovering of underlying valuation biases, and the critical reconstruction of the valuation and decision-making process itself.

However, for a discourse process to be ethical it has to be open, respectful, and willing to accept and hear a diversity of voices. Otherwise it will be in danger of deteriorating into a manipulative assertion of predetermined agendas. Meeting these principles of discursive ethics is easier said than done. As the case study example shows, even in an arena where normative values are explicitly called for, their real expression remains difficult. The dissecting, distanced and supposedly objective mode of inquiry and argument we are accustomed to asserts its influence


even in an explicitly value-oriented discourse process. This may not necessarily be due to an unwill- ingness to change, but rather due to a lack of knowing how to go about changing or challenging familiar conceptual frameworks. We simply seem to be more accustomed to managing and responding to detail than to addressing the larger ethical questions at stake.

Reflexively, it has to be admitted that discursive ethics is just one ethic, which may in any real world context be expressed in contradiction with a variety of other ethics embodied in the discourse process, some of which may preach and practice intolerance, exclusion and self-legitimating valuation hierarchies. Since by its very premise, discursive ethics does not seek to establish a coerced hegemony, it may find itself in the painful position of inviting closed doors to be opened, and unable to reach even partial consensus. Yet this does not make discursive ethics a mute exercise. Active dialogue can bring about change or at least uncover barriers to change. This uncovering of barriers and hidden valuation concepts may well be one of the most valuable contributions of discursive ethics. As an ethic critical of commonly accepted valuation fundaments--that is, the basic assumptions of concepts and methods--discursive ethics may start as a discourse of "exper ts" from various fields, including particularly those whose disciplines address ethical values and questions of qualified knowing and "unknowing." t3 Open discourse may clarify what we know, what the uncertainties and risks at stake are, and become explicit about the ethical responses called for in light of our ignorance. However, an ethical discursive valuation process must go beyond any expert community to include the diverse voices of those affected by common valuation practices, particularly those who have been unheard. This is not to denigrate the contributions of those with expertise in science, technology or economics, but rather it is to empower and re-value the contributions of empathetic knowledge, local knowledge, and experiential knowledge of those affected by standard valuation concepts and resulting policies. However, if one is unaware of the difficul-

t3 I use this term not only in the sense of ignorance, but also in the sense of unlearning what hinders our knowing.

ties involved in leveling the playing field of valuation concepts, discourse may well be in danger of reinforcing existing valuation biases. Apart from of~ fering a process for democratizing exclusive valuation and decision-making processes, discursive ethics can help open up the vision for new areas of research, education, and policy.

Acknowledgements

My sincere thanks to John Gowdy and Martin Btischer for their supportive comments and many hours of discussion. Thanks are also due to Martin O'Connor for his helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this manuscript, and to Manfred Max-Neef and Harold Glasser for their useful comments.

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