discussion of “the role of managerial overconfidence in the design of debt covenants” sudipta...

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Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

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Page 1: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the

Design of Debt Covenants”Sudipta Basu

Page 2: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Is the paper interesting?

No accounting content

Behavioral finance – but old theory…

Managerial hubris... Roll (1986)

Still interesting to understand whether bondholders “pierce the corporate veil”

(i.e. look through firm characteristics to managers actually making decisions)

Page 3: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

What’s the paper about?

Are overconfident managers more restricted in their business activities?

Do managers who do not rush stock option exercises have their judgment questioned by bondholders?

Merger restrictions correlated with overconfidence, “abnormal” accruals, M/B, ROA, financing restrictions…

Page 4: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Libby Boxes

5

Control Agency costs, Transparency, Profitability Vs (prior), Zs (current causes)

4

2 3

Option delay X

Debt covenants Y

Operational

Overconfidence X (X )

Distrust Y (Y)

Conceptual1

Independent Dependent

Page 5: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Validity threats related to Libby Boxes

From easiest to hardest to think about:• Statistical Conclusion Validity (5)• Internal Validity (4)• Construct Validity (2 and 3)• External Validity (1 generalizes to ??)

Page 6: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Are the results persuasive?

Basic question is how well are potential validity threats addressed?

Is a definitive/sharp test presented?

Are multiple test results consistent?

What is the totality of the evidence?

Thin (regression) versus thick (case study, institutional detail) association

Page 7: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Theory/External Validity

Do we usually distrust overconfident people?

How much is “optimal” confidence?

How do we identify overconfidence?

Can you be both depending on domain?

Is overconfidence the same as optimism?

Review PSYCHOLOGY research

Overconfidence X (X )

Distrust Y (Y)

Conceptual1

Independent Dependent

Page 8: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Construct Validity (1)

2 3

Option delay X

Debt covenants Y

Operational

Overconfidence X (X )

Distrust Y (Y)

Conceptual1

Independent DependentNegative Proxy

Founder CEO?

Family CEO?

Very wealthy CEO?

Power-hungry CEO

Try Positive Proxies like N successive optimistic forecasts, MD&A or conference call tone, press or analyst descriptions…

Page 9: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Construct Validity (2)

2 3

Option delay X

Debt covenants Y

Operational

Overconfidence X (X )

Distrust Y (Y)

Conceptual1

Independent Dependent

What are distrustful actions?AvoidanceRecommend othersLimited trial (credit line?)Boundaries (covenants)Compensation (interest)

Model other distrustful actions—selection bias issues

Page 10: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Internal Validity

Control Agency costs, Transparency, Profitability Vs (prior), Zs (current causes)

4

2 3

Option delay X

Debt covenants Y

Operational

Easier to observe proxy for overconfidence?

repeated optimistic management forecasts

conference call behavior or MD& A tone

WHO observes and decides?

5

Page 11: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu

Other minor issues

Why don’t shareholders fire these CEOs?Abnormal accruals = accounting ignoranceConservatism reduces control denominatorsTime-series clustering? (mid-1980s?)Benchmark model with only control variablesMedians not means (very skewed variables)Include predicted signs in tables

Page 12: Discussion of “The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants” Sudipta Basu