dispatch criteria and resource allocation for vegetation

Running head: DISPATCH CRITERIA AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Dispatch Criteria and Resource Allocation for Vegetation Fires in the City of San Diego

Colin T. Stowell

San Diego Fire-Rescue Department

San Diego, California

DISPATCH CRITERIA AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 2

Certification Statement

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of others is

set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where I have used the

language, ideas, expressions, or writings of another.

Signed: _________________________________________


Abstract

Dispatching appropriate levels of emergency resources to vegetation fires is critical to mitigating

hazards and limiting property damage. Assigning insufficient resources can be detrimental in

efforts to reduce fire spread and damage, yet assigning too many resources can result in

unwarranted costs and increased risks. Ideally, a commitment of initial resource levels should be

based on multiple factors which affect potential fire danger and risks to the public. San Diego

Fire-Rescue Department uses only two initial dispatch levels for vegetation fires with the

assigned level based solely on one factor, the geographic location of the incident. The research

questions for this study focused on (a) efficiency of assigned resources, (b) factors that better

predict fire danger and potential risk, (c) theoretical rationale that supported this dispatch

practice, and (d) and added costs and risks associated with dispatching resources based on a

single criterion. This study utilized a descriptive research methodology that included a review of

vegetation fire incident reports, interviews with senior department officers, a survey of

comparable fire departments, and an analysis of the costs and vulnerabilities associated with

units unnecessarily assigned. Results indicated significant inefficiencies, particularly in cases

involving the higher dispatch level. Further, multiple pre-incident factors can better predict the

potential fire risk and number of resources needed versus relying solely on geographic location.

A number of additional costs and risks were identified, most significantly the unavailability to

respond to other emergencies. Recommendations included (a) incorporate additional factors into

the dispatch criteria for vegetation fires to improve resource efficiency, (b) update geographic

and topographic information to reflect special response areas and target hazards, (c) include

remote weather stations that offer accurate information regarding the fire danger within the city,

and (d) establish incremental dispatch levels according to conditions and initial fire reports.


Table of Contents

Certification Statement 2

Abstract 3

Table of Contents 4

Introduction 5

Background and Significance 6

Literature Review 10

Procedures 18

Results 25

Discussion 36

Recommendations 42

References 45

Appendix A: SDFD Vegetation Fire Danger Rating System (Pre May 2009) 48

Appendix B: Vegetation Fire Response Area Map 49

Appendix C: Current SDFD Dispatch Matrix for Vegetation Fires 50

Appendix D: Weather Index Pocket Card 51

Appendix E: Sample Fire Incident Data Reports 52

Appendix F: Regional Vegetation Dispatch Survey Questions 54

Appendix G: Interview Questions 56


Introduction

San Diego Fire-Rescue Department (SDFD) staffs and operates its own Fire

Communication Center (FCC), dispatching emergency resources according to policies and

procedures set forth by management and dispatch review committees. Currently SDFD uses two

different dispatch levels for vegetation fires that determine the amount and type of resources sent

to a reported fire. The two dispatch levels are Vegetation-No Special Response (VNSR) and

Vegetation-Special Response (VSR) which are assigned solely by geographic location and do not

take other pre-incident factors or information (e.g., weather conditions, recent precipitation, fuel

moisture, or time of day) into consideration. The number of resources for the dispatch levels is

significantly different, as a VNSR assigns two units while a VSR assigns 13 units consisting of

39 emergency responders. Further, according to the Information Systems Analyst for SDFD, the

dispatch decisions are complicated by the fact the city’s designated geographic locations that

identify a response area as “No Special Response” or “Special Response” are based on outdated

topography information and field surveys compiled almost two decades ago (L. Brenner,

personal interview, October 8, 2012). The method of using only one criterion in determining the

resources to be dispatched to a vegetation fire often results in significantly more resources than

are needed to mitigate the incident. The problem is SDFD dispatches resources to all vegetation

fires based upon a single factor; geographic location. The purpose of this research project is to

identify if the current practice of dispatching resources to vegetation fires solely on the location

results in operational inefficiency and/or risks. This project uses a descriptive research

methodology reviewing dispatch data, current resource allocation criteria, surveys from other fire

departments, personal interviews with active and retired senior management chief officers, and

retrospective analysis of incident reports. The research questions to be answered by this project


are (a) using the current dispatch criteria, to what degree are the resources assigned to a

vegetation fire in San Diego being effectively and efficiently utilized, (b) what were the theories

and data used to support and implement the current dispatch levels for a vegetation fire in San

Diego, (c) what additional pre-incident conditions and information can be used by SDFD to

better predict fire behavior and potential risk of a reported vegetation fire, and (d) what are the

sacrifices, consequences, and costs associated with assigning unnecessary resources to a

vegetation fire in San Diego as a common practice?

Background and Significance

San Diego Fire-Rescue Department provides fire protection and emergency medical

services to more than 1.3 million people covering 331square miles of urban and suburban

communities. The department includes a workforce of 1,036 uniformed personnel staffing 47 fire

stations and nine permanent life guard stations with 47 engine companies, 12 truck companies,

and numerous cross staffed specialty apparatus including hazmat, heavy rescue, light and air,

water tenders, and 12 type III brush apparatus (http://www.sandiego.gov/fire/index/shtml).

Within the city there are over 500 linear miles of wildland urban interface (E. Villavicencio,

personal communication, October 25, 2012). In Fiscal Year 2012 (FY2012) the department

responded to 122,172 emergency incidents, of which 87% were medical responses, nearly 3%

fire responses, and the remainder including miscellaneous rescues, ringing alarms, and other

service calls (FY2012 Annual Report, 2012). Of the 3,565 fire related emergencies SDFD

responded to in FY2012, just over 15% (547) involved vegetation fires (FY2012 Annual Report,

2012).


Prior to May 2009, SDFD employed a dynamic three-level dispatch system when

assigning resources to a vegetation fire. The three dispatch levels were Low, Medium, and High

with weather conditions taken periodically throughout the day and factored into the dispatch

determination for these responses. Included in the levels was a geographic and topography factor

of canyon rim areas, both top and bottom which would assign different types of resources to the

appropriate location. The various dispatch levels were intended to align the amount and type of

resources to the potential and calculated fire danger, considering both weather conditions and

topography. The dispatch levels were determined by a software program developed by retired

Fire Captain Craig Nielsen using the 1972 version of the National Fire Danger Rating System

evaluating weather conditions, fuel model, and slope (Appendix A). Weather data was entered

into the program three times a day generating the fire danger rating and dispatch level

accordingly; information which was sent to all stations anytime the level changed. This

dispatching practice ended in May of 2009 primarily because of two challenging issues. First, the

process of routinely collecting weather data and inputting the measurements into a program to

determine the dispatch level proved to be inconsistent, time consuming, and the various dispatch

levels were difficult to manage by the multiple dispatchers. The weather data was not automated,

requiring manual input of the measurements into CAD, while at the same time geographic and

target hazard information needed to be collected prior to dispatching units. This multiple step

process and evaluation of changing conditions resulted in significant delays in response time.

According to Assistant Fire Chief Brian Fennessy, it was felt that “ too many variables were

being assessed before the actual dispatch could take place, at times taking up to 7-8 minutes to

finally dispatch the entire alarm assignment” (Fennessy, personal interview, 2012).


The second reason for the change was since San Diego had the potential for significant

fire danger throughout the year, there was the need to ensure adequate resources were assigned in

the early stages of a fire. The Cedar Fire in 2003 which burned 273,246 acres destroying 2,232

homes, and the Witch Fire in 2007 that burned 197,990 acres and destroyed 1,125 homes (Cal

Fire Incident Information, 2007) focused much attention and concern on providing enough

resources early to be effective and to protect structures being threatened. In an interview with

retired Deputy Chief of Operations Ken Malbrough, he explained how the Fire Chief had given

public statements following the devastating October 2007 Witch Fire that San Diego no longer

had a fire season because it was considered an ongoing threat (Malbrough, personal interview,

2012). Soon after, a more aggressive dispatch approach was implemented to ensure adequate

resources were sent to all fires regardless of variable conditions. Because of the difficulty in

coordinating the dynamic dispatch levels and the accompanied delays with this process,

combined with the goal to provide sufficient equipment and personnel early to all vegetation

fires that pose a threat to structures, SDFD changed its dispatch procedures and resource levels

assigned to vegetation fires.

On May 15, 2009, the SDFD changed its dispatch procedures to a more simplistic process

using two predetermined dispatch levels based on geographic location alone. Unit assignments

for vegetation fires are now based on whether the incident is located inside of or adjacent to a

designated special response area in the city (Appendix B). Depending on this designation, the

alarm is dispatched as Vegetation-Special Response (VSR) or Vegetation-No Special Response

(VNSR). The resource allocation for a VNSR is two engines and for a VSR is five engines, three

brush apparatus, two battalion chiefs, a water tender, a helicopter, and an ambulance for a total of

13 units (Appendix C). The designation of “Special Response” and “No Special Response” is


largely automated and determined by Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) information which

considers previous dispatch identifiers and assigned response area subgroups such as “Canyon

Rim” or “Wildland” based field survey maps created in the late 1980’s (L. Brenner, personal

communication, October 8, 2012). Although some areas have been updated in CAD, the city as

whole has not been updated resulting in many inaccurate designators.

Another departmental change that occurred in May of 2009 was the utilization of the

National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) burn index to provide situational awareness of the

potential for vegetation fires. The Burn Index (BI), which will be described in further detail later,

is communicated to all operations personnel daily at the beginning of shift and intended to

heighten their awareness of weather conditions and the possibility of fire danger based on the

index rating. Pocket cards with comparative information dating back to 1993 were distributed to

all personnel to be referenced for more details and significance in comparison to BI’s of past

years (Appendix D). This reference shows the relationship of the current BI to the 97th percentile

threshold in which some of the more devastating fires have occurred. Although SDFD recognizes

the burn index provides valuable situational awareness and a historical perspective of fire danger

in certain BI ranges, this index rating is not incorporated into procedures that influence the

dispatch levels of resources assigned to a vegetation fire.

The practice of dispatching a vegetation alarm assignment based on a single factor is

significant to SDFD because of the possible costs, risks and consequences of not considering

other influencing factors and conditions. It’s also significant since SDFD is in the small minority

of departments that do not consider other factors for vegetation alarm assignments. Although an

aggressive response to all fires of unknown magnitude is publicly popular, it is also important to

consider that such practices may be excessive, resulting unintended risks and costs.


This research paper is relevant to several objectives contained in Executive Development

curriculum including the units on Change Management and Organization Culture and Change

(Executive Development Student Manual, 2012, Chapter 5 & 7). In these units, the role of the

Executive Fire Officer as an agent of change was described, highlighting the essential need to

identify a problem first and for understand the purpose for change. The process of Analysis,

Planning, Implementation, and Evaluation (APIE) when evaluating a problem and making

change will be an important follow-up component to this paper. This paper also relates to two of

the United States Fire Administration’s strategic goals: (a) improve local planning and

preparedness, and (b) improve the fire and emergency services’ capability for response to and

recovery from all hazards (United States Fire Administration Strategic Goals, 2012, p. 14).

Literature Review

The literature review for this paper focused on four distinct areas; (a) industry standards

for efficiency and effectiveness at fire incidents, (b) data and influences that affected change to

the current SDFD dispatch criteria, (c) fundamental factors and indexes available to predict fire

danger and potential, and (d) the associated risks and costs with deployment of resources.

Although some of these areas lack national standards or prior research applicable across the fire

service, there was sufficient literature and data specific to the SDFD with quantitative

measurements applicable to this research project.

When evaluating the delivery of fire protection and service, there is a noted difference

between effectiveness and efficiency, and the two terms are not synonymous. A National Fire

Protection Administration (NFPA) report on performance standards defines efficiency in terms

of how well resources are used in providing services and notes that efficiency measures are most


often in reference to an economic criterion (Flynn, 2009). The same report refers to effectiveness

as how well a service is provided and makes note that “it’s important to look beyond immediate

output and determine the associated consequences of the output” (Flynn, 2009, p. 5).

Effectiveness is a quantitative measurement in comparison to established target rates and goals

set by individual departments based on service areas, public demands, political influence, and

industry guidelines making it difficult to compare from one department to another. Because of

the variations that exist in determining effectiveness and efficiency, the standard guidelines used

by SDFD as well as department specific goals and target rates were used for the purposes of

comparison and evaluation.

NFPA1710 specifies minimum criteria addressing efficiency and effectiveness of fire

operations. This national standard sets minimum staffing levels and response time goals for

career fire departments. One of these standards is to have an initial alarm assignment arrive at the

scene of all fires within eight minutes 90 percent of the time (Standard for the Organization and

Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, 2004). This standard applies to fire suppression

involving structure fires and although the staffing level for an individual company is identified,

the standard does not cite a specific number of units included in a first alarm. NFPA 1710

qualifies this recommendation by stating that the first alarm should be sufficient to accomplish a

list of fire ground tasks necessary for mitigation. Included in NFPA 1710 is a recommended

standard for deployment for wildland fires, yet it also fails to specifically identify a minimum

number of units to respond. The standard calls for a sufficient number of vehicles to be deployed

in order to initiate a direct attack on the fire with ten minutes of the first arriving company and

capable of deploying two hand lines from two separate engines, staffed with two firefighters on

each line with an effective water flow of 30 gallons per minute (Standard for the Organization


and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, 2004). Based on the minimum staffing levels

in the same NFPA standard, a minimum of two engine companies would be required to meet the

above task level standards.

A 2005 Standards of Response Coverage Plan developed by SDFD for the Commission

on Fire Accreditation International frequently referenced NFPA 1710 as a national deployment

standard that very few departments can meet, as it does not recognize local issues, conditions,

service demands, or community needs (Standards of Response Coverage Plan - SDFD

Accreditation Report, 2005). The accreditation report also examined a hazard risk analysis for

wildland/urban interface that was conducted using spatial analysis tools and the city’s

Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Using NFPA Standards for Protecting Life and Property

from Wildfire (NFPA 1144) and the Wildland/Urban Interface Code Danger rating System,

geographic locations in the city were assigned a risk value based on accessible roads,

vegetation/cover class, fire hydrant location, slope severity, and five minute response plan data

(Standards of Response Coverage Plan - SDFD Accreditation Report, 2005). The data and risk

analysis from this study, which used GIS and field survey information now outdated, is still

currently used as dispatch criteria for assigning resources for vegetation fires within the city.

In November 2011, the San Diego City Council adopted the recommendations contained

in a Fire Service Standards of Response Coverage Deployment Study conducted by Citygate

Associates Inc. which completed a comprehensive analysis of the SDFD and its deployment

model. One of the recommendations made by Citygate was to deploy sufficient resources to

confine a fire near the room of origin and to stop wildland fires at fewer than three acres with a

“Multiple-Unit Effective Response Force” of at least 17 personnel within 10 minutes and 30

seconds of 911-call receipt, 90 percent of the time (Citygate Associates, LLC., 2011). Although


the “Effective Response Force” was intended for setting minimum resources and response time

targets for structure fires, it has been used as a comparison and referenced when defining the

resources currently allocated for Vegetation Special Response incidents (K. Malbrough, W.

Middelton, J. Carle, P. Peake, S. Infantino, & B. Fennessy, personal interviews, September,

2012).

Effectiveness and efficiency are subjective, agency specific objectives, and difficult to

define for emergency response to vegetation fires. During interviews with current and retired

operations chiefs for SDFD, the issue of how to best determine if a resource was effectively

utilized using dispatch information was addressed. Consensus from the group indicated that a

unit’s scene time, and specifically the threshold of a unit being at scene for two minutes or more,

was believed to be a conservative indication of the unit being assigned a task and utilized at the

incident (K. Malbrough, W. Middelton, J. Carle, P. Peake, S. Infantino, & B. Fennessy, personal

interviews, September, 2012).

Several known and scientific factors can provide valuable and predictive information in

regards to fire danger and fire behavior. The most commonly accepted definition of fire danger

is: “The resultant descriptor of the combination of both constant and variable factors which affect

the initiation, spread and difficulty of control of wildfires on an area” (Deeming, Lancaster,

Fosberg, Furman, & Schroeder, 1972, p. 165). Often associated with fire danger is the

assessment of fire behavior which is site specific dealing with an existing fire and describes the

speed, intensity, and combustion rate of that fire in its location and time. Fire danger rating is a

numerical rating reflective of the overall conditions in a general area and intended to assist the

fire manager in making day-to-day “fire business” decisions (National Wildfire Coordinating

Group, 2002, p. 4).


As described above, the National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) became available

in1972 to create a mechanism to relate fire danger ratings to a specific geographic area for

planning purposes and has been updated in 1978 and 1988. ”The current system is based on the

physics of combustion and laboratory developed constants reflecting relationships between fuels,

weather, topography and risk conditions” (National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2002, p. 5).

The NFDRS also tracks the effects on live and dead fuels that previous weather events had, and

makes adjustments based on predicted weather conditions. Two main purposes of the NFDRS

are to yield fire danger based on current weather conditions in relation to historical conditions,

and to use National Weather Service forecasts to predict fire danger the next day (Deeming,

Burgan, & Cohen, 1977). NFDRS output ratings and measurements deal with fire potential

which generate the Burn Index (BI). The BI is derived from a combination of Spread Component

(how fast a fire will spread) and Energy Release Component (how much energy will be

produced) and rates the fire danger in relation to potential flame length over a fire danger rating

area. This numerical value is related to potential flame length in feet multiplied by 10 (National

Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2002). The Spread Component and Energy Release Component

take into account current and predicted weather conditions, fuel types and moisture, and

historical fire data. The NFDRS is currently utilized by all federal and most state agencies to

assess fire danger conditions.

Two other fire danger rating systems that were reviewed were the Fire Behavior System

(FBS) developed in the 1970’s to compliment the NFDRS and the Fire Information Retrieval and

Evaluation System (FIRES). FBS deals with fire behavior of an existing fire in a specific

location and “was designed for high resolution, small scale application” (Bradshaw et al., 1983,

p. 41). FIRES was designed to evaluate the relationship between fire danger indexes and fire


activity to set intervals that could be used by fire managers in determining severity of fire

danger.

Effective May 15, 2009 SDFD began calculating and broadcasting the BI for situational

awareness at the same time the new dispatch procedures for vegetation fires were implemented

(SDFD Bulletin 09-055, 2009). SDFD calculates the BI for both inland and coastal zones of the

city using an average of BI readings collected at designated Remote Automated Weather Stations

(RAWS) and listed on the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) website (SDFD

Communication Procedures, 2009). Three readings are taken from each zone and averaged,

producing a Coastal BI and Inland BI. The index readings are then communicated to all on duty

personnel for reference with the SDFD Weather Index Pocket Cards to ensure appropriate

situational awareness (SDFD Operations Manual - Vegetation Fire Procedures, 2009). Although

these index readings do not have any influence on the dispatch levels to vegetation fires, the

intent was to have the 97th percentile serve as a trigger point to initiate discussions regarding

increased staffing levels and alternative deployment plans (Malbrough, personal interview,

2012).

Based on interviews with senior management and a review of past practices however, it

appears these intended discussions on staffing levels were not automatic when the critical

threshold was reached, involved a multitude of other variables, and rarely resulted in additional

staffing because of the BI rating (K. Malbrough, W. Middelton, J. Carle, P. Peake, S. Infantino,

& B. Fennessy, personal interviews, September, 2012). An interesting fact discovered through

this review was that the three RAWS used for the Inland BI (Goose Valley, Descanso, and

Valley Center) are all outside and significantly inland from the San Diego city limits. Similarly,

of the three coastal RAWS, only one station (San Miguel) is still in operation negating the


original intent to produce an average BI across all coastal areas. Because of the location of these

RAWS, the data produced a lack of specificity with respect to current conditions in many areas

of the city, which diminished the value of these readings as they were initially intended. The

reliance on incomplete or inaccurate information for planning and awareness is surprising given

that current data is available from other institutions. For example, according to San Diego Gas

and Electric (SDG&E) Meteorologist Brain D’Agostino, SDG&E has fully operational RAWS in

critical areas of the city (Mt. Soledad, Carmel Valley, and Mission Valley) that collect all the

necessary data to produce the BI for the coastal zone and is available via their website, but has

not yet been incorporated the fire danger analysis for SDFD (B. D’Agostino, personal

communication, November 2, 2012).

Over committing resources to an emergency response not only comes with added costs, it

results in additional risk to the personnel and public inherent to that response. For example,

NFPA reported that in 2011 there was an estimated 14,850 collisions involving fire department

vehicles responding to or returning from an emergency incident (Karter & Molis, 2012).

Although these collisions only accounted for about one tenth of one percent of total responses

nationwide, they resulted in 970 firefighter injuries, or 1.4 percent of all firefighter injuries. An

article in Firehouse magazine asserted that there was three times greater chance of being

involved in a vehicle accident while responding to an emergency incident and that responding

with lights and sirens increased a driver and crew’s chances of being injured or killed by 10

times (Wilbur, 1995). Data produced by the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) and NFPA showed

that approximately 25 percent of all firefighter fatalities occurred in motor vehicle accidents,

which is second only to cardiovascular ailments as the leading cause deaths to on duty personnel

(Peterson, Amandus, & Wassell, 2009). Fire apparatus collisions are not only a hazard and risk


to the responding fire personnel; it is a tremendous risk to the same public being protected. The

incidence of emergency vehicle accidents is not just a problem but, it’s an “epidemic” writes Jeff

Clawson in an article for Public Management (Clawson, 2002, p. 2). Clawson points out that if

the same number of accidents and deaths attributed to fire responses were thought of as an

epidemic, the Center for Communicable Diseases would quickly address the issue and spend

millions to mitigate the problem. Clawson also discusses that in addition to the risk associated

with emergency responses; there is the significant liability and legal consequences of which most

public safety leaders are unaware. A study conducted by Glatfelter Insurance Group revealed that

of all fire service related claims made against their subsidiary, vehicle losses and damage

associated with lights and siren responses accounted for 62 percent of the claims paid out

(Glatfelter Insurance Group, 2000).

Research on national standards for fire apparatus operating costs proved impossible

because of the variables associated with these costs such as apparatus type, age, preventative

maintenance schedules, labor costs, and contracted services. Individual departments have

historical data on their fleets; however, the data wasn't comparable to SDFD in determining

operating costs. The City of San Diego’s Fleet Division does have a detailed rate-setting process

to determine Usage Rates for Operational Costs. The Usage Calculation is accomplished by

taking labor, parts, and fuel costs for each type of apparatus and applies certain inflation

percentages and “overhead” cost to arrive at an estimated operating expense for that apparatus

type (Usage Rates for Operational Costs, 2005).

Most research related to the areas of this study focused on national risks and costs

associated with emergency responses and operational demands. Although national statistics on

accident and injury rates have relevance and apply theoretically to San Diego, they do not give


accurate or reflective costs specifically to this department. No data was found on efficiency of

units or standards for dispatch levels on vegetation fires that could be directly compared to

response levels for SDFD. The most valuable data and comparable standards for efficiency were

obtained from previous reports pertaining to SDFD response plans and strategic goals. Relevant

and applicable comparisons could only be made using the SDFD incident report data obtained

specifically for this study along with the respective costs and accident rates provided by the

various city departments. Annual statistics and risk management reports provided the basis for

analysis and determination of costs represented in later sections.

Procedures

Methodology

Several procedures were employed to answer the questions and address the problem this

paper describes. Electronic surveys, personal interviews, review of internal policies and

procedures, incident reports and technical analysis of unit assignments and time allocation were

all used to answer the questions central for the purpose of this project.

In order to evaluate the level and efficiency of resources assigned to vegetation fires,

incident reports for all vegetation fires from May 15, 2009 to October 1, 2012 were obtained and

reviewed (Appendix E for Sample Data). The beginning date of May 15, 2009 coincides with the

change in dispatch procedures using the current criteria of geographical location only. The

incidents were separated and analyzed by type (VSR and VNSR) looking at the number of

resources assigned to each incident and whether the resources for each incident were cancelled

before arrival or before being assigned a task at scene. A consensus of current and retired Deputy

Chiefs of Operations indicated that an “at scene” time of less than two minutes could reasonably


be used as a standard for determining if a unit was utilized “efficiently” or not. This assessment

is based on the notion that a unit released within two minutes of arrival could not have

accomplished any task necessary to mitigate the incident and deemed not critical to the

operation. Although the two minute marker could be argued as an arbitrary time of determining

if a unit was “efficiently utilized” or not, it did provide a consistent benchmark and standard

evaluation against all the data reviewed. For comparison, the same report was run using a three

minute or less “at scene” to check for any significant deviation from the lesser time of two

minutes.

Understanding that there are numerous conditions and pre-incident information available

to predict fire behavior and potential risk, and many departments set dispatch levels according to

these factors, an electronic survey (Appendix F) was distributed to comparable fire departments

to assess variations in dispatch levels and criteria used. The survey questions were designed to

provide information related to the research questions proposed in this paper, which focus on

SDFD dispatch procedures. Each question was developed to answer one or more of the research

questions in comparison to the problem faced by SDFD, and to assess if other departments

struggle with similar problems or have different criteria in place. The survey evaluated the

percentage of departments that have various dispatch levels for vegetation fire responses, how

many different dispatch levels are in place, what criteria and factors are used in determining the

dispatch levels, whether the factors were based on objective (i.e., weather, incident location) or

subjective (i.e., reporting party information, familiarity of the location) data, and how many

resources are assigned to the lowest and highest levels of response. Before being distributed to

other departments, the survey was sent internally to 20 SDFD Chief Officers requesting feedback

on clarity, context, applicability, and relativity to this project which resulted in several revisions


before the survey was finalized. Using the California Fire Chiefs Association directory, the

survey was sent to the Fire Chiefs of 75 career California fire departments requesting that the

survey be forwarded to the most appropriate person in the organization to provide the responses.

The survey was distributed on September 16, 2012 and closed for responses on November 1,

2012. The population that received the survey was based on similarities to SDFD including

metropolitan departments, departments having wildland urban interface areas, multiple types of

apparatus available for responses, and being a career department.

With the BI already an institutional measurement accepted and used daily by the

department, procedures were examined on how this index is collected and incorporated into any

dispatch decisions or resource allocations. Recognizing that the BI does not influence dispatch

levels yet is accepted as an important piece of daily information communicated to all personnel

for situational awareness, Standard Operating Procedures used by FCC were reviewed to

examine the process of information gathering and dissemination. The different components that

make up the BI were compared to known scientific factors affecting fire danger to determine its

value in predicting potential risk. Archived BI values dating back to May 15, 2009 were obtained

from the U.S. Forest Service Cleveland National Forest and inputted into the incident reports

corresponding to each vegetation fire for the respective dates. The BI data from the San Miguel

RAWS (Station ID 045737) was used because of its consistency of daily reports, reliability of

measuring equipment, and proximity to the response areas for SDFD. The purpose was to

compare vegetation fire activity and unit utilization in relationship to the BI for that date.

Incident reports were also separated into daytime (0800-2000 hours) and nighttime (2000 – 0800

hours) to examine fire activity based on time of day to examine trends.


To address and understand the theories and data supporting the current dispatch criteria

and practices used for vegetation fires, personal interviews were conducted with six Senior

Management Officers to determine the rationale and goals of the new dispatch procedures. These

Officers, active and retired, were selected based on their intimate involvement with the policy

changes and rationale supporting the current system and the decisions surrounding the criteria.

The individuals interviewed consisted of two retired Assistant Chiefs of Operations, the current

Assistant Fire Chief of Support Services, two retired Deputy Chiefs of Operations, and the

current Communications Manager. Standard questions were presented in the interviews

(Appendix G) which lead to additional information and questions based on their specific role in

the changes in dispatch for vegetation fires. The development of the current dispatch levels for

vegetation fires was discussed and the theories supporting these levels explained. Questions

regarding how and why the BI was to be collected and disseminated was discussed and

compared to current practice and effectiveness in relation to the intended purpose.

To examine costs or risks associated with units responding to vegetation fires, several

internal documents were used including driver training records, risk management reports and

statistics, as well as CAD data obtained specifically for this report. Additionally, hourly

operating costs for fire apparatus were obtained through the Equipment Division as well as

operating costs for SDFD’s helicopter provided by the Air Operations Division. This information

was used for the purpose of costing out the units hourly costs, which were then compared to the

respective incident reports. Included in the determination of overall costs was information

regarding personnel risk and accidents. Apparatus accident statistics from the previous two fiscal

years were used to determine the hazard associated with emergency responses specific to SDFD,


and Risk Management reports for city claims last fiscal year along with Fleet Division reports

were used to determine property damage costs.

Using the incident reports and unit assignments for all vegetation fires since May 15,

2009, a separate report was reviewed to identify all the units that were assigned but not utilized

(cancelled or at scene less than 2 minutes) at the incident. Then another query was run for those

unit’s respective districts to identify any emergency incidents that took place during the time that

the home unit was briefly assigned to the vegetation fire. The purpose of this examination was to

determine how often a fire unit was unnecessarily assigned to a vegetation fire and subsequently

unavailable to respond to another emergency in their district. This only examined simultaneous

emergency calls in districts of units assigned to a vegetation fire but not utilized.

Limitations and Assumptions

Personal interviews involving recollections of operational decisions made over three

years ago by an individual are limiting and difficult to substantiate unless written documents by

that person exist to support their statements. Competing and vested interests in a current or

previous dispatch model would also influence and limit the information provided during an

interview. Although there were other SDFD personnel that could have provided information on

the history and theory behind the changes, it was assumed that the six individuals interviewed

would provide reliable and accurate information on the issues.

The electronic surveys were limited to departments in California but without any

knowledge of their dispatch system and what management controls the department has over the

dispatch center or its procedures. Whether a department has control over the dispatching of units


varies greatly, as does the dispatch levels due to the limited resources available to some of the

smaller departments.

There were significant limitations in finding any standard operating costs associated for

fire apparatus because of the variables involved in these calculations with different departments.

CAD data for the incident responses was limited to time parameters of each unit, so actual miles

traveled resulting in specific fuel costs could not be calculated. There is an assumption of risk

with any emergency response and a specific measurement of risk could not be quantified with a

relatively small number of incidents. This paper made the assumption that any time a unit

responds to an emergency there is an increase of risk to the crew and public even if it cannot be

reflected in a risk per mile or hour.

Burn Index readings are subject to accuracy and availability of measurements taken at

specific RAWS. Because these measurements are specific to an area, they may not always be an

accurate reflection of another area in the city experiencing a vegetation fire. Microclimates

within the city, both inland and coastal, may result in different fire and weather conditions than

represented by the BI for that zone. Occasionally readings are unavailable at certain RAWS

affecting the average for that zone.

The fire incident reports were limited to a three and a half year period and based on CAD

data. The limitation of time for this study did not allow for the review and inclusion of older

incident data using previous dispatch criteria to compare against current criteria and practice.

Lastly, when determining if a unit was efficiently utilized, a standard needed to be used

for comparison in the study. For the purposes of this study, the assumption was made that a unit

was not essential to the mitigation efforts at a vegetation fire and could not have been assigned a

critical task if it was at scene less than two minutes.


Definitions

Burn Index (BI). A number related to the contribution of fire behavior related to the overall

effort required to contain a fire and fire line intensity. The BI rates fire danger related to potential

fie flame length over a fire danger area.

Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD). The computer system and software used for selecting and

dispatching of fire units to an emergency. CAD is also the data base for incident reports and unit

assignment times.

RAWS. Remote Automated Weather Stations that collect weather and fuel moisture conditions

used in calculating the BI.

Unit. A single fire apparatus, vehicle, or aircraft.

Unit Efficiency. For the purpose of this study, relates to whether or not a fire unit is assigned to

an incident for two minutes or more. Units assigned to an incident for more than two minutes are

considered to be efficiently utilized with the assumption they performed a necessary task.

Vegetation-Special Response (VSR). A dispatch level assigning 13 units consisting of 39

emergency responders to a designated response area located inside or adjacent to a geographical

location determined to have significant risk or potential for canyon or wildland fire. Designated

Special Response locations in CAD are comprised of nine smaller response area subgroups.

Vegetation-No Special Response (VNSR). A dispatch level assigning two units consisting of

eight emergency responders to a designated response area not within or adjacent to a

geographical location with significant risk or potential for canyon/wildland fire.


Results

Using the current dispatch criteria, the efficiency of resources assigned to both VSR and

VNSR incidents were evaluated using a time marker of two minutes or less on scene to

determine utilization. Units cancelled before arrival or at scene less than two minutes were

categorized as “unnecessary” to the mitigation of the fire. Of the 1,637 vegetation responses

reviewed from May 15, 2009 through October 1, 2012, there were 1,244 (76%) VNSR and 393

(24%) VSR incidents. Figure 1 displays the utilization of units assigned to VNSR incidents and

shows that 57% of the incidents required less than the first alarm assignment of two units, while

30% utilized the full alarm assignment and only 13% of the incidents required additional

resources.

Figure 1. Percentage of Vegetation No Special Response (VNSR) Incidents by Resource Utilization, SDFD May 2009-October 2012 (N=1,244).

Source: SDFD Incident Report Data

In comparison, Figure 2 displays the utilization of units assigned to VSR incidents and

shows 86% of the 393 incidents required less than the equivalent alarm assignment of 13 units,


while only 7% of the incidents utilized the equivalent alarm assignment and the other 7%

required additional resources. Identical incident reports were examined using a three minute at

scene marker to compare unit utilization in identify any significant deviation from the standard

of two minutes used. Of the 8,683 units assigned to the examined vegetation fires, there was only

a 1.7% increase in units remaining at scene for three minutes or less as opposed to two minutes.

This indicates that the determination of a unit’s necessity to help mitigate the fire or given a task

is made early in the incident and does not change significantly with an additional minute at

scene.

Figure 2. Percentage of Vegetation Special Response (VSR) Incidents by Resource Utilization, SDFD May 2009-October 2012 (N=393).


Figure 3 shows the VNSR incident totals and the respective utilization of resources by

month based on the equivalent alarm type of two units. The data show an obvious trend of

increased vegetation fire responses in the summer months of May through September with 63%

of VNSR and 79.6% of all VSR incidents during those months reflective of warmer temperatures


and increased fire activity. Little fluctuation is seen in the percentage of incidents requiring

additional resources or unnecessary units. The narrow percentage range of incidents for each

month requiring less than the two units (displayed vertically in the red portion of each bar) shows

consistency throughout the year and reflects the overall 57% of all VNSR incidents requiring less

than two units was relatively stable. This representation correlates to better efficiency and

supports the resources level assigned to VNSR incidents throughout the year.

Figure 3. Percentage of Vegetation No Special Response (VNSR) Incidents by Resource Utilization and Month, SDFD May 2009-October 2012 (N=1,244).

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec

VNSR less than VNSR (0-1 Units) VNSR Equivalent (2-Units) VNSR Additional Resources (3+ Units)

5.5%

3.7%

4.4%

7.0%

12.2%

13.5%13.9%

13.3%

10.1%

7.1%

5.0%4.3%

63.0% of ALL NVSR's

59.7

%

60.2

% 70.5

% 56.2

%

59.0

%

62.6

%

65.2

%

55.6

%

64.3

%

66.2

%

46.4

%

61.0

%


By comparison, Figure 4 shows the VSR incident totals and the respective utilization of

resources for the same period. The data also show a significant increase in VSR incidents in May

through September along with consistent high percentage of inefficiency year round. Of the 80

total VSR incidents during the months of January through April and October through December,

only 7 of the incidents (9%) required the equivalent alarm or greater. During May through


September there were a total of 313 VSR incidents with 49 (16%) requiring the equivalent alarm

or more. Compared to the VNSR data, there is a greater fluctuation of units utilized throughout

the year for VSR incidents (displayed vertically in the red portion of each bar), and although all

the months show inefficiency with high percentages of unnecessary units assigned, slightly better

efficiency is seen in the summer months.

Figure 4. Percentage of Vegetation Special Response (VSR) Incidents by Resource Utilization and Month, SDFD May 2009-October 2012 (N=393).


Because of the large number of resources dispatched to VSR incidents, it is difficult to

determine efficiency solely on whether the entire alarm assignment of 13 units was utilized or

not. Figure 2 and Figure 4 grouped VSR incidents into one of three categories: (a) less than, (b)

equivalent to, or (c) more than the first alarm assignment but does not represent the incremental


intervals between 1-13 units utilized. Figure 5 shows the number and percentage of VSR

incidents for each interval of utilized units at the incident, identifying the number of incidents for

the previous level of resources in red and the number of incidents requiring the additional unit

for that level in yellow. For example, there were 174 (44%) VSR incidents handled with just

three units or less, and there were an additional 33 (totaling 53% of all VSR) incidents that

required a fourth unit to be utilized.

Figure 5. Number and Percentage of Units Still Assigned to Vegetation Special Response (VSR) Incidents by Resource Utilization, SDFD May 2009-October 2012 (N=338).


There were 49 of 75 electronic surveys returned from comparable departments seeking

information on dispatch criteria and resource levels assigned to vegetation fires. Responses from

the other departments show 71% have multiple initial alarm assignments for vegetation fires,

with 57% having three or more levels. The range of units assigned to the lowest dispatch level


was 1-11 units, and the group average for the lowest level was 3.3 units. The range of units

assigned to the highest dispatch level was 2-19 units with the group average of 8.1 units. The

VSR alarm assignment for SDFD falls within the range of the surveyed group, and is five units

above the average.

Figure 6. Factors Used by Other Fire Departments to Set Vegetation Fire Dispatch Levels, by Percentage.

72.7 68.2

47.7 47.7

13.6

29.5

0102030405060708090

100

GeographicLocation

Weather Informationfrom

ReportingParty

Fuel Moisture PreviousIncidents at

that Location

Other

Source: Comparable Department Surveys

Several conditions and information sources were found to be available that can better

predict fire behavior and potential risk of a reported vegetation fire. Of the departments with

different dispatch levels, 42% use only objective data in determining the level while 53% use a

combination of subjective and objective data. The remaining 5% determine the level solely on

subjective information and decisions made by a person of authority. Of those same departments,

71% adjust the dispatch level as needed during an operational period based on dynamic

conditions such as weather changes. Figure 6 displays the various factors used by other

departments in determining dispatch levels. Nearly 73% use geographic location followed by

68% of departments using weather conditions.


Figure 7. Vegetation Special Response (VSR) Incidents by Burn Index Range, SDFD May 2009-October 2012 (N=393).


Weather conditions and Burn Index values are standard factors used by most fire

departments for determining the potential fire dangers. Although results did not show a direct

correlation of the BI to the number of reported vegetation fires, the BI did show a correlation to

the significance of the fire after its start and the resources required to manage the incident in the

higher BI ranges. Figure 7 shows the number of VSR incidents associated with the respective BI

ranges. The high numbers of VSR incidents (49.8% of all VSR incidents) occurred in the BI

range of 20-49 and can be explained by the fact that the majority of dates in San Diego had BI’s

falling in this range, and thus the majority of fires occurred within this restricted range. The

average number of units utilized for more than two minutes at scene remains constant up to a BI

point of 80, after which the average increases significantly. The average number of units required

at scene increases from five to nine when the BI reaches 80 and peaks in the ranges of 100-119.


The accuracy of the lower unit averages in the extremely high BI ranges is affected by the low

number of incidents that occurred in these ranges.

Figure 8. Vegetation Special Response (VSR) Incidents by Resource Utilization and Time of Day, SDFD May 2009-October 2012 (N=393).


Another pre-incident factor which was examined for potential in predicting fire danger was

the time of day that the incident occurs. Of the 1,637 vegetation fires reviewed, 1,260 (77%)

occurred between the hours of 0800 – 2000 hours. Examination of just the VSR incidents shows that

318 (81%) of all VSR occurred during this 12 hour period. Figure 8 separates the VSR incidents by

time of occurrence and graphs them according to the utilization of an equivalent VSR alarm

assignment. Most significant in this analysis is 89% of all VSR responses that occur at night utilize

less than the equivalent alarm assigned, and only 4% required additional units be assigned to

manage the incident. The results clearly suggest that time of day is an influencing factor when

evaluating f ire potential and can help in determining the number of resources needed in when


setting resource levels.

The theories and data used to set current resource levels and assignments to vegetation

fires were found to be subjective decisions based on historical fire experiences and efforts to

strive towards the goal of committing sufficient resources to vegetation fires having potential

risk based on the incident location. Although NFPA 1710 does not identify an “effective fire

force” for vegetation fires but only the minimum operational tasks, SDFD set an alarm

assignment for VSR incidents based on the opinions of senior management and “worst case

scenarios”. No data or statistical reports were found to support the May 15, 2009 change in

dispatch criteria or resource levels. Personal interviews concluded that as a result of recent fire

disasters experienced in San Diego, the Fire Chief publicly embraced and supported an

aggressive and multi-unit response to any such threat.

Costs associated with resources that were unnecessarily assigned to incidents were

derived from department fiscal reports using average operating costs for various apparatus.

Figures based on FY2013 rates provided by the Fleet Division revealed an average hourly

operating cost of $34.56 per hour for type I engines and $15.68 per hour for type III brush

apparatus. Since apparatus/vehicle operating costs are represented in hourly costs, assignment-to-

available times associated with the responding units that were not utilized at a vegetation fire

were calculated to produce the costs. During the time period examined (5/15/09 – 10/1/12) there

were 9,990 minutes associated with units unnecessarily assigned to VNSR incidents and 32,640

minutes associated with units not utilized at VSR incidents. These calculations were based on the

assignment-to-available time for all units not utilized at the incident (canceled or at scene less

than two minutes). Using the operating costs provided by the Fleet Division, the total time

associated with units dispatched to a vegetation fire yet not utilized represents an average


estimated cost of $5,354 per year. Figures provided by the Air Operation Division of SDFD cite

a $3,855 per hour operating cost for the helicopter. For the time period examined, there were 54

incidents in which one or both helicopters were assigned to a vegetation fire and not utilized.

This resulted in 69 canceled missions, totaling 858 minutes. This unit assignment time represents

a theoretical cost of $55,126: however, the actual cost is difficult to calculate due to the fact that

the helicopter request is sometimes canceled before departing and incurring the flight time.

Quantifying risk directly correlated to resources which were unnecessarily assigned to a

vegetation fire in San Diego was insignificant. Numerous studies have produced statistical

results in relation to increased risk of injury as discussed above. Although national averages of

increased injury and accidents are published and used for reference, the specific risk percentages

for SDFD employees, equipment, and property are unavailable. Risk Management reported 79

apparatus/vehicle accidents in FY2011 and 73 accidents in FY2012, of which 30 (41%) of the

FY2012 accidents were related emergency responses (E. Baskin & R. Tong, personal

communication, November 21, 2012). The first quarter of FY2013 alone had 30 reported

accidents with nine being related to emergency incidents. Although the number of accidents

during emergency responses represents a small share of all responses (0.014%), the acuity and

significance of the accidents is impossible to measure. The City of San Diego realized $80,325 in

costs associated with repairs and replacements for fire vehicles/apparatus involved in accidents

during FY2012 (Fleet Repair Costs/Fire-FY2012, 2012), and paid out $40,631 in property

damage claims associated with these accidents (FY2012 Property Damage Claims-Fire, 2012).

With the findings that show any emergency response increases risk to the responders and the

public, SDFD realized 42,630 total minutes of unnecessary response time associated with


vegetation fires during the time period examined, which resulted in an average of 12,789 minutes

per year of increased risk.

One of the unfortunate but accepted consequences of units unnecessarily assigned to an

incident is the unit being unavailable to respond to another call in their home district. There were

163 incidents during the time period examined in which a unit was unavailable for a call in their

home district as a result of being assigned to a vegetation fire where they were not utilized, and

for which a unit from another district was required to respond. The disproportionate share of

these cross-district service calls were conducted while the home unit was assigned to a VSR

incident. Specifically, of the 163 incidents, 116 (71%) occurred in districts of units assigned to a

VSR, while only 47 (29%) occurred in the district of a unit assigned to a NVSR. Based on a total

of 393 VSR incidents, a subsequent emergency incident is missed by a unit unnecessarily

assigned on 29.5% of all VSR responses, as opposed to only occurring on 3.7% of all NVSR.

More units are assigned to a VSR incident resulting in more open districts, yet VSR incidents

only make up 24% of all vegetation fire responses. Looking at daytime versus nighttime data,

77% of all vegetation fires occurred during the daytime (0800-2000 hours) and 84% of the

emergency incidents where the home unit was unavailable occurred during the day. The

unavailability of the home unit not only resulted in delayed service, but also compounded the

challenges of meeting response time goals identified in the adopted Citygate report. Indeed the

single unit response time goal of 7 minutes and 30 seconds was only met by SDFD 77.2% of the

time, while the goal of a “Multi-Unit Effective Response Force” arriving within 10 minutes and

30 seconds of the call received was only met on 55.4% of the incidents (Citygate Associates,

LLC, 2011, p. 5).


Discussion

Defining efficiency in the fire service is not an easy task, as Flynn (2009) points out that

the term is most often offered in reference to financial costs in relation to an output or service

delivered. Because the cost of providing fire protection is an insurance policy for “worst case

scenarios,” the fiscal costs associated with excessive units being assigned yet not needed are

considered acceptable. Effectiveness of fire resources is easier to define because it’s a

quantitative measurement in relation to target rates and goals. Considering these two evaluative

terms in the fire service, it is obvious that a level of service or deployment model can be

extremely effective yet unclear as to how efficient they are delivered. NFPA 1710 sets minimum

recommended standards for staffing and effective fire force for structure fires, but not for

wildland fires. Since the only recommended standard for wildland fires defines the tasks

expected of arriving units (Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression

Operations, 2004), individual departments are left with the decision as to what resource level is

appropriate to accomplish the tasks. With only two dispatch levels employed by SDFD that

range from two units to 13 units respectively, there is frequent opportunity for resources to be

unnecessarily assigned. Of the 5,483 units assigned to VSR incidents, only 39% of the units were

utilized. By most industry standards, this would be considered inefficient and unacceptable. But

since the hazard remains undetermined at the time of dispatch, and only the potential based on

limited information is available, it can be argued that the current model subscribes to the notion

that “it is better to be safe than sorry.” Without intermediate dispatch levels to compare unit

utilization to the high and low levels used by SDFD, it’s difficult to determine what level is most

efficient for different conditions. Units are more efficiently utilized on VNSR incidents but that

is expected with only two units responding. The dispatch level of VSR incidents appears to be


generally inefficient, and even more so under specific conditions by not considering such factors

as time of day and month of the year.

One of the factors that decreases the efficiency of units assigned to a VSR incident is the

designation of the response area. Because a broad designation of “Special Response” or “No

Special Response” is determined using outdated GIS data as well as risk assessment values

conducted decades ago (Standards of Response Coverage Plan - SDFD Accreditation Report,

2005), a significant amount of resources are dispatched to areas that no longer pose a threat of

potential fire hazard. Many areas still showing as “Canyon-Rim” or “Wildland” response areas

have since been developed and little vegetation or fire danger still exists.

Rather than examining scene time and number of resources utilized to assess efficiency, a

more accurate assessment of the dispatch levels would be an evaluation of the size of each fire

and the necessity of each unit in order to contain it. This evaluation would better assess the

effectiveness of units assigned and could be compared to the recommendations in the Citygate

report and the goal of SDFD to limit vegetation fires to less than three acres 90% of the time

(Citygate Associates, LLC, 2011,). However, such an analysis of efficiency could not conducted

for the purpose of the present study due to the number of fires used in the report and the limited

NFIRS data available containing this information.

The literature review on the NFDRS showed that historical data, weather conditions, fuel

models, and other scientific measurements can be combined to provide rating values useful in

predicting fire danger and potential risk. One of the main purposes of NFDRS is to provide the

fire manager with information essential for planning and making operational decisions (National

Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2002). Because of the weather climate in San Diego, the majority

of the dates in the time period examined had relatively low BI readings, and as such most of the


vegetation fires occurred in these low ranges. Although the BI did not influence the number of

fires, it did correlate with the number of resources needed to manage the fires in the higher BI

ranges. This latter point is supportive of the importance role that the BI can play in predicting

fire danger and potential risk, particularly in the higher BI ranges which can be a useful tool in

setting and adjusting appropriate resource levels. This is not to suggest that the BI alone should

be used to determine a dispatch level, as several other factors such as time of day, as well as

geographic and topographic information can also help predict conditions and show value in

supporting resource level decisions.

The BI values produced using NFDRS data has been accepted by SDFD as valuable

situational awareness information and incorporated into daily notification procedures for all

operations personnel (SDFD Communication Procedures, 2009). However this valuable

information has not been included as a criterion for dispatching resources. These Communication

Procedures give authority to the Captain in FCC to reduce an alarm assignment based on

conditions (i.e. weather), though this option is rarely used since it comes with scrutiny from

ranking officers and added responsibility of the Captain. A majority of departments surveyed

(68%) use weather or burn index information in the process of determining dispatch levels, and

of the respondents that use weather as criteria, 98% prioritize relative humidity and wind as the

most important factors. While the BI is a comprehensive and all inclusive rating of the fire

danger, it is not recommended to be a sole criterion when determining resource levels. However,

significant wind events alone should be considered when setting dispatch levels because of its

independent influence on fire spread and historical fires experienced in southern California.

It is important to note that despite its value, the BI is also limited in a number of ways.

One of the deficiencies and challenges inherent with the current collection and reporting


procedures of the BI, is the specific RAWS locations used and the unreliability of consistent

reporting. The three inland RAWS locations are significantly inland from the city limits and are

not reflective of weather or fuel moisture conditions in the area served by SDFD. Coastal

influences of on shore winds and marine layers have a dominant effect on morning and evening

weather conditions and are not seen inland where the BI data is gathered. Furthermore, of the

three coastal RAWS locations that were initially used to produce a triangular average of

measurements, only one is still in operation (San Miguel). This has resulted in the Coastal BI

determined by the measurements taken at only this specific location and not truly a citywide

reflection of the conditions influencing fire danger. San Diego Gas & Electric has installed new

RAWS in the central and coastal areas of the city that report measurements every ten minutes

and better represent the various communities; however the measurements have not yet been

integrated with the other scientific components that produce a BI value.

Objective data that is quickly referenced is most desirable and effective to use when

determining the type and amount of resources allocated to a fire emergency. As explained during

a personal interview with the Assistant Fire Chief, the complicated and frequently changing

criteria used in the previous vegetation dispatch procedures caused significant delays and was

one of the main reasons prompting a change in 2009 (Fennessy, personal interview, 2012).

However the BI was not being collected by SDFD at that time and dispatch matrixes were not as

established in CAD at that time. Certainly any evaluation of data or conditions that may cause a

delay in dispatching units should be avoided, but it is important to use supplemental information

to support or modify initial alarm assignments. Other factors that were not examined in this

paper but should also be considered when setting dispatch levels are: (a) reporting party


information, (b) number of calls received at FCC, (c) familiarity with the reported location, and

(d) availability of resources due to other incidents in the area.

SDFD has historically been a data driven department when making operational decisions

or policy changes. Surprisingly the noted dispatch procedure change for vegetation fires in May

2009 was not based on studies or evaluations of the previous procedures or incident reports (K.

Malbrough, W. Middelton, J. Carle, P. Peake, S. Infantino & B. Fennessy, personal interviews,

September, 2012). Rather the current dispatch levels, while well intended given public concern

and recent fire disasters, were established based on professional opinions and experiences

without intermediate levels or objective mechanisms to alter a response. An aggressive approach

to any potential threat or area designated as having wildland topography regardless of other

conditions was deemed as the best practice for San Diego with a “year round fire season”

(Malbrough, personal interview, 2012) and the effects of recent fire disasters still present.

Although this is always the safe approach, the results from the present study reveal that this

practice has a number of unanticipated consequences. Arguably one of the most notable

consequences among them, is the large number of resources underutilized and challenges in

providing district coverage while home units have been unnecessarily assigned. Although this

report shows the majority of incidents do not utilize the equivalent alarm assignment and more

resources are cancelled than are used to mitigate the fire, this may very well have been the case

with the previous High, Medium, and Low dispatch levels. Without a similar analysis of the prior

dispatch levels and incident data, it is not known if the newer procedures and criteria of using

solely geographic location to determine resource levels are any less efficient than the previous

procedures.


In terms of the financial impact of resources unnecessarily assigned to vegetation fires,

the cost is quite small for SDFD, which has an operating budget of close to $200 million. More

pressing concerns are the associated risks and consequences that come as a result of inefficiency.

Considering that emergency responses increase the likelihood of being involved in an accident

by three times and ten times of being injured or killed (Wilbur, 1995), the additional 12,789

minutes of risk per year faced by SDFD crews carries the potential for serious and long lasting

consequences. While the report did not examine how many of the 30 accidents or claims against

the city in FY12 involved SDFD apparatus/vehicles unnecessarily responding to vegetation fires,

it can be concluded that any additional time on the road responding to emergencies equates to an

increased likelihood of risk of injury and property damage.

The Citygate study on response coverage deployment for SDFD identified that the City

of San Diego is deficient in coverage for 19 service areas in hard to serve neighborhoods

(Citygate Associates, LLC, 2011). Therefore, efficiency and keeping resources available is even

more important in order to provide a level of service expected and achieve response time goals.

A unit unavailable to respond to an emergency in their home district as a result of already being

committed to another incident is unfortunate but accepted as “first call–first serve” practice. Yet

when units are unavailable due to being assigned unnecessarily, which was the case for 163

incidents highlighted in this study; it calls into question the current dispatch practices and the

importance in examining whether adjustments to those policies are needed. Because nearly three

quarters of all missed calls under these circumstances occur during a VSR dispatch, it

underscores the necessity of reevaluating the efficiency of this dispatch level.

The purpose of this paper was not to identify all of the conditions and information that

should be considered when dispatching resources to a vegetation fire, nor was it intended to offer


definitive conclusions regarding the dispatch levels. The purpose of the study was to determine if

there are other conditions and pre-incident information available that would be valuable and

could better predict the potential danger and resources required to manage the fire. However,

since the results show that the current dispatch procedures and levels for vegetation fires are not

efficient and there are several factors that should be considered, both objective and subjective,

that could improve efficiency and reduce costs and risks; the recommendations in the following

section will be proposed to Senior Management Staff.

Recommendations

By using pre-incident information and data on conditions affecting fire danger, updating

current geographical information and maps, along with changes to dispatch procedures and

resource levels, SDFD can improve the utilization of resources and decrease the risks and costs

associated with the allocation of resources to vegetation fires. Based on the research and results

presented in this paper, the following recommendations are proposed:

1. Determine what pre-incident information is reliable and that impacts potential fire

danger and incorporate this information into revised dispatch procedures. Information

available such as BI values from updated RAWS, forecasted wind events, and

geographic location should determine initial dispatch levels for a particular incident

and will avoid any delay in dispatching resources. Additional subjective information

and decisions by the Emergency Resource Officer (ERO) in FCC should also be

considered for adjustments to these levels.

2. SDFD should avoid the complexities and delays experienced with past dispatch

procedures by setting initial levels in CAD based on objective data and known pre-


incident factors, and then develop supplemental criteria to adjust those levels as a

result of subsequent information or reports.

3. The GIS data and field surveys used to map and designate areas requiring a VSR or

VNSR response should be revisited to reflect development and topography changes

throughout the city. By updating this information, areas designated as posing a

significant threat and requiring a high number of resources can be adjusted

accordingly to reduce the number of units initially assigned to that area.

4. A smaller sample of VSR incident reports representative of the entire year should be

carefully evaluated, including a review of the NFIRS data and discussion with the

crews to confirm the fire size and resources required to manage the incidents during

different periods of the year. This information along with the unit efficiency results

presented in Figure 5 of this report will help to determine the average and most

efficient number of resources needed to mitigate VSR incidents throughout the year.

5. An automatic dispatch level of the closest two type I engines should be implemented

as the standard dispatch level to vegetation fires for initial attack and assessment of

fire conditions. SDFD should determine incremental levels of alarm assignments

based on conditions identified in recommendation #1 and rely on reported conditions

from the first arriving units for additional resource requests.

6. With the exception of periods experiencing extreme weather conditions and fire

danger, lower dispatch levels should be considered for nighttime vegetation fire

responses with additional resource assignments based on reports from arriving fire

units and informative decisions by the ERO.


7. The fire-rescue helicopter should only be automatically dispatched at the highest

dispatch level and fire danger conditions, and be notified to monitor lower level

incidents in preparation of being requested. Based on initial reports, the helicopter can

be added to responses for which it is not automatically assigned.

8. The RAWS locations used to determine the BI value for SDFD should be updated to

sites that better reflect the weather conditions and fire danger within the city.

Cooperative agreements with SDG & E should be developed include their Mission

Valley, Carmel Valley, and Mount Soledad RAWS in producing more geographically

appropriate values of the BI used by SDFD.

An evaluation of changes to vegetation fire dispatch criteria and procedures should be

conducted six months after implementation with individual audits of each vegetation response to

collect data on the utilization and effectiveness of resources.


References

Bradshaw, L. S., Deeming, J. E., Burgan, R. E., & Cohen, J. D. (1983). The 1978 national Fire

danger rating system [Technical Research INT-169]. Ogden, UT: U.S. Department of

Agriculture, Forest Service, Intermountain Research Station.

City of San Diego usage rates for operational costs. Unpublished manuscript. (2005).

Citygate Associates, LLC. (2011, February 14). Fire service standards of response coverage

deployment for the San Diego Fire-Rescue Department [Deployment Planning Study].

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Appendix A

SDFD Vegetation Fire Danger Rating System (Pre May 2009)


Appendix B

Vegetation Fire Response Area Map


Appendix C

Current SDFD Dispatch Matrix for Vegetation Fires


Appendix D

Weather Index Pocket Card


Appendix E

Sample Fire Incident Data Reports


Appendix F

Vegetation Dispatch Survey Questions


Appendix G

Interview Questions

Interviews conducted with: Jeff Carle, Asssistant Fire Chief (Retired), Operations Brian Fennessy, Assistant Fire Chief, Support Service Susan Infantino, Communications Manager

Bill Middleton, Asssistant Fire Chief (Retired), Operations Ken Malbrough, Deputy Chief (Retired) Perry Peake, Deputy Chief (Retired)

1. What were the theories, discussions, and conditions that resulted in the May 2009 change to SDFD’s dispatching of resources to vegetation fires?

2. What criteria and data were used in determining the dispatch levels prior to the change? 3. Were the previous dispatch procedures effective and manageable? 4. What problems existed with the previous dispatch levels and procedures? 5. What research was done prior to making the dispatch change in 2009? 6. How were the amount and type of resources determined for each dispatch level? 7. What desired improvements and/or benefits were expected from the change? 8. Did the department recognize and gain the desired improvements? 9. What factors and conditions were considered when determining how to set the new

dispatch levels? 10. Were there any concerns with the change to the new level and using geographic location

as the sole factor determining resource assignments? 11. How was the Burn Index (BI) expected to be to incorporated into our dispatch procedures

and staffing models? 12. Was the BI intended to support and influence dispatch levels or staffing plans? 13. Was there a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of the dispatch change after any time frame

from implementation?

dispatch criteria and resource allocation for vegetation

Documents