CHAPTER II

DISPERSAL OF SMALL ARMS AS A COLD WAR LEGACY

33

The dispersal of small arms has been a key element of the East-West competititon

and the Cold War attitudes. During the Cold War a direct armed conflict between the

superpowers was realised to be an extremely dangerous path to tread on. So this rivalry

found expression in the tactics of covert or open support to warring states or factions

within a state. The avowed objectives were to curtail each other's sphere of influence to

gain ideological or strategic objectives. As a consequence, arming the sympathisers

within the adversary with small arms seemed a useful alternate method.

SMALL ARMS DIFFUSION AND EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN THE THIRD WORLD

"The international system shaped in the aftermath of the World War II,

particularly in the Cold War was characterized by a division of the world into two camps

opposed by political and economic viewpoints, ideologies and systems of government". 1

Further, the Cold War was the consequence of an irreconcilable antagonism between two

hostile systems- East and West. The essential elements of Cold War involve: a sharpened

international conflict between the leading Capitalist and Communist States; an increased

emphasis upon the need for military build up and the use of force; and an attempt by the

leading states in both camps to impose order and control upon their own junior allies to

subordinate international political, m!litary and economic relations to the confrontation

of the East and West. 2

2

In the beginning, the Cold War was centered upon remaking the boundaries of

Marion Mushkat, The Third World and Peace: Some Aspects of the Interrelationship of UnderdeveLopment and International Security (New York, 1982), p. 19.

K.P. Misra. ed., The World Towards 1990s: Third World in Contemporary IntemationalRelatioiL~ (New Delhi. 1985), p.5.

34

Europe. 3 But "the Chinese Revolution of 1949 and the Korean War of 1950-53 heralded

a transfer of the superpower confrontation from the European centre stage to peripheral

third world arena. While merely a 'pawn' in the early US-Soviet clashes, the third world

was soon to attract more intense attention on the part of the superpowers. As the

demands of the increasingly conscious and cohesive third world countries grew more and

more insistent and vociferous and, concomitantly, the emerging nuclear stalemate barred

direct superpower confrontation, American and Soviet attitudes to the third world

changed from benign neglect to hopeful interest."4 In other words to both the East and

West, the third world promised to turn into the principal battleground of their global

struggle. As Kenneth Waltz noted, with only two blocs capable of acting on a world

scale, anything that happens anywhere was potentially of concern to both of them.5 And,

in this rivalry there was the creation by both the East and the West of alliances across

the globe, and the competition to find new partners - or at least to prevent third world

countries from joining the other side.

Many third world states are themselves highly fragmented or polarized which lead

to the religious and ethnic violence. In these circumstances, the major powers had

considerable incentive for meddling in the internal affairs of third world states. More

importantly, security complexes in the third world emphasise the external influences

tending to amplify local problems, and local problems shaping and constraining external

entanglements and influences. Such types of threats and vulnerability lead to

militarisation.

3

4

5

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and FaLL of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from J 500 to 2000 (London, 1989). p.480.

Christer Johnson. Superpower-Compqring American and Soviet Foreign Policy (London. 1984), pp.l07-I08.

Kelmeth Waltz. quoted in Roy Allison and Phil WiIIiams, eds .• Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World (Cambridge. 1990). p.l.

35

"Militarisation is the result of oppressive relations in the social structure which

give a dominant few the power over the many. And there exists a supporting network

of political, economic, social and cultural relations that reinforces military power. ~(j The

resources that fuel militarisation include not only domestic resources bUlt also

international links among militarised regimes which exchange intelligence information

and aid, give shelter to foreign military bases and installations, trade in armaments and

technology and conduct training, tactical as well as strategic, in counterinsurgency,

interrogation etc. Foreign military bases lead to the militarisation of the societies of both

the host coufltry and the country operating the bases. The pretext of such bases is mutual

defence. This requires that arms be supplied to the host country and this, ion turn,

requires increased development and production of arms by the dominant country. Hence.

"arms supplies played an obvious role in hardening and intensifying the local disputes,

and the linking together of local and external patterns of hostility amplified insecurities

all round. "7

"Since the 1950s arms transfers to third world countries have become one

prominent strand in the multiple web of relationships between rich and poor countries.

Most wars which have taken place over the past decades have been fought ill the poorer

parts of the world, and the weapons used in these wars have come aboutentirelly from

rich, industrialised countries. ~8 When the then Soviet Union joined the arms transfer

race in the mid - 1950s and preemption of Soviet influence became an added incentive,

the geographical scope of American military assistance was expanded. Arms were

delivered not only to allies but also to friends. 'n the 196Os, there was an increased

6

7

8

;

Yoshikazu Sakailloto, ed., Asia: Militarisation and Regional Conflicts (Tokyo, 1988), \p. 37.

Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in IntematiofUJl Relations (Sussex, 1983), p.lll.

SIPRJ Year Book (Oxford), 1975, p.7.

36

emphasis on the internal threat to the third world countries, and American military

assistance was increasingly designed to train local forces to combat guerrilla activities.9

Further, the countries in third world conflict regions have been receiving the arms and

ammunition produced by the US and the then Soviet Union, sometimes before the

weapons are fully assimilated by the supplier's own forces. 10

During the Cold War, the dispersion of arms and ammunition across the border

of a country is a major factor in escalating political violence. Small arms and light

weapons have played a stellar role as instruments of death and destruction in all such

violence, an~ societies at large bore the brunt of the attacks.

Hence the major powers during the Cold War embarked on a policy of

undisguised militarism, and a continual arms build up, fuelling tension and interfering

in the affairs of sovereign states. "During the post-War era, the Third World has been

a principal' arena of East-West rivalry. From South-east Asia to the Middle East to

Southern Africa to Central America, the superpowers have found themselves on opposing

sides of regional conflicts locked in a global competition for influence. "11 This is well

founded as a sizable proliferation of small arms which appears to be a common factor

in all states in the grip of instability and political violence. Cambodia, Angola,

Mozambique, Sudan, Somalia, Middle East, Central America and Afghanistan illustrate

the scene.

9

10

11

Johnson, n.4, p.122.

ibid. p.124.

Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells Jr.; eds .• Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World (Cambridge. 1988). See Introduction.p.IX.

37

Role of External Actors in Cambodia

"At the heart of Indochina there is an ancient country of seven million people,

most of them small and independent farmers, who used to live reasonably cheerful lives

- short of idyllic, no doubt but not very far short - and who early in the 1970s saw

themselves drafted, drilled, uprooted, rent by violent factions, infiltrated by fanatic

partisans, invaded by armies, driven from their homes, and pulverized by explosives

dropped from foreign planes" .12 The major actors in the Cambodian political violence

are: the Khmer Republic, under General Lon Nol, seated in Phnom Penh with links to

the West, and the Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC) with

an absentee Prince Sihanouk claiming traditional loyalties for his Peking-linked rule.

Supporting Lon Nol were the US and the Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam, while

Sihanouk had behind him the People's Republic of China (PRC) and - with a difference

- the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, North Vietnam and Provisional Government of

South Vietnam (better known as the Viet Congress).

Early in 1970, the Cambodian Head of State, Prince Sihanouk, was ousted by a

group of right wing opponents. Shortly afterwards, the deposed Prince issued an appeal

for the formation of a Liberation Front which followed by a civil war. Each year, the

Liberation Front captured more territory and successively isolated patches of land under I

government control. Particularly during an initial period of build-up both sides relied

heavily on external military assistance . During the War a large number of outsiders

intervened in various ways ranging from militry hardware to monetary assistance. _

The PRC supported the Prince both financially and materially. "Chinese weapon

assistance was provided in agreement with North Vietnam which transported the (ifms

12 Sheldon W. Simon, War and Politics in Cambodia: A Communications Analysis (Durham, North Carolina, 1974), p.3.

38

to Cambodia and distributed them there. "13 "In an interview with Afrique Asie (Paris)

published on May 25, 1970, the Prince first revealed that China had agreed to an

interest-free loan for his front's operational expenses as well as the free provision of

arms. According to the Prince, Chairman Mao told:

We shall lend you money for the business of your state. But as for arms, we are not in the habit of selling them; we are not traffickers in arms. We cannot sell you weapons, we can only give them to you. This arms would be transported from China through North Vietnam to the Cambodian insurgents' .14

But later in an important development in 1979 China shifted its allegiance and hosted

military training camps for the Khmer Rouge to at least 1986 and stationed military

advisers with the Khmer Rouge troops as late as 1990. 15

The opposite side, the so-called Khmer Republic, was assisted by some other

countries. The United States and the Republic of South Vietnam were prominent

i'nterveners. There was "massive introduction of weapons and war material to the Lon

.. ,Nol clique at a ,rate of $lmn a day from. the US plus American·orders to'secretly send

so-called volunteers to Phnom Penh". 16 The US Air Force bombed targets in Cambodia

from the very beginning of the War and provided close air support for the Cambodian

Air Force's ground operations. 'The USA also dispatched mercenary forces. Later, a

regular invasion was undertaken and the USA started p~trolling the Cambodian Coast to

stop supplies being delivered to the enemy side. Moreover, they rushed in arms and were

its major supplier. The USA also took part in the training of the Cambodian Army ~nd

13

14

15

16

Bertil Duner, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s (Hampshire, England, 1985), p.127.

Simon. n.12, p.68.

Human Rights Watch Arms Project (Washington), March 1995. p.106.

Sheldon W. Simon, "The Role of Outsiders in the Cambodian Conflict", Orbis (Philadelphia), voI.l9.no.l, Spring 1975, p.128.

39

ferried South Vietnamese ground troops to the operation areas in Cambodia. The

National United Front for Cambodia (FUNK) accused the US of building up from 3000

toward a total 10,000 US military and civilian personnel in Cambodia who were directly

in command of military operations on all battlefields. 17

When the US troops entered Cambodia in strength in 1970, it was in a combined

operation with the South Vietnamese armed forces. South Vietnamese territory served

as a staging post for US involvement in Cambodia throughout the war. The South

Vietnamese blockaded the Cambodian coastline to prevent enemy infiltration. Training

programmes for Khmer soldiers were coordinated and carried out at camps in South

Vietnam. South Vietnamese army personnel were also engaged in Cambodia in planning

and similar activities for the armed forces. Moreover, the South Vietnamese Air Force

bombed targets in Cambodia for long periods.

Further, Thailand cooperated with the USA and South Vietnam and China at a

later phase in carrying out this large-scale invasion. The Thai Air force operated across

the southern border. Cambodian perso~nel 'were also sent to Thailand for ~iiitary

instruction. The Thailand territory served as a US logistic base for supplies to Cambodia

and that US air strikes in Cambodia were carried out from the US air bases in Thailand.

Under American offiCers, the Lon Nol army was doing all the combat tasks while Thai

mercenaries had to see to the transportation by air of weapons, gas and food to the Lon

Nol army and the training of spies and commander and the defense of certain places

along the North-Western borders and the Saigon mercenaries are given the tiSks of

protecting the Sihanoukville port, helping Lon Nol troops in holding some frontier areas,

and escorting convoys on the Mekong river. 18

17 ibid, p.219.

18 ibid, pp.218-19.

40

In addition, Thailand acted as the conduit for Chinese aid. Large volume

shipments of weapons from China used to come in at the Sattahip Port in Bangkok, and

later weapon shipments from other countries, including Singapore. 19 The shipments

arriving at Sattahip were distributed by the Thai military to major weapons storehouses.

W~ehouses were situated for easy access to strategic resistance bases inside Cambodia.

The Khmer Rouge guerrillas were given storage facilities near Aranyaprathet, to supply

the Phnom Malai region, near the sea at Trat, to supply the southern front. 20 Besides;

Thailand also provided logistic supports which included allowing the guerrillas to launch

attacks on their opponents from positions in Thailand, allowing resistance fighters to take

sanctuary in Thai territory, providing transportation for troops and weapons through

Thailand to various points on the Cambodian border, and facilitating travel and residence

for Khmer Rouge leaders in Thailand}1

A number of other states became involved, all backing the Khmer Republic.

Australia provided military training for Khmer Republic forces. Instruction took place

at US training centers in South Vietnam. Laos totally approved of this large scale

violence. Links with the USA were manifested by the harbouring of Khmer soldiers who

were trained by North American instructors. Further, France intervened in a low key

fashion, continuing an ongoing programme of military instruction but cutting off supplies

of weapons.

Towards 1975, the capital of Cambodia came under siege and when it fell the war

ended. But rhere started a border clash between Cambodia and Vietnam during 1977-78

which ended with a Vietnamese military intervention in December 1978. It ousted

Democratic Kampuchea (new name given to Cambodia then) in Khmer Rouge from

19

20

21

Human Rights Watch ArtrIS Project, n.15, p.lOB.

ibid.

ibid. p.1l5.

41

power in January 1979. Again the conf! ict assumed the form of an international ised

political violence.

A Vietnamese expeditionary force was engaged in protecting and consolidating

the position of a client Khmer administration subject to challenge from a disparate Khmer

resistance movement with military support provided primarily from China.22 External

support for Vietnam's political purpose came from the erstwhile Soviet Union whose

material benefaction was estimated to amount to approximately US $ 3 million a day.23

The then Soviet government was engaged in a continuing dialogue with its Chinese,

counterpart in an attempt to become better placed to manage its central adversary

relationship with the United States. Spearheaded by the surviving and refurbished military

arm of the ousted government of so-called Democratic Kampuchea, in coal ition form

since mid-1982, that movement enjoyed a mixture of military support from the then

Soviet Union and China. The Vietnamese were well equipped with superior military

arsenals supplied by the erstwhile Soviet Union.

On the other hand, in August 1985 President Reagan of the USA signed a two

year foreign aid bill that gave him authority to allocate $5 million annually in military

or non-military form to the non-Communist Khmer resistance ... Congress subsequently

reduced the sum allocated to $ 6.3 million.24

Hence, the political violence in Cambodia continued with the dispersal of small

arms and conventional weapons by the major external powers.

In August 1990, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security

Council agreed on a 'peace plan' for Cambodia. The plan included a cease fire,

disarmament, UN administration of Cambodia during an interim period and the formation

22

23

24

Litwak and Wells. Jr., eds .• n.ll. p.204.

ibid,

ibid. p. 210.

42

of a Supreme National Council (SNC) to represent Cambodia in the UN. Further, the

Paris Conference on Cambodia, arranged in 1989, was reconvened and a peace

agreement was signed on 23 October 1991. According to the agreement, the United

Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was given the charge of

organising the elections by April 1993. But, as the UNT AC forces grappled with the

electioneering process, they faced the herculean task of disarming rival armies numbering

2,00,000. The Khmer Rouge has 35,000 or so well disciplined guerrillas, and stocks of

weapons and ammunition sufficient for two years of fighting. 25 The Khmer Rouge

established a criminal nexus with Thai generals in the illegal logging and mining of

gemstones. 26 These finances would be quite adequate for further procurement of arms

to wage guerrilla war. Further, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had planted vast

quantities of anti-personnel mines along the 800 km border which were of Soviet

Manufacture. 27 However, in recent years, peace has emerged in Cambodia with the

efforts of the United Nations.

Internationalisation: The Angolan Political Violence

The Angolan civil war was conceived in the context of the Cold War. In Angola,

uniquely among the former Portuguese-ruled African territories, the colonial power was

not confronted by a unified nationalist movement. Instead, there were three rival groups:

The Movimento Popular de Libertaco de Angola (MPLA) founded in 1956; the Uniao

das Populacoes de AngolalFrente Nacional de Libertacas de Angola (UPA/FNLA)

founded in 1962; .the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)

25

26

27

New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur). 22 June 1992.

ibid.

Jane's Defence Weekly (Surrey), 20 May 1989.

43

founded in 1966. This fragmentation was attributable to ethnic divisions, rivalries among

the leading figures, and genuine ideological differences. All three groups engaged in

armed a~tivity, mainly in areas bordering Zambia and Zaire: the MPLA was probably

the most effective, partly because of an increase in support from the Organisation of

African Unity (OAU) from 1967 onwards. The nationalists' success was reduced by

conflicts within and between the movements, despite the OAU's efforts at reconciliation.

The three groups vied for external support both from the governments and from non­

governmental organisations. "An armed revolt against Portuguese colonial rule began

during the 1960s and guerrilla operations were carried out by three separate and mutually

antagonistic movement which were able, to varying extents, to count on sympathy and

support from neighbouring states and from certain other countries. "28 In the aftermath

of the revolution in Portugal in 1974, negotiations on the end of colonial rule were

begun. Further, the external power's interest in Angola increased markedly and the

territory was subjected to active intervention in many forms.

In January 1975, an independence agreement was signed between the colonial

authorities and the main liberation movements. The same month, a basically nationalist

transitional government took office,but only a few months later an interfactional war

started.

The parties to the political violencecan best be were MPLA on one side, and the

anti-MPLA forces, on the other. The MPLA's major opponent was the FNLA, which

was later joined by the UNITA. Armed factions in the Cabinda enclave also took part

in the conflict. It was evident that, at the root of the. conflict, there were factors such as

tribal affiliations, personal rivalries, as well as conflicting ideologies and the desire for

political power. A large number of external actors were involved in the violence, ranging

28 Duner, 11.13, p.lO!.

44

from the two superpowers to very small states. The MPLA was assisted by the then

Soviet Union, Cuba and Congo. On the other hand, the FNLA and UNITA were backed

by the USA, South Africa, China, Zaire and France. The warring factions were supplied

with small arms and minor weapons.

The MPLA was primarily assisted by erstwhile Soviet Union and Cuba. The then

Soviet Union trained MPLA soldiers at an early stage of the war. Arms were furnished

in great quantities. The MPLA was "supplied with 122-mm artillery weapons, armored

cars, automatic rifles, T 54 tanks, and SAM-7 missiles" .29 By 1976 the Soviets had

supplied an estimated $300 million worth of greatly diversified weapons: troop carriers,

PT -76 amphibious tanks, 122-mm multiple rocket launchers, recoilless guns, mortars and

AK-47 rifles ... 30 "In the early 1980s the MPLA received an estimated $ 3-4 billion

'worth of some of 'the Soviet Union's most advanced equipment, including MIG-21,

MIG-23, and SS-22 fighters and Mi-25, Mi-8 and Mi-16 helicopters".31 Moreover,

Soviet instructors provided a good many military services but no troops were sent in.

However, the then Soviet Union was instrumental in transporting Cuban combat troops

to Angola. Cuba sent in troops on a fairly large scale well over 5,00,000 men and the

then Soviet Union helped with their transport and equipment. Further, "Cubans brought

in six new infantry regiments, three special infantry battalions, an anti-aircraft regiment

equipped with SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8 and SA-13 missile systems, several radar

systems, one artillery regiment with substantial numbers of heavy guns and multiple

rocket launchers, and a tank regiment with 105 ~nks"32 Cuba had military instructors

29

30

31

32

Stephen Blank and others, Responding to Low-Irttensity Conflict ChaLlenges (Alabama. USA. 1990). p. 230.

ibid. p.232.

ibid. p. 235.

ibid. p.237.

45

staffing MPLA training camps.

The Congo backed the same side as Cuba and the Soviet Union. Moreover,

Congo was a staging post for Soviet-Cuban involvement. Cuban troops were transported

partly via Congo. It served as a transit post for Soviet arms deliveries and perhaps even

to a certain extent actively helped in transporting them further. 33

On the other hand, the USA supplied large quantities of arms to FNLA-UNITA,

directly and indirectly. The CIA of the USA released the first $300,000 allotment of

authorised US aid to the FNLA on 22 January 1975.34 US aid to UNITA then followed

in mid-1975. The US supplied anti tank weapons and anti-aircraft missiles. CIA

deliveries in 1975-76 comprised of 622 crew-served mortars, 42,100 anti-tank rockets

and 20,896 rifles. 35 Further, "the US Air Force C-141 jet transport continued to life

25 tonne loads of obsolete USA on untraceable foreign weapons from Charleston South

Carolina to Kinshasa where smaller planes took them into Angola. The 'USN-American

Champion' sailed from Charleston on 30 August 1975 with a cargo of arms and

equipment. "36 America delivered covert aid via Zaire and even South Africa, following

congressional repeal in 1985 of the 1976 Clark Amendment.37 Between the USA and

Zaire, there were close contacts. Zaire served as a conduit for US funds and American

weapons were supplied pardy in the form of swap operations with Zaire.38 US Covert

33

34

35

36

37

38

DUller, n.13, p.125.

Lucy Matbjak, "Light Weapons and Intental Conflict in Angola", in Jeffrey Boutwell and others, eds., Lethal Commerce: Giobal Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (Massachusetts, 1995), p.84.

ibid. p.85.

Satish Kumar, CIA and the Third World: A Study in Crypto DiplomaLY (New Delhi, 1981). p.70.

17le Times (London). 21 November 1986.

Duner. n.13. p.126.

46

aid to UNITA totalled about $250m between 1986 and 1991.39

South Africa played a major role throughout the 1970s and 1980s in delivering

small arms and light weapons .. They operated from the bases in Namibia. Many of the

small arms supplied to UNITA by South Africa also originated in the US. It was reported

in December 1986 that the US had airlifted an estimated forty tons of machine guns and

twenty tons of rockets and rocket ·.launchers directly from Connecticut to

Johannesburg.4O Additional quantities of arms also arrived in South Africa from

Belgium and Switzerland for transshipment to UNITA.41

Further, South Africa assisted FNLA/UNITA with a mechanised unit, artillery

and reconnaissance aircraft. "An estimated 1000 South African regulars had supported

UNIT A with Panhard armored cars, 130mm artillery, and Puma helicopters while

another 3000 troops dug in at Cunene where they assumed defensive position with respect

to the MPLA .• 42 South Africa also delivered 'G-5 and G-6 long-range guns which

unleashed a torrent of firepower. Furthermore, South African forces gave military

training to anti-MPLA forces. Later, combat troops were sent in. Two thousand South

African soldiers were sent to aid UNIT A and FLNA with maintenance logistic,

reconnaissance, and combat ass istance. 43

Ther!! was also Chinese arid Romanian support for the anti-MPLA camp. The

People's Republic of China was engaged in military training of the FNLA from the . beginning of the war. China had contacts primarily with Zaire where Chinese instructors

39

40

41

42

43

Alex Vines. "Angola and Mozambique: The Aftennath of Conflict". Conflict Studies (London). po.280, May-June 1995. p.ll.

Mathiak. n.34. p.9O.

New York Times, 25 January 1993.

Blank and others. n.29. p.23l.

ibid. p.229.

47

were training FNLA soldiers. But this did not continue beyond the initial stages of the

civil war. Further, French funds were funnelled via Zaire.

In 1990s efforts have been made to quell Angolan civil war. "The May 1991

Bicesse Accord prohibited both the government and the UNITA rebel group from

acquiring new weaponry ... and the UN Security Council imposed an international arms

embargo on UNITA in 1993. Yet both sides have been procuring arms and foreign

expertise for some time. "44 UNITA purchased large/amounts of weaponry from foreign

sources. Now, Zaire has become the most important source of support as a transit area

and conduit for diamond sales and weapons transpires. 45 On the other hand, since

mid-1993, a South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO) has trained 4-5,000

government troops and about 30 pilots on contract with the government. 46

With the end of the Cold War, many of external support networks dried up which

contributed to UNITA's weakening. However, the UNITA can still wage an effective

guerrilla campaigns with the bet over arms and money from the diamond sales.

Military Intervention in Mozambique

The political violence in Mozambique was the result of big power politics in the

region. The Mozambican guerrillas RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Macambicana,

Mozambique National Resistance) have been fighting Chissano's Frelimo (Front for the

Liberation of Mozambique, leftist government) sinCe 1976. While originally created by

Rhodesia as a strike force against the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU)

guerrillas based in Mozambique, the arming, training and control of RENAMO was

taken over by the South African Defense Forces (SADF) at Zimbabwean independence

44

45

46

Vines, n.39, p.ll.

ibid.

ibid.

48

in 1980. 47 To a large extent RENAMO was supported by the US both financially and

materially.

Large-scale military destabilisation of Mozambique began in 1981. RENAMO still

receives clandestine material support and military training irt bases inside South Africa

and is supported from Kenyan and Malawian territory. Money and material support

arrive from non-government origanisations (e.g. right wing and or/religious

organisations) and individuals.48

The south African Army delivered weapons to the guerrillas which included

AK-47 assault rifles, Belgian FN rifles, SAM-7 missiles and assorted type of small

arms. 49 RENAMO's main recruitment method is press-ganging youths captured in

attacks. On the other hand, military cooperation has taken place between the Government

and Zimbabwe since 1985 and many Western governments grant military aid to the

Government. Other military whites include the Napramas spiritualist peasant militia

groups (fighting both RENAMO and Government) and Unamo (a RENAMO defection

force fightingb6th RENAMO and government).

Hence the political violence in Mozambique and the intervention by external

major powers in dispersing arms to the rebel groups resulted in 1,00,000 people dead50

and driven one million people into exile.

47

48

49

50

SIPRl Year Book, 1993, p. lIS.

ibid.

Jane's Defence Weapons, 15 August 1992.

Vines, il.39, p.15.

49

Proxy War in Somalia

The Somalian experience has been the most distressing as they face starvation and

poverty while Kalashnikov-totting warlords loot and plunder, Somalia in East Africa

occupies most of the Horn of Africa between the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Somalia has an entirely Muslim population in which tribes are engaged in one of the

most murderous political violence on the continent. This is a rivalry of families and

clans, fought not for religion nor ideology nor even drug turf but merely for the prize

of being able to tell others what to do.51 Moscow first and then Washington sat by as

the country disintegrated, and continued to pour arms and ammunition into Somalia, then

considered a strategic piece of real estate on the Cold War chess-board because of its Red

Sea port at Berdera and its position in Horn of Africa.52

The Somali National Movement (SNM), drawn largely from the Isaaq clan in the

north of Somalia, began armed struggle in 1981 against the Government of President Siad

Barre. In 1988 the conflict escalated as the SNM attempted to create military bases inside

Somalia in order to replace bases held on Ethiopian territory. Emerging from a military

mutiny in the south in 1989 the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM, drawn from the

Ogadeen Clan) became an important armed oPPosltion group. A third armed opposition

group was formed in 1990, the United Somali Congress (USC drawn from the Hawiye

Clan). In August 1990 the three groups began to cooperate. In late December 1990,

fighting in the capital Mogadishu with USC forces gradually gaining control res\llted in

an estimated 5000-10000 people ki lied. 53

Since 1970s the Somalian army depended on Soviet equipment and training. The

erstwhile Soviet Union acquired a variety of military fac~lities, notably at the northern

51

52

53

Dawn (Karachi), 23 August 1992.

Asian Strategic Review (IDSA,New Delhi), 1992-93, p. 223.

SIPRI Year Book, 1992, p. 450.

50

pan of Berbera. In May 1977 it became clear that the then USSR was prepared to fill the

vacuum created in Ethiopia by the expulsion of US personnel. As a result, the diplomatic

relations between the then USSR and Somalia were severed. Further, following promises

of finance for military purchases from Saudi Arabia and indications of US and Western

support, Somalia in November abrogated its treaty of friendship with the then USSR and

expelled the 6000 Soviet personnel. 54 Records reveal that from 1980-89, the USA

provided aid worth US $187 million, essentially for small arms. The gun problem is most

pronounced and large arms caches have reached the most remote corners of the country.

"Gun dealers abound and an AK-47 or the American M-16could be bought for US $100.

Traders sell bullets and grenades on a wooden stall where a grenade is available for US

$2.70 and 30 rounds of ammunition for US $14. With no functioning economy, police

force or legal system, most consider weapons the only reliable means for settling dis­

putes. Rival factions belonging to two leading warlords, namely. President Mohammed

and General Aidid, fight wars armed with assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades and

mortars." 550n the other hand, anti-aircraft weapons. rocket launchers and small arms

were supplied to anti-US guerrillas. Serbia and Sudan delivered small and sophisticated

weapons to Somalian guerrillas. 56 Further, the US stepped up its efforts to stop such

shipments. The effort was driven by concern over the proliferation of advanced

weaponry, and because of the large number of companies of Serbia and Iraq were willing

to sell weapons, military-related goods and raw materials to the rebels. 57

54

55

56

57

Africa: South of the Sahara, 1994 (London, 1994), p.774.

Asian Strategic Review. 1992-93. p. 223.

Strategic Digest. vol. 24. 110. 3. March 1994. p.44l.

ibid.

51

Today, 1,80,000 Somalis are armed and there is enough ammunition left over

from arms stockpiling to last another 20 years. 58 Moreover, security remains difficult

in Somalia, as young gunmen hijack and loot delivery trucks filled with food. Armed

Somalis in vehicles with mortars attacked the port at Kismayu. They stole 100 tonnes of

food and barrels of fuel imported to move the emergency aid.59 Further, the gunfire

and looting have subverted efforts to feed at least 1,75,000 hungry people in town and

a further 1,00,000 in the surrounding Juba Valley.60

External Intervention in Sudan

Sudan, one of the biggest nations in Africa, has faced prolonged civil violence

since 1983 when the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and the Sudanese People's Liberation

Army (SPLA) have distinctly emerged in opposing camps. An Islamic ideological divide

is inflaming passions in which Muslim groups are fighting a raging battle to acquire

power. Here black Christians and Animists of the south rose up against the Islamic

Fundamentalist government in the Arab north. The war started as a fight for religious,

economic and political rights for the southerners, who are mostly nomadic herders.

Iran was helping to train the Sudanese armed forces and was financing Sudan's

purchase of arms from China.61 Iran also supplied arms to the fundamentalist Popular

Defence Forces (PDF). Nearly 2500 mortars and more than 50 million rounds of small

arms ammunition were supplied to the fundamentalist PDF.62 Iranian loans were being

provided for purchase of Chinese weapons often via Iran. The PDF increased_their force

58

59

60

61

62

Times of In4ia (New Delhi), 12 August 1992.

Associated Press (Mogadishu); 17 August 1992';"

Financial Times (London), 25 August 1992.

Africa: South of the Sahara, 1994, '{>.845.

Asian Strategic Review, 1992-93, p.225.

52

strength from 20,000 to 35,000. This force stockpiled 50,000 assault rifles. On the other

hand, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) received massive aid from the

Ugandan and Egyptian regimes who attach great importance to curbing fundamentalist

forces, PDF. In August 1992, a Ugandan Presidential aide and two former Egyptian

Army officers were arrested in the USA on charge of shipping 400 anti tank TOW

missiles and 34 launchers to Uganda. The anti tank guided weapons were destined for

the SPLA.63 In August 1993, the USA added Sudan to its short list of states sponsoring

terrorism because of Sudan's permission to use its territory as a sanctuary and training

ground for all manner of Muslim fundamentalist and radical organisations.

Low Intensity Conflicts in Middle East and Superpower Intervention,;

The cohflicts and tensions in the Middle East region stem from the sustained

American and Soviet policy of arming the countries during the Cold War. Both the US

and the erstwhile Soviet Union introduced sophisticated weapon systems into the region.

Wars between Isr(iel and her neighbours have occurred in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1969-70,

1973 and J 982; the wars between Egypt and Libya in 1977 and between Ethiopia and

Somalia in the 1977-78 period have been followed by continued border conflicts;

Morocco has been battling the Algerian and occasionally Libyan-backed Polisario in ~he

former Spanish Sahara since 1976; North and South Yemen have alternated between war

and talks of unity; war was waged between Iran and Iraq from 1980-88; and major armed

conflicts and civil war have raged in Lebanon, and Kurdish areas of Iraq.

Arms transfer in large quantities to Iran in the early 1970s were followed a couple

of years later with vast quantities to Iraq, only to be followed by the Iran-Iraq War. The

then USSR was shipping arms to Iraq via Saudi airfield at Badanah in the country's

63 Jane's Defence Weapons, 13 February 1992.

53

north-east from where it was moved on to the Nukhayb in Iraq.64 Since 1980 massive

arms aid were also made to Saudi Arabia by the USA. Further, the USA supplied arms

through Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt and the Soviet Union through Syria and Libya.

Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Syria alone received arms worth over a hundred billion

dollars during the period 1985-1992. Of all the conflicts in the Middle-East region, the

Arab-Israeli conflict has been the most serious in terms of threatening a superpower

confrolltation.

In the aftermath of 1967 war, the Arab-Israeli ·conflict rose to the top of Middle

Eastern concerns and, as a result, became a key issue in Soviet-American relations.

Soviet assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is aimed at creating a

new state in which it will have considerable influence as a result of its support of this

nation's claim for self-determination. The PLO then helps, weaken and restricts the U.S.

imperialist influence in the Middle-East. The PLO adopted the technique of armed

struggle. Adopted by the PLO's National Congress in 1968, the Charter contains :

Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and it is the overall strategy not

merely a tactical phase (Article 9). At the same time the PLO assists in transmitting

doctrines and skills to promote destabilising campaigns by other terrorist groups In

Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa.

Committed to strengthening Palestinian armed struggle, especially through violent

activities in the Mideast and beyond, the then Soviet Union began channeling funds and

small arms directly and through intermediaries as early as 19~9. In 1979, a wide-ranging

Soviet intelligence network was reported to exist in Pakistan, a~ded by Palestinian

free40m fighters. Also, the operational and intelligence - gathering activities for the PLO

were carefully delegated by Moscow to East European countries. Czechoslovakia is

known to have been the home training base of the Palestinians.

64 K. Subrahmanyam, ed., The Second Cold War (New Delhi, 1983).

54

A major element of Soviet-PLO cooperation is in the field of training. Various

intelligence sources reported on the existence of an elaborate infrastructure of over forty

training camps within the then Soviet Union. The camps in Moscow, Tashkent, Batum

on the Black Sea, Odessa, Baku, and Simferopol, the major base known for the Soviet

Academy for Military Training" give special attention to intelligence. The Third

Department of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) in close cooperation with the KGB,

provides direct military instruction for terrorists. It is estimated that the then Soviet

Union spends more than US $200million per year on training within the country. The

KGB also operates training camps in Eastern Europe. The most active are those in East

Germany in the vicinity of Pankow and Finsterwalde ; in Bulgaria at Varna; in

Czechoslovakia at Karlovy Vary and Ostrava; and in Hungary near Lake Balaton. 65

Further, the PLO personnel receive training in China, Vietnam and North Korea; various

PLO factions also train together in the then Soviet Union and on PLO bases in Lebanon

irrespective of their political differences. 66 The training included political instruction,

tactical military exercises, the use of light and small arms, hand grenades, the production

and concealment of explosive material topography, an!i communication.

An ever-increasing flow of arms and ammunition, manufactured in the erstwhile

Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, have been shipped to the PLO via

East Germany and Hungary. The then Soviet Union, however, was the chief supplier of

weapons to the PLO. The US Senate Committee hearings on terrorist activities, 1975,

. noted that the PLO received Soviet RPG-7 hand held launchers and AK-47 and SKS

carbines. 67 Further, specific information regarding small arms dispersal flows from

65

66

67

CIA Report, April 1976. Published in Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander. Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York. 1984). pp. 45-46.

New York Times. 31 October 1980.

US. Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on Terrorist Activities, 14 May, 1975, published in Cline and Alex;mder, n.65, p.50.

55

various sources: 68

"On January 15, 1977 two vessels docking in Tyre unloaded Soviet arms and

sophisticated missiles, some of them anti-aircraft missiles, for use by the PLO. In

January 1978, two vessels docked at Tyre delivered sophisticated missiles among other

things. Eastern Europe manufacturer were found in Lebanon in March 1978. In August

1978, the PLO received sophisticated Soviet weaponry, including anti-tank and

anti-aircraft systems. Advanced Soviet arms were also issued to thePLO in January

1979. Further, two Soviet Vessels Locked in Tyre in August 1979 with a consignment

of rockets, anti-tank shells, small arms, mortar bombs, and 160mm, 130mm, and 82mm

cannons for the PLO. The decision to supply the PLO with modern T-62 tanks was made

at a meeting between the then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Grorriyko and Yasser

Arafat, the PLO leader, in January 1980. The Fatah-controlled F . "c;t.ille Liberation

Army's Ein Jalyout Brigade re~ived a consignment of twenty to twe~,,:':;~oviet-made T -34 tanks, transferred to the PLO from Hungary via Syria in early 1980. The PLO

received fiftyT-34 tanks in May of that yea"r. In December 1980, Soviet arms were

unloaded in Tyre. They included seventeen tanks, rocket launchers, and ammunition.

During August 1981, in Moscow, a Palestinian delegation signed a weaponry supply

agreement that included SAM-6 and submarine missiles. In October 1981, Soviet arms

were supplied to the PLO through Libya. In November 1981, military agreements were

signed by Abu Iyad with the Soviet Union and East Germany. During the same month

Abu Jihad discussed military cooperation in East Germany and Hungary. In December

1981, Soviet weaponry arid ammunition were supplied by Cuba to the Popular Front.

Soviet and Cuban embassies in Cyprus had a key role in smuggling arms to the PLO.

The PLO and Yugoslavia concluded a number of military agreements, including-one that

Yugoslavia would supply heavy artillery, surface-to-air missiles and other arms to the

68 Cline and Alexander, 0.65, p.50.

56

PLO. 69

One of the most active periods of Soviet - ,PLO arms cooperation occurred

between July 1981 and June 1982 when the ceasefire along the Lebanese-Israeli border

was in force. The PLO during that time, reinforced its supplies with massive quantities

of weapons and ammunition - mostly Soviet-made. These supplies arrived in Lebanon by

air, sea and land. According to the Israeli intelligence estimates:

Twenty T-54 and T-55 tanks were added to the 60 T-34 tanks already in use; Forty 130mm long-range cannons were added to the 50 in place before the ceasefire and 48 were deployed in the south as compared with 23 before July 1981; The number of BM-21 rocket launchers (Katyushas, equipped with 40 barrels apiece) was doubled from 40 to 80; Anti-tank cannons were more than doubled from 60 to 150 and of these 77 were deployed in South Lebanon; the number of 120mm and 160mm mortars was doubled to about 200; the PLO acquired four-barreled ZSU-4 radar-guided anti-aircraft cannons mounted on armored personnel carriers to supplement its 14.5mm anti-aircraft cannon and SAM-7 shoulder-launched missiles; a 500-man Libyan SAM-9 anti-aircraft missile unit arrived in Lebanon to aid the PLO; and Libya also supplied the PLO with two 37-metre gunboats, anchored in Syrian ports.70

Further, the Palestinians were supplied with MB-41 machine guns and

ammunition, 57mm anti-aircraft cannons and ammunition, Shilka NK Is, 37mm, l00mm

and 122mm cannons and ammunition, automatic and improved automatic rifles,

engineering and artillery equipment. "71 "On April 25, 1982 the PLO delegation met

with Hungarian Defense Ministry personnel and visited the commercial weapons firm

Technikal. The Company's deputy Director General gave a report on various items

ordered by the PLO that were currently being stored at company facilities or at military

warehouses. These items comprised spare parts for T-34 tanks, 122mm shrapnel shells,

69 ibid. pp.50-51.

70 ibid. pp.51-52.

71 ibid. p. 53.

57

and mortar shells and ammunition. "72

A wide variety of arms and ammunition came from the Soviet Union and East

European countries, with substantial contributions from China, North Korea and

Vietnam. Also, most consistent support was given by Syria to the more radical

Palestinian groups. Syria acted as a conduit in shipping sm.all arms, -like F-l hand

grenades, AK-47 assault rifles which were made in the USSR.73

On the other hand, the USA supplied sophisticated arms to Israel in order to

counter the Palestinian armed struggle. Israel's strength was in substantial due to the US

which had been a major supplier of economic and military assistance. "Military

assistance from the US rose from $307.5 million in 1973 to $1.5 billion in 1976 and

approximately $1 billion in each of the next two years. Most of this money was used to

purchase American arms and military equipment. In addition, the US promised at the

time of Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was signed in 1978 to grant Israel an additional $3

billion for new weapons, the construction of two air bases to replace those abandoned in

the Sinai and the removal of civilian settlements. "74

Also, Israel used the weapons which were seized from the Palestinians in various

wars. In Lebanon, during and after the hostilities in 1982, the Israeli forces found that

the actual amount of arms they had seized far exceeded any of their previous estimates.

The combat material uncovered by October 1982 in some 540 southern Lebanese and

West Beirut weapons depot was enough to equip several infantry brigades and artillery

units. When the Israelis transported. this cache to their homeland, they filled 4,300

trucks. The supplies were: 5,630 tonnes of ammunition; 1320 armed combat and other

72

73

74

ibid.

Anat Kurz and others, Inter 86: A Review of International Terrf)rism in 1986 (Colorado, 1987), p.29.

Andrew J. Pierre, The GLobaL Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, New Jersey, 1982), p.157.

58

vehicles including several hundred tanks of the T-34, T-55 and T-62 varieties; 33,303

small arms; 1352 anti-tank weapons, including 1,099 personal weapons, 27 anti-tank

missile launchers, 138 recoilless rifles and 88 anti-tank guns; 215 mortars (60mm,

81mm, 82mm, 120mm and 160mm); 62 Katyusha rocket launchers; 82 field artillery

pieces (l22mm; 130mm and 25 pound guns); 196 anti-aircraft weapons, including 43AA

machine guns, 153AA guns (20mm, 23mm, 30mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm and 100 mm);

2204 communications instruments and; 2387 optical instruments (e.g. telescopes,

binoculars, and periscopes).75

The Superpowers and Central America

"The conflicts in Central America arose during a period when the dominant elite

within the United States was reflecting on its future as a world power, and Central

America became a cardinal issue in the US debate over foreign policy. After President

Reagan came to office in 1981, Central America's conflicts were seen as an opportunity

for the US to reassert its hegemony in the region and to test the new counterinsurgency

strategy developed as a result of the Vietnam experience. "76 Further, the US admin­

istration attributed the developments in -Central America to interference by foreign

powers, specifically the Soviet Union and Cuba, and viewed them as a threat to US

security.

Since the overthrow of the reformist government in 1954, Guatemalan society has

been split into two ferve~t1y opposed halves, one favouring revolutionary chapge and the

other conservative reaction. For the greater part of the 1960s the country was subjected

to armed rebellion by leftist groups. A change in the nature of the fighting then occurred

75

76

Cline and Alexander, n.65, p. 52.

Deborah Barry and others, "Low Intensity Warfare! The Counterinsurgency Strategy for Central America", in Norae Hamilton and others. eds .• Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and-US Policy in the 1980s (Boulder, 1988). p.77.

59

- terrorism, assassinations and kidnappings were methods which gained importance. The

insurgency was countered by army involvement. The guerrilla warfare was fomented by

Cuba and the erstwhile Soviet Union. The government was supported by the USA who

supplied weapons and gave counterinsurgency training. The then President of the US,

Ronald Reagan, quietly approved the sale of $3.2million of vehicles, and it was

suggested that the next items would include spare parts for Huey helicopters used by the

armed forces in counterinsurgency operations.77 Further; major mil itary purchases to

regear Guatemala's security system for major counterinsurgency offensives in the late

1970s were made from non-traditional suppliers, including ltaly, Belgium, Yugoslavia

and Israel. It was Israel that became the main supplier of arms and expertise for

counterinsurgency.78 "Israel's contribution to the Guatemala security system after 1975

included sales and grants of large numbers of counterinsurgency aircraft and provision

of light automatic weapons. Between 1975-82, a minimum of 15,000 Galil submachine

guns (technically 'light assault rifles'), II Arava Short take off and Landing Aircraft

(STOL), 10 armoured cars and other equipment were provided by Israel. "79

Next, in EI Salvador, the US increased its military assistance to the Salvadorian

government to help it combat a widespread guerrilla movement trying to overthrow the

government. US military assistance to EI Salvador before the October 1979 coup

included the provision of material, training, counsel and doctrine, and was decisive in

transforming the traditional system of 1961 to a security system designed explicitly for

counterins!lrgency in the 1980s.8o The army's heavier weapons recoilless rifles, .30 and

77

78

79

80

Pierre, n.74, p. 248.

Michael McClintock, The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemaln, Vol.2, (London, 1985), p. 192.

ibid.

Michael McClintock, The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador, Vol. 1, (London, 1985), p. 326.

60

.50 calibre machine-guns, mortars and rocket-launchers were US-supplied. The National

Police was reported to hold 200 M-l rifles and 2,378.38 calibre revolvers the National

Guard, 1,795 M-l carbines and 30 M-l rifles. 81 The March 1981 assistance grant

under Reagan administration provided for quantities of ammunition, weapons,

communications equipment and aircraft including 9000 M-16 rifles, 59 M-60 machine

guns, five helicopter gunships, 500-lb bombs grenade launchers, mortars and

fragmentation grenades. 82 "The amounts of US military assistance to EI Salvador

increased from practically none in 1979 to $6mill ion in 1980 to more than ten times that

amount in 1984. "83 Also, fifty military advisers were there to provide training. Around

150 CIA agents were operating in EI Salvador.

EI Salvador government's "major purchases after 1974 included aircraft from

Israel, France and Brazil. Under a 1975 contract, Israel sold EI Salvador 18 refurbished

French fighter bombers and trainers. France provided more jet trainers and riot tanks;

by 1979 Israel had sold EI Salvador 25 Arava STOL aircraft and six Fouga Magister

trainers. These and 12 Brazilian EMBRAER EMB-ll patrol aircraft, acquired in the

same period, were designed explicitly for counter-insurgency warfare. In the same period

Israel also sold at least 200 Uzi submachine-guns, the army death squads' favourite

weapon, and 200 80mm rocket launchers. The US last provision of aircraft, until 1980,

was three C-47 transports (in 1974) and the work horses of counter-insurgency warfare

from Guatemala to Vietnam, 4 Bell Uh-IH helicopters, delivered in 1976.84 Further,

"the standard weapon of the individual army soldier is the Belgium-made G-3 rifle. The

81

82

83

84

ibid, p. 328.

ibid, p. 333.

Thomas L. Brewer. American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction (New Jersey, 1986). p.232.

ibid. p. 329.

61

US M-l Grand rifle is primarily for the interior guard of installations and training. The

standard weapon of the National Police is the .38 Smith and Wesson, US made revolver,

and US M-l carbine, The standard weapon of the National Guard is the G-3 rifle and the

machete. "85

On the other hand, a massive supply by small arms was being shipped to Marxist

guerrillas in EI Salvador seeking to overthrow the government. These weapons, supplied

by the then Soviet Union, East European Countries, Vietnam, and Ethiopia, were being

shipped via Cuba to Nicaragua for delivery to EI Salvador.86 The Nicaraguan

government continues to provide support to the . guerrillas. Also, the PLO served as a

conduit for the Salvadoran opposition guerrilla forces. In 1980 Fatah transferred weapons

mostly light arms and mortars to the guerrillas. 87

The involvement of external countries in Nicaragua also caused concern. Since

the 1930s this Central American country had been ruled by the Sdmoza family. In 1978,

there were several spectacular incidents of political violence. The initiative passed from

more moderate groups to a militant opposition movement, the Sandinista National

Liberation Front, a left-oriented guerrilla organisations. And, the Somoza regime

collapsed at the hands of the Sandinista. The then Soviet Union provided the Sandinistas

with sufficient military hardware to defend Nicaragua in its war against the contra rebels

who, in turn, received support from the Reagan administration.

The US provided bases in neighbouring Honduras from which the guerrillas

launched operations. The US also supplied a wide array of weapons, supervised the

mining of Nicaraguan harbours and other command operations, and perhaps flew air

support missions. The CIA was involved in the mining of the harbours.

~s ibid, p. 328.

86 Pierre, n.74, p. 247.

87 Cline and Alexander, n.65, p. 63.

62

On the other hand, the erstwhile Soviet Union provided material and financial

support to the Sandinistas. Nicaragua's military ties with Cuba became vital to the

relationship. "Increasing military collaboration included the provision of advisors, arms

and training for Nicaraguan military personnel. n88 By December 1979, 120

Nicaraguans were receiving military training in Cuba. Upon completing their courses,

these cadres would return to Nicaragua to train and lead the militias. "In addition to in­

creasing to 700 the number of advisors serving the Nicaraguan military, in 1981 Cuba

sent arms including tanks attack helicopters, and ground to air missiles. The Sandinistas

also approached Cuba to acquire MIG fighters" ,89

"According to the US State Department, Soviet vessels brought 10,000 tons of

armaments each year, including tanks, antia'rcraft guns, armoured cars, artillery and

other ordnance ... Shipments sent between 1979 and 1982 have been valued at $125mn

by US intelligence sources. During 1983, Soviet military aid increased dramatically as

arms shipments doubled, reaching 20,000 tons for the year. "90

Further, a crucial role was played by Costa Rica which served asa safe haven

and a transit territory for the Sandinistas. Sandinista government also developed military

relationships with Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, China, North

Korea, Kampuchea, Mongolia and Albania.· In 1983 the Czechs sent several SL-39 pilot

trainers. Arms shipment also commenced when the N~caraguan army received new Czech

rifles. Also, "bolstered by Cuban-Soviet support, the Sandinistas proclaimed their revolu­

tion without boundaries and established Managua as a centre for supplying arms and

training to guerrilla organisations involved in low-intensity conflict elsewhere in Central

88

89

90

Theodore Schwab and Harold Sims, "Relations with the Communist States", in Thomas W. Walker, ed., Nicaragua: The First Five Years (New York, 1985), p. 450.

ibict.

ibid, p. 454.

63

America. "91

Superpower Intervention in Afghanistan92

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 10 later part of 1979 witnessed a

widespread diffusion of small arms to the Afghan rival factions. In response to the Soviet

intervention, the US set up arms pipeline through Pakistan to ensure the Afghan

Mujahideen rebel group acquired a sufficient firepower to counter the Soviet army.

Throughout the 1980s, a large number of arms and ammunition flowed through the

pipeline which was controlled by the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (lSI). But with

the withdrawal of the Soviet army and the end of the Afghan war, the small arms started

making inroad to various arms bazaars of South Asian region.

Thus the above studies reflect the rivalries between the East and the West during

the Cold War and the dispersal of small arms by them to the third world countries, in

order to exert influence over these countries. The small arms enhance regional

instabilities by increasing the destructive capacities of recalcitrant terrorist or rebel

organisations in the third world region. Such dispersal of small arms as a legacy of the

Cold War is· also very much true in the context of contemporary South Asia where the

superpower intervention in Afghanistan has a direct bearing on the proliferation of

sophisticated small arms.

91

92

Blank and others, n.29, p.163.

A detail description of superpower intervention in Afghanistan is given in the third chapter because dispersal of small arms by the superpowers to the warring factious iu Afghanistan has a direct bearing on small anllS proliferation in South Asia.