dissertation personal copy
TRANSCRIPT
A Resurgent Russia? An Analysis of the
Western Role and Actors in Strained East-West
Relations, 1991-2015
Ewen R Dymott
Academic Year: 2015/2016
Word Count: 14,977
Dissertation Supervisor: Dr Magnus Feldmann
A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for
the award of the degree of MSc in Development and Security in the Faculty of Social
Sciences and Law.
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Dedications
I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my grandfather, without whom I would not have
been able to finance this MSc. In addition, I would like to thank Dr Magnus Feldmann for
helping me to finalise my topic, and for answering any queries that arose promptly and
effectively. Furthermore, thanks are owed to Dr Egle Cesnulyte, Professor Timothy
Edmunds, Dr Winnie King, Dr Anna Maria Friis Kristensen, and Dr Elspeth Van Veeren for
providing me with the knowledge and skills I needed to complete this degree.
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Abstract
This dissertation will examine three questions. Is Russia resurgent? What role has the West
played in Russia’s resurgence? And which actor has been the determinant in Russia’s
resurgent policies? These questions will be answered through a thorough chronological review
of the key moments in East-West relations between the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the
end of 2015, broken down into three main chapters: Russia in the 1990s; Putin’s first terms as
president; and Russia from 2008 to 2015. Each chapter shall focus on three specific features
that define resurgence, geopolitics, economics, and defence policy, and in turn analyse the role
of the West in Russia’s resurgence and the key actors driving resurgent policies. In summary,
this dissertation argues the following: in the 1990s, the West contributed to feelings of
isolation, marginalisation, and inferiority felt within Moscow’s leadership; during Putin’s first
terms, this trend continued but Putin began to transform Russia economically, signalling the
start of Russia’s resurgence; and from 2008, Russia was able to utilise its re-acquired
economic might and diplomatic freedom to pursue assertive foreign, economic, and military
policies, indicating a fully resurgent Russia. A lack of understanding and appreciation of
Russia’s foreign policy objectives on the part of the West is a consistent feature, which helped
to create the Kremlin’s strategic aims of returning Russia to the top international stage, and
creating a multipolar world. If the West had chosen to integrate and understand Russia from
the outset, it is likely that the contemporary strain in relations could have been avoided.
Finally, throughout the period examined, the key foreign policy decision maker was the
president, but more specifically, it was Putin. From his election in 2000 until the end of 2015,
he has centralised control over foreign policy and called the shots, even whilst he was prime
minister to Medvedev between 2008 and 2012. Putin’s perspective has become Russia’s
perspective.
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Contents
1.0 Introduction Page 5
2.0 Methodology Page 9
3.0 Theoretical Perspective Page 10
4.0 Russia in the 1990s Page 13
4.1 Geopolitical Environment Page 14
4.2 Economic Situation Page 21
4.3 Military and Defence Policy Page 23
4.4 Summary Page 26
5.0 Putin’s First Terms as President Page 28
5.1 Geopolitical Environment Page 28
5.2 Economic Situation Page 32
5.3 Military and Defence Policy Page 35
5.4 Summary Page 38
6.0 Russia from 2008 to 2015 Page 40
6.1 Geopolitical Environment Page 40
6.2 Economic Situation Page 44
6.3 Military and Defence Policy Page 47
6.4 Summary Page 51
7.0 Conclusion Page 53
8.0 Acronyms Page 55
9.0 Bibliography Page 57
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Graph showing the GDP of the Russian Federation in current
US$ from 1991-1999.
Page 23
Figure 2 Graph showing the military expenditure of the Russian
Federation in rubles from 1992-1999.
Page 25
Figure 3 Graph showing the GDP of the Russian Federation in current
US$ from 2000-2008.
Page 33
Figure 4 Graph showing the military expenditure of the Russian
Federation in rubles from 2000-2008.
Page 37
Figure 5 Graph showing the military expenditure of the Russian
Federation as a percentage of total government spending
from 1997-2008.
Page 38
Figure 6 Graph showing the GDP of the Russian Federation in current
US$ from 2008-2015.
Page 47
Figure 7 Graph showing the military expenditure of the Russian
Federation in rubles from 2008-2015.
Page 49
Figure 8 Graph showing the military expenditure of the Russian
Federation as a percentage of total government spending
from 2008-2014.
Page 50
Figure 9 Graph showing the military expenditure of the Russian
Federation as a percentage of GDP from 2008-2013.
Page 51
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1.0 Introduction
The foundations of the Russian Federation were laid during the 15th and 16th centuries by Ivan
III and his son Vassili. Between them, they fought off the Mongols, and gathered the medieval
principalities of Pskov, Smolensk, and Ryzan, to create a centralised ethnic Russian state
(Trenin, 2009). With the additions of Kazan and Astrakhan by Ivan IV, Russia became a multi-
ethnic empire, and just 70 years after the death of Ivan IV, Russia had expanded to include
Siberia, and as far east as the Pacific (Trenin, 2009). These 17th Century borders are remarkably
similar to those of post-Cold War Russia. However, they have not remained static over the past
four centuries. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia has contested ownership of
Finland, the Baltic States, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Poland, the Balkans, Mongolia, and
Manchuria with other great powers in Europe and Asia (Trenin, 2009). It is clear therefore that,
historically, Russia has been a major geopolitical actor with significant global influence. The
height of Russia’s power came during its Soviet period following World War Two. The Russian
Empire, then named the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), became engaged in an
ideological conflict with the West, namely the US and the EU, which was aligned militarily
under the banner of NATO. This battle of communism vs capitalism, brought the world to the
brink of what could have been a truly devastating nuclear war until, on the 25th December 1991,
the USSR was disbanded, and the Cold War was ended.
From this rather broad and over-simplified account of Russian nationhood, one key point stands
clear: throughout history Russia has been a major world power competing for geopolitical
influence amongst rival empires, often those originating in the West. It is a long held belief
amongst the Russian people that their country is to be respected, and listened to at the very
least. However, during most of the 20th Century, Russia was “disqualified from full social
acceptance” (Goffman, 1963: 1). This was partly due to the classification of Russia as an
‘enemy’ during the Cold War, and a ‘loser’ in the aftermath, by a geopolitical system
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dominated by the ideology and values of the West. The Russian viewpoint on the end of the
Cold War is that the USSR chose to dissolve the empire following a groundswell of the Russian
populace that created opportunities for regional separatism (Trenin, 2009). Conversely, the end
of the Cold War was portrayed as a triumph of the West over the USSR by the ‘victorious’
NATO and EU countries (Baker, 2002). Needless to say, the Russian Federation has very little
in common with its Soviet predecessor – it is not autocratic, nor is it communist, but most
importantly for this dissertation, contemporary Russian foreign policy is not the same as was
practised in its communist and imperialist past. During the Cold War, one of the main foreign
policy priorities of the USSR was to facilitate the international growth of communism, whilst
post-Soviet Russia’s primary foreign policy objective is to re-establish Russia’s historic
identity as a great power that exerts global influence and commands international respect within
a new multi-polar world, as evidenced by Boris Yeltsin’s press secretary’s statement in January
1994: “the role played by the great powers in the world will steadily grow … the world needs
a strong new order, and Russia will play the role of a great power in it” (SWB, 1994). Russia’s
identity has been tarnished by its reputation as the defeated party of the Cold War (Trenin,
2007). In post-Soviet Russia, the guiding foreign policy principle revolves around national
interest, not political ideology, and it could be argued that Russia is one of the most pragmatic
and least ideological countries in the world (Trenin 2007).
In 1990, Manfred Wӧrner became the first NATO Secretary General to visit Moscow. His
presence in the Russian capital was designed to symbolise a turning point in East-West
relations: “the time for confrontation is over. The hostility and mistrust of the past must be
buried. We (NATO) see your country, and other countries of the former Warsaw Treaty
Organisation (USSR), no longer as adversaries but as partners” (NATO, 1990). Yet, just
twenty-five years later, the NATO Deputy Secretary General, Alexander Vershbow, said “the
choices made by Moscow have taken our relations with Russia to their lowest point in decades.
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We are not back to the Cold War, but we are far from a strategic partnership” (Vershbow,
2015). The question then is how and why, after such promising words in the early 1990s, have
Russia’s relations with Western countries and its near neighbours deteriorated to such an extent
that a senior NATO official has to reassure the world that a new Cold War is not around the
corner? In the last eight years Russia has invaded both Georgia and Ukraine, and annexed
Crimea. By March 2015, reports suggested that there were 12,000 Russian troops operating in
Ukraine, and in June 2015, plans for NATO to deploy 40,000 troops near the Russian border
in Eastern Europe were being discussed (Urban, 2015; Mukhopadhyay, 2015). Recent actions
have contributed to the tense atmosphere between Russia, its nearest neighbours, Europe, and
America, that the international community was so keen to avoid. Indeed, East-West relations
have never been so strained in contemporary history (Trenin, 2009a). Western media often
reports that these actions are indicative of a Russian resurgence (Adelman, 2015; Stratfor,
2016).
This dissertation will focus on three specific questions: Is Russia resurgent? What role has the
West played in causing this resurgence? And how have resurgent policies been decided upon?
For the purposes of this dissertation, resurgence will be defined as an increase in internationally
assertive political, economic, and military action after a period of relative quiet. The structure
of this dissertation will be centred around a three-chapter chronological exploration of Russian
foreign policy ranging from the end of the USSR in 1991 through to December 2015, with each
chapter focusing on the geopolitical environment, the Russian economic situation, and the
Russian military in order to compare policy against preceding years. In the 1990s, under Boris
Yeltsin, the foundations for Russian resurgence were lain (chapter 4); during Putin’s first terms
as president he oversaw an increasing capability to enact resurgence (chapter 5); and from
2008-2015 Russian resurgence can be observed (chapter 6). In turn this will provide a complete
picture and comparison of each of the defined requirements for resurgence throughout
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contemporary Russian history, leading to the conclusion that present day Russia can be defined
as resurgent due to the increase in the levels of assertive foreign and economic policy since
1991 and the near constant rise in Russian military expenditure (SIPRI, 2015). The second
question to be answered is arguably the most important for the international community: What
role has the West played in Russia’s resurgence? This dissertation will argue that a lack of
understanding, and a failure to accommodate the Russian desire to regain its great power
identity on the part of the West, namely NATO and the EU, is the predominant reason for
Russian resurgence. Had the West chosen to integrate, rather than isolate Russia, the chances
of an assertive and aggressive Russian resurgence would have been greatly reduced. By
analysing three distinct periods in Russian foreign policy, it can be seen that Western oversight
is a long running theme in East-West relations, and was present right from the start of the post-
Cold War era. It is important to note that Moscow’s desire to re-obtain a great power identity
can explain the aims of a resurgent policy, but it does not explain why a resurgent policy is
deemed necessary. The final question will explore the actors involved in Russia’s resurgent
policies in an attempt to understand foreign policy decision making in terms of the
agency/structure debate. This shall also be analysed within the three chronological chapters
(4,5 and 6) to establish whether there has been continuity or change in Russian foreign policy
decision making since 1991. Ultimately, this dissertation will conclude that the most significant
actor in the Russian foreign policy decision making process is the Russian president, although
this has not been constant since the fall of the USSR. A conclusion of the arguments in this
dissertation will be presented in chapter 7.
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2.0 Methodology
The primary method of researching this dissertation involved conducting a thorough review of
the existing literature covering Russia foreign policy, including journal articles, books, news
articles, and speeches. This form of research comes with certain advantages in that it allows
one to draw upon a variety of peer-reviewed academic work covering a plethora of differing
perspectives, and enables the gathering of a large amount of respected opinions, and quotes
from influential actors. However, it is worth noting that bias can be prevalent throughout
scholarly work and other published literature, especially in speeches and news articles.
Therefore, a reflexive attitude and consideration of the author’s motives was essential when
analysing sources. In addition to the empirical research conducted from news articles and
speeches, this dissertation also includes the presentation of publically available data in graph
form. This method of research is useful for representing complex data in an easily identifiable
form. Moreover, generally speaking, data does not come attached with similar levels of bias
that can be present in published work.
Conversely, this dissertation does not include any research from primary sources. The use of
secondary data in the form of news articles, speeches, and publically available data is, in some
sense, a disadvantage because I had no control over which questions were asked to whom.
Therefore, I could not influence the answers given or data collected. This can increase the
amount of bias present in the source material used for this dissertation.
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3.0 Theoretical Perspective
There are a number of theoretical perspectives that the questions raised in this dissertation
could be viewed from. However, in order to address the question of which actor has the most
influence over Russian resurgence, foreign policy analysis is the most appropriate.
Foreign policy analysis is a unique discipline in that it aims to bridge the gap between
international relations theory and policy making through attempting to understand the
processes by which an actor makes policy choices (Garrison, 2003; Kaarbo, 2003; Foyle,
2003). As with most theories in international relations, there are many different levels to
foreign policy analysis, each combining to shape foreign policy as a whole (Garrison, 2003).
In other words, there is no singular factor that controls output, in fact foreign policy is a
convergence of individual, structural, cultural, and societal factors with neither one more
influential than another. It is often the domestic political system that that empowers certain
factors over others.
To simplify this somewhat, one can say that foreign policy analysis is centred around the
agency-structure debate. That is, do individuals (agency) or collectives (structure) most affect
foreign policy output? Within this debate, arguments can be broken down further. Those that
prefer agency over structure face the epistemological question of whether individuals act
objectively (using rational choice theory) or subjectively (individual choice theory) (Carlsnaes,
1992). In both examples, it is implied that the individual is the source of social order, and the
actor that has the most control and influence over foreign policy: “all social phenomena, and
especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting
from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc. of human individuals”, (Popper, 1966: 98). In
practice, the choice of epistemology for scholars that prefer agency over structure, can
drastically affect policy outcomes. If one assumes that foreign policy is controlled mostly by
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individuals that act rationally, then it can be expected that all individual actors will chose the
same foreign policy decisions when faced by the same problems, regardless of cultural,
societal, or ideological backgrounds. For example, when faced with the decision to launch a
retaliatory nuclear strike, scholars that subscribe to the objective individual agency argument
will suggest that all leaders will opt in favour of a retaliatory nuclear strike, because it is the
‘rational’ option. This line of thinking is useful when attempting to understand strategic
decisions that could be taken in certain situations. However, human nature is rarely this neat.
Rationality can be subjective, that is to say, one leader may in fact deem the launching of a
retaliatory nuclear strike to be irrational based on that particular leader’s ideological or even
cultural beliefs. The subjective approach is the more mainstream school of thought in foreign
policy analysis, although it also suffers problems when it comes to practical application
(Carlsnaes, 1992). Whilst it certainly seems more appropriate to conceive of individual actors
that take decisions based upon their own subjective preferences, this approach can limit the
effectiveness of foreign policy analysis as a tool for predicting policy. It would be impossible
to build a complete picture of a leader’s individual values and beliefs, and, without full
consideration of all variables, it is hard to understand why a certain foreign policy was actioned,
or the way in which a leader might act in the future.
The other side of the agency-structure debate consists of scholars that believe in the power of
the collective. This position postulates that individual action is a function of social order
(Carlsnaes, 1992). In other words, collective values and interests determine individual
behaviour, and people are what society has made them. For example, all citizens of the United
States would be expected to choose policy options that satisfy every other citizen, because they
each, in theory, share a common set of values as dictated by being part of the same society. In
practice however, it is obvious that this argument does not hold up. The process of socialisation
is not universal. Not all citizens of the same country subscribe to the same beliefs and values,
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as is plainly evident by the presence of multiple political parties within democratic countries.
Treating actors as a homogenous collective ignores the nuances of individual preferences
which can drastically change the nature of the international system.
The agency-structure debate cuts right to the heart of the question of who is in control of
Russia’s resurgent policies. Across the time periods covered in this research, it can be argued
that the most significant determinant on foreign policy is the individual, rather than the
collective. Although this question will be explored further in the subsequent chapters, this
dissertation will argue that subjective agency is the most applicable means of analysing Russian
foreign policy due to the significant power of the Russian president in decision making, even
if the relative power and the subjective foreign policy aims of the leader have not remained
constant.
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4.0 Russia in the 1990s
December 1991 represented a seismic shift within Russia, and over the following nine years
the Russian Federation had to adjust to a significant loss of power – both internationally and
economically – and come to terms with the break-up of the USSR. These events triggered a
change in the attitudes of the Russian elite towards foreign policy, and opened up a period that
can be characterised by an identity crisis – was Russia still seen as a great power, could the
West be seen as an inclusive partner, and how does Russia perceive the international
environment? With the loss of the Soviet Union, questions around Russia’s new role in the
international system had to be answered although not only by Russia. Following the Cold War,
the US and the EU member states became the most dominant international actors with their
shared ideals and values infiltrating the international system to a greater extent than ever before.
Russia, under President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) faced a challenging and, in many ways,
defining period of Russian history.
Following the Cold War, Russia suffered both politically and economically, and so it cannot
be argued that Russian resurgence began during the 1990s, although Western attitudes and
actions towards Russia created feelings of isolation and inferiority that would, in later years,
drive resurgent policies. Throughout this period Russia was run by President Yeltsin, but,
unlike subsequent decades, he shared a great deal of foreign policy decision making with his
foreign ministers Andrei Kozyrev (1990-1996) and Yevgenny Primakov (1996-1998), who had
very different views on Russia’s role in the international system (Rahr, 1992; Petro &
Rubinstein, 1997; Khrushcheva & Hancox, 2006). For the first time in the nation’s long history,
Russian society could no longer be described as ‘totalitarian’ or ‘autocratic’ (Tsygankov &
Tsygankov, 2004).
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4.1 Geopolitical Environment
The initial stance in post-Soviet Russia, as favoured by then foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev,
with regards to its undefined international role was to seek a close relationship with the US and
the EU, and undergo the process of westernisation – characterised by closer integration with
Western countries, involving improved political ties and adopting a more Western outlook and
value system (Smith, 1997a; Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2004). Yeltsin envisaged a ‘grand
partnership’ in 1991 seeking to build a post-Cold War international system with the West, and
in return for Russia’s westernisation, he expected recognition for transforming Russia into a
democracy, ending the Cold War, and recognising the independence of the former USSR
satellites in Eastern Europe (Smith, 1997a; Trenin, 2009). In suggesting and seeking a
partnership with the West, Yeltsin was effectively offering Russian co-operation and support
to the very countries it had been at ‘war’ with for the last few decades. This change in Russia’s
outlook could have been a real turning point in East-West relations, opening up the possibility
for greater collaboration and understanding between Russia and its potential Western partners
and helping to heal the wounds created during the Cold War. Unfortunately, Yeltsin’s offer
towards the West was received in rather different light than it was intended. Whilst Russia
believed that it should be praised for ending the Cold War after the Russian people and elites
toppled the communist regime, the West, and particularly the US under President George Bush,
saw the Russian concessions as little more than a starting point in repairing the damage caused
by the Soviets, and thus deserved no special measures in return (Trenin, 2009). Furthermore,
due to the decline of the Russian economy and military in the wake of the end of the Cold War,
America did not believe that they could partner with Russia on an equal basis (Smith, 1997a).
Kozyrev’s and Yeltsin’s idea of a meaningful alliance with the West was scuppered. This
pointed to a fundamental difference in perspective: the West viewed Russia as a defeated party
of the Cold War that was required to grant reparations in the form of political reform, whilst
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Russia, on the other hand, did not believe that communism was defeated, but rather ‘kicked
out’ by an unhappy population. The Western perspective did not sit well with Russia’s identity
as a great power – an alliance with Russia was something to be desired, not spurned. The
Western political elite failed to grasp the fact that a former adversary’s continued economic
and political weakness can instigate revanchist tendencies and create a desire for greater
strength (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). Right from the start of the post-Soviet era, a fundamental
misunderstanding was evident and the seeds of Russian inferiority and isolation were sown.
The rejection by the West began to create feelings in Russia that it needed to be more assertive
to be taken seriously on the international stage. It is worth noting however, that not everyone
in Russia was happy with Yeltsin and Kozyrev’s ambitions. The success of the Liberal
Democratic and Communist parties in the 1996 parliamentary elections was evidence of
opposition to Western integration, and, to many observers, westernisation was seen as a
symptom of a lack of strategy rather than a viable strategy in itself (Mankoff, 2007). To further
compound the problem, Russia’s informal bid to join NATO, included in the offering of an
alliance with the West, was rejected outright (Trenin, 2009). This built upon a feeling that
Russia would not be accepted into the Western fold, but instead managed by it. Russia was to
be classified as something other than Western, a trend that continued from 1991.
Throughout 1992 and 1993, Moscow hosted heated internal debates around Russia’s national
interest (Trenin, 2009). The lack of clarity around post-Soviet aims and objectives was
demonstrated nicely by Kozyrev during an exchange with the former US president Richard
Nixon in which Kozyrev said, “if you … can advise us on how to define our national interest,
I will be very grateful to you” (Simes, 1998). During these discussions, close relations with the
West continued to feature prominently however the decision was made that Russia should
instead focus on the newly independent, former Soviet states – otherwise known as the ‘near
abroad’ (Trenin, 2009). In December 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
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was established, consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. In
1992, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan joined, in 1993 Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Georgia
followed suit, and in 1994 Moldova also joined the CIS (Trenin, 2009). By April 1994, all
countries had ratified the Creation Agreement with the exception of Turkmenistan and Ukraine,
which became an Associate in 1993. The only former Soviet countries that weren’t included in
the CIS were Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The concept of membership of the CIS was
formalised in the CIS Charter in January 1993 to contain nine members, and proved to be a
smooth mechanism of transition from empire to individual statehood, although the model was
only half-heartedly accepted by the former Soviet states (International Legal Materials, 1995;
Trenin, 2009; Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). Ultimately, the promise of cheap gas prices that
came with the formation of the CIS, proved hard to reject (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016).
Although considered imperialistic by some in the West, Russia became the newly independent
republics’ main donor, and pursued policies of integration as outlined in the decree entitled the
‘Strategic course of Russia with participant states of the Commonwealth of Independent States’
(Smith, 1997; Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016; Diplomatic Herald, 1995). Issued in September 1995,
the decree outlined the main goals of Russian foreign policy towards the CIS to be to create a
political and economic union able to play a role in the international system, and to strengthen
Russia’s position as a leading political and economic force in the former Soviet territories
(Smith, 1997). This clarifies that CIS integration was a key component of Russia’s foreign
policy and was reiterated when Yevgenny Primakov became Russian foreign minister in 1996
(Gornostayev & Karpov, 1996). Russia’s dominance and ‘neo-imperialism’ in its
neighbourhood meant it had become the target of many CIS member states’ suspicions and
problems which lead to the creation of the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova) coalition in 1997 in an attempt to counter balance Russian influence
(Kosolapov, 2001; Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). The underlying implication of Russia’s turn
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towards the CIS is that, from very early on in the 1990s, Russia established its ‘sphere of
interest’, an area in which Moscow expected to be able to exert significant influence free from
the political ambitions of the West. The relevance of this will become clearer in subsequent
chapters, but put simply, any attempts by Western institutions to limit Russian influence would
be seen as an attempt to further weaken Russia and hinder its ambitions to create a multi-polar
world.
Throughout the 1990s, the attention of NATO, the USA and the EU was focused primarily on
the former communist states in Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic States, and so
allowed Russia to pursue, what they saw as, heavy-handed non-Western policies in the CIS
(Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). The fundamental reason for this was that the West saw Moscow’s
recognition of the former Soviet republic’s sovereignty as a guarantee that a new Soviet Union
would not be established. In fact, the desire for a permanent end to the USSR was placed at the
centre of NATO and EU regional strategies, but had the knock on effect of creating fear
amongst Russia’s political elite that the West would attempt to force Moscow’s influence from
its areas of interest (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). In 1999, NATO dealt a major setback to
Russian ambitions to be seen as a great power. In March, following years of conflict and after
over 300,00 people had been forced to flee their homes, NATO embarked on a 72-day bombing
campaign over the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo (Trenin, 2009; NATO, 2016). The
implications for Russia were clear. Kosovo told the Russian leadership that democracies could
chose to wage war against a former Soviet state on the basis of, what they viewed as, political
ambition disguised by human rights rhetoric (Trenin, 2009). This was catastrophic for East-
West relations because it signalled that NATO was willing to launch military action against the
will of Russia without any direct threat to its territorial integrity, and without the UN Security
Council. This increased Russia’s sense of vulnerability, particularly when considering the fact
that Russia was undergoing a period of domestic upheaval and weakness (Cross, 2015;
18
Zimmerman, 2002; Hopf, 2002). By the end of 1999, 77% of Russians either agreed or totally
agreed with the statement “there is nothing stopping NATO from getting involved in Russia as
it did in Yugoslavia” (Russian Election Watch, 1999: 3). Furthermore, Russian wishes for
NATO not to launch an air campaign in Kosovo were largely ignored by the West which left
the perception in Moscow that their concerns would not be taken seriously on the international
stage (Cross, 2015). As Dmitri Trenin so adequately puts it “Russia, for the first time in 250
years, had ceased to be a power in Europe” (Trenin, 2009: 9). The reduced significance of
Russia in the international system was simply untenable for Moscow’s foreign policy
community (Cross, 2015). NATO’s actions in 1999 set a dangerous precedent because it
became clear to Russia that despite territorial integrity and non-interference being cornerstones
of international law, these principles did not apply to regions that the West deemed in need of
reform (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). When it came to a rival state, priority was not given to the
established government, but to the rights of minorities and humanitarian action (Arbatov,
2014). Furthermore, Kosovo signalled to the Russian elite that unipolarity was alive and well
– Russia needed to do more to establish a multi-polar world and get its voice heard. The
unilateral actions of NATO, and its failure to consider how these actions would be perceived
by Russia, significantly contributed to the idea in Moscow that Russia needed resurgence to re-
establish its historic position as an influential global power.
When the air campaign of 1999 was concluded, NATO had already swelled its ranks with the
addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as member states (NATO, 2016a).
During Kozyrev’s period in office, Yeltsin expressed little concern over NATO expansionism,
but this prompted considerable criticism from the political class and military establishment –
mostly because NATO had refused a Russian fast-track accession, and they were unwilling to
see former Soviet territory turned into, as they perceived it to be, an advanced position against
post-Soviet Russia (Trenin, 2009). The Kremlin had argued strongly against any NATO
19
expansion that did not include Russia since 1992, but Russia was not left completely out of the
loop. In 1994 the ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PfP) became NATO policy, and was offered to all
the former Soviet and neutral European states, including Russia (Smith, 1997a). The purpose
of this policy was to encourage closer military and political co-operation with NATO, develop
Western concepts of civil-military relations, calm fears in Moscow surrounding NATO
expansion, and signal to the former Soviet states that NATO remained aware of their security
concerns (Smith, 1997a). Russia joined in June amidst concern from the Russian political class
that PfP would simply accelerate NATO widening, bring the Russian military-industrial
complex under NATO control, and eventually facilitate membership for the former USSR
member states, but it was granted a special relationship on the basis of it being the only nuclear
weapon state, and possessing the most advanced military (Smith, 1997). After the publication
in September 1995 of a NATO study on enlargement that confirmed Russia’s fear that NATO
widening was a desired outcome, Anatoly Chubays (the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia)
warned that enlargement would be the greatest mistake in 50 years, and would force Russia to
revise its political, military, and economic relationship with the West (Gornostayev, 1997;
Kennan, 1997). In an attempt to further ameliorate Russia’s concerns, the ‘Founding Act of
Basic Relations between NATO and the Russian Federation’ was signed in May 1997 (Smith,
1997a). The Founding Act intended to institutionalise cooperation and consultation in East-
West relations through the creation of a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) (Smith, 1997a). The
PJC was to serve as a means for NATO and Russia to communicate directly during times of
crisis, inform each other of their strategic policies, and develop joint decisions on a case-by-
case basis (Smith, 1997a; NATO, 2009). Rather than inviting Russia to NATO meetings,
NATO members discussed issues amongst themselves and then presented their united position
to Russia (Smith, 2002). A crucial part of the Founding Act agreement was that NATO agreed
not to deploy or base nuclear and military forces in Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic
20
(Smith, 1997a; NATO, 2009). Whilst the PJC and PfP calmed some of the Kremlin’s security
concerns in the event of the 1999 NATO enlargement (even though many Russian politicians
feared NATO involvement in Chechnya (Lynch, 2016)), expansion continued to demonstrate
that NATO preferred security against Russia rather than with Russia – after all, George H.W
Bush and Margaret Thatcher has assured Gorbachev that NATO would not advance “one inch
forward” (Kramer, 2009). In addition, NATO expansion eroded a geographical ‘buffer’
between Russia and the West, which further reinforced the idea in Moscow that Russia was
seen as the loser in the Cold War (Trenin, 2009). Thus, the NATO action in Kosovo and its
policy of enlargement, contributed to a sense of Russian isolation, marginalisation, and
inferiority which, as Moscow believed, could only be addressed by a more aggressive and
resurgent foreign policy.
Throughout this decade, Russia was ruled by President Boris Yeltsin. However, his foreign
policy was not consistent, and a clear division between desires for westernisation and
nationalism can be drawn at the point in which Primakov took over from Kozyrev to become
the Russian foreign minister in 1996. This suggests that rather than the Russian president being
the most influential actor in foreign policy decision making, it was in fact the Russian foreign
minister. Naturally, the Russian Duma and played an important role, but so too did the Russian
oligarchs. The business elite has had considerable influence over Russian policy since 1991,
although the height of their power came during the 1996 presidential election, during which
their public backing of Yeltsin helped to ensure his return to office (Smith, 2003). It is possible
then, that Yeltsin and Primakov partly adapted their foreign policy to suit business interests,
however this does not detract from the fact that foreign policy was devised mostly by the
foreign minister (Mankoff, 2007). The relative inconsistency in Russia’s foreign policy
throughout the 1990s is one of the main reasons why Russia cannot be considered resurgent.
Without a guiding strategy, and following the political upheaval that was the end of the Cold
21
War, Russia needed time to reorganise itself and reconsider its place in the world – Moscow
simply didn’t have the knowledge of its own priorities, or the resources needed to enact
resurgence.
4.2 Economic Situation
Aside from the political turmoil in Russia, its reduced economic power was another reason why
Russia cannot be considered resurgent in the 1990s. With the establishment of the CIS it was
decided that all the debt accrued by the USSR, somewhere between $45bn and $60bn, would
be inherited by Russia (Trenin, 2009; Conway, 2006; Pravda, 2006). For obvious reasons, such
significant debt limited Russia’s ability to enact resurgence. The Kremlin could not finance
aggressive foreign policy nor could it afford military modernisation. In order to try and boost
Russia’s economic prospects, the political elite turned to the CIS. In 1993, nine CIS members
signed the ‘Treaty of Economic Union’, and in 1994 they created a ‘Commission of Economic
Union’ (known as the MEK), and decided to reduce customs duties to advance the cause of a
free trade and customs area (Smith, 1997). Unfortunately for the Russian economy, trade with
the former Soviet Union declined following the Cold War: in 1988 Russia exported $51bn to
the CIS and imported $74.2bn, but by 1995, these figures were just $30bn and $16.5bn
respectively (Smith, 1997). In 1996, Aman Tuleyev (1996) stated that in 1995, Russia’s GDP
was just 62.2% of GDP in 1990 (in 1985 Russia had the 6th largest GDP in the world but in
1995 it was just 14th highest (San’ko, 1997)), and attributed this decline to a disruption of trade
ties with the former USSR. Although trade between the CIS increased in 1996, this did little to
solve Russia’s economic problems (Serov, 1997). To put things into perspective, the USA’s
GDP in 1995 was $6.95 trillion and Russia’s was just $344.71 billion (World Bank, 1997).
Aside from the CIS, Russia had an important trade partner in the EU. In 1995, the EU’s share
of Russian trade was 35%, however Russia’s only represented 3.5% of the EU’s total trade,
22
highlighting the massive differences in terms of trade between Russia and the closest economic
power (Borko, 1997).
In 1998, Russia suffered a serious financial crisis. On August 13th the Russian stock, currency,
and bond markets collapsed amid fears of devaluation of the ruble and a default on the debt
owed from the days of the USSR (Van de Wiel, 2013). During the same year the Russian
economy shrank by 5.3% and GDP per capita was at its lowest point since 1991 (Pinto &
Ulatov, 2010). The effect of this crisis on GDP can be seen in figure 1. By this time Russia had
firmly shifted its foreign policy towards the CIS, but the financial crisis demonstrated that
Russia had no economic power to support its foreign policy objectives there – further evidence
that Russia cannot be described as resurgent during the 1990s (Trenin, 2009). However, 1998
did bring some good news with regards to Russia achieving great power status. It was admitted
to the G8, the IMF, and the World Bank and applied to join the World Trade Organisation
(Smith, 1997a).
Despite Russia’s inclusion within some Western financial institutions (which undoubtedly
helped to alleviate feelings of isolation within Russia), the West made a fundamental error,
from a Russian perspective, in the spread of Western oil companies into the Caspian Sea – an
area in which Russia enjoyed a monopoly on oil and gas transit (Trenin, 2009). Furthermore,
the US offered official support to the creation of multiple oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian
that would bypass Russia (Trenin, 2009). Energy exports were, and still are, vital to the Russian
economy (between 1995 and 1999, Russia exported between $10.3bn and $15.6bn of oil
annually, and between $10.8bn and $16.4bn, annually of natural gas (Bush, 2002)) and the fact
that pipelines from the Caspian and beyond passed through Russia was a source of great
leverage. This attempted removal of Russian power whilst it faced economic difficulty
exacerbated the notion that the West was seeking to limit Russian influence, and the fact that
Western companies were now operating on Russia’s border was a source of insecurity in the
23
Kremlin. Western actions expanded East-West tensions to include economics, as well as
politics (Trenin, 2009). With this in mind, it is clear why Russia sought more aggressive energy
and economic policies in the subsequent years – a defining characteristic of resurgence.
4.3 Military & Defence Policy
Towards the end of the Cold War, the Russian armed forces numbered 3 million and was one
of the most feared in the world (Barany, 2008; Global Security, 2015). Russia inherited a great
deal of military hardware left over from the days of the USSR, some of which included: 635
ICBMs, 22,800 main battle tanks, 30,000 artillery pieces, 14 strategic and 37 tactical
submarines, 600 bombers, 7,800 operational nuclear warheads, and 900 fighter jets (IISS,
2004). Clearly Russia was not in need of new armaments. Conversely, Yeltsin ordered drastic
reductions in military manpower and the rapid withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in
Eastern and Central Europe, and the former Soviet Republics (Barany, 2008). With reductions
in the size of the Russian military and no real plans for military modernisation, Russia in the
1990s cannot be considered resurgent.
Figure 1: Graph showing Russia’s GDP from 1991 – 1999 (World Bank, 2016). It demonstrates Russia’s
economic problems following the Cold War, and highlights the effect of the 1998 financial crisis.
$0
$100,000,000,000
$200,000,000,000
$300,000,000,000
$400,000,000,000
$500,000,000,000
$600,000,000,000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GD
P (
US$
)
YEAR
GDP of the Russian Federation in Current US$, 1991-1999
24
In line with Russia’s foreign and economic policies of this decade, Moscow turned to the CIS
to improve Russian security. A CIS collective security agreement (CSTO) was signed in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan in May 1992 with the intention of creating a military counterweight to
NATO on Russia’s borders, and deepen military integration (Smith, 1997). The concept ran
into difficulties for several reasons: the break-up of Soviet forces made the prospect of
integration and synchronisation more difficult, Russian military leaders were resistant to
military reform, and the CIS members adopted differing geo-political interests with only
Belarus supporting Russia’s anti-NATO expansion position (Smith 1997). Nevertheless,
Russia did manage to stabilise the CIS through the deployment of troops in Transdniester,
Tajikistan, Armenia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). The Russian
notion of collective security within the CIS demonstrates the importance of the ‘near abroad’
to post-Soviet policy. Russia made it very plain that it saw the CIS as its territory, as evidenced
by the presence of Russian border forces on the external borders of the several CIS countries.
This sense of responsibility, felt within the Kremlin towards the CIS, indicates that Russia still
believed in the notion of a strong Ethnic-Russian buffer against the West. The implications of
this will be discussed in later chapters but the main point is that Russia felt it needed influence
in the CIS to provide a sense of security from NATO.
In 1994, Russian armed forces entered Chechnya to try and prevent the region separating from
the Russian Federation, but partly as a result of the financial crisis, by 1998 Russian tanks were
low on fuel, vital aircraft were missing parts, and ships were rusting in their docks (Mirovalev,
2014; Global Security, 2015). Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s total military expenditure rose
from 0.9 billion in 1992 to 159 billion in 1999 (figure 2) (SIPRI, 2015a). Most interestingly,
there is a constant rise in total military expenditure since the early 1990s when Russia was
turned away from an alliance with the West until the financial crisis hit in 1998, and a sharp
rise following the crisis – the same time as NATO expansion (SIPRI, 2015a). Whilst the data
25
implies a Russian resurgence, it is worth noting that 159 billion rubles equates to roughly
$6.4bn (SIPRI, 2015b). To put this in perspective, US military expenditure at that time was
$281bn (SIPRI, 2015b). Therefore, the increase in Russian military spending would have had
little practical effect. The correlation between increases in military spending and the Western
actions of denying an alliance with Russia and stating NATO’s expansion policy, strongly
indicates that it was Western actions that were responsible for the early signs of resurgence.
In 1993, Presidents Yeltsin and Bush signed START-2 (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty),
which aimed to reduce the number of Russian and US strategic warheads down to a maximum
of 3,500 each by January 2007 – roughly one third of the size of their arsenals before START-
1 was signed in 1991 (Smith, 1997a). The treaty was extremely successful: in September 1990
the USA had 12,718 strategic warheads compared to 10,779 owned by Russia, but after
START-2 these numbers had reduced to 3,500 and 3,296 respectively (Kile et al., 1997).
However, the picture was more complicated than it appeared on the surface. The treaty banned
ICBM MIRV systems which were the bulk of Russia’s strategic forces, but only a small section
Figure 2: Graph showing the increase in Russian Military expenditure from 1992-1999 (SIPRI, 2015a).
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
MIL
ITA
RY
EXP
END
ITU
RE
(BIL
LIO
N R
UB
LES)
YEAR
Military Expenditure of the Russian Federation in Rubles, 1992-1999
26
of the USA’s forces, which meant that Russia would need to invest in a large number of single
warhead ICBMs to compensate for its strategic losses – something that was economically
impossible at the time (Smith, 1997a). For this reason, START-2 received a hostile reception
within the Duma, which believed that it would put Russia in a position of weakness (Kile et
al., 1997). Whilst the MIRV ban might have been clever politics from an American perspective,
in Russia it was seen as further evidence of Western attempts to undermine Russia’s great
power status, and weaken their strategic capability. Once again, Western political actions
created insecurity and a feeling of inferiority within Moscow, which contributed to a desire to
pursue a more aggressive foreign, economic, and military policy in later years.
4.4 Summary
The rejection of Russia’s proposed westernisation by the US pushed Moscow away from a
more co-operative phase in its foreign policy and returned East-West relations to dynamics of
mistrust and suspicion. Russia was left feeling marginalised and under the impression that, if
its foreign policy objective of being seen as a great power within a multipolar world was to be
achieved, Moscow would have to do so through assertive policies. NATO expansion and its
actions in Kosovo went directly against assurances given during the Cold War and gave the
Kremlin reason to believe NATO had transformed into an aggressive alliance aiming to limit
Russia’s influence globally and in its neighbourhood, and that it was an organisation Russia
needed to counter-balance in the form of the CIS. The military expenditure data highlights the
anxiety felt in the Kremlin. The infiltration of Western oil companies into the Caspian Sea
during the financial crisis of 1998 reduced Russian power and increased their vulnerability.
Little consideration was given towards how these actions would be perceived in Russia which
further deepened the suspicion between Russia and the West. An aggressive, national interest
27
focused and resurgent economic policy was required to protect Russian interests – Moscow did
not feel it could rely on the West to look after them. Furthermore, START-2 limited Russia’s
strategic capabilities more than it did the USA’s, and was seen as further evidence of a Western
plot to diminish Russian power. From a holistic view of the actions taken in the 1990s, it is
evident that the foundations for a Russian resurgence were lain, even if Russia lacked the
political direction and economic resources to enact assertive policies. Yeltsin and his foreign
ministers were instrumental to Russian foreign policy during this period, although the change
in attitude following the appointment of Primakov to foreign minister indicates that foreign
policy was driven more by the subjective agency of the foreign minister than the president.
28
5.0 Putin’s First Terms as President
Vladimir Putin’s first terms as president (2000 – 2008) were, in many ways, a continuation of
the principles laid out towards the end of Yeltsin’s time in office. Putin continued to focus on
Russian national interest and returning Russia to the top table, but he was more pragmatic in
his approach and as a result, gained real freedom on the international stage (Gomart, 2006).
However, similarly to Yeltsin, Putin did flirt with the West following the 9/11 attacks in the
USA. Putin himself cites his three main achievements are strengthening the Russian state,
paying off foreign debts whilst enabling economic growth, and restoring Russia’s international
status (Putin, 2006). Russia’s economic growth under Putin allowed Russia to begin to pursue
resurgent policies, and prepare for more assertive action – again the West played a decisive
role in Putin’s desire to do so. Furthermore, there was a general trend of centralisation of
political power, particularly within the foreign policy realm, that consolidated the power
around the office of the president. This suggests that Putin became the most influential foreign
policy actor during the early 2000s.
5.1 Geopolitical Environment
Putin started his reign by adopting the Foreign Policy Concept devised under Yeltsin which
stated that “a unipolar world structure dominated by the United States” was one of the major
threats to Russian national interest, and that Russia’s first priority was “ensuring reliable
security of the country and preserving and strengthening its sovereignty and territorial integrity
and its strong and authoritative position in the world community” – indicating that Putin
sympathised with Primakov’s mistrust of the West and wished to continue a Eurasianist foreign
policy based on the re-establishment of Russia as a great power (Ivanov, 2002). However, in
the early 2000s, Putin showed little evidence of this. Whilst Yeltsin initially sought to integrate
29
into the West, Putin appeared to want to work alongside it (Trenin, 2009). Following the 9/11
attacks in the US, Putin and his inner circle promoted the idea of a strategic partnership between
Russia and the US to combat global terrorism, amidst much opposition from Moscow’s broader
foreign policy community (Trenin, 2009; Mankoff, 2007). This implies that the Russian
political class as a whole did not change their perspectives following 9/11 (Yavlinsky, 2002).
Nevertheless, Putin ignored his critics but did ask for concessions in return for Russia’s help:
Washington had to recognise Moscow’s leadership in the CIS and vow not to undermine
Russia’s interests there (Trenin, 2009). In return, Russia offered to accept Central Europe’s
westernisation, allow the entry of the Baltic States into NATO and the EU, and tolerate a US
military training programme in Georgia (Trenin, 2009). These concessions identified Russia’s
main interests, and offered a pragmatic division so as to avoid encroachment into each other’s
‘territory’. As with Yeltsin, the US rejected this deal, with what it saw as a lesser power,
refusing to accept any new ‘spheres of influence’ (Trenin, 2009). The rejection of this deal on
similar grounds to those in the 1990s, reconfirmed Putin’s suspicions and contributed further
to feelings of isolation, marginalisation, and mistrust. Russia would first have to act like a great
power to be seen as one.
Furthermore, in October 2001, with reference to NATO’s planned enlargement (which would
include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), Putin said that
Russia would adopt a more positive attitude if it was included in this process (Jones, 2001).
Moscow was given no coherent response and the new round of NATO enlargement went ahead
without them (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). Excluding Russia from NATO increased the
likelihood of resurgent sentiments in Moscow, whereas offering to include Russia, on the basis
that it managed to satisfy the entry criteria, would have reduced that risk (Baker, 2002). In
some sense this demonstrates a self-fulfilling prophecy, by treating Russia as an enemy, it
becomes an enemy. Yet, NATO did make efforts to nullify Russia’s fears. In May 2002, NATO
30
and the Russian Federation signed the declaration entitled ‘NATO-Russia Relations: A New
Quality’ in Rome which established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) (NATO, 2016b). The
NRC built upon the PJC but focused heavily on joint action and decision making, consultation,
consensus building, and co-operation (NATO, 2010). The most significant change between the
PJC and NRC is that NATO and Russia would discuss issues together to reach a common
position rather than NATO presenting their position to Moscow (Smith, 2002). The
establishment of the NRC can only be seen as a positive step towards improved East-West
relations, even if Russia, in the early 2000s, would have preferred to be a NATO member. Up
until 2003, Putin’s foreign policy was centred around rapprochement with the West (Trenin,
2009a).
The EU has also taken steps to marginalise Russia. In March 2003, the EU released the first
draft of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which was designed to increase political
and economic association between the EU and its nearest neighbours (EEAS, 2016). There was
considerable debate about whether to include Russia, but a solution was found through inviting
Russia in such a manner that it had to refuse (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). The EU decided to
classify its neighbours as a single entity meaning that Russia (the closest and largest neighbour)
was seen as having equal standing to the most distant countries (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016).
Given Russia’s obsession with its great power status, this offended the Kremlin and Russia
refused to participate (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). If Russia had been included within the ENP,
levels of mistrust and isolation would have been reduced and Russia would have not have felt
such a strong need to pursue resurgent policies to re-establish its great power identity.
Between 2003-2005, Russia’s near abroad saw a series of ‘colour revolutions’. Whilst the
causes are too numerous to discuss in detail in this dissertation, it is worth studying the impact
of the Ukrainian ‘orange’ revolution which occurred during 2004-2005. Putin had campaigned
on behalf of the Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych
31
in an effort to defeat pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko and preserve Russia’s influence in the
country, but following a popular revolt, the election was re-run and won by Yuschenko (Trenin,
2009). Moscow had come to rely on the support of Ukraine’s political leadership, and their
failure to win re-election caused concern in the Kremlin. Putin’s fear was that the US was trying
to project its influence on Russia’s borders and undermine their political system – although this
concern was largely conspiratorial (Trenin, 2009). Rather than recognising the revolution as an
expression of popular anger against corrupt authorities, made possible by splits within
Ukrainian elites, Putin saw it as a US planned and led conspiracy against Russia aimed at
reducing Russian influence and possibly as a ‘dry run’ for a revolution in Russia itself (Trenin,
2009). At the same time, the US and UK granted asylum to Chechen separatist leaders that had
been accused of terrorism by Moscow which Putin saw as support for their separatist cause
(Trenin, 2009). Putin even blamed the West for being behind terrorist attacks in Russian
controlled North Ossetia (Putin, 2004; Putin, 2007). Putin’s beliefs are largely unfounded, but
they demonstrate the level of mistrust and insecurity that had accrued between Russia and the
West by this time.
The principle factor in shaping Russian foreign policy has been the return of power to the state,
which, under Putin’s more authoritarian rule, essentially means a returning of power to the
office of the president (Lynch, 2016). Right from the start of his reign, he introduced a concept
known as ‘strengthening the power vertical’ which enabled him to centralize foreign policy
decision making, and remove these discussions from the pressures of domestic politics
(Mankoff, 2007). Furthermore, since Putin came to power, opposition journalists have been
under some considerable danger, with the murder of Anna Politkovskaya as just one example
(Lynch, 2016). Further evidence of Putin’s autocratic tendencies can be found in the fact that
all Russian channels broadcasting political news nationally became either directly or indirectly
32
controlled by the state very early on in his time in office and used to cultivate anti-Americanism
(Pomerantsev, 2014; Lynch, 2016).
5.2 Economic Situation
In the early 2000s, Russia was beginning to recover from the financial crisis, and rising oil
prices meant that Moscow had greater economic resources to direct towards its strategic
interests in the CIS (Trenin, 2009). As early as 2000, Putin recognised the potential of energy
in foreign policy, and established an institute for the Fuel and Energy Complex at the MGIMO
(Moscow State Institute of International Relations) to train specialists in international law,
economics, management, and finance to help protect Russian oil companies’ interests in OPEC,
the IOGP, and the IEA (Torkunov, 2001). The Kremlin’s turn towards the CIS is as much about
geopolitics as it is economics because the Russian leadership believes that economic
dependency leads to political dependency, and ultimately privileges (Trenin, 2007). In 2005,
Moscow began to use its vast energy reserves as a weapon directed towards Ukraine. Gazprom,
a largely state owned Russian energy company, drastically increased the price of gas exported
to Kiev which ultimately resulted in cutting Ukraine’s energy supply on 1st January, 2006,
when Ukraine was unable to pay its bills (Trenin, 2007). The timing of this event is particularly
important because Ukraine had just elected a pro-Western president, and so Russia’s aggressive
actions must be seen through the light of a nation that was concerned about Ukraine’s growing
interest in NATO membership and Western integration. This provides a clear example of
Russia using economics to influence another states’ foreign policy (Mankoff, 2007; Wallander,
2007). This is the first indication of a resurgent Russian foreign policy designed to promote
Russia’s role as a great power, against a backdrop of fear surrounding the West’s growing
interests and influence in what Moscow believes to be ‘its territory’. Had Ukraine not elected
a pro-Western president, and had the West shown restraint in its ambitions in the CIS, it is
highly likely that such an aggressive foreign economic policy would not have been needed.
33
Such ‘negotiations’ with Ukraine have borne agreements for Russian control over strategic
pipelines, and exclusive contracts for Russian energy companies (Wallander, 2007). Pipelines
are essential to Russia’s economic leverage, particularly with the EU – 44% of Europe’s natural
gas comes from Russia (Trenin, 2007). With 6% of global oil reserves, and 31% of global gas
reserves, Putin found a means to reassert Russia’s historic status as a leading player in its
neighbourhood by pursuing assertive economic policies, indicative of resurgence (Grace, 2005;
Stern, 2005).
Putin’s domestic focus on strengthening the Russian state through economic growth, helped by
the rise in oil prices, and spending on strategic initiatives such as reducing foreign debt, has
freed Russia from dependence on international financial institutions and granted the Kremlin
leverage that it could only have dreamt of under Yeltsin (Putin, 2001; Mankoff, 2007). In 2000,
debt was equivalent to 61.3% of Russia’s GDP, but by 2006, Russia had paid off its entire
Soviet debt through the use of oil revenue windfalls (MinFin, 2005; Pravda, 2006). According
to the World Bank (2016), Russia’s GDP rose from $259.7bn to $1.67tn during Putin’s first
terms as president (see figure 3), indicating the enormous steps taken towards economic
development that offered Russia such freedom on the international stage. Mankoff (2007)
argues that this improvement of the Russian economy is the reason for an increase in Russia’s
assertive foreign policy. However, this perspective only explains how Putin was able to fund
it, not the underlying causes. The feelings of isolation, marginalisation, mistrust, and inferiority
felt in the Kremlin as a result of Western policy towards Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s
drove the need for Moscow to pursue aggressive economic policies in the CIS.
34
Whilst the business elite played important roles in foreign policy decision making under
Yeltsin, Putin oversaw the reduction of the oligarchs’ power, and the strengthening of state
control over them (Lo, 2003). However, Smith (2003), argues that business interests, and
therefore the business elite, exert considerable influence over policy in the ‘near abroad’. This
perspective does not take the power of the president’s office into account. Most negotiations,
transactions, and business relationships are overseen by Putin, and the state’s significant
control over major economic sectors further cements Putin’s power (Wallander, 2007). For
example, Russia’s largest energy company Gazprom is mostly owned by the state. The Russian
government owned 38.37% of Gazprom’s shares, whilst 13% were controlled by Gazprom and
its subsidiaries, which, when combined, granted the state and company a controlling 51% stake,
which meant that Gazprom was effectively a tool of the Putin (Gubenko, 2003; Komarov,
2001). Furthermore, Russia’s second major gas company, Itera, was until 2013, connected to
Gazprom (Smith, 2003). Dmitri Trenin (2007: 95), suggests that “private and corporate
interests are behind most of Moscow’s major policy decisions, as Russia is ruled by people
$0
$200,000,000,000
$400,000,000,000
$600,000,000,000
$800,000,000,000
$1,000,000,000,000
$1,200,000,000,000
$1,400,000,000,000
$1,600,000,000,000
$1,800,000,000,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
GD
P (
US$
)
YEAR
GDP of the Russian Federation in Current US$, 2000-2008
Figure 3: Graph showing the GDP growth of the Russian Federation during Putin’s first terms as
president (World Bank, 2016).
35
who largely own it”. Whilst this is certainly true, the presence of Kremlin staff and senior
ministers on corporate boards provides Putin with a direct link to many of Russia’s largest
companies. With Putin’s firm control of the state, and the state’s influence in Russian business,
it is evident that Russia’s foreign economic policies are directed by the president.
5.3 Military and Defence Policy
At the start of the 21st Century, Primakov’s (1996) statement that “Russia has always been, is,
and will be a great power” returned as a central principle to Russian foreign policy. However,
success would require more than just economic expansion. Once again the CIS was in
Moscow’s sights as Putin sought to keep the Commonwealth from expanding Western
political-military alliances like NATO, however this required Russia to show real political
leadership, and to mediate and manage conflicts (Trenin, 2009). With the US and key NATO
members involved in Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001), Russia streamlined the CSTO into a
more effective organisation; undertook crisis management operations in Georgia to stabilise
Tbilisi during the Rose Revolution, and even extend its governance to include the separatist
Adjara region; established an airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, close to an American facility at
Manas; and attempted to mediate conflict in Moldova (Trenin, 2009). This broad brush attempt
to improve Russian influence was largely successful, and demonstrates a period of active and
assertive foreign policy, indicative of resurgence. However, although the West was focused
elsewhere, they still kept half an eye on Russian actions, and in November 2005, they forced
the Moldovan president not to sign a Russian brokered peace agreement designed to stop the
conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol at what was virtually the last minute (Trenin, 2009).
The peace agreement permitted a continuation of the Russian military presence in Moldova,
and the West’s successful attempt to stop this from happening was seen by the Kremlin as
36
further evidence of efforts to weaken Russian influence in the region (Trenin, 2009). The hard
work done by the Kremlin to improve Russia’s standing in its neighbourhood suffered another
setback with the colour revolutions (Trenin, 2009).
Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign policies have been supported by military improvement
and reform (Barany, 2008). Putin identified defence reform as a top priority when he came to
power (see figure 5), in part due to Russia’s poor military performance in Chechnya, “The
Russian armed forces need to be of a new quality, and that quality has to manifest itself in
everything” (Putin, 2003). He appointed Sergey Ivanov as defence minister (indicating a desire
to limit the power of military leaders) to create a more modern, streamlined, and effective force
(Barany, 2008; Facon, 2005). Initially, Putin wanted a manpower reduction of around 365,000
troops and 120,000 defence ministry employees, but Ivanov failed to implement the levels of
reform desired, and so in terms of manpower, the Russian military was the 4th largest in the
world with roughly 1.2 million soldiers (organised into over 20 divisions and hundreds of
regiments), and 875,000 civilians by the end of Putin’s second term as president (Barany, 2008;
Golts, 2006). But it would be wrong the say that Ivanov failed completely. Spending on new
weapons increased significantly due to Putin’s 2003 military reform programme, fulfilling part
of Putin’s modernisation ambitions (Facon, 2005). Some of the most important purchases were:
the S-400 (an air defence rocket system); 36 SS-27 ICBMs; an Iskander tactical theatre missile
system; several diesel submarines and anti-submarine ships; and the new Mi-28N helicopter
(Barany, 2008). Furthermore, in 2007 building of newly designed ships, aircraft carriers, and
nuclear submarines had begun and Moscow announced the development of an aviation vacuum
bomb (Barany, 2008). The 2006 defence budget was 22% higher than 2005, which in turn was
27% higher than 2004, but these funds were being used to increase troop’s pay alongside
weapons development (Korchagina, 2005; Mankoff, 2007). Between 2000-2008 Russian total
military expenditure had increased by just over 500% (see figure 4) from 260bn rubles to
37
1,396bn rubles (SIPRI, 2015a). This is strongly indicative of a Russian resurgence. Figure 5
demonstrates the importance of military expenditure in relation to government spending. It is
clear to see that Putin believed that defence spending should occupy a higher percentage than
Yeltsin, in order to fund his military reform programmes – highlighting the considerable
difference in the two leaders’ ambitions.
Further evidence of Russia’s resurgence can be seen during 2006, when Putin announced a
major $200bn 7-year rearmament programme designed to give Russia the capability to fight
one global war, a regional war, and several localised wars simultaneously (Barany, 2008). The
majority of the funds were spent on 1,400 tanks, heavy artillery pieces, new generations of
planes and missiles, and thousands of infantry vehicles (Barany, 2008). Furthermore, in 2007,
after a 16-year pause Russia resumed long-range bomber missions, conducted a large scale
military exercise with the SCO, and planned the reclamation of a former Soviet naval base in
Syria that would give the Russian navy access to the Mediterranean (Barany, 2008; Gomart,
Figure 4: Graph showing the increase in Russian total military expenditure under Putin’s first two terms
as president (SIPRI, 2015a).
0
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
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Military Expenditure of the Russian Federation in Rubles, 2000-2008
38
2006). Whilst it is true that Moscow has been able to pursue these policies as a result of rapid
economic growth, the motivation behind the military resurgence is a sense of insecurity over
its leadership position within the CIS – caused by increasingly intrusive Western policies.
5.4 Summary
During Putin’s first terms as president, Russia began to pursue an independent and national
interest centred foreign policy, despite an attempt to work alongside the West at the start of his
presidency. His increasingly assertive foreign policies are indications of the beginning of
Russia’s resurgent phase. Following the USA’s rejection of Russia, NATO expansion,
Moscow’s exclusion from the ENP, and the colour revolutions, Russia’s sense of
marginalisation and insecurity reached levels not seen since the Cold War. Putin’s aggressive
economic policies in the CIS, and the rising cost of oil, led to an increase in Russia’s relative
power and saw a period whereby the Kremlin began to reassert control over former Soviet
0.0%
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
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Russian Federation Military Expenditure as Percentage of Total Government Spending, 1997-2008
Figure 5: Graph showing the percentage of total government spending on defence between 1997-2008
(SIPRI, 2015c). It demonstrates the marked difference in military priority between Yeltsin and Putin.
39
states – particularly Ukraine – which had been adopting a more favourable approach to
westernisation. If NATO and the EU had taken account of Russia’s desire to remain the
dominant power in the CIS, it is likely that Russia would not have adopted such assertive
policies. This demonstrates a real lack of understanding in East-West relations which in turn
had fuelled Russia’s perception that it needs to be more active on the international stage to
protect its policy interests. By taking into account the Kremlin’s increased military expenditure
and modernisation programmes, we can clearly see that Russia can start to be classified as
resurgent. Due to Putin’s autocratic tendencies such as the centralisation of foreign policy, and
control over major Russian companies, it is fair to argue that the main actor behind Russia’s
resurgent policies is Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, the differences between Putin’s foreign
policies and Yeltsin’s demonstrate that there is a considerable degree of subjectivity in Russian
foreign policy decision making.
40
6.0 Russia from 2008 to 2015
The tandem leadership of Dmitri Medvedev (May 2008-May 2012) and Vladimir Putin (prime
minister under Medvedev and president from May 2012), represented more continuity, in terms
of Russia’s foreign policy objectives and the decision making structures, than it did change.
However, during this period, Russia did pursue more aggressive foreign policies, and for the
first time since the end of the Cold War, this included using military power to maintain control
over its CIS neighbours. Russia is indeed resurgent, aided by the continuing economic growth
and increasing room for manoeuvre on the international stage, and many of the key events that
indicate resurgence are linked to Western actions that seek to undermine Russia’s long term
goals of becoming a global power, maintaining control of its neighbourhood, and creating a
multipolar world.
6.1 Geopolitical Environment
The issue of NATO expansion re-appeared during 2008 following a referendum on NATO
membership in Georgia (in which 77% voted in favour of NATO), and plans to introduce
MAPs (Membership Action Plans) to Georgia and Ukraine at the NATO summit in Bucharest
(Trenin, 2009a; NATO, 2011). In April, President Putin travelled to Bucharest to personally
warn against issuing MAPs, which are intended to speed up a state’s accession to NATO,
referring to an unstable Ukraine and a warring Georgia as reasons for Moscow’s objections
(Trenin, 2009a). Russia has long sought to freeze conflicts in its neighbourhood, rather than
end them, to provide evidence of a country’s instability to NATO. Putin’s plea was heard, and
NATO decided not to issue MAPs, but did approve eventual admission for Ukraine and
Georgia (Trenin, 2009a). In Georgia, the outcome led to an attempt to settle the Ossetia conflict
through the use of force, and in Kiev, President Yushchenko began his pro-Western re-election
41
campaign in earnest (Trenin, 2009a). Furthermore, this decision set the stage for Russian
resurgence which lead to Moscow’s involvement in both Georgia and Ukraine. Once again, it
appeared to Moscow that NATO was seeking to encircle and weaken Russia (Georgia and
Ukraine’s justification for membership stated they sought a means of protection from Russia
which strengthened that perception), and now that Russia was in a stronger position than it had
been over the past 17 years, it was time to take action (Cross, 2015).
From 2008 it became clear that Russia was continuing the isolationist and Eurasianist foreign
policy that had emerged under Putin (Trenin, 2009a). A prime example of this was Russia’s
actions in the 2008 Georgian War (see chapter 6.3), which was essentially a manifestation of
Moscow’s insecurities surrounding NATO expansion, and a desire to remain the dominant
power in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In the aftermath of the war, whilst explaining
Russia’s foreign policy principles, President Medvedev spoke of Russia’s sphere of ‘privileged
interests’ and its obligation to defend ethnic Russians abroad (Medvedev, 2008). This phrasing
harkened back to the Soviet Union’s ‘spheres of influence’ concept and indicated that Russia
was willing to intervene in other states that harboured significant Russian populations (Trenin,
2009). The public suggestion was that Russia would seek to defend its people, but taking into
account the Georgian War, the warning that Russia could become more militarily active
seemed to be aimed towards NATO – a message warning that Moscow was opposed to
westernisation projects, and confident enough to support those objections with the use of force.
Russia had clearly outlined its areas of strategic interest since the 1990s with the creation of
the CIS and subsequent integration attempts, but Medvedev’s ‘spheres of privileged interests’
concept brought matters to a head and many in the West viewed this as a reclamation of
imperial and Soviet principles (Trenin, 2009). Russia was now an independent and important
foreign policy actor that was willing and capable of using military action to achieve its goals.
In 2009, Georgia formally withdrew from the CIS, which expressed their extreme
42
dissatisfaction and lack of confidence in the Kremlin following the Georgian War and
Medvedev’s statement (Coalson, 2009; Trenin, 2009a; RFE/RL, 2009a).
When Barack Obama replaced George Bush as president of the United States, he sought a
‘strategic reset’ in US-Russian relations to calm the heightened tensions that had built up
through NATO expansionism, Russia’s marginalisation from the Western political set-up,
American unilateralism, and Russia’s military actions in Georgia. Moscow was willing to
‘reset’ relations if the US adhered to several conditions: respect for Russia’s international role
and interests; recognition of Russia’s opposition to the anti-missile shield to be deployed in
Poland and the Czech Republic; recognition of Russia’s objections to further NATO
enlargement; and acceptance of Russia’s leadership role within the CIS (Tsygankov, 2009). In
March 2009, foreign ministers Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov pushed the ‘reset’ button,
and a few months later, in July, Medvedev allowed US weapons and military personnel to use
Russian airspace on route to Afghanistan (Shuster, 2010). Further evidence of thawing tensions
appeared in September, when Obama announced that the planned missile defence shield in
Eastern Europe would be scrapped (Shuster, 2010). Whilst pleasing Russian liberals like
Medvedev, a number of Central and Eastern European politicians wrote to Obama asking him
to stop Russia “defending a sphere of influence on its borders”, and so the US Vice-President,
Joe Biden, travelled to Kiev and Tbilisi to calm their concerns (RFE/RL, 2009; Trenin, 2009).
Significantly, this ‘reset’ did not mean a return to relations before the Georgian War, but rather
an acknowledgement by America that its unilateral actions since the 1990s had harmed
international relations, and a recognition of Russia’s re-discovered status as a European and
world power (Rachwald, 2011). However, whilst politicians like Medvedev were happy to trust
that Obama represented real change in US foreign policy, there were conservatives, like Putin,
who were not so comfortable with the new friendship (Shuster, 2010). In the end, conservative
values won the argument, with Putin declaring that the reset was over following the 2011 Libya
43
intervention (Putin, 2014). The strategic reset demonstrated two things. The first is that Russia
was now seen as an equal partner by the US who had refused similar arrangements in previous
years, which illustrated to Russia the success of its resurgent policies. The second is that,
following the failure of the reset in 2011, Putin – although just the prime minster – still wielded
considerable influence in Russia’s international relations. The internal power dynamic had
changed from presidential power, to prime ministerial, but Putin remained a constant.
Putin returned to the presidential office in 2012, and oversaw the development of the greatest
rift in East-West relation since the end of the Cold War (Wolff, 2015). In 2014, the long-
standing rivalry between pro-Western and pro-Russian politics in Ukraine came to a head with
the removal of pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, nationwide protests, Russian
attempts to separate eastern regions of Ukraine, and the abandonment of an EU agreement
designed to increase economic ties with Ukraine (Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016; BBC, 2014;
Mohammadi, 2014). However, the real issue was Putin’s decision to annex Crimea in March,
citing Medvedev’s commitment to defend Russian people abroad (Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016;
BBC, 2014). Following a swift Russian military take-over of the province, a referendum was
held in Crimea on whether it wished to succeed from Ukraine and become a federal member
of Russia. 97% of the Crimean population voted in favour Russian accession (Koldunova,
2015). Moscow’s actions have been heavily criticised by both Ukraine and the West and are
seen as an indication of an imperialistic and aggressive Russia (Zamani, 2013). But to Moscow,
its assertive foreign policy towards Ukraine is a symptom of repeated Western betrayal,
disrespect for Russian foreign policy objectives, and ignorance of Russian security concerns
(Wolff, 2015). In 2015, Putin admitted that fear of Ukraine joining NATO had partly motivated
his decision to annex Crimea, and said “we were promised that after Germany’s unification,
NATO wouldn’t spread eastward” (Putin, 2014a). The EU’s proposals to integrate Ukraine into
the West were seen by Moscow as a path that would lead to NATO membership and reduce
44
Russia’s influence in its long stated area of strategic importance (Haukkala, 2015; MacFarlane
& Menon, 2014). As far back as 1991, Yeltsin had declared that Russia retained the right to
make territorial claims against states with a large Russian population, making specific reference
to Crimea, and throughout post-Soviet Russian history, the Kremlin has made plain Russia’s
interest in retaining influence in Ukraine (Remnick, 1991; Plokhiy, 2014). If Russia had been
invited to participate in the ENP, it is likely that the perception of insecurity regarding Russia’s
status in Ukraine would have been reduced, and Russia would have felt less need to use
aggressive tactics to prevent Ukraine’s westernisation (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016:). The West
severely underestimated Ukraine’s geopolitical importance to Russia, and stoked fears of
isolation and marginalisation within Moscow as a result. Rather than evidence of Russian
imperialism, the Ukraine crisis demonstrates how EU member states and the US have failed to
consider Russia’s foreign policy interests and inadvertently created a resurgent Russia
(Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016).
6.2 Economic Situation
The 2008 global financial crisis hit the Russian economy hard, but it remained an economic
powerhouse compared to the CIS countries which were much more negatively affected (Trenin,
2009; Wieclawski, 2011). Moscow saw the economic crisis as an opportunity to strengthen its
influence in the ‘near abroad’ through provision of financial support: a $2bn loan to Belarus;
$2bn in stabilisation credits and investment to Kyrgyzstan; $500m for Armenia; $300m for
Mongolia; and $5bn for Ukraine (who refused the offer) (Trenin, 2009; Wieclawski, 2011). In
addition, Russia established a $10bn special assistance fund within EurAsEC (Euro-Asian
Economic Community), which was Moscow’s platform for economic integration with the
participating states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) until it was
45
replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 (Trenin, 2009; Sputnik, 2014). However,
Moscow expected political concessions in return for its assistance (Kononczuk, 2009). This
indicates a resurgent and assertive Russia using its relative economic strength for political gain.
The best example of this was Kyrgyz president Kumanbek Bakiyev’s decision in February
2009 to close the US airbase in Manas, but his decision was overturned by US influence who
managed to prolong their presence there (Pannier, 2009). Because this was not successful, some
analysts believe that Russia ousted Bakiyev in the 2010 riots for his lack of cooperation
(Karmanau, 2010). This is a clear example of Russian resurgence because 15 years ago
Moscow would not have had the financial resources or diplomatic freedom to offer such
‘assistance’ or topple unfavourable leaders.
However, Russia’s economic strong-arm tactics did not end with the allocation of financial
assistance to the CIS. The idea of using the Russian ruble as a regional reserve currency was
officially announced as an objective by Medvedev at the 2008 World Economic Forum, and
even after the global financial crisis, the concept persisted (Medvedev, 2008a; Medvedev,
2009; Pronina, 2009). Concurrently, Russia and Belarus were belligerents in the so called ‘milk
war’, which was a Russian ban on the imports of Belarussian dairy products after Minsk began
talks with the EU on the certification of Belarussian milk standards (Trenin, 2009). With 10%
of Belarus’ population employed in the agricultural sector, and with dairy potentially worth 7%
of their foreign trade revenue, Russia’s ban was a powerful political tool in preventing Belarus
from creeping towards the EU (Associated Press, 2009; Trenin, 2009). Another example of
Russia using economics to force CIS members to fall in line, is the gas ‘cold war’ of January
2009. Ukraine was unable to settle a $2.4bn gas bill to Gazprom from 2008 and unwilling to
accept an increase in the cost of Russian gas, this quickly turned into a dispute and resulted in
Russia turning off the gas supply to Ukraine on the 1st January, which consequently meant that
16 EU member states and Moldova were left without gas for weeks in the middle of winter
46
(Trenin, 2009a; McLaughlin & Mock, 2009; Pirani et al., 2009). Economics aside, Russia also
had a political aim to weaken the credibility of the pro-Western President Yushchenko (Trenin,
2009a). Both cases highlight the continued use of economic power as a weapon, and support
the claim that Russia had become resurgent by this stage due to the levels of assertive foreign
economic policy prevalent when compared to Russia in the 1990s.
The Russian economy continued to grow under Medvedev and Putin, but their actions in
Georgia and Ukraine were reflected in Russia’s GDP (see figure 6). Medvedev’s war in
Georgia led to huge outflow of capital from Russian markets which depreciated the ruble and
led to a drop in the Moscow Stock Exchange (Wieclawski, 2011). By the end of 2008, $130bn
had been lost through outflow and attempts to stabilise the ruble failed (Sindelar, 2009).
Between 2008 and 2009, Russia’s GDP fell from $1.67tn to $1.22tn (World Bank, 2016).
Moscow’s actions in Ukraine led to several rounds of Western imposed sanctions on Russian
businesses and individuals. The assets of 18 people involved in the violence in Ukraine were
frozen by the EU; the G8 suspended Russia; and the US sanctioned Gazprom Bank, Novatek,
and Rosneft (Radio Zamaneh, 2015; Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016). All of the Western sanctions
were focused on Russian oil and banking sectors – all major banks with more than 50%
ownership by the state were sanctioned (Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016). In response to these
sanctions, Russia imposed their own on Western states. In August Moscow imposed a food
embargo on the EU, US, Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Ukraine – between
them, Russia had spent $26bn on food imports in 2013 (Fazli, 2015; Khordad News, 2015).
Furthermore, Russia imposed sanctions on US and EU member state officials such as Senator
John McCain, John Boehner, Nick Clegg, General Nick Houghton, and Andrew Parker
(Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016). From the start of the sanctions in 2014, Russian GDP fell from
$2tn to $1.3tn (World Bank, 2016). To Russia, it seemed they were being punished for doing
little more than defending their interests against an aggressive NATO.
47
6.3 Military and Defence Policy
Following the decision at the NATO Bucharest summit to eventually approve Georgian and
Ukrainian accession to NATO, Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, took the decision to
try and end the conflict with the separatist region of South Ossetia, and demonstrate that
Georgia was ready for NATO membership (Trenin, 2009a). On the 8th August 2008, following
a night of Georgian attacks in South Ossetia, Russia launched an armed campaign to remove
the Georgian military (BBC, 2009). Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, blamed the war
on the US and declared that they had “decided to test the strength of Russian authority” using
Saakashvili as a proxy, and forced Russia “to embark on the path of militarisation and abandon
modernisation” (Lavrov, 2008). Whilst the Bush administration was probably responsible for
not halting Saakashvili’s attack on Tskhinvali, due to his ambiguous signals to Tbilisi, it is
obvious that Moscow’s allegations of an attempt to militarise Russia and stop its modernisation
were simply untrue (Trenin, 2009a). Although Georgia sought to use its military to speed up
NATO enlargement, Russia used its military for the exact opposite. Moscow had three main
$0
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GD
P (
US$
)
YEAR
GDP of the Russian Federation in Current US$, 2008-2015
Figure 6: Graph showing the GDP of the Russian Federation from 2008-2015 (World Bank, 2016).
48
aims when they engaged in South Ossetia. The first was to put a stop to the eastward expansion
of NATO (Asmus, 2010; Dyomkin, 2011; Allison, 2008). Every Russian president has
expressed dislike of NATO expansion believing that the organisation is an aggressive alliance
that aims to weaken Russian influence, and it is highly likely that if Russia had been included,
or at least accepted and understood by NATO, the Georgian War would not have happened
(Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). NATO’s decision to approve Georgian accession was the final
straw. Too long had the Kremlin lost ‘territory’ to the West, and a border with NATO was not
something Russia was willing to tolerate. The second aim was to demonstrate Russian primacy
in the post-Soviet CIS and highlight the inability of the West to limit Moscow’s influence
(Cornell et al., 2008). It has been evident since 1991 that the CIS is Russia’s primary foreign
policy concern, and any attempts to limit the Kremlin’s influence there would be perceived as
a threat to Russia’s global power ambitions and an attempt to hinder the progress of a multipolar
world order. The Russian invasion of Georgia was not only a message to NATO, but also to
other CIS states – if their allegiance is not to Russia, then they can expect Moscow to force
their allegiance (Muzalevsky, 2009). The third aim of Russia’s intervention was to support the
ethnic Russian minority in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as demonstrated by Moscow’s
recognition of their independence following the war, and Medvedev’s statement in 2008
proclaiming Russia’s right to defend its citizens abroad (BBC, 2015; Medvedev, 2008).
According to Rachwald (2011), the war with Georgia signalled the re-birth of a successful and
assertive Russia. However, in the West’s condemnation of Russian activity in Georgia,
Moscow saw a glaring hypocrisy. Whilst territorial integrity and non-interference are
cornerstones of international law, the West was happy to break the rules and support succession
for minorities in Eritrea, and East Timor, to name just two examples – yet when Russia invaded
and later recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the West condemned this action (Arbatova
& Dynkin, 2016). The US explained the need for Kosovan independence by claiming that the
49
people of Kosovo simply didn’t want to live with Albanians, yet when Moscow saw that
Ossetians didn’t want to live with Georgians, the US was critical. This suggested to Moscow
that NATO was allowed to play by one set of rules, but Russia, for no better reason than it
being Russia, was not allowed to apply similar principles. This cemented the sense of
inferiority perpetuated by the West since the end of the Cold War. Whilst Russia was already
resurgent by this point, the West’s response to Georgia did little to quell the desire for
resurgence, and suggested that the West still fundamentally misunderstood the Kremlin’s
mind-set of perceived inferiority and a desire to restore Russia’s historical status.
In February 2009, the CSTO announced the creation of the Collective Operational Reaction
Force (CORF) which would establish a new rapid-reaction unit to mirror NATO (Wieclawski,
2011; Bugajski, 2010). Plans were altered slightly in June at the CSTO summit in Moscow,
changing CORF from ‘rapid response’ to ‘operational response’, reflecting Moscow’s desire
for a larger number of troops with greater capability – the operational response force planned
to include up to 20,000 soldiers, an airborne division, and Russia’s Caspian naval fleet
(Bugajski, 2010). However, due to resistance from within the CSTO, mainly from Belarus and
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Military Expenditure of the Russian Federation in Rubles, 2008-2015
Figure 7: Graph showing the increase in Russia’s military expenditure, measured in Russian rubles from
2008-2015 (SIPRI, 2015a).
50
Uzbekistan, CORF troops will have to remain on national territory, there will be no permanent
joint staff, and the force will only be assembled when missions are approved by CSTO
presidents at an emergency summit, reflecting the CIS members mistrust of a resurgent Russia
(Bugajski, 2010).
Under Medvedev and Putin, Russia’s total military expenditure has risen consistently from
1.4tn rubles, to 4tn rubles between 2008-2015, as displayed by figure 7 (SIPRI, 2015a).
Interestingly, military and defence spending has increased in priority since 2009 rising from
10.2% of the government’s total spending, to 13.7% in 2014 (data unavailable after 2014, see
figure 8), suggesting that Russia prioritised the military over other sectors (SIPRI, 2015c).
Although Russia’s GDP has fluctuated following its actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and the global
financial crisis, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP has risen (aside from a 0.1% drop
between 2008-2009) from 3.8% to 5.4% in 2013 (data unavailable after 2013, see figure 9)
(SIPRI, 2015). This shows that despite Russia’s economic problems, military expenditure
remained important to both Medvedev and Putin. High levels of military spending go hand in
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Military Expenditure of the Russian Federation as Percentage of Total Government Spending, 2008-2014
Figure 8: Graph showing Russian military expenditure as a percentage of the total government spending
(SIPRI, 2015c). This illustrates an increased priority in the Russian military.
51
hand with the increasing assertiveness of Russia’s foreign policy, with a notable increase after
Russia annexed Crimea (figure 7). This data, combined, shows that Russia is continuing the
increase in military spending since 1998, lending support to the claim that Russia is resurgent.
6.4 Summary
Between 2008-2015, Russia became fully resurgent. Talk of ‘privileged interests’, a desire to
defend ethnic Russians abroad, the Georgian war, and the Ukraine crisis shows Moscow’s
continued domination of the post-Soviet republics and willingness to defend its citizens. This
level of assertive foreign policy is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War and serves to
illustrate how far Moscow has come since the 1990s in terms of international power and
economic freedom. Both major military actions however, were caused by a deep rooted fear of
NATO enlargement that had built up since the 1990s. It seems that the West continued to
miscalculate Russia’s intentions and misunderstand their aspirations well into 2014, and
provoked aggressive military action as a result. The trend of using Russia’s relative economic
0.0%
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5.0%
6.0%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
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DP
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Military Expenditure of the Russian Federation as Percentage of GDP, 2008-2013
Figure 9: Graph showing Russia’s increased military expenditure against GDP despite experiencing
economic problems (SIPRI, 2015).
52
might to subordinate its neighbours, set during Putin’s first terms as president, continued to
dominate the Kremlin’s foreign economic policies, as demonstrated by the ‘milk war’ and gas
cold war in 2009. Again, this reflects Russia’s resurgence, in that it has gained more economic
freedom and confidence in its international relations, although it is highly probable that without
Western (mainly EU) attempts to integrate some former Soviet republics, like Ukraine and
Belarus, Russia would have felt less of a need to force the CIS states’ allegiance. Despite
Russia’s economic woes caused by the global economic crisis, its actions in Georgia, and the
sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea, Russia continued to increase its military
expenditure which enabled Moscow to act so decisively and effectively defend its ‘buffer’
against NATO, and the ethnic Russians in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and eastern Ukraine. The
first military confrontations between Russia and the CIS over westernisation reveals the
increased capability of the Russian military that struggled to end the Chechnya conflict in 1998.
Despite this period seeing two different presidents, Russia’s foreign policy remained
remarkably consistent. Instead of this being a result of similar leaders, it reflects the power of
Vladimir Putin, who managed to end the ‘reset’ with the United States even whilst prime
minister. Furthermore, his return to power in 2012 suggests that Medvedev was little more than
a placeholder to do Putin’s bidding until he was eligible for re-election. This supports the
argument that Russian foreign policy is formulated by the subjectivity of an individual, rather
than rationality or a collective.
53
7.0 Conclusion
This dissertation has focused on three questions: Is Russia resurgent? What role has the West
played in Russia’s resurgence? What has controlled Russia’s resurgent policies? In answer to
the first question, a comprehensive look at the assertiveness of Russian foreign policy, Russian
economic policy, and Russian military spending is all that is required. At the start of the post-
Soviet era, Russia sought to maintain its influence in its neighbourhood through political
integration projects like the CIS, and the associated economic union. Between 2000-2008, the
method changed from political control, to economic control through the use of energy exports
as a weapon. But with the outbreak of the Georgian War, the method evolved to incorporate
military action. The progression from peaceful political means of controlling its ‘near abroad’
to the use of military force to subordinate these countries, clearly shows a resurgent Russia. In
terms of economics alone, Russia’s GDP has grown from $517bn in 1991 to $1.3tn in 2015,
experiencing rapid levels of economic growth along the way. The economic freedom enjoyed
by the current Russian government could only have been dreamt of by Boris Yeltsin. Finally,
the growing Russian military expenditure (which has been near constant) is a product of
Russia’s economic growth and need to pursue assertive foreign policies. In 1998, Russia was
struggling to finance a war in Chechnya, but by 2015, Russia had invaded Georgia and Ukraine,
and annexed Crimea, which in itself validates the claim that Russia is resurgent. During the
1990s, the foundations of resurgence were lain; during Putin’s first terms, Russia began its
resurgence through a dominant economic strategy and saw a dramatic increase in diplomatic
capability; and finally, from 2008, Russia has continued its resurgence with aggressive military
action.
The second question for this dissertation explored the role the West has played in Russia’s
resurgence. Right from the end of the Cold War in 1991, the West has treated Russia as an
inferior nation, snubbed chances to integrate Moscow into key Western institutions such as
54
NATO, broken Cold War promises to respect Russia’s influence in its neighbourhood, and
caused insecurity through NATO expansion. These themes are common to every period studied
in this dissertation and suggest a high degree of mistrust, and a lack of understanding of
Russia’s foreign policy objectives. This dissertation demonstrates how this played a crucial
role in Russia’s desire for security, international recognition, and a multipolar world order that
led it to become resurgent.
In conclusion to the question over who controls Russia’s resurgent policies, this dissertation
has argued in favour of the individual subjectivity side of the agency/structure debate. Through
the differing approaches between Yeltsin and Medvedev on one hand, and Primakov and Putin
on the other, the influence of individual subjectivity on foreign policy decision making can be
clearly seen. Both Yeltsin and Medvedev preferred to pursue pro-Western policies whilst
Primakov and Putin adopted more eurasianist and nationalistic policies. The variating world
views of these key actors clearly shows the degree of subjectivity in Russian foreign policy.
Furthermore, the semi-autocratic Russian political structure, strengthened by Putin, indicates
the individual is responsible for Moscow’s resurgent policies, not the collective.
It is important to mention that this dissertation does not condone Russia’s aggressive responses
to Western actions, but merely tries to explain why Russia has sought to use them. In addition,
the West cannot solely be blamed for the increased East-West tensions since 1991 and Russia
must recognise the part it has played. If the world is to avoid another Cold War scenario, two
things need to happen. The first is that Russia and the West need to improve their understanding
of each other’s objectives; primarily through clear communication. Secondly, Russia needs to
try to integrate into the current international system rather than oppose it, and the West needs
to help facilitate this integration. Without these two basic measures, further conflict, whether
direct or through a proxy is highly likely.
55
8.0 Acronyms
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States.
CORF – Collective Operational Reaction Force.
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organisation.
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy.
EU – European Union.
EurAsEC – Euro-Asian Economic Community.
GDP – Gross Domestic Product.
GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
ICBMs – Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.
IEA – International Energy Agency.
IMF – International Monetary Fund.
IOGP – International Association of Oil and Gas Producers.
MAPs – Membership Action Plans.
MEK – Mezhgosudarstvennaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommissiya (Interstate Economic
Commission).
MGIMO – Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
MIRV – Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle.
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
NRC – NATO-Russia Council.
56
NRF – NATO Response Force.
OPEC – Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
PfP – Partnership for Peace.
PJC – Permanent Joint Council.
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
US(A) – United States of America.
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
WTO – World Trade Organisation.
57
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