Divine Knowledge and CounterfactualsDoes God know how I would have chosen, had my circumstances been different?

QadarThe plan and program of creation

Relationship between freewill and qadar:

Allah’s knows, from His ezel-i state, all our ‘future’ choices

Hence, qadar is ‘written’ with knowledge of these choices

CounterfactualsAllah knows what I will choose in the

circumstances that Allah does, in fact, place me in

But, does Allah also know what I would have chosen, had He placed me in different circumstances?

That is, does Allah know the truth value of counterfactuals pertaining to persons’ free choices?

Do such counterfactuals even have a truth value?

Counterfactuals of freedom in the Quran“Even if thou wert to bring to the people of the

Book all the Signs (together), they would not follow Thy Qibla; nor art thou going to follow their Qibla; nor indeed will they follow each other's Qibla…” Al-Baqarah: 146

Counterfactuals of freedom in the Quran“Hast thou not observed the Hypocrites say to

their misbelieving brethren among the People of the Book? - "If ye are expelled, we too will go out with you, and we will never hearken to any one in your affair; and if ye are attacked (in fight) we will help you". But Allah is witness that they are indeed liars.

If they are expelled, never will they go out with them; and if they are attacked (in fight), they will never help them; and if they do help them, they will turn their backs; so they will receive no help.” Al-Hashr: 12

Do counterfactuals of freedom have a truth value?Opponents have traditionally tried to say that

they don’t:

‘How can the hypothetical choice of a person (who is perhaps a hypothetical person), in hypothetical circumstances, have a truth value?’

E.g. If God were to create Bob, and this hypothetical Bob had to choose between stealing and not stealing an apple, would he steal the apple?

Is there any answer to such a question?

ReplyYes, there must be an answer

Once we specify a full set of circumstances, the law of bivalence applies to these counterfactuals:

Law of bivalence: Every proposition has a truth value, and there are only two truth values – true or false

Thus, in a full set of circumstances C, Bob must either choose to steal the apple, or not choose to steal the apple. There’s no other alternative

Grounding objectionBut one still wonders, what grounds the truth

of such counterfactuals?

Here, objectors are making the mistake of misapplying a theory of truth as correspondence known as ‘truth-maker theory’ (which is itself a minority view)

There doesn’t need to be any concrete thing to ground the truth of a proposition (P) on truth-maker theory

Reply to grounding objection Analogy with tensed propositions:

On truth-maker theory (properly applied), some future or past tense P has as its truth maker, just the state of affairs in which P will be true, or was true. And a ‘state of affairs’ is just an abstract thing

E.g. P: A woman will be the Prime Minister in 2020

On truth-maker theory, the ‘truth-maker’ for this P is the state of affairs in which the PM in 2020 is a woman.

Grounding objection That is, if it will be true that the PM in 2020 is

a woman, then this fact or state of affairs (which I have underlined) becomes the truth-maker of the proposition that the PM in 2020 is a woman

Similarly, the truth-maker for some counterfactual could be the abstract state of affairs in which P would be true

Thus, even if we accept truth-maker theory, the grounding objection still fails

Sources: Plantinga, Craig, Flint and others

Allah’s Name of ‘Alim Allah is All-Knowing. Thus, He knows all truths, and

believes nothing that is false

This must be the case, since Allah must possess the attribute of knowing necessarily and essentially

Per Bediuzzaman: If a thing be essential to a being, the opposite of that thing cannot intervene in or form any part of that being. It is impossible that it should

But if Allah knows all truths, and counterfactuals of freedom have a truth value, if follows that He must know what their truth value is

Qadar and Divine Purposes If Allah knows what we would have chosen in any

set of circumstances, He can choose to create just that set of circumstances that, on balance, best achieves His divine purposes

Namely: Our achieving the most growth, or most merit, and knowing Allah’s beauty and perfection, and reflecting it, to the highest degree

And given that freewill is free, certain logically possible ‘worlds’ (sets of circumstances) may nonetheless not be feasible. In particular, a world where nobody sins, may not be feasible

Qadar and Divine PurposesFor there might be the those who make bad

choices no matter what the viable circumstances

Viable circumstances: the right balance of guidance:

Too much, and there is no merit, no opportunity to reflect beauty by freely acting. We end up no different to angels, if it’s impossible to sin

Too little and the beauty of Allah’s Name of Hadi goes un-manifested

Other options?1. If a concrete ground of the truth of

counterfactuals is wanted, we could say all possible worlds really do exist, in a substantial way, as knowledge or ideas with Allah (per Colin Turner?)

2. Alternatively, we might say Allah can predict what a being would choose, based on His knowledge of the prevailing reasons for choices – since we usually do choose on the basis of these reasons.

Other options?He can then create the world/write qadar on

the basis of these likely choices, and then alter the non-choice variables where necessary, so as to still achieve His purposes

Problem with this view is that it seems to countenance Allah’s getting something wrong, which is impossible