Logic and Belief in Indian PhilosophyWarsaw Indological Studies, Volume 3 (2008) 421433.

Major Points of Vcaspatis Disagreement with Maana*

DIWAKAR ACHARYA

The first two works of Vacaspatimira I, the Nyya-kaik and Tattva-samk1,are commentaries on Maanamiras works. This indicates that Vcaspati initiallystudied Mms, focusing especially on Maana. His study of MaanasMms works made him gradually develop his interest further in the lattersVednta work, the Brahma-siddhi (BSi), before he found his way to Nyya. As aresult, Vcaspatis tenets are influenced by Maanas thought, particularly insofaras they reflect Mms and Vednta2. The Bhmat, which establishes a distinctschool of interpretation of the Brahma-stra-kara-bhya (BSBh), is mainlybased on the foundation of the Brahma-siddhi and Vcaspatimiras commentarythereon, the Tattva-samk (TSam). It is not unknown to the scholars of Indianphilosophy that most of distinctive features of the Bhmat-school have their rootsin Maanas views as set forth in the Brahma-siddhi. In the Bhmat, Vcaspati-mira resorts to the Brahma-siddhi whenever he faces unclear points in the kara-bhya, and so invariably explains the text convincingly. Therefore, Vcaspatimirais blamed by some traditional authors for following Maanamira blindly.

My impression, however, is that this is not always true, at least in the final stageof his writing career. It is true that Vcaspatimira appears to have been heavily

* I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Ashok Aklujkar (University of British Colum-

bia), Prof. Harunaga Isaacson and Prof. Emeritus Albrecht Wezler (Universitt Hamburg) for theircritical comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am grateful to Prof. Akihiko Akamatsu(Kyoto University) for his offer to present this issue in the VAADA lecture series of the 21stcentury COE Program at Kyoto University in October 2005. I am also grateful to Mr. Philip Pierce(Nepal Research Centre) for going over my English.

1 On chronological order of Vcaspatis works, see ACHARYA (2006: xxxixxxiii).2 Following the line of Maanamira and further developing it, Vcaspatimira brings to-

gether the Mms and Nyya theories of error as two dimensions of a combined theory of errorin Vednta, which, if observed from two different angles, is equally acceptable to all these threeschools (see ACHARYA (2006: lxvii-lxviii)). I intend to compare concerned passages at some otheroccasion in near future.

422 DIWAKAR ACHARYA influenced by Maanamiras ideas but, at the same time, we find him reconsid-ering the latters positions and refining them in the Bhmat. There it appears that hedeveloped further arguments or even new ideas from simple points made byMaana and blended them with the ideas of akara. Not only that, Vcaspatimirain the Bhmat seems to differ from Maanamira on a number of crucial points. Ishall reflect upon them here briefly.

1. Levels of Brahman Realisation

Firstly, Vcaspati does not agree with Maana on the levels of realisation of Brah-man. At the beginning of the Niyoga-ka, Maana mentions three possible levelsof Brahman realisation: verbal knowledge, meditative knowledge and the final intui-tive knowledge. In the Tattva-samk, Vcaspati briefly comments on the passage,saying nothing specific from his side, but in the Bhmat he delimits the third as theprofound meditation (nididhysana) in the form of continuity of the mind (citta-santati-maya) and identifies the intuitive knowledge as a fourth form at the top, andproceeds to justify its necessity. This fourth level of realisation is an original idea onthe part of Vcaspati; however, his speculation is grounded in Maanas discourse.Let us compare the following passages from the Brahma-siddhi and Bhmat:

There are three [levels of] realisation with regard to Brahman. Thefirst comes from verbal knowledge (lit. word). Another is the realisa-tion variously known as meditation, contemplation and cultivation,which is a continuation of the first realisation from the verbal knowl-edge, and the other takes the form of intuitive perception, when thestate of completion occurs and all mental fabrications have ceased.3

There are four [levels of] realisation with regard to Brahman. The firstis reached by merely studying sentences from the Upaniads; this isknown as the act of hearing. The second is reached by studying ofthe same Upaniadic sentences but at the same time reflecting onthem; this is known as the act of reflection. The third is the profound

3 BSi 1.74: tisra ca pratipattayo brahmai. pratham tvac chabdt, any abdt pratipadya

tat-santnavat dhyna-bhvanpsandi-abda-vcy, any tato labdha-nipattir vigalita-nikhila-vikalp skt-karaa-rp, see ACHARYA (2006: 156).

Vcaspatimiras commentary on this passage runs as follows (ACHARYA (2006: 156157)):tm jtavya iti hi kila brahmai pra[ti](pattir vidhyate, ti)sra ca t sambhavantty hatisra cti. any tata santnavaty pratter dara-nairantarya-drgha-klsevana-labdha-paripky (labdha-nipattir viga)lita-nikhila-vikalp, vieaa-vieya-bhva-nirbhso vacchinna-viaya-pratyayo vikalpa, tad-rahitty artha.

VCASPATIS DISAGREEMENT WITH MAANA 423

meditation in the form of a continuation of the mind, and the fourth isthe state of the intuitive perception in the form of a particular mode ofthe mind. Absolute unity is an inherent property of this fourth state.4

In the above passage from the Bhmat, Vcaspati clearly states that verbalknowledge continues up to the second level, and on the third level merely continuityof thought prevails, while on the fourth level intuitive realisation occurs from a par-ticular operation of mind.5

Thus, according to him, a particular operation of the mind following upon impres-sions of hearing (ravaa), reflection or spiritual cultivation (manana) andmeditation (nididhysana) causes the final and direct realisation of Brahman. Forthe followers of the Vivaraa-school of kara Vednta, the latter is caused by thehearing of the Upaniadic sentences being perfected by spiritual cultivation andmeditation. This is one of the major points of difference between the two schools ofinterpretation among the followers of kara Vednta.

This question is of great importance because it involves another controversialpoint of debate concerning the capacity of the Upaniadic sentences. In Vcaspatisscheme, spiritual cultivation is fundamental and necessary; the Upaniadic sentencescan produce only indirect knowledge of Brahman, and without spiritual cultivationdirect realisation of Brahman is not possible. This is not acceptable to the followersof the Vivaraa-school, since it limits the capacity of the Upaniadic sentences.

In Maanas three-level scheme, the third level is already the final stage of intui-tive perception and is said to be a culmination of the second level and free of allfabrications and diversities.6 This level is already the level of final culmination, andthere is no scope for the fourth in this scheme.

In the Brahma-stra-kara-bhya there is not the slightest allusion to a fourthlevel or a passage that would admit such a stage. In the Paca-pdik (PP) andVivaraa, there is no mention of the fourth level either. Therefore, we must say that

4 Bhmat ad BSBh 3.4.26: catasra pratipattayo brahmai. pratham tvad upaniad-

vkya-ravaa-mtrd bhavati y kila cakate ravaam iti. dvity mms-sahit tasmdeva upaniad-vkyd ym cakate mananam iti. tty citta-santati-may, ym cakatenididhysanam iti. caturth skt-kravat vtti-rp, nntarya hi tasy kaivalyam iti.

5 This operation of the mind in later Vednta texts is identified as being in a pure and undif-ferentiated state.

6 It is not clear from Maanas passage, however, whether or not the verbal knowledgewhich is continued in the second level continues till the third, where it is culminated. This can beinterpreted either way: nandapra in Bhu thinks that this final culmination takes place bymeans of hearing (ravaa-dvr); and if he is right, Praktman is closer to Mandana. In anycase, Maanas stance is less disputable than that of Vcaspatis.

424 DIWAKAR ACHARYA this is an original idea on the part of Vcaspati which is not in agreement withMaanas thought.

2. Liberation in life

Once Brahman is realised, what happens to the realised person? Does his bodyimmediately collapse, that is, does he die, due to the total annihilation of ignorance(avidy) and karman brought about by the realisation of Brahman? If not, how doeshis body remain functional after such an annihilation?

Maana says that it all depends either upon leftover traces of the cause of thebody (avidy), which was once in operation (labdha-vtti), or upon the residualeffect of this cause, or upon both of them.7 The bodies of those who have no suchtraces may immediately collapse, but those who have such traces may persevere in abodily state for some time, this state being termed liberation in life (jvan-mukti).Maana holds a person in this state to be a man of stable insight (sthita-praja)and explains that he might not be a siddha, one who has already attained the goal,but still a sdhaka, one who has reached a highly advanced stage in spiritual culti-vation and is waiting for the final realisation. He writes:

We say, first of all, the man of stable insight is not a siddha (i.e. onewho has accomplished the goal), for whom avidy has entirely disap-peared, but a sdhaka (i.e. one who is still progressing towards the goal)who has reached a particular state, and we do not say that the body isdropped immediately after the realisation of Brahman. He awaits the ex-tinction of the karman whose effects are still in motion. Here the oneenjoys immediate liberation, whereas the other suffers some delay.8

On this point, Vcaspati does not follow Maana, and indeed even refutes him,following akara. According to akara, a question like whether a realised persondies or continues to live is not a matter of debate, for the realisation of Brahmanbrings about annihilation of only that portion of karman which has not fructified andbegun to produce results (anrabdha) but not of that which has begun to produceresults (prrabdha). akara writes:

7 Maanamiras preference seems to be for the second alternative (see below, p. 425). As

commentators think, inasmuch as differences in the mind produce impressions and the body con-tinues to exist.

8 BSi1 130131: ucyatesthita-prajas tvan na vigalita-nikhilvidya siddha, ki tu sdhakaevvasth-viea prpta syt. na ca brmabrahma-vedannantara eva deha-viyoga.rabdha-krya-karma-kaya bhogena pratkata iti tatra kasya cit tat-klo pavarga, kasya citkiy cit kepa.

VCASPATIS DISAGREEMENT WITH MAANA 425

Moreover, one should not debate in this point whether a realised per-son bears his body for some time or not. How could the realisation ofBrahman, a conception of ones mind, negate endurance of a body af-fected by some other [conception]? This point is explained in both therutis and smtis by describing the characteristics of a man of stableinsight. Therefore, it can be concluded that on the strength of realisa-tion there is extinction only of those vices and virtues the effects ofwhich are not yet in motion.9

As already stated, Vcaspatimira in the Bhmat not only accepts the position ofakara on this issue but also refutes Maanamiras position by stating that asthita-praja or jvan-mukta cannot be a sdhaka awaiting the final realisation butmust be a siddha, and that there is no higher state than this to be accomplished. Hereis Vcaspatimiras commentary on the above excerpt from the Brahma-stra-kara-bhya:

On the mla expression one should not debate: the man of stableinsight is not one who is still progressing towards the goal (sdhaka),for there is not any more primal conception that could be based on thesupremacy of even further meditation. Rather, the man of stable in-sight is without a superior and is one who has already accomplishedthe goal (siddha).10

It should also be noted that Maanamira does not think that the realised personhas to consume the prrabdha-karman by experiencing its results; he seems to say thatwhat remains even in the state of jvan-mukti is merely an impression of prrabdha-karman but not the residue itself. Thus he mentions the contrary position and refutes it:

9 BSBh 4.1.15: api ca nvtra vivaditavyambrahma-vid ka cit kla arra dhriyate

na v dhriyata iti. katha hy ekasya sva-hdaya-pratyaya brahma-vedana deha-dhraacparea pratikeptu akyeta? ruti-smtiu ca sthita-praja-lakaa-nirdeentad eva nirucyate.tasmd anrabdha-kryayor eva sukta-duktayor vidy-smarthyt kaya iti niraya.

10 Bhmat ad BSBh 4.1.15: api ca nvtra vivaditavyam iti. sthita-praja ca na sdhaka;tasyttarttara-dhyntkarea prva-pratyaynavasthitatvt. niratiayas tu sthita-praja. sa casiddha eva.

Interestingly enough, Amalnanda in commenting upon this passage expressly states thatVcaspati has here refuted Maana, see KT on Bhmat ad BSBh 4.1.15: bhye sthita-praja-lakaa-nirdeo jvan-mukti-sdhaka ukta. tatra sthita-praja sdhako na skt-kravn itimaana-mirair ukta daam uddharatisthita-praja cti.In the Bhya, a mention ofthe characteristics of the man of stable insight [found in the Upaniadic and smti texts] is said tobe the proof of liberation in life. In this context, Vcaspati takes out the fault Maana [pointedout] that the man of stable insight is one who is still progressing (sdhaka) but not one who hasobtained the intuitive perception, and writes The man of stable insight.

426 DIWAKAR ACHARYA

Some people, however, think that cessation of the karman set for fruitionis not possible, just as in the case of an arrow impetuous [in its course] ora wheel [in motion], and that for this reason it is necessary to wait for thecessation of such karman. That is not true. An arrow can certainly bestopped by setting a wall or the like in its way, and can also be destroyedby cutting it off [in flight] or by other means. In our case, too, there arepacifying rituals which are capable of destroying karman bound for con-sumption, as indicated in a dream or the like. Therefore, it is sure that theendurance of the body is due to impressions (saskra).11

However, both akara and Vcaspati are opposed to this view and regard what isdestroyed after realisation as only the karman which is not yet bound to have reper-cussions but not the karman which is set for fruition.12 Thus Vcaspati not onlydiffers from Maana on this issue but even accepts a position refuted by him.

3. The Relationship between karman and Realisation

Another controversial view of Maanamira that Vcaspati discards in theBhmat concerns the relationship between karman and realisation. According toMaana, karman has a vital role to play even in the process of realisation ofBrahman, the former being closely associated with the latter. Maana presentsseven possible theories on this issue and affirms two of them. For him, either karmanby virtue of its bi-functional nature is conducive to the realisation of tman along-side the production of its direct result; or else it exists for the purification of theindividual and perfects him so as to prepare him for Brahman realisation. Maanapresents these two views as follows:

Others, however, say that all types of karman are finally governed bythe realisation of tman due to the property of separateness-with-con-junction, for it is stated in the ruti that they desire to know by per-forming sacrifice and by whatever means he makes sacrifice, hismind becomes pure after the concluding darv-homa. Some others de-scribe the relationship between karman and the governing authority ofBrahman realisation with the words that by means of sacrifices and

11 BSi1 132133: ye tu manyantepravtta-bhogn karma pravtta-vegasyor iva cakra-

syeva v na akya pratibandha, ato bhogena kaya-pratkti. tad asat. akyo hu pratibandhukuydibhi, nayitu ca ccheddibhi. svapndi-scitpasthita-vipka-varttamna-deha-bhogya-karma-kayrthni ca ntikni karmi. tasmt saskrd eva sthiti.

12 See ACHARYA (2006: cxxi).

VCASPATIS DISAGREEMENT WITH MAANA 427

great sacrifices this body is made ready for [realisation] and towhom the forty rites of purification and the eight virtues [apply].13

Later, after presenting all possible views, he returns to these two views and af-firms them in the following way:

It is logical that that karman which is not dependent on some otheraction is subordinate to realisation according to the property of separa-tion-with-conjunction, even as the ruti states that those who contem-plate Brahman desire to know it by means of sacrifice. It is calledsubordinate, inasmuch as it is instrumental in attaining [realisation] butdoes not contribute to producing it the way prayja and the like do, forrealisation has no other effect to be produced. Alternatively, the otherposition of purification is acceptable because of the testimony of thesmti and also because of the fact that realisation comes only to a puri-fied person. Thus it is said: and since it is prescribed, the karman of aparticular rama, too, [is helpful in realisation].14

Thus Maana not only claims usefulness of karman in the course of realisingBrahman but also says that the accumulation of karman accelerates the process ofrealisation and so should be continued until the final intuitive stage of realisation(skt-kra)15.

Vcaspati criticises this view of Maana and accepts that of akara, who be-lieves that karman and Brahman realisation are quite opposed to each other and areconciliation of the two is impossible. Though Vcaspati accepts that karman puri-fies and qualifies a person for the realisation of tman, he says it is effective as longas a desire for such knowledge (vividi) is not produced. He writes:

For [fear of] entering into a cumbersome assumption, it is not logicalto agree upon the position which postulates that the obligatory dutieshave a direct relation to realisation via separation-with-conjunction,

13 BSi1 27 = BSi2 2122: anye tu sayoga-pthaktvena sarva-karmam evtma-

jndhikrnupraveam hu vividianti yajena iti rute, yena kenacana yajetpi darv-homennupahata-man eva bhavati iti ca. anye tu purua-saskrataytma-jndhikra-saspara karma varayantimah-yajai ca yajai ca brhmya kriyate tanu,yasyte catvriat-saskr av tma-gu iti ca.

14 BSi1 36: ida tu yuktamkryntara-nirkkm api karma sayoga-pthaktvttam eta vednuvacanena brhma vividianti yajena iti vidyga-bhva. so py upapatty-arthatay, na prayjdivat krypayogena, vidyy kryntar-bhvt. sakra-pako v, smte;sasktasya hi vidytpatte. tad uktamvihitatvc crama-karmpi iti.

15 See the passage quoted below, p. 429.

428 DIWAKAR ACHARYA

whereas these duties can be related easily with realisation [in anotherway], inasmuch as they purify a person by regularly disposing accu-mulated vice. Thus virtues are in fact acquired from the performanceof the obligatory duties, whence vice goes away. Vice alone pollutesones mind by casting an antithetic view of eternity, purity and pleas-ure on this mortal, impure and sorrowful world. So when vice is re-moved and the doors of perception and reasoning are opened, one un-derstands by perception and reasoning the nature of this world beyonddoubt as mortal, impure and sorrowful. Then a disliking for this worldknown as displeasure is developed, and then rises a desire to abandonit. Then one searches for the means to do so, and in this search, hear-ing that the knowledge of the self is the means being searched for, onedesires to know the self. Thereafter, one comes to know it by follow-ing the due course, beginning with hearing. Because of all this, it islogical to agree that the purification of the mind by karman is indi-rectly contributive to the process of realising the truth.16

In brief, then, according to akara and Vcaspati, once the desire for knowledgeis produced and one is minded to listen to the Upaniads, karman has no further roleto play and must be dropped entirely.17

16 Bhmat ad BSBh 1.1.1: kptenva ca nityn karma nityhitenptta-durita-

nibarhaena purua-saskrea jntpattv aga-bhvpapattau na sayoga-pthaktvena skdaga-bhvo yukta, kalpan-gauravpatte. tath hi nitya-karmnuhnd dharmtpda, tatoppm nivartate, sa hy anityuci-dukha-rpe sasre nitya-uci-sukha-khyti-lakaenaviparysena citta-sattva malnayati. ata ppani-vttau pratyakpapatti-dvrpvarae satipratyakpapattibhy sasrasynityuci-dukha-rpatm apratyham avabuddhyate, tatosysminn anabhirati-saja vairgyam upajyate, tatas taj-jihspvartate, tato hnpyaparyeate, paryeama ctma-tattva-jnam asypya ity uparutya tat jijsate, tataravadikramea taj jntty rd upakrakatva tattva-jntpda prati citta-sattva-uddhykarma yuktam.

17 In commenting on akaras interpretation of the Upaniadic sentence kurvann evhakarmi (one should aspire to live a full life by performing karman), Vcaspatimira followsakara in admitting the point that a realised person can continue accumulating karman but statesthat even so he is not afflicted by it. However, his inclination is to take the above statement as arecommendation to an unrealised person, and so for him it is a secondary solution, Bhmat adBSBh 3.4.1314: kurvann evha karmi jijviet ity-evam-diu niyama-ravaeu na viduaiti vieo sti, avieea niyama-vidhnt. kurvann evha karmi ity-atrparo vieakhyyate. yady apy atra prakaraa-smarthyd vidvn eva kurvann iti sambandhyeta, tathpividy-stutaye karmnuhnam etad draravyam. na karma lipyate nare iti hi vakyati. etadukta bhavatiyvaj-jva karma kurvaty api vidui purue na karma lepya bhavati vidy-smarthyd iti tad eva vidy styate.In the case of the statement of rules like One shouldaspire to live in this world by performing karman, there underlies the special point that such a

VCASPATIS DISAGREEMENT WITH MAANA 429

Contrary to this, Maana thinks that the process of Brahman realisation is accel-erated if it is accompanied by karman, even though plodding on towards realisationwithout accumulating karman is also possible. In support of his view, he quotesBrahma-stra 3.4.26 (sarvpek ca yajdi-ruter avavat) and elaborates the ideathat, even as it is possible to reach a destination without a horse, although one isdesirable for reaching there quickly or for the sake of convenience, in the same waykarman is desirable in the process of Brahman realisation for the same reason. Hewrites:

In the case of ascetics living in chastity, the rise of pure knowledgecould be expected even without [the performance of] those duties; still,there is difference in terms of time. Thanks to these particular means,pure knowledge is revealed quickly, [much] more quickly, while in theabsence of these means it is revealed slowly, [much] more slowly. It issaid: the requirement of all types of karman is admitted, for the rutiteaches sacrifice and so on [as a means of attaining Brahman], but [theseduties are] like a horse. This is the meaning of this stra: the perform-ance of duties is required for realisation, which is to be attained throughrepeated practice, as the ruti teaches through sacrifice and charity, justas a horse is required in order to reach a village swiftly and conveniently,even though it is possible to reach there without a horse.18

akaras interpretation of the same stra is quite different, and seemingly a bitdistorted. He says that as a horse is employed to draw a chariot but not to ploughfields, so too karman is required in order to produce a desire for knowledge(vividi), not to accomplish the final goal of Brahman realisation (brahma-jna):

prescription is not for a realised person. For this statement is made without any specification, [sothat a clarification is needed]. However, in the case of this particular statement, One should as-pire, it is further necessary to make another point, that though depending on the context arealised person may be an agent who accumulates karman, the accumulation of karman should beviewed as something for the sake of praising the realisation of [Brahman]. Later it is said thatkarman does not defile a [realised] person. This amounts to saying the following: even though arealised person accumulates karman for his whole life, his karman will not cause any defilementin him, given his realisation, and thus [Brahman] realisation is praised.

18 BSi1 3637: rdhva-retas crami vinpi tair viuddha-vidyodaya iyate. ki tukla-kto viea. sdhana-vied dhi s kipra kipratara ca vyajyate, tad-abhve cireaciratarea ca. tad uktamsarvpek ca yajdi-ruter avavat. eo rthayajena dnena itiravat karmy apekante vidyym abhysa-labhyym api, yathntareva grma-prptausiddhyanty aighryykleya vvo pekyate.

430 DIWAKAR ACHARYA

The right knowledge, once attained, requires nothing towards accom-plishing the goal, but it requires means towards its [own] rise. How so?Because the ruti teaches sacrifice and so on as the means thereto. Given their connection with the desire to know [the self], they are re-garded as the means whereby [the right knowledge] arises. The expres-sion like a horse in the stra points at ability. Even as a horse, becauseof its ability, is employed to pull a chariot but not to plough, similarly theritual duties of [the earlier] ramas are not required by the right knowl-edge towards accomplishing the goal, but only towards its [own] rise.19

Maana strongly criticises this position. He postulates that karman and Brahmanrealisation are hardly opposed to each other, and repeatedly states that the former isconducive not only to a desire for knowledge (vividi) but also to the final intuitiverealisation of Brahman.20

For his part, Vcaspati rejects any positive relation between the two:

In this way, for a person who has not performed karman in this lifebut whose mind has been purified by his actions in the previous lifeand an aversion to this world has arisen in him through an apprehen-sion of its worthlessness, there is no use performing karman, that is fitand favourable for the rise of aversion. For its purpose has alreadybeen served by his having performed karman in his previous life.21

Thus neither of the two views concerning the relation between karman and reali-sation affirmed by Maanamira is acceptable to Vcaspatimira in this matter.

4. The Significance of Renunciation (sanysa)

The above view of Maanamira regarding the relationship between karman andBrahman realisation has a direct impact on the question of the significance of

19 BSBh 3.4.26: utpann hi vidy phala-siddhi prati na ki cid apekate, utpatti prati tv

apekate. kuta? yajdi-rute. vividi-sayogc cm utpatti-sdhana-bhvo vasyate. avavad iti yogyat-nidaranam. yath ca yogyat-vaenvo na lgalkarae yujyate, ratha-caryy tu yujyate. evam rama-karmi vidyay phala-siddhau npekyante, utpattaucpekyanta iti.

20 See BSi1 3236.21 Bhmat ad BSBh 1.1.1: eva cnanuhita-karmpi prg-bhavya-karma-vad yo viuddha-

sattva sasrsrat-daranena nipanna-vairgya, kta tasya karmnuhnena vairgyt-pdpayogin, prg-bhavya-karmnuhnd eva tat-siddhe.

VCASPATIS DISAGREEMENT WITH MAANA 431 sanysa. Since karman is conducive to the final realisation and is effective till theend of ones life, sanysa should not really be necessary. A householder who con-tinues with the performance of karman, specifically the obligatory duties (nitya-karman), should reach the goal rather earlier than an ascetic who renounces every-thing. Indeed, according to Maana, a householder gallops towards the goal whilean ascetic is still plodding on.22 This idea would in no way have been acceptable toakara and his followers, who champion sanysa with almost propagandist fervour.

According to akara, sanysa is a necessary condition for Brahman realisation.For him, abiding in Brahman (brahma-sasthat), in complete surrender to Brahman,is possible only for a renunciant, not for others in any of the other three stages oflife. These have to perform their specific duties; if they stop performing the recom-mended duties, they will be committing sin. A renunciant, however, is different; hedoes not acquire sin by not performing karman, inasmuch as he has renounced allkarman.23

akara states that renunciation is part and parcel of the maturity leading toBrahman realisation and is recommended for a qualified person. One is called uponto renounce all karman after listening to the Upaniads:

As renunciation is part of the maturity leading to Brahman realisation,it is not for people other than allotted ones. And the ruti teaches this:Now a mendicant with his head shaved, pale-dressed, without posses-sions, clean, free from malice and living on alms is [ready] forBrahmanhood.24

Here too, Vcaspati follows akara, not Maanamira, as his commentary onthe above Brahma-stra-kara-bhya passage makes clear:

This is what is taught: Brahman[hood] is renunciation characterised bythe abandonment of all types of longing through devotion to Brahman.Therefore, such a special [way of life] characterised by renunciationand abiding in Brahman is only for the mendicant, not for people in the

22 See ACHARYA (2006: cxv).23 BSBh 3.4.20: atrcyatebrahma-sastha iti hi brahmai parisamptir ananya-vyprat-

rpa tan-nihatvam abhidhyate. tac ca traym ram na sambhavati, svrama-vihita-karmnanuhne pratyavya-ravat. parivrjakasya tu sarva-karma-sanyst pratyavyo nasambhavaty ananuhna-nimitta. ama-damdis tu tadyo dharmo brahma-sasthatyupodbalako na virodh. brahma-nihatvam eva hi tasya ama-damdy-upabhita svrama-vihita karma.

24 BSBh 3.4.20: brahma-jna-paripkgatvc ca privrjyasya nnadhikta-viayatvam.tac ca darayatiatha parivr vivara-vs muo parigraha ucir adroh bhaikobrahma-bhyya bhavati iti.

432 DIWAKAR ACHARYA

other stages of life. Intuitive perception, the maturity of Brahman re-alisation arising from verbal knowledge, is the only means of emanci-pation. Renunciation is prescribed as part of this maturity, and is notfor people to whom it has not been allotted.25

According to Vcaspati, one should renounce as soon as desires have fallenaway;26 and thus he appears to assume that sanysa is a prerequisite for Brahmanrealisation.

Vcaspati generally takes the liberty to introduce new ideas and add extra re-marks. Thus, though he appears to follow akara in the last three instances above,it is important to note that he does so while refuting or discarding Maanas views.As to the first instance, it is a revised presentation of an idea found in the Brahma-siddhi; still, it is perfect and effective in its own way, and even leads to new avenuesof philosophic pursuit.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACHARYA 2006 = Acharya, Diwakar: Vcaspatimiras Tattvasamk: The EarliestCommentary on Maanamiras Brahmasiddhi. Nepal ResearchCentre Publications 25, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2006.

Bhmat = Vcaspatimira I: Bhmat. See: BSBh.Bhu = nandapra: Bhva-uddhi. N.S. Anantakrishna Sastri (ed.): Two

Commentaries on Brahmasiddhi: Bhvauddhi of nandapraMuni and Abhipryaprakik of Citsukha Muni. Madras Govern-ment Oriental Series 161, Government Oriental Manuscript Library,Madras 1963.

25 Bhmat ad BSBh 3.4.20: etad ukta bhavatibrahma-paratay sarva-parityga-

lakao nyso brahmti. tath cda nysa-lakaa brahma-sasthatva-lakaa bhikorevsdhraa ntarem ramim. brahma-jnasya abda-janitasya ya parpka skt-kro pavarga-sdhana tad-agatay privrjya vihitam, na tv anadhikta pratty artha.

26 Bhmat ad BSBh 1.1.1: yadi vetarath brahmacaryd eva pravrajed ghd v vand vity etvat hi vairgyam upalakayati. ata eva yadahar eva virajet tadahar eva pravrajet itiruti.

VCASPATIS DISAGREEMENT WITH MAANA 433 BSBh = akara: Brahma-stra-kara-bhya. Anantaka str (ed.):

The Brahmastra nkara Bhya, with the CommentariesBhmat, Kalpataru and Parimala. Second edition by Bhrgavstr, Nirya Sgara Press, Bombay 1938.

BSi = Maanamira: Brahma-siddhi. (1) S. Kuppuswami Sastri (ed.):Brahmasiddhi of Maana Mira with akhapis Commentary(vykhy). Madras Government Oriental Series No. 4. GovernmentPress, Madras 1937. [Photographic reprint Sri Satguru, Delhi1984]. (2) See: ACHARYA (2006).

KT = Amalnanda: Kalpa-taru. See: BSBh.NK = Vcaspatimira: Nyya-kaik. See VV.PP = Padmapda: Paca-pdik. S. rrma str, S. R. Krishnamurthi

str (eds.): Pacapdik of Padmapda with Prabodha-pariodhin of Atmasvarpa and Ttparyrthadyotin ofVijntman and Pacapdikvivaraa of Praktman withTtparyadpik of Citsukha and Bhvaprakik of Nsihrama.Madras Government Oriental Series. Madras Government OrientalManuscripts Library, Madras 1958.

TSam = Vcaspatimira I: Tattva-samk. See: ACHARYA (2006).VV = Maanamira: Vidhi-viveka. Mahaprabhu Lal Gosvami (ed.): The

Vidhi-viveka of Maanamira with the Commentary Nyya-kaik of Vcaspatimira. Tara Publications, Varanasi 1978.