djibouti: france's strategic toehold in africaauthor(s): thomas a. markssource: african affairs,...

8/11/2019 Djibouti: France's Strategic Toehold in AfricaAuthor(s): Thomas A. MarksSource: African Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 290 (Ja…

1/11

The Royal frican Society

Djibouti: France's Strategic Toehold in AfricaAuthor(s): Thomas A. MarksSource: African Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 290 (Jan., 1974), pp. 95-104Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society

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2/11

DJIBOUTI:

FRANCE'S STRATEGIC

TOEHOLD

IN

AFRICA

by

THOMAS

.

MARKS

United States

Army,

Hawaii

WITH

THE fourth

major

outbreakof war

in the Middle East

having

once

again

rivetted

great

power

attention

to this

vital

corner of

the

globe,

a

seemingly

unobtrusive

piece

of

barren

territory lying

between

Ethiopia

and the Somali

Republic

has

suddenly gained

in

political

and

strategic

importance.

The

FrenchTerritoryof the Afars and the Issas,a sparsely-inhabitedandof searing

heat and

mutually

hostile

tribal

factions,

commonly

referredto

by

the name

of

its

capital

and

only

major

city,

Djibouti,

has

long

been looked

upon by

western

observers

as

nothing

more

than a sentimentalremnant

of

France's

once-sprawling

African

colonial

empire.

The French

themselves have seemed

hard-put

to

justify

their

continued

presence

n

what was until 1967

known

as

French Somali-

land;

yet

by

an historicalaccident

they

may

well

find themselves

the

possessors

of an

area

having

a

great

deal more

strategic mportance

han has been

hitherto

appreciated.

Djibouti's value stems from its significant location at the Indian Ocean

entrance to the Red

Sea,

a

position

from which

a

naval

power

of

consequence

could exert

powerful

nfluence over the

oil

tankertrade

plying

the

waters of the

Indian

Ocean,

and could also

stand

ready

to

make its

presence

felt in the

pursuance

of

political

goals.

The

Territory

already

possesses

a

modern

port

in

Djibouti,

which also serves

as a

base for

an

air

transport

network between

Europe,

East

Africa,

the

Near

East,

and India.' For a

number of

years

this

position

has been used

by

the French

to

link

their

upper

African

sphere

of

influence with that which

they

maintain n

southern

African,

and until

recently

in the MalagasyRepublic, formerly Madagascar. This strategicnetwork has

been

little

understood

or

appreciatedby

Western

military

observers,

who

tend

to

view the African

continent as

a

hodgepodge

of

newly emergent

states

known

primarily

for

their

poverty,

unstable

rulers,

and

domestic

political squabbles.

French

defence olicy

in

Africa

and the Middle East

To understand he

French

position

and hence the role

Djibouti

has come

to

play

in

it,

it is

necessary

o

examine

briefly

French

strategy

n

Africa.

'France's

defence

policy

in the

independence

era of

Africa has

been

based on

two needs:

This article

was

completed

after

the

outbreak of

the

October Arab-Israeli

war,

but

before

the full implications of the Arab decision to use oil as a major military and diplomatic

weapon

became

apparent.

Thomas A. Marks is a

Second

Lieutenant

(Infantry)

in

the

United States

Army,

at

present

stationed

in

Hawaii. He is

the

author of a number of

articles

on

military

and

strategic

issues.

In

this

article the French

spelling

of

Djibouti

has

been

retained.

95


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3/11

96

AFRICAN

AFFAIRS

to maintain ts own

strategic

position

in

Africa

without an

overly

conspicuous

deployment

of

forces

in

Africa

itself;

and,

as

an

extension of

this,

to reserve

the

right

of intervention

on

behalf

of

African states

and

regimes.'

This

strategywasdevelopedfollowingan analysisof the militaryandpolitical collapse

of

France

in

1940.

It was

reasonedthat a

large

proportion

of French

fighting

power

could

have

been

withdrawn

ntact

to

North Africaand

from

there

gathered

the

necessarystrength

to

launch

a

counterattack

gainst

Germany. According

to the writer

quoted

above,

in

considerationof

this

argument

France's

post-war

defences were

organized

on a

'Euro-African

basis',

thus

allowing

France

to

present

itself as a

major

military power.2

When

independence

was

granted

to

France's

African

colonies

by

President

de Gaulle in

1960,

national

armies

were created and armed

directly by

France,

thus being committed to that countryfor supplies and training. A system of

defence

co-operation

was

developed through

the use of defence

agreements

signed

with eleven

African

nations. These

agreements

generally

stated

that the

Africannation had

to

provide

for

its

own internaland external

security,

but that

France could be called

upon

to

intervene

in

extreme

circumstances.

For

its

part

France would

use

intervention

only

in

special

circumstances

and reserved

to itself

the

right

to decide if it

would

accede

to the

request

for

aid.

Several

states,

among

them

Chad,

where the French

recently

concluded

a

successful

intervention on

behalf of President

Frangois

Tombalbaye's government,

had

included in their treaty a clause relatingto the conduct of stability operations

(au

maintiende

l'ordre)

which allowed for

the

interventionof

French

troops

at

the African

government'srequest

for

specified

durationsof

time.3

To fulfil

its

agreements

France maintained he 11th Division

of

six airborne

infantry

battalions and two combined

support

battalions

n southwest

France,

together

with the 9th Marine

Brigade

of

three

amphibious

battalions

stationed

in

Brittany.

(Troupes

de Marine

are

a

part

of

the

army,

supplying

troops

for

intervention,

overseas

service,

and

advisory duty.) Additionally,

a

permanent

intervention

force

is

deployed

at

Fort

Lamy,

Chad,

consisting

in

1972-73

of

a

battaliontask force of 500 men.4 Between 1960 and 1963 Frenchforces inter-

vened

twelve

times at the

request

of

legitimate

African

governments;5

and it

was

the intervention

orce at

Fort

Lamy, together

with

a

company

of

reinforce-

ments from

France,

which

first aided the

Chadians

in

the

suppression

of

the

revolt

by

Moslim tribesmen from

the

Sahara

against

the

black,

Christian/

animist

government.6

1. T.

N.

Dupuy,

The Almanac

of

World

Military

Power

(Dunn

Loring, Virginia,

1970),

p.

199.

2. Ruth

First,

Power in

Africa

(Baltimore, Maryland, 1971), p.

422.

3.

Thomas

A.

Marks,

'Chad: The

Mysterious

War',

Infantry,

63

(May-June

1973),

pp.

28-31.

4. Interview with Lt.-Col.

Jean Salvan,

French Liaison Officer to the US

Army

Infantry

School,

Fort

Benning, Georgia,

on 7 December 1972.

5.

First,

Power in

Africa, pp.

423-24.

6.

Philippe

Jaubert,

'Intervention

Franqaise

au

Tchad',

Terre-Air-Mer

(January

1970),

pp.

21-6.




4/11

DJIBOUTI:

STRATEGIC

RENCHTOEHOLD 97

Cementing

he

defence

alignment

outlined

abovewas the fact that he economic

development

and even

the

government

budgets

of the 15 former African

colonies were underwritten

by

the

French,

thus

tying

a vast area of West Africa

integrally to the metropole. Along the Red Sea/Indian Ocean coast was

Djibouti

and

in

the Indian

Ocean

the

French forces

stationed

in

Malagasy.

To

complete

the chain

France

very quietly

became

South Africa's

eading

arms

supplier,

a

major

trading

partner,

and

an instrumental

factor in

moving

the

white-ruled nation towards

arms

production

self-sufficiency.7

Thus France

developed

a

web of

influence

extending

down

the entire

west coast

of Africaand

linked to the

Indian Ocean

by

the

outposts

just

mentioned,

as well as

by

several

small

archipelagoes

near

Malagasy.

Until

recently

the

French seemed

to have

established

a secure

position,

and

the roleplayedby Djiboutiremainedperipheral. The first cracks n the system

came in

early

1973

when

Libya's

leader

Colonel

Qaddafi

persuaded

he

govern-

ments of

Niger,

Mali,

and

Chad

to break

diplomatic

relations

with Israel

in

return

for

promises

of economic

aid,

little of

which

eventually

materialized.8

The

significance

of this

development

was

the illumination

of the

ease with which

the

loyalties

of

the

desperately

poor

nations

France

was

relying upon

as

part

of

its

own national defence

system

could

be

bought.

The

price

in

Niger's

case

was

a mere

$35

million

in

loans

and

$7-5

million

in

grants,

while Chad

gave

in

to

a

promise

of

$93

million

in aid and

an

end to

the

open support

of

Libya

for

the Moslim guerrillasstill activeagainst the Chadiangovernment.9

The middle of 1973

saw

still

further

moves

detrimental o

French interests.

With

Europe

obtaining

60

per

cent or

more

of

its oil

from

the Middle

East,

it

had

been

vital that

some

Western

Europeanpower

maintaina

protectivepresence

in

the

area

following

the British withdrawal

from east of the Suez

Canal.

Djibouti

formed one

end

of

a

protective

arc which

the French had

been able

to

establish

by

defence

agreements

with

Malagasy, coupled

with

their

military

presence

on the Comoro Islands

and

Reunion.

The main route

taken

by

oil

supertankers

making

the

trip

between

the

Middle

East

and

Europe

was

through

the Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Channel separatingMalagasy from

Africa;10

hence the French

appeared

o be in an

excellent

position

to

safeguard

their

own interests in

particular,

and those

of

Western

Europe

in

general.

Suddenly

this

system

came

tumbling

down.

Riding

a

wave

of

discontent

which

swept

throughout Francophone

Africa,

triggered

by

the

heavy-handed

French

approach

of

dealing

with

its former

colonies,

Malagasy

oined

Mauritania

in

quitting

the franc

zone,

and demanded that

the French withdrawfrom the

bases

which

they

had

held since

the turn

of

the

century.

At

the

time the

French

had

stationed

in

Malagasy

the Third

Foreign

Legion Regiment (3e

Rdgiment

7. 'Arms:

The

French

Connection',

Newsweek

(21 May 1973),

pp.

45-6.

8.

'Libya:

The Dust

Devil',

Newsweek

(28 May

1973),

pp.

10-11.

9.

Ibid.

10. C. L.

Sulzberger,

'Oil and

the Indian

Ocean',

Honolulu

Star-Bulletin,

11

June

1973,

sec.

1,

p.

A-18.




5/11

98

AFRICAN

AFFAIRS

Etranger

d'Infanterie),

one

paratroop

regiment,

an

air force

detachment,

and a

naval

contingent manning

the

key

base of

Diego

Suarez,

a

vital

link

in

the

French Indian

Ocean and African

defence

system.

In

August

1973

France

beganto close its bases and pull out. 1

Final

disposition

of the

rejected

forces has not

yet

been decided.

Some

of

them

are to

be

redeployed

to the French

island of Reunion to

the

east

of

Malagasy,

with additional

units

being

sent north to the Comoro

Archipelago.

Yet

the

facilities of

Reunion and

the

naval base at the Comoro

port

of

Mayotte

cannot be

compared

with the

relinquished

base of

Diego

Suarez.

Moreover,

the

Comoro

Islands

have

a restless

independence

movement,

MOLINACO,

based in

nearby

Tanzania,

which

cannot

help

but be

encouraged

by

the

French

setback

n

Malagasy. 2

Faced with the

continuing

requirement

of

safeguarding

its oil supply, the greaterpart of which-22 million tons in 1972-comes from

Saudi

Arabia,

and

its

strategic

interests,

France will

have

no

choice

but to

increase its

present

force level

in

Djibouti.

It stands as the sole base

capable

of

serving

as

a viable alternative o the facilities that

have

had to be abandoned.

Not

only

France's nterests

are at

stake, however,

as the Western World

now

well

knows.

A

military presence plays

an

important

role in

any

diplomatic

framework,

but

despite

the

enormous

significance

of

Middle Eastern

oil,

Western

powers

other than France have been slow

to establish

any

sort of concrete

presence

in the Indian

Ocean,

relying

primarilyupon

Arab

largess

to secure

a

steadyoil supply. This situation s rapidlycomingto a forced end. Emerging

with burned

fingers

from

the

French national

oil

company's ERAP)

attempts

o

reach favourable

oil

accords

with

Iraq,

the French

government

understands

ully

that

a

pro-Arab

orientation

s

not

proof against

he

capriciousness

of individual

Arab

rulers,13

r

against

their use

of

oil as

a

major

weapon

in

the Arab-Israeli

conflict.

So,

also,

do

the Communist

powers. Germany,

t

has

been

said,

was the first

nation

to

comprehend

he

value

of

political strategy

as an

adjunct

to war

and to

recognize

that it was rooted

in

geography,14

but since

the second world

war

the

Communistshave excelled in the use of political geographyto further their

aims. After

being

blocked

in

any

attempt

to

expand

by outright

force

of

arms,

the

Soviet

Union

was forced to break

out of

its

continental

solation

and

compete

for

power

and

influence

among

the Third World

nations.

While

making

numerous tactical

blunders,

the Communist

have shown

increasing

sophisti-

cation

in their

geographicaldispositions

so as to

maximize

political

and

military

influence.

11.

'Africa:

Unbinding

the

Ties',

Newsweek

(27

August

1973),

pp.

36,

40.

12.

Sulzberger,

'Oil and

the

Indian Ocean'.

In

June

1973

agreement

was

reached

between

France

and the Comoro nationalist

parties, including

the

Comoro National

Liberation Movement (MOLINACO), for the independence of the islands in five years'

time.

13.

James

E.

Akins,

'The Oil

Crisis:

This

Time the Wolf is

Here',

Foreign

Affairs,

51

(April

1973),

p.

486.

14. Derwent

Whittlesey, 'Chapter

16-Haushofer:

the

Geopoliticans,'

in

Makers

of

Modern

Strategy,

ed.

Edward Mead Earle

(New

York,

1969),

p.

393.




6/11

DJIBOUTI:

STRATEGICRENCHTOEHOLD

99

After

failing

to obtain

through

its

relationship

with

Egypt

any

concessions

which

would

significantly

enhance

its

staying

and

striking

power

in

the

area,

Russia moved

elsewhere.

A

new

Soviet

base

is under

construction

at

Um

Qasr,on the PersianGulf in Iraq,whilethe strategic ocationof Djiboutihasbeen

appreciated

and

a

nearby

Soviet

base

built

at Berbera n the Somali

Republic.15

Other countries

have

joined

the

scramble

or

influence in the

region.

Cuba

has

more than

100

advisers

training

pilots

in South

Yemen to

fly

the

advanced

MIG-21

jet

fighter;'6

a number of North

Korean

pilots

have

flown in

combat

for the

Egyptian

Air

Force

against

the

Israelis,

following

the

precedent

set

in

1971

by

the direct

participation

of about 100 Soviet advisers

n the effort of

the

Sudanese Moslim

majority

to

crush the revolt of

the

black

southerners;18

and

in

April

1973 India

began

to

supply

military

advisers

to

Iraq

under

a

secret

agreementdesignedprimarily o counterthe growing strengthof Iran.19

Such

developments,

coupled

with the Soviet

naval

build-up

in the

Indian

Ocean,20

have

inevitably

brought

about much

discussion

in the Western World

concerning

the

proper

response.

Japan,

which receives

90

per

cent of its oil

from

the Persian Gulf

area,

has been

urged

to take a more

active role

in the

region.21

The

United

States,

which

has but a

seaplane

tender and two

old

destroyers

based at Bahrain Island in the Persian

Gulf,

is

preparing

to set

up

an

outpost

on the British island of

Diego

Garcia

in the Indian Ocean.22

In

addition Americahas been

the

major

supplier

n Iran's

$3

billion 1973

purchase

of militaryhardware,with more than 1,200 advisers n the country.23

Djibouti

and its

neighbours

Having

now

examined French

strategy

in relation

to

Africa,

the

process

which

has thrust

Djibouti

into

a

sudden

position

of increased

prominence,

and

the

involvement of other

powers

which forces a Western

response,

it is

proper

to

examine in more

detail

Djibouti

itself

and

the

characteristicswhich will

aid or

hinder French

endeavours

o use

it

as the

linchpin

for the

security

oftheir

African

and Middle Eastern

positions.

The

French

presence

in

the

Territory

15. Joseph Alsop, 'Soviet Naval Power Increase Threatens Persian Gulf Route', The

Oregonian.

Clipping,

no data available.

16.

'Cuba

Training

MIG

Pilots in S.

Yemen',

The Honolulu

Advertiser,

25

June

1973,

sec.

1,

p.

A-2.

17.

'North

Koreans

Flying

for

Egypt',

Honolulu

Star-Bulletin,

15

August

1973,

sec.

1,

p.

A-7;

'Israelis,

N.

Koreans

Fight

in

Egypt

Skies',

Honolulu

Star-Bulletin,

18

October

1973,

sec.

1,

p.

1.

18.

'Africa-Rumblings

on a Fault

Line/Sudan:

The

Soviet Viet

Nam',

Time

(1

March

1971),

p.

34-5.

19.

'India

Helping

Iraq's Military

With

Advisers',

The

Honolulu

Advertiser,

22

June

1973,

sec.

1,

p.

A-10.

20.

Richard T.

Ackley,

'The Soviet

Navy's

Role in

Foreign Policy',

Naval War

College

Review,

XXIV

(May 1972),

pp.

48-65.

21.

Crocker

Snow, Jr., 'Japan's

Sea

Power',

The

Honolulu

Advertiser,

6

October

1973,sec.

1,

p.

A-16.

22.

Dara Adams

Schmidt,

'Isolating

the

Military',

The

Honolulu

Advertiser,

18

July

1973,

sec.

1,

p.

A-16.

23.

Georgie

Anne

Geyer,

'Iran,

an

Emerging Power',

Honolulu

Star-Bulletin,

23

July

1973,

sec.

1,

p.

A-20.




7/11

100

AFRICAN

FFAIRS

dates

from

a

treaty

made

in

1862 with

local

chiefs,

which

set

the

stage

for

gradual

expansion,

by

treaty,

in

1884,

1885,

and

1896.

Djibouti

became the

capital

town in

1892,

and

the officialname

of the

possession

French

Somaliland

n

1896.

Two treatiessignedin 1897 with Menelik II of Ethiopiafinalized he Territory's

borders

and

provided

for the

constructionof a

railway

between

the

Ethiopian

capital

of Addis Ababaand

Djibouti.

Since

1946

Djibouti

has

been

represented

in

the

French

Parliamentas an

Overseas

Territory,

a

status it

chose

to

continue

in a

popular

referendum

conducted n

1967. A

High

Commissioner

s

appointed

by

Paris,

but his

powers

are

theoretically

imited to certain

areas

such as

defence

and

foreign

affairs.

The

Territory

s

financially

autonomous.

The

economy

itself

is

based

upon

the

port

of

Djibouti's

shipping

and

the

traffic

of

the

Franco-Ethiopian

railway.

It

costs

France

$60

million a

year

to

administerthe Territory and subsidize its economy. While the Territory's

location

gives

it

its

strategic

importance,

it

is

also in one

of the

world's

most

barren,

resource-lacking

reas. Its

8,800

square

miles,

roughly

the size

of

New

Hampshire,

burn

under

temperatures

which

average

920 from

May

to

October,

and

are covered with

sand,

thorny

scrub

bush,

and

rock

hills.

Rivers

are

generally

dry,

and

permanent

lakes such as

Lake

Assal and

Lake

Abbe

have

too

high

a salt concentration

o

be

of

any

use. Some

livestock

is

raised

in the

coastal

region

and on

the

high

plateaus

of the

Gouda

and

Mabla

mountain

ranges,

but at

present

there are

only

10,500

head of

cattle and

80,000

sheep,

as

against 600,000 goats. Agricultural development is limited mainly to the

outskirts of the

larger

towns and

at some oases

plots,

industry being

based

entirely

upon

the

port

activities at

Djibouti.24

In

1967

exports

were

a mere

$2-8

million,

principally

hides

and

salt,

all but

$400,000

of

this

trade

going

to

France.

Imports

were

$26.9

million,

again

primarily

from France. Tourism

has

been

increasing

in

recent

years

to the

pleasant

holiday

resort area

along

the

Bay

of

Tadjoura,

but

can

do little to offset

the

tremendous

mbalance

of trade. The

situationhas been

exacerbated

by

the

closing

of the Suez Canal in

1967;

shipping

passing

through Djibouti

has

declined 80 per cent, thus causing massive unemployment. The city itself

already

contains two-thirds

of the

Territory's population,

and

in 1967 barbed

wire

fences studded

with

watchtowersand flaremines

were erected n

an

attempt

to

control the

constant

influx

of

rural

peoples

drawn

by

the

salaries

which

are

still

twice those of

neighbouring

countries.25

The

problem

of

continual

population

flow into

Djibouti

is

intimately

con-

nected with

the

most

pressing

and

potentiallyexplosive

aspect

of the

Territory's

internal and external relations-the

nearly

even ethnic division of the

125,000

24. Ambassade de France Service de Presse et

d'Information,

The

French

Territory of

the

Afars

and the Issas

(no publication data), pp. 4-5,

7-16. See also 'Africa:

Droppingin on

Djibouti',

Time

(29

January 1973), p.

28,

and

generally, Virginia

Thompson

and

Richard

Adloff,

Djibouti

and the Horn

of Africa

(Stanford, 1968).

25.

John

Hatch,

Africa Today-And

Tomorrow

(New

York,

1965), p.

351;

P.

J.

M.

McEwan, ed.,

Twentieth-Century Africa

(London, 1968), p.

197.

See also

'Dropping

in

on

Djibouti'.




8/11

DJIBOUTI:

STRATEGIC RENCHTOEHOLD

101

population

into two

mutually antagonistic

ribal

groups,

the

Afar,

or

Danakil,

nomads who

have

ties with

Ethiopia,

and

the Issa

tribesmen who

have ties

with

Somalia. Both

Ethiopia

and Somalia

stand

ready

to assert

their

claims to

the

Territory n the event of a Frenchdeparture. Ethiopiabasesits claimsupon an

historical

presence

n the areaand the nineteenth

century

treaties

t

made

ceding

land to

France. Until the

grafting

of

Eritrea

onto

Ethiopia

in 1952

under

United

Nations'

direction,

Djibouti

served as

Ethiopia's only

outlet to the

sea.

Although

now

possessing

the

Eritrean

ports

of Massawa and

Assab,

Ethiopia

still

sends

over

half

of

its

foreign

trade

through

Djibouti

via the

Franco-

Ethiopian

railway.

The

presence

of

a

simmering

revolt

in Eritrea

ed

by

the

Liberation

Front

of

Eritrea

(ELF)26

has served

to

further increase

the

vital

natureof

the

railway

n

which

Ethiopia

acquired

a

financial

nterestas

a result

of

a 12 November 1959 treaty with France.27 EmperorHailie Selassie stated in

September

1966

that when France left the

Territory,

which

he

claimed had

once

been

part

of

Ethiopia,

it

would return

to its

'rightful

owners'. Somalia

said it

would

oppose

any

such

move.28

For

its

part

Somalia

sees

the

acquisition

of

Djibouti

as

a

necessity

in

its

quest

to

unite

the Somali

peoples

of Africa.

During

the nineteenth

century

Somalia

was

divided

among

the

British,

French,

and

Italians. In

1960 the British

zone

joined

the

Italian

area,

then

under United Nations'

trusteeship,

to form

the

Republic

of

Somalia.

French Somalilandhad

been

granted

internal

autonomy

in 1956, but by a 75 per cent majorityvoted in 1958 to retain its territorial

status.29

Somalia

s

committed

by

its

constitution o

seek

the

peaceful

and

legal

reunification

of

all the

Somali

peoples.

Most of those who

live

outside

the

borders

of

Somalia are

nomads who

constantly

squabble among

themselves,

and

who

accept

neither

government

rule nor

national boundaries.

There

is,

however,

a

strong

underlying

unity

when the

fighting

s

turned

against

outsiders,

and

many

of the

Somalis

look to

the

Republic

of

Somalia

for

support

in

their

more

serious

battles.30 The Somali

flag

has

a

five-pointed

white

star on an

azure

background,

two

points

symbolizing

the

former

British and

Italian

colonies, one the French territory,one the Northern Province of Kenya, and

the

other

the

Haud-Ogaden egion

of

Ethiopia.

The

Somaliclaims n

pursuance

of

their

goal

of

unity

have led

to strained

relations

with the

states

involved.

France

has

strongly

opposed

the

pan-Somali

movement,31

nd

the

presence

of

Somalia-based

political

parties

n

Djibouti

has

led to

violence

in

recent

years.

When

President de

Gaulle

visited

the

Territory

in

1966,

the nationalist Issa

26.

Mary

Hanson,

'Eritrea: The Hidden

War

in

East

Africa',

Pacific

Research

&

World

Empire Telegram,

I

(10

September

1969),

pp.

1-6.

27.

The

French

Territory of

the

Afars

and the

Issas,

p.

9.

28.

'Somalia

Moving

to

Ease Tension

Over

Neighbour',

The

New York

Times,

8

March

1967,

sec.

1,

p.

18.

29. Thomas Patrick Melady, Faces of Africa (New York,

1964),

p.

240.

30.

'Somalia

Moving

to

Ease

Tension Over

Neighbour.'

On

Somalia

generally,

see

I.

M.

Lewis,

The

Modern

History of

Somaliland

(London,

1965),

J.

Drysdale,

The

Somali

Dispute (London,

1964),

and

S.

Touval,

Somali

Nationalism

(London,

1969).

31.

Helen

Kitchen, ed.,

A Handbook

of

African

Affairs (New

York,

1964),

p.

136.




9/11

102

AFRICAN

AFFAIRS

Parti Mouvement

Populaire,

which

drew

most

of its

strength

from the 66

per

cent of

Djibouti

city's

population

which

was

of

Somali

extraction,

launched

a

series

of violent riots

demanding

mmediate

ndependence.

Highly

embarassed,

de Gaulle ordered an immediatereferendumto determinethe future status of

the

Territory.

Due

to

the

continual nflux

of non-citizensacross

he

Territory's

borders,

stiff

voting

regulations

were

put

into effect

under which

only

French

citizens over

21

years

whose

papers

were

in

orderwere

alllowed

to vote.

There

were

39,024

eligible

voters out of

125,050

inhabitants,

22,004

Afar

and

14,689

Somalis of

the Issa and

Isaq

subgroups.32

Thousands

who lacked

valid

residence

papers

were

expelled.

In the actual

balloting

held on 19 March

1967,

nearly

60

per

cent

of

the

voters

opted

for

continuance of

the French mandate. As

was to

be

expected,

the

opposition claimed that the ballotinghad been rigged, and Somalia stated its

refusal

to

accept

the

results. Demonstrations

erupted,

leading

to

rioting

in

which at

least

17 civilians

were

killed.33

With

Ethiopian

and Somali

troops

poised

on the

Territory's

borders,

the

French were

caught

n a situationwhere

they

were forced to localize

the

bloodshed

by calling

in

troops

and

police

to

forcibly

quell

the

disorders.34

Given the fact

that a French

departure

would

have led to an

Ethiopian-Somali

war,

which

would

hardly

have been

expected

to

stay

localized for

long,

the French chose to take

what came

and continue

their

'mission'

in

Djibouti.

The

reaction

of

most African

governments

was

favourable.35

Acting swiftly,

French

troops

held

or

deported

thousands

of

Somalis who

held no valid

papers

and were

suspected

of

being agitators.36

Somalia refused

to

let

the

deported

ribesmen

nto her

territory,

and

feelings

became

very

bitter,

particularly

n

light

of

evidence that massive Somali financial

aid had

played

a

part

in the

post-election

demonstrations.37

Acrimonious

verbal

volleys

passed

betweenAfar

and

Issa

leaders,

with

Ali

Aref,

leader

of the

strong

Afar

Democratic

Party,declaring

The Afarhate the

Somalis,

o

say

things

as

they

are.

They

have

always

been

our

enemies.'38

Somali

leaders said

they

would no

longer

take

partin any internalgovernment,39 ut laterrelented,while the Frenchlaunched

an intensive

programme

o

raise the economic level

of the

nomadic

Afar

to

that

of

the

more

urban Issa. In a final

move

the

name

of French

Somaliland,

32. Eric

Pace,

'French Said to Plan Fast Exit

if

Displeased by

Somali

Election',

The

New York

Times,

17 March

1967,

sec.

1,

p.

16;

Eric

Pace,

'Somaliland

Voters

Back

Con-

tinuation of

Rule

by

France',

The New York

Times,

20

March

1967,

sec.

1,

p.

1.

33.

'French

Somaliland:

Victory

for

Trouble',

Time,

89

(31

March

1967),

p.

30.

34. Eric

Pace,

'

11

Somalis

Killed

by

French

Troops

in

Djibouti

Riots',

The New York

Times,

21

March

1967,

sec.

1,

p.

1.

35.

Henry

Tanner,

'France to Retain Somaliland

Rule',

The

New

York

Times,

23

March

1967,

sec.

1,

p.

1.

36.

Eric

Pace,

'Somalia

Bars

Somalis',

The

New

York

Times,

23 March

1967,

sec.

1,

p. 10.

37.

Eric

Pace,

'Desert Torture

is

Laid to

French',

The

New York

Times,

24 March

1967,

sec.

1,

p.

10.

38. Eric

Pace,

'France

Will

Help

Somaliland

Tribe',

The

New York

Times,

25 March

1967,

sec.

1,

p.

5.

39. 'Somaliland: Votes

and

Riots',

The

New York

Times,

26

March

1967,

sec.

4,

p.

2.




10/11

DJIBOUTI:

STRATEGIC RENCH

TOEHOLD

103

which

in

French

is 'the French Coast

of the

Somalis',

was

changed

to

the

French

Territory

of

the Afars and

the

Issas.40

Tensions

gradually

ubsided,

although

Somalia

continuedto

covertly support

resistance parties and a small-scale guerrilla movement. On the night of

24

January

1970 a

grenade

thrown

into a restaurant

njured

16

Europeans,

while

a

number

of leaflets

calling

for violence

were scattered in the African

quarter

of

Djibouti.

These were

signed

by

the Somali Coast Liberation

Front.41

Today

both

the

Somalis

and

Ethiopians

provide

refuge

for

groups

seeking

the

independence

of the

Territory,

so

as

to be

in a

position

to

capitalizeupon

a French

withdrawal. The

Ethiopiancounterpart

o the

Hargeisa-based

Somali

Coast

Liberation

Front

is

the Movementfor

the

Liberationof French

Somaliland,

led

by

an

Afar tribesmen.

To

avoid

a

confrontation,

he

Somali have

asked

that when and if the Frenchwithdraw,the United Nations assumea temporary

administration

over the

territory

for

a

period

of

two

years.

This

would allow

both time

for the Somalis

to cultivate

support

before the

self-determination

referendum and

for

some

arrangement

o be reached that

might

satisfy

both

Somalia

and

Ethiopia.42

In

January

1973

President

Pompidou

visited

the

Territory.

Amidst

massive

security

precautions

and

reports

that

both the Somalis and

Ethiopians planned

to foment

trouble,

the visit went

off

peacefully.43

There are

reports

of a

gradual

shift in

the French attitude towards

the

continuing

costly presence

in

Djibouti,

with many wondering why France bothers to stay at all.44 Such doubt is

understandable,

iven

the traditional

French

governmental

eluctance o

publically

explain

he

strategic hinking

behind its

military

decisions. More

fundamentally,

however,

it

is

obvious

that

while

Djibouti

has

always

had

intrinsic

positional

value,

the

French continuedto

hang

onto it in the

past

as the lesser of two evils.

A

withdrawal

would

precipitate

both an

internal

conflict

between

the

Afar and

Issa and

also a sure war between

Ethiopia

and

Somalia. Such a

conflict

would

involve

others,

for the United States

and Israel back

Ethiopia's

claims,

while

Russia

and

China

support

Somalia.45

France,

it

would

appear,

had little

option but to remain. Althoughsuch a decision was perhapsthe only realistic

solution,

the

French

public

has

long

since

lost

its

desire to

participate

n

these

kinds

of

colonial

ventures.

If,

in the

immediate

past,

France has

kept

hold of

Djibouti

for want of

any

better

solution,

it now

finds

its

albatross

porting

plummage

of

a

differentcolour.

40.

'French to Alter

Name of

Somali

Territory',

The New

York

Times,

25

April

1967,

sec.

1,

p.

46;

'French

Somaliland

Votes

to

Alter

Territorial

Name',

The

New York

Times,

14

May 1967,

sec.

1,

p.

17.

Elections

were

again

held

in

the

Territory

in

November

1973.

The

ruling

Union

and

Progress Party,

which

favoured the maintenance

of French

control,

won

all

forty

seats

in

the

assembly.

The

opposition

People's

African

League

declared

that the

election

had

been

rigged.

41. '16 Hurt in Djibouti in Terrorist Attack', The New York Times, 26 January 1970,

sec.

1,

p.

10.

42.

Irving Kaplan

et

al,

Area

Handbook

for

Somalia

(Washington,

D.C.,

1969),

p.

232.

43. 'The

Last

Outpost',

Newsweek

(22

January

1973), pp.

39-40.

44.

'Africa:

Dropping

in

on

Djibouti'.

45.

'The

Last

Outpost'.




11/11

104

AFRICAN

AFFAIRS

Developments

in

the

Indian

Ocean

region

(which

have been

described in the

section

above)

have thrust

upon

the

Territory

a new

importance.

Prior to the

beginning

of the

withdrawal rom

Malagasy,

French

forces

n

Djibouti

numbered

between 5,000 and 6,000 men, consisting of a Military Commandgroup, the

highly-decorated

Thirteenth

Demibrigade

of

the French

Foreign Legion

(13e

D.B.L.E.)46

one Marine

infantry

battalion,

a

Marine

artillery

battalion,

one

army

aviation

troop,

two air force

squadrons (one

of A-1E attack

aircraft

and one

of

mixed

transports),

and a

naval

contingentmanning

two

minesweepers

and some

landing

craft.47

Whether these forces will be

augmented

is

not

yet

known,

but

appears

probable.

For

the

Territory

to

continue as a

viable

base will of

necessity depend

to a

large

extent

upon

the

ability

of the French to convince

the

inhabitants that

associationwith France s in their best interests. Development s a slow taskin

a

land where there

is

such a

paucity

of human and natural resources.

Fully

90

per

cent of

the

population

is

completely

illiterate. In 1969

only

4,778

students attended the

Territory's

19

public

and seven

private

elementary

schools,

and

only

604

students

attended he

one

public

and two

private

secondary

schools.

Increasing

numbers of students are

being

sent to

universities

in

France,

primarily

n the

hope

of

strengthening

cultural

ies,

but

they

are a

small

group.

Djibouti

itself has but

one

600-bed

hospital,

and ten

dispensaries

are

located

in the main rural centres.

The

transportation

etwork

(apart

from

the

railway) s primitive but growing.48

Illegal

immigration

continues to swell

the

population,

although

this

problem

has been cut

considerablythrough

the

efforts

of the

Foreign Legion,

which

patrols

the desolate 250-mile

border. The Afar are

strongly

committed to

French rule as

the

only

means

to retain

their

ethnic

independence,

while

the

Issa

are

just

as committed to

independence

and union with Somalia.

Whether

the

new focus

of attention

upon

the

Territory

will increase tensions

cannot

be

accuratelypredicted.

For the

moment the French

are

firmly

in

possession

of their

strategic

oehold

on the African continent. The future of the Territory would appearto be

as

one observer

orecast n

1964: 'French Somaliland

has chosen

what seems

the

only way

for

a

territory

with

a

precarious

political

and economic future.

It

has voted to

remain a

French

territory,

hereby obtaining

the

aid

and

guidance

it

needs

desperately.

At least for

the near

future,

it is

likely

to remain

a

necessary

vestige

of

colonialism

on the

continent

of

Africa.'49

Of

one

thing

there

is little

room

for

doubt-the

heightened importance

of the Red

Sea/Western

Indian

Ocean area

in the uncertain

post-October

Arab-Israeliwar

situation.

46. Martin

Windrow,

French

Foreign

Legion

(Berkshire, England, 1971), p.

35.

47. Interview with Lt.-Col. Jean Salvan, 7 December 1972.

48.

The French

Territory

of

the

Afars

and the

Issas,

p.

6.

49.

Melady,

Faces

of

Africa, p.

241.

djibouti: france's strategic toehold in africaauthor(s): thomas a. markssource: african affairs,...

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