dl3.2-report on the eus capacities conflict prevention-v1.4 ......located within discussions of the...

EU-CIVCAPPreventingandRespondingtoConflict:DevelopingEU

CIVilianCAPabilitiesforasustainablepeace

ReportontheEU’sCapabilitiesforConflictPrevention

Deliverable3.2

(Version1.4;30January2017)

LauraDavis,NabilaHabbidaandAnnaPenfrat

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementNo653227.

DL3.2TheEU’sCapabilitiesforConflictPrevention

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Howtocitethisreport

LauraDavis,NabilaHabbidaandAnnaPenfrat (2017),“ReportontheEU’sCapabilities forConflictPrevention”, EU-CIVCAP Report DL 3.2, available from:https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/eu-civcap_deliverable_3-2_updated.pdf.

Summaryofthedocument

TitleDL3.2ReportontheEU’sCapabilitiesforConflictPrevention

Lastmodification

State

30January2017

Final

Version 1.4

LeadingPartner

OtherParticipantPartners

Authors

EPLO

UBRIS

LauraDavis,NabilaHabbidaandAnnaPenfrat

Audience Public

Abstract

ThisreportexamineshowconflictpreventioninEUexternal action is understood and implemented –bothasawayofactingintheworldandasasetofdistinct activities. The report also providesrecommendations forways inwhich theEU couldstrengthen its capabilities to reduce conflictthroughitsexternalaction.

Keywords

• conflictprevention• EUexternalaction• conflictanalysis• mediation• earlywarning• capabilities


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

TABLEOFCONTENTS.........................................................................................................3EXECUTIVESUMMARY.......................................................................................................4LISTOFABBREVIATIONS....................................................................................................71.INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................82.THEEUROPEANUNIONANDCONFLICTPREVENTION.....................................................83.UNDERSTANDING‘CONFLICTPREVENTION’...................................................................94.CONFLICTPREVENTIONCAPABILITIES:POLICYANDPRACTICE....................................124.1.CAPABILITYTOLEAD...........................................................................................................124.2CAPABILITIESTOENGAGE.....................................................................................................134.2.1Mediationanddialogue.........................................................................................184.2.2Otherconflictpreventioninstruments...................................................................18

4.3CAPABILITYTOFUND...........................................................................................................194.4CAPABILITYFORCOOPERATIONANDCOORDINATION..................................................................20

5.CONCLUSIONANDRECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................21BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................23ANNEX1–LISTOFINTERVIEWS.......................................................................................25ANNEX2–ORGANIGRAMMEOFTHEEEASANDDGDEVCO............................................26


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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Preventingconflictsandrelapsesintoconflict,inaccordancewithinternationallaw,

is(…)aprimaryobjectiveoftheEU’sexternalaction.

CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,Councilconclusionsonconflictprevention,3101stForeignAffairsCouncilmeeting(Luxembourg,20June2011)

ThenotionoftheEUasapeaceprocess isanimportantstrandintheEU’s identity indealingwiththe rest of the world. The European Council has declared that conflict prevention is a primaryobjective of the EU’s external action. This report analyses what that means in practice andrecommendswaysinwhichtheEUmaystrengthenitscapacitytopreventconflictsworldwide.Thefirstobservationisthat‘conflictprevention’isusedindifferentwaysbydifferentactorswithintheEU’sexternalactionmachinery,notablytocoverbothconflictpreventionasawayinwhichtheEUactsinandengageswiththerestoftheworld,andasasetofdistinctactivities,particularly,forthisreport, conflict analysis, early warning and mediation.1 This multiple usage of the same termpresents real policy challenges,which shouldbeaddressedbywayof greater conceptual clarity–ensuringthatallactorsattachthesamemeaningtotheseterms.

Thisreportstartsbyanalysingwhat‘conflictprevention’meansfortheEU.Itthenconsidershowtheintention of preventing conflict and relapses into conflict – as “a primary objective of the EU’sexternal action”2 – is translated into policy and put into practice3 in order to assess the EU’scapacitiesforconflictpreventionandtorecommendwaysinwhichthesemaybestrengthened.

The report examines how conflict prevention is understood and implemented – both as away ofacting in theworldandasasetofdistinctactivities.Thecapacityof theEUto implementconflictprevention, in both these senses, is examined through the lens of component capabilities: thecapabilitiestoengage,capabilitiestofund,andthecapabilitytocoordinateandcooperatewiththirdparties. These three capabilities contribute to the capability to lead, which in turn feeds thecapabilitytoact–thatis,topreventconflict(seeFigure1insection4.1).

Politicalleadershipiscrucialateachstageofputtingconflictpreventionintopractice.Prioritisationisakeypartofleadership,4asthisreportconsidersleadershiptocomprise:

• establishingprioritiesamongcompetingneeds;• prioritisingtheimportantaswellastheurgent;• focusingonprevention,notonlyonresponse;and• integratingconflictpreventionintodecision-makingatthemoststrategiclevels.

1FutureEU-CIVCAPpaperswilladdressconflictprevention in relation to theCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,developmentandtrade;theseareasarethereforenotaddressedinthispaper.2 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on conflict prevention, 3101st Foreign Affairs Councilmeeting(Luxembourg,20June2011).3 Drawing on the framework developed in L. Davis, EU foreign policy, transitional justice and mediation(London:Routledge2014).4Davis (2014), ibid.and I.Manners,“TheNormativeEthicsoftheEuropeanUnion”, InternationalAffairs84,No.1(2002a):45-60.


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ThisstudyshowsthattheEUlargelyhasthecapabilitiestoengage.Thereisconsiderablepressureon time and personnel, yet the EU has awide array of policies, institutions and instruments thatenable intervention. Some of these, however, such as EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) andEuropean Parliament election observation missions, could be used to greater effect, and the EUshould also develop its capabilities further for preventive diplomacy. There are additionally thecapabilitiestofundconflictprevention,withacertainamountoffinancialresourcesavailableinthelongandtheshortterm,theissuebeingwhetherandhowtheyareused.

TheEUalsohasthecapabilitiestocoordinateandcooperate,particularlywiththirdpartiesduetothemultilateralnatureof theEUasanactor.CoordinationandcooperationwithintheEUpresentperhaps greater challenges that are intimately connected to the question of leadership. Thechallenges of the EU-28 in agreeing common policy in a given situation are a fact of EU foreignpolicy,yetanEUofficialinterviewedforthispaperbelievesthatthenecessaryspiritofcoordinationandcooperationexists across theEUmachinerywhen it comes to conflictprevention.5 This studyhasfoundthat,todate,theSECPOL.2Division6oftheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)andthe B.7 Unit7 in the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation andDevelopment(DGDEVCO)haveplayedimportantrolesinprovidingtechnicalassistanceforconflictpreventionacross theEU’sexternalactionand in facilitatingcoordinationandcooperationamongdifferentpartsofthemachineryforconflictprevention.

Recommendations

1. Asa first step in strengtheningEU capabilities toprevent conflict, EPLO recommends thatthe EEAS and the Commission jointly clarify in internal documents how the EU promotesconflictpreventionasawayofactingintheworld,howitcansupportandbesupportedbystabilisation,andhowspecificdistinctactivities(particularlyconflictanalysis,earlywarningand mediation) contribute differently to conflict prevention, and the differences andsynergiesbetweenthem.

2. SeniormanagementintheEEASandtheEuropeanCommissionshouldmainstreamconflictpreventionasamatterofpolicyandpracticeacrosstheEUexternalactionmachinery(theDGforNeighbourhoodandEnlargementNegotiations,DGDEVCO,DGEnergy,DGTrade,aswellastheEEAS)8andprioritisepreventionaswellasresponse.

3. The EU’s Global Strategy implementation plans should ensure that conflict prevention isprioritisedacrossall the thematicareas identified,notonly for the implementationof thesection on “an integrated approach to conflict”. It should also be prioritised in thepreparationof the action plan on security anddefence, the initiative onpublic diplomacyandotherfollow-upactionstotheGlobalStrategy.Implementationandactionplansshouldaddress these concerns directly and clearly identify resources, including institutional

5InterviewwithanofficialfromtheEuropeanCommission,September2016.6TheConflictPrevention,PeacebuildingandMediationDivision in theEEAS isalsocalledSECPOL.2andwaspreviouslyK2.Atthetimeofwriting,itwasexpectedthatthisdivisionwouldmergewiththeCSDP.1division(CoordinationandSupport)andbefurtherrenamed,duetotheongoingrestructuringoftheEEASsecurityandcrisismanagementstructures.7Thatis,theUnitforFragilityandResilience.8RecommendationsonmainstreamingorintegratingconflictpreventionintoallrelevantEUpoliciesandinstrumentscanbefoundinEPLO,LettertoHR/VPMogherinion“AnEUGlobalStrategyforPeace”(Brussels,2016a),availableatwww.eplo.org.


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expertiseand leadership, forpreventingconflictaswellasrespondingto itandaddressingtheimportantaswellastheurgent.

SeniormanagementintheEEASandtheCommissionshouldensurethat

4. SECPOL.2andDEVCOB.7continue toprovide leadership, technical supportandexpertisewithintheEEAS,DGDEVCOandacrosstheEU’sexternalactionmachinery;

5. SECPOL.2 and DEVCO B.7 are adequately resourced in terms of personnel, expertise andaccess tohigh-leveldecision-makingso that theEUprevents importantconflictsaswellasrespondstourgentcrises;

6. SECPOL.2andDEVCOB.7continuetoworkin innovativepartnerships inconflictsituationsworldwide,includingwithcivilsocietyorganisationsandotherexternalexpertise;

7. time isavailableforpersonneltogenerateand implementconflictanalysisacrosstheEU’sexternalaction,supportedbySECPOL.2andDEVCOB.7;

8. previousEUexperiencesandlessonsidentifiedinconflictzonesarecapturedbyanadequateknowledge management system that strengthens the evidence base for future conflictpreventionwork;and

9. the EU further develops its capacities for preventive diplomacy in situations at risk ofescalatingconflict, forexample,byreinforcingandtailoringthesupportprovidedtoEUSRsand heads of delegations in charge of carrying out dialogue in conflict-affected countries(e.g. mediation and analysis training, support staff) and by including conflict expertise intheirjobdescriptions.


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LISTOFABBREVIATIONS

DEVCOB.7 FragilityandResilienceUnit,EuropeanCommissionDirectorate-GeneralforInternationalCooperationandDevelopment

CSAP CountrySituationalAwarenessPlatform

CFSP CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy

CSDP CommonSecurityandDefencePolicy

DGDEVCO Directorate-GeneralforInternationalCooperationandDevelopment

DGHOME Directorate-GeneralforMigrationandHomeAffairs

DGNEAR Directorate-GeneralforEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyandEnlargementNegotiations

EC EuropeanCommission

EEAS EuropeanExternalActionService

EP EuropeanParliament

EUSR EUSpecialRepresentative

IcSP InstrumentcontributingtoStabilityandPeace

SEPCOL.2 ConflictPrevention,PeacebuildingandMediationDivision,EuropeanExternalActionService


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1.INTRODUCTION

The EU’s role in preventing conflictworldwide has been the subject of practitioner and scholarlyattentionsinceatleastthe1970s.Thesedebatesarenotrepeatedhere.

This report assesses thepolicies and tools currently available for EU conflict prevention, includingconflictanalysis,earlywarningandmediation,inordertoproviderecommendationsforhowtheEUmaystrengthenitsconflictpreventioncapabilitiesinthefuture.

EU documents, analysts and scholars use a range of terms to refer to related issues – conflictprevention, resolution ormanagement, crisismanagement, peacebuilding – any ofwhichmay belocatedwithin discussions of the EU as an international security provider or actor, or as a globalactor.Thispaperfocusesonconflictprevention.As‘conflictprevention’isfirmlylimitedtoexternalactionby the EU, although the EUmayhave significant influenceon intra-EU conflicts, this paperonlyaddressesconflictpreventioninrelationtotheEU’sexternalaction.FutureEU-CIVCAPpaperswill address conflictprevention in relation to specificpolicyareas, including theCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP),developmentandtrade.

Methodology

Theresearchthatinformsthisreportdrawsonscholarlyandpractitionerliteratureandanonymisedinterviewswith key informantsworking in andwithEU institutions conductedby LauraDavis, theleadauthor,andNabilaHabbidabetweenJulyandSeptember2016.9Noopinionexpressed in thisreportmaybeattributedtoanyindividualorinstitutionunlessdirectlyreferenced.

2.THEEUROPEANUNIONANDCONFLICTPREVENTION

In2011, theCouncilof theEuropeanUniondeclared that“[p]reventingconflictsandrelapses intoconflict, inaccordancewith international law, is thereforeaprimaryobjectiveof theEU’sexternalaction, inwhich itcouldtakea leadingroleacting inconjunctionwith itsglobal, regional,nationalandlocalpartners”.10

The role thatprinciplesplay in theEU’s relationswith thewiderworld is the subjectofextensivescholarship, including on civilian power Europe, a European civilising process, normative powerEurope,andthecurrent‘thirdwave’ofnormativetheorising.11AcriticalassessmentofwhethertheEUdoesordoesnotpursue thesenormativeobjectives is important toavoid complacency.12 This9 Thecontributions to this reportbyAnnaPenfratandNabilaHabbida,bothof theEuropeanPeacebuildingLiaisonOffice,aregratefullyacknowledged.10CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(2011),op.cit.11F.Duchêne,“Europe’sRole inWorldPeace” inR.Mayne(ed.),EuropeTomorrow:SixteenEuropeansLookAhead (London:Fontana,1972);K.E.Smith,EuropeanUnionForeignPolicy inaChangingWorld (Cambridge:Polity, 2003); A. Linklater, “A European Civilising Process?”, in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.), InternationalRelationsandtheEuropeanUnion(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005)pp.367-87;I.Manners,“NormativepowerEurope:Acontradictioninterms?”,JournalofCommonMarketStudies40,No.2(2002b),pp.235-258;R.G. Whitman, “The neo-normative turn in theorising the EU’s international presence”, Cooperation andConflict28,No.2(2013),pp.191-211.12H.Sjursen,“Whatkindofpower?”,JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy17,No.2(2006):169-81.


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report focuses on the capabilities that form the power the EU wields in relation to conflictpreventionratherthandebatingwhatkindofpowertheEUis.13

This report startsbyanalysingwhat ‘conflictprevention’means,ormaymean, for theEU. It thenconsidershowtheintentionofpreventingconflictandrelapsesintoconflict–as“aprimaryobjectiveof the EU’s external action”14 – is translated intopolicy andput intopractice15 to assess the EU’scapacitiesforconflictpreventionandtorecommendwaysinwhichthesemaybestrengthened.

3.UNDERSTANDING‘CONFLICTPREVENTION’

‘Conflict prevention’ presents numerous challenges to policy-makers, practitioners and advocates.Thefirstisaquestionofdefinition.Discussionsondefiningconflictandpeacespanmillenniaandthewide range of human endeavour and thought. Johan Galtung’s definition of “positive peace”16 isperhaps the most commonly referred to, where peace is more than the absence of war andsupposesaninclusivesociety.Yet,asOliverRichmondandothershavediscussed,‘liberal’peacecanbe seen as a Western-led attempt to impose a hegemonic system throughout the world thatreplicates certain social, political and economic institutions, norms and systems.17 Although thesediscussions cannotbe summarisedhere, theyprovide thebackdrop to this section,which situateshowtheEUunderstandsconflictprevention,asthiswillinfluencepolicyandpractice.

Conflict prevention can be understood – seemingly most simply – as the prevention of conflict,takingsteps toensure thatconflictdoesnothappen.This,however, leads to thenextquestionofwhatkindofconflictistheEUtryingtoprevent?EUdocumentsfocusonpreventingviolentconflict18andalsolistarangeof‘rootcauses’:issuesthatmayoftenbeconsideredtobestructuralconflicts,which may culminate in violent conflict. Structural conflicts typically include poverty,marginalisation,andabuseofhumanandcivilrights,andmayalsoincludegenderinequalityand/ortheexclusionofparticulargroupsongroundsofethnicity,religionorage,particularlychildrenandyoungpeople.Preventingviolentconflictthereforerequiresaddressingstructuralconflicttoo.

The focus on violent conflict in EU policy discourse deserves some reflection. If we accept thatconflict isnormal inanyhumansocietyand isevennecessary forall societies to transform in linewiththeuniversalvaluespresentedintheEUTreaties(suchasracialandsexualequality)astheEUideal,thendistinguishing‘peaceful’ornon-violentconflict(suchasdemonstrationsandadvocacyto13K.E.Smith,“TheEuropeanUnionintheWorld:FutureResearchAgendas”,inM.Egan,N.NugentandW.E.Paterson (eds), Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,2010),p.343,emphasisoriginal.14CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(2011),op.cit.15DrawingontheframeworkdevelopedinDavis(2014),op.cit.16J.Galtung,“Violence,Peace,andPeaceResearch”,JournalofPeaceResearch6,No.3(1969):167-19117O.P.Richmond,APost-LiberalPeace(London:Routledge,2011).18TheEUProgrammeforthePreventionofViolentConflicts(2001),henceforththeGothenburgprogramme,European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM(2001) 211 final(Brussels, 11 April 2001); European Commission, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European SecurityStrategy” (Brussels,2003),henceforththeEuropeanSecurityStrategy,and its ImplementationReportontheEuropeanSecurityStrategy–ProvidingSecurityinaChangingWorld(Brussels,2008);CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(2011),op.cit.;“SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy”(Brussels,June2016),henceforththeGlobalStrategy.


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changediscriminatory laws) fromviolentconflict (suchasrebellion) isperhapsausefulshorthand,but is nonetheless problematic: violence is, after all, only oneway of dealingwith conflict.Whatcausesviolence inaparticular timeandplace inaparticular contextwhere the ‘root causes’mayhaveremainedunchangedandlargelyunchallengedforsometime,andwhetherthatviolencethenescalates to involve more people and more issues, or whether it dies down again, is difficult topredict.19Itisworthnotingatthispointthathow‘rootcauses’areunderstoodwilllikelyshapehowa conflict is understood: an observer looking for evidence of tension between ethnic groups, forexample, is more likely to then understand the conflict as an ‘ethnic conflict’, perhaps to theexclusionofotherequallyormoreplausiblecauses.

Animportantnotehereisthat‘mainstreaminggenderequality’sometimesappearsalongside‘rootcauses’ infewEUdocuments,butit isabsentfromtheCommunicationonConflictPrevention(theGothenburgprogramme) and theCommunicationon theComprehensiveApproach.20 For its part,theEUGlobal Strategymakes references towomen inpeace-making rather thangenderequality.Structuralviolenceagainstwomenandgirls isnotconsidereda rootcause,despite itsprevalence,revealingperhapsacriticalblindspotinEUunderstandingofconflictthatwillinfluencesignificantlyanyEUinterventioninagivensituation.

Thereareconflictscontainedbygeopolitics– suchas theso-called ‘frozen’conflicts in the formerSovietspace–whichmaynotbeparticularlyviolent(yet)butwhicharegenerallybelievedtobeatrisk of eruption or escalation and which are a present as well as potential future threat to EUinterests, such as regional stability. Preventing the escalation of these crises is clearly in the EU’sinterestsandisnotthesameasresolvingthem,evenifresolvingthemmightbemore in linewiththeEU’smuch-vauntedidentityasapeace-makeraroundtheworld.

Besidesthecomparativeeaseof identifyingaviolentratherthanalatentorstructuralconflict,thedistinctionof ‘violent’maybeuseful shorthandto transmit themeaningof ‘negative’conflict.21 Inotherwords,sinceviolenceharmspeople,humansufferingshouldbe limitedasmuchaspossible.But conflicthasdrivenmanypositive socialmovementsacross theworld, includingduring the so-calledArabSpring.Preventing (violent)conflictshouldnotbesynonymouswithstabilisation–andthe consequences of the EU’s past equation of stabilising regions with stabilising authoritarianregimes are clear.22 Conflict prevention may contribute to stabilisation, and stabilisation maycontribute to preventing conflict, but these connections are not automatic: stabilisation maypostpone or even exacerbate the potential for future violent conflict by reinforcing structuralviolenceand/orautocraticruleinsocieties,forexample.

19SeeforexampleT.Diez,S.StetterandM.Albert(eds),TheEuropeanUnionandborderconflicts:Thepowerofintegrationandassociation(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008);L.Bossi,N.ÒDochartaighandD.Pisoiu(eds),PoliticalViolenceinContext:Time,SpaceandMilieu(Colchester:ECPRPress,2015).ThispointiswellmadebytheEarlyWarningSystem.20TheGothenburgprogramme(2001),op.cit. ;EuropeanCommissionandHighRepresentativeoftheEUforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy, “TheEU’scomprehensiveapproach toexternal conflictandcrises”, JointCommunication to the European Parliament and the Council, JOIN(2013) 30 final (Brussels, 11 December2013),henceforth:CommunicationontheComprehensiveApproach.21Galtung(1969),op.cit.22 G. Noutcheva, “What the ENP review did not say”, Blog post (Antero EU Foreign Policy Education andResearch,2May2016) (http://www.eufp.eu/what-enp-review-did-not-say-g-noutcheva),accessed31August2016.


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The distinction between ‘good’ conflict and ‘bad’ conflict (and its near relation, terrorism) isthereforeapoliticalonereflectingEU interests,whichshouldbebasedondeepknowledgeof thecontextandshouldnotbehiddenbehindmoreapparentlyneutral,evenifinaccurate,adjectiveslike‘violent’.Conflictprevention ispolitical: it isbasedonunderstandingthepowerrelationsbetweendifferentactorsandstakeholders inaconflictandonprioritisingEU intervention insomeform,ornot,inrelationtotheEU’sinterests.

Beyond the complexities of definingwhich conflicts the EUwishes to prevent lies one of the keychallenges at the heart of conflict prevention policy and practice: the combination of addressingmacro-level issuessuchaspovertyandexclusionwiththeobjectiveofstructuraltransformation inthelongterm,andtheneedtoidentifyandaddressspecificeventsandactorsthatmay(ormaynot)resorttoviolenceinaparticularplaceandtime.

Oneofthekeyproblemswithconflictprevention,however,referstothelackofconceptualclarityattheEUlevel.Thisisreflectedininterviewswithkeyinformants.Forinstance,forsomeinterviewees,conflictpreventionisunderstoodasthewayinwhichtheEUengageswithandactsinrelationtotheoutsideworld.23Forothers,conflictpreventioncouldbeseenasasetofdistinctactivities–conflictanalysis, early warning and mediation, for the purposes of this report – intended to defuseescalationinagivensituation.24Othersseeitasacombinationofboth.25Asthisreportshows,thisconceptualambiguity is thus translateddirectly into thechallengesof theEU’s institutional set-upandofmainstreamingandresponsibility,whicharediscussedinthecapabilitiessectionbelow.

A related challenge is that while there is evidence of the effectiveness of EU support for certainconflictpreventionactivities,26itismoredifficulttodemonstratetheimpactof‘conflictprevention’,when understood as a way of acting, rather than a set of activities or tools. Successful conflictpreventionbydefinitionresultsinanabsenceoftheexpectedeventorprocess:the(violent)conflictdoes not erupt or escalate, although other positive proxy indicators, such as more resilientcommunitiesormoreresponsiveinstitutionsmaybeused.Giventhecomplexityofconflictandtheunpredictability of eruption of violence, this challenge is exacerbated by the near impossibility oftracinghowtheEU’sspecificcontribution(s)canbeplausiblysaidtohaveplayedapartinpreventingaparticularoutbreakofviolence.UnderstandingtheEU’scontributions–positiveornegative27–topreventing conflict worldwide suffers from a general lack of evidence on the EU’s impact onpopulationsinnon-EUcountries.28Theproofthereforeiscounterfactual,andconflictpreventionasawayofactingintheworldbecomes‘amatteroffaith’and‘fuzzy’.29

23InterviewwithanofficialfromaMemberStatePermanentRepresentation,23August2016.24Interviewwithanon-governmentalorganisation,4August2016.25InterviewwithanofficialfromtheEEAS,10August2016.26EuropeanCommission, “ThematicEvaluationofEuropeanCommissionSupport toConflictPreventionandPeace-building”(Brussels,October2011).27 The EU can of coursemake a situation worse. Albert et al. characterise the EU in some situations as a“‘perturbator’, a worrying disturbance for the conflict” (see M. Albert, T. Diez and S. Stetter, “Thetransformativepowerofintegration:Conceptualizingborderconflicts”inDiezetal.(2008),op.cit.,p.23).28 G. Noutcheva, “Fake, partial and imposed compliance: The limits of the EU’s normative power in theWesternBalkans”,JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy16,No.7(2009):1065–1084.29InterviewwithanofficialfromtheEEAS,10August2016.


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While EUMember States are supportive of conflict prevention30 and the interviewees agree thatthere is apositive trendwithin theEU institutions tomainstreamconflictprevention,31 this isnotnecessarilyreflectedinasharedviewonwhatconflictpreventionis,andwhatshouldbedoneandbywhom.Toconclude, conflictprevention isnot something thatpolicy-makersareagainst,but itdoesnotautomaticallyfollowthatpolicy-makershaveacommonunderstandingofwhatitentailsinpractice or a sharedwillingness to allocate resources to it, especially in the absence of evidencedemonstratingitseffectiveness.

Thissenseofadualmeaningoftheterm–awayofactingintheworld,andasetofdistinctactivities–poseschallengesforanalysis,aswellasforpolicyandpractice.

4.CONFLICTPREVENTIONCAPABILITIES:POLICYANDPRACTICE

ThereisconsiderableliteratureonhowtodeterminetheEU’scapabilities,orcapacities,forexternalaction,32muchofwhichhasdevelopedfromthe‘actorness’literature33andisoftenfocusedmainlyontheCSDP.ThispaperadaptsandadoptsthemodelputforwardbyRichardWhitmanandStefanWolff,whichincludesononelevelthecapabilitiestoengage,capabilitiestofundandcapabilitiestocoordinate and cooperate with third parties; on the next level the capability to lead; and at thehighestlevel,thecapabilitytoact.34

4.1.CAPABILITYTOLEAD

Asdiscussedabove,conflict ispolitical,conflictprevention ispoliticalandalldecisionsonwhetherandhowtoactinagivensituationarealsopolitical.TheinterestsoftheEUanditsMemberStatesdetermine the priorities of its external action and theways inwhich the EU acts. Leadership35 iscrucialtosuccessfulconflictprevention.36Leadershipatall levelsofthebureaucracyiscriticalbothforstimulatingthedevelopmentofcapabilities–thatis,thetoolsarethereifleadersdecidetousethem–andfordecidingthatthetoolsbeused,ornot,forthisspecificobjective.Leadershipshouldthereforebeconsideredacapabilityinitsownright,andacomponentofthecapabilitytoact.

A key challenge is the question of political priority-setting. Conflict prevention by its very natureseeks topreventconflictsover thehorizon: responsesarepre-emptive,not reactive.Successdoesnot lead to headlines in national newspapers. The EU, like any other actor, has limited resources(political, technical, financial and human) that must be prioritised. The risk is that the urgent

30InterviewwithanofficialfromaMemberStatePermanentRepresentation,23August2016.31InterviewwithanofficialfromtheEEAS,10August2016.32TheEU-CIVCAPprojecthasitsownconceptualframeworkoncapabilities:seeEU-CIVCAP,EUCapabilitiesforConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding:ACapabilities-BasedAssessment(2016),internaldocument.33C.BrethertonandJ.Volger,TheEuropeanUnionasaGlobalActor(London:Routledge,1999,2006).34AdaptedfromR.G.WhitmanandS.Wolff(eds),TheEuropeanUnionasaGlobalConflictManager(London:Routledge,2012).35 Although sometimes also referred to as ‘political will’ (seeWhitman andWolff, 2012, p. 11), leadershipbetterreflectstheextenttowhichindividualdecisionscreateanenvironmentinwhichsomethinghappensordoesnothappen. ‘Politicalwill’on theotherhandtends toadddistance,as though ‘politicalwill’ somehowexistsindependentlyfromdecision-makingprocesses.36Interviewswithanon-governmentalorganisation,4August2016;withanofficialfromtheEEAS,10August2016;andwithanofficialfromaMemberStatePermanentRepresentation,23August2016.


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overshadowstheimportant–thatrespondingto(visible)crisestakesthelion’sshareofresources,and therefore de-prioritises preventive action. Preventing the urgent from squeezing out theimportantrequirespoliticalleadership.

Thepresumedlikelihoodofsuccessofanyinterventionisalsoanotherfactorthatwillcontributetodecisions to intervene in certain cases, which is in turn influenced by how well the variouscapabilitiesareperceivedtobeabletomeetthechallengesofaparticularsituation(theredarrowsinFigure1).37Thispresentsanotablechallengewhen,asdiscussedabove,itisdifficulttoprovetheeffectivenessofEUconflictpreventioninterventionsingivensituationsandconflictpreventionmayoftenbeseenasamatteroffaith.

Thisdiagramdemonstratesclearlyhowproblematicitisthatconflictpreventionisunderstoodbothasawayofacting inexternalactionandasasetofdiscreteactivities:mediation,conflictanalysisand early warning, as these latter will form a potentially small sub-set of the broader conflictpreventionfield.

Figure1:Thenecessarycapabilitiesforconflictprevention

Note:Thepresumedlikelihoodofsuccessisshowninred.

Source:WhitmanandWolff(2012),op.cit.

ThefollowingsectionswillanalyseEUcapabilitiesforconflictprevention,firstasacross-cuttingwayofactingintheworld,andtheninrelationtothespecificconflictpreventionactivitiesthatarethefocusofthisreport.

4.2CAPABILITIESTOENGAGE

37WhitmanandWolff(2012),op.cit.


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Capabilitiestoengageincludethearchitecture–thepolicies,institutionalset-upandinstruments–thatenablestheEUtoact,shoulddecision-makersdecidetodoso.Havingthecapabilitiesislikelytogeneratemoredesiretoact,asinterventionismorelikelytosucceed.Thissectionbrieflytracesthepolicies,institutionsandinstrumentsattheEU’sdisposalthatenableaction.38

TheLisbonTreaty(2007)inArt.21statesthat“[t]heUnionshalldefineandpursuecommonpoliciesandactions,andshallworkforahighdegreeofcooperationinallfieldsofinternationalrelations,inorderto(...)(c)preservepeace,preventconflictsandstrengtheninternationalsecurity”.ThisisthefirsttimethatconflictpreventionisexplicitlymentionedintheTreaties,althoughthefirstpoliciesonconflict prevention were developed in 2001 with the Gothenburg programme and theCommunication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, and the Gothenburg programmeremainsthebasisforEUpolicyinthisfield.39

The Council conclusions on conflict prevention of 2011 then flesh out Art. 21(c), defining conflictprevention as “a primary objective of the EU’s external action”.40 These conclusions list areas ofprogress,includingparticularpolicies:theEuropeanSecurityStrategyanditsimplementationreport,theCommissionCommunicationonConflictPrevention,policiesondialogueandmediation,securitysectorreform,thesecurityanddevelopmentnexusandsituationsoffragility.Asconflictpreventioninstruments, the conclusions cite strengthening civilian and military CSDP, establishing theInstrumentforStabilityandEUSpecialRepresentatives(EUSRs).Theyalsonotethatwhiletherehasbeen progress in early warning, these capabilities need to be strengthened, and early action –including through mediation – improved. The document also notes how the formation of theEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)willenablemorecomprehensiveapproachestoconflict.41

The 2011 conclusions recognise the Gothenburg programme as the basis of future policydevelopment, yet it is noticeablehow the conclusionsdonot address the firstpointmadeby theGothenburg programme, and which is directly connected to both questions of leadership andcapabilitytoact:thepoliticalprioritiesforconflictprevention.42TheGothenburgprogramme,whichpredatestheLisbonTreatyandthecreationoftheEEAS,sawacentralrolefortheCouncilinconflictprevention in providing political leadership. This role has been significantly diminished with thecreationoftheEEAS:“conflictpreventiondoesnotsurfaceoftenwithinCouncil formations,sotheworkoftheEEASwithinitsmandateandwithCommissionresourcesisoftenbelowMemberStates’radar”.43Yetwhile theCouncil conclusionsdescribe the“renewed impetus” theEEAScanbring toconflict prevention, they do not explicitly transfer the political leadership described in theGothenburgprogrammetotheEEAS,reflectinguneaseamong(some)MemberStatesthattheEEASis taking too strongapolitical leadership role. Thismay represent an important capability gap forconflictprevention.

Thequestionofpoliticalleadershipandinstitutionalset-uparecentraltodiscussingcapabilitiesforconflictprevention.IfLisbonpartiallypassedthemantelofpoliticalleadershiptotheEEASfromthe38SeealsoEPLO,PowerAnalysis:TheEUandPeacebuildingafterLisbon (Brussels,updatedinJune2016(b)),availableatwww.eplo.org.39CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(2011),op.cit.40Ibid.41Ibid.42Gothenburgprogramme(EuropeanCommission,2001).43InterviewwithanofficialfromaMemberStatePermanentRepresentation,23August2016.


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Council, and if conflictprevention isunderstoodasaway inwhich theEUacts in theworld, thenmost of the conflict prevention resources – the budgets, personnel, expertise of the context andinfluenceoverthirdparties–lieswiththeCommission,andnotjustthosepartsoftheCommission(such as the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, DG DEVCO)traditionally associated with conflict-prevention-as-activities but also Directorate-Generals forNeighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), Energy (DG Energy), Trade (DG Trade)and Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) at the least. This brings us back to the ongoingdiscussion since Lisbon about the status and roles of the EEAS and theCommission. Intervieweesstated clearly that they felt that institutions and individuals across the EU are willing to worktogether on conflict prevention, “there is a positive trajectory”.44 This willingness is a form ofcapability to act that both creates and demands political leadership, and which overcomes thechallengeofinstitutionalfragmentation.

TheEUGlobalStrategymayprovideusefulinsightshere.TheCouncilhasnotformallyadoptedthedocument45 so its status is unclear, especially as the political balance between Member StatesregardingEUexternalaction,includingconflictprevention,ischangingwiththeUK’sBrexitvote.Thedocument does not represent a change in policy but does provide some insight into the HighRepresentative’spriorities.ItismoreasumofearlierCommunicationsandconcepts,anditdoesnotallocateresources.

“An Integrated Approach to Conflict” is the third priority, after “The Security of our Union” and“StateandSocietalResiliencetoourEastandSouth”.46Thisintegratedapproachtoconflictincludes“coherentuseofallpoliciesattheEU’sdisposal”:“TheEUwillactatallstagesoftheconflictcycle,acting promptly on prevention.”47 Although this language is generally welcome, the use of“promptly” is some cause for concern as it does not suggest prioritising intervention to preventimportant (violent) conflict over the horizon, but suggests a far more reactive understanding ofconflict prevention, a point reinforced by the emphasis in the text on the situations in Syria andLibya.ThisisnottoarguethattheEUshouldnotrespondtocrisis:itistounderscoretheimportanceofsettingpoliticalprioritiestopreventconflict,andnotonlyrespondtoit.

TheinclusionofanintegratedapproachtoconflictasapriorityintheGlobalStrategyiswelcomeyetshouldnotbeconsideredinisolationfromtheothertwopriorities.ThefirstpriorityisthesecurityoftheUnion, includingstrengtheningtheEUasasecuritycommunityandcounter-terrorism,andthesecond,resilience,includesaddressingmigration.48Conflictpreventionapproachesare–andshouldbe– central toall thesepolicies,both in termsof their impacton third countriesand in termsoftheirlikelysuccessintheirownregard.RecentdevelopmentsinEUresponsestomigrationgiverisetoconcernthatthecausesanddriversofconflicthavenotbeenadequatelytakenintoaccountand

44InterviewwithanofficialfromaMemberStatePermanentRepresentation,23August2016.45Atthetimeofthisresearch,theEuropeanCouncilhadonly“welcome(d)thepresentationofthestrategy”,EuropeanCouncilconclusions(Brussels,28June2016).46GlobalStrategy(2016),op.cit.47Ibid.,p.7.48Ibid.,p.13.


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so EU interventions risk doing harm and increasing the likelihood of forced displacement (andthereforeof‘irregularmigration’fromtheEU’sperspective).49

When itcomes toconflictpreventionactivities, theEUhasa rangeof supplementary resources intheformofpersonnelandanalysisatitsdisposal.Personnelandtimearescarceresources:theEUisoneofthedonorswiththeloweststaff-to-budgetratio50andtherewillbenostaffincreasesintheforeseeablefuture.51Thishassignificantimplicationsfortheextenttowhichconflictanalysiscanbegeneratedandintegratedintoprogrammingacrosstheboard52andforhowfundingisallocated,asstaffcandevotelesstimeandcreativitytothewayinwhichthebudgetisspent.ThisisdespitethefactthattheintegrationofconflictanalysisintotheEU’sexternalactionhasbeenidentifiedasakeypriority. For instance, SECPOL.2 and DG DEVCO’s Fragility and Resilience Unit (DEVCO B.7) havedevelopedajointguidancenoteontheuseofconflictanalysisinsupportofEUexternalaction53tohelpincreasetheconflictsensitivityofallEUfundinginstruments.TheEUGlobalStrategyalsocallsfor making “all our external engagement conflict- and rights-sensitive”. Yet, officials, particularlythose working on geographical instruments, are under pressure to spend substantial fundingenvelopesandtheextenttowhichconflictsensitivity,orevenDoNoHarm,issufficientlyintegratedremains unclear.54 Some geographical teams, however, have specific personnel dedicated tosupporting conflict-related activities, such as the technical support team on crisis reaction andsecuritysectorreform(SSR)inDGNEARB.2RegionalProgrammesSouth.55

IntheEEAS,thespecialistdivisionSECPOL.2providessupporttotherestoftheEUmachineryaswellas implementing andmanaging specialist interventions. Its sister unit, DEVCO B.7, is in charge ofdefining the policy framework, mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches to fragility and crisis,andcoordinatingtheactivitiesofDGDEVCOwiththerestoftheEU’sinstitutionsonmattersrelatedto conflictpreventionandcrisismanagement. Theseunits thereforeare important capabilities forEUconflictprevention,bothasawayofactingintheworldandasasetofdistinctactivities.

SupportingtherangeofEUactorsinintegratingconflictanalysisacrosstheboardisaspecialistfieldsupported by SECPOL.2 and DEVCO B.7. The latter is much less visible and has the potential tointegrateconflictanalysisintoDEVCO’sworkandacrosstheEuropeanCommission’sexternalactionmorelargely.TheconflictEarlyWarningSystemisdesignedtoenablestaffacrosstheEU(theEEAS,Commission andMember States),with input from civil society, in headquarters and in-country toidentifyandcommunicatewheretheyseelong-termrisksforviolentconflictand/ordeteriorationin

49Oxfam,“OxfamPositionPaperfortheEU-AfricaSummitonMigration”,LaValetta,11-12November2015,EU-AfricaCooperationonMobility,DisplacementandMigration(Oxford,2015);PaxforPeace,“SudanAlert:TheEU’spolicyoptionsforSudan”(Utrecht,June2016).50 EPLO,Reportof theCSDNmeeting ‘Peacebuilding in theEUGlobal Strategy:Gathering civil society input’(Brussels,2016c).51InterviewwithanofficialfromDGNEAR,16September2016.52Ibid.53Thedocument(undated)isavailableathttp://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/guidance-note-on-conflict-analysis_en.pdf;accessed23September2016.54InterviewwithanofficialfromDGNEAR,16September2016.55AfutureEU-CIVCAPpaperwilladdressconflictpreventioninrelationtoEUdevelopmentandtradepolicies–thisareaisthereforenotfurtherdevelopedinthispaper.


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a country or region and to stimulate early preventive actions to address those risks.56 Externalobserversnotethattheanalysisitgeneratesisinterestingandthatwhileitincludesproactiveworkin-country,itisnotonlyadeskexercise.57ThechallengefortheconflictEarlyWarningSystemisnotthequalityoftheanalysis,buttherelationshipbetweenearlywarningandearlyaction–aconcernthat repeatedly surfaces in EUdocuments aswell as among analysts.58 This brings us back to thequestion of priority-setting and political decision-making: how (finite) resources are distributedamongalonglistof‘at-risk’situations,andtheriskthattheurgentovershadowtheimportant.

TheEUhasdevelopedcapacityforconflictanalysis,althoughthereisscopetoincreasetherangeofactors involved, particularly in-country.59 Insiders note that there is considerable appetite withinpartsoftheCommissionforconflictanalysis,which,whendonewell,bringsrealvaluetotheworkparticularlyofDGDEVCOandDGNEAR.Inthefuture,extendingtheuseofconflictanalysistootherpolicyinstrumentssuchasthoseofDGTradewouldstrengthenconsiderablytheEU’spotentialforconflictpreventionasawayofactingintheworld.

The light-touch analysis workshops seem to have been useful, especially when the facilitator hasbeenanexpert in thesituationandnotonly themethodology,as theseprovideausefulbasis forconversationbetweenofficials fromdifferentparts of the EUmachinery and there are reportedlyinstances where the workshops have led to a useful exchange between the EEAS, CommissiongeographicalexpertsandEUdelegations.60Akeychallengetoboostingtheimpactoftheworkshopsistimeandresourcing,asdiscussedbelow.

In certain situations, where civilian CSDP missions are present, it is foreseen that a CountrySituationalAwarenessPlatform(CSAP)willcomplementtheEarlyWarningSystem.TheCSAPwillbechairedbytheheadofthedelegation,anditsobjectiveistostrengthenthetiesbetweenCSDPandFreedom, Security and Justice to “potentially facilitate sharing a common understanding of thesituationatcountrylevel,andimprovethecombinedsituationalawarenessandanalysiscapacitybybetterlinkingupthededicatedfacilitiesintheEU”.61Theextenttowhichthisisused,andwhetheritaffectshowtheEarlyWarningSystemworksinplaceswherethereisnoCSDP,missionremainstobeseen.

EU delegations throughout the world play important roles in contributing to analysis and inimplementing interventions,whether directly (through political dialogue, for example) or throughmanaging processes undertaken by others, and in developing and maintaining relationships withthirdparties.ThesensethatthedelegationsarenotbeingusedtotheirfullpotentialandthattheEU

56SeetheFactSheet,“EUConflictEarlyWarningSystem”ontheEuropawebsite,September2014(availableathttp://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_warning_en.pdf);accessed31August2016.57Interviewwithanon-governmentalorganisation,4August2016.58See,forexample,Councilconclusions(2011),op.cit.59InterviewwithanofficialfromtheEEAS,10August2016.60InterviewswithanofficialfromDGNEAR,16September2016.SeealsoEPLO(2016c),op.cit.61 European Commission and High Representative, “Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach toexternal conflicts and crises – Action Plan 2016–17”, Joint Staff Working Document, SWD(2016) 254 Final(Brussels,18July2016),p.4.


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could ‘makebetteruse’of them is reflected in theEU’sComprehensiveApproach, itsActionPlanandtheGlobalStrategy.62

4.2.1MEDIATIONANDDIALOGUE

TheEUhasenjoyedsomenotablemediationsuccessesinrecentyears,suchastheIrandealandtheBelgrade/Pristinaprocesses.Unlikeconflictanalysisandearlywarning,thedevelopmentoftheEU’smediationcapacityhasbeenaccompaniedbyspecificpolicy.FollowingreferencestotheEU’sneedto “expand [its] dialogue and mediation capacities”,63 the Swedish presidency then led thedevelopmentoftheConceptonStrengtheningEUMediationandDialogueCapacities.64Still,analysisoftheconceptrevealsgaps:itisdescriptiveratherthanprovidingguidanceforEUmediators,anditprioritisesmediationasacrisismanagementratherthanaconflictpreventionapproach.65

SECPOL.2’sMediationSupportTeamprovidedtheEUmachinerywithimportantresources,includingexpertstaffmemberstaskedwithmediationsupportinitiativesandexternalexpertiseformediationsupportwithin theEEAS. TheDivision is able tomake innovativeuseof service contracts toworkwith third parties,which observers identify as an important asset in certain situations, because itallowstheEUtobeengagedwithnon-governmentalorganisationpartnerstosupportprocessesontheground,ratherthantobeinamorehands-offdonor/grantrecipientrelationship.

Despite the progress in supportingmediation, the EEAS (and EUmore generally) is still too littleengaged in preventive diplomacy,66 which limits the EU’s ability to prevent conflict. This cansometimes be attributed to the difficulty Member States have in coming to an agreed position,which is a necessary prerequisite for the EU to engage in preventivediplomacy, as in the caseofChad.67

4.2.2OTHERCONFLICTPREVENTIONINSTRUMENTS

Beyond the EEAS, the EU has a range of other instruments, including military and civilian CSDPmissions,68 and in some conflict-affected regions, EUSRs are potentially very useful in a range ofconflictpreventioninterventions.EUSRsreporttoboththeEEASandMemberStates–andsoareananomalyafterLisbon–yettheyareprobablynotusedtotheir fullpotential.EuropeanParliamentelection observation missions are another underused tool, with great potential for preventivediplomacyinrelationtoelection-relatedviolence.69

62Ibid.,p.4.63EuropeanSecurityStrategyImplementationReport(EuropeanCommission,2008),p.9.64 Council of theEuropeanUnion, “Concepton StrengtheningEUMediationandDialogueCapacities”, “I/A”ItemNote15779/09(Brussels,2009).65Davis(2014),op.cit.,pp.69-71.66 As defined by the European Institute for Peace (EIP), “the most desirable and efficient employment ofdiplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict”. See EIP, http://eip.org/en/news-events/eip-explainer-what-‘preventive-diplomacy’;accessed22September2016.67Interviewwithanon-governmentalorganisation,4August2016.68A futureEU-CIVCAPpaperwill addressconflictprevention in relation toCSDP– thisarea is thereforenotfurtherdevelopedinthispaper.69Interviewwithanon-governmentalorganisation,4August2016.


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InadditiontoEUresources,theEUinstitutionscanalsocallontheexpertiseandskillsofitsMemberStates.TheUKisamajorcontributortoEUconflictpreventionundertakings,butasonerespondentpointedout,theseresourcesarenota“hornofplentyforEUuse.TheUKwasalwayscarefulthatitsresourceswereusedbytheEUtofurthertheUK’sforeignpolicyobjectives.”MemberStateinterestsmay be particularly served by the EU in states where there is little Member State presence,especiallywherethestateconcernedisnotakeygeopoliticalinterest.Inthesekindsofstates,suchasChad,CentralAfricanRepublic,CameroonandSouthSudan, it is intheMemberStates’ interestthattheEUtakesamoreleadingrole,thanincountriesofmoregeopoliticalimportance,likeSudan.

This review suggests that the EU has by and large the capabilities to engage. It also suggests,however,thatthekeyroleplayedbySECPOL.2andtheEEASinensuringthatconflictpreventionissituated high up and strategically in the decision-making process, so that prevention receivesadequateresourcingand isnotovershadowedbyresponse. It furthermoresuggests thatSECPOL.2and theEEAShavean important role inproviding technical support to theCommissionandotherparts of the EUmachinery. The EU nonetheless should develop greater capabilities in preventivediplomacy, and couldmakemuchbetter use of key instruments, EUSRs and EuropeanParliamentelectionobservationmissions.

4.3CAPABILITYTOFUND

Ifweunderstand conflict prevention as away the EU acts in theworld, thenpotentially all of itsexternally-orientedbudget,includingthebudgetfortheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicyaswellastheEuropeanDevelopmentFund,couldfundconflictprevention,especiallyinthelongterm.

Whenitcomestoconflictpreventionasasetofspecificactivities,whicharebytheirnatureusuallymoreshortterm,themainsourcesoffundingaretheInstrumentcontributingtoStabilityandPeace(IcSP)alongwithotherthematic instruments,suchastheEuropeanInstrumentforDemocracyandHumanRightsorthethematicprogrammeforCivilSocietyOrganisationsandLocalAuthoritiesoftheDevelopmentCooperation.

ThegeographicalinstrumentsandtheEuropeanDevelopmentFundcanalsosupportlong-termandshort-term conflict prevention activities in different parts of the world. The legal basis of thesefundinginstrumentsprovidesforthisoptionbutthisdoesnotmeanthatEUofficialswillnecessarilyuse these funds to support conflict prevention activities, as it is one option among others.70Additionally,MemberStatesmayalsoprovidesignificantfundingforconflictprevention.

Aswithcapabilitiestoengage,thereisnoapparentlackofpotentialfundingforconflictprevention,althoughsmallernon-stateactorshavedifficultyaccessingEUfunding.71Existingconflictpreventionfunds,however,arecomingunderpressure:theEuropeanCommissionproposedthatforthe2017budget, parts of the IcSP crisis response component would fund the EU–Turkey agreement. TheEuropeanCommission,ontheinitiativeofseveralMemberStates,publishedalegislativeproposaltoamendtheIcSPsothatitcanalsofundnon-lethalequipmentforthemilitariesofpartnercountries.Thesourceoffundingforsuchadditional(andcostly)activitieshasnotbeenidentifiedyet.

70SeetheEPLObriefingpaper,SupportforpeacebuildingandconflictpreventionintheEU’sexternalfinancinginstruments2014-2020(Brussels,2014).71Thereareattemptstofixthiswithasub-grantingschemethroughinternationalorganisationsbutitcouldbefurtherimproved.


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Thechallengesmaywellbehowfinitefundingisallocatedamongcompetingprioritiesandwhetherofficials choose to use the available funding in a conflict-sensitiveway and/or to support conflictpreventionactivities(seebelow).

4.4CAPABILITYFORCOOPERATIONANDCOORDINATION

TheEUisbynatureamultilateralactor:unilateralactivitybytheEUistheexceptionratherthantherule,andconflictpreventionisalsoafieldofactivity,orawayofacting,thatfavoursmultilateralismoverunilateralism.TheEUengageswiththirdpartiesfromtheUNandregionalorganisations,withnon-EU states, and with local authorities, non-governmental organisations and other non-stateactors,ontheinternationalstage,intheEU,outsidetheEUinregionalandnationalcapitalsaswellaslocally.ThismultilateralismisarguablyasourceofstrengthfortheEUasaforeignpolicyactoringeneral,andparticularlywhenitcomestoconflictprevention.72

CoordinationandcooperationwithintheEUpresentsperhapsmoreofachallenge,andisintimatelyconnectedtothequestionof leadershipdiscussedearlier.Thechallengesof theEU-28 inagreeingcommon policy in a given situation are not new, and are a fact of EU foreign policy life that themachineryhastocopewith.Theintra-institutionaltusslesthatdominatescholarshiponcoherence,forexample,maynothavebeensolvedwiththecreationoftheEEAS,butsomeobserversbelievethereisthenecessaryspiritofcoordinationandcooperationacrosstheEUmachinerywhenitcomestoconflictprevention.

TheSECPOL.2Divisionhasdevelopedandprovidedkey resources forotherpartsof theEEASandEuropeanCommission,andhascreateddemandfortheirservices,whichinturnhasenabledgreatercooperation and coordination across relevant parts of the system. The fact that early warning,conflict analysis and process design have been located in the same department has not onlyfavoured coordination but may also have helped policy-makers to balance the urgent and theimportant.AstheEEASdevelopsanditsorganigrammeisrevised,itwillbeimportanttoassesspastsuccesses in theseareas.Given the interconnectednessof these tools, itwill alsobe important toanticipatetheeffectsoncoordinationandcooperationforprevention–if,forinstance,thecurrentfunctionsofSECPOL.2weretobedividedbetweendifferentdivisions.

Adifferentaspectof internalcoordinationandcooperation,againclosely linkedtothequestionofleadership,iswhere‘conflictprevention’issituatedwithintheEEASandtheCommission.Ifconflictprevention expertise is situated close to the most senior decision-making levels, there is morechance that it will become a strategic approach rather than a set of responsive activities. Theinstitutions also need mechanisms to facilitate exchange between different parts of the system.Previous initiatives, such as the Conflict Prevention Group,73 did not work well enough, perhapspartlybecausetheGroupstruggledtofindtherightwaytobalancethe importantandtheurgent.

72Davis(2014),op.cit.73 The Conflict Prevention Group was convened by SECPOL.2 and brought together representatives of therelevant geographical and thematic directorates aswell as the crisismanagement bodies, the chairs of theCommittee forCivilianAspectsofCrisisManagement (CivCom)andPolitico-MilitaryGroup (PMG)aswell asrepresentatives fromtheService forForeignPolicy Instruments (FPI)andDGDEVCO (theFragilityandCrisisManagement Unit). The Conflict Prevention Group was to gather and review early warning information,identify early response options, develop conflict risk analysis and mainstream conflict prevention in EUexternalaction.ItreportedtotheCrisisManagementBoard.


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However, there should be a process by which the Secretary General, political directors andgeographicalmanagingdirectorscandiscusskey issues–andparticularly thosesituations thatarecurrently‘overthehorizon’andwhereearlyinterventioncouldpreventconflict–ratherthanfocusonlyonrespondingtocrisesthathavealreadyerupted.

ThisreviewsuggeststhattheEU’smodusoperandiofoperatingmultilaterally iswellestablishedinpracticeandisarguablyasourceofstrength.Thegreaterchallengeisinternalcoordination,andherethe EEAS and Commission’s senior management have a pivotal role to play in requiring andsupporting different parts of the EUmachinery to adopt conflict prevention practices and also ingatheringandsharingexpertisefromdifferentEUorgans.

5.CONCLUSIONANDRECOMMENDATIONS

ThisanalysisoftheEU’scapabilitiesforconflictpreventionhasdemonstratedthechallengeposedbytheterm,asitdenotesbothawayofactingintheworldandasetofdistinctactivities.Thislackofclarityisexacerbatedbythecounterfactualnatureofmuchoftheevidencethatconflictpreventionworks.GreaterclarityintermsandthereforeinpolicymighthelpestablishconflictpreventionasawayofactingintheworldaspartoftheEU’sexternalactionculture.

Thisstudyhasdemonstratedtheimportanceofpoliticalleadershipateachstageofputtingconflictpreventionintopractice,inestablishingprioritiesamongcompetingneeds,prioritisingtheimportantas well as the urgent, focusing on prevention, not only response, and in integrating conflictpreventionintodecision-makingatthemoststrategiclevels.

This study has demonstrated that the EU largely has the capabilities to engage: although there ispressure on time and personnel, it has awide array of policies, institutions and instruments thatenable intervention. Some of these, however, such as EUSRs and European Parliament electionobservationmissions, could be used to greater effect. The EU should also develop its capabilitiesfurtherforpreventivediplomacy.Similarly,thepotentialfundingforconflictprevention,inthelongandshortterm,ispresent,theissuebeingwhetherandhowthisfundingisused.

Finally,thisreviewhasdemonstratedtheimportanceoftheSECPOL.2DivisionandDECVOB.7Unitin providing technical assistance for conflict prevention across the EU’s external action and infacilitating coordination and cooperation among different parts of the machinery for conflictprevention.

Recommendations

4. Asa first step in strengtheningEU capabilities toprevent conflict, EPLO recommends thatthe EEAS and the Commission jointly clarify in internal documents how the EU promotesconflictpreventionasawayofactingintheworld,howitcansupportandbesupportedbystabilisation,andhowspecificdistinctactivities(particularlyconflictanalysis,earlywarningand mediation) contribute differently to conflict prevention, and the differences andsynergiesbetweenthem.

5. SeniormanagementintheEEASandtheEuropeanCommissionshouldmainstreamconflictpreventionasamatterofpolicyandpracticeacrosstheEUexternalactionmachinery(the


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DGforNeighbourhoodandEnlargementNegotiations,DGDEVCO,DGEnergy,DGTrade,aswellastheEEAS)74andprioritisepreventionaswellasresponse.

6. The EU’s Global Strategy implementation plans should ensure that conflict prevention isprioritisedacrossall the thematicareas identified,notonly for the implementationof thesection on “an integrated approach to conflict”. It should also be prioritised in thepreparationof the action plan on security anddefence, the initiative onpublic diplomacyandotherfollow-upactionstotheGlobalStrategy.Implementationandactionplansshouldaddress these concerns directly and clearly identify resources, including institutionalexpertiseand leadership, forpreventingconflictaswellasrespondingto itandaddressingtheimportantaswellastheurgent.

SeniormanagementintheEEASandtheCommissionshouldensurethat

10. SECPOL.2andDEVCOB.7continue toprovide leadership, technical supportandexpertisewithintheEEAS,DGDEVCOandacrosstheEU’sexternalactionmachinery;

11. SECPOL.2 and DEVCO B.7 are adequately resourced in terms of personnel, expertise andaccess tohigh-leveldecision-makingso that theEUprevents importantconflictsaswellasrespondstourgentcrises;

12. SECPOL.2andDEVCOB.7continuetoworkin innovativepartnerships inconflictsituationsworldwide,includingwithcivilsocietyorganisationsandotherexternalexpertise;

13. time isavailableforpersonneltogenerateand implementconflictanalysisacrosstheEU’sexternalaction,supportedbySECPOL.2andDEVCOB.7;

14. previousEUexperiencesandlessonsidentifiedinconflictzonesarecapturedbyanadequateknowledge management system that strengthens the evidence base for future conflictpreventionwork;and

15. the EU further develops its capacities for preventive diplomacy in situations at risk ofescalatingconflict, forexample,byreinforcingandtailoringthesupportprovidedtoEUSRsand heads of delegations in charge of carrying out dialogue in conflict-affected countries(e.g. mediation and analysis training, support staff) and by including conflict expertise intheirjobdescriptions.

74RecommendationsonmainstreamingorintegratingconflictpreventionintoallrelevantEUpoliciesandinstrumentscanbefoundinEPLO,LettertoHR/VPMogherinion“AnEUGlobalStrategyforPeace”(Brussels,2016a),availableatwww.eplo.org.


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ANNEX1–LISTOFINTERVIEWS

Interview Organisation Date Interviewer

1 Non-governmentalorganisation 4August2016 LauraDavis

2 EuropeanExternalActionService

10August2016 LauraDavis

3 MemberStatePermanentRepresentation

23August2016 LauraDavis

4 DGNEAR,EuropeanCommission 16September2016 LauraDavis


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ANNEX2–ORGANIGRAMMEOFTHEEEASANDDGDEVCO


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dl3.2-report on the eus capacities conflict prevention-v1.4 ......located within discussions of the...

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