do banks underestimate var diversification? by

47
DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by Jiawen Lin Bachelor of Business Administration, Simon Fraser University 2006 and Yannan Qin Bachelor of Business Administration, University of International Business and Economics 2001 PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS In the Faculty of Business Administration Financial Risk Management Program © Jiawen Lin and Yannan Qin 2007 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 2007 All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.

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Page 1: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION

by

Jiawen Lin Bachelor of Business Administration Simon Fraser University 2006

and

Yannan Qin Bachelor of Business Administration

University of International Business and Economics 2001

PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Faculty of Business Administration

Financial Risk Management Program

copy Jiawen Lin and Yannan Qin 2007

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

2007

All rights reserved This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part by photocopy

or other means without permission of the author

APPROVAL

Name Jiawen Lin Vannan Qin

Degree Master of Arts

Title of Thesis Do banks underestimate VaR diversification

Supervisory Committee

Dr Christophe Perignon

Senior Supervisor Assistant Professor Faculty of Business Administration

Dr Daniel Smith

Second Reader Assistant Professor Faculty of Business Administration

Date Approved

ii

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms and signed by this author may be found in the original bound copy of this work retained in the Simon Fraser University Archive

Simon Fraser University Library Burnaby BCCanada

Revised Summer 2007

ABSTRACT

In this paper we study empirically the diversification effect in banks

aggregated Value-at-Risk (VaR) Using actual data from the six largest Canadian

commercial banks and five leading US commercial banks we estimate the

benchmark VaR based on individual VaRs for each risk factor and an historical

correlation matrix and then compare the benchmark with the aggregated VaR

disclosed by the bank Our main result is that the diversification effect reported

by Canadian banks tends to be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation

model over the period from 1999 to 2006 For the US banks there is no

supportive evidence for the underestimation of VaR diversification however

there are very interesting results among different banks

Keywords Bank Value-at-Risk (VaR) Diversification Correlation

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First we thank our supervisor Dr Christophe Perignon for his continual

support for this paper and generous offer of the necessary data He inspired our

intellect listened and gave us advice and taught us how to write an academic

paper Besides all these his passion for finance and dedication to academic

research motivated us to undertake this study

We also want to thank Zi Yin Deng and Zhi Jun Wang for their effort in

collecting the information of Value-at-Risk from the financial reports of the

Canadian and US banks Their work saved us an enormous amount of time

Special thanks go to Dr Daniel Smith who has provided useful comments

that improved our paper tremendously

Finally we would like to thank our classmates who helped us to solve the

difficulties in the organization of the data and encouraged us to achieve our best

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ApprovaI i i

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Table of Contents v

List of Tables vi

List of Figures vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Data 4 21 Canadian Banks VaR 4 22 Canadian Market Indices 5 23 US Banks VaR 6 24 US Market Indices 8

3 Methodology 9

4 Analysis and Empirical Results 12 41 Disclosed VaR Diversification 12 42 Determinants of Diversification Effects 13 43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR 15

5 Conclusion 18

Reference List 19

Tables 20

Figures 30

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks 20

Table 2 Canadian Market Indices 21

Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Canadian indices 21

Table 4 Disclosed VaR for US Banks 22

Table 5 US Market Indices 24

Table 6 Correlation Matrix of US indices 25

Table 7 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 25

Table 8 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 26

Table 9 Regression Results for Diversification Effect 27

Table 10 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for Canadian Banks 28

Table 11 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for US Banks 29

vi

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Canadian Market Indices 30

Figure US Market Indices 31

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 32

Figure Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 33

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 34

Figure Average Diversification Effect for US Banks 35

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks 36

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks 37

Figure Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR 39

vii

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

le 2

C

anad

ian

Mar

ket

Ind

ices

Ris

k C

aite

gory

M

arke

t in

dex

F

req

uen

cy

So

urc

e

No

tes

Inte

rest

Rat

e Y

ield

for

1 y

ear

zero

-cou

pon

Can

adia

n ao

vern

men

t bo

nds

Dai

ly

Ban

k of

Can

ada

Equ

ity

Samp

PfT

SX

Com

posi

te i

ndex

D

aily

C

FM

RC

The

Can

adia

n F

inan

cial

Mar

kets

Res

earc

h C

entr

e (C

FM

RC

) S

umm

ary

Info

rmat

ion

Dat

abas

e in

clud

es d

aily

an

d m

onth

ly T

oron

to S

tock

Exc

hang

e tr

adin

g in

form

atio

n

The

sub

scrip

tion

to C

FM

RC

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

CH

AS

S

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a th

e S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

itv L

ibra

ry

For

eign

E

xcha

nge

Can

ada

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

dolla

r

clos

ing

spot

rat

e D

aily

C

AN

SIM

CA

NS

IM (

Can

adia

n S

ocio

-eco

nom

ic I

nfor

mat

ion

Man

agem

ent

Sys

tem

) is

Sta

tistic

s C

anad

as

com

pute

rized

da

ta b

ase

and

info

rmat

ion

retr

ieva

l ser

vice

T

he

subs

crip

tion

to C

AN

SIM

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

CH

AS

S D

ata

Cen

tre

via

the

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

Com

mod

ity

The

mul

tiplic

atio

n of

Dow

Jon

es-

AIG

Spo

t C

omm

odity

Ind

ex a

nd th

e sp

ot e

xcha

nge

rate

of

CA

DU

SD

D

aily

A

IG F

inan

cial

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

Dow

Jon

es amp

C

ompa

ny I

nc

The

Eco

nom

ist

The

Dow

Jon

es -

AIG

Spo

t C

omm

odity

Ind

ex p

rovi

des

a ge

nera

l est

imat

e of

the

tren

d in

com

mod

ity p

rices

an

d re

pres

ents

a d

iver

sifie

d gr

oup

of c

omm

oditi

es

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

http

w

ww

diin

dexe

sco

m

The

sub

scrip

tion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Can

adia

n co

rpor

ate

and

gove

rnm

ent b

ond

yiel

d W

eekl

y

No

tes

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e C

an

ad

ian

ma

rke

t in

dic

es

we

use

for

the

pro

xie

s o

f ris

k fa

cto

rs a

nd t

he s

ou

rce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

Tab

le 3

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

Can

adia

n i

nd

ices

CA

Co

rrel

atio

n M

atri

x

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Eq

uity

FX

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

Sp

rea

d

Inte

rest

R

ate

Eq

uity

F

X

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

So

rea

d

10

00

0

00

16

0

10

00

0

008

11

(00

85

9)

10

00

0

00

44

7

01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

03

0)

(00

00

7)

(00

06

2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

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imat

ed

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317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

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449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

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527

0 65

20

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521

0 64

15

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467

0 55

89

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438

0 53

50

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401

0 51

51

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116

0 11

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102

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11

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113

0 11

83

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135

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29

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0 61

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0 60

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0 55

81

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23

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0 62

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19

113

80

106

75

6

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0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

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798

0 65

98

17

113

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106

16

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0 83

38

16

108

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985

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0 76

53

9

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0 68

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0 83

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0 87

33

10

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690

0 73

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0 82

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0 88

82

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0 10

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0 96

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116

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94

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29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 2: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

APPROVAL

Name Jiawen Lin Vannan Qin

Degree Master of Arts

Title of Thesis Do banks underestimate VaR diversification

Supervisory Committee

Dr Christophe Perignon

Senior Supervisor Assistant Professor Faculty of Business Administration

Dr Daniel Smith

Second Reader Assistant Professor Faculty of Business Administration

Date Approved

ii

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Simon Fraser University Library Burnaby BCCanada

Revised Summer 2007

ABSTRACT

In this paper we study empirically the diversification effect in banks

aggregated Value-at-Risk (VaR) Using actual data from the six largest Canadian

commercial banks and five leading US commercial banks we estimate the

benchmark VaR based on individual VaRs for each risk factor and an historical

correlation matrix and then compare the benchmark with the aggregated VaR

disclosed by the bank Our main result is that the diversification effect reported

by Canadian banks tends to be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation

model over the period from 1999 to 2006 For the US banks there is no

supportive evidence for the underestimation of VaR diversification however

there are very interesting results among different banks

Keywords Bank Value-at-Risk (VaR) Diversification Correlation

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First we thank our supervisor Dr Christophe Perignon for his continual

support for this paper and generous offer of the necessary data He inspired our

intellect listened and gave us advice and taught us how to write an academic

paper Besides all these his passion for finance and dedication to academic

research motivated us to undertake this study

We also want to thank Zi Yin Deng and Zhi Jun Wang for their effort in

collecting the information of Value-at-Risk from the financial reports of the

Canadian and US banks Their work saved us an enormous amount of time

Special thanks go to Dr Daniel Smith who has provided useful comments

that improved our paper tremendously

Finally we would like to thank our classmates who helped us to solve the

difficulties in the organization of the data and encouraged us to achieve our best

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ApprovaI i i

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Table of Contents v

List of Tables vi

List of Figures vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Data 4 21 Canadian Banks VaR 4 22 Canadian Market Indices 5 23 US Banks VaR 6 24 US Market Indices 8

3 Methodology 9

4 Analysis and Empirical Results 12 41 Disclosed VaR Diversification 12 42 Determinants of Diversification Effects 13 43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR 15

5 Conclusion 18

Reference List 19

Tables 20

Figures 30

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks 20

Table 2 Canadian Market Indices 21

Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Canadian indices 21

Table 4 Disclosed VaR for US Banks 22

Table 5 US Market Indices 24

Table 6 Correlation Matrix of US indices 25

Table 7 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 25

Table 8 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 26

Table 9 Regression Results for Diversification Effect 27

Table 10 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for Canadian Banks 28

Table 11 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for US Banks 29

vi

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Canadian Market Indices 30

Figure US Market Indices 31

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 32

Figure Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 33

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 34

Figure Average Diversification Effect for US Banks 35

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks 36

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks 37

Figure Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR 39

vii

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

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32

915

D

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atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 3: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

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Simon Fraser University Library Burnaby BCCanada

Revised Summer 2007

ABSTRACT

In this paper we study empirically the diversification effect in banks

aggregated Value-at-Risk (VaR) Using actual data from the six largest Canadian

commercial banks and five leading US commercial banks we estimate the

benchmark VaR based on individual VaRs for each risk factor and an historical

correlation matrix and then compare the benchmark with the aggregated VaR

disclosed by the bank Our main result is that the diversification effect reported

by Canadian banks tends to be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation

model over the period from 1999 to 2006 For the US banks there is no

supportive evidence for the underestimation of VaR diversification however

there are very interesting results among different banks

Keywords Bank Value-at-Risk (VaR) Diversification Correlation

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First we thank our supervisor Dr Christophe Perignon for his continual

support for this paper and generous offer of the necessary data He inspired our

intellect listened and gave us advice and taught us how to write an academic

paper Besides all these his passion for finance and dedication to academic

research motivated us to undertake this study

We also want to thank Zi Yin Deng and Zhi Jun Wang for their effort in

collecting the information of Value-at-Risk from the financial reports of the

Canadian and US banks Their work saved us an enormous amount of time

Special thanks go to Dr Daniel Smith who has provided useful comments

that improved our paper tremendously

Finally we would like to thank our classmates who helped us to solve the

difficulties in the organization of the data and encouraged us to achieve our best

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ApprovaI i i

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Table of Contents v

List of Tables vi

List of Figures vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Data 4 21 Canadian Banks VaR 4 22 Canadian Market Indices 5 23 US Banks VaR 6 24 US Market Indices 8

3 Methodology 9

4 Analysis and Empirical Results 12 41 Disclosed VaR Diversification 12 42 Determinants of Diversification Effects 13 43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR 15

5 Conclusion 18

Reference List 19

Tables 20

Figures 30

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks 20

Table 2 Canadian Market Indices 21

Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Canadian indices 21

Table 4 Disclosed VaR for US Banks 22

Table 5 US Market Indices 24

Table 6 Correlation Matrix of US indices 25

Table 7 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 25

Table 8 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 26

Table 9 Regression Results for Diversification Effect 27

Table 10 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for Canadian Banks 28

Table 11 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for US Banks 29

vi

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Canadian Market Indices 30

Figure US Market Indices 31

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 32

Figure Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 33

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 34

Figure Average Diversification Effect for US Banks 35

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks 36

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks 37

Figure Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR 39

vii

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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C

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6

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No

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581

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tot

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rom

11

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5 to

10

31

20

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21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

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d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 4: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

ABSTRACT

In this paper we study empirically the diversification effect in banks

aggregated Value-at-Risk (VaR) Using actual data from the six largest Canadian

commercial banks and five leading US commercial banks we estimate the

benchmark VaR based on individual VaRs for each risk factor and an historical

correlation matrix and then compare the benchmark with the aggregated VaR

disclosed by the bank Our main result is that the diversification effect reported

by Canadian banks tends to be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation

model over the period from 1999 to 2006 For the US banks there is no

supportive evidence for the underestimation of VaR diversification however

there are very interesting results among different banks

Keywords Bank Value-at-Risk (VaR) Diversification Correlation

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First we thank our supervisor Dr Christophe Perignon for his continual

support for this paper and generous offer of the necessary data He inspired our

intellect listened and gave us advice and taught us how to write an academic

paper Besides all these his passion for finance and dedication to academic

research motivated us to undertake this study

We also want to thank Zi Yin Deng and Zhi Jun Wang for their effort in

collecting the information of Value-at-Risk from the financial reports of the

Canadian and US banks Their work saved us an enormous amount of time

Special thanks go to Dr Daniel Smith who has provided useful comments

that improved our paper tremendously

Finally we would like to thank our classmates who helped us to solve the

difficulties in the organization of the data and encouraged us to achieve our best

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ApprovaI i i

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Table of Contents v

List of Tables vi

List of Figures vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Data 4 21 Canadian Banks VaR 4 22 Canadian Market Indices 5 23 US Banks VaR 6 24 US Market Indices 8

3 Methodology 9

4 Analysis and Empirical Results 12 41 Disclosed VaR Diversification 12 42 Determinants of Diversification Effects 13 43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR 15

5 Conclusion 18

Reference List 19

Tables 20

Figures 30

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks 20

Table 2 Canadian Market Indices 21

Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Canadian indices 21

Table 4 Disclosed VaR for US Banks 22

Table 5 US Market Indices 24

Table 6 Correlation Matrix of US indices 25

Table 7 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 25

Table 8 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 26

Table 9 Regression Results for Diversification Effect 27

Table 10 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for Canadian Banks 28

Table 11 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for US Banks 29

vi

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Canadian Market Indices 30

Figure US Market Indices 31

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 32

Figure Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 33

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 34

Figure Average Diversification Effect for US Banks 35

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks 36

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks 37

Figure Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR 39

vii

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

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and

gove

rnm

ent b

ond

yiel

d W

eekl

y

No

tes

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e C

an

ad

ian

ma

rke

t in

dic

es

we

use

for

the

pro

xie

s o

f ris

k fa

cto

rs a

nd t

he s

ou

rce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

Tab

le 3

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

Can

adia

n i

nd

ices

CA

Co

rrel

atio

n M

atri

x

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Eq

uity

FX

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

Sp

rea

d

Inte

rest

R

ate

Eq

uity

F

X

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

So

rea

d

10

00

0

00

16

0

10

00

0

008

11

(00

85

9)

10

00

0

00

44

7

01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

03

0)

(00

00

7)

(00

06

2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 5: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First we thank our supervisor Dr Christophe Perignon for his continual

support for this paper and generous offer of the necessary data He inspired our

intellect listened and gave us advice and taught us how to write an academic

paper Besides all these his passion for finance and dedication to academic

research motivated us to undertake this study

We also want to thank Zi Yin Deng and Zhi Jun Wang for their effort in

collecting the information of Value-at-Risk from the financial reports of the

Canadian and US banks Their work saved us an enormous amount of time

Special thanks go to Dr Daniel Smith who has provided useful comments

that improved our paper tremendously

Finally we would like to thank our classmates who helped us to solve the

difficulties in the organization of the data and encouraged us to achieve our best

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ApprovaI i i

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Table of Contents v

List of Tables vi

List of Figures vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Data 4 21 Canadian Banks VaR 4 22 Canadian Market Indices 5 23 US Banks VaR 6 24 US Market Indices 8

3 Methodology 9

4 Analysis and Empirical Results 12 41 Disclosed VaR Diversification 12 42 Determinants of Diversification Effects 13 43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR 15

5 Conclusion 18

Reference List 19

Tables 20

Figures 30

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks 20

Table 2 Canadian Market Indices 21

Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Canadian indices 21

Table 4 Disclosed VaR for US Banks 22

Table 5 US Market Indices 24

Table 6 Correlation Matrix of US indices 25

Table 7 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 25

Table 8 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 26

Table 9 Regression Results for Diversification Effect 27

Table 10 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for Canadian Banks 28

Table 11 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for US Banks 29

vi

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Canadian Market Indices 30

Figure US Market Indices 31

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 32

Figure Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 33

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 34

Figure Average Diversification Effect for US Banks 35

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks 36

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks 37

Figure Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR 39

vii

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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C

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Mar

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Ind

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M

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req

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cial

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kets

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e (C

FM

RC

) S

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rmat

ion

Dat

abas

e in

clud

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6

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ne

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sam

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tot

al f

rom

11

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5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 6: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ApprovaI i i

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Table of Contents v

List of Tables vi

List of Figures vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Data 4 21 Canadian Banks VaR 4 22 Canadian Market Indices 5 23 US Banks VaR 6 24 US Market Indices 8

3 Methodology 9

4 Analysis and Empirical Results 12 41 Disclosed VaR Diversification 12 42 Determinants of Diversification Effects 13 43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR 15

5 Conclusion 18

Reference List 19

Tables 20

Figures 30

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks 20

Table 2 Canadian Market Indices 21

Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Canadian indices 21

Table 4 Disclosed VaR for US Banks 22

Table 5 US Market Indices 24

Table 6 Correlation Matrix of US indices 25

Table 7 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 25

Table 8 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 26

Table 9 Regression Results for Diversification Effect 27

Table 10 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for Canadian Banks 28

Table 11 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for US Banks 29

vi

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Canadian Market Indices 30

Figure US Market Indices 31

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 32

Figure Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 33

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 34

Figure Average Diversification Effect for US Banks 35

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks 36

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks 37

Figure Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR 39

vii

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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a d

iver

sifie

d gr

oup

of c

omm

oditi

es

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

http

w

ww

diin

dexe

sco

m

The

sub

scrip

tion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Can

adia

n co

rpor

ate

and

gove

rnm

ent b

ond

yiel

d W

eekl

y

No

tes

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e C

an

ad

ian

ma

rke

t in

dic

es

we

use

for

the

pro

xie

s o

f ris

k fa

cto

rs a

nd t

he s

ou

rce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

Tab

le 3

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

Can

adia

n i

nd

ices

CA

Co

rrel

atio

n M

atri

x

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Eq

uity

FX

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

Sp

rea

d

Inte

rest

R

ate

Eq

uity

F

X

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

So

rea

d

10

00

0

00

16

0

10

00

0

008

11

(00

85

9)

10

00

0

00

44

7

01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

03

0)

(00

00

7)

(00

06

2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 7: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks 20

Table 2 Canadian Market Indices 21

Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Canadian indices 21

Table 4 Disclosed VaR for US Banks 22

Table 5 US Market Indices 24

Table 6 Correlation Matrix of US indices 25

Table 7 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 25

Table 8 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 26

Table 9 Regression Results for Diversification Effect 27

Table 10 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for Canadian Banks 28

Table 11 Comparison between Disclosed VaR and Estimated VaR for US Banks 29

vi

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Canadian Market Indices 30

Figure US Market Indices 31

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 32

Figure Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 33

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 34

Figure Average Diversification Effect for US Banks 35

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks 36

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks 37

Figure Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR 39

vii

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

le 2

C

anad

ian

Mar

ket

Ind

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Ris

k C

aite

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M

arke

t in

dex

F

req

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Rat

e Y

ield

for

1 y

ear

zero

-cou

pon

Can

adia

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vern

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ly

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k of

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ada

Equ

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Samp

PfT

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D

aily

C

FM

RC

The

Can

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n F

inan

cial

Mar

kets

Res

earc

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entr

e (C

FM

RC

) S

umm

ary

Info

rmat

ion

Dat

abas

e in

clud

es d

aily

an

d m

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ly T

oron

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tock

Exc

hang

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adin

g in

form

atio

n

The

sub

scrip

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is a

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thro

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CH

AS

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Dat

a C

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Sta

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clos

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spot

rat

e D

aily

C

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SIM

CA

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Can

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Man

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Sys

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) is

Sta

tistic

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T

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AN

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is a

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ata

Cen

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rase

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nive

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Lib

rary

Com

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The

mul

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Dow

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of

CA

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aily

A

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Pro

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Ind

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the

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Can

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n co

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and

gove

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sum

ma

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e C

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ma

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dic

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we

use

for

the

pro

xie

s o

f ris

k fa

cto

rs a

nd t

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trie

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ata

from

Tab

le 3

C

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elat

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Mat

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of

Can

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n i

nd

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CA

Co

rrel

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atri

x

Inte

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Rat

e

Eq

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Co

mm

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Cre

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Cre

dit

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10

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11

(00

85

9)

10

00

0

00

44

7

01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

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(00

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(00

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2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 8: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Canadian Market Indices 30

Figure US Market Indices 31

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 32

Figure Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks 33

Figure Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks 34

Figure Average Diversification Effect for US Banks 35

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks 36

Figure Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks 37

Figure Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR 39

vii

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

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01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

03

0)

(00

00

7)

(00

06

2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 9: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the trading portfolios of large commercial banks have

grown rapidly both in size and in complexity as banks have taken massive

positions in the derivatives market For example the trading portfolio of Royal

Bank of Canada increased from CAD18740 million in 1996 to CAD147237

million in 2006 a 680 increase whereas the total assets increased by only

120 over the same period This fact shows that large commercial banks are

more exposed to market risk than they used to As a result regulators banks

and academics have been intensively debating about how to measure and

manage market risk

Commercial banks have been computing their VaJue-at-Risk (VaR) since

the mid 90s VaR is a measure of the maximum expected loss (in dollars) on a

given position at a given confidence level (eg 99) over a given forecast period

(eg 1 day) Besides the aggregated VaR some banks disclose their individual

VaRs associated with different risk categories as well as the effect of

diversification across different risk categories The five main risk categories are

interest rate risk equity risk foreign exchange risk commodity risk and credit

spread risk

Previous empirical studies have shown that banks tend to overstate their

VaR This finding is surprising since under the 1996 Amendment of the Basel

Accord higher VaR induces higher regulatory capital for banks Perignon Deng

and Wang (2007) uncover that the six largest Canadian commercial banks

exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates Out of the

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

le 2

C

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Ris

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rase

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nd t

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Tab

le 3

C

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elat

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Mat

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Can

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n i

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CA

Co

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x

Inte

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FX

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mm

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dit

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10

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(00

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10

00

0

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7

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2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

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(00

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0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

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co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

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sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 10: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

7354 trading days analyzed in their study there are only two exceptions (days

when the trading loss exceeds the VaR) whereas the expected number of

exceptions with a 99 VaR is 74 Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) also find that for

a sample of US commercial banks the 99 VaRs are too high and sometimes

inaccurate Furthermore Periqnon and Smith (2007a) report consistent results

for a sample of international banks

Academics have put forward several reasons to explain the inflated VaR

puzzle including (1) extreme cautiousness due to the penalty imposed by

regulators (2) reputation risk of the banks if their actual loss exceeds the VaR

too frequently (3) the obligation of risk managers to explain the reason of each

exception and (4) underestimation of the diversification effect of the individual

risk factors To the best of our knowleQge there has been no direct empirical test

of the last assertion yet

Our study moves one step forward to test whether banks underestimate

the diversification effects when computing their VaR By doing so we try to

understand why banks overstate their VaR Our empirical analysis is based on

the VaR disclosed by the six largest Canadian commercial banks and five

leading US commercial banks For each bank we collect from the banks

financial reports the aggregated VaR the individual VaR of each risk category

and the diversification effect We also collect the Canadian and US market

indices to calculate the correlation matrix among the five risk categories Le

interest rate equity foreign exchange rate commodity price and credit spread

These individual VaRs and correlation matrix are used to compute our own

2

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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C

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D

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or

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Ban

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3

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56

63

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13

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121

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4

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n C

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C

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read

U

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fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

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sific

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n D

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sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

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gn e

Xch

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10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

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odity

C

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t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 11: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

estimated VaR that we call the benchmark VaR Our central test is to compare

the total VaR disclosed by the banks with our estimated VaR

Our main result is that the diversification effect of Canadian banks tends to

be smaller than the one estimated by our correlation model over the period 1999

- 2006 This finding suggests that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Bank of Montreal (BMO) is the most extreme case in our

Canadian sample BMOs aggregated VaRs are larger than our estimates

throughout the sample period implying that BMOs diversification effect is

smaller than the one calculated by the correlation matrix On average BMOs

estimated VaR is 30 less than the disclosed VaR We also find that there is a

difference between Canadian and US banks In our US sample we do not find

any supportive evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the VaR

diversification effect Indeed there is no obvious excess estimation of the

aggregated VaR disclosed by banks over our benchmark For instance between

2000 and 2004 the aggregated VaRs of Bank of America (BoA) were

systematically smaller than our estimated VaRs which suggests that BoA was

overestimating its VaR diversification

The paper proceeds as follows Section 2 presents the data used in our

empirical test In Section 3 we describe our methodology for estimating the VaR

after diversification Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and Section 5

concludes our study

3

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

le 2

C

anad

ian

Mar

ket

Ind

ices

Ris

k C

aite

gory

M

arke

t in

dex

F

req

uen

cy

So

urc

e

No

tes

Inte

rest

Rat

e Y

ield

for

1 y

ear

zero

-cou

pon

Can

adia

n ao

vern

men

t bo

nds

Dai

ly

Ban

k of

Can

ada

Equ

ity

Samp

PfT

SX

Com

posi

te i

ndex

D

aily

C

FM

RC

The

Can

adia

n F

inan

cial

Mar

kets

Res

earc

h C

entr

e (C

FM

RC

) S

umm

ary

Info

rmat

ion

Dat

abas

e in

clud

es d

aily

an

d m

onth

ly T

oron

to S

tock

Exc

hang

e tr

adin

g in

form

atio

n

The

sub

scrip

tion

to C

FM

RC

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

CH

AS

S

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a th

e S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

itv L

ibra

ry

For

eign

E

xcha

nge

Can

ada

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

dolla

r

clos

ing

spot

rat

e D

aily

C

AN

SIM

CA

NS

IM (

Can

adia

n S

ocio

-eco

nom

ic I

nfor

mat

ion

Man

agem

ent

Sys

tem

) is

Sta

tistic

s C

anad

as

com

pute

rized

da

ta b

ase

and

info

rmat

ion

retr

ieva

l ser

vice

T

he

subs

crip

tion

to C

AN

SIM

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

CH

AS

S D

ata

Cen

tre

via

the

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

Com

mod

ity

The

mul

tiplic

atio

n of

Dow

Jon

es-

AIG

Spo

t C

omm

odity

Ind

ex a

nd th

e sp

ot e

xcha

nge

rate

of

CA

DU

SD

D

aily

A

IG F

inan

cial

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

Dow

Jon

es amp

C

ompa

ny I

nc

The

Eco

nom

ist

The

Dow

Jon

es -

AIG

Spo

t C

omm

odity

Ind

ex p

rovi

des

a ge

nera

l est

imat

e of

the

tren

d in

com

mod

ity p

rices

an

d re

pres

ents

a d

iver

sifie

d gr

oup

of c

omm

oditi

es

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

http

w

ww

diin

dexe

sco

m

The

sub

scrip

tion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Can

adia

n co

rpor

ate

and

gove

rnm

ent b

ond

yiel

d W

eekl

y

No

tes

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e C

an

ad

ian

ma

rke

t in

dic

es

we

use

for

the

pro

xie

s o

f ris

k fa

cto

rs a

nd t

he s

ou

rce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

Tab

le 3

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

Can

adia

n i

nd

ices

CA

Co

rrel

atio

n M

atri

x

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Eq

uity

FX

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

Sp

rea

d

Inte

rest

R

ate

Eq

uity

F

X

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

So

rea

d

10

00

0

00

16

0

10

00

0

008

11

(00

85

9)

10

00

0

00

44

7

01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

03

0)

(00

00

7)

(00

06

2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

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2

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middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

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ss r

atio

rep

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DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

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29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 12: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

2 DATA

Our study covers the six largest Canadian banks and five leading US

banks Market indices are also collected for both Canadian and US markets We

describe the details regarding to the data collection for Canadian and US banks

separately in this section

21 Canadian Banks VaR

We study the year end disclosed VaR of six Canadian commercial banks

over the period from 1996 to 2006 The six banks are Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)

National Bank of Canada (NBC) Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and Torontoshy

Dominion Bank (TO) These six banks are the largest commercial banks in

Canada and have important trading positions The data are collected from their

annual reports (fiscal year ended October 31)

In Canada the VaR calculation has been made compulsory since 1997 by

the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) but the

public disclosure is optional and the format of disclosure is not restricted

Canadian banks started to disclose their VaR at different time RBC was the first

to disclose its VaR starting from1996 CIBC started from 1999 followed by BMO

BNS and NBC in 2001 TO only disclosed the year end VaR in risk categories

after 2005 As a result we have VaR data from six Canadian commercial banks

with different sample periods from 2 years to 11 years

4

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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C

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ion

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Tab

le 3

C

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elat

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Mat

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Co

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10

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6

10

00

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No

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s hi

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co

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latio

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atr

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on

581

we

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ne

sda

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sam

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s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 13: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

All the VaR data are 1-day VaR with 99 confidence level except for

BNS that used a 1O-day VaR with 99 confidence level in 2001 and 2002 To be

consistent with other banks we convert BNSs 1O-day VaR to 1-day VaR 1 BMO

and RBC started to disclose the credit spread VaR separately from the interest

rate VaR from 2004 whereas CIBC has separated the credit spread VaR from

the very beginning BNS and NBC do not disclose the credit spread VaR but

instead combine it with the interest rate VaR RBC combined the foreign

exchange VaR with the commodity VaR before 2005 and started to separate

them in 2005

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample Canadian banks in Table 1

22 Canadian Market Indices

We use the five market indices as proxies to estimate the correlation

among the five risk factors The Canadian market indices include yield for one-

year zero coupon government bonds the SampPfTSX Composite index the Dow

Jones-AIG Spot Commodity Index the exchange rate between Canadian and US

dollars and the difference between the yield of Canadian corporate bond and

government bond with each index representing one risk category We retrieve

the time-series indices for the period from November 1 1995 to October 31 2006

and details about the indices can be found in Table 2

As Canadian corporate bond yield data are only available with a weekly

frequency measured on Wednesdays we use weekly data for all the Canadian

market indices (also measured on Wednesdays) to estimate the correlation

1 1-day VaR equals to 10-day VaR divided by the square root of 10 See Jorion (2006) p122 for details

5

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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C

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Ind

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e (C

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) S

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ion

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Tab

le 3

C

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Mat

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of

Can

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Co

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ne

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tot

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11

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10

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20

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21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

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4 O

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1 -O

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2 O

OQ

3 O

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4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

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2 39

9

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3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

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3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 14: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

matrix Out of 581 weekly data points there are 20 trading days when there is

one or more than one index missing data In each case we interpolate linearly the

missing data points

The five Canadian market indices are plotted in Figure 1 From the figures

we see that the market indices display an interesting correlation structure Table

3 shows the in-sample correlation matrix among the five index returns which

equal to the difference between index (t) and index (t-1) divided by index (t-1)

We find that the correlation coefficients are small with the highest one being 028

occurring between foreign exchange rate and the commodity price The average

of the correlation coefficients is only 0037 In addition 5 out of 10 correlation

coefficients in the matrix are negative and the credit spread index has negative

correlation with all the other four indices This implies that the diversification

effect is expected to be strong in the sample

23 US Banks VaR

The five sample US commercial banks in our study are JPMorgan Chase

and Co (JPMorgan) Citigroup Inc (Citibank) HSBC USA Inc (HSBC) Bank of

America (BoA) and Wachovia Bank (Wachovia) We examine these five banks

because they are among the ten largest US commercial banks in terms of

consolidated assets More importantly these five banks have disclosed their

aggregated VaRs the individual VaRs in different risk groups and the

diversification effect in their 1O-K and 10-0 forms The sample period covers

from the last quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2007 with different banks

2 Source The Federal Reserve Board 2007

6

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

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ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 15: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

having different starting points In the US market risk disclosure is mandatory in

financial reports required by the SEC however banks can choose between three

different formats of the disclosure and the disclosure of individual VaRs is

voluntary

Among the five US banks JPMorgan and Citibank disclose their 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level at each quarter end HSBC reported its 10-day VaR

at the 99 confidence level until June 30 2006 and changed to 1-day VaR at the

99 confidence level afterwards To obtain consistent measurement we convert

the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for HSBC Unlike the first three banks BoA and

Wachovia disclose their average VaR instead of the period end VaR BoA

discloses its average VaR for the past twelve months at each quarter end while

Wachovia only discloses its yearly average VaR at year end Both report 1-day

VaR at 99 confidence level

In case of restated VaR because of changed assumption and estimation

approach used in the VaR models we collect from the most recent reports and

systematically use the most recent VaRs We recalculate the VaRs for Citigroup

before 2000 by adding the VaRs of Salomon Smith Barney a division of

Citiqroup Global markets Inc because (1) VaRs for Salomon Smith Barney were

disclosed in Citibanks 10-K and 10-0 before 2000 (2) we think it is a reasonable

conversion suggested by the VaRs released by Citibank after 2000 and (3) our

approach is consistent with Jorion (2007) who adds up data from separate

entities

We present the disclosed VaR for the sample US banks in Table 4

7

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

le 2

C

anad

ian

Mar

ket

Ind

ices

Ris

k C

aite

gory

M

arke

t in

dex

F

req

uen

cy

So

urc

e

No

tes

Inte

rest

Rat

e Y

ield

for

1 y

ear

zero

-cou

pon

Can

adia

n ao

vern

men

t bo

nds

Dai

ly

Ban

k of

Can

ada

Equ

ity

Samp

PfT

SX

Com

posi

te i

ndex

D

aily

C

FM

RC

The

Can

adia

n F

inan

cial

Mar

kets

Res

earc

h C

entr

e (C

FM

RC

) S

umm

ary

Info

rmat

ion

Dat

abas

e in

clud

es d

aily

an

d m

onth

ly T

oron

to S

tock

Exc

hang

e tr

adin

g in

form

atio

n

The

sub

scrip

tion

to C

FM

RC

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

CH

AS

S

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a th

e S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

itv L

ibra

ry

For

eign

E

xcha

nge

Can

ada

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

dolla

r

clos

ing

spot

rat

e D

aily

C

AN

SIM

CA

NS

IM (

Can

adia

n S

ocio

-eco

nom

ic I

nfor

mat

ion

Man

agem

ent

Sys

tem

) is

Sta

tistic

s C

anad

as

com

pute

rized

da

ta b

ase

and

info

rmat

ion

retr

ieva

l ser

vice

T

he

subs

crip

tion

to C

AN

SIM

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

CH

AS

S D

ata

Cen

tre

via

the

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

Com

mod

ity

The

mul

tiplic

atio

n of

Dow

Jon

es-

AIG

Spo

t C

omm

odity

Ind

ex a

nd th

e sp

ot e

xcha

nge

rate

of

CA

DU

SD

D

aily

A

IG F

inan

cial

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

Dow

Jon

es amp

C

ompa

ny I

nc

The

Eco

nom

ist

The

Dow

Jon

es -

AIG

Spo

t C

omm

odity

Ind

ex p

rovi

des

a ge

nera

l est

imat

e of

the

tren

d in

com

mod

ity p

rices

an

d re

pres

ents

a d

iver

sifie

d gr

oup

of c

omm

oditi

es

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

http

w

ww

diin

dexe

sco

m

The

sub

scrip

tion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Can

adia

n co

rpor

ate

and

gove

rnm

ent b

ond

yiel

d W

eekl

y

No

tes

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e C

an

ad

ian

ma

rke

t in

dic

es

we

use

for

the

pro

xie

s o

f ris

k fa

cto

rs a

nd t

he s

ou

rce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

Tab

le 3

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

Can

adia

n i

nd

ices

CA

Co

rrel

atio

n M

atri

x

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Eq

uity

FX

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

Sp

rea

d

Inte

rest

R

ate

Eq

uity

F

X

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

So

rea

d

10

00

0

00

16

0

10

00

0

008

11

(00

85

9)

10

00

0

00

44

7

01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

03

0)

(00

00

7)

(00

06

2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 16: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

24 US Market Indices

The US market indices are the market yield on one-year US Treasury

securities SampP500 Composite index the major currencies index and the

difference between Moodys corporate BAA yield and one-year Treasury yield

We retrieve the time-series US indices for the years from 1998 to the first quarter

of 2007 with details explained in Table 5 Out of 2313 data points there are 47

trading days when there is one or more than one index missing data We

interpolate the missing data linearly The five US market indices are plotted in

Figure 2 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix between the five index returns We

find that the positive correlation coefficients are smaller than the Canadian ones

with the highest one being 020 and an average of 001

8

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

le 2

C

anad

ian

Mar

ket

Ind

ices

Ris

k C

aite

gory

M

arke

t in

dex

F

req

uen

cy

So

urc

e

No

tes

Inte

rest

Rat

e Y

ield

for

1 y

ear

zero

-cou

pon

Can

adia

n ao

vern

men

t bo

nds

Dai

ly

Ban

k of

Can

ada

Equ

ity

Samp

PfT

SX

Com

posi

te i

ndex

D

aily

C

FM

RC

The

Can

adia

n F

inan

cial

Mar

kets

Res

earc

h C

entr

e (C

FM

RC

) S

umm

ary

Info

rmat

ion

Dat

abas

e in

clud

es d

aily

an

d m

onth

ly T

oron

to S

tock

Exc

hang

e tr

adin

g in

form

atio

n

The

sub

scrip

tion

to C

FM

RC

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

CH

AS

S

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a th

e S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

itv L

ibra

ry

For

eign

E

xcha

nge

Can

ada

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

dolla

r

clos

ing

spot

rat

e D

aily

C

AN

SIM

CA

NS

IM (

Can

adia

n S

ocio

-eco

nom

ic I

nfor

mat

ion

Man

agem

ent

Sys

tem

) is

Sta

tistic

s C

anad

as

com

pute

rized

da

ta b

ase

and

info

rmat

ion

retr

ieva

l ser

vice

T

he

subs

crip

tion

to C

AN

SIM

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

CH

AS

S D

ata

Cen

tre

via

the

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

Com

mod

ity

The

mul

tiplic

atio

n of

Dow

Jon

es-

AIG

Spo

t C

omm

odity

Ind

ex a

nd th

e sp

ot e

xcha

nge

rate

of

CA

DU

SD

D

aily

A

IG F

inan

cial

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

Dow

Jon

es amp

C

ompa

ny I

nc

The

Eco

nom

ist

The

Dow

Jon

es -

AIG

Spo

t C

omm

odity

Ind

ex p

rovi

des

a ge

nera

l est

imat

e of

the

tren

d in

com

mod

ity p

rices

an

d re

pres

ents

a d

iver

sifie

d gr

oup

of c

omm

oditi

es

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

http

w

ww

diin

dexe

sco

m

The

sub

scrip

tion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Can

adia

n co

rpor

ate

and

gove

rnm

ent b

ond

yiel

d W

eekl

y

No

tes

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e C

an

ad

ian

ma

rke

t in

dic

es

we

use

for

the

pro

xie

s o

f ris

k fa

cto

rs a

nd t

he s

ou

rce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

Tab

le 3

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

Can

adia

n i

nd

ices

CA

Co

rrel

atio

n M

atri

x

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Eq

uity

FX

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

Sp

rea

d

Inte

rest

R

ate

Eq

uity

F

X

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

So

rea

d

10

00

0

00

16

0

10

00

0

008

11

(00

85

9)

10

00

0

00

44

7

01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

03

0)

(00

00

7)

(00

06

2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

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-6

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5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

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03Q

3 03

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04Q

1 04

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3 04

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1 O

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3 05

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1 06

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1 A

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n D

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537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

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ed

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ess

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690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

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middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

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106

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962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

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660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

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485

2 44

12

9

105

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150

0 19

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900

12

77

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160

0 15

87

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clos

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ed

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363

0 51

76

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325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

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406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

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28

7

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137

0 14

69

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187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

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Av

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ks a

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r cor

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disc

lose

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29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 17: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

3 METHODOLOGY

The diversified VaR (or aggregated VaR) is determined by two factors (1)

the level of individual VaRs and (2) the diversification effect in aggregating the

VaR of each risk factor

If the risk factors in the portfolio are perfectly correlated with Pij =1 the

diversified VaR of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the individual VaRs

However in general the correlations for the market indices differ from one

resulting in diversification effect The diversification can be measured by the

difference between the diversified VaR and the sum of the individual VaRs

There are two potential causes for banks inflated VaR First banks VaR

models can overstate the individual VaR of each risk factor Second banks VaR

models can underestimate the diversification effect Our paper focuses on testing

the diversification effect story

We estimate the diversified VaR based on the historical correlation among

the market indices and the disclosed individual VaRs By comparing our

estimated VaR with the banks disclosed VaR after diversification we investigate

whether there is any evidence for the claim that banks underestimate the

diversification among risk factors

The formula for the diversified VaR is derived from Jorion (2006) and

Perignon and Smith (2007b)

The VaR of the investment in asset i is given by

VaRi=amXi (1)

9

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

le 2

C

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k C

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a C

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rase

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t C

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Can

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n co

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and

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s ta

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e C

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the

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k fa

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nd t

he s

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e re

trie

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ata

from

Tab

le 3

C

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elat

ion

Mat

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of

Can

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n i

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CA

Co

rrel

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n M

atri

x

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Eq

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FX

Co

mm

od

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Cre

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rest

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Eq

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F

X

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Cre

dit

So

rea

d

10

00

0

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16

0

10

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0

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11

(00

85

9)

10

00

0

00

44

7

01

22

2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

71

8)

(00

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0)

(00

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(00

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2)

10

00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

ba

sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 18: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

where a is the standard normal deviate a is the standard deviation of the rate of

return of asset i and Xi is the dollar exposure of asset i

As aW2 = xIx the portfolio VaR is given by

(2)

where araquois the standard deviation of the portfolio W is the initial portfolio value

x is the vector of the dollar exposure of the portfolio and I is the covariance

matrix of the asset returns

We know that the covariance matrix can be decomposed as follows

I=DRD (3)

where D is the diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of return of

asset i and R is the correlation matrix of the returns of assets in the portfolio

The diversified VaR (DVaR) which aggregates all the risk categories

VaRs follows the same formula of VaRp so by substituting formula (2) and (3)

(4)

In the case of calculating the DVaR D represents the diagonal matrix with the

standard deviation of each risk categorys VaR and R stands for the correlation

matrix among the risk factors

By rearranging formula (4) we get

DVaR = J(axD)R(aDx (5)

As VaRi = aaoa aDx forms a vector comprising of each risk categorys

VaR therefore

10

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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C

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Tab

le 3

C

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elat

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Mat

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Can

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Co

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dit

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10

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10

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7

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2

02

76

6

10

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0

(00

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(00

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No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

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co

rre

latio

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atr

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sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

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ne

sda

ys)

sam

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s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 19: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

DVaR = JVRV (6)

where DVaR is the diversified VaR V is the column vector containing the

individual VaRs and R is the correlation matrix of the market indices The

formula (6) is used to calculate the diversified VaR in our study

We use the following example to illustrate the importance of the

diversification effect in determining the diversified VaR for a bank Assume that

Bank A has calculated its individual VaRs $10m for interest risk $10m for equity

risk $10m for foreign exchange risk $0 for commodity risk and $10m for credit

spread risk and the correlation coefficients among the five risk factor indices are

all 01 The DVaR is

1 01 01 01 01

01 1 01 01 01

DVaR= (10 10 10 0 10) 01 01 1 01 01 i 01 01 01 1 01

01 01 01 01 1

10

10

10 =228

0

10

whereas the sum of the individual VaRs is $40m As a result the diversification

effect is $172m ($40m-$228m) or 43 of the undiversified VaR

If we decrease the correlation coefficients to 0 we get the new DVaR

equal to $20m and the diversification effect increases to $20m If the correlation

coefficients are all -01 the DVaR changes to $1673 and the diversification

effect increases by $227m

This example shows that the lower the correlation coefficients among risk

factors the higher the diversification effect The bottom line of the methodology

section is that the diversification is a key factor in determining the diversified VaR

11

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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C

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581

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tot

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11

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10

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20

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Tab

le 4

D

iscl

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d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

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exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

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t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 20: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

4 ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

41 Disclosed VaR Diversification

The actual diversification effect is the difference between the undiversified

VaR and diversified VaR scaled by the undiversified VaR We summarize the

disclosed diversification effects of the Canadian banks and US banks in Table 7

and Table 8 respectively

We cannot find a similar pattern for the diversification effect of the sample

Canadian banks (Figure 3) Thus we calculate the time average and the crossshy

bank average to investigate whether there is any pattern for the Canadian

banking industry For the cross-bank average diversification we omit the first

three years (1996-1998) since RBC is the only bank that disclosed its individual

VaRs during that period and one bank does not represent the industry properly

The cross-bank average diversification effect (Figure 4) is stable over the period

from 1999 to 2006 with some movement from 28 to 42 CIBC has the largest

diversification effect of 468 followed by RBC (409) BNS (4025) TD

(3599) NBC (3179) and BMO (2046) BMOs has the least

diversification less than half of CIBCs

Compared to the Canadian banks our sample US banks show more

characteristics The disclosed diversification effect of the five US banks is

summarized in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 5 We notice that there is an upward

trend for the diversification effect curve for JPMorgan and Wachovia ~IPMorgan

had a diversification effect of 1772 in the first quarter of 2001 and reached its

highest level of 5282 in the second quarter of 2006 Wachovia has an even

12

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

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C

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) S

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ion

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abas

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Tab

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C

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Mat

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10

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6

10

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No

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s hi

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co

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latio

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581

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ne

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sam

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tot

al f

rom

11

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5 to

10

31

20

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21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

Page 21: DO BANKS UNDERESTIMATE VAR DIVERSIFICATION? by

stronger increase It started from 1077 in 1999 increased to 3110 in 2001

fell back to 2367 in 2004 and jumped to 5178 in 2006 The curves for

Citibank and BoA are smoother with several exceptions For Citibank we see an

upward trend after the second quarter of 2004 BoAs diversification effects are

around 52 but with a bump in 2003 HSBCs diversification effect is the most

volatile among the five US banks It had the least diversification a ratio as low as

454 in the third quarter of 2004 and also a peak of 5714 in the fourth

quarter of 2006 However when we average the diversification effect across

banks as shown in the first graph of Figure 6 we can not tell there is any trend

for all the banks over the period from 1999 to 2006 The rank of the average

diversification effect (the second graph of Figure 6) is BoA (5323) Citibank

(376) ~PMorgan (3670) HSBC (2912) and Wachovia (2911) and

Wachovias diversification effect is the lowest almost half of BoAs

Overall US banks report an average of diversification of 392 more

than Canadian banks This result agrees with our findings from the correlation

matrix As the average of US correlation coefficients is smaller than the Canadian

one the diversification effects of US banks are supposed to be larger

42 Determinants of Diversification Effects

As a preliminary analysis we run some regressions to investigate what

factors have impact on the diversification effect of VaR The most intuitive

independent variables are the individual VaRs disclosed by banks In addition

the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is included in our regression since

13

the balance among individual VaRs might affect the diversification as well Thus

the first regression we run is

DVaR (A) LVaRj

where DVaR is the diversified VaR disclosed by bank LVaRis the sum of the

individual VaRs for each risk factor Vcredit is the interest rate VaR Vequity is the

equity VaR VFX is the foreign exchange VaR Vc is the commodity VaR and

Vcredit is the credit risk VaR

The regression results for both Canadian and US banks are summarized

in Table 9 In the case of Canadian banks the t-statistics suggest that the

coefficients of VFX and Vcredif are significant at 95 confidence level The two

coefficients are all negative suggesting that higher VFX and Vcredif lead to more

diversification For US banks only the coefficient of Vcredif is significant and it is

negative We notice that the standard deviation of the individual VaRs is

insignificant in either case Thus we run our regression B without the standard

deviation of the VaRs

When we regress fvaR against the five individual VaRs only we find VaR

that VR VFX and Vcredif are significant for Canadian banks and only Vcredif is

significant for US banks Unlike other significant coefficients the coefficient of VR

for Canadian banks is positive implying that larger VR is associated to lower

diversification

We notice that the standard deviation of VaRi is highly correlated with VR

The correlation coefficients are 080 and 099 for Canadian banks and US banks

14

respectively This is because that VR is the largest component among individual

VaRs as interest rate risk is the biggest risk that banks face We suspect the high

correlation is the reason for why VR becomes significant when we exclude the

standard deviation in our regression B

Our preliminary analysis shows that interest rate VaR is negatively

correlated with the diversification effect while foreign exchange VaR and credit

spread VaR are positively correlated with the diversification The level of balance

among the individual VaRs does not affect the diversification significantly

43 Comparison between Bank VaR and Estimated VaR

As we discussed in Section 3 our benchmark VaR is computed by the

estimated correlation matrix and the individual VaR disclosed by the banks In

our DVaR estimation model we use a one-year moving window to estimate the

correlation matrix at each yearquarter end In the case that the banks do not

disclose the VaR for particular risk categories we put zero VaR in the vector of

individual VaRs

The comparison between the disclosed DVaR and estimated DVaR is

summarized in Table 10 and Table 11 for Canadian banks and US banks

respectively We calculate the VaR excess ratio as the difference between the

disclosed DVaR and the estimated DVaR over the disclosed one

For the Canadian sample as shown in Figure 7 we notice that BMOs

disclosed DVaRs are always greater than our estimation from 2001 to 2006 by

an average of 30 CIBC takes the second place and seven out of eight

disclosed DVaRs are greater than the estimated ones with an average of 18

15

exceeding the estimated DVaR TDs disclosed DVaR in 2005 is very close to our

estimated DVaR however the 2006 disclosed DVaR is in excess of 20 of our

estimated DVaR We notice that the difference for RBC in 1996 and 1997 is shy

102 and -54 respectively the largest difference among all data A small

difference suggests that the banks reasonably analyze the diversification effect

while a large difference implies an inaccurate estimation for the diversification

effect One possible explanation for RBCs large difference is that RBC is the first

bank to disclose quantitative market risk and it might not be experienced enough

to estimate the VaR in the first couple of years Disregarding the first two years

impact the results for NBC and RBC do not show much tendency toward either

overestimation or underestimation with half of the disclosed VaRs greater than

the estimated ones and the other half smaller Unlike the case of BMO BNS has

only one disclosed DVaR exceeding the estimated DVaR from 2001 to 2006

We perform the same analysis for the five US banks as well The results

are presented in Table 11 and Figure 8 is the plot of the VaR excess ratio of

each bank The graph of BoA is interesting We find that the estimated DVaRs

are very close to the disclosed ones since the second quarter of 2005 However

the difference is big from the second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of

2004 underestimating by more than 20 with an extreme value over 60 in the

third quarter of 2003 The overestimation of VaR diversification might be the

reason why BoA experienced three exceptions of actual trading loss exceeding

VaR in 2003 On the contrary HSBC overestimates its DVaR 73 of the time

and the magnitude of the excess ratio is as high as 40 on average from the

second quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2005 However the DVaRs of

16

HSBC become smaller than our estimation from the fourth quarter of 2005 with a

peak value of -71 in the second quarter of 2006 The disclosed DVaRs of

JPMorgan and Wachovia are close to the estimated DVAR with a maximum

difference of 29 and 21 respectively Citibank the first one to disclose VaR

among the five has the smallest variations for the sample period

If we analyze each bank individually we cannot find a typical trend of the

difference between the disclosed DVaR and the estimated one across the

Canadian banks or the US banks However when we average the excess

percentage of disclosed DVaR over estimated DVaR among Canadian banks for

the period from 1999 to 2006 Figure 9 shows that in all the seven years

Canadian banks overestimate the DVaR by a level around 1 to 20 with an

average of 11 The years from 1996 to 1998 are not included in Figure 9

because no other banks disclosed VaR during the three years except RBC The

analysis from the perspective of average effect across Canadian banks supports

our claim that Canadian banks underestimate the VaR diversification effect which

leads to the VaR overestimation The same analysis for US banks does not

reach the conclusion of a general underestimation of VaR diversification

In addition we calculate the estimated DVaR based on the correlation

matrix derived from the five-year moving window market index data and find

there is no material difference compared to the previous estimated DVaR

Besides that we also form a market index matrix by deleting those trading days

with missing data instead of interpolating them and the estimated DVaR based

on this approach is very close to the result derived from the interpolated indices

17

5 CONCLUSION

Our empirical analysis reveals that Canadian banks underestimate the

diversification effect of the VaR thus overstating their aggregated VaR However

there is no clear evidence indicating that the US banks are also underestimating

the diversification effect

We also find some very different cases among the sample banks BMO

always underestimates the VaR diversification effect and has the highest

percentage in terms of the VaR overestimation so BMO is likely to

underestimate the VaR diversification This finding is further verified by the fact

that BMO reports the least average diversification effect during our sample period

BoA on the contrary constantly underestimated the diversified VaR with a

significant magnitude from 2000 to 2004 In cases when the VaR diversification is

overestimated we suspect that the overestimation of the disclosed individual

VaRs contributes a partial effect to the overestimation of the diversified VaR

More empirical tests need to be done to validate the individual VaRs However

the portfolio data of each risk category are not publicly available which makes it

hard to investigate the individual VaRs

We use the historical correlation model to estimate the correlation matrix

for the individual VaRs Instead of the historical data as a proxy more

sophisticated correlation models such as the conditional correlation model

proposed by Robert Engle (2002) can be applied to obtain a better estimation of

the time-varying correlation matrix thus a closer measurement of the

diversification effect

18

REFERENCE LIST

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks Bank for international settlement

Berkowitz J OBrien J 2002 How accurate are value-at-risk models at commercial banks Journal of Finance 57 1093-1111

Engle R 2002 Dynamic conditional correlation A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models Department of Finance New York University Leonard N Stern School of Business New York and Department of Economics University of California San Diego

Jorion P 2006 Value at risk The new benchmark for managing financial risk McGraw-Hili New York NY Third Edition

Jorion P 2007 Bank trading risk and systematic risk University of Chicago Press In The Risk of Financial Institutions Carey M and Stulz R M (Editors) Chicago IL

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2001 Guideline Capital Adequacy Requirements

Periqnon C Deng Z Y amp Wang Z J 2007 Do banks overstate their value-atshyrisk Journal of Banking and Finance Forthcoming

Periqnon C Smith DR 2007a The level and quality of value-at-risk disclosure by commercial banks Working Paper Simon Fraser University

Perignon C Smith DR 2007b Correlation and value-at-risk Working Paper Simon Fraser University

The Federal Reserve Board 2007 Insured US-chartered commercial banks that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more ranked by consolidated assets as of December 312006

19

TABLES

Table 1 Disclosed VaR for Canadian Banks

Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Interest rate 158 169 214 101 118 191 Equity 48 66 51 39 38 98 Foreign exchange 70 38 63 05 04 33

BMO Commodity Credit spread -

20 na

11 na

08 na

11 40

32 41

84 58

Undiversified VaR - 296 284 336 196 233 464 Diversification (56) (52) (54) (46) (55) (104) Diversified VaR 240 232 281 150 178 360

BNS

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

-

- 42 43 12 07 na

105 (39) 66

74 36 17 08 na

136 (57) 79

85 64 10 12 na

171 (65) 106

36 40 15 07 na 98 (45) 53

46 43 10 17 na

116 (50) 66

95 28 06 05 na

134 (48) 86

Interest rate 122 64 61 73 25 60 34 61 Equity 156 141 83 93 54 47 51 61 Foreign exchange 10 09 09 05 10 02 01 04

CIBC Commodity Credit spread

21 144

10 133

11 67

26 57

08 26

20 29

11 26

12 57

Undiversified VaR 453 355 231 254 123 158 123 195 Diversification - (206) (150) (120) (100) (61) (70) (60) (103) Diversified VaR 247 205 112 154 62 88 63 92

NBC

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

--

-

20 10 10 na na 40 (10) 30

30 10 00 na na 40 (10) 30

20 12 02 02 na 36 (07) 29

21 11 02 02 na 36 (09) 27

35 51 09 06 na

101 (50) 51

41 41 12 15 na

109 (51) 58

Interest rate 150 120 50 60 70 30 110 80 80 120 130 Equity 20 100 170 90 140 80 70 40 40 70 70 Foreign exchange 100 200 50 60 40 20 20 20 20 10 20

RBC Commodity Credit spread

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na na

na 20

10 20

10 30

Undiversified VaR 270 420 270 210 250 130 200 140 160 230 260 Diversification (170) (270) (90) (80) (70) (50) (70) (60) (60) (80) (90) Diversified VaR 100 150 180 130 180 80 130 80 100 150 170

TO

Interest rate Equity Foreign exchange Commodity Credit spread Undiversified VaR Diversification Diversified VaR

- -

-

40 60 12 10 na

122 (50) 72

73 55 19 08 na

155 (48) 107

Notes This table summarizes the year end individual VaRs and diversified VaRs (1-day 99) disclosed by the sample Canadian banks in their annual reports for the period from 1996 to 2006 The blank cells mean that the data are not available in the annual reports BNS only disclosed 10shyday VaRs in 2001 and 2002 To be consistent with other reported VaRs we convert the 10-day VaRs to 1-day VaRs for BNS in 2001 and 2002

20

Tab

le 2

C

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rase

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Tab

le 3

C

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elat

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Mat

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CA

Co

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Inte

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mm

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Cre

dit

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d

10

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(00

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10

00

0

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7

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2

02

76

6

10

00

0

(00

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8)

(00

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0)

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00

0

No

tes

Thi

s hi

stor

ical

co

rre

latio

n m

atr

ix is

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sed

on

581

we

ekl

y (W

ed

ne

sda

ys)

sam

ple

s in

tot

al f

rom

11

11

99

5 to

10

31

20

06

21

Tab

le 4

D

iscl

ose

d V

aR f

or

US

Ban

ks

Ban

k In

tere

st r

ate

98Q

4 -99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 O

OQ

1 -O

OQ

2 O

OQ

3 O

OQ

4 19

0

01Q

1 37

0

01Q

2 39

9

01Q

3 53

4

01Q

4 85

3

02Q

1 76

9

02Q

2 63

9

02Q

3 74

6

02Q

4 59

6

Equ

ity

-6

0 27

2

227

19

3

107

11

7

243

12

4

84

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

40

56

63

69

87

209

13

6

121

18

4

JPM

orga

n C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

--

- -- - -

40

40

370

38

26

762

45

25

759

47

30

873

137

3

5 12

19

48

25

116

8

41

31

109

0

20

36

104

7

19

32

915

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-- -

-- -

-(1

30)

24

0

(13

5)

627

(1

41)

61

8

(24

7)

626

(2

86)

93

3

(34

9)

819

(4

16)

67

4

(28

7)

760

(2

69)

64

6

Inte

rest

rat

e 88

0

660

49

0

360

35

0

380

49

0

460

53

0

680

57

0

540

44

0

500

44

0

510

75

0

Equ

ity

200

12

0

140

16

0

170

23

0

210

21

0

240

11

0

180

14

0

100

27

0

240

11

0

120

F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

10

0

140

16

0

140

17

0

110

12

0

70

110

13

0

120

10

0

90

110

13

0

150

25

0

Citi

bank

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

12

0

nla

130

nl

a 18

0

nla

80

nla

100

nl

a 9

0 nl

a 14

0

nla

280

nl

a 15

0

nla

160

nl

a 20

0

nla

150

nl

a 21

0

nla

260

nl

a 10

0

nla

90

nla

50 nla

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

130

0 10

50

970

74

0

790

81

0

960

10

20

103

0 10

80

107

0 93

0

840

11

40

910

86

0

117

0 D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

(44

0)

860

(3

60)

69

0

(38

0)

590

(3

20)

42

0

(32

0)

470

(3

30)

48

0

(38

0)

580

(4

30)

59

0

(39

0)

640

(3

60)

72

0

(39

0)

680

(2

90)

64

0

(30

0)

540

(4

30)

71

0

(27

0)

640

(3

20)

54

0

(34

0)

830

In

tere

st r

ate

--

--

--

68

68

38

43

27

Equ

ity

--

--

--

-0

6 0

9 0

3 0

3 0

3 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

--

--

15

21

26

17

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

-- -

-- -

-0

1 nl

a 0

4 nl

a 2

4 nla

02

33

08

21

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-9

0 10

2

91

97

69

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

- -

- --

--

(29

) 6

1 (3

8)

64

(21

) 7

1 (2

9)

68

(19

) 5

0 In

tere

st r

ate

--

-25

7

279

28

8

319

33

0

425

54

8

621

67

5

660

57

5

526

48

0

Equ

ity

--

137

17

6

242

29

5

267

23

9

193

14

6

154

15

6

130

10

5

88

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

-10

8

115

11

4

106

10

6

99

90

86

72

60

48

36

32

BoA

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

16 nla

16

143

1

8 13

9

19

126

2

1 10

1

23

85

24

80

30

91

43

109

5

8 11

4

71

130

8

2 13

8

92

148

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

518

72

9

801

86

5

825

87

1

935

97

4

105

3 10

48

954

88

7

840

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

--

-(2

01)

31

7

(40

7)

322

(4

29)

37

2

(44

4)

421

(4

10)

41

5

(42

2)

449

(4

54)

48

1

(48

2)

492

(5

26)

52

7

(52

7)

521

(4

87)

46

7

(44

9)

438

(4

39)

40

1

Inte

rest

rat

e -

113

-

89

98

--

-11

2

Equ

ity

-0

9 -

40

52

--

-6

9 F

orei

gn e

Xch

ange

-

08

-1

3 -

-1

4 -

13

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

-

-0

0 nl

a -

00

nla

- -0

0 nl

a -

- -0

0 nl

a U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

-

130

-

142

-

164

-

194

D

iver

sific

atio

n D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

-(1

4)

116

-

(40

) 10

2

- --

(51

) 11

3

-(5

9)

135

22

Ba

nk

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

O4Q

1 0

40

2

04

03

04

Q4

05Q

1 0

50

2

05Q

3 0

50

4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 0

60

4

07Q

1In

tere

st r

ate

579

58

1

491

79

9

478

10

82

730

57

3

716

94

0

620

89

0

470

38

0

650

44

0

650

E

quity

10

1

82

130

45

6

278

25

0

220

19

8

181

46

0

350

24

0

230

21

0

370

49

0

430

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

149

16

9

199

23

5

284

17

9

119

28

4

216

20

0

270

19

0

190

22

0

220

27

0

190

JP

Mor

gan

Com

mod

ity

23

31

79

87

71

91

102

8

4 10

0

210

38

0

340

52

0

460

39

0

410

36

0

Cre

dit

spre

ad

37

53

195

13

2

155

14

8

132

15

0

129

17

0

160

15

0

140

15

0

150

15

0

140

U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

88

9

916

10

94

170

9 12

66

175

0 13

03

128

9 13

42

198

0 17

80

181

0 15

50

142

0 17

80

176

0 17

70

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

2)

(31

6)

(45

4)

(69

8)

(49

5)

(61

2)

(46

7)

(51

2)

(54

4)

(85

0)

550

(7

30)

(7

10)

(7

50)

(8

40)

(7

20)

(8

00)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

53

7

600

64

0

101

1 77

1

113

8 83

6

777

79

8

113

0 23

30

108

0 84

0

670

94

0

104

0 97

0

Citi

bank

Inte

rest

rat

e E

quity

F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

Co

mm

od

ity

Cre

dit

spre

ad

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

680

11

0

190

7

0 nl

a 10

50

(36

0)

690

940

16

0

270

4

0 nl

a 14

10

(50

0)

910

750

20

0

150

4

0 nl

a 11

40

(40

0)

740

830

17

0

140

13

0

nla

127

0 (4

40)

83

0

940

28

0

180

16

0

nla

156

0 (5

90)

97

0

960

23

0

140

20

0

nla

153

0 (5

40)

99

0

118

0 24

0

150

13

0

nla

170

0 (5

10)

11

90

103

0 32

0

220

15

0

nla

172

0 (5

60)

11

60

111

0 34

0

130

20

0

nla

178

0 (6

20)

11

60

109

0 37

0

160

15

0

ntlaquo

177

0 (6

40)

11

30

690

54

0

130

13

0

nla

149

0 (5

60)

93

0

830

50

0

170

8

0 n

a 15

80

(65

0)

930

950

43

0

290

15

0

nla

182

0 (7

60)

10

60

960

13

0

270

41

0

nla

177

0 (9

10)

86

0

890

44

0

280

11

0

nla

172

0 (8

20)

90

0

810

62

0

270

18

0

nla

188

0 (8

20)

10

60

990

77

0

290

27

0

nla

232

0 (1

100

) 12

20

Inte

rest

rat

e 4

4 4

0 5

6 5

0 5

5 7

3 11

4

85

114

7

0 19

6

220

45

2

57

200

13

0

160

E

quity

0

0 0

3 0

7 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 F

orei

gn e

xcha

nge

12

09

18

36

12

16

32

03

19

16

22

10

35

03

20

20

10

HS

BC

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

2

2 2

3 0

7 2

0 2

0 2

6 0

2 3

8 1

5 1

5 1

3 3

0 0

3 20

0

35

90

09

230

0

6 9

0 2

2 24

0

00

60

06

150

0

3 8

0 1

0 6

0 2

0 4

0 0

0 5

0 U

ndiv

ersi

fied

VaR

10

1

79

127

12

8

96

131

34

9

216

37

2

185

48

0

290

64

3

143

29

0

210

22

0

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(35

) (1

9)

(46

) (2

9)

(27

) (1

6)

(16

) (2

5)

(76

) (7

3)

(15

8)

(12

0)

(15

8)

(38

) (1

40)

(1

20)

(6

0)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

6

6 6

0 8

0 9

9

70

115

33

3

191

29

6

112

32

2

170

48

5

105

15

0

90

160

In

tere

st r

ate

452

44

1

428

41

1

403

41

9

379

36

7

345

36

4

357

36

1

355

28

5

285

26

9

241

E

quity

11

6

128

18

1

199

22

4

305

22

5

218

16

9

144

15

9

181

18

6

205

19

8

188

18

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e 3

2 3

8 4

0 4

1 4

2 3

9 3

4 3

6 4

2 4

9 5

4 5

6 5

4 5

8 6

4 8

2 8

9 B

oA

Com

mod

ity

105

10

6

103

8

7 6

7 6

3 6

0 6

5 7

3 7

3 7

2 6

6 6

0 5

8 5

8 6

1 6

3 C

redi

t sp

read

17

9

189

19

3

207

23

2

219

29

0

357

22

7

207

20

9

227

22

7

245

26

5

268

28

7

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

884

90

2

945

94

5

968

10

45

988

10

43

856

83

7

851

89

1

882

85

1

870

86

8

861

D

iver

sific

atio

n (5

21)

(5

77)

(6

12)

(6

09)

(5

67)

(5

90)

(5

48)

(5

63)

(4

33)

(4

29)

(4

44)

(4

73)

(4

79)

(4

45)

(4

56)

(4

55)

(4

48)

Div

ersi

fied

VaR

36

3

325

33

3

336

40

1

455

44

0

480

42

3

408

40

7

418

40

3

406

41

4

413

41

3

Inte

rest

rat

e -

100

12

4

-15

1

68

Equ

ity

-8

5 -

107

-

104

10

1

For

eign

exc

hang

e -

07

-1

2 0

8 -

09

Wa

cho

via

C

omm

odity

C

redi

t sp

read

- -

00

nla

02

nla

05

na

--

-0

4 21

2

Und

iver

sifie

d V

aR

192

24

5

268

39

4

Div

ersi

ficat

ion

(55

) (5

8)

-(7

6)

(20

4)D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

137

-

-18

7

192

19

0

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

mar

izes

the

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

and

dive

rsifi

ed V

aRs

(1-d

ay

99

) di

sclo

sed

by th

e sa

mp

le U

S b

anks

in

thei

r 10

-Ks

and

10-Q

s fo

r th

e

perio

d fr

om 1

998

to 2

007

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

rep

orts

T

he V

aRs

of J

PM

org

an

C

itiba

nk

and

HS

BC

are

qua

rter

end

VaR

s W

e ar

e on

ly a

ble

to g

et t

he y

early

ave

rage

VaR

s at

qu

art

er

end

for

BoA

and

the

yea

rly a

vera

ge a

t ye

ar e

nd f

or W

acho

via

res

pect

ivel

y T

he 1

-day

VaR

s fo

r H

SB

C b

efor

e th

e th

ird q

uart

er o

f 20

06 a

re c

onve

rted

fro

m t

he 1

O-d

ay V

aRs

23

Tab

le 5

U

S M

arke

t In

dic

es

RI$

k C

ateg

ofy

M

arke

t In

dex

F

req

uen

cymiddot

middotmiddot

So

urc

e middotmiddot

middotNo

tu

Inte

rest

Rat

e M

ark

et y

ield

on

US

T

reas

ury

secu

ritie

s at

1-y

ear

con

sta

nt

mat

urity

da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

Equ

ity

Samp

P5

00

Com

posi

te in

dex

daily

C

RS

P

Ce

nte

r fo

r R

esea

rch

in S

ecur

ity P

rices

(C

RS

P)

prov

ides

a

cce

ss t

o N

YS

EA

ME

XIN

asd

aq

Dai

ly a

nd M

onth

ly

Se

curi

ty P

rices

T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

to C

RS

P i

s ac

cess

ed

thro

ug

h C

HA

SS

Dat

a C

entr

e vi

a S

imon

Fra

ser

Uni

vers

ity

Libr

ary

Fo

reig

n

Exc

ha

ng

e

The

in

vert

of

the

ma

jor

curr

enci

es

inde

x da

ily

Fed

eral

Res

erve

The

maj

or c

urre

ncie

s in

dex

is a

we

igh

ted

ave

rage

of

the

fore

ign

exc

ha

ng

e v

alue

s of

the

US

d

olla

r ag

ains

t a

sub

set o

f cu

rren

cies

in t

he b

road

ind

ex t

hat

circ

ulat

e w

ide

ly o

utsi

de t

he c

ount

ry o

f is

sue

The

wei

ghts

are

de

rive

d fr

om t

hose

in

the

broa

d in

dex

Co

mm

od

ity

Dow

Jon

es A

IG S

pot

Co

mm

od

ity

Inde

x da

ily

AIG

Fin

anci

al

Pro

duct

s C

orp

and

D

ow J

ones

amp

Co

mp

an

y In

c

Dat

a ar

e re

trie

ved

from

htt

p

ww

wd

jinde

xes

com

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

Mo

od

ys

corp

orat

e B

AA

yie

ld a

nd 1

yea

r T

rea

sury

yie

ld

daily

B

ank

of C

anad

a T

he s

ubsc

ript

ion

is a

cces

sed

thro

ugh

http

w

ww

glo

balfi

ndat

aco

m

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

sum

ma

rize

s th

e U

S m

ark

et i

nd

ice

s w

e us

e fo

r th

e pr

oxie

s of

ris

k fa

ctor

s an

d th

e so

urce

s w

e re

trie

ve d

ata

from

24

Tab

le 6

C

orr

elat

ion

Mat

rix

of

US

ind

ices

US

Co

rrel

atio

n

Mat

rix

Inte

rest

Rat

e

Equ

ity

FX

Com

mod

ity

Cre

dit

Spr

ead

Inte

rest

C

redi

tE

quity

FX

C

omm

odity

Rat

e S

prea

d 1

00

00

020

49

100

00

(01

925)

(0

090

7)

100

00

002

34

002

32

019

66

100

00

(02

758)

(0

092

9)

006

82

002

84

10

00

0

No

tes

Th

is c

orre

latio

n m

atrix

is

base

d on

23

13 d

aily

sam

ples

in

tota

l fro

m 1

11

998

to 3

31

2007

Tab

le 7

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

Can

adia

n B

anks

Ba

nk

1

99

6

19

97

1

99

8

19

99

2

00

0

20

01

2

00

2

20

03

2

00

4

20

05

2

00

6

Ave

rag

e

BM

O

--

--

-1

9

1

8

1

6

2

3

2

4

2

2

2

0

B

NS

--

--

-3

7

4

2

3

8

4

6

4

3

3

6

4

0

C

IBC

-

--

45

42

52

39

50

44

49

53

47

NB

C

--

--

-2

5

2

5

1

9

2

5

5

0

4

7

3

2

R

BC

6

3

6

4

3

3

3

8

2

8

3

8

3

5

4

3

3

8

3

5

3

5

4

1

T

O

--

--

--

--

-4

1

3

1

3

6

A

ve

rag

e

63

64

33

42

35

34

32

33

35

40

37

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iscl

osed

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct o

f the

sam

ple

Can

adia

n ba

nks

for

the

perio

d fr

om 1

996

to 2

006

The

div

ersi

ficat

ion

effe

ct i

s th

e

diff

eren

ce b

etw

een

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

and

div

ersi

fied

VaR

sca

led

by th

e un

dive

rsifi

ed V

aR

and

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

is

the

sum

of

indi

vidu

al V

aRs

in

each

ris

k ca

tego

ry

The

bla

nk c

ells

mea

n th

at t

he d

ata

are

not

avai

labl

e in

the

annu

al r

epor

ts

25

Tab

le 8

D

iscl

ose

d D

iver

sifi

cati

on

Eff

ect

for

US

Ban

ks

Ba

nk

9

8Q

4

99Q

1 9

9Q

2

99

Q3

9

9Q

4

00Q

1 0

0Q

2

00

Q3

0

0Q

4

01Q

1 0

1Q

2

01

Q3

0

1Q

4

02Q

1 0

2Q

2

02

Q3

0

2Q

4

JPM

org

an

-

--

--

--

-35

18

19

28

23

30

38

27

29

C

itib

an

k 34

34

39

43

41

41

40

42

38

33

36

31

36

38

30

37

29

HS

BC

-

--

--

--

--

--

-32

37

23

30

27

Bo

A

--

--

39

56

54

51

50

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

W

ach

ovi

a

--

--

11

-

--

28

-

--

31

-

--

30

A

vera

oe

34

34

39

43

30

48

47

47

38

33

35

36

35

39

35

36

34

03Q

1 0

3Q

2

03

Q3

0

3Q

4

04Q

1 0

4Q

2

04

Q3

0

4Q

4

05Q

1 0

5Q

2

05

Q3

0

5Q

4

06Q

1 0

6Q

2

06

Q3

0

6Q

4

07Q

1 A

vera

ge

JP

Mo

rga

n

40

34

41

41

39

35

36

40

41

43

44

40

46

53

47

41

45

37

Cit

iba

nk

34

35

35

35

38

35

30

33

35

36

38

41

42

51

48

44

47

38

HS

BC

35

24

37

23

28

12

5

12

20

39

33

41

25

26

48

57

27

29

Bo

A

59

64

65

64

59

56

55

54

51

51

52

53

54

52

52

52

52

53

Wa

cho

via

-

--

29

-

--

24

--

-2

8

-

--

52

-

29

A

vera

oe

42

39

45

38

41

35

31

32

37

42

42

41

42

46

49

49

43

-N

otes

T

his

tabl

e pr

esen

ts t

he d

iver

sific

atio

n ef

fect

of t

he s

ampl

e U

S b

anks

for

the

per

iod

from

199

8 to

200

7 T

he b

lank

cel

ls m

ean

that

the

dat

a in

not

avai

labl

e in

the

finan

cial

rep

orts

26

Tab

le 9

R

egre

ssio

n R

esu

lts

for

Div

ersi

fica

tio

n E

ffec

t

Reg

ress

ion

obs

a f3

R

f3eQU

ity f3 FX

f3

c laquo

13

0 R

2

Ca

na

dia

n B

anks

(A

) 39

0

5768

-0

00

10

-0

007

1 -0

028

3 0

0191

-0

018

8 0

0488

0

4135

t-

stat

istic

s 39

(1

477

60)

057

12

(-0

07

06

) 0

01

37

(-

058

98)

000

46

(-3

2807

) -0

021

5 (0

965

6)

000

39

(-2

8503

) -0

017

0 (1

083

6)

039

19C

an

ad

ian

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(14

7236

) 0

8125

(3

16

62

) 0

0004

(0

862

5)

-00

027

(-3

6011

) 0

0009

(0

279

5)

-00

01

2

(-2

6585

) -0

010

0 -0

004

0 0

3588

US

Ban

ks (

A)

t-st

atis

tics

120

(26

3125

) 0

8099

(0

07

68

) -0

00

12

(-

177

88 )

-0

002

8 (0

295

4)

000

12

(-0

6506

) -0

000

9 (-

53

17

6)

-00

097

(-0

3409

) 0

3582

US

Ban

ks (

B)

t-st

atis

tics

(27

1810

) (-

168

03)

(-1

8906

) (0

430

8)

(-0

56

07

) (-

58

32

6)

Not

es

Thi

s ta

ble

pres

ents

the

res

ults

for

the

tw

o re

gres

sion

s as

pre

limin

ary

anal

ysis

to

find

out

whi

ch f

acto

rs h

ave

imp

act

on

the

leve

l of

dive

rsifi

catio

n of

VaR

R

egre

ssio

n A

reg

ress

es t

he r

atio

of

DV

aR o

ver

the

undi

vers

ified

VaR

aga

inst

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s an

d th

e st

anda

rd d

evia

tion

of t

hese

ind

ivid

ual

VaR

s R

egre

ssio

n 8

only

has

the

fiv

e in

divi

dual

VaR

s as

the

in

de

pe

nd

en

t va

riabl

es

Bot

h re

gres

sion

s ar

e ru

n fo

r th

e C

anad

ian

bank

s an

d U

S b

anks

27

Tab

le 1

0 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r C

anad

ian

Ban

ks

Ban

k D

iver

sifi

ed V

aR

1996

19

97

1998

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

A

vera

ge

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-24

00

232

0 28

10

150

0 17

80

360

0 B

MO

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

182

1 19

58

227

3 8

58

104

4 22

67

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-24

16

19

43

41

37

30

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-6

64

791

10

60

530

6

60

860

B

NS

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

668

9

08

111

1 5

19

662

9

53

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

--1

-15

-5

2

0

-11

-5

Dis

clos

ed

--

-24

68

204

9 11

16

153

5 6

20

880

6

30

920

C

IBC

E

stim

ated

-

--

189

9 16

59

101

3 11

58

620

6

45

550

9

66

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

-23

19

9

25

0

27

13

-5

14

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

-3

00

300

2

90

270

5

10

580

N

BC

E

stim

ated

-

--

--

244

3

35

241

2

22

610

5

85

Exc

ess

Rat

io

--

--

-19

-12

17

18

-2

0

-1

3

D

iscl

osed

10

00

150

0 18

00

130

0 18

00

800

13

00

800

10

00

150

0 17

00

RB

C

Est

imat

ed

201

8 23

15

174

2 12

12

142

1 8

97

139

3 9

13

780

12

23

133

6 E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

7

21

-1

2

-7

-1

4

22

19

21

-9

Dis

clos

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

20

107

0 T

D

Est

imat

ed

--

--

--

--

-7

25

851

E

xces

s ra

te

--

--

--

--

--1

20

10

Ave

rage

E

xces

s R

atio

-1

02

-5

4

3

15

20

8

1

3

22

9

10

Not

esT

his

tabl

epr

esen

tsth

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

nth

eD

VaR

sdi

sclo

sed

byth

esa

mpl

eC

anad

ian

bank

san

dth

eD

VaR

ses

timat

ed b

you

rcor

rela

tion

mat

rix

The

exce

ssra

tiore

pres

ents

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

dou

rest

imat

ion

asa

perc

enta

ge o

fthe

disc

lose

d D

VaR

28

Tab

le 1

1 C

om

par

iso

n b

etw

een

Dis

clo

sed

VaR

an

d E

stim

ated

VaR

fo

r U

S B

anks

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

98Q

4 99

Q1

99Q

2 99

Q3

99Q

4 OO

Q1

OOQ2

OO

Q3

OOQ4

01

Q1

01Q

2 01

Q3

01Q

4 02

Q1

02Q

2 02

Q3

02Q

4 JP

Mor

gan

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

0

OO

D 0

0

0

0

0

0

240

0 19

29

20

627

0 49

22

21

618

0 46

22

22

626

0 58

02

7

933

0 86

26

8

819

0 76

80

6

674

0 70

81

middot5

760

0 77

22

-2

646

0 62

70

3

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

860

0 97

61

-14

690

0 72

87

-6

590

0 57

88

2

420

0 41

48

1

470

0 39

91

15

460

0 41

31

14

580

0 55

40

4

590

0 59

28

0

640

0 61

03

5

720

0 73

01

-1

680

0 66

57

2

640

0 59

65

7

540

0 51

72

4

710

0 67

10

5

640

0 55

40

13

540

0 57

04

-6

830

0 81

73

2

HSB

C

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

607

6

74

-11

642

6

90

-7

705

4

97

30

684

3

83

44

504

2

86

43

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

317

0 27

68

13

322

0 30

38

6

372

0 35

93

3

421

0 42

78

-2

415

0 42

30

middot2

449

0 49

04

-9

481

0 56

65

-18

492

0 59

87

-22

527

0 65

20

-24

521

0 64

15

-23

467

0 55

89

-20

438

0 53

50

-22

401

0 51

51

-28

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

116

0 11

19

4

102

0 10

11

1

113

0 11

83

-5

135

0 15

29

-13

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-14

-6

2

1

10

10

4

-1

6

4

2

-3

-6

middot5

5

4

1

Ban

k D

iver

sifie

d V

aR

03Q

1 03

Q2

03Q

3 03

Q4

04Q

1 04

Q2

04Q

3 04

Q4

05Q

1 O

SQ2

OSQ

3 05

Q4

06Q

1 06

Q2

06Q

3 06

Q4

07Q

1 A

vera

oe

JPM

orga

n D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

537

0 61

10

-14

600

0 60

04

0

640

0 55

81

13

101

10

100

23

1

771

0 62

38

19

113

80

106

75

6

836

0 71

89

14

777

0 54

55

30

798

0 65

98

17

113

00

106

16

6

990

0 83

38

16

108

00

985

3 9

840

0 76

53

9

670

0 68

69

-3

940

0 83

39

11

104

00

805

5 23

970

0 87

33

10

10

Citib

ank

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

690

0 73

07

-6

910

0 10

068

-1

1

740

0 82

20

-11

830

0 88

82

-7

970

0 10

250

-6

990

0 96

92

2

119

00

116

23

2

116

00

101

66

12

116

00

111

51

4

113

00

117

94

-4

930

0 92

26

1

930

0 10

060

middot8

106

00

108

54

-2

860

0 10

502

-2

2

900

0 93

80

-4

106

00

962

9 9

122

00

128

96

-6

0

H

SBC

D

iscl

osed

E

stim

ated

E

xces

s ra

tio

660

4

96

25

605

3

98

34

801

6

17

23

990

5

46

45

697

5

67

19

115

4 7

46

35

332

8 12

02

54

191

2 8

75

54

296

4 10

65

64

112

1 6

16

45

322

2 18

76

42

170

0 21

38

-26

485

2 44

12

9

105

3 18

05

-71

150

0 19

57

-30

900

12

77

-42

160

0 15

87

1

18

B

oA

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

363

0 51

76

-43

325

0 50

90

-57

333

0 54

51

-64

336

0 53

87

-60

401

0 54

27

-35

455

0 55

23

-21

440

0 48

66

-11

480

0 47

04

2

423

0 36

24

14

408

0 40

24

1

407

0 40

86

0

418

0 42

73

-2

403

0 43

98

middot9

406

0 40

11

1

414

0 39

48

5

413

0 38

71

6

413

0 38

28

7

-14

W

acho

via

Dis

clos

ed

Est

imat

ed

Exc

ess

ratio

137

0 14

69

-7

187

0 15

94

15

192

0 18

94

1

190

0 23

04

-21

middot3

Av

eraQ

e E

xces

s ra

tio

-9

-8

-10

-6

-1

6

17

23

25

12

14

-5

2

-2

4

middot5

-5

3

Not

es

Th

ista

ble

pres

ents

th

eco

mpa

rison

bet

wee

n th

eD

VaR

s di

sclo

sed

by

the

sam

ple

US

ban

ks a

nd t

he

DV

aRs

estim

ated

by

ou

r cor

rela

tion

mat

rixT

he

exce

ss r

atio

rep

rese

nts

the

diffe

renc

e be

twee

nth

edi

sclo

sed

DV

aRan

do

ur e

stim

atio

n as

a pe

rcen

tage

oft

he

disc

lose

d D

VaR

29

FIGURES

Figure 1 Canadian Market Indices

Interest Rate

O (J cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

006

0lt6

004

om

002

00

OL-------------------- 1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Blnn 2l)1 axJ2Dl3 zoizrs zrs

Foreign Exchange

17 ----------------

16

15

11

13

12

11

09 -------------------- shy

1005 1Dl 1007 1008 1Bl zm 2l)1 axJ2 Dl3 2Xl4 ars 2005

Cn-(J i t Spread

006

005

001

003

002

001

0----------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl UUI nnltDJ1 = zm 2Xl4 2IXl5am

Equi ty

11000 rmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot

12000

10000

8000

0000

1000

2000

0---------------------- 10015 10015 1007 1Dl1999 2lXXlltDJ1 = am 2Xl4 2IXl52IXl5

Cceuod ly

350

mo

250

200

ISO

00

50

0-------------------- shy1005 1D3 1007 1008 1Bl2DJaxJ1 = am= 2IXl52005

Notes These are the plots of the weekly (Wednesdays) Canadian market indices for the period from 1111995 to 10312006

30

Figure 2 US Market Indices

Interest Rate amplily

UIJ7 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull iao IfniUIE 14(1)

urs I ian U04 IIIlI

I lll

flll Ilill

4(1) lUll

I all 10------------------ 0

1Rl 19IJ am zm am am alii ani IlE am 1Rl 19IJ am alii alll am alII Il6 IlE am

GlJIII-dity

3fJJ r middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot

ao

21

181

1m

811 __ oL---------------- shy1Rl 19IJ alii am alll am alII al6 alii 2(m

Crodit ~reaI

007 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

OL-------------------- 1Rl I9IJ zm am = am ID1 an alE 2(117

Notes These are the plots of the daily US market indices for the period from 111998 to 3312007

11m I

nos

005

0111

0111

0112

1101

31

Figure 3 Disclosed Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 ----shy ----JIIiiiL--L-iiiL_JIIIIL-iiiL_ LJ

70 rmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbull

60

50

40

30

20

10 0 -----~__~ __LJ-iL_ JOIILJ

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 0

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CIBC NBC

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 iL_____-JIIOLj 0 LJ-_-------~__~___~__LW- L JOIILJ

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC TD

70 cmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullbullbull

60

JI50

40

I 3020

10 0 LIIIILI__---__--__LJ__--1iIIJ 0 -------~------

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effectfor each Canadianbank which is the disclosed diversification effectdivided by the sumof individual VaRs in each risk category

32

Figure 4 Average Diversification Effect for Canadian Banks

Cross-bank Awrage Diwrsification Effect for Canadian Banks

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

RankedAwrage Diwrsification For Canadian Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected Canadian banks for the period from 1999 to 2006 which is the sum of the diversification percentage of all the Canadian banks divided by the number of Canadian banks in each particular year The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of years

50

40

30

20

10

0

33

Figure 5 Disclosed Diversification Effect for US Banks

70 60 50 40

30

20 10

JPMorgan Citibarllt

i bull ~~~ r-----------------middot 50

40 i 30

10ill II 20

0 --------L-----LILWO~ 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70 70 60 60 bull

50 50 40 40 30 30

20 i 20 10 10 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wacholia

~~ r

----------------~

50 ~ i 40

30 20 100 L-shy --------__L-shy

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the disclosed diversification effect for each US bank which is the disclosed diversification effect divided by the sum of individual VaRs in each risk category

34

Figure 6 Average Diversification Effect for US Banks

Cross-bankAverage DiversificationEffect for US Banks

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Ranked A-erage Di-ersification for US Banks

Notes The first figure plots the cross-bank average of the diversification effect of the selected US banks for the period from 1999 04 to 2007 01 The cross-bank average is calculated as the sum of the diversification percentage of all the US banks divided by the number of US banks in each particular period The bottom figure plots the time average of the diversification effect for each bank which is the sum of the diversification percentage throughout the available years for each bank divided by the number of periods

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

35

Figure 7 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for Canadian Banks

BMO BNS

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25

j

I ~ hllll

45 r

35

I I

25

l~ fl1-II_bull11111 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

CI3C

111LI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

RBC

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

NBC

45

35

25

15

5 IJl-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

TO

45

35

25

15

5

-5

-15

-25 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for Canadian banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR Excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -25 to 45 The excess ratio for RBC is -102 and -54 in 1996 and 1997 respectively

36

Figure 8 Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR for US Banks

JPMorgan

80

60 i

40 i

20

0 II 1Jl11T-1 13JIIII bull 11 -20

-40

-60

-80 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Citibank

80

60

40

20

0 1I-_JIII __ lIl11llLl~IIiIfIam-middotL Iom~ir-1 oJ -20

-40

-60

-80 L 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

HSBC

r i 20 I

0 f---shy-20 I

-40 I

l 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37

BoA

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Wachovia

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-II

-40

-60

-60 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes These figures display the ratio of VaR overestimation or underestimation for US banks which is the excess of the disclosed DVaR over our estimated DVaR divided by the disclosed DVaR The excess ratio is positive when the disclosed DVaR is greater than the estimated one To be consistent with all the sample banks we set the y-axis from -80 to 80

38

Figure 9 Average of Excess Ratio of Diversified VaR

Canadian Banks

40

30

20

10

II _0 ~ -10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

US Banks

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Notes The figure is the plot of average percentage of overestimationunderestimation of VaR which is the sum of the overestimationunderestimation percentage of all the Canadian banks or US banks divided by the number of banks in each particular year

39

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