DOCKETTH

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TRIVIA NIGHT ORGANIZED BY THE YOUNG AND NEW LAWYER’S COMMITTEE!

The Official Publication of the Lake County Bar Association • Vol. 27 No. 5 • May 2020

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300 Grand Avenue, Suite AWaukegan, Illinois 60085

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THE DOCKET EDITORIAL COMMITTEEJeffrey A. Berman,Co-Editor

Hon. Charles D. Johnson,Co-EditorJennifer C. Beeler

Hon. Michael J. FuszHon. Daniel L. Jasica

Sarah A. KahnKevin K. McCormick

Hon. Raymond J. McKoskiTracy M. Poulakidas

Stephen J. RiceNeal A. Simon

Hon. James K. SimonianRebecca J. Whitcombe

Alex ZagorSTAFF

Dale Perrin Executive Director

Jose Gonzalez Membership CoordinatorKatherine Montemayor

Office Manager

ContentsTHE DOCKET • Vol. 27, No. 5 • May 2020

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FEATURES 16 People v. Eubanks:

Reminder that DUI Blood and Urine Tests are only Allowed with a Warrant, Consent, or Exigent Circumstances Despite Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code

BY RUTH LOFTHOUSE

20 Second District Affirms Nineteenth Judicial Circuit’s Interpretation of HIPAA Qualified Protective Orders. BY BETH PRAGER

24 Executive Summary: April 15 LCBA Survey Results BY STEPHEN RICE

COLUMNS 2 President’s Page Thank You BY STEPHEN J. RICE, PRESIDENT

6 The Chief Judge’s Page Courthouse Updates BY CHIEF JUDGE DIANE WINTER

8 Bar Foundation Times are Changing BY NICHOLAS A. RIEWER,

PRESIDENT

10 Monthly Case Report 28 The Meeting Minutes February 20, 2020 BY TARA R. DEVINE, SECRETARY

30 In the Director’s Chair As we Wrap up this Year BY DALE PERRIN,

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

LCBA EVENTS IFC 2019 LCBA Office

Rental Pricing 9 New LCBA Members 29 Lawyer Referral Service 32 Monthly Committee

MeetingsBC Member Reception

The Docket2

My Presidency began with a Young Lawyer’s Event

at which the participants (myself included) contract-ed the Cyclospora parasite,

and it ends with the Coro-navirus. You’re welcome, Lake County!

Certainly every PR firm in the world would advise me against starting my last President’s Page with a reminder of the difficulties that befell us this past year. But the Young Lawyer’s Event last June is a fitting place to start a lookback at this LCBA year. That event saw a terrific crowd of well over 60 people gather for networking and learning, just a week after 160 mem-bers gathered at our instal-lation dinner. #WeAreLCBA

In July we hosted our second-ever Appellate Justices Reception. We used the event to show-case both our new crimi-nal courts tower and our still-new LCBA building. We were honored to have the presence of every Sec-ond District Justice except one, who was out of town at the time.

July and August saw the

President’sPage

The

BY STEPHEN J. RICEPRESIDENT

2019-2020 OFFICERS & DIRECTORSStephen J. Rice

PresidentHon. Patricia L. Cornell

First Vice PresidentJoseph M. Fusz

Second Vice PresidentKathleen Curtin

TreasurerTara R. Devine

SecretaryBrian J. Lewis

Immediate Past PresidentHon. Christen L. Bishop

Katharine S. HatchDavid R. Del Re

Thomas A. PasquesiDwayne Douglas

Daniel Hodgkinson

Thank You

Sarah Raich organized and emceed the June Young Lawyer’s Event, at which a panel of judges gave advice and took questions.

The affirmed (mostly!) and the affirm’ers.

Pat Salvi after his Anatomy of a Trial presentation.

May 2020 3

kickoff of our free Anato-my of a Trial series, with inaugural presentations by Chief Deputy ASA Jeff Pavletic, who spoke about openings, and Pat Salvi, who addressed closings. Two higher-caliber speakers on these topics could not be found. The Anatomy series continued through-out the fall with equally outstanding CLEs about trial practice. All took place in our court’s beautiful new ceremonial courtroom.

October saw three events of special note: first, we hosted Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul at our initial fall luncheon. For this I thank John Joanem, whose friendship with the AG provided us entrée. Sec-ond, a group of over 16 peo-ple attended the Waukegan to College Gala at Glen Flora, as part of our Lake County Bar Foundation’s ongoing support of that organization. (Currently, 13 LCBF members are men-toring W2C students in an oratory contest that seeks to help the students avoid the “summer slump” that all students go through, and may be particularly acute this year.) Finally, Fuqua Winter used our LCBA Member Center to celebrate its 100th Anniversary as a firm. That is a firm that has survived several pandemics!

December provided an inflection point that we could not yet appreci-ate: well over 100 people packed tightly into the LCBA office to celebrate the holidays. Were it not for current circumstances, this annual event would not be noteworthy. But look closely at the pictures to the right and you will appreciate what we have

recently lost. Temporarily.For many of us, January

and February were con-sumed with preparing and then performing the 2020 Gridiron. Aside from the new friendships and en-tertainment that this show supplies, the 2020 Grid-iron was also important to undergird our Association’s non-dues revenue. That is revenue we constantly strive to build, and it makes up about half of the Associa-tion’s budget.

The inflection point I foreshadowed above came to pass right around our March 11 doctor-lawyer dinner—a curious coin-cidence. About 40 people attended the dinner, and the attendees were about half doctors, half lawyers. Shortly before the event, we discussed—also with the doctors—whether the dinner should be cancelled. The decision—and this shows what a time-warp we have entered since March 11—was to proceed. Dr. Mendoza Temple gave an-other fascinating presenta-tion on marijuana (she had spoken at the same dinner five years earlier). Just two days later, Governor Pritz-ker prohibited gatherings of more than 1,000 people; shortly thereafter he closed schools; the rest is not history, but rather current events as I write this. As one bookstore meme humor-ously put it: “the post-apoc-alyptical fiction section has been moved to Current Affairs.”

In this new era of rapid technological adoption, I first “RiceChatted” with you by video on March 20. From that date on, I’ve confront-ed a different but interest-ing role as LCBA President.

Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul

LCBA/F members at the October Waukegan to College Gala.

Fuqua Winter celebrates 100 years!

The holiday party, which current circumstances make seem like a long-ago era in human history.

Gridiron in the early making.

The Docket4

Brian Lewis joked with me that I’m now a “wartime president,” and that was a healthy dose of humor, but also some truth. All of our planned seminars and other events evaporated this spring. We had a big April seminar planned for Family Law, as always. But we were also planning an April reception for recent-ly-retired Illinois Supreme Court Justice Bob Thomas and his replacement, Justice Michael Burke, plus we had three luncheons scheduled, and the many other com-mittee meetings and events that fill our yearly spring schedule.

Since March, I would summarize my role as Pres-ident in two ways. First, I tried to serve as an interme-diary between our attorney members and our judges with regards to how the practice law of law will con-tinue—an ongoing topic. This encompassed phone calls, then Zoom sessions, and next the surveys you participated in, some writ-ing, and finally additional “RiceChats.”

The second task I’ve had since mid-March is trying, with Dale Perrin and our Board, to figure out how the LCBA will operate in the near future. One task was simply to figure out how to conduct our annual meet-ing, which was supposed to occur at the end of March, and at which we elect our slate of new leaders. By the time you read this, we will hopefully have announced how that will take place. In the week I wrote this, we finalized additional bylaw revisions encompassing a remote-meeting procedure. (Needless to say, the proce-dure will be used before the

bylaws can be adopted.)Next, as we now do

each year at this time, we drafted our 2020-21 budget. This past year by March, we had outperformed enough categories in our 2019-2020 budget that we will end the year in a decent financial position. By way of just one example: losses result-ing from stricken spring seminars were somewhat counterbalanced by the Gridiron’s solid revenue. But I hardly need to note here that the future is perilous and uncertain. My favorite song is the Indigo Girls Closer to Fine. As they sing about the future in that song, so too here is there “more than one answer to these questions, pointing me in a crooked line.” Even still, I remain optimistic that our Association will remain strong in both finances and fellowship.

I’ve been asked recently whether I achieved what I set out to do this year? If you attended my instal-lation dinner or read my second President’s Page, you may recall that I made a point of having no “Presi-dential Initiative.” This was a conscious choice, not lazi-ness, and it was not a choice some of you welcomed. Like all associations of attorneys, we skew heavily Type-A.

Other bar leaders at an ABA leadership seminar I attended advised against having a Presidential ini-tiative. I also thought that, coming out of our still-re-cent troubles with he-whose-name-shall-not-be-mentioned, it made sense to try to do what we already do, but better. So are we?

In many respects: abso-lutely. Dale and our Trea-surer, Kathy Curtin, have

“I don’t even know what I’m doing here—I don’t even want to be a judge!”

Dr. Leslie Mendoza Temple spoke at the annual doctor-lawyer dinner

on March 11.

RiceChat #1

The Family Law Committee’s Fireside Chat via videoconference with Judge Smith.

You think COVID-19 can keep us apart? Guess again: Trivia Night organized by the Young and New Lawyer’s Committee!

May 2020 5

worked diligently this year to clean and streamline our financial reporting (in QuickBooks, but also in our Mem-ber Management System), plus develop written procedures for our financial affairs. We continue to have quarterly audits (reviews of “agreed-upon-procedures,” to be more precise). We have reduced costs through rationalizing some of our technolo-gy providers. And we have refreshed our bylaws and our Judicial Selection Standards, thanks to Judge Cornell, who spearheaded those efforts. All of this was decidedly unsexy but critically necessary for the future wellbeing of our association. Somewhat sexier: we have greatly expanded our Facebook reach over the last six months.

Did not having a Presidential Ini-tiative enable us to get 110% of every-thing ship-shape? Never. The reality of a dynamic organization like ours, with its very capable but small staff, is simply that there always remains much yet to do. But our “organizational hygiene,” as I liked to call it even before the COVID crisis, is in a much better condition than it was three years ago. I think even Dr. Fauci might approve.

I end this column with an eye toward all of the pictures

shown to the right—take a final look. I’ve written twelve of these columns, and I do not expect you to have read them all. But I would ask you to revisit one of them, from October

2019 (I re-posted it on Facebook, where you might find it more easily). That column was titled “A Reason to Join, A Reason to Participate.” Its message is even more important today than it was then, because the daily stress and anxiety we face has been greatly exacerbated over the last few months. If you are one of the hundreds of members who have partici-pated in our recent committee meetings via videoconferencing, then you know how helpful and even cathartic these meetings have been. The trivia night (the tiled pictures to the right are of that event) was positively uplifting.

So I want to reiterate my October message to you, because it is important to me:

Your mental and social health should not be put aside: these are important things. Is this a reason to

join or increase your participation in the Lake County Bar Association?

It is. Thank you for letting me serve as your President.

The Docket6

First, the good news---from an organizational standpoint, there have

been no changes in the judiciary or their courtroom assignments for the month of April!

However, COVID-19 now controls the methods and procedures for the administration of justice for the foreseeable future.

Courtrooms crowded with litigants, attorneys, witnesses and officers are a thing of the past. In person meetings and events are either cancelled or held by telephone, conference call or remote video con-ference. Judges are getting used to this new way of doing business. The 19th Judicial Circuit has and

wil be expanding imple-mentation of the Zoom conference meeting app as another means to conduct court calls and hearings without having attorneys and litigants coming to the courthouse. Judges will also utilize conference calls for court and to conduct pretri-als. Using these new meth-ods will not be the same as being in court in person, but will allow us to move cases forward. There will be technical cliches, connec-tivity issues and transmittal problems, but staff will be available to trouble shoot and assist attorneys and litigants. We will all need to be patient with each other as we learn and adapt to these new procedures. The judges have been attending webi-nars to learn and take ad-vantage of the best practices which other jurisdictions including, Texas, Alaska and Wisconsin which have pre-viously developed the use of

remote hearings as a normal way of doing business.

While the almost weekly issuance of new Administrative Orders has been challenging, these orders have been necessary to be responsive to the needs of litigants and attorneys during this stay at home period. We will continue to add back services as person-nel, equipment and training make it possible. Jury trials will remain a challenge until social distancing planning for our courtrooms has been completed.. I am very grateful to LCBA President, Steve Rice and association members for their support and suggestions. Several bar association committees have provided a forum for discussion and problem solving. As I write this, Administrative Orders are being prepared in anticipa-tion of the end of the stay at home order. Change, the one constant!

BY CHIEF JUDGE DIANE WINTER

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Courthouse Updates

May 2020 7

On a lighter note, DuPage County Judge Paul Marchese challenged Lake County Judge Luis Berrones to a blood drive competi-tion. DuPage had a slight advantage with 45 judges to Lake’s 39 judges. Lake County won handily with 22 judges giving blood in a 2 week period versus the 17 judges DuPage County mustered! The donors were: Luis Berrones, Mike Betar, Christy Bishop, David Brodsky, Val Ceckowski, Janelle Christensen, Ray

Collins, Patricia Cornell, Steve DeRue, Bodie Hax-all, Mitch Hoffman, Chris Kennedy, Chris Lombardo, Reggie Mathews, Jacqui Melius, Veronica O’Malley, Jorge Ortiz, Liz Rochford, Vicki Rossetti, Jim Simoni-an, George Strickland, and Diane Winter. DuPage has graciously acknowledged Lake’s success and invited Lake County judges to make this an annual event. Judge Berrones noted, “It was certainly easier to recruit people to donate blood than

it was to do the Polar Bear Plunge in January 2019 and warmer too.”

While I understand the last 2 months have been difficult for our legal com-munity, I wish to thank the LCBA membership for their patience and assistance.

Hopefully, by the time you read this article, all of our courtrooms will be in oper-ation in some capacity and we can catch up on the work we were not able to accom-plish while obeying the stay at home orders.

Stay healthy everyone!

The Docket8

The COVID-19 Pan-demic has not only caused us to change

the way we live and look

at society but has also allowed us to learn more about ourselves and others. For instance, the Supreme Court made his-tory on Wednesday, May 6, when it held arguments over the phone because of the COVID-19 Pandemic. What we did learn from this, thanks to the flush heard around the world, is that Supreme Court Jus-tices actually do go to the bathroom. Go figure.

We have also learned that one of the ways to deal with the Pandemic, is for people to hoard toilet paper, chicken and beef. Because I shop at the warehouse stores, I now have what appears to be several thousand rolls of toilet paper in my basement. If anybody needs any, please contact me and I would be happy to sell them to you at a ridiculously inflated rate.

Most businesses that are still open, are re-quiring their patrons to wear facemasks covering their nose and mouth at all times. Inhaling and exhaling in a mask that is covering both your nose and mouth, lets you know what the state of your breath is very quickly. I think it might be time to start buying stock in the companies that make breath mints.

Wearing the mask at all times, does give me some cause for concern. The other day I was going into my local liquor store (definitely an essential business in these times) and started being con-cerned that the store pro-prietor may be thinking I am going to try to rob him, and that he might shoot at me.

Speaking of essential businesses, how is it that

firearm stores and garden nursery stores are consid-ered essential business, but I can’t get a haircut. My hair is starting to look like Jack Nicholson’s did in “The Shining”. For many of you younger readers, the movie “The Shining” was released in 1980 and, oh never mind.

Then there is e-learn-ing. I have a seven-year old son who currently attends a local elementary school and a 19-year old daughter, who currently attends a university in California. I know the teachers and professors are working very hard to make the e-learning suc-cessful. If e-learning is a successful substitute for traditional learning, what is going to happen with all those buildings that they call elementary schools, high schools, and univer-sities? More importantly,

Times are Changing BY NICHOLAS A. RIEWER

PRESIDENT

BOARD OF TRUSTEESNicholas A. Riewer

PresidentCarey J. Schiever

Vice PresidentJoann M. Fratianni

SecretaryPerry S. Smith Jr.

TreasurerJeffrey A. Berman

Immediate Past PresidentJennifer L. AshleyNandia P. Black

Douglas S. DorandoKristie Fingerhut

Hon. Fred Foreman (Ret.)Joseph M. FuszScott B. GibsonKenneth J. GlickDavid J. GordonKeith C. Grant

Amy L. LonerganFredric B. Lesser

Steven P. McCollumJoseph Morrison

Michael G. NerheimMelanie Rummel

Hon. Henry C. Tonigan (Ret.)Hon. Joseph R. Waldeck (Ret.)

May 2020 9

what about the poor so-rorities and fraternities? Are they going to have to do e-rushing and have e-parties? I just don’t see this e-learning thing working out, since my seven-year old son wants to go back to school.

Then there are the Zoom conferences that everybody seems to be engaging in. I have been doing Zoom depositions and some of my partners have been doing Zoom Prove-Ups. So far, I have not had any incidents with the Zoom depositions, because I have been doing them at my office, and I usually keep my pants on while I am in the office.

On a more serious note, I would like to take this opportunity

to thank the healthcare workers who are risking their safety on a daily basis to aide those who have been severely af-fected by the COVID-19 Pandemic. Also, thank you to the many workers in the food and medicine industry who are keeping us fed and providing the necessary medications for our society.

One of the decisions that the Lake County Bar Foundation Board was faced with was wheth-er to proceed with the upcoming Gala that was tentatively scheduled for November 2020. The Gala is a function that the Lake County Bar Foundations puts on every two years with the proceeds going to various charities. Be-

cause of the uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic, we have come to the decision to cancel the Gala in its traditional form. We are, however, looking at alternative fundraising so that we can continue to support the charities.

The Lake County Bar Foundation Board is try-ing to figure out if we can have an e-Gala fundrais-er or some other means to raise money for the charities. If any of you have been involved in a successful e-fundraiser, I would appreciate it if you would contact me (nriew-er@strategicdivorce.com) or Dale Perrin (dale@lakebar.org) and share your experience with us.

Dale will be sending

out e-mails to you once we have come up with a good alternative to the traditional Gala.

New LCBAMembers

Welcome

ATTORNEYSTerry Mueller

Law Offices of Steven Lihosit

ASSOCIATESArt Miller

CPS Strategies

Frances Paparigian 19th Judicial Circuit Court

STUDENTClayton Mieszala

Video Meeting Tips & Tricks- Log on a minute or two before the meeting starts to make sure everything is working properly.

- Close the door to your office/room or find a place in your house that is quite and where people won’t be walking by, or doing other stuff, in the background.

- MUTE yourself after saying hello. Un-Mute yourself to speak, then re-mute after speaking. *6 mutes and un-mutes most smart phones.

- If on a computer that has a working microphone, do not also use your phone. Talking on your phone while the computer mic is on causes feedback.

- Avoid walking around or rocking in a chair. If you need to move around, turn off your video camera so people don’t see.

- Inform others (spouse, children, dogs) that you will be on a video call and ask them to be quite or go outside.

- If you MUST go to the bathroom, please mute yourself and turn the video camera off.

- To avoid people talking over each other, It’s best if you submit questions or comments one of two 2 ways:

1. Type your question or comment using the CHAT function or2. Type “Question/Comment” in the CHAT function. When the speaker calls on you, un-mute

yourself and ask your question. Re-mute when done.

The Docket10

Illinois Second Appellate Court - Civil

Centegra Hospital-McHenry v. Mercy Crystal Lake Hospital and Medical Center, Inc., Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, November 22, 2019, 2019 IL App (2d) 180731, 141 N.E.3d 1167.

Background: Hospital sought judicial review of decision by the Health Facilities and Services Review Board, which granted healthcare provider’s application for certificate of need to build a new hospital. The Circuit Court, McHenry County, Thomas A. Meyer, J., reversed the Board. Healthcare provider appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Schostok, J., held that:1 Evidence supported Board’s issuance of certificate of

need;2 Board did not fail to consider bed-requirement

criterion;3 Board did not improperly amend its own rules as to

ignore bed-requirement criterion;4 Board’s approval of the application was not arbitrary

or capricious;5 Board was not obligated to provide additional

rationale for its decision; Board did not arbitrarily disregard its own

regulations; and7 Provider’s application did not have to substantially

comply with all regulatory criteria.

Reversed._________________________________________________

Miwel, Inc. v. Kanzler, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, November 25, 2019, 2019 IL App (2d) 180931, 141 N.E.3d 1181.

Background: Property owner brought action against rock-crushing company and its president seeking recovery of unpaid rent, a declaratory judgment that president orally assigned his interest in rock-crushing equipment and crushed rock, and specific performance of the alleged assignment. The Circuit Court, DuPage County, No. 17-MR-627, Paul M. Fullerton, J., entered partial summary judgment for company and president on grounds not raised by defendants. Owner appealed.

Holding: The Appellate Court, Schostok J., held that

owner was not given sufficient notice and opportunity to argue that oral assignments did not run afoul of the Uniform Commercial Code UCC, and thus trial court improperly entered summary judgment on those grounds.

Reversed and remanded._________________________________________________

Illinois Second Appellate Court – Criminal

People v. Lenz, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, July 24, 2019, 2019 IL App (2d) 180124, 141 N.E.3d 359, 435 Ill.Dec. 849

Background: Defendant was convicted following a bench trial in the Circuit Court, Du Page County, Nos. 15-DT-2963 and 15-TR-99963, Anthony V. Coco, J., on all counts on two separate cases arising from two separate traffic incidents that occurred on same day. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Birkett, J., held that: Defendant lacked notice and meaningful opportunity

to present defense at trial for leaving scene of accident involving damage to vehicle, failure to reduce speed to avoid accident, and failure to provide information after damaging unattended vehicle;

2 Jeopardy did not attach to defendant’s convictions of leaving scene of accident involving damage to vehicle, failure to reduce speed to avoid accident, and failure to provide information after damaging unattended vehicle;

3 Defendant forfeited claim that various convictions arising from traffic incident were tainted with inadmissible testimony;

4 Defendant’s claim that trial court erred in admitting results of urine test would be reviewed under de novo standard, rather than abuse of discretion;

5 Leak of urine sample did not prejudice defendant nor render results of urine test unreliable;

6 There was sufficient evidence, outside of defendant’s out-of-court statements, that offenses of disobeying traffic-control device and failing to reduce speed to avoid accident occurred; and

7 There was sufficient evidence that defendant was under influence of drug or combination of drugs when he drove his vehicle on date of offense.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

March 2020 Monthly Case ReportEditor’s Note: Monthly Case Report is a new feature of The Docket, provided by 19th Judicial Circuit Law Librarian, Emanuel Zoberman

May 2020 11

The Docket12

Illinois Second Appellate – Criminal

People v. Knapp, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, June 13, 2019, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 IL App (2d) 160162, 2019 WL 2462669.

Background: After petitioner was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and mob action, and the Appellate Court affirmed, he filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, alleging actual innocence, involuntary waiver of his right to testify and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Circuit Court, McHenry County, No. 08-CF-562, Sharon L. Prather, J., summarily dismissed. Petitioner appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Birkett, P.J., held that:

1 Postconviction petition failed to establish even the gist of a claim that trial counsel performed deficiently by not allowing petitioner to testify at criminal trial, and

2 Under the statute concerning State’s attorney fees in counties under 3 million population, where the State’s attorney appellate prosecutor prosecutes the appeal it is proper to grant the State its $50 statutory assessment.

Affirmed.

People v. Rivera, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, February 27, 2020, --- N.E.3d ----, 2020 IL App (2d) 171002, 2020 WL 948421.

Background: Defendant pled guilty in the Circuit Court, Kane County, Nos. 15-CF-885, 15-CF-892, John A. Barsanti, J., to aggravated battery with firearm and unlawful possession of controlled substance. Pursuant to agreement with State, defendant would pay certain fines. Defendant moved to revoke fine. The Circuit Court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, J., held that:

1 Revocation of defendant’s fine would not constitute

changing terms of plea agreement, and2 Motion to withdraw negotiated plea is not

prerequisite for revocation of fine.

Reversed and remanded.

People v. Peltz, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, September 12, 2019, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 IL App (2d) 170465, 2019 WL 431657.

Background: Defendant who was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to four consecutive 8 1/2 year prison terms, filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. The Circuit Court, DuPage County, John J. Kinsella, J., denied defendant’s motion. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Birkett, P.J., held that:

1 Defense counsel’s certificate strictly complied with form requirements;

2 Trial court’s remarks at sentencing did not imply that court improperly relied on its own opinion of offense; and

3 Remand was required to allow defendant to file motion raising alleged errors regarding fees pursuant to court rule adopted during pendency of appeal.

Affirmed in part, and remanded. McLaren, J., filed dissenting opinion.

People v. Scott, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, May 21, 2019, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 IL App (2d) 160439, 2019 WL 2183350.

Background: Defendant, convicted of multiple offenses related to a shooting in a bank parking lot, filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The Circuit Court, Du Page County, No. 02-CF-3615, Liam C. Brennan, J., denied relief. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Hutchinson, J., held that:

April 2020 Monthly Case ReportEditor’s Note: Monthly Case Report is a new feature of The Docket, provided by 19th Judicial Circuit Law Librarian, Emanuel Zoberman

May 2020 13

1 Amended supreme court rule applied retroactively to defendant;

2 Defendant’s proof of service, when read together with his affirmation under penalty of perjury, stated a complete address;

3 Defense counsel’s failure to investigate and call witness who averred that he had shared holding cell with defendant and heard defendant ask for an attorney did not prejudice defendant; and

4 Defense counsel’s failure to challenge defendant’s statements to police as being product of physical coercion did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Affirmed.

People v. Cavitt, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, September 30, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 170149, 2019 WL 4744711.

Background: Defendant was convicted, following jury trial, in the Circuit Court, Kane County, John A. Basanti, J., of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, aggravated battery of a peace officer, and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer. The Court denied defendant’s motion for new trial. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, J., held that:

1 The Circuit Court’s decision to restrict jury to one silent viewing of surveillance video in open court constituted error;

2 The Circuit Court’s admonishment to jury violated jury’s exclusive right to weigh evidence;

3 The Circuit Court’s admonishment prejudiced defendant;

4 The Circuit Court’s restriction and admonishment undermined fairness of defendant’s trial; and

5 Evidence supported conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer.

Reversed and remanded.

People v. Rodriguez-Palomino, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, November 28, 2018, --- N.E.3d ----, 2018 IL App (2d) 160361, 2018 WL 6191410.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Lake County, George D. Strickland, J., of predatory criminal sexual abuse of a child and

aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Burke, J., held that:

1 Defendant’s late notice of appeal was not attributable to flaw in trial court’s admonition; and

Trial judge was not responsible for defendant’s failure to timely file notice.

Appeal dismissed.

Illinois Second Appellate – Civil

Village of Buffalo Grove v. Board of Trustees of Buffalo Grove Firefighters’ Pension Fund, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, January 17, 2020, 2020 IL App (2d) 190171, 141 N.E.3d 1200, 436 Ill.Dec. 104.

Background: Municipality sought judicial review of decision by municipal firefighter pension board, which found that widow of firefighter was entitled to duty pension survivor’s benefits after firefighter’s death from colon cancer. The Circuit Court, Lake County, Diane E. Winter, J., affirmed the board. Municipality appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Schostok, J., held that:

1 Pension board was not obligated to consider whether widow was eligible for nonduty pension;

2 Board’s decision was subject to manifest weight of the evidence review;

3 Evidence supported board’s decision; and4 Board did not apply occupational disease pension

statute’s rebuttable presumption of causation.

Affirmed.

Village of Lisle v. Spelson, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, September 25, 2019, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 IL App (2d) 180673, 2019 WL 4666304.

Background: Following bench trial, the Circuit Court, DuPage County, No. 18-OV-422, Christine T. Cody, J., found defendant to have violated village ordinance prohibiting parking in handicapped parking space. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, J., held that:

1 Reasonable person would have recognized parking space in which defendant parked was a space

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reserved for those with disabilities;2 Trial court did not err by focusing on defendant’s

personal knowledge rather than on reasonable-person standard; and

3 Trial court’s finding that markings on parking space in which defendant was parked were sufficient to put reasonable person on notice that space was designated for handicapped use was not against manifest weight of evidence.

Affirmed.

In re Marriage of Brunke, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, December 24, 2019, 2019 IL App (2d) 190201, 141 N.E.3d 1186, 436 Ill.Dec. 90.

Background: Following dissolution of marriage and initial marital settlement agreement awarding former wife maintenance, wife filed petitions to extend and increase maintenance, and husband filed motion to abate maintenance. The Circuit Court, Kane County, No. 12-D-387, Joseph M. Grady, J., granted wife’s petition to extend maintenance, denied her petition to increase maintenance, and denied husband’s petition to abate maintenance. Husband appealed and wife cross-appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Zenoff, J., held that:

1 The Circuit Court orders declining to abate maintenance pending trial on wife’s petitions to extend and increase maintenance were moot;

2 The Circuit Court was warranted in extending former wife’s award of rehabilitative maintenance;

3 The Circuit Court was warranted in refusing to award former wife permanent maintenance; and

4 The Circuit Court was not required to apply factors from section of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act governing maintenance awards during review proceeding on wife’s maintenance award.

Affirmed.

In re Marriage of Izzo, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District., October 15, 2019, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 IL App (2d) 180623, 2019 WL 5152870.

Background: Father petitioned to reduce his $6,500 monthly child-support obligation to mother. After a hearing, the Circuit Court, DuPage County, Robert E. Douglas, J., denied the petition. Father appealed.

Holding: The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, J., held that change in custody constituted a substantial change in circumstances.

Reversed and remanded.

United City of Yorkville v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, March 20, 2019, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 IL App (2d) 180230, 2019 WL 1275325.

Background: City filed separate suits against purchasers of lots in subdivision and against surety to secure completion of public improvements in the subdivision. Surety filed third-party complaint against purchasers. The Circuit Court, Kendall County, No. 11-L-30 and 14-MR-90, Stephen L. Krentz and Robert P. Pilmer, JJ., dismissed the complaints and the third-party complaint and later denied motions to reconsider filed by city and surety. City and surety filed separate appeals.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Birkett, P.J., held that:

1 Subdivision annexation agreement’s exception to successor liability applied alike to purchases of single and multiple lots, whether empty or improved;

2 Purchasers of lots were not subject to agreement’s exception to successor liability;

3 Appellate Court’s comments in prior case as to whether a purchaser of lots in subdivision was bound by the duties of subdivision annexation agreement were obiter dicta and had at most persuasive value;

4 City and surety’s allegations sufficiently alleged that purchasers failed to fulfill their obligations under agreement as successors of developer and subdivision owner;

5 City and surety sufficiently alleged that duty of owner and developer of subdivision to complete public improvements ran with the land;

6 Surety’s allegations sufficiently alleged that surety relationship arose between surety and purchaser, as required to state claim for reimbursement based on purchaser’s failure to complete improvements; and

7 Fact that surety did not sign agreement did not bar surety from having standing to seek reimbursement.

Reversed and remanded.

May 2020 15

Trackman v. Michela, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, November 20, 2019, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 IL App (2d) 190131, 2019 WL 6167826.

Background: Following dismissal of grantor’s son’s claim against grantor’s daughter, as trust beneficiary, asserting that grantor had lacked testamentary capacity in amending her trust, and the voluntary dismissal of grantor’s son’s claim against grantor’s daughter asserting she had tortiously interfered with son’s expectation of inheritance and had exerted undue influence over grantor, son filed new action against daughter asserting tortious interference with expectation of inheritance. The Circuit Court, Lake County, Luis A. Berrones, J., granted daughter’s motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Son appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Hudson, J., held that:

1 Son’s initial claim that grantor lacked testamentary capacity and later claim for tortious interference with expectation of inheritance were same, for purposes of res judicata, and

2 Res judicata barred son’s claim against daughter for tortious interference with expectation of inheritance.

Affirmed.

City of McHenry v. Kleven, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, August 13, 2019, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 IL App (2d) 180758, 2019 WL 3818792.

Background: Defendant charged with driving with a breath-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more and driving under the influence of alcohol moved to suppress the result of breath test. The Circuit Court, McHenry County, Joel D. Berg, J., granted defendant’s motion. City appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, J., held that:

1 police officer did not “continuously observe” defendant, and

2 audio-visual recording of defendant sufficiently compensated for police officer’s failure to continuously observe defendant.

Reversed and remanded.

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The Docket16

1The Supreme Court reversed the First District, which found the statute facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it created per se exigent circumstances for warrantless blood draws instead of applying a case by case analysis of exigency.2 The Illinois Supreme Court found the statute constitutional because it codified exigent circumstances that would generally excuse a warrant in DUI cases involving personal injury,

1 People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525.2 People v. Eubanks, 2017 IL App (1st)

142837 aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2019 IL 123525. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const., Am. 4. Illinois adopted this Amendment. See Ill. Const., Art. I, §6. “This court interprets the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in ‘limited lockstep’ with its federal counterpart.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶16.

but unconstitutional as applied to Eubanks.3 This article will examine both courts’ analyses and holdings to sug-gest where we stand now with regard to warrantless blood draws of DUI suspects in Illinois.

At issue in Eubanks was the constitutionality of Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code:

Notwithstanding any ability to refuse under this Code to submit to these tests or any ability to revoke the implied consent to these tests, if a law enforce-

ment officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination thereof has caused the death or personal injury to another, that person

3 Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, at ¶ 68.

People v. Eubanks: Reminder that DUI Blood and Urine Tests are only Allowed with a Warrant,

Consent, or Exigent Circumstances Despite Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code

BY RUTH LOFTHOUSE

The Illinois Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the man-dated blood/urine draw of Section 11–501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code in People v. Eubanks.1

Ruth Lofthouse is an Assis-tant State’s Attorney for Lake County. Previously, she practiced family law.

May 2020 17

shall submit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol content thereof or the presence of any other drug or combination of both. 4 5

STIPULATED FACTSRalph Eubanks was

arrested after a hit-and-run accident that killed a woman and injured her son. Eubanks was driving 60 to 90 miles per hour down a residential street in Chicago with his head-lights off. The officers sus-pected him of driving under the influence and took him into custody at 9:05 p.m. At 12:05 a.m., the officer told Eu-banks that he was under ar-rest for a DUI and requested a breath, blood and urine test. Eubanks refused. Eubanks was taken to the hospital at 2:57 a.m., and at 4:10 a.m. his blood was drawn by physical force. At 5:20 a.m., the nurse approached defendant with a catheter for a urine test, and Eubanks consented to the urine test. His blood test was negative. His urine test was positive for cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine metabolite.6

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDPrior to trial, Eubanks moved to suppress the blood

and urine results as unconstitutional Fourth-Amendment

4 625 ILCS 5/11–501.2(c)(2). The statute was amended to add the “law enforcement officer shall request, and that person shall sub-mit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath, other bodily substance, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol content thereof or the presence of any other drug or combination of both.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(2).

5 This article will not address the implied consent portion of the statute because the U.S. Supreme Court, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016), previously determined that consent to a blood draw must be expressly and voluntarily given. In Birchfield, the Court addressed whether implied consent could be given for a blood draw and whether the blood draw could be taken as a search incident to arrest. The Court answered both in the negative. The Court held that warrantless breath tests, in contrast to blood, were permitted because they are insufficiently intrusive to outweigh the State’s need for BAC testing, and because of this implied consent could be given. Id. at 2183-84. The Court also held that warrantless blood tests were significantly more intrusive than breath tests and the State’s need for evidence does not outweigh these privacy concerns, and thus express and voluntary consent must be given. Id. at 2184-86.

6 2019 IL 123525, at ¶¶ 5-7.

searches. He argued that because the warrantless search lacked consent, the State needed to show (and failed to) that there were exigent circumstances that excused a war-rant. He also argued that Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which the State relied upon for the blood and urine draws, was unconstitutional under Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 141 (2013), because it created a per se

exception for a warrant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.7

At trial, Eubanks was found guilty of first-degree murder, failure to report an accident involving death or injury and aggravated driving under the influence.8 The court found the Vehicle Code section constitutional un-der Schmerber v. California,9 People v. Jones,10 and Missouri v. McNeely.11 The respective holdings of these cases can be summarized as follows:

In Schmerber, the defendant was arrest-ed at a hospital for a DUI after a car acci-dent in which he and the passenger were injured. He refused a blood draw and the officer forced one without a warrant.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because “special facts” created exigent circumstances that justified the search, namely a delay caused by the investiga-tion at the accident scene and the hospital trip left the police, “no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant before the destruction of evidence through the dissipation of alcohol.”12

The Illinois Supreme Court, in Jones, (DUI arrest without personal injury) interpreted Schmerber to hold that a compulsory blood test did not violate any constitutional rights and the dissipation of alco-hol or other substances in DUI cases established an exigency exception to the warrant requirement.

In McNeely, the defendant was stopped by a po-

7 Id. at ¶¶ 4-8.8 2019 IL 123525, at ¶ 23. 9 384 U.S. 757 (1966).10 214 Ill. 2d 187 (2005).11 569 U.S. 141, 141 (2013).12 384 U.S. at 770-772.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that there will almost always be an

exigency when there is an unconscious driver

because that unconscious driver presents a pressing

medical issue for an officer that would delay a

warrant application

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lice officer for a routine DUI investigation with-out any car accident or injury. McNeely declined a breath and blood test, and the officer directed a blood sample at the hospital. The officer never attempted to obtain a warrant. The U.S. Supreme Court held that where no factors, other than the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, suggested that there was exigency, a nonconsensual war-rantless blood draw violated a person’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Court explained that even with a serious injury to a person, if an officer can secure a warrant without significantly delay-ing a blood draw, such as when another officer could transport the injured person to the hospi-tal, “there would be no plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.”13

Thus, McNeely overruled Jones and held that dissi-pation of alcohol alone, i.e. the threatened destruction of evidence, cannot be a per se exigency that defeats Fourth Amendment protections.14

APPELLATE COURTOn appeal, Eubanks renewed his constitutional ar-

guments.15 The Appellate Court agreed, finding Section 11-501.2(c)(2) facially unconstitutional, and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial with the blood and urine samples to be suppressed. In finding Section 11-501.2(c)(2) unconstitutional, the Appellate Court found the statute created a per se category of exigency, that “exigent circum-stances necessarily exist whenever there is probable cause to believe an individual has been driving under the influ-ence of alcohol or other intoxicants, and, in doing so, has injured or killed another individual,” instead of exigency being shown on a case by case basis as required by McNeely (exigency “must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances”).16

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT While Eubanks was pending before the Illinois Supreme

Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Mitchell v. Wis-consin.17 Mitchell resolved whether a blood draw from an unconscious DUI suspect offends the Fourth Amendment.18 The U.S. Supreme Court held that there will almost always be an exigency when there is an unconscious driver because that unconscious driver presents a pressing medical issue for an officer that would delay a warrant application. Thus, while holding that every case must still be resolved on a case

13 Id. at 152–54.14 See People v. Harrison, 2016 IL App (5th) 150048 (recognizing

that Jones was abrogated by McNeely).15 Eubanks also argued that the trial court should have instructed the

jury on reckless homicide as a lesser included offense, that the State failed to meet their burden of proof for his conviction for failure to report an accident, and that the prosecutor’s improper comments denied him a fair trial. This article does not address those issues.

16 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 156.17 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).18 Id.

by case factual determination in accordance with Schmerber and McNeeley, the U.S. Supreme Court arguably created a definition of exigency in DUI cases for which a warrant is not required:

[e]xigency exists when (1) [blood alcohol con-tent (BAC) ] evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application.19

The Illinois Supreme Court applied Mitchell in Eubanks:

Thus, Mitchell makes clear that, although the determination of exigent circumstances requires a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, courts may identify general rules that will apply in most cases. One of these general rules is that exigency will exist when BAC is dissipating and “some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant ap-plication.” … Two such factors have been expressly identified: (1) when there has been a traffic accident causing personal injury (Schmerber) and (2) when the suspect is unconscious (Mitchell).20

The Illinois Supreme Court then concluded that Section 11-501.2(c)(2) is not facially unconstitutional because this statute sets forth precisely the type of general rule that the Supreme Court held will almost always support a warrant-less blood test – “a codified exigency.” And, “[b]ecause the statute sets forth a scenario in which warrantless testing will almost always be constitutional, the statute cannot be invalid in all its applications. In fact, it is valid in almost all its applications.”21

However, while the Illinois Supreme Court decided to validate the Vehicle Code provision (and the other cases that rested upon it), the Court determined that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Eubanks:

Here, before we even get to the hour that it took to transport defendant from the police station to the hospital, we have the three hours that passed between the time defendant was arrested and was asked to give blood, breath, and urine samples and, then, another three hours that passed between de-fendant’s refusal and the officers taking him to the hospital. The police did not appear to be acting with any urgency to get the testing done, and with all the offices who were working on the case, it seems

19 Id. at 2537.20 Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, at ¶ 55 (internal citations omitted).21 “Demonstrating that the statute could be found unconstitutional

under some set of circumstances does not establish its facial unconstitutionality. … Rather, a statute will be found facially un-constitutional only if there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. … If it is reasonably possible to con-strue the statute in a manner that preserves its constitutionality, we have a duty to do so.” Id., at ¶ 34 (internal citations omitted).

May 2020 1919

obvious that the police could have attempted to get a warrant without significantly increasing the delay before testing was conducted or without interfering with other pressing needs or duties. The record thus does not show sufficient exigent circumstances to dispense with a warrant. For these reasons, the general rule set forth in section 11-501.2(c)(2) does not apply here, and the statute is unconstitutional as applied to defendant’s case.22

Additionally, the Court warned the legislature of the statute’s problematic nature as evidenced by the police offi-cer’s actions in Eubanks:

Although we do not find section 11-501.2(c)(2) fa-cially unconstitutional, it is nevertheless misleading in suggesting that the facts set forth therein amount to exigent circumstances whenever they are present. Again, the facts described in section 11-501.2(c)(2) will amount to exigent circumstances in most, but not all, cases. As written, the statute tells the police that a warrant is unnecessary in all cases in which the police have probable cause to believe a person has driven or been in actual physical control of a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol and has caused a death or injury. However, Mitchell ex-

22 Id. at ¶ 68.

plained that the general rule will not apply in those unusual cases in which the blood draw is solely for law enforcement purposes and the police could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties. The legislature may wish to clarify this point.23

In summary, where there has been personal injury or death caused by a DUI suspect, there will generally be an exception to the warrant requirement because too much time will have passed to obtain evidence of alcohol content after the officers attend to urgent medical care and inves-tigate a scene. However, these “pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs” that make a warrant untimely or impractical must still be demonstrated to a court if chal-lenged. And, like in Eubanks, where there were a number of officers that could have obtained a warrant without sig-nificant delay given today’s technological advancements, the search results may still be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment regardless of any wording of a statute. In other words, “[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significant-ly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”24

23 Id. at ¶¶ 68-69.24 Id. at ¶ 42, quoting McNeeley, 569 U.S. at 152.

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1Individuals and entities which seek to obtain medical records—like attorneys in litigation—are often confused about how to request the records and what their obligations are with respect to maintaining the confidentiality of those records after they receive them. In Haage v. Zavala,2 the Second District Court of Appeals provided needed guidance in a decision outlining the procedure for obtaining medical records in litigation via a protective order, and the necessary parameters of such an order.

As most people are aware, HIPAA was designed “to establish national privacy standards and fair information practices regarding individually identifiable health informa-tion.”3 The statute authorized HHS to enact regulations implementing HIPAA. HHS subsequently adopted the “Privacy

1 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 18, 26, 29, and 42 of the United States Code).

2 2020 IL App (2d) 190499.3 2020 IL App (2d) 190499, ¶7.

Rule.” The Privacy Rule actually is a series of regulations which govern the use and disclosure of protected health information (“PHI”).4

The Privacy Rule prohibits the use or disclosure of an in-dividual’s PHI by a “covered entity” unless the use or disclo-

4 The Privacy Rule defines the term “protected health information” as “individually identifiable health information” transmitted by electronic media, maintained in electronic media, or transmit-ted or maintained in any other form or medium. 45 C.F.R. §

160.103 (2018). “Individually identifiable health information” means information, including demographic data, that (1) “is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse”; and (2) relates to “the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individ-ual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual” and (3) “identifies the in-dividual” or where “there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).

Second District Affirms Nineteenth Judicial Circuit’s Interpretation of

HIPAA Qualified Protective Orders.BY BETH PRAGER

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) provides comprehensive protections to ensure the confidentiality of medical information. Medical care providers and institutions must meet specific criteria before releasing

medical records.

Beth Prager has been an Assis-tant State’s Attorney in the Civil Division since 2008. Prior to that she was in private practice.

May 2020 21

sure otherwise specifically is permitted or required.5 Cov-ered entities are subject to financial and criminal penalties for violating the confidentiality provisions. In order to avoid violations, covered entities have maintained strict nondis-closure practices, sometimes refusing to release information even if allowed. For example, during the Opioid Crisis HHS released a statement explain-ing that treatment providers could share information with their patients’ families. A misunderstanding about the scope of the Privacy Rule had prevented family members from receiving crucial infor-mation during emergencies or crisis situations. The HHS Office of Civil Rights clari-fied that HIPAA regulations broadly granted health pro-fessionals the ability to share health information with patients’ family members during those times without violating HIPAA privacy regulations.6

HIPAA provides three ways to obtain PHI from covered entities in administrative or judicial proceedings. A litigant can: request a signed individual authorization; seek a court order allowing access to specific medical information; or propound a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process in conjunction with a HIPAA-approved protective order.7 This third method is commonly used and many courts have form qualified protective orders and simple pro-cedures for attorneys to follow to have these orders issued. 8

Haage was a consolidated appeal of two Lake County cases arising out of automobile accidents.9 In both cases, the plaintiffs asked the court for qualified protective orders for their PHI. The proposed qualified protective orders con-tained clauses which were consistent with HIPAA—prohib-iting the use of the medical records for purposes other than the litigation and requiring the parties to return or destroy the records at the end of the cases.10

State Farm insured the defendants in both cases and intervened specifically to object to the scope of the protec-tive order.11 State Farm argued that the plaintiffs’ proposed orders were too restrictive and it asked the courts to instead issue the standard Cook County protective order, used by

5 A “covered entity” means “[a] health plan,” “[a] health care clear-inghouse,” or “[a] health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form” as those terms are defined in the regulation. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).

6 https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-opioid-crisis.pdf.7 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(iv) (2018).8 See Northern District of Illinois procedure and form HIPAA qual-

ified protective order. https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/_assets/_documents/_forms/_judges/Martin/Protective%20Order.pdf. https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/PrintContent.aspx?cmpid=734.

9 Haage v. Zaveda, 17 L 897 (Hoffman, J., presiding); Surlock v. Starcevic, 18 L 39 (Winter, J., presiding).

10 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(v)(A),(B) (2018).11 2020 IL App (2d) 190499, ¶ 2.

the Law Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County.12 The standard Cook County order allows insurance companies to “disclose, maintain, use, and dispose of PHI or what would otherwise be considered PHI to comply and conform with current and future applicable federal and state statutes,

rules, and regulations” for 11 designated purposes.13

Both Lake County Circuit courts ruled against State Farm and issued the orders as plaintiffs had proposed them. The consolidated appeal followed. On appeal, State Farm argued that it was exempt from HIPAA because it is not a “covered entity” and that it could not comply with the more restricted pro-tective order because state law required that it maintain and use the PHI after litiga-

tion for “certain insurance functions.” The appellate court analyzed HIPAA, state law, and the relationship between these laws and affirmed the Circuit courts’ decisions.

IS STATE FARM A “COVERED ENTITY,” AND DOES IT EVEN MATTER?

The heart of HIPAA is a comprehensive system to regulate information in the possession of covered entities. In some circumstances it may be unclear whether a business is a covered entity for purposes of HIPAA. In Haage, the court analyzed whether State Farm was a covered entity and concluded that it was not.14 But the court also disagreed with State Farm about the significance of that conclusion. State Farm argued that because it was not a covered entity, it was “exempt” from HIPAA. The court disagreed, noting that HIPAA imposes restrictions on the use and disclosure of PHI for both covered entities and those who receive the PHI from the covered entities.15 While covered entities are closely regulated and subjected to the financial and criminal penalty provisions of HIPAA, entities who receive PHI pur-suant to a protective order are not free to use this informa-tion as they please. In this context, State Farm’s status as a covered or non-covered entity simply did not matter. As the Court observed:

In short, while State Farm is not a “covered entity” under HIPAA, it has not directed us to any specific language in HIPAA, the Privacy Rule, or any other regulation, authority, or case law indicating that a noncovered entity that receives PHI from a covered

12 General Administrative Order 17-4 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Law Div. Gen. Adm. Order 17-4 (Dec. 15, 2017)).

13 The order was modified and reissued in AO 18-1. The sub-stance of the order remains the same.

14 2020 IL App (2d) 190499, ¶ 40.15 Id., at ¶ 49.

In some circumstances it may be unclear whether a business is a covered entity for purposes of

HIPAA.

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entity in response to a HIPAA qualified protective order is exempt from complying with the order’s restrictions regarding the use or disclosure of the PHI. Thus, if State Farm wishes to access the PHI at issue, it must abide by the terms of the HIPAA qual-ified protective orders entered by the trial courts.16

HIPAA PROVIDES A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME TO PROTECT HEALTH INFORMATION AND PREEMPTS ANY LESS RESTRICTIVE STATE LAW.

State Farm also argued that a less restrictive protective order was necessary because Illinois law required it to use PHI in ways prohibited by the HIPAA protective order. The court analyzed each provision State Farm cited and conclud-ed otherwise:

In short, State Farm has failed to direct us to any provision of the Insurance Code or the Illinois Administrative Code that requires it to use or disclose plaintiffs’ PHI after the conclusion of the litigation. We find nothing in the statutory and administrative regulations cited by State Farm in its brief requiring it to retain PHI or use it for any particular purpose after the conclusion of litiga-tion. As such, we reject State Farm’s argument that the terms of the HIPAA qualified protective order conflict with its obligations under state law.17

The court stated that even if there was a conflict, HIPAA would preempt Illinois law. HIPAA and its regulations establish a uniform federal floor of privacy protections and preempts any state laws that are contrary or stand as obsta-cle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of HIPAA un-less they are more stringent. 18 The court specifically called out the Cook County order:

In this case, a covered entity cannot comply with HIPAA if the statutory and administrative regula-tions, as interpreted by State Farm, are inserted in the qualified protective order. In this regard, the Cook County protective order does not require an insurer to return or destroy PHI at the conclusion of litigation and would permit the insurer to use and retain PHI outside of litigation. This directly conflicts with the requirements for a HIPAA quali-fied protective order under section 164.512(e)(1)(v) of the Privacy Rule. Likewise, by eliminating these two requirements, the Cook County protective order would not provide the confidentiality and protection of PHI envisioned when the Privacy Rule was promulgated.19

Although not at issue in Haage, the standard Cook

16 Id.17 Id., at ¶ 60.18 Id. 19 Id., at ¶ 62.

County order also requires a plaintiff to waive its right to privacy for PHI,20 and provides that a failure to consent may result in sanctions up to and including dismissal.21 Similarly broad language was found to be unconstitutional in Kunkel v. Walton.22 In Kunkel, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Section 2–1003(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure violated individuals’ right to privacy expressly set forth in the Illinois Constitution. Section 2-1003(a) required that “any party who alleges a claim for bodily injury or disease shall be deemed to waive any privilege of confidentiality with his or her health care providers.” The Kunkel court found that the “disclosure of highly personal medical information having no bearing on the issues in the lawsuit is a substantial and unjustified invasion of privacy.”23 The Cook County order appears to limit the use of the PHI but not the scope of disclosure and thus also may impermissibly infringe on the right to privacy.

MEDICAL RECORDS ARE CONFIDENTIAL-WITH OR WITHOUT A PROTECTIVE ORDER

State Farm attempted to bolster its position that it could use PHI after litigation by arguing that it could have ob-tained the same information without a protective order. The court did not decide this issue because it was not properly before the court.24 However, the use or disclosure of PHI is limited by law, even without a protective order.

Illinois provides significant protections which preclude the use of information outside litigation. As stated by the Supreme Court in Kunkel, the privacy interests in medical information are rooted in the Illinois Constitution.

The confidentiality of personal medical informa-tion is, without question, at the core of what society regards as a fundamental component of individual privacy. Physicians are privy to the most intimate details of their patients’ lives, touching on diverse subjects like mental health, sexual health and re-productive choice. Moreover, some medical condi-tions are poorly understood by the public, and their disclosure may cause those afflicted to be unfairly stigmatized. Respect for the privacy of medical information is a central feature of the physician-pa-tient relationship. Under the Hippocratic Oath, and modern principles of medical ethics derived from it, physicians are ethically bound to maintain patient confidences.25

Medical records are presumed confidential by the

20 “A party disclosing PHI explicitly stipulates that he or she: … Understands that by refusing to consent to the entire contents of this court order, the court may impose sanctions up to and including the dismissal of the lawsuit.”

21 General Administrative Order 18-1 ¶2.22 Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill.2d 519, 523 (1997).23 Id.24 2020 IL App (2d) 190499, ¶ 70.25 179 Ill.2d at 537.

May 2020 23

Medical Patient Rights Act.26 This act states that medical records are private and confidential except as otherwise provided by law. Medical records are privileged from discovery by the Physician-Patient Privilege.27 Medical records are only subject to disclosure in discovery in “actions brought by or against the patient … wherein the patient’s physical or mental condition is an issue.”28 That provision, moreover, is narrowly construed. Most recently the Supreme Court found that the exception only applies if the patient puts his or her own condition at issue.29 And, when a plaintiff “waives” the privilege by filing a lawsuit, he or she waives it for that lawsuit only.30 A party who has medical records provided in litigation is not free to use these records for other purposes.

An individual’s privacy interests in medical records continues after they are disclosed for a legitimate purpose. The privacy interest supersedes other interests which might support disclosure of other types of information. In Coy v. Washington County Hosp. Dist.,31 an agreed order containing patient names was filed under seal at the con-clusion of the case. A newspaper asked the court to unseal the order. Thereafter, the parties agreed to unseal the order with the patients’ names removed. The newspaper asked the trial court to release the patients’ names, arguing that there is a strong presumption of public access to court re-cords. The trial court denied that request based on HIPAA and the newspaper appealed. The appellate court there-after held that “a court is not a covered entity for HIPAA purposes and HIPAA does not prevent the unsealing of the court order.” The appellate court, however, affirmed the trial court’s finding of a broad public policy in favor of a medical patient’s right to privacy which outweighed the public’s right to access.32

THE HAAGE APPROACHIn Coy, the appellate court did not consider HIPAA’s

comprehensive protections. Instead, the appellate court held that a court is not a “covered entity” and, therefore, HIPAA was irrelevant. While the appellate court reached the same result solely based on public policy, HIPAA is relevant. In Haage, the court recognized that HIPAA not only imposes restrictions on covered entities, but may also limit the use of the information by those who receive the information from them.33 These restrictions are

26 410 ILCS 50/3(d).27 735 ILCS 5/8-802.28 735 ILCS 5/8-802(4).29 Palm v. Holocker, 2018 IL 123152, ¶¶ 12-13. 30 Reagan v. Searcy, 323 Ill.App.3d 393, 397 (5th Dist. 2001).31 Coy v. Washington County Hosp. Dist., 372 Ill.App.3d 1077,

1081–82 (5th Dist. 2007).32 Id.33 As simply stated by the concurrence in Trent v. Office of Coro-

ner of Peoria County, 349 Ill.App.3d 276, 282 (3rd Dist. 2004): “Here, the medical records sought from the coroner’s office were provided to it under the privacy of medical records provi-sions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/8–802 (West 2002). I would find that the restrictions upon disclosure provid-ed in the Code of Civil Procedure follow those medical records

express or implied and are necessary to the accomplish-ment of the full purposes of HIPAA.

HIPAA allows disclosure under many circumstances not involving protective orders. For example, covered entities may disclose PHI to law enforcement agencies in a variety of situations.34 Law enforcement agencies are not covered entities and HIPAA does not contain explicit restrictions on the redisclosure of PHI by law enforcement. But law enforcement makes assurances to covered entities when they request the records. Redisclosure of health information outside of those purposes is inconsistent with the authorized uses and would undermine HIPAA privacy protections.35

There is a danger associated with language indicating that HIPAA protections only apply to restrict the disclo-sure of PHI in the possession of covered entities. Par-ties, like State Farm, all too often conclude that they are “exempt” and do not need to protect medical information because they are not covered entities. Although the Coy court analyzed the privacy interests and statutory restric-tions outside of the context of HIPAA, many parties do not take those additional steps.

HIPAA restrictions should be fully considered—not discarded after it is determined that the entity possessing the records is not a “covered entity.” As in Haage, disclo-sure of PHI may be pre-empted if it would undermine HIPAA’s privacy protections. In addition, when fully considering HIPAA’s restrictions, one should be reminded that medical information is considered highly personal and that its disclosure is strictly limited not just by HIPAA, but also by Illinois laws and public policy.36

when they were provided to the coroner’s office pursuant to its investigation into the cause of death of C.N. Thus, like the phy-sicians who first generated the medical records in question, the coroner, as custodian of copies of those records, must follow the same statutory limitations on any further disclosure.”

34 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2018).35 The Illinois Attorney General has stated that law enforcement

agencies are not “covered entities” and cannot use HIPAA to exempt records pursuant to a FOIA request. Ill. Att’y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 41455, issued July 6, 2016, at 3; Ill. Att’y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 25627, issued January 27, 2014, at 6.

36 Some medical records receive even more protection. See, e.g., Mental Health Confidentiality Act, AIDS Disclosure Act, Alcohol and Other Substance Abuse Disorder Act.

David Rubin Men’s ClothierBy Appointment847.247.1019

Suited to you

The Docket24

Dear Members,

Our second survey’s results are in, and we include them with this cover letter. I spent several hours collat-ing the results to provide this “executive summary” for your review. The narrative responses to Q4 are some-what voluminous, but if you feel like you are alone in this world right now, please read those responses. You are not alone.

We had 200 respondents this time (there were 175 respondents to the first survey). I realize that highlight-ing some responses elevates their importance, perhaps unduly. But you can review the full results yourself and make your own decision about whether this executive summary spotlights things well or poorly.

Questions one and two were not substantive, so I’ll start with Q3. That is a question we asked in both the previous survey and this new one. The results are thus interesting to compare (although we had 22 more respon-dents on this question for the new survey). Here was the question, and below are the collated results:

Q3: On a sliding scale of 0 to 10, where “0” represents “I am exclusively concerned about health/COVID”; “10” represents “I am exclusively con-cerned about the economic consequences of COVID on my practice”; and “5” thus represents “I am equally worried about the health and eco-nomic consequences of COVID,” where do you currently fall on the scale?

The concerns in Q3 were reflected in the narratives to Q4: “What are the most significant professional con-cerns you currently have?” Here, under subcategories I’ve created, are some illustrative responses:

Several comments related to the ability to com-municate with clients:

• “No physical connection with clients. Inability to attract new clients.”

• “Maintaining adequate communication with clients.”• “Client contact.”• “The inability to meet with clients and process work.”

Other comments touched on litigation-related effects of the shutdown:

• “Inability to complete discovery before scheduled trial dates.”

• “What judges will expect me to have accomplished

Executive Summary: April 15 LCBA Survey Results

APRIL 15 SURVEY (197 responses)

APRIL 2 SURVEY (175 responses)

How many 10s (econ.) 14 8

How many 0s (health) 4 9

0,1,2,3 (health bias) 38 42

7,8,9,10 (econ. bias) 48 25

4,5,6 111 108

Average 5 4.674

Median 5 5

May 2020 25

during this closure once court resumes.”• “Backlog of cases once crisis resolves; opposing

counsel leveraging this for an advantage.”

Then there were health concerns:• “Infecting my family if I go to court.”• “Keeping my staff well and employed.”• “That attorneys who are in high risk groups will have

to be present in court before it is safe for them to do so. A lot of them do not have associates who can go in their place. Also if people are reaching out to those 65+ to see if they need help using technology to serve their clients.”

Finally—and with great frequency—came expres-sions of economic concern:

• “Loss of income.” • “Payroll.”• “Keeping employees employed.”• “Clients being able to pay.”• “Maintaining revenue streams in a declining econ-

omy where the pandemic has forced us all into hiber-nation and stalled all the normal court and settlement processes. And, the ultimate effect on the resolution of cases - will they become worthless, will inflation kill settlement value, will clients end up with fair compen-sation for injuries, claims, losses or the value of their business dealings?”

• “Sole-practitioner with no office staff—I am con-cerned with not being able to meet expenses short term, not being able to collect earned fees from clients due to their own financial circumstances and I am concerned about being overwhelmed by expectations of court/op-posing counsel/clients once things are ‘open’ and every-one will want stuff done immediately.”

The fifth question also generated a lot of narrative responses:

Q5: What, if anything, do you believe that the LCBA and/or the 19th Judicial Circuit Court could do to assist the legal community during this time?

Again, I’ll supply some subcategories:There were many comments in this vein: “Maximize

remote court appearances.” And relatedly: “Open up all civil matters for hearing not just emergency matters.”

• “Offer remote hearings for non-emergencies.”• “Allow Telephonic court appearances without using

CourtCall, which has costs associated with each use.”• “Hold hearings and pretrial remotely, if parties

agree. Though I have concerns about remote hearings, some cases require court involvement to get to a conclu-sion. Without this, some cases are forced into limbo.”

• “Lobby the lake county judicial court to go exclu-sively virtual.”

• “A multi-door courthouse using online tools and online mediation can enhance justice in Lake County. Zoom mediations are happening privately on a daily basis yet many litigants and potential litigants are not aware of

this method, and the Court is not generating any revenue from these disputes. The 19th Judicial Circuit Court is innovative and I would be happy to help on this front.”

But one response to the next question, Q6, merits mention here because of its contrasting perspective:

• “Video conferencing should not be expanded. It is cold, impersonal, and ineffective in resolving real issues. It limits the personal interaction necessary. Law and the counseling of clients is a personal business. We deal with people’s lives and their livelihood. You cannot do that properly via video conference.”

Other responses to the “what can the LCBA/19th Judicial do” question included these:

• “Take preventive measure to safeguard people’s health when the court reopens.”

• “Fellowship, service to community and members, is there help/advice from savvy members for those who need bank loans?”

• “Promote the legal profession; plan for reopening of courthouse; publicize that the legal profession is still essential and working both through alternate dispute resolution and litigation with mechanisms to keep all of us safe.”

• “judges should recognize the enhanced difficulty of litigation in the present circumstances.”

• “I would be reluctant to put anyone in the posi-tion to require personal appearance at this time. . . . There are too many people with children at home with-out help and others in need of assistance to require them to do anything besides take care of themselves and their families.”

• “Be considerate that when we reopen that we were not fully functional when we were closed, that our clients were unable to meet certain deadlines due to teaching and caring for children, not having means to print and scan documents or gather documents.”

• “Access to mental health professionals and motiva-tional presentations.”

And finally for Q5, the following response is one that many people have expressed to me outside this survey:

• “I may be wrong, but it seems that [we] will be crossing into a new frontier once things ‘return to nor-mal.’ What will that ‘normal’ possibly look like? Fear of the unknown can be a paralyzing thing.”

That comment provides a somewhat fitting segue to the next question, which was:

Q6: Would you find it helpful to have instruc-tions on the use of remote appearances by Zoom or the LCBA’s current conferencing solution, Google Meet?

68% responded with a “yes” of some sort to this question (I will let you peruse the comments yourself, if interested).

The Docket26

The remaining questions sought to suss out some workload or workflow data from respondents.

Q7: Approximately what percentage of your normal (pre-COVID) workload are you currently accomplishing?

Q8: If you have non-attorney employees, on a sliding scale of 1 - 10, where “1” represents “no support” and 10 represents “full support,” what is your current situation with respect to these em-ployees being able to assist you with your or your firm’s work?

Q9: If you are a civil litigator: on a sliding scale of 1 - 10, where “5” represents “normal,” 1 rep-resents “way below normal,” and “10” represents “way above normal,” are you currently conducting discovery?

Q10: If you are a civil litigator: on a sliding scale of 1 - 10, where “5” represents “normal,” 1 rep-

resents “way below normal,” and “10” represents “way above normal,” are you currently receiving discovery requests?

Q11: On a sliding scale of 1 - 10, where “5” rep-resents “normal,” 1 represents “way below normal,” and “10” represents “way above normal,” are your clients communicating/working with you?

Our final question invited some “informed speculation,” and the responses provide a fitting capstone to our second survey, because they indicate that some of the same stresses that attorneys are feeling are likely reflected in our clients. (This is not surprising, because we and our clients may be fitting proxies for Americans generally: in the end, many of us, regardless of profession, are experiencing the same eco-nomic and health anxieties, differing only in degree.)

Q12: If your clients are not communicating or working with you, what is the reason that they are unable to communicate or work with you, if you know? • “More pressing life concerns.”• “Inability or refusal to come into office environment.”• “Digital divide.”• “I reach out to my clients at least once per week

and am able to (except for Court) provide full services to them. I am working well with some clients. The ones I am not working with have told me they are putting money and other issues ahead of their cases and want to regroup until after the stay home orders are lifted.”

• “With courts being closed they do not feel an imme-diate need.”

• “Some of my clients are in the healthcare field, some are caring for children, some are extremely depressed.”

May 2020 27

• “Many are under extreme stress in managing their own health, families, balancing working from home with other responsibilities. Being a litigant is stressful under normal circumstances, many cannot add the stress of communicating with their lawyer, complet-ing discovery responses, discussing settlement post Covid-19, etc. adds another layer of stress many are not able to manage. Further, I do not have the same ability to communicate with my clients as I did at the begin-ning of March given that I am also managing trying to work from home while also caring for a family.”

I want to highlight two final comments, one of which I can answer: to the question “what can the LCBA do,” one comment was to “Provide the email addresses of all practicing attorneys/LCBA members so that they can readily be reached to provide discovery, etc.” Although the LCBA does not have all attorneys’ addresses, we do have our members’ contact info on our website, and many members include their email. Here’s where you find the member search on our website (you must be logged in as a member to access this feature):

Lastly, one highlight for me: “I like Steve’s fireside chats.” I’m glad my face-for-radio hasn’t ruined everyone’s Fridays.

Thank you for participating in our survey. Please do not hesitate to reach out further.

stephenJrice@gmail.com(773) 910-1192

FREE CLE • DISCOUNTED CLE BUSINESS MEETINGS • LAWYER REFERRAL

SERVICE • COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP THE DOCKET & WEEKLY E-NEWS

The Docket28

ACTION ITEMS:1. Consent Agenda:a. January Minutes – P4b. January New Members – P7. Motion to approve Consent Agenda and Motion to approve New Members; Motions sec-onded; Motions passed.

2. Treasurer’s report:a. June – January 2020 Fi-nancial Report – P8. Update by the treasurer on finan-cial report, including total revenue, total expenses, and net operating income. Also discussed upcoming sources of revenue and expenses

for the next 30 to 180 days. Discussions on looking ahead at next year’s budget. Discussion on a quickbooks clean up with an estimated quote by Manny Silver-man. Motion to approve Manning Silverman to do a quickbooks cleanup; Motion seconded; Motion passed.

OLD BUSINESS:1. Board Meeting Date Changes – Move May 21 to May 28 and April 23 to April 30.

NEW BUSINESS:1. Real Life Project – Up-

date on progress of com-pleting videos and imbed-ding on website.2. Foundation Board Ap-pointments – Review and discussion of Foundation Board Nominees received – P21.3. Future Finances for As-sociation & Foundation – Review of and discussion of both organization’s finances going forward – P22.

OTHER MATTERS:1. Real Estate Seminar Update2. Family Law Seminar Update3. By-Laws Committee Update4. Gridiron Update5. Discussion on possible Ring or alternative alarm system for the building.

Committee Liaison Reports – Director Liaisons reported on activities of their assigned committee(s).

Motion to adjourn: 1:05

Board of Directors’ MeetingFebruary 20, 2020

MeetingMinutes

The

BY TARA R. DEVINESECRETARY

BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT

Stephen Rice President

Hon. Patricia Cornell First Vice President

Joseph Fusz Second Vice President

Kathleen Curtin Treasurer

Tara Devine Secretary

Brian Lewis Past President

Hon. Christen L. Bishop 2017-2020 Director

Katherine S. Hatch 2017-2020 Director

David R. Del Re 2018-2021 Director

Thomas A. Pasquesi 2018-2021 Director

Dwayne Douglas 2019-2022 Director

Daniel Hodgkinson 2019-2022 Director

Dale A. Perrin, Executive Director

May 2020 29

L A W Y E R R E F E R R A L S E R V I C E

C O N TA C T T H E L C B A AT 8 4 7 . 2 4 4 . 3 1 4 3 O R AT I N F O @ L A K E B A R . O R G

L A K E C O U N T Y L AW Y E R . I N F O

The Lawyer Referral Service is an intuitive win/win/win. We’re helping the public, by providing them with legal resources with some degree of reliability; we’re helping our members, by playing matchmaker with clients whom they can help for a minimal referral cost; and we’re helping the Bar Association and our public image by offering our services. Although not all of the matches will work out, the risks and costs are minimal and the rewards are great.

Deborah Goldberg, Goldberg & Kane

“I have been a member of the referral service for many years, particularly in the fields of Trusts & Estates. The service has generated a stream of potential clients, some of which are not viable but many of which have ripened into clients for litigation or estate planning. Frankly, I don’t mind answering people’s questions about our field of law, which most people find confusing. The referral service has been a great way for potential clients to speak with me and discuss the issues before having to spend money and before I have to commit to the clients. I whole-heartedly recommend the LCBA’s Client Referral Service as a way to grow your practice.”

Fredric Bryan Lesser, Lesser, Lutrey Pasquesi, & Howe LLP

As a long-time member of the LCBA Lawyer Referral Service I know how useful it is to be a member of the service. I have obtained several cases through the service and would strongly recommend that attorneys seeking cases join. Compared to the many online services that claim to provide cases, the LCBA’s referral service actually delivers at a much lower cost.

Steve McCollum, Law Offices of Steven P. McCollum, P.C.

Why should YOU join the LCBA Lawyer Referral Service?

The LCBA Lawyer Referral Service (LRS) is a valuable member benefit as well as a public service. LRS provides member attorneys with an opportunity to build business through client referrals. The service benefits the public by helping callers quickly find an attorney in the area of law in which they need help. The LRS is widely publicized and all LCBA members in good standing who carry the required malpractice insurance are eligible to join.

The LRS program is designed to assist persons who are able to pay normal attorney fees but whose ability to locate legal representation is frustrated by a lack of experience with the legal system, a lack of information about the type of services needed, or a fear of the potential costs of seeing a lawyer.

• Administrative• Appellate• Commercial

• Consumer• Criminal• Employment

• Environmental• Family• Real Estate

• Estate Planning, Wills, Trusts and Probate• Personal Injury / Property Damage

AVAILABLE REFERRAL PANELS

The Docket30

As we come to the end of our fiscal year (for those of you who

may not know, the Associa-tion and Foundation’s fiscal, and membership, year runs from July 1 to June 30) and hopefully the end of the worst of this Coronavirus Pandemic, I’d like to give a shout out to the members of our organizations for your continued support and involvement. Without you, we wouldn’t exist. I encour-age everyone to continue to be involved, or become more involved, continue to read, or at least quickly scan, our weekly E-News and other committee specif-ic emails we send regularly. Logon to your member page and update your informa-tion as needed. Reach out to other members for ad-

vice, or just to stay in touch. In case you don’t know, as a member, when you login to your member profile, you have access to the entire LCBA membership direc-tory. This directory is only available to members who login.

One of the great ben-efits of belonging to an as-sociation, especially during a time like this, is the “community” with those in the same profession that we create and the commu-nication, or as I like to call it “Being in the Know” with what’s going on. If you have important, interesting or exciting news you’d like to share, sent it to us and we’ll pass it along. If you have questions or concerns, contact us. If we don’t know the answer, we will

find it.I’d also like to give a

shout out to the Chairs and Co-Chairs of our many committees. Most com-mittees have seen an uptick in activity, participation and involvement this year. Thank you for your dedica-tion and work to foster im-provement in your specific area of law.

Thank you to our many professional, non-attorney members for your involve-ment, support, valuable programs and information that supports our attorney members, and your many sponsorship dollars that al-lows many of our programs to happen.

Thank you also to the members of both the As-sociation and Foundation Board of Directors. Your foresight and dedication to the organizations has helped us grow and set a solid foundation for future boards.

In early June you will receive your membership

dues renewal. Please watch your email and possibly your regular mail for this notice and invoice. We obviously encourage you to renew right away so you continue to receive the many benefits offered. However, we understand these are challenging times and the uncertainty of what lies ahead may cause you pause to renew right away. We plan to extend the renewal period for up to 90 days past the due date of July 1 for those who may need extra time. You also have the option of paying monthly for 11 months. That amounts to only $27.73 per month. If you need extra time or wish to discuss other options, please don’t hesitate to call the LCBA office. It benefits both of us to work some-thing out and keep you as a member then to have you not renew.

I wish you continued good health for you and your family.

Director’sChair

In the

BY DALE PERRINEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

As we Wrap up this Year

Visit the LCBA Websitelakebar.org

May 2020 31

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The Docket32

CommitteeMeetings

Monthly

• RSVP to a meeting at www.lakebar.org.

• Meetings subject to change. Please check your weekly e-news, the on-line calendar at www.lakebar.org or call the LCBA Office @ (847) 244-3143.

• Please feel free to bring your lunch to the LCBA office for any noon meetings. Food and beverages at restaurants are purchased on a individual basis.

DAY MEETING LOCATION TIME

1st Tuesday Diversity & Community Outreach LCBA 12:15-1:15

1st Thursday Real Estate Primo, Gurnee 5:30-6:30

1st Thursday (Even Mo.) Docket Editorial Committee LCBA 12:15-1:15

2nd Tuesday Criminal Law LCBA 12:15-1:15

2nd Tuesday (Odd Mo.) Immigration LCBA 4:30-5:30

2nd Wednesday Family Law Advisory Group (FLAG) LCBA 12:00-1:00

2nd Wednesday Civil Trial and Appeals LCBA 4:00-5:00

2nd Thursday Young & New Lawyers TBD 12:15-1:15

2nd Thursday Trusts and Estates LCBA 12:15-1:15

3rd Tuesday Local Government LCBA 12:15-1:15

3rd Tuesday LCBF Board of Trustees LCBA 4:00

3rd Wednesday Debtor/Creditor Rights Varies 5:30-6:30

3rd Wednesday Family Law C-105 12:00-1:00

3rd Wednesday (Odd Mo.) Employment Law Varies 5:15-6:15

3rd Thursday LCBA Board of Directors LCBA 12:00 noon

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