doctrine for joint interdiction operations · 2005-11-18 · the planning, coordination, and...

10 April 1997

Doctrinefor Joint Interdiction

Operations

Joint Pub 3-03

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides the guidancenecessary to conceptualize, plan, coordinate,and conduct successful joint interdictionoperations throughout the range of militaryoperations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine for jointoperations and training. It provides militaryguidance for use by the Armed Forces inpreparing their appropriate plans. It is not theintent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in thispublication apply to the commanders ofcombatant commands, subunified commands,joint task forces, and subordinate componentsof these commands. These principles andguidance also may apply when significantforces of one Service are attached to forces ofanother Service or when significant forces ofone Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

DENNIS C. BLAIRVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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Preface

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Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IFUNDAMENTALS OF INTERDICTION

• Introduction.............................................................................................................. I-1• Interdiction Background............................................................................................ I-1• Interdiction Objectives.............................................................................................. I-2

CHAPTER IICONDUCTING JOINT INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

• Overview................................................................................................................. II-1• Joint Interdiction Operations.................................................................................... II-3• Synchronizing Interdiction and Maneuver................................................................ II-5

CHAPTER IIITARGETING

• Interdiction Targeting Considerations..................................................................... III-1• Combat Assessment and Feedback......................................................................... III-4

CHAPTER IVACHIEVING EFFECTIVE JOINT INTERDICTION

• Immediacy of Interdiction Operations.................................................................... IV-1• Elements of Effective Interdiction.......................................................................... IV-1• Complementary Operations.................................................................................... IV-4

CHAPTER VJOINT FORCE INTERDICTION ASSETS

• General................................................................................................................... V-1• Interdiction-Capable Forces.................................................................................... V-1

APPENDIX

A References........................................................................................................ A-1B Administrative Instructions................................................................................ B-1

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GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-2

FIGURE

I-1 Interdiction Objectives................................................................................... I-3II-1 Joint Interdiction Operations......................................................................... II-1II-2 Joint Interdiction Plan................................................................................. II-12III-1 Execution Planning Considerations............................................................. III-2IV-1 Interdiction Operations Elements................................................................. IV-1IV-2 Intelligence Support to Interdiction............................................................. IV-3V-1 Interdiction-Capable Forces.......................................................................... V-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Discusses Background and Fundamentals of InterdictionOperations

Provides General Supported and/or Supporting Relationshipsand Joint Interdiction Planning Considerations

Discusses Targeting Considerations Applicable to InterdictionOperations

Describes Conditions for Achieving Effective Joint InterdictionOperations

Covers Joint Force Interdiction Assets and Capabilities

Overview of Interdiction Operations

Joint interdiction operations encompass that interdictionconducted in support of theater- and/or joint operations area(JOA)-wide priorities or when conducted between supportedand supporting components. Joint interdiction operations canachieve tactical, operational, or strategic level effects, andcan significantly affect the course of a campaign or majoroperation. However, to be most effective, they must be tailoredto the situation. This requires the close integration ofinterdiction operations with the joint force commander’s(JFC’s) overall strategy.

Interdiction is “an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroythe enemy’s surface military potential before it can be usedeffectively against friendly forces.”

Interdiction can divert enemy forces away from areas wherethe enemy has immediate or critical requirements for them, orit can divert enemy forces to a location more favorable tofriendly forces.

Joint interdictionoperations may beconducted across therange of militaryoperations and from allenvironments — air, land,sea, and space.

The purpose ofinterdiction is to divert;

Interdiction Definition

Interdiction Objectives

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Interdiction can disrupt enemy operations, including themovement and routing of the enemy’s information, materiel,and forces, through such means as at tacks ontelecommunications; command, control, communications,computers, and intelligence (C4I) nodes; and other lines ofcommunications (LOCs).

Interdiction can delay enemy forces on such occasions as whenthey are forced to halt their advance behind a damaged routesegment or are forced to make lengthy detours. Delay canresult in more concentrated forces and longer periods ofexposure, making the enemy easier to destroy or renderineffective.

Interdiction can destroy enemy forces and materiel, tippingthe correlation of forces in favor of the friendly force.Destruction is the most direct of the four interdiction actions.The enemy’s perception of our ability to destroy them can benearly as effective in achieving interdiction objectives asphysically destroying target systems, if it causes the enemy toreact in a way upon which friendly forces can capitalize.

The planning, coordination, and integration of jointinterdiction with other operations (such as maneuver) can yieldunique advantages. This synchronization of effort beginswith the JFC’s theater- and/or JOA-wide perspectives andobjectives. Subsequently, the JFC’s theater and/or JOAcampaign or operation plan facilitates such synchronizationand helps ensure that interdiction operations are part of a largerdesign aimed at achieving the JFC’s objectives.

Joint interdiction operations with strategic and operationallevel objectives generally occur deeper in enemy territory andproduce more delayed effects, while tactical level objectivesconcentrate on targets which are generally closer to friendlyforces and usually produce more immediate effects. However,geographic distance (that is, “close” versus “deep”) shouldnot constitute the primary distinction between different formsof interdiction; the most important aspect in planninginterdiction operations is the effect desired.

disrupt;

delay;

or destroy.

Unity of effort, centralizedplanning, anddecentralized executiondirectly affect theresponsiveness andversatility of jointinterdiction operations.

Conducting Joint Interdiction

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Executive Summary

Land- and sea-based air forces employ such weapons asmissiles, bombs, precision-guided munitions, clustermunitions, land and/or sea mines, electronic warfare systems,and sensors from airborne platforms. Their flexibility, range,speed, lethality, precision, and ability to mass at a desiredtime and place contributes significantly to the overall jointinterdiction effort.

Naval forces can employ missiles, munitions, torpedoes, andmines in the conduct of interdiction operations. Maritimeinterdiction can isolate an enemy from outside support, enhancefree use of the sea LOCs for friendly operations, and providesecurity for other naval operations.

Land forces employ such assets as fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft, missiles, artillery, and those forces capable ofconducting conventional airborne, air assault, and amphibiousoperations. Commanders isolate the battlefield by interdictingenemy military potential before it can be used effectivelyagainst friendly forces.

Special operations forces (SOF) may support conventionalinterdiction operations by providing terminal guidance forprecision-guided munitions, for example, or can be usedindependently in a direct action role when the use ofconventional forces is inappropriate or infeasible. There maybe circumstances where SOF are employed in an independentunconventional role.

Interdiction can be performed with joint force component’sorganic forces. These forces may also support the JFC’soperation or campaign objectives, or support other componentsof the joint force, to benefit the joint force as a whole. Sincethere will rarely be enough joint interdiction assets to meet alldemands, the JFC should arrange for the centralized directionof these assets to ensure the unity of effort required for theiroptimum use. The JFC structures the joint force to ensurethat diverse component capabilities, operations, and forcescomplement each other to achieve the desired results effectivelyand efficiently.

Forces that can conduct,or be employed in,interdiction operationsinclude land- and sea-based air forces;

ships and submarines;

land forces;

and special operationsforces.

Numerous subordinatecommanders possessresources that cancontribute to interdiction.

Joint Force Interdiction Assets

Joint Interdiction Operations

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The commander with the preponderance of air assets andthe ability to task and control those assets will normally bedesignated the joint force air component commander (JFACC).

The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC’soverall air interdiction effort. For situations in whichdesignation of a JFACC is not required, the JFC may plan,direct, and control joint air interdiction operations. If this optionis exercised by the JFC, the JFC’s staff will assist in planningand coordinating joint interdiction operations for JFC approval.

Interdiction and maneuver operations are potent entities intheir own right. Both maneuver and interdiction operationsinclude: movement of forces and weapon systems; deliveryof fires (lethal and nonlethal weapons effects); and attainingobjectives at all levels through the range of military operations.Maneuver and interdiction could be conducted relativelyindependent of each other in certain circumstances. However,synchronizing interdiction and maneuver and their joint firesenhances the ability for each to more fully contribute to asuccessful outcome of a campaign or major operation.

Space assets are used to support interdiction and maneuveroperations with timely surveillance, reconnaissance, andintelligence as well as reliable communications, navigation,and weapons guidance. This support significantly contributesto effective synchronization of operations.

To ensure unity of command and effort throughout the theaterand/or JOA, the JFC may delegate the planning andexecution of theater- and/or JOA-wide interdictionoperations (that is, interdiction effort conducted relativelyindependent of surface maneuver operations) to the componentcommander best able to perform these functions, or the JFCmay use the staff to accomplish these tasks. The JFC willnormally designate a JFACC. The JFACC recommendstheater- and/or JOA-wide targeting priorities and, incoordination with other component commanders, forwardsthe air apportionment recommendation to the JFC. TheJFACC, using the priorities or percentages established bythe JFC’s air apportionment decision, then plans andexecutes the theater- and/or JOA-wide interdiction effort.

The joint forcecommander (JFC)normally designates a jointforce air componentcommander.

Synchronizing interdictionand maneuver (land, air,and sea) provides one ofthe most dynamic conceptsavailable to the joint force.

Theater- and/or jointoperations area (JOA)-wide interdictionoperations may be plannedand executed by the JFCstaff or the appropriatecommander as directed bythe JFC.

Synchronizing Interdiction and Maneuver

Directing the Theater- and/or JOA-wide Interdiction Effort

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Executive Summary

As supported commanders within their area of operations(AO), the land and naval force commanders areresponsible for synchronizing maneuver, fires, andinterdiction . To facilitate this synchronization, suchcommanders designate the target priority, effects, and timingof interdiction operations within their AO. They maydesignate the priority of attacks to focus allocated interdictionassets on the targets or target systems essential to achievingtheir maneuver objectives. The supported commander specifiestarget effects to defeat threats to the maneuver force, to positionthe enemy for defeat by maneuver forces, and to avoid fratricideor hindrance to friendly maneuver.

Within their AO, supported commanders usually attemptto strike interdiction targets with organic assets first.Interdiction operations within AOs occur simultaneously withjoint interdiction operations ranging theater- and/or JOA-wide. Joint interdiction assets are limited resources.Nominated targets will usually outnumber assets capableof attacking them. Coordination, communication, andfeedback between and among components regarding targetingdecisions are essential and enhance trust between supported,supporting, and subordinate commanders and forces.Interdiction targets that the land or naval force commanderis unable to strike due to lack of organic assets, or for whichjoint force interdiction assets are best suited, are passed to theJFACC and staff via liaison elements. These targets may beeither individual targets, categories of targets, or requests toachieve certain effects on the battle area.

Within their AOs, land and naval force commandersemploy permissive and restrictive fire supportcoordinating measures to enhance the expeditious attack oftargets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, andsites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage forfuture operations. When appropriate, a fire supportcoordination line (FSCL) will be established and adjustedby appropriate land or amphibious force commanders withintheir AOs in consultation with superior, subordinate,supporting, and affected commanders. Interdiction can occurboth short of and beyond the FSCL. During the conduct ofjoint interdiction operations, attacks on surface targets shortof the FSCL must be controlled by the appropriate land oramphibious force commander. Forces attacking targets beyondan FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficienttime to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both inthe air and on the ground. In exceptional circumstances, theinability to conduct coordination will not preclude the attack

Interdiction may beconducted within surfaceboundaries by the landand naval forcecommanders’ organicassets, by a supportingcomponent, or as part ofthe theater- and/or JOA-wide interdiction effort.

Commanders establish firesupport coordinationmeasures which mayimpact interdictionoperations.

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of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so mayincrease the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources.

The land or amphibious force commander adjusts the locationof the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. Forhigh-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL should strike abalance so as to not unduly inhibit operational tempo whilemaximizing the effectiveness of organic and joint force assets.Control of air-to-surface operations short of the FSCL requiresdetailed synchronization, increased communications assets,more restrictive rules of engagement, positive identificationprocedures, and more people in the decision cycle in real timethan that required for missions conducted beyond the FSCL.

Intelligence can provide interdiction operations withcrucial input on target development by assessing enemycapabilities, centers of gravity, force dispositions, relationships,intentions, operations, vulnerabilities, defenses, enemywarfighting sustainability, passive defense measures, andpossible enemy courses of action. Intelligence also supportsinterdiction planners by providing environmentalassessments (such as effects of terrain, adverse weather,darkness, and seasonal and temperature effects) and byidentifying enemy target systems such as C4I systems,LOCs, and military geography.

Appropriate interdiction resources are matched to targetsystems based on operational requirements and capabilities.The goal for joint interdiction targeting is to execute aconnected series of missions and attacks to achieve theJFC’s interdiction objectives. This requires a concertedapplication of lethal and nonlethal weapons designed to affectas many elements as necessary of selected target systems. It iscritical to understand the enemy as a system and how variouscomponents of that system interrelate. Interdiction can causecascading effects which lead to achieving operational andstrategic objectives.

Commanders identify desired mission effects and the enemysystems for joint interdiction. Analysis should focus on suchvariables as the determination of critical vulnerabilities, time

The decision on where toplace (or even to use) afire support coordinationline requires carefulconsideration.

Effective intelligencesupport greatly enhancessuccessful jointinterdiction operations.

Interdiction targetingtranslates desired effectsinto specific missions andattacks.

Interdiction Targeting Considerations

Intelligence Support to Interdiction

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Executive Summary

windows in which vulnerabilities are likely to occur, threatsto friendly forces, and the relative value of potential missionobjectives or enemy systems. The JFACC conducts executionplanning, coordination, allocation, tasking, and deconflictionassociated with joint air interdiction in accordance with JFCguidance and ensures that the process is a joint effort.

Individual targets and target systems must be identifiedand prioritized in relation to their importance in achievingthe JFC campaign objectives. These campaign objectives arethe basis for developing and prioritizing component interdictionobjectives. Targeting analysis should focus on analyzing targetsystems and/or targets to achieve the desired objectives. Thenet effect is a coordinated targeting process that linkscomponent interdiction operations to JFC campaign objectives.

The purpose of combat assessment is to determine if thedesired results were achieved and to identify areas that requireadditional effort, de-emphasis, or other adjustment. Analysisof interdiction missions should address, in near real time, theeffectiveness of the operation in achieving the interdictionobjectives and actions undertaken by the enemy to counterthe interdiction effort. Appropriate feedback on interdictionresults (or changes) permits timely retargeting efforts andtasking for subsequent interdiction operations. Suchfeedback ensures the effective employment of interdictionassets and enhances the mutual trust of supported, supporting,and subordinate commanders and forces.

Successful and effective interdiction operations share anumber of common elements. These elements lead to theattainment of interdiction objectives, such as destruction ofenemy forces. To what degree each element will contribute tothe operation depends on such variables as the nature of theconflict, geographic location, weather, and characteristics ofthe enemy. Operations notable for their specialized roles whichcan complement joint interdiction operations include:counterair operations, strategic attack operations, close airsupport, space operations, information operations, and specialoperations.

A target analysis should beconducted to ensure athorough understanding ofthe mission requirementsin relation to the target.

Information gained fromcombat assessmentprovides inputs for follow-on targeting efforts.

Effective interdictionoperations arecharacterized by acombination of elements.

Combat Assessment and Feedback

Elements of Effective Interdiction

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Joint interdiction can play a key role in the successful outcomeof a campaign or major operation. Joint interdiction operationsrequire close integration with the JFC’s overall strategy to beeffective and must be tailored to the situation. They mayachieve tactical, operational, or strategic level effects.Interdiction can complement, support, or be supported by otherjoint force operations. Because interdiction assets are a limitedresource, joint interdiction requires unity of effort to achievethe desired synergy to achieve campaign or major operationobjectives.

CONCLUSION

REQUIREMENTS TO SUCCESSFULLYPROSECUTE INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

Dimensional Superiority

Sustained, Concentrated Pressure

Accurate,Timely Intelligence

Appropriate Munitions/Assets

Synchronized Maneuver and Interdiction

CHAPTER IFUNDAMENTALS OF INTERDICTION

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“The line that connects an army with its base of supplies is the heel of Achilles— its most vital and vulnerable point.”

John S. Mosby, War Reminiscences, 1887

1. Introduction

This publication provides a basis for thepreparation and employment of joint forcesfor interdiction operations. Interdiction isan action to divert, disrupt, delay, ordestroy the enemy’s surface militarypotential before it can be used effectivelyagainst friendly forces. Joint interdictionoperations are those interdict ionoperations conducted in support of theater-and/or joint operations area (JOA)-widepriorities or interdiction operationsconducted between supported andsupporting components. Doctrine for jointinterdiction operations can be applied acrossthe range of military operations (war andmilitary operations other than war [MOOTW])and from all environments — air, land, sea, andspace. These operations may complement,support, or be supported by surface maneuveroperations. Joint interdiction operations canachieve tactical, operational, or strategic leveleffects. Interdiction operations apply tocombatant commands, subordinate unifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of the joint force. Interdiction-capable forces include land- and sea-basedair forces; maritime forces; land forces,including those capable of conductingconventional airborne, air assault, andamphibious operations; and specialoperations forces (SOF). Interdiction-capableforces are discussed in Chapter V, “Joint ForceInterdiction Assets.” Joint force commanders(JFCs) may employ interdiction operations as aprincipal means to achieve intended objectives.

2. Interdiction Background

To appreciate fully the dynamics ofinterdiction and the role it fulfills in jointcampaigns and operations, one needs first toplace it in the context of operational art.When required to employ force, JFCs seekcombinations of forces and actions toachieve concentrat ion in variousdimensions. This interaction can be bestdescribed with respect to friendly forces andenemy forces. Friendly arrangements arecharacterized as either supported orsupporting. With regard to enemyforces, though, JFCs arrangesymmetrical (land versus land forces,for example) and asymmetrical (airversus land or sea forces, for example)actions to take advantage of friendlystrengths and enemy vulnerabilities, andto preserve freedom of action for futureoperations.

a. Symmetric engagements betweensimilar forces often require a superiorcorrelation of forces and/or technologicaladvantage to ensure success and minimizefriendly casualties. Asymmetric engagementsbetween dissimilar forces can be extremelylethal, especially if the force being attackedis not ready to defend itself against the threat.The massive Allied air bombardmentconducted in France from April to June 1944to interdict enemy railroads and troopmovements attempting to move into theNormandy lodgment areas is a classic exampleof these asymmetries.

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b. Asymmetric engagements offertremendous potential efficiencies. Theproperly functioning joint force is powerfulin asymmetric attack, posing threats from avariety of directions with a broad range ofweapon systems to stress the enemy’sdefenses. Interdiction operations are oneof the primary means for a joint force toseize opportunities and exploit thetremendous leverage afforded byasymmetric engagements.

c. Interdiction can significantly affectthe course of a campaign or majoroperation. It can create opportunities forcommanders to exploit and should be plannedin conjunction with other operations of thejoint force. However, the use of interdictionmust be tailored to the situation. Conductinginterdiction against an enemy with a simpleforce structure, minimal logistic requirements,and primitive logistic systems differs frominterdiction conducted against a highlymechanized, modern force with extensive andsophisticated logistic requirements.Interdiction can be particularly effective whenthe enemy must rapidly move major forcesand their sustaining supplies. However,interdiction conducted without regard to theoperational situation may be largelyineffective. Thus, planning for interdictionshould be closely integrated in the JFC’soverall strategy. It is important to bear inmind that the objective determines whetheran operation or mission is interdiction, notthe target type or weapon system used. Forexample, close air support (CAS) and airinterdiction can both be performed by thesame weapon systems, but CAS and airinterdiction are differentiated by the relativeproximity of friendly forces to the enemybeing attacked, the requirement for detailedintegration with the supported force, and thedesired effects of the operation.

3. Interdiction Objectives

The purpose of interdiction is to attackthe enemy’s ability to fight primarily bytargeting their tactical and operationalinfrastructure. Appropriate interdictiontargets may include but are not limited tosurface forces; command, control,communications, computers, and intelligence(C4I) systems; installations and facilities;transportation and supply systems; lines ofcommunications (LOCs); and other vitalresources and infrastructure (see Figure I-1).The desired objectives of interdiction are thediversion, disruption, delay, and destructionof enemy surface military potential by eitherlethal or nonlethal means.

a. Diversion. Interdiction can divertenemy forces from areas where the enemyhas critical operational requirements forthem. It may divert enemy ground forces toa location more favorable to the JFC and canalso divert enemy naval, engineering, andpersonnel resources to the tasks of repairingand recovering damaged equipment andfacilities as well as keeping LOCs open.These diversions prevent enemy groundforces and their backup support resourcesfrom being employed for their intendedpurpose. Diversions can also cause morecircuitous routing along LOCs, resulting inadditional delays for the enemy.

b. Disruption. Interdiction can disruptthe enemy’s C4I systems, intelligencecollection capability, transportationsystems, supply lines, and industrial base.Interdiction thus disrupts the movement androuting of the enemy’s information, materiel,and forces.

• The enemy’s combat operations may bedisrupted with attacks on their

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Fundamentals of Interdiction

telecommunications C4I nodes or keycommercial infrastructure components(such as electrical power andtransportation) which support and sustainmilitary operations. Such attacks mayforce the enemy to use less capable, lesssecure backup communication systemsthat can be more easily exploited byfriendly forces. Regimes which possessa rigid, top-down command and control(C2) structure can be particularlyvulnerable to the disruptive effects ofinterdiction on C4I systems.

• Interdiction can disrupt by attackingenemy LOCs, forcing the enemy to useless capable transportation modes. Thesedisruptive effects can severely affect thetempo of enemy operations. Thisdegradation may enhance the effects ofattacks on enemy C4I facilities. Enemyforces, which must disperse to avoiddamage or destruction, have a reducedability to mass to initiate or sustaineffective offensive operations.

• Interdiction attacks can also produce apsychological impact which couldsignificantly reduce enemy capabilitiesand morale. Uncertainty as to whetheror not forces, materiel, or supplies willarrive can directly affect enemycommanders, their staffs, and forces.

“The greatest secret of war and themasterpiece of a skillful general is tostarve his enemy.”

Frederick the Great

c. Delay. Interdiction can delay enemyforces and supplies.

• When interdiction delays the enemy,friendly forces gain time. What JFCsdo to improve their situation in the timegained is critical to any assessment ofinterdiction’s contribution. However, aninterdiction plan that focuses on delayand is effectively executed does notguarantee a major impact on combat

INTERDICTION OBJECTIVES

ENEMY:

DISRUPT

DIVERT DELAY

DESTROY

Command,Control,

Communications,Computers, &Intelligence

Systems

Lines ofCommunications

Surface Forces

Installations &Facilities

Other VitalResources andInfrastructure

Transportation& SupplySystems

Figure I-1. Interdiction Objectives

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operations. In order for delay to have amajor impact, either the enemy must faceurgent movement requirements insupport of its own operations or tocounter friendly maneuver, or the delaymust enhance the effect of plannedfriendly maneuver.

• It is advantageous for friendly forces topressure their opponent to attempttime-urgent movement. Ideally, if thejoint force maintains the initiative in air,ground, sea, and space, the opponent isforced to make unplanned time-urgentmovements, at times and places thatmaximize their exposure to interdiction.

• Delay is critical in achieving additionalinterdiction payoffs. For example, it canlengthen the time during which enemyland or naval forces are at risk of attack.When vehicles amass behind a damagedroute segment, or ships are trapped in aharbor because of mines, a moreconcentrated set of targets and a longerperiod of exposure results. This makesthe enemy easier to destroy or rendersthem ineffective.

d. Destruction. The destruction ofenemy forces, support elements, andsupplies is the most direct of the fourinterdiction actions in achieving the goals ofthe interdiction operation and objectives ofthe campaign or major operation. Destroyingtransportation systems is usually not an endin itself, but contributes to the delay, diversion,and disruption of enemy forces and materiel.The demonstrated or perceived ability todestroy may, by itself, achieve substantialdelay and diversion of enemy resources. Itmay cause the enemy to move only at night,or to mass air defense assets (which may beuseful elsewhere) around criticaltransportation nodes. The enemy may haveto divert engineering resources from othertasks to prepare alternate routes in anticipationof possible attacks. This may be true even

when transportation systems remain largelyundamaged. However, destruction may alsoinhibit friendly freedom of action. Forexample, destruction of key enemytransportation infrastructure in and aroundland and naval areas of operations (AOs)could hinder subsequent friendly surfaceoperations. Appropriate coordination ofinterdiction helps to preserve friendly freedomof action.

e. Effective interdiction can typicallyachieve the following desired effects: it maychannel the enemy’s movements, constrict theenemy’s logistic system, and force time-urgent movement upon the enemy.

• Channeling Enemy Movements.Interdiction channels the enemy’s movementswhen conditions force the enemy tomaneuver through or along predictableavenues. This generally results fromthe lack of transportation routes,manmade and natural obstacles, andother geographic constraints. The fewerthe routes to h a n d l e e n e m ysuppl ies and reinforcements, thegreater the loss or delay caused bysevering those routes. Attacks onenemy lateral LOCs can channelmovement, impair reinforcement,reduce operational cohesion, and createconditions for defeating the enemy indetail. Minefields may be employed tochannel enemy maritime and groundmovements. Geography may alsorestrict or channel surface movement,creating chokepoints and concentratedtargets. Geography influences therate of enemy movement, the size ofthe force to be moved, where it canmove, and the means required tomove the force. In cases wheregeography favors rapid movement ofenemy forces, artificial and/ortemporary chokepoints can be createdby such means as delivery of largenumbers of scatterable mines.

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• Constriction of the Enemy’s LogisticSystem. The less surplus capacity theenemy’s logistic system has, the lessi t can compensate for damage.Degrading the mobility of the enemy’sdistribution system hinders its abilityto redistribute assets to effectivelycounter friendly operations. Whenattacking the enemy’s logistic systems,it is normally prudent to concentrateefforts on a small number of limitingfactors such as concentrations ofsupplies; petroleum, oils, and lubricants;storage and resupply systems; or softvehicles. There may not be enoughinterdiction assets to attack all of anenemy’s logist ic systems, evensequentially over time.

• Forcing Time-Urgent MovementUpon the Enemy. Time-urgentmovement may occur for several reasons:an enemy attempt to achieve surprise, theneed to attack before reinforcements orsupplies arrive, the requirement for rapidreinforcement of threatened defensivepositions, the attempt to exploitoffensive operations, or when driven to

urgent movement by interdict ioneffects. Under these conditions, theenemy has a strong incentive to attainspecific objectives within t imeconstraints. Rapid movement ofenemy forces and supplies maymake them more vulnerable tointerdiction. They generally becomemore concentrated while traversingmore exposed and predictable avenues,foregoing time-consuming camouflageand concealment ef forts. However,t i m e - u rg e n t movements aretemporary due to a desire to limitexposure. For friendly forces tocapitalize on such opportunities, wemust deny the enemy mobility whenthey need it most. Close coordinationis required among all forces to take fulladvantage of the situation.Additionally, commanders requireaccess to C4I systems able to processreal-time and near-real-timeintelligence in order to fully exploit thecapabilities of interdiction andopportunities which interdictionoperations create; otherwise the enemycan negate their effects.

CUTTING OFF THE IRAQI ARMY

Air interdiction attacks were planned to reduce and slow resupply for the[Iraqi] forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) which were almosttotally dependent on outside sources for supplies, including food and water.The Iraqis had extensive stockpiles in rear areas which were only moderatelydegraded by air attacks — but air attacks dramatically slowed resupply. Thekey interdiction targets were identified as about 40 of the 54 bridges acrossthe Tigris and Euphrates rivers, along with railroad marshaling yards, fueldepots, and supply concentration areas. Truck convoys also were hit.

Cutting the one rail line running south from Al-Basrah through Az-Zubayr tothe KTO and the bridges over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers reduced theability of the Iraqi army to resupply the theater. Once stockpiled supplies hadbeen destroyed from the air or consumed, the Iraqi army would be unable tosustain itself.

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Interdiction attacks reduced the flow of supplies from Baghdad to the KTOand made supply movements within the KTO extremely difficult and slow. By4 February (D+18), intelligence estimated the amount of supplies reaching Iraqiforces in the KTO was below the level needed to sustain combat operations.One captured senior Iraqi infantry officer said that one week after the bombingbegan, there was no more resupply. Food shortages apparently causeddesertion rates to escalate. Air interdiction attacks left most of the Iraqi armyin the KTO weak and demoralized, although front-line forces in Kuwait borethe brunt of these privations. These and other air attacks, according to militaryintelligence reports, psychologically disarmed some Iraqi soldiers.

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress:Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

CHAPTER IICONDUCTING JOINT INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

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“Whereas in previous times we could chop up the battlespace and delegatethe various ‘pieces’ to the components, as battlespace becomes morenonlinear and combat power is applied more asymmetrically, this is a luxurywe can no longer afford.”

GEN George Joulwan, USCINCEUR

1. Overview

The JFC synchronizes the actions of air,land, sea, and special operations forces toachieve objectives through an integrated jointcampaign and major operations. The manner

in which JFCs organize their forces directlyaffects the responsiveness and versatilityof joint interdiction operations. Unity ofeffort, central ized planning, anddecentral ized execution are keyconsiderations (see Figure II-1).

Figure II-1. Joint Interdiction Operations

ObjectivesAchieved

JOINT INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

Unity ofEffort

DecentralizedExecution

CentralizedPlanning

The joint force commander synchronizes theactions of air, land, sea, and special operations

forces

Integrated joint campaignsand major operations

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a. Joint Force Objectives. JFCs canemploy their forces for a variety of purposes;the principal challenge is to combine forcecapabilities and operations into aconcentrated effort. The planning,coordination, and integration of jointinterdiction with other operations (such asmaneuver) can yield unique advantages. Thissynchronization of effort begins with theJFC’s theater- and/or JOA-level perspectivesand objectives. Likewise, the JFC’s theaterand/or JOA campaign or operation planfacilitates such synchronization and helps toensure that interdiction operations are partof a larger design aimed at achieving theJFC’s objectives. Centralized planning anddecentralized execution of jointinterdiction operations ensure coherenceand aid in the effective use of force;enhance the exploitation of tactical events;avoid fragmented, duplicated, andconflicting efforts; and accommodatethe Service and functional components’different employment concepts andprocedures.

b. Operational Art. Joint forceplanning for campaigns and operationsis based on operational art. One of thefundamental elements of operational art as itapplies to interdiction is the concept ofsimultaneity and depth. This concept alsoforms the foundation of deep operationstheory. The intent of deep operations is tobring force to bear on the opponent’s entirestructure, at the tactical, operational, andstrategic depths, in a near simultaneousmanner. The objective is to overwhelm andcripple enemy capabilities and their will toresist.

• Simultaneity refers to the simultaneousapplication of friendly capabilitiesagainst the full array of enemycapabilities and sources of strength.Likewise, joint force operationsshould be conducted across the fullbreadth and depth of the operational

area, creating competing andsimultaneous demands on enemycommanders and resources. Just as withsimultaneity, the concept of depth seeksto overwhelm the enemy throughout theoperational area from multipledimensions, contributing to their rapiddefeat or capitulation. Interdiction isone manner in which JFCs add depthto operations at the operational level.

•• Geographic distance (that is,“close” versus “deep”) should notconstitute the primary distinctionb e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o finterdiction. First, in joint operations,depth is a relative term. As Joint Pub 1,“Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces ofthe United States,” points out, “The fulldimensional joint campaign is inmajor respects ‘non-linear.’ That is,the dominant effects of air, sea, space,and special operations may be feltmore or less independently of the frontline of troops.” Second, the concept ofdepth applies to time as well as space.Operations extended in depth, in timeas well as space, shape futureconditions and can disrupt anopponent’s decision cycle. Althoughit has usually been the case thatinterdiction closer to surface forces wasdesigned to affect the battle over a shorterterm than actions deeper in the enemy’sterritory, the most important aspect inplanning interdiction operations is theeffect desired, which may be measuredin time. Once objectives and desiredoutcomes are known, commanders canmake appropriate targeting decisions.

• Joint interdiction typically focuses onoperational level objectives, asdelineated in the JFC’s campaign plan.It can enhance strategic level objectivesby working in concert with other effortsto neutralize or destroy the enemy’scenter(s) of gravity or other key target

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Conducting Joint Interdiction Operations

systems that may affect the entire theater.Joint interdiction can also enhancetactical level objectives which moredirectly complement maneuver forces.Successful joint interdiction requiresclose integration with other operations,available resources, and expected results.Strategic and operational levelobjectives are best described in termsof desired outcomes rather thanspecific targets. Those interdictionoperations with strategic and operationallevel objectives generally occur deeperin enemy territory and produce moredelayed effects. Tactical levelobjectives concentrate on targets whichare generally closer to friendly forcesand usually produce more immediateeffects.

2. Joint Interdiction Operations

Planning and coordinating interdictionoperations occurs at many levels ofcommand within a joint force. Theflexibility and capability of interdiction assetsallow them to be employed in a multitude ofsituations. Subordinate commanderspossess organic assets which can contributeto interdiction operations. These assets mayalso be employed in support of the JFC’s

operation or campaign objectives, or tosupport other components of the joint force,which benefits the joint force as a whole.Normally, joint interdict ion assetstasked in support of the theater- and/or JOA-wide in terd ic t ion ef for t(in terd ic t ion operations conductedrelatively independent of surface maneuveroperations) are also heavily tasked for otherjoint operations in addition to jointinterdiction, such as counterair, strategicattack, information operations (IO), andmaritime support. Since there will rarelybe enough of these assets to meet alldemands, the JFC arranges for thecentralized direction of joint interdictionassets to ensure the unity of effort requiredfor their optimum use.

a. Unity of Effort in Joint InterdictionOperations. The capabilities of forces usedfor joint interdiction, as well as the magnitudeof their potential contribution, must beconsidered while planning and conductingthe joint interdiction effort. The JFCstructures the joint force to ensure thatdiverse component capabilities, operations,and forces complement each other toachieve the desired results effectively andefficiently.

The precision and flexibility of interdiction assets provide the joint force acapability to apply responsive combat power to attain joint force objectives.

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b. Air Interdiction Operations aredefined as air operations conducted todestroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’smilitary potential before it can be broughtto bear effectively against friendly forcesat such distance from friendly forces thatdetailed integration of each air missionwith the fire and movement of friendlyforces is not required. Air interdiction isdifferentiated from other air operations by theobjective. For instance, a strike withTomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs) ona land-based airfield in order to deny theenemy a staging area for supplies would be

an air interdiction operation, while a strikeagainst the same airfield with F-16s, targetedon recently deployed forward based fighters,would be classified as an offensive counterairoperation.

c. Component Organic InterdictionOperations. Components may conductinterdiction operations as part of theirspecific mission in addition to, or in lieuof, supporting the theater- and/or JOA-wide interdiction effort. For example, navalforces charged with seizing and securing alodgment along a coast may include theinterdiction of opposing land and naval forcesas part of the overall amphibious operation.

Within an assigned AO, a surfacecommander can interdict enemy forces toenhance the effects of the friendly scheme ofmaneuver with the use of such organic assetsas Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS),organic fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, andartillery. In such situations as these, C2 forthe operation is normally conductedaccording to the component’s procedures.

d. The JFC ultimately approves theintegration of joint interdictionoperations with execution of other jointforce operations. Air interdiction operations

conducted over maritime and littoral areasmay require close coordination between thejoint force air component commander(JFACC) and the naval force commander.Such coordination is necessary because manymissions involving sea control may includejoint air interdiction efforts. In anunpredictable maritime environment, oftenonly the at-sea naval task force commanderknows the location and detai ledintentions of friendly at-sea forces.Additionally, in the case of air interdictionoperations short of the fire supportcoordination line (FSCL), all air-to-groundand surface-to-surface attack operations arecontrolled by the appropriate land or

A long history of inter-Service teamwork is exemplified in thisWorld War II skip-bombing interdiction operation of enemy sea LOCs.

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amphibious force commander. Coordinationbetween the JFACC and the land forcecommander, as well as coordination betweenaircrews and friendly forces on the ground,is required through the appropriate air C2agencies.

3. Synchronizing Interdictionand Maneuver

a. General. Interdiction and maneuveroperations are potent entities in their ownright. Both maneuver and interdiction

operations include: movement of forces andweapon systems; delivery of fires (lethal andnonlethal weapons effects); and attainingobjectives at all levels through the range ofmilitary operations. Maneuver andinterdiction could be conducted relativelyindependent of each other in certaincircumstances. However, synchronizinginterdiction and maneuver as well as theirjoint fires enhances the ability for each tomore fully contribute to a successful outcomeof a campaign or major operation.

• Interdict ion and maneuver arecomplementary operations thatshould normally be synchronized tocreate dilemmas for the enemy.Accordingly, synchronizing interdiction

and maneuver (land, air, and sea)provides one of the most dynamicconcepts available to the joint force.Interdiction and maneuver should notbe considered as separate operationsagainst a common enemy, but rather ascomplementary operations designed toachieve the JFC’s campaign objectives.Moreover, maneuver by land or navalforces can be conducted to interdictenemy surface potential. Potentialresponses to synchronized maneuver andinterdiction can create a dilemma for the

enemy. If the enemy attempts to counterthe maneuver, enemy forces can beexposed to unacceptable losses frominterdiction. If the enemy employsmeasures to reduce such interdictionlosses, enemy forces may not be able tocounter the maneuver.

• When properly synchronized, theseoperations place the enemy in theoperational dilemma of either defendingfrom disadvantageous circumstances orexposing forces to interdiction strikesduring attempted reposit ioning.This was frequently the case inOperation DESERT STORM. Asrecorded in the DOD Final Report toCongress on the Conduct of the Persian

Interdiction and maneuver are complementary actions.

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Gulf War, Coalition air interdictionoperations “... placed Iraqi forces onthe horns of a dilemma: if they remainedin position, they would be struck eitherfrom the air or by the advancingCoalition ground forces; if they tried tomove, they made themselves extremelyvulnerable to patrolling Coalitionaircraft, including attack helicopters.”

•• Successful interdiction operationshave several characteristics in common,as discussed in this publication.Maneuver can play a major role inenabling these conditions for effectiveemployment of interdiction. Maneuvercan place sustained pressure on theenemy, enabling interdiction to destroyenemy forces and assets at a faster ratethan they can be repaired or replaced.Maneuver can also affect target systemsto facilitate their acquisition and attackby interdiction-capable forces. Actualor threatened maneuver can force anenemy to respond by attempting rapidmaneuver or resupply. This can forcethe enemy into the open, concentratingthem along channeled routes. Thismakes the enemy a more identifiable,lucrative, and vulnerable target. Closecoordination among the componentssupporting the component leading thejoint interdiction effort will help ensurethat conditions occur in which the enemyforce is made most vulnerable tointerdiction.

•• Joint interdiction can also facilitatemaneuver operations. It may, but doesnot have to, occur at the same place andtime as the maneuver to be effective.Joint interdiction can control thetime of engagement to that point mostadvantageous to friendly forces. Jointinterdiction can be a major contributorand enabler for land and naval forceoperations. Interdiction can give surfaceforces the time and protection they need

to maneuver. The psychological effectsof interdiction efforts can greatlyreduce the will of enemy forces tocontinue, especially when faced with theprospects of having to also defendagainst subsequent maneuver operations.In a forced entry scenario, jointinterdiction may support land andamphibious maneuver operations bydenying the enemy supply or resupplyof equipment and forces to the objectivearea. It may also interfere with theirmeans of C2 or provide a diversionaryscreen. Joint interdiction can isolateenemy forces, control the movement ofenemy forces into or out of a land ornaval AO, and set conditions formaneuver forces. The joint interdictioneffort conducted in support of land ornaval forces should be properlyintegrated with the scheme of maneuverof the supported force. The supportedland or naval commander within the AOis responsible for the synchronizationof maneuver, fires, and interdiction.To facilitate this synchronization, suchcommanders designate the targetpriority, effects, and timing ofinterdiction operations within their AOs.

•• The land or naval force commandercan determine specific targets for jointinterdiction or, most preferably, give thesupporting commanders mission-typeinstructions in order to provide the othercomponents as much leeway as possible.For example, a naval commander couldindicate to the JFACC that a particulargroup of enemy naval units areautomatically the highest priority. TheJFACC can then determine how best tosupport the naval commander — withoutknowing in advance the exact locationor timing of the priority target. Byjudiciously employing fire supportcoordination measures, surfacecommanders can facilitate the jointinterdiction effort within their AOs.

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•• It is important to note that not alljoint interdiction conducted inside aland or naval AO is responding to theneeds of the commander. The JFC may,for example, have designated certainhigh priority targets that are locatedinside a surface force AO that are not ofimmediate interest to the land or navalcommander. In such a case, thecomponent commander tasked by theJFC to conduct the joint interdictionmission inside the particular surfaceforce AO will inform and/or coordinatewith the affected commander insidewhose boundar ies they wi l l beconducting interdiction operations toensure that there are no adverse effectson surface operations. Joint interdictioncan even be conducted in support of asurface force prior to the introduction ofland or naval forces. For example, ininterdiction operations conducted to setthe conditions for a forcible entryoperation, the supported commanderintroducing forces into the AO willdesignate the timing, priority, and effectsof joint interdiction so that it bestsupports the intended scheme ofmaneuver. This is but one example ofsynchronizing interdiction andmaneuver to achieve a synergy that isgreater than the sum of its parts.

b. Conducting Joint Interdiction. At thehighest level, the JFC establishes broadplanning objectives and guidance forinterdiction of enemy forces as an integralpart of a joint campaign or major operation.Supported and supporting commandersrecommend to the JFC how to use theircombat power more effectively to this end.With the advice of subordinate commanders,the JFC sets interdiction priorities,provides targeting guidance, and makesapportionment decisions. The JFC shouldclearly designate where the weight of thejoint interdiction should be applied.Weight of effort may be expressed in terms

of percentage of total available resources;by assigning priorities for resources usedwith respect to other aspects of the theaterand/or JOA campaign or operation; or asotherwise determined by the JFC. This isa particularly important consideration forcommanders who must determine acorrelation of forces within their AO,including the effects of joint interdiction.Likewise, effective interdiction plannersmust have a thorough understanding of theJFC’s campaign or major operation plan.Once the JFC establishes campaign or majoroperation objectives, componentcommanders develop operation plansthat accomplish (or contribute to theaccomplishment of) the theater- and/or JOA-wide strategic and operational objectives. Allcommanders should consider how theircapabilities and operations can complementjoint interdiction in achieving campaignobjectives and vice versa. These operationsmay include such actions as deceptionoperations, withdrawals, lateralrepositioning, and flanking movements thatare likely to cause the enemy to maneuverlarge surface forces which may make themmore vulnerable to interdiction.

• Directing the Theater- and/or JOA-wide Interdiction Effort. JFCstypically conduct joint interdictionoperations through componentcommanders. Many elements of thejoint force may perform interdictionoperations. For example, SOF mayconduct limited interdiction operationsdeep in enemy territory, and land and navalforce commanders may employ interdictionassets within their AOs. To ensure unityof command and effort throughout atheater and/or JOA, the JFC normallydelegates the planning and execution oftheater- and/or JOA-wide interdictionoperat ions to the componentcommander, with the preponderance ofinterdiction assets with theater- and/orJOA-wide range and the ability to

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include exercising operational controlover assigned and attached forces andtactical control ( TA C O N ) o v e ro t h e r m i l i t a r y capabilities and/orforces made available for tasking.However, the JFC may decide that directsupport (DS) is a more appropriatecommand authority for certaincapabilities and/or forces.

• TACON is the command authority overassigned or attached forces orcommands, or military capabilities orforces made available for tasking, thatis limited to the detailed and usually local

KOREAN WAR — INTERDICTION DURING RETREAT FROM THE YALU

Highly successful United Nations amphibious operations at Inchon in Sep1950 and Wonsan in Oct 1950 culminated in a sustained drive northward,reaching North Korea’s northernmost border, the Yalu River, in late Nov 1950.These actions spurred a massive Chinese Communist counteroffensiveagainst UN forces from Manchuria China. As General MacArthur saw it, theUnited Nations Command was “facing the entire Chinese nation in anundeclared war.” According to prisoner-of-war reports during this period,Red Chinese troops in Korea numbered between 400,000 and 500,000 men,nearly a 10-to-1 enemy advantage. There was no way to verify these estimates,and friendly forces had no choice but to fall back as fast as possible to escapeannihilation. General Lin Piao, the Chinese commander, intended to defeatthe US Eighth Army as far north as possible, ideally north of the ChongchonRiver. Failing this, the Chinese threw their usual caution to the wind and,abandoning their previous practice of traveling only at night, quickly marchedsouthward in pursuit of the Eighth Army and US X Corps over main andsecondary roads in bold daylight movements. American interdiction forces,taking advantage of this exposure, inflicted massive casualties upon theChinese. Even under attack, Chinese columns continued to march forward,apparently ignoring the casualties inflicted upon them by attacking planes ofthe Fifth Air Force. At night vehicle columns often refused to extinguishtheir lights, even when they were being strafed and bombed. On the basis ofaccumulative combat claims, it was estimated that in the first half of Dec1950, interdiction operations accounted for 33,000 killed or wounded enemytroops — the equivalent of four full-strength divisions. After sustaining 2weeks of punishment from air interdiction forces, the Chinese Communistsbegan to realize that they could not sustain such high casualty rates, andwere forced to return to their rigid discipline of concealment and camouflage.Interdiction operations afforded MacArthur’s armies the time to regroup andeventually repel the Chinese Communist onslaught, while maintaining a UnitedNations presence in Korea.

SOURCE: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953,Office of Air Force History, 1983

control them. In most cases, this is theJFACC.

c. Designation of a Joint Force AirComponent Commander. The JFC willnormally designate the commander withthe preponderance of air assets and theability to plan, task, and control joint airoperations as the JFACC. The JFACC isthe supported commander for the JFC’soverall air interdiction effort.

• The authority and commandrelationships of the JFACC areestablished by the JFC. These typically

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direction and control of movements ormaneuvers necessary to accomplishassigned missions or tasks.

• Support is a command authority. DS isa mission requiring a force to supportanother specific force and authorizingit to answer directly to the supportedforce’s request.

• Unless limited by the establishingdirective, the supported commander willhave the authority to exercise generaldirection of the supporting effort.General direction includes thedesignation and prioritization oftargets or objectives, timing andduration of the supporting action, and

other instructions necessary forcoordination and efficiency. Thesupporting commander determines theforces, tactics, methods, procedures,and communications to be employedin providing this support. Joint Pub0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF),” provides additionalinformation on command relationships.

• The JFACC directs, coordinates, anddeconflicts operations from an

operations center which is normallydesignated a joint air operationscenter (JAOC). The JAOC isstructured to operate as a fully integratedfacility. JAOC operations rely onexpertise from other component liaisonsto coordinate requests or requirementsand maintain an up-to-date status of theother component operations. Thestructure of a JAOC is discussed inJoint Pub 3-56.1, “Command andControl for Joint Air Operations.”

• The JFACC recommends theater- and/or JOA-wide targeting priorities and,in coordination with other componentcommanders’ interdiction priorities,forwards the air apportionment

recommendation to the JFC. TheJFC provides target priorities and airapportionment guidance to theJFACC and other componentcommanders. The JFACC, usingpriorities established in the JFC’s airapportionment decision, then plansand executes the theater- and/or JOA-wide interdiction effort. Othercomponents may simultaneouslyconduct interdiction efforts with otherorganic or assigned capabilities.

SOF operations add another dimension to a joint force’s interdiction capabilities.

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• JFC Staff Option. There may besituations in which designation of aJFACC is not required. This could occurif a conflict or situation is of limitedduration, scope, or complexity. If thisoption is exercised by the JFC, theJFC’s staff will assist in planning andcoordinating interdiction operationsfor JFC approval. Refer to Joint Pub3-56.1, “Command and Control for JointAir Operations,” for a detaileddiscussion on the “JFC Staff Option”involving joint air operations.

• Capabilities and forces made availablefor p lanning and tasking aredetermined by the JFC, in consultationwith component commanders. They arebased on JFC-assigned objectives and theconcept of operations. These capabilitiesand forces are tasked directly by the JFCor by the JFACC based on the JFC’s airapportionment decision. The JFACC’sair interdiction employmentguidance, based on the airapportionment decision, is used by theJAOC to develop the air tasking order(ATO) . Aircraft or other capabilities andforces not allocated for tasking shouldbe included in the ATO for coordinationpurposes. These may be redirected onlywith the approval of the JFC o ra ffected component commander.The ATO process assists the JFACC insynchronizing, planning, and executingthe overall theater- and/or JOA-wideinterdiction effort. The airapportionment process and the airtasking cycle are discussed further inJoint Pub 3-56.1, “Command andControl for Joint Air Operations.”

•• The JFC is the only individual whohas the authority to change the airapportionment decision. However, theJFACC may divert, cancel, or changeapport ioned interdict ion targetassignments to adapt to a changing

situation, consistent with the JFC’sintent. Such changes are notconsidered “changing the airapportionment”; however, the JFACCcoordinates changes with affectedcommanders whenever possible tominimize impact on other joint forceoperations. The JFC may give theJFACC the authority to redirect joint airoperations. The JFC or affectedcomponent commander must approve allrequests for redirection of direct supportair assets. Affected componentcommanders will be notified by theJFACC upon redirection of joint sortiespreviously allocated in the joint ATO forsupport of component operations.Aircraft or other capabilities and/orforces not apportioned for tasking, butincluded in the ATO for coordinationpurposes, will be redirected only withthe approval of the respective componentcommander or designated senior JAOCliaison officer.

•• Proper coordination facilitates acoherent interdiction effort involvingdiverse forces us ing d i f ferentemployment procedures and reduces thepotential for fratricide. Interdictioncoordination procedures must notinhibit timely application of firepowerin the conduct of other operations.Commanders shou ld cons idercomponent capabilities for speed,range, maneuver, weapon systemcharacteristics, IO, intelligencegathering, and the ability to receiveand distribute information availablefrom space-based assets. Commandersat all levels must ensure interdictionoperations are synchronized withother ongoing operations in supportof campaign or major operationobjectives. At the joint force level, thejoint operations center is the focal pointfor integrating joint operations at themacro level to include interdiction. (1)

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Normally, subordinate commandersestablish planning cycles for operationsbased on JFC guidance. This practicepermits the coordination of applicableoperat ions between componentcommanders early enough and insufficient detail to allow integration ofthose operations with the plan for thejoint interdiction effort. (2) Certaintime-sensitive targets (highly lucrative,fleeting targets designated by the JFCas high priority) and other targets ofopportunity may preclude the use ofnormal coordination procedures. Insuch cases, appropriate coordinationmeasures, prior coordination, on-scenecommand, and rules of engagementshould allow rapid attack of these targets.Time-sensitive targets and other targetsof opportunity should be coordinatedb e t w e e n a f f e c t e d c o m p o n e n tcommanders prior to attack. (3) Whenmission objectives, desired effects, andgeneral deconfl ict ion and t imesequencing have been jointly plannedand integrated at the JAOC for airinterdiction operations, details such asattack tactics and individual missiondeconfliction can be worked out by thoseresponsible for execution. To ensure acoherent and coordinated effort, a planfor conducting joint interdiction shouldaddress two principal areas: a generalconcept of operations and a descriptionof the planning and coordination cyclerequired for the phasing of joint interdiction(see Figure II-2).

•• Joint interdiction operationsoutside surface AOs and conductedagainst closing enemy forces, LOCs, C2elements, C4I systems, and other typesof enemy forces can provide direct andindirect benefits for subsequent orongoing maneuver operations.

•• JFCs may employ various controland coordinating measures to

facilitate effective joint operations.These measures may includeestablishing boundaries, objectives,coordinating altitudes to deconflict airoperations, air defense areas,amphibious objective areas, andsubmarine operating areas. Boundariesrequire special emphasis because of theirimplications on the synchronization ofinterdiction and maneuver.

•• Boundaries define surface areasin order to facilitate coordinationand deconfliction of operations. Inland and sea warfare, a boundary is aline that defines areas between adjacentunits or formations. A naval boundarymay be designated for seas adjacent tothe area of land conflict to enhancecoordination and execution of navaloperations. Synchronization of effortswithin the land or naval operationalboundaries is particularly important. (1)The JFC may use lateral, rear, andforward boundaries to define AOs forland and naval forces. These are sized,shaped, and positioned to enable land ornaval forces to accomplish their missionwhile protecting deployed forces. Theaterair sorties are not constrained by landboundaries, per se. However, since theairspace above surface areas is used by allcomponents of the joint force, JFCspromulgate airspace control measures todeconflict the necessary multiple usesrequired (see Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine forJoint Airspace Control in the CombatZone”). (2) Boundaries are based onthe JFC’s concept of operations and theland or naval force commander’srequirement for depth to maneuver rapidlyand to fight at extended ranges. Withinthe AOs contained by these boundaries, theland or naval force commander isdesignated the supported commander.

•• As supported commanders withintheir AOs, the land and naval force

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commanders are responsible forsynchronizing maneuver, fires, andinterdiction . They may designatepriority of attacks to focus allocated

interdiction assets on the targets or targetsystems essential to achieving the landor naval force commander’s maneuverobjectives. The supported commander

JOINT INTERDICTION PLAN

The concept of operations should include:

Identification of objectives and resource requirementsnecessary to sustain activities

An orderly schedule of anticipated decisions needed toshape and direct the conduct of joint interdiction

Phases for related joint interdiction operationsArrangements for orchestrating the operations of air,

land, maritime, and special operations forces toensure an integrated effort

Scheme of support operations needed to assist andprotect forces engaged in joint interdiction operations

Provisions for feedback or analysis concerning theeffectiveness of joint interdiction operations

The planning & coordination cycle should:

Emphasize simplicityEmphasize mission-type orders when appropriateEnsure availability of appropriate forces and capabilities

for employmentEnsure that component efforts support and reinforce

each other to minimize duplication and conflictingactions

Arrange tasking and coordination of support operationsto assist and protect forces engaged in jointinterdiction

Preclude adverse effects on other friendly forces andoperations

Ensure the continuance of effective operations duringperiods of degraded communications

Provide flexibility to adapt to changing conditions andpriorities

Figure II-2. Joint Interdiction Plan

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specifies target effects to defeat threatsto the maneuver force, to position theenemy for defeat by maneuver forces,and to avoid fratricide or hindrance tofriendly maneuver. Timing ofoperations is synchronized to masseffects at the desired instance to achievethe objective. Synchronization requiresexplicit coordination and unity ofpurpose among the units andcomponents in any operation. Maneuverforce commanders are assisted in thissynchronization by such elements as thebattlefield coordination detachment(BCD), tactical air control party, and airliaison officers who provide advice to themaneuver force commander and staff onthe capabilities, limitations, andemployment of air assets, to includeinterdiction.

•• Component commanders developinterdiction priorities to enhancemission accomplishment. Within theirAOs, supported commanders attempt tostrike interdiction targets with organicassets first when practical and feasible.

Preplanned targets scheduled for attackby land or naval forces’ direct supportair capabilities and forces should beincluded in the joint ATO, whenappropriate, for deconfliction andcoordination. Interdiction targets whichthe land or naval force commander isunable to strike, due to lack of organicassets or for which joint forceinterdiction assets are best suited, arepassed to the JFACC via liaisonelements. These targets are passed asindividual targets, categories of targets,or in terms of desired effects. However,forwarding desired effects ratherthan strict target nominations givesthose responsible for conducting jointinterdiction maximum flexibility toexploit their capabilities. These jointinterdiction target recommendations areprioritized in accordance with JFCdirectives. (1) The joint team in theJAOC’s Combat Plans Divisionintegrates target nominations into ajoint integrated prioritized target list(JIPTL) based on prioritized tasks.The JFACC’s objectives, tasks, airapportionment recommendation, andJIPTL are reviewed by the JFACC andsenior component liaison officers.Typically, it is at this level (or lower)where issues concerning specifictargets are resolved. The JFACC airapport ionment recommendation isdeveloped from these activities; theJFC then approves the recommendation.The Joint Targeting CoordinationBoard (JTCB), if formed by the JFC,maintains a macro-level view of thetheater and/or JOA and ensures thattargeting nominations are consistentwith JFC guidance. The JTCB providesa forum in which all components canarticulate strategies and priorities forfuture operations to ensure that they aresynchronized. Typically, the JTCBreviews targeting information, developstargeting guidance and priorities, and

Attack helicopters provide a lethal andresponsive organic and joint interdictioncapability.

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may prepare and refine joint target lists.Specific target issues are not typicallyaddressed by the JTCB and/or JFCunless they cannot be resolved at a lowerlevel. The JFACC has the capability inthe JAOC to address component targetrequests throughout the planning andexecution of the ATO and can retaskassets based on JFC guidance. (2) Jointinterdiction assets are l imitedresources. Nominated targets willusually outnumber assets capable ofattacking them. A component commander’snumber one priority may be the JFC’stenth priority (based on the JFC’s schemeof maneuver, objectives, or concept ofoperations for a given period or phaseof the campaign). Interdictionoperations within AOs occursimultaneously with joint interdictionoperations ranging theater- and/or JOA-wide. Coordination, communication, andfeedback between and amongcomponents regarding targetingdecisions are essential and enhance trustbetween supported, supporting, andsubordinate commanders and forces.(3) Time-sensitive targets acquiredwithin land or naval force AOs maybe attacked by interdiction-capableforces, in accordance with establisheddirectives and permissive and restrictivefire support coordination measures.Attacks should be coordinated with theaffected commanders unlessexceptional circumstances dictateotherwise. Under most circumstances,the ATO ach ieves the des i redcoordination for preplanned airinterdiction missions. Failure toproperly coordinate attack of targetswithin the boundary may result in aduplication of effort or increase the riskof fratricide.

•• The supported commander shouldclearly articulate the concept ofmaneuver operations to commanders

who apply joint interdiction forceswithin the supported commander’sAO. In particular, supported commandersshould provide supporting commandersas much latitude as possible in planningand executing their operations. Whencoordinating maneuver operations,supported commanders should clearlystate how they envision interdictionenabling or enhancing their maneuveroperations and what they want toaccomplish with interdiction (as well asthose actions they want to avoid, suchas the destruction of key transportationnodes or the use of certain munitions ina specific area). Once they understandwhat the supported commanders wantto accomplish and what they want toavoid, supporting commanders cannormally plan and execute theiroperations with only that coordinationrequired with supported commanders.

“For our air offensive to attain its fulleffect, it is necessary that our groundoffensive should be of a character tothrow the greatest possible strain uponthe enemy’s communications.”

Winston Churchill

• Fire Support Coordination Line.Within their AOs, land and naval forcecommanders employ permissive andrestrictive fire support coordinatingmeasures to enhance the expeditiousattack of targets; to protect forces,populations, critical infrastructure, andsites of religious or cultural significance;and to set the stage for future operations.The most recognizable fire supportcoordination measure, and the one withthe potential to impact joint interdictionoperations most, is the FSCL.

•• When appropriate, an FSCL will bees tab l i shed and ad jus ted byappropriate land or amphibious forcecommanders within their AOs in

II-15


consultation with superior,subordinate, supporting, and affectedcommanders. (The FSCL is a termoriented to land operations; there is nosimilar term used at sea.)

•• The decision on where to place (oreven to use) an FSCL requires carefulconsideration. Placement of the FSCLshould strike a balance so as not toinhibit unduly operational tempowhile maximizing the effectiveness oforganic and joint force interdictionassets. Establishment of the FSCL toofar forward of friendly forces can limitthe responsiveness of air interdictionsorties. Control of air-to-surfaceoperations short of the FSCL requiresdetailed synchronization, increasedcommunications assets, more restrictiverules of engagement, posit iveidentification procedures, and more keypersonnel involved in the decision cyclethan for those missions conducted beyondthe FSCL. Once established, the land oramphibious force commander, aftercoordination with superior, subordinate,supporting, and affected commanders,adjusts the location of the FSCL asrequired to keep pace with currentoperations. In high tempo maneuveroperations, the FSCL location may changefrequently. Accordingly, affectedcommanders must be notified in time toadjust their respective operations when theFSCL location changes.

•• Interdiction can occur both shortof and beyond the FSCL. Attacks onsurface targets short of the FSCL duringthe conduct of joint interdictionoperations must be controlled and/orcoordinated with the appropriate land oramphibious force commander. Whileconducting air interdiction short of the

FSCL, mission updates through atheater air control system or amphibioustactical air control system agency canhelp ensure that those targets are stillvalid, eliminate redundant targeting,and reduce the potential for fratricide.An example of this type of coordinatingagency is an air support operations center(ASOC), airborne battlefield commandand control center (ABCCC), or Navytactical air control center.

•• Attack of time-sensitive targetsshort of the FSCL is controlled by theappropriate land or amphibious forcecommander. Coordination is normallyconducted through such agencies as thefire support element and fire supportcoordination center. This coordinationis facilitated by such C2 platforms orcenters as: ABCCC; Airborne Warningand Control System; joint surveillance,target attack radar system (JSTARS); BCD;ASOC; Direct Air Support Center; NavalAmphibious Liaison Element; or specialoperations liaison element (SOLE).

•• Supporting forces attackingtargets beyond the FSCL mustinform all affected commanders insufficient time to allow necessaryreaction to avoid friendly casualties.SOF operations beyond the FSCL andoutside the land force AO areparticularly at risk and require detailedcoordination through the SOLE. Theinability to inform affectedcommanders will not preclude theattack of targets beyond the FSCL,providing the attack will not produceadverse effects. However, failure tocoordinate this type of attack increasesthe risk of friendly casualties and couldwaste limited resources throughduplicative attack.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIITARGETING

III-1

“The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple beforethe battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculationsbeforehand. Thus, many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations todefeat. It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is to win or lose.”

Sun Tzu

1. Interdiction TargetingConsiderations

a. General. Targeting is the process ofselecting targets and matching theappropriate response to them, takingaccount of operational requirements andcapabilities. Interdiction targeting translatesdesired effects into specific missions andattacks. Appropriate interdiction resources arematched to target systems based onoperational requirements and capabilities.The goal for joint interdiction targeting isto execute a connected series of missionsand attacks to achieve the JFC’sinterdiction objectives. This requires aconcerted application of lethal and nonlethalweapons designed to affect as many elementsof selected target systems as possible.Interdiction attacks on widely dispersed targetsystems (such as a railway system) should beconcentrated in purpose, which is notnecessarily the same as massing physicalassets in one location at one time. Coherentoperations of this type depend oncentralized planning. Differing conditionsand considerations determine what operationsare required. Interdiction should disrupt thosesystems which will result in the greatest payoffand achieve the desired objectives. However,commanders must balance the potentialadvantage of attacking enemy facilities,capabilities, and threats with the potential lossof intelligence that might result from thedestruction of specific targets. Commandersidentify desired mission effects and theenemy systems for joint interdiction.Analysis should focus on such variables as

the determination of critical vulnerabilities,time windows in which vulnerabilities arelikely to occur, threats to friendly forces, andthe relative value of potential missionobjectives or enemy systems.

b. Targeting Responsibilities

• Since interdiction operations can beconducted by different elements of ajoint force, the JFC may eitherdelegate the authority or use the staffto conduct execution planning,coordination, allocation, tasking, anddeconfliction associated with thetheater- and/or JOA-wide interdictioneffort. When designated, the JFACCis responsible for ensuring unity ofeffort for execution of theater- and/or JOA-wide interdiction . Thisresponsibility includes deconfliction,coordination, control measures, andadjustments to the theater- and/or JOA-wide air interdiction effort. Jointinterdiction execution planningconsiders the elements shown in FigureIII-1.

• JFCs may establish and task anorganization within their staffs toaccomplish broad targeting oversightfunct ions or may delegate theresponsibi l i ty to a subordinatecommander. Typically, JFCs organizeJTCBs. If the JFC so designates, theJTCB may be an integrating center forthe targeting oversight effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case,

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EXECUTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Target Selectio

n Means of Attac k

Des

ired

Effe

cts

Time of Attack

Place of A

ttack

Fixed/rotary-wingaircraft, missiles,artillery, specialoperations forces,submarines, andnaval surface firesupport, as well asnonlethal means

Figure III-1. Execution Planning Considerations

sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequatefacilities, and joint planning expertise.Detailed joint interdiction executionplanning is based on the JFC’s jointcampaign planning objectives; it isdone in close cooperation with elementsof the appropriate components.

• In addition to normal target nominationprocedures, JFCs establish proceduresthrough which land or naval forcecommanders can specifically identifythose interdiction targets which couldaffect planned or ongoing maneuverwithin their boundaries and whichthey are unable to attack with organic

it must be a joint activity comprised ofrepresentatives from the joint force staff,all components and, if deemed necessary,their subordinate units. The JFC definesthe role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCBreviews target information and developstargeting guidance and priorityrecommendations for the JFC’s approval.

• If targeting oversight functions aredelegated to a component commander,the JFC ensures that the targeting processis a joint effort, and the designatedcomponent staff should includeappropriate component representation atall levels. Execution planning requires a

III-3

Targeting

assets. This also includes key areas thatthey do not want targeted, such as enemytransportation nodes to be preserved forfuture friendly use. These targets maybe identified individually or by category,specified geographically, and/or tied todesired effects and time periods. Thepurpose of these procedures is to addvisibility to, and allow the JFC to givepriority to, targets directly affectingplanned maneuver by land or navalforces. Component commanders assisteach others’ target validation efforts byestablishing a timely target feedbackprocess. Component liaison elementssuch as the BCD (collocated with theJAOC) are ideally situated to relayinformation and concerns involving thet a r g e t i n g p r o c e s s . Ta rg e t i n grelationships are discussed further inJoint Pub 3-56, “Command and ControlDoctrine for Joint Operations” (indevelopment), Joint Pub 3-56.1,“Command and Control for Joint AirOperations,” Joint Pub 3-60, “JointDoctrine f o r Ta r g e t i n g , ” ( i ndevelopment), and Joint Pub 2-01.1,“JTTP for Intelligence Support toTargeting.”

“All the numerous applications ofphysics, chemistry, engineering, etc.,which make up the modern arsenal arein fact at the mercy of humans, thesoldiers who use or direct them.”

S.T. Das

c. Target Detection

• The ability to detect and identifytargets is a function of the followingattributes:

•• The nature of a target set maydetermine its suitability for interdictionand what forces and weapon systemsshould be employed. For example, apipeline in the jungle might best be

attacked by SOF ground elements. Thefewer the routes and depots in anenemy transportation system, and themore the enemy depends on that system,the more that system may be vulnerableto interdiction. Conversely, an enemywho possesses a varied, dispersedtransportation system is usually muchless affected by interdiction. Mobile oreasily concealed targets may require anapproach different from that employedin attacking fixed emplacements.

•• Target area environmentalconditions include terrain restrictions,adverse weather, darkness, and seasonaland temperature effects. Theseconditions may camouflage or concealtargets, reduce visibility, and degradeweapon systems and force capabilities.(1) Terrain features may affectacquisition of the target, requiringspecialized weapons and attack tactics.For example, heavi ly forestedemplacements or staging areas may bemore suited to SOF direct actionmissions or air-released clustermunitions than laser-guided or generalpurpose weapons or surface-to-surfacefirepower. (2) Adverse weatherconditions can affect movement as wellas capability to interdict the enemy. Therate and extent of surface maneuver mayalso be influenced by weather conditions.These, in turn, can provide greaterinterdiction opportunities (for example,when enemy maneuver is restricted to afew major routes or by seasonalconditions, it results in the concentrationof forces). Adverse weather may alsohinder interdiction by makingacquisition of the enemy more difficult.Additionally, darkness and otherconditions that degrade visibility maylimit surveillance and reconnaissanceefforts, as well as degrade weaponsystems and forces. Effective weathersupport is essential to the potency of

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interdiction operations. Accurateweather information allows the jointforce to maximize the performance ofits personnel and systems, such asforecast ing the electro-opt icalenvironment (thermal crossover periodsand other target acquisition data) foremploying advanced weapon systems.Accurate weather information canincrease the probability of undivertedsuccessful attacks and enable friendlyforces to exploit weather-inducedlimitations of enemy forces and systems.(3) Technology can enhance detectionand identification of obscured targets.For example, night vision devices andelectronic sensors can greatly reduce theconcealment previously provided bylimited visibility. More importantly,aviation assets equipped with technologysensors such as JSTARS can directinterdiction assets onto immediate, high-value, time-sensitive targets which mightotherwise be undetectable. (4) Targetdefenses may distract or target aircrews,reducing the effectiveness of air attacks.Detection assets, such as JSTARS or theuse of all-source intelligence, may enhancetarget acquisition. However, enemy airdefenses may not allow aircrewsadequate time or avenues to acquire theirtarget visually due to high speeds, low ormedium altitudes, or restricted ingressrouting necessary to minimize the risk ofengagement. Effective force packaging can

JSTARS not only enhances situational awareness, but C4 capabilities as well.

reduce the impact of enemy air defensesand achieve local air superiority.

2. Combat Assessment andFeedback

a. Joint interdiction operations shouldinclude both pre- and post-interdiction targetreconnaissance efforts in order to facilitatecombat assessment. The purpose of combatassessment is to determine if the desiredresults were achieved and to identify areasthat require additional effort, de-emphasis, orother adjustment. Analysis of interdictionmissions should address, in near real time, theeffectiveness of the operation in achieving theinterdiction objectives and actions undertakenby the enemy to counter the interdiction effort.The combat assessment function consistsof three components: battle damageassessment, munitions effects assessments,and reattack recommendation (a combinedintelligence and operations function).Information gained from combat assessmentprovides input for follow-on targeting efforts.

b. The JFC and component commanderscommunicate about revisions toanticipated targeting for joint interdictionoperations through component liaisonelements. These revisions may result fromunforeseen joint force needs, unavailabilityof assets, or as otherwise directed by the JFC.If joint interdiction missions tasked to supportmaneuver operations are delayed, canceled,

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Targeting

or diverted to higher priority targets, theaffected commander should be informed insufficient time to allow adjustments to thescheme of maneuver. Appropriatefeedback on the results of interdictionmissions permits timely retargeting

efforts and tasking of subsequentinterdiction operations. Thus, suchfeedback ensures the effective employmentof interdiction assets and enhances themutual trust of supported, supporting, andsubordinate commanders and forces.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVACHIEVING EFFECTIVE JOINT INTERDICTION

IV-1

“They forget that the whole art of war is to gain your objective with as littleloss as possible.”

Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery

1. Immediacy of InterdictionOperations

The relative immediacy of the impact ofinterdiction may depend on several factors:the distance between interdiction operationsand the location of intended effect, the meansand rate of enemy movement (ships, trains,aircraft, trucks, tanks, or foot), the type ofinterdiction targets (forces, supplies, fuel,munitions, or infrastructure), the level ofenemy activity, and the strength and resilienceof the attacked force or system. The JFCshould not apply strict geographic boundariesto interdiction, but should plan for its theater-and/or JOA-wide application. Bydirecting interdiction operations with thisbroad perspective, the JFC can take fulladvantage of the effects of interdiction atthe operational level.

2. Elements of EffectiveInterdiction

Effective interdiction operations share anumber of common elements which lead tothe attainment of interdiction objectives, suchas destruction of enemy forces orinfrastructure. To what degree each willcontribute to the operation depends on suchvariables as the nature of the conflict,geographic locat ion, weather, andcharacteristics of the enemy. Elements whichare normally required to successfullyprosecute interdiction operations are shownin Figure IV-1 and are discussed below.

a. Dimensional Superiority. Althoughair and maritime superiority are not ends in

themselves, history shows that control of thesea and/or airspace has been a pivotal wartimefactor. In particular, successful joint airinterdiction operations have resulted froma largely unimpeded access to the enemy’sairspace. To ensure interdiction success, theJFC must establish conditions conduciveto effective operations in enemy areas.Counterair operations, which can achievetheater- and/or JOA-wide or localized airsuperiority, allows interdiction forces toconduct operations in the enemy’s AOwithout undue interference and enhances the

Dimensional Superiority

Sustained, ConcentratedPressure on the Enemy

Accurate and TimelyIntelligence

Appropriate Munitionsand/or Assets

Synchronization withSurface Maneuver

REQUIREMENTS TOSUCCESSFULLY

PROSECUTEINTERDICTIONOPERATIONS

Figure IV-1. InterdictionOperations Elements

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acquisition of targets to facilitate their attack.Without such freedom, sustained interdictionoperations may cause friendly forces to suffermuch higher levels of attrition. Effectiveinterdiction, in turn, may allow freedom ofaction for other friendly operations. Forexample, an enemy’s counter to interdictionmay leave the enemy more susceptible tofriendly surface maneuver.

b. Sustained and ConcentratedPressure. Successful interdiction operationshave highlighted the importance of sustained,concentrated efforts. Since interdiction isoften directed against replaceable systems(vehicles, weapons, aircraft, ships,communications equipment) and reparablesystems (engineering features, such as bridgesand rail lines), sustained, persistentpressure, sufficient to impede efforts toreplace or repair affected assets, isrequired. This applies particularly tooperations of long duration, because timeallows the enemy to restore losses. Attackson key enemy repair and replacement assetsmay be advisable in many circumstances.Concentrating the effects of interdiction isessential due to generally limited numbers ofinterdiction-capable assets. The JFCprioritizes and aggressively attacks highpayoff, high value interdiction target setsover lower priority interdiction opportunities.This economizes forces in one area so thatother more critical target sets may be attackedwith a mass of forces and weapons effectssufficient to enhance friendly combatoperations. Conversely, when the enemyconsumes large quantities of supplies becauseof heavy combat or extensive movement tocounter friendly maneuver, interdictionoperations can also have an acceleratedimpact. This is true for two reasons. First,when opponents are under heavy pressure,they may be forced to deplete stockpilesreserved for ongoing or future operations.Inability to stockpile supplies makes it moredifficult for the enemy to initiate large-scaleoffensive operations. Second, high

consumption rates normally drive an enemyto use direct resupply routes, making theenemy more vulnerable to interdiction attacks.

c. Accurate and Timely Intelligence.Information about the enemy’s LOCs, tacticaldispositions, and capabilities is imperative.Accurate and timely intelligence providesinformation about the enemy’s probablecourse(s) of action, identifies interrelatedtarget systems to include their componentsand elements as well as critical nodes, andallows the commander to anticipate enemy’sactions or counteractions and respondaccordingly. A prerequisite for planningjoint interdiction operations is anunderstanding of the capabilities andlimitations of the enemy and how the enemyis most likely to fight. Accurate intelligenceallows commanders to develop achievableobjectives, select appropriate targets, applythe appropriate weapon and delivery systems,and keep abreast of the enemy’s response.In order to accomplish this, interdiction-capable commanders require C4I systemswhich facilitate exploitation anddissemination of real-time and near-real-time intelligence. Such intelligence isparticularly useful in dealing with targetswhich may have near or immediate effect onsurface forces or whose location was notaccurately known. Intelligence operationsmust support the joint interdiction effort toenhance unity of effort. To that end,interdiction targets must be identified andthen prioritized in relation to theirimportance in achieving campaignobjectives.

• Intelligence can provide interdictionoperations with crucial input on targetdevelopment by assessing enemycharacteristics described in Figure IV-2.Intelligence also supports interdictionp lanners wi th env i r onmenta lassessments and by identifying enemytarget systems such as C4I systems,LOCs, and mil i tary geography.

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Achieving Effective Joint Interdiction

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INTERDICTION

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Human IntelligenceImagery IntelligenceSignals Intelligence

Open-Source IntelligenceMeasurement and Signatures Intelligence

Assessments of enemy capabilities, centers of gravity,force dispositions, relationships, intentions, operations,

vulnerabilities, defenses, enemy warfightingsustainability, and possible enemy courses of action

TargetDevelopment

Input

Figure IV-2. Intelligence Support to Interdiction

Reconnaissance, surveillance, and targetacquisition forces support theseintelligence efforts through the collectionof a broad range of information.

• As all-source intelligence such as humanintelligence, imagery intelligence, signalsintelligence, open-source intelligence,and measurement and signaturesintell igence is collected, analystsmust systematically evaluate potentialtargets to identify critical nodes anddetermine the most effective means todisrupt them. Analysts should considerthe value of leaving a critical node intactso it can be exploited for intelligencepurposes. The complete analysis of allintelligence derived from technical andnon-technical means may revealvulnerabilities in the enemy’s operationswhich friendly interdiction can exploit.Conversely, interdiction may enhance

intelligence collection if, for example,the destruction of primarycommunications nets causes the enemyto use systems which are more vulnerableto exploitation. Additional informationon intelligence doctrine and tactics,techniques, and procedures is providedin the Joint Pub 2-0 series andspecifically in Joint Pub 2-01.1, “JTTPfor Intelligence Support to Targeting.”

d. Appropriate Munitions and/orAssets. Mismatching available munitions orassets with targets and/or target systems cangreatly increase the time and resourcesrequired to achieve the objectives of theinterdiction operation. Matching the correctweapon (system) to the target enhances thejoint force’s ability to realize the intendedeffect on the target and frees excess assetsfor use elsewhere. For example, from 1965to 1972 during the Vietnam War, hundreds

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Destroyed Paul Doumer Bridge, North Vietnam — A testimony to properinterdiction weaponeering.

In addition to counterair and maneuver,which were discussed earlier, other operationsnotable for their specialized roles which cancomplement joint interdiction operationsinclude the following:

a. Strategic Attack Operations.Strategic attack operations target enemycenters of gravity and such other vitaltarget systems as government and militaryleadership C2, C4I networks, weapons ofmass destruction and the means to deliverthem, critical materiel stockpiles, and otherwar-sustaining capabilities. Strategica t tack and interdiction operationscomplement one another through theireffects. As an example, strategic attackmay focus on production and storage ofcritical war materiel, while interdictionconcentrates on cutting off the flow of thismateriel. Strategic attack and interdictionoperations also create a synergistic effect withsimultaneous attacks against the enemy indepth, which places maximum stress on theenemy, allowing them no respite.

b. Space Operations. Space operationsenhance interdiction’s freedom of actionthroughout the theater and/or JOA andinclude protection of friendly forces from

of sorties dropping thousands of tons ofunguided ordnance failed to close the heavilydefended Thanh Hoa and Paul Doumerbridges permanently. All supplies cominginto Hanoi or moving southward by railpassed over these two key bridges. Whenprecision-guided munitions becameavailable, the first strike on each target withlaser guided bombs resulted in two droppedbridges with no friendly losses.

e. Synchronization With SurfaceManeuver. An important factor insuccessful interdiction operations issynchronizing interdiction and maneuver.Planning and conducting interdiction andsurface operations within a coherentframework provides a synergistic effect.The benefits of integrating these operationsare discussed in more detail in Chapter II ofthis publication, “Conducting JointInterdiction Operations.”

3. Complementary Operations

Joint interdiction operations are mosteffective when planned and executed in asynergistic manner with other planned andongoing air, land, sea, space, information,and special operations of the joint force.

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Achieving Effective Joint Interdiction

space threats as well as the ability to deny anadversary support from space. Denying theenemy support from space increases theadvantages friendly forces have in a conflict.Space systems support joint interdictiontarget analysts, planners, and combatforces by providing capabilities for C4I; sea,land, and space surveillance; intelligencecollection; tactical warning and combatassessment; navigation; geospatialinformation and services; andenvironmental monitoring. Denying theadversary access to their space capabilities,and attacking the adversary’s capabilitiesto deny US and allied space capabilities,must be integrated into joint interdictionplans and operations. Joint Pub 3-14,“Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Space Operations,” providesfurther amplification on the role of spaceforces in joint operations.

c. Information Operations. Informationoperations encompass actions taken to affectadversary information and informationsystems while defending one’s owninformation and information systems. IOcomplement interdiction through a variety ofmeans and can be used to accomplishinterdiction objectives, ideally achieving the

goals before friendly forces engage in battle(but also during and after combat operations).IO targeted against adversary informationsystems for the purposes of disrupting C2 canhave collateral effects on the entireinformation system. IO actions can divertenemy forces through insertion of falsecommands and deception, disrupt enemy C4Isystems (including C2, supply, andtransportation) through technical andphysical means, delay enemy forces andsupplies by impairing enemy C2 capabilities,and contribute to the destruction of enemyforces through insertion of false commandsand by impairing enemy C2. Effective IOcontribute to the security of friendly forces,bring the adversary to battle (if appropriate)on terms favorable to friendly forces, helpseize and maintain the initiative, enhanceagility, contribute to surprise, isolate enemyforces from their leadership, and createopportunities for a systematic exploitation ofadversary vulnerabilities. They provide thecommander with nonlethal means of conductinginterdiction operations. CJCSI 3210.01, “JointInformation Warfare Policy,” CJCSI 6510.01A,“Defensive Information WarfareImplementation,” and Joint Pub 3-13, “JointDoctrine for Information Operations,” discussthe role of IO in joint warfare.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VJOINT FORCE INTERDICTION ASSETS

V-1

“One can never have too many guns; one never has enough.”

Napoleon

1. General

Interdiction operations can be conducted byall components of the joint force, during warand MOOTW, by both lethal and nonlethalmeans. In congruence with the JFC’s conceptof operations, components may support, orbe supported by, another componentcommander to achieve theater- and/or JOA-wide interdiction objectives; they may alsoconduct interdiction operations as part of theirmission.

2. Interdiction-Capable Forces

Forces that can conduct, or be employedin, interdiction operations include those listedin Figure V-1 and described below.

a. Land- and sea-based air forces employsuch weapons as missiles, bombs, precision-guided munitions, cluster munitions, landand/or sea mines, electronic warfare (EW)systems, and sensors from airborne platforms.Aircraft have attributes which allow them to be

Figure V-1. Interdiction-Capable Forces

INTERDICTION-CAPABLE FORCES

Land- and sea-based air forces employ such weapons asmissiles, bombs, precision-guided munitions, clustermunitions, land and/or sea mines, electronic warfaresystems, and sensors from airborne platforms

Naval forces employ missiles, munitions, torpedoes, andmines

Land forces employ such assets as attack helicopters,missiles, artillery, and those forces capable of conductingconventional airborne, air assault, and amphibiousoperations

Special operations forces may support conventionalinterdiction operations by providing terminal guidance forprecision-guided munitions, or may act independently whenthe use of conventional forces is inappropriate or infeasible

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employed in diverse and multiple combat airtasks throughout a theater of operations.

• The flexibility, range, speed, lethality,precision, and ability to mass at a desiredtime and place contributes significantly tothe overall joint interdiction effort. Airforces offer the versatility and capability todeliver combat power against the enemywhen and where needed to attain objectivesacross the range of military operations. Theability of aircraft to employ precision-guidedmunitions offers a distinct advantage overother weapon systems in many cases.Guided weapons can correct for ballistic,release, and targeting errors in flight.Explosive loads can also be more accuratelytailored for the target, since planners canassume most bombs will strike in themanner and place expected. Unless usingtime-delayed munitions, manned aircraftcan offer the advantage of providingimmediate attack assessment. Also, stealthtechnology and the ability to employ air-launched conventional standoff weaponryoffer unique advantages and, in effect, mayachieve their own local air superiority dueto their reduced detectability.

AIR INTERDICTION IN THE GULF WAR

On 30 January, two Iraqi divisions were detected marshalling for a follow-onattack into Al-Khafji. This offered Coalition air power a lucrative target and,shortly after nightfall, Coalition aircraft took full advantage of their night combatcapabilities. Heavy Coalition air attacks were directed onto the two Iraqdivisions. B-52s dropped armor-sensing mines, AV-8Bs, A-6s, and F/A-18sdelivered cluster and precision munitions, A-10s and F-16s fired Maverickmissiles, and F-15Es and F-16s dropped combined effects munitions. In somecases, when Iraqi vehicles were found in columns, the first aircraft took outthe lead and trail vehicles, trapping the rest of the vehicles for follow-on attacks.In another case, the Tactical Air Control Center used Airborne Warning andControl System aircraft to redirect a three-ship B-52 formation to strike Iraqiarmor north of Al-Khafji. The strike caught more than 80 Iraqi vehicles incolumn and broke it apart, making it easier for other aircraft to destroy therest of the column.

SOURCE: “CENTCOM Messages and Unit Reports” DOD Final Report toCongress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

• Employment of air-deliverable,scatterable mines and munitions canincrease the overall effectiveness ofattacks. Scatterable mines cantemporarily channel enemy movementinto killing zones or create temporarychokepoints that enhance theeffectiveness of follow-up destructiveattacks. Mixing even a few land and/orsea mines or time-delayed cluster munitionswith other weapons will createuncertainty and fear among the repair crewsor personnel in the target areas. Often, air-deliverable mines and time-delayedmunitions are more effective forinterdiction than such directly deliveredmunitions as bombs, because delayed effectsmunitions continue to be effective after thedelivery aircraft have left the area. Enemyuncertainty regarding the presence of thesemunitions can result in excessive delays,diversion of resources into time-consuming countermeasures, andreduced enemy morale. Considerationshould be given to the possible effects theseweapons may have on follow-on friendlyoperations in or moving through thetargeted area.

V-3


• Joint forces utilize EW systems toprovide direct and indirect support tointerdiction operations as well as toconduct lethal and nonlethal interdictionas part of electronic attack or EW supportoperations. Examples of interdiction byEW systems include degrading, denying,and exploiting enemy C4I links withelectromagnetic jammers, antiradiationmissiles, and use of specialized sensors.EW systems may also intercept,maintain, and update enemy electronicorder of battle data for use in subsequentoperations. Joint Pub 3-51, “ElectronicWarfare in Joint Military Operations,”provides indepth guidance for EWoperations.

b. Naval forces employ missiles, torpedoes,mines, and other munitions (such as navalgunfire) to support naval, air, and groundforces.

• Ships and submarines can conductinterdiction operations to establish andmaintain sea control. Maritimeinterception operations can isolate anenemy from outside support. It can alsoenhance free use of the sea LOCs forsuch friendly operations as deploymentof forces and can provide security forother naval operations. Because of thehighly specialized nature of some navaloperations, such as submarine and minewarfare, joint interdiction operationsin maritime areas often require a higherdegree of coordination amongcommanders.

• Missiles such as the TLAM can beeffective interdiction assets and providea potent employment option to the jointforce. Several variants provide singlewarhead unitary blasts or multi-effectsubmunition capabilities. Low risk,accuracy, and range make missilesmost viable in the p lann ing o fi n t e r d i c t i o n c o n t i n g e n c y

operations against stationary, non-hardened targets. The TLAM weaponsystem may require coordinationbetween strike planners in-theater andsupporting mission planners out oftheater (Cruise Missile SupportActivities). This is an ongoing processindependent of the decision to use theweapon. With proper preplanning,TLAMs are capable of conducting short-notice strikes, without aircraft support,against targets in heavily defended areaswhere the probability of the loss ofmanned aircraft is too high. TLAMsare also capable of neutralizing enemyair defenses to facilitate a much largerattack by land- and sea-based airpower.In theater, the associated afloat planningsystems suites provide the Navycomponent commander with thecapability to plan new missions ormodify selected missions in the AO.

The Tomahawk land-attack missile gives the jointforce increased options for attacking heavilydefended targets.

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• Interdiction firepower can deny theenemy free movement into or within anobjective area prior to an amphibiousassault by landing force elements.During offensive operations, navalsurface fire support and othermunitions can be directed on the axis ofadvance, objective, enemy positionswhich slow down or disrupt the advance,and other targets of opportunity. Theymay be used to provide coveringfirepower during such operations asminefield and obstacle breaching, and arecapable of being massed on enemy forcesthreatening or conducting counterattacks.Naval bombardment may also be usedto destroy or damage transportationinfrastructure and assets along LOCs onor near enemy coasts.

“One cannot think about this activitywithout mentioning the Navy — thevery quiet, very professional way theypu t the [Mar i t ime In te rcep t ionOperations] on . . . very, very effective— maybe one of the most effectivethings we did.”

General Merrill McPeak,Chief of Staff, USAF

• Interdiction of waterways can disruptenemy infiltration, movement, andresupply along and across majorwaterways in an AO. Mines have awide application to interdictionoperations in both the littoral regionsand the open ocean. They are effectivein harbors, coastal regions, and strategicchokepoints of the ocean. Harbors canbe key to maintaining both a viableeconomy and an effective maritime force.A lack of adequate ports to resupplynaval vessels may reduce theeffectiveness of enemy forces. Ports mayalso be essential in sustaining a militarycampaign. Disrupting the flow of shipsin and out of a port — or shutting it offaltogether — can be an effective way to

cripple an enemy. Maritime interceptoperations complement waterwayinterdiction through surveillance,interception, and boarding operations inboth war and MOOTW. Commandersmay employ aircraft and ships incoordinated operations designed to stop,board, search, and divert vessel traffic todisrupt or deny the use of supply lines orembargoed materiel and the movementof maritime traffic or forces.

c. Land forces employ such assets asattack helicopters, missiles, artillery, andthose forces capable of conductingconventional airborne, air assault, andamphibious operations. Operational-levelcommanders isolate the battlefield byinterdicting enemy military potential beforeits effective use against friendly forces.Firepower employed by land forces may be eitherdirect or indirect. It is usually combined withmaneuver (for greatest effect) and can beintegrated with EW systems (as discussed above)and other assets to disrupt, disorganize, or destroythe enemy, producing specific physical andpsychological effects.

• At tack he l icopters p rov ide acommander with an effective andversatile means of interdicting enemyforces. They may use them for rapidreaction operations and where terrainrestricts or prohibits ground forceoccupation or engagement of the enemy’sforces. Attack helicopters are capable ofemploying precision-guided weaponsand providing terminal guidance for otherinterdiction forces. They are capable ofoperating during the day or night and inadverse weather conditions.

• Missile systems such as ATACMS arevery effective assets for interdicting highvalue, well-defended targets, day ornight, in all weather conditions.ATACMS provides the joint force with aflexible employment option which can

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MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS (MIO) IN THE GULF WAR

MIO appears to have been very effective. As a result of Coalition efforts duringthe seven months of the Persian Gulf crisis, more than 165 ships from 19Coalition navies challenged more than 7,500 merchant vessels, boarded 964ships to inspect manifests and cargo holds, and diverted 51 ships carryingmore than one million tons of cargo in violation of UN Security Councilsanctions. Commerce through Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports was essentiallyeliminated; ships were deterred from loading Iraqi oil while Turkey and SaudiArabia prohibited use of Iraqi oil pipelines that crossed their territory. Virtuallyall Iraqi oil revenues were cut off; thus the source of much of Iraq’s internationalcredit was severed, along with 95 percent of the country’s pre-invasionrevenues.

By severely restricting Iraqi seaborne trade, MIO played a major role inintercepting the import of materials required to sustain military operationsand operate such equipment as surface-to-surface missile systems, commandand control equipment, and early warning radar systems. Importantly, accessto outside sources of tanks, aircraft, munitions, and other war materiel toreplenish combat losses effectively was precluded. Iraq did obtain someimports by smuggling along its borders and by air, but most high-volumebulk imports were completely cut off.

SOURCE: “Maritime Intercept Operations,”Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

complement and enhance the theater-and/or JOA-wide interdiction effort.They can conduct short-notice strikeswithout airborne aircraft support againsttargets in heavily defended areas wherethe probability of the loss of mannedaircraft is too high. Missile systems areusually employed against soft, stationary,semi-fixed targets. These targets includeunhardened surface-to-surface missile sites,emplaced artillery batteries, air defense sites,logistic sites, and C4I facilities.

• Although artillery primarily providesclose supporting fires to the maneuverforce, it can also provide a significantcontribution to interdiction operations.Artillery can create obstacles to enemymaneuver and cover the friendly force’sadvance with smoke and fire. Artillerycan suppress enemy defensive systemsto facilitate ground and air operations,and can be used to promote deception,

keep the enemy off balance, interdictenemy counterattack routes, and testtheir responses. Appropriate artillerytarget areas include mobility corridorswhich form chokepoints on the enemysupply route and areas through whichhostile weapon systems and equipmentmust pass. Artillery systems such as theMultiple Launch Rocket System can beextremely effective against a variety oftargets, and are capable of keeping upwith fast-paced maneuver advances.

• Airborne and air assault forces providethe joint force with a unique interdictioncapability, using forcible entry operationsin the form of raids to seize key terrainor chokepoints to achieve interdictionobjectives. During Operation DESERTSTORM, elements of the XVIIIthAirborne Corps, in the largest airassault in mil i tary history ,penetrated 260 kilometers into Iraqi

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All components can conduct joint interdiction through lethaland nonlethal means.

territory to the Euphrates River. Thepurpose of this operation was to cut theIraqi LOCs along Highway 8 toBaghdad, effectively isolating Iraqiforces in the Kuwait Theater ofOperations.

d. Special Operations Forces. SOF maysupport conventional interdictionoperations by providing terminal guidancefor precision-guided munitions, for

example, or may act independently whenthe use of conventional forces is inappropriateor infeasible. Special operations are generallyunconventional in nature and often clandestinein character. SOF may conduct coastal orriverine interdiction operations, using avariety of special operations ships and craft.In a linear battlespace, ground forces maybe inserted in the enemy’s rear operations areafor their disruptive effect or to take out keytransitory targets. Such direct action

Interdiction operations can be conducted throughout the JOA by any component.Proper coordination enhances effectiveness and reduces potential for fratricide.

V-7


operations typically involve an attack on suchcritical targets as the interdiction of LOCs orother target systems. A very successfulexample of this type of mission was theinterdiction of the Pacora River Bridge bySOF during Operation JUST CAUSE. Afterair assaulting into a blocking position, a smallSOF team engaged a battalion-sizedPanamanian Defense Force reaction forcewith organic weapons and CAS from an AC-130 gunship, destroying six vehicles. Thesurviving Panamanian Defense Forcesreturned to their base at Fort Cimmaron. Thismission effectively denied a major avenue ofapproach into the friendly lodgment area atthe Tocumen-Torrijos Airport complex. SOFmay also provide intelligence; grounddesignation of vital camouflaged, well-hiddentargets for air-employed, precision-guidedmunitions; and post attack assessment. SOFcan also employ such weapon systems asfixed- or rotary-wing gunships for theirspecialized sensors and weapons effects.Additionally, SOF may enlist the support oflocal insurgents who may interdict from

within the enemy’s infrastructure in areaspresumed to be safe from attack. SOF mayalso degrade or obstruct the warmakingcapability of a country by damaging,destroying, or diverting war materiel,facilities, utilities, and resources. Thissabotage may be the most effective or the onlymeans of attacking specific targets that liebeyond the capabilities of conventionalweapon systems.

“The Americans, with minimum losses,attacked and seized a relatively weakarea, constructed airfields, and thenproceeded to cut the supply lines totroops in that area. The Japanese armypreferred direct assault, after Germanfashion, but the Americans flowed intoour weaker points and submerged us,just as water seeks the weakest entryto sink a ship. We respected this typeof strategy for its brilliance because itgained the most while losing the least.”

Lt Col Matsuichi Iino,Japanese Eighth Area Army

SOF provide a wide array of specialized capabilities.

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APPENDIX AREFERENCES

A-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-03 is based upon the following primary references.

1. DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its MajorComponents.”

2. CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy.”

3. CJCSI 6510.10A, “Defense Information Warfare Implementation.”

4. Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

5. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

6. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and JTTP DevelopmentProgram.”

7. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

8. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”

9. Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”

10. Joint Pub 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support toTargeting,” (In Development).

11. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

12. Joint Pub 3-01, “Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats,” (InDevelopment).

13. Joint Pub 3-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression ofEnemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD).”

14. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”

15 Joint Pub 3-04, “Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air).”

16. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

17. Joint Pub 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.”

18. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

19. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support,” (In Development).

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20. Joint Pub 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,” (In Development).

21. Joint Pub 3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).”

22. Joint Pub 3-14, “Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for SpaceOperations,” (In Development).

23. Joint Pub 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations,” (In Development).

24. Joint Pub 3-18.1, “Joint Doctrine for Airborne and Air Assault Operations,” (InDevelopment).

25. Joint Pub 3-51, “Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations,” (In Revision).

26. Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

27. Joint Pub 3-56, “Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations,” (In Development).

28. Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.”

29. Joint Pub 3-60, “Joint Doctrine for Targeting,” (In Development).

30. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

31. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

32. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)Systems Support to Joint Operations.”

APPENDIX BADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

B-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsorfor this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: HQ AFDC MAXWELL AFB//DR//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ABCCC airborne battlefield command and control centerAO area of operationsASOC air support operations centerATACMS Army Tactical Missile SystemATO air tasking order

BCD battlefield coordination detachment

C2 command and controlC4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligenceCAS close air supportCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

DOD Department of DefenseDS direct support

EW electronic warfare

FSCL fire support coordination line

IO information operations

JAOC joint air operations centerJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJIPTL joint integrated prioritized target listJOA joint operations areaJSTARS joint surveillance, target attack radar systemJTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board

LOC line of communications

MOOTW military operations other than war

SOF special operations forcesSOLE special operations liaison element

TACON tactical controlTLAM Tomahawk land-attack missile

airborne battlefield command andcontrol center. A United States AirForce aircraft equipped withcommunications, data link, and displayequipment; it may be employed as anairborne command post or acommunications and intelligence relayfacility. Also called ABCCC. (Joint Pub1-02)

air interdiction . Air operations conductedto destroy, neutralize, or delay theenemy's military potential before it canbe brought to bear effectively againstfriendly forces at such distance fromfriendly forces that detailed integrationof each air mission with the fire andmovement of friendly forces is notrequired. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air support operations center. An agencyof a tactical air control system collocatedwith a corps headquarters or anappropriate land force headquarterswhich coordinates and directs close airsupport and other tactical air support.(Joint Pub 1-02)

air tasking order. A method used to taskand disseminate to components,subordinate units, and command andcontrol agencies projected sorties/capabilities/forces to targets and specificmissions. Normally provides specificinstructions to include call signs, targets,controlling agencies, etc., as well asgeneral instructions. Also called ATO.(Joint Pub 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distributionof limited resources among competingrequirements for employment. Specificallocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclearweapons, forces, and transportation) aredescribed as allocation of air sorties,nuclear weapons, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

allocation (air). The translation of the airapportionment decision into totalnumbers of sorties by aircraft typeavailable for each operation or task.(Joint Pub 1-02)

apportionment (air) . The determinationand assignment of the total expected aireffort by percentage and/or by prioritythat should be devoted to the various airoperations and/or geographic areas for agiven period of time. Also called airapportionment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enoughfor component commanders toaccomplish their missions and protecttheir forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographicalarea associated with a combatantcommand within which a combatantcommander has authority to plan andconduct operations. 2. In naval usage, apredefined area of enemy terrain forwhich supporting ships are responsiblefor covering by fire on known targets ortargets of opportunity and by observation.Also called AOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

battlefield coordination detachment. AnArmy liaison provided by the Armycomponent commander to the AirOperations Center (AOC) and/or to thecomponent designated by the joint forcecommander to plan, coordinate, anddeconflict air operations. The battlefieldcoordination detachment processes Armyrequests for tactical air support, monitorsand interprets the land battle situation forthe AOC, and provides the necessary

GL-2 Joint Pub 3-03

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

interface for exchange of currentintelligence and operational data. Alsocalled BCD. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and itsdefinition and is approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

campaign. A series of related militaryoperations aimed at accomplishing astrategic or operational objective withina given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or localities from which amilitary force derives its freedom ofaction, physical strength, or will to fight.(Joint Pub 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination ofthe overall effectiveness of forceemployment during military operations.Combat assessment is composed of threemajor components, (a) battle damageassessment, (b) munitions effectsassessment, and (c) reattackrecommendation. The objective ofcombat assessment is to identifyrecommendations for the course ofmilitary operations. The J-3 is normallythe single point of contact for combatassessment at the joint force level,assisted by the joint force J-2. Also calledCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control. The exercise ofauthority and direction by a properlydesignated commander over assigned andattached forces in the accomplishment ofthe mission. Command and controlfunctions are performed through anarrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, andprocedures employed by a commander inplanning, directing, coordinating, andcontrolling forces and operations in theaccomplishment of the mission. Alsocalled C2. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control warfare. Theintegrated use of operations security,military deception, psychologicaloperations, electronic warfare, andphysical destruction, mutually supportedby intelligence, to deny information to,influence, degrade, or destroy adversarycommand and control capabilities, whileprotecting friendly command and controlcapabilities against such actions.Command and control warfare is anapplication of information warfare inmilitary operations and is a subset ofinformation warfare. Command andcontrol warfare applies across the rangeof military operations and all levels ofconflict. Also called C2W. C2W is bothoffensive and defensive: a. C2-attack.Prevent effective C2 of adversary forcesby denying information to, influencing,degrading, or destroying the adversary C2system. b. C2-protect. Maintaineffective command and control of ownforces by turning to friendly advantageor negating adversary efforts to denyinformation to, influence, degrade, ordestroy the friendly C2 system. (JointPub 1-02)

counterspace operations. Offensive anddefensive operations by friendly spaceand joint forces directed against anenemy’s space forces to gain and maintaina desired degree of space superiority.(This term and its definition are providedfor information and are proposed forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02 by Joint Pub 3-14.)

electronic warfare. Any military actioninvolving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or to attack theenemy. Also called EW. The three majorsubdivisions within electronic warfareare: electronic attack, electronicprotection, and electronic warfare

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support. a. electronic attack. Thatdivision of electronic warfare involvingthe use of electromagnetic, directedenergy, or antiradiation weapons toattack personnel, facilities, or equipmentwith the intent of degrading,neutralizing, or destroying enemycombat capability. Also called EA. EAincludes: 1) actions taken to prevent orreduce an enemy’s effective use of theelectromagnetic spectrum, such asjamming and electromagnetic deception,and 2) employment of weapons that useeither electromagnetic or directed energyas their primary destructive mechanism(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particlebeams). b. electronic protection. Thatdivision of electronic warfare involvingactions taken to protect personnel,facilities, and equipment from any effectsof friendly or enemy employment ofelectronic warfare that degrade,neutralize, or destroy friendly combatcapability. Also called EP. c. electronicwarfare support. That division ofelectronic warfare involving actionstasked by, or under direct control of, anoperational commander to search for,intercept, identify, and locate sources ofintentional and unintentional radiatedelectromagnetic energy for the purposeof immediate threat recognition. Thus,electronic warfare support providesinformation required for immediatedecisions involving electronic warfareoperations and other tactical actions suchas threat avoidance, targeting, andhoming. Also called ES. Electronicwarfare support data can be used toproduce signals intelligence, bothcommunications intelligence, andelectronics intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination line. A lineestablished by the appropriate land oramphibious force commander to ensurecoordination of fire not under thecommander’s control but which may

affect current tactical operations. Thefire support coordination line is used tocoordinate fires of air, ground, or seaweapons systems using any type ofammunition against surface targets. Thefire support coordination line shouldfollow well-defined terrain features. Theestablishment of the fire supportcoordination line must be coordinatedwith the appropriate tactical aircommander and other supportingelements. Supporting elements mayattack targets forward of the fire supportcoordination line without priorcoordination with the land or amphibiousforce commander provided the attack willnot produce adverse surface effects on orto the rear of the line. Attacks againstsurface targets behind this line must becoordinated with the appropriate land oramphibious force commander. Alsocalled FSCL. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interdiction . An action to divert, disrupt,delay, or destroy the enemy’s surfacemilitary potential before it can be usedeffectively against friendly forces. Seealso air interdiction. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint air operations. Air operationsperformed with air capabilities/forces madeavailable by components in support of the jointforce commander’s operation or campaignobjectives, or in support of other componentsof the joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint air operations center. A jointlystaffed facility established for planning,directing, and executing joint airoperations in support of the joint forcecommander’s operation or campaignobjective. Also called JAOC. See alsojoint air operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force air component commander.The joint force air component commanderderives authority from the joint forcecommander who has the authority to

GL-5

Glossary

exercise operational control, assignmissions, direct coordination amongsubordinate commanders, redirect andorganize forces to ensure unity of effortin the accomplishment of the overallmission. The joint force commander willnormally designate a joint force aircomponent commander. The joint forceair component commander’sresponsibilities will be assigned by thejoint force commander (normally thesewould include, but not be limited to,planning, coordination, allocation, andtasking based on the joint forcecommander’s apportionment decision).Using the joint force commander’sguidance and authority, and incoordination with other Servicecomponent commanders and otherassigned or supporting commanders, thejoint force air component commanderwill recommend to the joint forcecommander apportionment of air sortiesto various missions or geographic areas.Also called JFACC. See also joint forcecommander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (commandauthority) or operational control over ajoint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub1-02)

joint operations center. A jointly mannedfacility of a joint force commander’sheadquarters established for planning,monitoring, and guiding the execution ofthe commander’s decisions. Also calledJOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint ta rgeting coordination board. A groupformed by the joint force commander toaccomplish broad targeting oversight functionsthat may include but are not limited tocoordinating targeting information, providing

targeting guidance and priorities, andpreparing and/or refining joint target lists.The board is normally comprised ofrepresentatives from the joint force staff, allcomponents, and if required, componentsubordinate units. Also called JTCB. Seealso joint target list. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint target list . A consolidated list ofselected targets considered to havemilitary significance in the jointoperations area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

line of communications. A route, eitherland, water, and/or air, which connectsan operating military force with a baseof operations and along which suppliesand military forces move. Also calledLOC . (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term “lines ofcommunications” and its definition andis approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

maneuver. 1. A movement to place shipsor aircraft in a position of advantage overthe enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carriedout at sea, in the air, on the ground, or ona map in imitation of war. 3. Theoperation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle,to cause it to perform desired movements.4. Employment of forces on thebattlefield through movement incombination with fire, or fire potential,to achieve a position of advantage inrespect to the enemy in order toaccomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mission type order. 1. Order issued to alower unit that includes theaccomplishment of the total missionassigned to the higher headquarters. 2.Order to a unit to perform a missionwithout specifying how it is to beaccomplished. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferablecommand authority that may be

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Joint Pub 3-03

exercised by commanders at any echelonat or below the level of combatantcommand. Operational control isinherent in combatant command(command authority). Operationalcontrol may be delegated and is theauthority to perform those functions ofcommand over subordinate forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative directionover all aspects of military operationsand joint training necessary toaccomplish missions assigned to thecommand. Operational control shouldbe exercised through the commanders ofsubordinate organizations. Normallythis authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Operational controlnormally provides full authority toorganize commands and forces and toemploy those forces as the commanderin operational control considersnecessary to accomplish assignedmissions. Operational control does not,in and of itself, include authoritativedirection for logistics or matters ofadministration, discipline, internalorganization, or unit training. Alsocalled OPCON. See also tactical control.(Joint Pub 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of warat which campaigns and major operationsare planned, conducted, and sustained toaccomplish strategic objectives withintheaters or areas of operations. Activitiesat this level link tactics and strategy byestablishing operational objectivesneeded to accomplish the strategicobjectives, sequencing events to achievethe operational objectives, initiatingactions, and applying resources to bring

about and sustain these events. Theseactivities imply a broader dimension oftime or space than do tactics; they ensurethe logistic and administrative support oftactical forces, and provide the means bywhich tactical successes are exploited toachieve strategic objectives. See alsostrategic level of war; tactical level ofwar. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations. Operations conductedby specially organized, trained, andequipped military and paramilitary forcesto achieve military, political, economic,or psychological objectives byunconventional military means in hostile,denied, or politically sensitive areas.These operations are conducted duringpeacetime competition, conflict, and war,independently or in coordination withoperations of conventional, nonspecialoperations forces. Political-militaryconsiderations frequently shape specialoperations, requiring clandestine, covert,or low visibility techniques and oversightat the national level. Special operationsdiffer from conventional operations indegree of physical and political risk,operational techniques, mode ofemployment, independence from friendlysupport, and dependence on detailedoperational intelligence and indigenousassets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war atwhich a nation, often as a member of agroup of nations, determines national ormultinational (alliance or coalition)security objectives and guidance, anddevelops and uses national resources toaccomplish these objectives. Activitiesat this level establish national andmultinational military objectives;sequence initiatives; define limits andassess risks for the use of military andother instruments of national power;develop global plans or theater warplans to achieve these objectives; and

GL-7

Glossary

provide military forces and other capabilitiesin accordance with strategic plans.See also operational level of war; tacticallevel of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement ofmilitary actions in time, space, andpurpose to produce maximum relativecombat power at a decisive place andtime. 2. In the intelligence context,application of intelligence sources andmethods in concert with the operationalplan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical air control center. The principalair operations installation (ship-based)from which all aircraft and air warningfunctions of tactical air operations arecontrolled. Also called Navy TACC.(Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any levelat or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. Seealso operational control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war atwhich battles and engagements areplanned and executed to accomplishmilitary objectives assigned to tactical

units or task forces. Activities at thislevel focus on the ordered arrangementand maneuver of combat elements inrelation to each other and to the enemyto achieve combat objectives. See alsooperational level of war; strategic levelof war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

targeting. 1. The process of selectingtargets and matching the appropriateresponse to them, taking account ofoperational requirements and capabilities.2. The analysis of enemy situationsrelative to the commander’s mission,objectives, and capabilities at thecommander’s disposal, to identify andnominate specific vulnerabilities that, ifexploited, will accomplish thecommander’s purpose through delaying,disrupting, disabling, or destroyingenemy forces or resources critical to theenemy. See also joint targetingcoordination board. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target list. The listing of targets maintainedand promulgated by the senior echelon ofcommand; it contains those targets that areto be engaged by supporting arms, asdistinguished from a “list of targets” that maybe maintained by any echelon as confirmed,suspected, or possible targets for informationaland planning purposes. See also jointtarget list. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target system. 1. All the targets situated in aparticular geographic area and functionallyrelated. 2. A group of targets which are sorelated that their destruction will producesome particular effect desired by the attacker.(Joint Pub 1-02)

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