document of the world bank of the world bank report no: icr0000282 implementation completion and...
TRANSCRIPT
Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR0000282
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-31000 IDA-31001 IDA-31002 IDA-31003)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 167.8 MILLION
(US$238.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF COTE D’IVOIRE
FOR A
TRANSPORT SECTOR ADJUSTMENT/INVESTMENT PROGRAM
March 29, 2012
Transport Sector
Country Department AFCF2
Africa Region
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective as of August 31, 2011)
Currency Unit = FCFA
SDR1.00 = US$1.61
US$ 1.00 = 454 FCFA
FISCAL YEAR
[January 1 – December 31]
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AERIA Concessionaire managing the extension and modernization of Abidjan
airport
AFDB African Development Bank
AFD French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement)
AGEROUTE Road Agency (Agence de Gestion des Routes)
AGETU Urban Transport Agency (Agence des Transports Urbains)
AM Aide Mémoire
ANAC National Civil Aviation Agency (Agence Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)
ANAM National Airport Management and Meteorology Agency (Agence
Nationale des Aérodromes et de la Météorologie)
BNETD National Bureau of Technical Studies and Development (Bureau National
d'Etudes Techniques et de Développement)
BOAD West African Development Bank (Banque Ouest Africaine de
Développement)
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
CFA Franc of African Financial Community
CIAPOL Antipollution Center (Centre Ivoirien Anti-pollution)
CIF Cost, Insurance and Freight
CNS National Security Council (Conseil National de Sécurité)
COMARCO Ivoirian Shipping Company (Compagnie Maritime de Côte d'Ivoire)
DCGTx Directorate for Management and Supervision of Large Works (Direction
et Contrôle des Grands Travaux)
DGTTC Directorate for Land Transport
DMTP Directorate of Public Works Equipment (Direction du Matériel des
Travaux Publics)
DRV Directorate of Highways and Urban Roads (Direction des Routes et
Voiries)
DTT Directorate of Land Transport
ERR Economic Rate of Return
EU European Union
FAC French Aid and Cooperation Fund (Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation)
FER Road Maintenance Fund (Fond d’Entretien Routier)
FHB Felix Houphouet Boigny International Airport
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GOCI Government of Cote d'Ivoire
IBDR International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICB International Competitive Bidding
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA International Development Association
IMO International Maritime Organization
IRR Internal Rate of Return
ISR Implementation Status and results Report
KFW German Development Agency (Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau)
KPI Key Performance Indicators
MARPOL International Convention for Actions against Pollution through Ship
Wastes
MET Ministry of Transport (Ministère des Transports)
MIE Ministry of Economic Infrastructure (Ministère des Infrastructures
Economiques)
MTR Midterm Review
NCB National Competitive Bidding
OCAB Banana-Pineapple Exporters Association (Organisation Centrale Ananas
Bananes)
OIC Ivorian Shippers’ Council (Office Ivoirien des Chargeurs)
OPRC International Convention for Actions against Hydrocarbon Spill Pollution
OSER Road Safety Office (Office de Sécurité Routière)
PAA Abidjan Autonomous Port (Port Autonome d’Abidjan)
PASP San Pedro Autonomous Port (Port Autonome de San Pedro)
PCU Program Coordination Unit
PDO Program/Project Development Objective
PFP Policy Framework Paper
PME Small and Medium Enterprises (Petites et Moyennes Entreprises)
PNAE National Environmental Action Program (Programme National d’Action
Environnementale)
PPF Project Preparation Facility
PSD Private Sector Development Project
RITO Reflows, Investment Income, IBRD Net Transfers and Others Resources
SAD Sector Adjustment Loan
SAL Structural Adjustment Lending
SGS Preshipment Inspection Company (Société Générale de Surveillance)
SGMTP Civil Works Equipment Management Company (Société de Gestion du
Matériel des travaux Publics)
SIGFIP Integrated Public Finance Management System
SITARAIL Private Concessionaire Operating Rail Transport on the Abidjan-
Ouagadougou-Kaya Line
SITRAM Ivorian Maritime Transport Company (Société Ivoirienne de Transports
Maritimes)
SME Small and Medium Entreprises
SODEXAM Airport Management and Meteorology Company (Société d’Exploitation
des Aérodromes ct de la Météorologie)
SONATT National Land Transport Agency (Société Nationale des Transports
Terrestres)
SOTRA Abidjan Public Bus Company (Société des Transports d’Abidjan)
SOTU Urban Transport Society (Société des Transports Urbains)
TA Technical Assistance
TSIAP Transport Sector Adjustment/Investment Program
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
VAT Value-Added Tax
Vice President: Obiageli K.Ezekwesili
Country Director: Madani M. Tall
Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn
Project Team Leader: Ibou Diouf
ICR Team Leader: Ibou Diouf
COTE D’IVOIRE
CI-TRANSPORT SECTOR ADJUSTMENT (FY98)
CONTENTS
Data Sheet ....................................................................................................................... 1
A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... 1
B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... 1
C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... 1
D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... 2
E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... 3
F. Results Framework Analysis ...................................................................................... 3
G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs .................................................................. 5
H. Restructuring .............................................................................................................. 7
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...................................... 8
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................... 19
3. Assessment of Outcomes .................................................................................. 25
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................................ 30
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ............................................. 30
6. Lessons Learned ............................................................................................... 32
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 33
Annex 1: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 34
Annex 2: Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 37
Annex 3: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results .................................................. 38
Annex 4: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 39
Annex 5: Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ..................... 42
Annex 6: List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 43
Annex 7: Status of KPI by August 2011 ....................................................................... 44
Annex 8: Implementation Timeline .............................................................................. 48
Annex 9: Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 52
Annex 10: Map IBRD No. 33393 ................................................................................. 56
1
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information
Country: Cote d’Ivoire Program Name: CI-Transp Sec Adj
Program ID: P001177 L/C/TF Number(s):
IDA-31000,IDA-
31001,IDA-
31002,IDA-31003
ICR Date: 03/29/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: SAD Borrower: Government of Cote
d’Ivoire
Original Total
Commitment: SDR 130.6M Disbursed Amount: SDR 166.28M
Revised Amount: SDR 167.8M
Implementing Agencies: Project Coordination Unit (PCU)
Co financiers and Other External Partners:
European Commission (EC)
French Development Agency (AFD)
Government of Japan
Germany (KFW)
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 04/11/1988 Effectiveness: 12/16/1998 11/09/1998
Appraisal: 04/28/1997 Restructuring(s):
11/08/1999
12/20/2001
12/17/2002
06/26/2003
09/02/2008
07/03/2009
08/31/2010
06/27/2011
Approval: 06/23/1998 Mid-term Review: 06/30/2001
Closing: 06/30/2001 08/31/2011
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial
Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory
2
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: MU Government: MU
Quality of Supervision: MS Implementing
Agency/Agencies: MS
Overall Bank
Performance: MU
Overall Borrower
Performance: MU
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating:
Potential Problem
Program at any time
(Yes/No):
Yes Quality at Entry
(QEA): Satisfactory
Problem Program at any
time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Central government administration 41 66
General transportation sector 18 1
Ports, waterways and shipping 5
Roads and highways 36 33
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Infrastructure services for private sector development 24 33
Macroeconomic management 25 32
Pollution management and environmental health 13 1
Public expenditure, financial management and
procurement 25 33
Regulation and competition policy 13 1
3
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Obiageli K. Ezekwesili Jean-Louis Sarbib
Country Director: Madani M. Tall Shigeo Katsu
Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard
Program Team Leader: Ibou Diouf Jean-Noel Guillossou
ICR Team Leader: Ibou Diouf
ICR Primary Author: Alain L. Labeau, Papa M. Fall
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from the Development Credit Agreement)
The initial Project Development Objectives (PDOs) of the project were to: (a) improve
the condition and efficiency of the Borrower’s transport infrastructure; (b) build capacity
for planning, programming and mobilizing funding required for the execution of
investments in the Borrower’s transport sector; and (c) strengthen the legal and regulatory
framework of the Borrower’s transport sector.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by the original approving
authority on September 2, 2008)
The revised PDO is to re-establish and improve road access and safeguard road
infrastructure assets across the country, notably in Northern Regions.
The PDO indicators were revised on September 2, 2008 but neither targets nor baseline
values were explicitly mentioned in the official letter to the Minister of Finance. The
below targets were mutually agreed and documented in aide-memoires.
(a)Revised PDO Indicators
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Number of bridges rehabilitated in the Northern region
Value
(quantitative or
Qualitative)
0 60 76
Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
127% achievement.
Indicator 2 : Number of representatives from road enterprises trained.
Value
(quantitative or
Qualitative)
0 300 1200
4
Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Achieved beyond target.
Indicator 3 : Number of bridges studies completed in the Northern region
Value
(quantitative or
Qualitative)
0 10 3
Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
30% achieved.3 bridges studies completed.
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Environmental mitigation clauses are included in all bridges contracts
Value
(quantitative or
Qualitative)
no yes yes
Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Fully achieved. Environmental clauses are now included in all Cote d'Ivoire
contracts.
Indicator 2 : The payments due to contractors are made within 15 days
Value
(quantitative or
Qualitative)
no yes yes
Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Fully achieved. 4 days average.
Indicator 3 : Number of pedestrian accidents reduced to 15 at Grand Bassam bus station at
end 2009
Value
(quantitative or
Qualitative)
n.a 15 Not measured
Date achieved 09/02/2008 12/31/2009 08/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
The annual reduction of accident rates at the Grand Bassam bus station could
not be measured as the rehabilitation works were only completed by the project
closing date.
Indicator 4 : The road safety training center is rehabilitated
Value
(quantitative or
Qualitative)
no yes yes
5
Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Fully achieved.
Indicator 5 : Bus station rehabilitated in Grand Bassam
Value
(quantitative or
Qualitative)
no yes yes
Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Fully achieved.
G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 11/19/1998 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory 50.23
2 12/22/1998 Satisfactory Satisfactory 50.23
3 02/12/1999 Satisfactory Satisfactory 77.40
4 05/20/1999 Satisfactory Satisfactory 79.55
5 11/12/1999 Satisfactory Satisfactory 79.55
6 12/01/1999 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 79.55
7 03/24/2000 Satisfactory Satisfactory 80.48
8 06/23/2000 Satisfactory Satisfactory 121.47
9 10/17/2000 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 121.58
10 05/30/2001 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 121.57
11 11/26/2001 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 121.57
12 04/11/2002 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 152.61
13 09/30/2002 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 158.79
14 12/23/2002 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 163.44
15 05/29/2003 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 171.26
16 10/16/2003 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 177.43
17 11/27/2003 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 180.45
18 12/24/2003 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 181.17
19 04/26/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 187.54
20 05/12/2005 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 205.38
21 09/24/2005 Moderately
Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 205.38
22 12/03/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 210.41
23 05/04/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 211.08
24 10/27/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 211.87
6
25 05/03/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 216.39
26 12/17/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 221.33
27 8/22/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 224.87
7
H. Restructuring
Restructuring
Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in USD
millions
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made DO IP
11/08/1999 No S S 79.55
Operating costs and artificial
reef added & Project Closing
date extended by 18 months
12/20/2001 No U U 121.57
Corrective restructuring
designed to accelerate
implementation based on Mid
Term Review (MTR)
recommendations; rural roads,
civil aviation, HIV/AIDS and
poverty components added,
artificial reef removed,
disbursement percentage for
civil works increased from 70%
to 80%
01/30/2002 U U 150.91
12/17/2002 No U S 163.44
Extension of project closing
date by six months to June 30,
2003
06/26/2003 No U S 172.71
Adaptive restructuring in
response to urgent post-conflict
infrastructure needs and part of
a wider portfolio restructuring;
all components but A are closed
07/01/2003 U S 172.89
09/02/2008 Yes MU U 205.38
Adaptive restructuring part of a
wider portfolio restructuring to
once again refocus the project
on post-conflict infrastructure
reconstruction needs;
Component A restructured, road
safety component added,
disbursement percentage for
civil works increased from 80%
to 100%
07/03/2009 No S S 211.22 Reallocation of Credit Funds
08/31/2010 No S S 220.61 Reallocation and Extension of
project closing date
06/27/2011 No S S 221.33
Adaptive restructuring to repair
and replace equipment and
building looted during the post-
election crisis; purchase of
goods and hiring of TA services
added.
8
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1. Since early 1994, following more than ten years of economic stagnation and the
subsequent devaluation of the CFA franc (Franc of African Financial Community), Cote
d’Ivoire successfully implemented a multi-year program of economic recovery and
reform. All external payments arrears to official bilateral and multilateral creditors and
most domestic arrears were cleared by end-1996. Notwithstanding the positive results of
the comprehensive adjustment strategy, the fiscal situation remained fragile, and the
heavy dependency on external budgetary support continued. Further fiscal consolidation
was needed to achieve external viability and the deepening of structural reforms was
necessary to promote the private sector regarded as the engine of growth.1
2. The program was consistent with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) dated
September 11, 1997 (IDA/17007-IVC), which aimed at achieving sustained economic
growth, reducing poverty and restoring financial viability, and more specifically,
supported institutional capacity building and governance and investment in basic
infrastructure in rural areas. The steep cost of transportation had been hampering the
functioning of internal markets, the efficient delivery of social services, and hurting
economic growth as a whole. Consequently, a program of remedial reforms targeting
protectionist or monopolistic practices and loss-making public enterprises was initiated
by the government in the maritime, civil aviation, rail and urban transport sub-sectors.
However, the road sub-sector responsible for 90 percent of transport movements
remained behind in terms of: (a) the poor condition of the infrastructure and the weak
management and maintenance of the same resulting in high vehicle operating costs; and
(b) the efficient organization of transport services.
3. The purpose of the program and the contributing project was to complete the
reform agenda in the various non-road sub-sectors, carry out additional road specific
reforms coupled to some physical investments to turn around the declining condition of
the road network. The International Development Association’s (IDA) involvement was
also perceived as a critical catalyst to sustain a coherent framework for donor
involvement and coordination in the transport sector. A follow up operation was already
contemplated to assist with the completion of the road maintenance and rehabilitation
program which could only be partially executed during the implementation of the project.
1 From the March 6, 1998 Final Document on the Initiative for HIPC jointly prepared by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and IDA.
9
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as
approved)
4. The PDO. The objectives2 of the project were to: (a) improve the condition and
efficiency of the Borrower’s transport infrastructure; (b) build capacity for planning,
programming and mobilizing funding required for the execution of investments in the
Borrower’s transport sector; and (c) strengthen the legal and regulatory framework of the
Borrower’s transport sector. The PDOs were consistent with the CAS dated September
11, 1997.
5. Key Indicators of Performance. The key performance indicators are
summarized in the table below.
Table 1: Key Indicators of Performance Road Maintenance
Transparency of budgetary allocations and their actual use
More cost-effective road maintenance using greater share of local inputs
Correctly maintained road network
Improving road condition
A lean and effective road administration working with clear and transparent procedures,
taking corrective actions with reasonable speed, disposing of modern management tools and
competent staff.
o date of finalization of annual maintenance program
o date of annual update of data bank
o average number of days for contract award
o percentage exceeding 30 days
o average number of days for contract payment
o percentage exceeding 30 days
o equipment provision to DRV
A robust and competent local contracting industry has developed offering steady employment
to a significant local work force
Private equipment rental and leasing activity develop in response to small contractor demand,
easing their constraints for equipment acquisition and equipment management capacity
Road Transport
Restructuring of DTT by end of 1998
Elimination of all existing temporary transport titles six months after establishment of new
structure, and progressive reduction of validity period of temporary titles thereafter
Improved knowledge of essential rules and their correct enforcement
Reduction of illegal ―tolling‖ through suppression of informal road blocks
Improvement of road passengers and freight services through more functional bus stations
Annual increase in number of drivers receiving specialized training
More efficient vehicle operation (annual mileage per truck/bus increased)
2 As per the Development Credit Agreement (DCA), September 16, 1998.
10
Increased transport enterprises efficiency
Road Safety
Children trained
Monitors trained
Accident rate decreased
Increased ratio of inspected vehicles
Urban Transport
Percent of passengers using public transport
Amount of subsidies to operators
6. Some of the above performance indicators and a few additional ones were used to
frame the conditions authorizing the release of four structural adjustment tranches as
explained in the tables below. The additional indicators, specific to the structural
adjustment tranches, are underscored.
Table 2: Additional Indicators Tranche Number Amount in
SDR
Expected
Release Date
Release
Date
Comments
1 36,300,000 Before Dec 15,
1998
Nov 16,
1998
Tranche 1 was to be released as
soon as the conditions for
effectiveness had been met
Supplemental
amount from Fifth
Dimension:
Reflows, Investment
Income, IBRD Net
Transfers and
Others Resources
(RITO)
19,200,000 Before Dec 15,
1999
Dec 21,
1998
2 14,500,000 n.a. Apr 4,
2000
Until October 1999 (cf. Aide
memoire Oct 99) progress on
conditions was dismal.
Supplemental
amount from Fifth
Dimension (RITO)
15,800,000 Before Mar 22,
2001
Apr 4,
2000
3 14,500,000 n.a. Jan 30,
2002
The release conditions were
changed in the Dec 20, 2001
project restructuring
Supplemental
amount from Fifth
Dimension (RITO)
9,190,000 Before Jan 30,
2003
Jan 30,
2002
Floating Tranche 7,000,000 n.a. This tranche was cancelled on June
26, 2003
Table 3: Structural Adjustment Tranches Tranche 1
Conditions from Legal Agreement Status
(a) Satisfactory FY 1998 road rehabilitation and
maintenance program.
See Declaration of Credit Effectiveness dated Nov.
9, 1998 on which basis the tranche was released.
(b) At least (i) US$23,600,000 for routine
maintenance; (ii) US$15,200,000 for periodic
Idem. In 1998, US$83 million (including IDA’s
contribution of US$32 million) were allocated to
11
maintenance; and (iii) US$8,400,000 for DRV
operating costs and required equipment.
road works (Restructuring memo Dec 2001).
(c) Satisfactory accounting and auditing system Manual transmitted (Aide memoire Dec 2-4, 1998)
(d) All Civil works Equipment Management
Company’s (SGMTP ) heavy road maintenance
equipment is liquidated
Document transmitted (Aide memoire Dec 2-4,
1998)
(e) Program launching seminars carried out Yamoussoukro Sep 21-28 seminars. Confirmation
transmitted (AM Dec 2-4, 1998).
Tranche 2
Conditions from Legal Agreement Status
(1) Satisfactory FY 99 transport sector investment
and expenditures program.
Tranche release authorized by Memo of the
President dated March 17, 2000.
(2) Adequate funding in FY99 budget for road
rehabilitation and maintenance program agreed
upon with IDA.
In 1999, CFAF 48 billion, i.e. US$83 million
(including IDA’s contribution of US$32 million)
were allocated to road maintenance (Restructuring
memo Dec 2001).
(3) Evidence that all funds allocated for road
maintenance in FY98 budget have been committed
for road maintenance purposes under a program of
works agreed upon with IDA.
The condition was not yet formally met and a
waiver was requested and accepted. Reason was that
the 1998 budget was executed until Nov 1999 and
therefore the audit of 1998, carried out in April
1999, supposed to certify that the condition was met
could not cover it. It was expected to be covered in
the audit of FY99 to be carried out in April 2000.
However, this latter audit was still not available in
June 2000.
(4) Evidence that (a) Borrower has ceased to
undertake road maintenance works by force account
and (b) arrears to private contractors do not exceed
one month.
The 1999 mid-year review carried out by the
auditors showed that all works had been undertaken
by private contractors.
(5) Audit report showing that informal road check
points are found only exceptionally.
The auditor confirmed that informal check points
were found only exceptionally. Illegal road barriers
removed in March 2000 reappeared progressively,
were removed again in Mar 2001 and kept on
reappearing. (Restructuring memo Dec 2001).
(6) Evidence that vehicle inspection rates have been
increased to levels acceptable to IDA (in relation to
paragraph 2.3 of the Letter of Sector Policy).
The Tranche release memo certifies that the rates
were attained. However, no progress was noted in
2001 on the February 2000 Action Plan to improve
technical inspections Mid-Term Review (MTR)
Aide memoire (AM.
(7) DTT has been restructured SONATT was created by the decrees of February
23, 2000. However, the restructuring was still
incomplete in June 2002 (key staff of SONATT not
yet recruited). This condition was thus half met as
evidenced by the Memo of the President for the
release of the Tranche: Boards being appointed,
decree to dismantle DTT being revised, plan being
prepared.
(8) Submission of an action plan and
implementation timetable to set and collect the
optimum level of taxes and user charges against
road users.
This condition was not met. A waiver was requested
and accepted. The study was stopped by the
previous government without informing the Bank.
The new government re-launched it. The final report
was expected in May 2000 including the
Implementation Plan. In reality the plan was never
made available.
12
Tranche 3
Conditions from Legal Agreement Status
(1) Original: satisfactory FY00 transport sector
investment and expenditures program; Amended on
Dec 20, 2001: The Borrower has adopted and
published the legislative and regulatory documents
pursuant to which the Road Maintenance Fund has
been established and will operate with functions,
responsibilities and resources satisfactory to IDA,
and the Director General of said Fund has been
appointed.
An inadequate institutional framework, i.e. DRV
and Ministry of Finances, was identified at the MTR
as the root cause of the insufficient mobilization of
resources for road maintenance and the inefficient
road maintenance management. Two legs of the
reform consisted in creating a Road Maintenance
Fund and a National Road Agency. Four road
projects included in the FY00 program did not meet
the 12% minimum Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
and were to be removed (cf. Paragraph 18 of Memo
of the President for the release of 2nd
Tranche). As
quoted from the AM of June 2000: ―The 2000
investment program is highly questionable: amounts
budgeted are way too small (one tenth in some
cases), works are overdesigned and expensive so
budget allocation means ridiculously low output and
at such pace works would last more than 10 years.
Worse, the selection of the road is weird because it
doubles an existing road with more traffic.
Conclusion, the investment program requires a
detailed review by IDA.‖
(2) Original: Adequate funding in FY00 budget for
road rehabilitation and maintenance program agreed
upon with IDA; Amended on Dec 20, 2001: The
Borrower has adopted and published the legislative
and regulatory documents pursuant to which the
National Road Agency has been established and
will operate with functions, responsibilities and
resources satisfactory to IDA, and the Director-
General of the said Agency has been appointed.
In 2000 and 2001 the budget for road maintenance
was reduced to about US$29 million with a local
contribution of about US$12 million in 2000 and
US$19 million in 2001, down from US$43 million
in 1998 and 1999 (Restructuring memo Dec 2001).
(3) Original: evidence that all funds allocated for
road maintenance in FY99 budget have been
committed for road maintenance purposes under a
program of works agreed upon with IDA; Amended
on Dec 20, 2001: As a result of the establishment of
the Road Maintenance Fund and the National Road
Agency, the Borrower has revised as appropriate the
legislative and regulatory documents defining the
functions and responsibilities of the Highway
Department of its Ministry of Economic
Infrastructure.
Only a small portion of the FY99 and FY00 road
maintenance programs was executed (53 percent of
routine maintenance, 37 percent of light grading 36
percent of reopening of earth roads, 2 percent of
paved roads rehabilitation, and 0 percent for both
patching on paved roads and regravelling
respectively), AGEROUTE and FER key personnel
were still not recruited in June 2002.
(4) Original: action plan under (8) above was
implemented in accordance with the timetable;
removed and transferred to the Floating Tranche
with the Dec 20, 2001 Amendment.
Condition (4) was shifted to the Floating Tranche to
―keep the focus of the 3rd
Tranche on Road
Maintenance and concentrate the floating tranche on
Transport Sector policy issues‖. This reasoning was
absurd because this condition was paramount to the
financing of Road Maintenance and as such had a
better fit with the 3rd
Tranche than with the Floating
Tranche. The double shift from Tranche 2 to 3 and
3 to floating has permitted the release of Tranche 2
and 3 while the condition was never fulfilled until
the end of the project.
Floating Tranche
13
Conditions from Legal Agreement Status
(1) (a) Satisfactory enactment of the law governing
road passengers and freight transport activities and ,
(b) Publication of updated regulations governing
land transport activities
The law governing road passengers and freight
transport activities was enacted on Feb 16, 2000; the
four implementation decrees were signed on Feb 23,
2000; five additional legal orders remain to be
adopted (Restructuring memo Dec 2001).
(2) (a) Satisfactory enactment of the Maritime Code
and, (b) satisfactory amendment of port regulations
The draft Maritime Code was available in Sep 2001;
port regulations were amended in the (Abidjan
Autonomous Port (PAA), a draft was available for
San Pedro Autonomous Port (PASP) but not signed
yet in 2003.
(3) Establishment of a satisfactory Urban Transport
Agency and appointment of its senior officials
AGETU was created on Feb 23, 2000
(Restructuring memo Dec 2001). Still not
operational in June 2002.
(4) The Borrower has concluded with a qualified
and experienced operator, selected on the basis of
procedures satisfactory to IDA, an arrangement
satisfactory to IDA for the operation and
management of the PAA’s ship-to-shore gantry
cranes
Bidding aborted because of no responses to
prequalification. Retendering was deliberately
aborted by the Government and a sole source
contract signed with Bollore in 2003.
(5) Satisfactory restructuring of OSER Still not done in June 2002
(6) The Borrower has concluded with qualified and
experienced private operators contractual
arrangements satisfactory to IDA for the provision
of bus transport services for Abobo and Yopougon
suburbs
A concessioning agreement was signed with SOTU
on Sep 18, 1998 (paragraph 22 AM Sep-Oct 1998)
however, operational prerequisites are unclear (AM
Dec 2-4, 1998) in particular Memorandum of
Understanding between SOTU and SOTRA
(paragraph 6 (h) AM June-July 1999). The operator
was unable to mobilize funds to purchase the buses
and start operations (Restructuring memo Dec
2001). Decision of the Government on the future of
the concession was still not available in June 2002
and the whole operation was abandoned later.
(7) Transferred from Tranche 3 as per Amendment
of Dec 20, 2001: action plan under condition (8) for
Tranche 2 was implemented in accordance with the
timetable
In June 2000, the study from BENETD did not
contain an action plan; in June the Ministry of
Transport had not received a copy for comments yet
(AM June 2000). The action plan was yet to be
defined in 2003 and in reality was never started.
1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification
7. The project was restructured eight times (including reallocation of funds and
extension of closing dates), although the PDO and Key Performance Indicators (KPI)
were formally revised only once on September 2, 2008.
(a) November 8, 1999: The closing date was extended from June 30, 2001 until
December 31, 2002 (cf. paragraph 8). An artificial reef pilot was added to the
Port Component. The withdrawal categories were adjusted: small reductions of
allocation under Category 4 - Consultants; two new categories added - Operating
Costs and Artificial Reef; SDR 19.2 million added to the first tranche. The PDO
and key indicators remained unchanged.
(b) December 20, 2001: This ―corrective‖ restructuring, designed to accelerate
implementation, reflected the recommendations of the July 2001 Mid-Term
14
Review (MTR) and the Bank’s re-engagement strategy (Cote d’Ivoire slipped into
non-accrual status in October 2000). Rural roads, civil aviation, Human
Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS)
and poverty components were added, the artificial reef pilot was removed; the
disbursement percentage for civil works were increased from 70 percent to 80
percent; some withdrawal category allocations were adjusted; and the release
conditions for the third and floating tranches were modified. The PDO and KPI
remained unchanged (no additional indicators were proposed to monitor the
performance of the new components).
(c) December 17, 2002: Extension of project closing date by six months to June 30,
2003.
(d) June 26, 2003: This ―adaptive‖ restructuring was part of a wider portfolio
restructuring and responded to urgent post-conflict infrastructure needs, it
embodied as a key element of the emergency phase of the new Bank re-
engagement strategy. The restructuring was also ―corrective‖ to some extent in
that it sought to improve project performance by restricting the institutional
support to road management and maintenance and lessening project implementing
arrangements. This was in response to the lack of traction on the non-road related
institutional reforms. All components were closed except Component A (Roads);
the closing date was extended until June 30, 2004; the floating tranche was
canceled (as conditions were not met by the deadline of January 30, 2003); and
withdrawal category allocations were adjusted. The restructuring of Component A
was meant to be made in two stages: the first stage set the rules to
complete/terminate ongoing works and the second stage followed the assessment
of the additional work program. The assessment was completed in November
2003; however, the project could not be formally restructured (i.e. revised PDO
and KPI) before June 15, 2004 when it was once again suspended for more than
four years.
(e) September 2, 2008: This ―adaptive‖ restructuring was part of a wider portfolio
restructuring/reactivation following the clearance of arrears by the Borrower and
the preparation of a new Bank Interim Strategy for fiscal year 08-09; it was meant
to: (i) adjust the project objectives to the country’s new post-conflict realities; (ii)
focus on urgent country reconstruction and reunification activities; (iii) extend the
closing dates to allow the completion of the new activities. Component A was
finally restructured and a Component B - Road Safety was added; some
withdrawal category allocations were adjusted; the disbursement percentage for
civil works was raised to 100 percent thanks to new country parameters; and the
closing date was extended until August 31, 2010. The PDO was revised to read
―the objective of the project is to reestablish and improve road access and
safeguard road infrastructure assets across the country, notably in the
Northern Regions‖. The revised KPI are
number of bridges rehabilitated in the Northern region;
number of bridges studies completed for the Northern region;
Road safety training center is rehabilitated;
15
Bus station rehabilitated in Grand Bassam;
Number of pedestrian accidents reduced by 60 percent at Grand
Bassam bus station at end 2009;
Number of representatives from road enterprises trained;
Environmental mitigation clauses are included in all bridges contracts;
and
The payments due to contractors are made within 15 days.
(f) July 3, 2009: Reallocation of Credit Proceeds.
(g) August 31, 2010: Reallocation of Credit Proceeds and extension of project
closing date.
(h) June 27, 2011: The purpose of this ―adaptive‖ restructuring was to: (i) repair and
replace office buildings and furniture, IT equipment and vehicles of the Ministry
of Economic Infrastructure (MIE) and the project implementing agencies which
were looted during the post-election crisis and the ensuing civil war, and (ii)
update the transport sector strategy. Acquisition of goods and consulting services
were added to Component A and withdrawal category allocations adjusted
accordingly. KPI and PDO remained unchanged.
8. The initial closing date of June 30, 2001 was extended five times as shown in the
table immediately below. In December 2004, the Bank decided that all operations in Cote
d’Ivoire would be retroactively extended once the suspension3 that started in June 2004
would be lifted, which happened in April 2008 only.
Table 4: Extension Dates Date granted Closing date Reasons
Sep 16, 1998 Jun 30, 2001 Initial closing date
Nov 8, 1999 Dec 31, 2002 Difficulties related to the October 1999 coup that affected the project
implementation
Dec 17, 2002 Jun 30, 2003 Difficulties related to the September 19, 2002 second coup attempt, brief
armed conflict leading to the country’s divide and a deep political crisis.
Give the Borrower some additional time for preparing a meaningful
action plan to address the new country’s context. The Bank had become
the coordinator of all donors and it was important to keep its
engagement in an increasingly sensitive dialogue with the government.
Jun 26, 2003 Jun 30, 2004 Portfolio restructuring strategy and project restructuring.
Sep 2, 2008 Aug 31, 2010 Portfolio reactivation and project restructuring.
Aug 31, 2010 Aug 31, 2011 Give the Borrower the means to complete ongoing activities and achieve
the PDO.
3 Because of debt service arrears, the project was suspended for six years (71.5 months exactly) over three
distinct periods: October 31, 2000 to January 30, 2002; June 15, 2004 to April 2, 2008; and December 4,
2010 to May 31, 2011.
16
9. Main Beneficiaries. There is no reference to beneficiaries in the Report and
Recommendation of the President of the IDA to the Executive Directors.4 The items
Beneficiaries and Poverty read ―Not Applicable‖ in the Credit and Project Summary of
the same document. However, from the description of the components, the main
beneficiaries would be the national road construction industry, the road users,
professional transporters, and farmers.
1.4 Original Components (as approved)
10. There were two components, an investment component and an adjustment
component. The latter consisted of four credit tranches with release conditions (cf.
paragraph 6) for a total amount of SDR 72.3 million later increased to SDR 116.49
million. The former, for an amount of SDR 58.3 million consisted of five components.5
Component A - Road Construction, Rehabilitation and Maintenance; Component B -
Road Transport; Component C - Urban Transport; Component D - Port; and Component
E - Transport Sector Administration. Each component contained sub-components as
shown in the table below.
Table 5: Original Components
Component Activities
I. Component A
Road Construction,
Rehabilitation and
Maintenance
1 (a) Routine maintenance 5,300 km paved roads, 62,750
km unpaved roads
(b) Periodic maintenance unpaved roads:
(i) full or spot regravelling 14,800 km
(ii) Spot improvement 59,700 km
(iii)construction/rehabilitation 1,600 small bridges &
culverts
(c) Rehabilitation 470 km paved roads
(d) Construction 175 km paved roads
2 (a) Strengthening capacity of agency responsible for
management and maintenance operations
(b) Developing/ strengthening capacity of Small and
Medium Enterprises (SME) to carry out maintenance
works
3 Work Supervision and engineering studies for
construction roads and bridges, rehabilitation paved roads
and annual road maintenance program
4 Report No. P-7250-IVC dated May 28, 1998.
5 From the DCA.
17
I. Component B
Road Transport
1
(a) Updating of legal, regulatory and institutional
transport framework
(b) Dissemination of revised legislation regulations
among staff responsible for transport matters
(c) Dissemination of revised legislation regulations
among public
2
(a) Streamlining of road control procedures for
improving traffic flow
(b) Carrying out sensitization and media campaigns to
enhance transparency of road control procedures
(c) Rehabilitation and equipping both control posts and
security corridors
3
(a) Provision of (Technical Assistance) TA services and
training to professional organizations of road
transporters to improve their performance
(b) Rehabilitation of:
(i) Driver training center
(ii) Training center for driving schools teachers
4
(a) Carrying out a study on technical specs for
construction and equipping of road transport stations
(b) Study for preparing bidding documents for
concessioning of transport stations to private
operators
5 Carrying study on optimum level of taxes and user
charges for road users.
1.5 Revised Components
11. In October 1999, a fifth sub-component ―artificial reef pilot‖ was added to
Component E and removed in December 2001 while the following components/sub-
components were added at the same time:
Table 6: Revised Components Activities
Component Activities
I. Component A
Road Construction,
Rehabilitation and
Maintenance
4 (a) Formulating a rural road maintenance strategy
involving local communities.
(b) Rehabilitation, periodic and routine maintenance on
400 km of rural road.
(c) Preparing, coordinating and implementing this
subcomponent through the rural road unit of
Directorate of Highways and Urban Roads (Direction
des Routes et Voiries DRV)
V. Component E
Transport Sector
Administration
5 Studies and seminars on linkages between transport and
poverty, establish an action plan to reduce poverty
[(contribution to Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP)].
18
VI. Component F
Poverty and HIV-
AIDS
1 Study of the impact of HIV/AIDS in the transport sector,
sensitization activities to mitigate impact through
trainings, seminars and condoms distribution.
2 Strengthening of the Coordinating Unit for Implementing
this component through purchase of equipment.
VII. Component G
Civil Aviation
1 Rehabilitation of Sub-regional Center for Aviation
Medicine (ANAC), 6 km fencing and rehabilitation fire
engines parks at Felix Houphouet Boigny International
Airport (FHB) International Airport.
2 Draft new code of civil aviation, establish new financing
mechanisms of the sector, restructure ANAC and Airport
Management and Meteorology Company (Société
d’Exploitation des Aérodromes et de la Météorologie
SODEXAM), evaluate progress achieved in safety,
security, train staff on security issues, dissemination of
safety concepts, and organize publicity campaign for
users.
3 Purchase equipment for crisis command center at FHB
and Accident Investigation Bureau, purchase equipment
for secondary airports.
12. In June 2003, all components but Component A were closed. Component A was
revised to reflect the country’s situation, essentially the fact that the northern area was out
of the control of the government and therefore inaccessible for the project. In September
2008, Component A was restructured and a Component B Transport Sector
administration which focused on Road Safety was added as presented in the table below.
Component A (1) was divided into a firm tranche of 50 bridges and a conditional tranche
of 10 bridges pending available resources—this point was specified in aide-memoires but
not in the formal restructuring letter sent to the Minister of Finance.
Table 7: Revised Components A and B
Component Activities
Component A
Road Construction,
Rehabilitation and
Maintenance
(AGEROUTE)
(a) Construction of about 60 bridges across the country
(b) DES for 10 bridges notably in Northern and Western regions
(c) supervision of bridge construction
(d) Strengthening capacity of Road Agency (Agence de Gestion
des Routes AGEROUTE) through TA and equipment
(e) Strengthening capacity of local contractors to carry out road
maintenance works
(f) Coordination of project activities
Component B
Transport Sector
Administration
(OSER)
(a) Rehabilitation of the OSER Road Safety Training Center
(b) Rehabilitation of the Grand Bassam bus station
(c) Creation of a road accident database
(d) Capacity building of Road Safety Office (Office de Sécurité
Routière OSER)
19
1.6 Other significant changes
13. In 2000, the donors who committed to fund the program in 1998 canceled their
support because of the country deep political crisis [French Development Agency (AFD),
European Union (EU) and Japan]. The German Development Agency (KFW) however,
maintained its support but it was not used as originally intended.
14. In June 2003, the SDR 7 million floating tranche of the adjustment component
was canceled. In June 2011, the proceeds of the investment component were reallocated
to fund the acquisition of equipment and the carrying out of an updated transport sector
strategy.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry
15. The background analysis was thorough and involved numerous experts and field
missions over a 10-year preparation period. Still project design was overambitious; it
exceeded the financial and human capacity available in the country and prescribed a
project implementation period that was too short to meaningfully achieve the institutional
reforms which were contemplated. Yet these points were noted during appraisal,
concerns were raised about the absorptive capacity of the Small and Medium Enterprises
(SME) in terms of qualified labor, equipment and access to credit; about the time
necessary for the Directorate of Highways and Urban Roads (DRV) to successfully
complete its profound restructuring; and about the financing gap in the road investment
component. Because of the short implementation period, too many results were expected
to materialize almost at the same time whereas in reality the change process is more
sequential. For example, a more effective road administration, leads to a more reliable
database, which leads to a tighter monitoring, in turn leading to more efficient works
management, which leads to better road condition.
16. A series of reform initiatives were launched during project preparation, but the
hard ones did not progress far enough for the project to be successfully implemented.
Therefore, a long list of conditions was imposed before negotiations, board presentation,
and effectiveness. Some of these conditions were postponed or were dropped after
negotiations - the completion of the lay-off plan for DRV, the effective privatization of
the Public Works Equipment Directorate (DMTP), the strengthening program of DRV,
and the advance funding mechanism from the Treasury to secure a fast payment of
contractors’ invoices. Inasmuch as the technical preparation was thorough, the
macroeconomic and fiscal analysis did not adequately flag the severe budget constraints
and liquidity problems that made the government incapable of fulfilling its funding
commitments right from the project start. Furthermore, the Integrated Public Finance
Management System (SIGFIP) start-up problems which affected the budget flow appear
to have been overlooked or underestimated.
20
17. Although the Government’s commitment seemed to be strong during the
preparation period, once project implementation started it waned. The project team
should have been more candid in its assessment of the real ownership of government of
the reform agenda that the project was supporting and could have been more realistic in
the objectives that the project was supposed to achieve. Furthermore, the team could have
done a more thorough assessment of the quality of governance in the sector to ensure
successful implementation of the investment component. The risk analysis identified the
right potential risks, most of which did materialize. The mitigation factors were
essentially the conditions attached to the release of the adjustment tranches, an instrument
that had been widely used by the Bank at the time to promote reforms. In reality, it did
not work as expected since the tranches, other than the floating tranche, were then
released with conditions partially fulfilled or changed altogether.
18. Nevertheless, Quality at Entry was rated Satisfactory (S) after a detailed review
undertaken by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG /QEA).
2.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation
19. Project implementation got off to a slow start due to budget management issues
and the unresponsiveness of DRV. In December 1999, one year after the project was
declared effective, a military coup was staged, the harbinger of a socio-political crisis that
would negatively affect the country for more than ten years (cf. Timeline in Annex 8).
The country then defaulted on its debt service commitment and the project was
suspended from October 2001 through January 2002. In September 2002, a second coup
attempt followed by a civil war cut the country in two leaving only the southern half of
the national territory under government control. From June 2004 until April 2008, the
country fell again into non-accrual status and the project was suspended. It was
reactivated and restructured in September 2008 and experienced a new suspension from
December 2010 until May 2011 following a post election crisis and civil war upheaval.
Altogether the project was suspended for six years. Thirteen different governments were
sworn in over the project period which saw the rotation of six Finance Ministers, six
Infrastructure Ministers and eleven Transport Ministers.
20. Within the above cited context, the implementation of the project can be broken
down into three key periods: the first period until the major restructuring of 2003, the
second until the restructuring/reactivation of 2008, and the third until project closing in
August 2011. The review of the first period can be further divided into the investment
part and the adjustment part—there was no more adjustment part after the 2003
restructuring. Details of performance per component can be found in the project’s
implementation status reports and Aide memoires.
21. September 1998 to June 2003 – Investment Part
(a) Context. Economic and financial crises followed the political crisis of
December 1999 and October 2000, they were marked by decline in
21
investment, drop in public expenditure and household consumption and
increase of internal budgetary arrears, and they led to slowdown in
implementation; by December 2001 four different ministers of transport had
been appointed; disbursements were suspended from October 2000 until
January 2002; implementation picked up in 2002 although with some
serious disruption due to the civil war and the ensuing split of the country in
September 2002.
(b) Poor financial management system. The public financial management
system was slow and complex and counterpart funds were inadequate. There
was uncertainty in the release of funds allocated to road maintenance as they
were combined to the counterpart funds and as such managed by a Public
Debt officer. The approval process of contractors’ monthly payment
certificates was lengthy and generated arrears; there were inconsistency
issues between SIGFIP and CI-PAST budgeting.
(c) Weak road construction industry. Contractors were reluctant to sign a
contract in an uncertain political and budgetary situation and growing
payment arrears, the quality of works executed by SMEs was poor and the
training program and access to credit were limited.
(d) Unresponsiveness of DRV. The DRV balked at executing its new
mandate/mission resulting from its restructuring; by June 2002.
(e) Unsatisfactory road works program. The execution of the program was
about three years behind schedule. By December 2001 only 1.5 percent of
the project funds allocated to road works had been disbursed, however this
number increased to 37 percent by June 2003. The contracts in the northern
area out of government control since September 2002 had to be
reprogrammed in the south, and the government had to remove from the
work program the construction of new roads that did not meet the minimum
12 percent IRR.
(f) Actions taken to resolve problems. An advance funding mechanism (régie
d’avance) was set up in October 2003 and successfully speeds up
disbursements. The defective financial management software was replaced
in 2000.
22. Mid Term Review (MTR) (June 2001). The MTR was carried out at the end of
June 2001. It found that the project objectives were still relevant and recommended to:
(a) simplify the logical framework; (b) create a second generation Road Maintenance
Fund to generate sustained resources for road maintenance without transiting through the
national budget, and a Road Authority to manage the road work program; (c) include a
social assessment in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA); and (d) recruit an
environmental/social expert in the PCU. Upon request from the government, the project
was restructured to add a rural transport, a transport and poverty, an HIV/AIDS, and a
22
civil aviation components (or subcomponents as the case may be) and to increase the
disbursement percentages for civil works from 70 to 80 percent to address a systemic lack
of counterpart funds.
23. September 1998 to June 2003 – Adjustment part. The fulfillment of the
conditions of effectiveness ipso facto authorized the release of the first tranche in
November 1998 (cf. tables in paragraph 6). It must be noted that the most critical
condition, i.e. the liquidation of all the heavy civil engineering equipment of the
Directorate of Public Works Equipment (DMTP), was barely met despite the fact that this
condition had been watered down after appraisal. The second tranche was released in
April 2000 with two conditions (No. 3 and 8) waived and not met later on, and one
condition (No. 7) was partially met. The third tranche was released in January 2002 after
conditions No. 1 to 3 had been modified in December 2001 (the original conditions were
not met), and condition No. 4 had been waived and transferred to the floating tranche.
The floating tranche was canceled by June 2003 restructuring, consistent with the closing
of all the reform related components of the investment part. At that time, out of seven
conditions, only condition No. 2 had been met. The Bank granted additional funding from
the so-called Fifth Dimension6, to adjustment tranches 1 to 3 raising their combined
disbursed amount to SDR 109,490,000 compared to SDR 58,300,000 available for the
investment part (a 65/35 percentage ratio). However, since the country economic
situation was poor that the additional budget support was mostly used for general
expenditures without any contribution to road maintenance which saw its funding dip
well below the minimum amount prescribed at project negotiations.
24. June 2003 to September 2008.
(a) Context. The project was completely restructured in June 2003 and was then
suspended for more than four years from June 2004 until September 2008.
(b) Restructuring. All components but component A were closed; however it
could not be formally revised before the project was suspended in June 2004.
(c) Project implementation over the period. The project was consistently rated
Satisfactory until May 2005. During this period the investment part
experienced its highest disbursement rate (US$42 million in 17 months)—
eligible disbursements made during the suspension period were reimbursed
after the project was reactivated. The rating was downgraded to Moderately
6 The economic performance of Côte d’Ivoire, a former International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) borrower, was downgraded soon before project start allowing the country to qualify
for IDA lending. As a result, it benefited from a partial reimbursement of its IBRD interest payments as did
other countries in the same situation at the time. This mechanism was called the Fifth Dimension and
adjustment tranches were the preferred instruments to channel these reimbursements.
23
Unsatisfactory in May 2005 and to Unsatisfactory in September 2005
reflecting the inability of the Ministry of Finance to fund the Road
Maintenance Fund and the standstill of physical progress due to the
compounded effect of the political crisis and the project suspension.
(d) Actions taken to resolve project implementation matters. The project team
kept the lines of communication open with the counterparts open at all times
and updated an action plan for the disbursement of the credit balance to
make it readily available for implementation as soon as the suspension
would be lifted.
25. September 2008 to August 2011.
(a) Context. The project was reactivated and restructured in September 2008
after the political crisis reached a positive outcome and the country was
reunited in a run up to new presidential elections. However, those elections
were delayed until November 2010 and followed by a new crisis and a
violent armed conflict which was finally resolved in April 2011. The project
was again suspended from December 2010 through May 2011.
(b) Restructuring. The road investment component was updated in September
2008 to reflect the pressing post-conflict infrastructure needs of the country
and a road safety component with an institutional dimension was added.
Disbursements made during the previous suspension period were reviewed
and only eligible expenditures were reimbursed. Another minor
restructuring was made in June 2011 to fund the replacement of looted
equipment and office buildings of the executing agencies.
(c) Project implementation ratings over the period. The ratings improved
consistently from Moderately Satisfactory to Satisfactory.
(d) Actions taken to resolve problems. The project was extended for one year in
August 2010 and was slightly restructured in June 2011 to give the
executing agencies the means for successfully completing the infrastructure
works critical for post-conflict recovery.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
26. M&E Design. Whereas the indicators and the targets were appropriate and
relevant although missing base line figures, there was little concern about which
executing agency would be responsible for their monitoring and whether they had the
capacity and the willingness to do so. Yet, in a context of reforms and potential
discontent and resistance, this aspect was even more critical. The actual expenditures for
road works were tracked under the adjustment part until 1999. However, this should have
been monitored under the investment part for the whole project duration as it is much
more telling than budget entries. Some targets were optimistic because improvements
24
come in sequence and not at the same time (DRV and road condition). The tranche
release conditions for the adjustment part were unequivocal and relevant.
27. M&E Implementation. The M&E framework was not systematically
implemented and is absent from the ISRs until sequence 26 when the new format was
introduced. It mostly served as a guide to assess the PDO ratings over the project life.
Pieces of the framework have been used in a few aide memoires to build up a remedial
action plan. It appears that some information required in the M&E framework were not
readily available and proved difficult to obtain, in particular the annual budget allocations
for various types of road works and the corresponding expenditures. To this date, it is
close to impossible to find meaningful detailed public finance data at the Ministry of
Finance. Some were obtained from the executing agencies but are fragmentary. The
M&E framework was not updated following the successive restructurings except for the
last one in September 2008. The monitoring framework of the adjustment part was
partially waived and substantially modified for the second and third tranches.
28. M&E Utilization. Until the June 2003 restructuring, the M&E framework was
more used to monitor the project implementation pace than the attainment of the
development objectives. This was especially the case for the adjustment part. Following
the September 2008 restructuring, the M&E framework was updated to reflect the drastic
change in project scope. Subsequently, great efforts were committed by PCU to measure
and monitor the indicators, and data were collected for all indicators.
2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance
29. Safeguards. The Environment Category was rated B at appraisal. Safeguards
compliance was moderately satisfactory. By MTR in June 2001, most environmental and
social safeguard activities were lagging behind due to weak safeguard capacity of PCU
and implementing agencies. It took more than three years to complete a Sectoral
Environmental Assessment7 (SEA) that was due by the end of the first year of project
implementation. Nonetheless by the end of the project and in spite of numerous
interruptions (cf. paragraph 19), the social and environmental management capacity was
significantly strengthened in all implementing agencies: The PCU was staffed with a
socio-environmental expert, an environmental unit was established within DRV and
progressively staffed and equipped, and the Port of Abidjan created a well-staffed
environmental unit in compliance with the MARPOL8 convention. A major outcome of
the project is the general mainstreaming of safeguards in road contracts in Cote d’Ivoire.
7 Some environmental assessment work was done during project preparation in May 1998, but that was
clearly not enough to be in compliance with the World Bank Safeguard Policies and with the EA regulation
in force in Cote d'Ivoire. AFTES management at the time requested a SEA to be done in the first year of
project.
8 International Convention for Actions against Pollution through Ship Wastes.
25
30. Financial Management. During the first leg of project implementation, i.e.
before the June 2003 restructuring, the financial management was inadequate and failed
to accurately capture the disbursements by components – the numerous changes in
components had a compounding effect. During the second leg of implementation,
financial management was rated satisfactory. The Coordination Unit (CI-PAST) acted
effectively and the quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports were received regularly and in
compliance with the agreed format.
31. Procurement. The overall procurement performance under the project was
moderately satisfactory. Until 2003, the weak procurement capacity generated delays in
the execution of the investment part of the program and significantly hampered project
implementation. However, by project closing, the capacity of the staff of the executing
agencies was considerably strengthened thanks to intensive training in procurement for
works and consultant services. As a result, procurement performance improved
significantly.
2.5 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation
32. A follow up operation is under preparation. The proposed project concept aims at
addressing short term emergency infrastructure needs that will directly support the peace
process through the provision of basic infrastructure services. Furthermore, the new
government is now considering adopting a more aggressive investment policy and
launching a large investment program to repair and upgrade the road network to support
agricultural exports and to reconnect communities affected by a decade of civil war. This
large investment program will require the financing support of the donor community
including the Bank. It will succeed if the road maintenance reform is completed, road
transport regulations are implemented, illegal roadblocks are eradicated, arrears are paid
to the construction industry, and above all it is championed by a government decision
maker. In other words, a follow up investment program would run significant risks of
failure if the fragile reforms initiated under the CI-PAST were not strengthened. Thus
Bank should incorporate the completion of a few of these reforms in the new operation if
it chooses to assist the new government in its investment program.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
33. The original PDO remained relevant at the closing date. However, in retrospect
the project design was overly complex and beyond the reach of the implementing
agencies while the counterpart financial requirements were unrealistic. The revised PDO
and restructured design remained relevant at the closing date as the need to reconnect
isolated rural communities continued to increase after 2008 following a long period of
neglect of road maintenance resulting in cut off land communications. The road safety
component logically completed the upgrading of road infrastructure to improve a critical
downside of road transport services in Cote d’Ivoire. These activities were aligned with
the post-conflict recovery strategy developed by the Borrower with the support of the
26
Bank, and the implementation arrangements capitalized upon the demonstrated capacity
of the AGEROUTE and the PCU under MIE.
3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives
34. The PDO revised in September 2008 was substantially achieved as evidenced by
the status of the following eight KPI at the closing date; the outcome is rated Satisfactory:
(a) 76 bridges completed out of an initial target of 60 (although not formally
specified in the restructuring letter, the target of 60 was mutually agreed and
specified in the aide memoires );
(b) three large bridges studies completed out of 10 (same comment as under (a)
above);
(c) The rehabilitation of the road safety training center is completed;
(d) The rehabilitation of the bus station in Grand Bassam is completed;
(e) No representatives of SMEs have been trained;
(f) The annual reduction of accident rates at the Grand Bassam bus station
could not be measured as the rehabilitation works were only completed by
the project closing date;
(g) Environmental safeguards mitigation measures have been incorporated in
the bridge contracts; and
(h) Contractors’ payments have been made within four days on average (from
the receipt of the approved monthly payment certificate by AGEROUTE).
35. In contrast the original PDO had not been achieved in September 2008 when the
project was deeply restructured and the PDO revised. The status of the KPI is split
between the investment component which remained in force until 2008 and the
institutional components which were formally closed in 2003. Details can be found in the
attached ―Status of the KPI in August 2011‖.
36. Investment component. Government expenditures on routine road maintenance
were well below target. Very little was spent until 2004 and compared to the target
amount of CFAF 12,495 million in 2002, the amounts spent were respectively CFAF 350
million in 2004; CFAF 3,500 million in 2005; CFAF 2,900 million in 2006; CFAF
14,300 million in 2007; and CFAF 7,400 million in 2008. It is difficult to figure out how
much was spent on the other type of works specified in the M&E framework because
such budgetary details are not available9. As far as the project itself is concerned (as
9
Whereas the 1998 and 1999 allocations for road maintenance and rehabilitation works met the
requirements, the actual spending was way below. One condition related to the actual spending was indeed
waived and the other was removed and replaced.
27
opposed to the program monitored in the M&E framework), the overall achievements
under the investment component are much lower than the planned quantities as shown in
the Table 8.
37. No new paved roads were constructed, the combined routine and periodic
maintenance planned quantities were only 1.5 percent achieved (2,080 km), the
construction of bridges was three percent achieved (1), the construction of culverts was
about 69 percent achieved (10,667) after conversion of the installed drainage pipes into
culverts (10 ml of drainage pipe per one culvert), while the rehabilitation of paved roads
was not achieved. As a matter of fact, for rehabilitation of paved roads, the achievement
indicated in the table below is misleading because the nature of the works which were
executed where not really road rehabilitation but simply emergency pothole patching.
The maintenance works undertaken on unpaved roads did not last nor contributed to
improving roads condition in the long run because they were not supported by annual
routine maintenance funding nor repeated at regular intervals. The interventions carried
out on paved roads were lightweight and most likely 50 percent of these interventions did
not last as they were not followed by routine or periodic maintenance. As a result of the
above, the overall outcome of the investment component under the original PDO is rated
Unsatisfactory (U).
Table 8: Investment Component Results
38. Adjustment components. Based on the June 2003 status of the institutional
reforms and the fulfillment of the conditions for release of the adjustment tranches (cf.
paragraph 6), the outcome of the adjustment components is rated Moderately
Unsatisfactory, if one takes into account the fulfillment of a few key conditions of the
floating tranche [Urban Transport Agency (AGETU)], Road Safety Office (OSER),
Maritime Code, and law governing passengers and freight transportation) and the fact
that the restructuring of the civil aviation sector was successfully completed including the
continued satisfactory management of Felix Houphouet Boigny (FHB) airport through a
concession signed before the project. In contrast to the investment component, the
Investment Component as of September 2008
Type of works Unit Planned Achieved Rate%
Routine
maintenance
Paved Km 5,300 - -
Unpaved Km 62,750 - -
Periodic
Maintenance
unpaved
Regravelling Km 14,800
2,080 3 Spot
improvement
Km 59,700
Culverts Nbr 1,600 27 2
Drain pipes Ml - 10,650 67
Rehabilitation Unpaved Km - 454
Paved Km 470 (4,144)
New Construction Paved Roads Km 175 - -
Bridges Nbr 30 1 3
28
institutional reforms which were achieved under the project are expected to last. As a
matter of fact, they were still in force at project closing and are likely to be sustained
provided they are fully completed; i.e. the funding mechanism of the Road Fund needs to
be improved to ensure a better match between road maintenance needs and resources and
a retrenchment plan of redundant DRV staff should be elaborated and executed.
39. The combined outcome rating (investment and adjustment) for the original PDO
is Unsatisfactory.
3.3 Efficiency
40. Improved operational efficiencies. Efficiency improvements caused by the
implementation of institutional reforms supported by the project have not been measured
in economic terms (cost-effectiveness/least cost), but in terms of gains in procedural,
process and service efficiency. With the creation of AGEROUTE, efficiency increases10
have been achieved in the awarding, supervision, and payment of Road Fund contracts, in
the programming of Annual Road Maintenance and in the production of technical and
financial audits. Although its funding is largely insufficient to meet overall maintenance
needs, the newly created Road Fund is improving its financing and control mechanisms.
This is expected to lead to the strengthening of the institution’s financial viability and
long-term sustainability. For land transport services, the creation of SONATT has
improved the quality of services for end users. As a matter of fact, modernization of
drivers’ licenses and vehicles’ registration are now more effective, reliable and secured.
41. Economic analysis. At appraisal, the Economic Internal Rate of Return was
calculated for the roads rehabilitation and construction component. However, this
component was entirely changed by the September 2008 restructuring while the expected
road rehabilitation and construction works had never started, making it impossible to
calculate an ex-post economic analysis of the same. The investment component first
concentrated on hot spot removal and cross drainage structures along paved and unpaved
roads and then, after the restructuring, on the construction/reconstruction of critical small
bridges in rural areas to unlock agricultural production zones. No ex-ante economic
evaluation had been calculated for these investments. This is why, at completion, the best
alternative to an economic analysis is a socio-economic impact analysis to measure the
benefits for local communities and farmers in the area of influence of the project. Data on
social impacts and economic benefits were collected.
42. On one hand, with the construction of 76 small bridges, 12,000 concrete culverts
and 5,000 steel culverts, the project helped connect 20 rural districts with all-season
access roads, covering an area of influence where more than 650,000 people have seen
10
Thanks to European assistance program, AGEROUTE was able to improve its capacity in planning,
procurement and supervision of road maintenance contracts. However, the country’s past political
instability and financial constraints were not conducive of an environment that could reinforce its
autonomy.
29
their mobility improve significantly giving them increased access to employment,
education and social services.
43. On the other hand, the benefits resulting from connecting agricultural production
zones are substantial, both in terms of product distribution and financial revenues. The
reopened rural roads have allowed the movement of over 430,000 tons of agricultural
products per year with higher farm prices because improved accessibility has generated
more competition and increased demand. The corresponding additional revenues to the
farmers are estimated around CFAF 5 billion annually (US$10 million). This amount
represents: (a) the value of the additional production that can now be shipped and
commercialized plus (b) the incremental value of crops thanks to a higher farmer’s price.
Assuming that these roads will continue to be maintained, a conservative 20-year life
cycle of the structures built, and a continued agriculture production, the net present value
(NPV) over 20 years discounted at 8 percent is around US$150 million or about three
times the cost of the investment.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
44. In September 2008, when the PDO was revised, US$205 million had been
disbursed of which US$60 million on the investment part. This means that 85 percent
was disbursed before the PDO was revised. When applying the guidelines for outcome
rating of projects with formally revised PDO, the overall outcome scores 2.5, which is
equivalent to Unsatisfactory/Moderately Unsatisfactory. This rating is negatively affected
by the heavy relative weight of the adjustment part (US$145.6 million versus US$95
million for the investment part). If one restricts the calculation of the overall outcome to
the investment part only, the resulting rating slightly increases to Moderately
Unsatisfactory.
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts11
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
45. The project completed the construction or the rehabilitation of a total of 76
bridges which have lifted out of isolation about 650,000 people from poor rural
communities and opened access to productive agricultural areas. The aggregate quantity
of agricultural products shipped on roads made accessible was about 430,000 tons in
2011.
11
The ISR rating for the DO at ICR stage is Unsatisfactory different from the rating in the Datasheet.
The system generates the Satisfactory rating as per last ISR archived before the closing date of the project
on August 31, 2011. Since the last ISR was done after the closing date, the system did not pick it up.
(Refers to section 3.4 in main document page 22 and section C3 in data sheet)
30
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
46. Numbers of institutional changes have been initiated by the project, namely: the
Road Maintenance Fund (FER); the Roads Agency (AGEROUTE); the National Land
Transport Agency (SONATT) further to reorganization of Directorate for Land Transport
(DGTTC); and the Urban Transport Agency (AGETU). Although all these agencies are
operational and are likely to remain, they require further support to ensure their
sustainability. This is particularly the case for AGEROUTE, FER and AGETU.
3.5 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
47. This is a core ICR which does not require a beneficiary survey/stakeholder
workshop.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Significant
48. The overall risk to development outcome has been calculated on the basis of the
table below.
Table 9: Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Risk Probability Impact Result
Road Maintenance Fund continues to be underfunded,
road maintenance continues to underperform, and road
network continues to deteriorate.
M H Significant
Road maintenance reform is not completed, overlap
between RMF and AGEROUTE persists, and role and
function of Highway Administration is not clarified.
M M Moderate
Respective roles of SONATT and DGTTC are not
clarified.
H M Significant
OSER is not restructured. H M Significant
Maritime Code and Merchant Navy Code are not voted
by the Parliament.
H M Significant
Government does not settle the arrears to the
construction industry.
H H High
Role and resources of AGEROUTE are not clarified. H M Significant
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
31
49. The technical preparation was thorough and of high quality; however it took about
ten years and in retrospect was not cost effective, misjudged the governments true
commitment to institutional reform, failed to properly assess the severe budget crisis that
impaired implementation from the start, and overestimated the capacity on the ground to
implement an already highly complex and demanding project. Moreover, the M&E
framework was overly complex, lacking base line, aggregated indicators, and
implementation arrangements (cf. paragraph. 15-17).
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
50. The supervision of the investment part was responsive, proactive and sustained
despite the very difficult context. ―Reverse‖12
supervision missions were organized
during the project suspension periods or during periods when security measures would
prevent Bank staff from traveling to Cote d’Ivoire; the MTR was actually organized in
country during a period of suspension. The frequency of the missions and the thorough
result-oriented aide memoires testify to the quality of the supervision of the investment
part which is rated Satisfactory. The supervision of the adjustment part was carried out
during the same supervision missions with an equal level of scrutiny and detail. However,
the resulting decisions were influenced by political-economy considerations, in particular
the need for the country to rapidly improve its financial situation, which affected the rigor
of the evaluation of the adjustment tranches and somehow discredited the use of an
adjustment instrument to promote sector reforms (cf. paragraph 23). The supervision of
the adjustment part is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory and the overall supervision is rated
Moderately Satisfactory.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
51. The quality of supervision was mixed (MS) while the quality of preparation was
Moderately Unsatisfactory.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
12
A limited government team would come to Washington or both teams would meet halfway in Paris at
the Bank office.
32
52. The government did not either follow up actively on the reform program or fulfill
its financial commitment, was impaired by a political crisis throughout project
implementation, and struggled with budget management. However, this unsatisfactory
performance is tempered by the institutional reforms achievements and the proactive
attitude of MIE to reverse the setbacks of DRV.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
53. The review is mixed. The PCU performed well after a few start up problems. The
Road Fund and the Road Authority performed as well as they could given the lack of
government counterpart funds and investment budget; and OSER performed well.
However, during the September 1998 to June 2003 period, DRV (the agency in charge
before AGEROUTE was created) performed poorly, and the performance of many other
implementing agencies under the Ministry of Transport was hovering between
Moderately Satisfactory and Moderately Unsatisfactory.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
54. The relatively good performance (MS) of the implementing agencies (MIE, PCU,
Road Fund, Road Authority and OSER) is undermined by marginal Government’s
performance, thus justifying the Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for overall Borrower
performance.
6. Lessons Learned
55. The following lessons were learned from this project:
(a) The macroeconomic context and the status of public/sectoral finances
should be carefully assessed during the preparation of transformational
projects to ensure adequate funding and financial coverage during
implementation;
(b) The preparation and implementation of a project should be cognizant of the
political economy factors affecting it but at the same should primarily focus
on the objectives, components and activities supported by the project.
(c) Assurance of continued support to institutional reforms in the medium term
should be sought in the form of adequate personnel and funding and
compliance with the legal framework;
(d) The M&E framework should be simple, easily implementable without too
much reliance on project funding, and the Borrower should see a clear
benefit in implementing it;
(e) The government should identify and empower a champion to push through
sectoral reforms through entrenched vested interests;
33
(f) The Bank’s added value is to facilitate the implementation of institutional
reform by leveraging its global experience of reforms;
(g) It is paramount to keep communication lines open with the counterparts
during periods of political crisis or project suspension;
(h) Project design and objectives should be kept simple with a focus on
implementability.
(i) Complex hybrid projects support both investment and ambitious sectoral
reforms should only be used were this strong ownership and strong capacity
to implement.
(j) It is important to quickly restructure a project that is no longer in tune with
the reality on the ground even if it happens early in project implementation;
(k) Careful consideration should be given to keep a project open during difficult
country circumstances to ensure continuity in dialogue with Government
and to allow for quick emergency response needed for reconstruction efforts
versus preparing an emergency operation.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/Implementing agencies
(b) Co financiers
56. All the co-financiers were contacted including KFW, but no comments were received.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)
34
Annex 1: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
Table 1: Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty
Lending
Michel Audige Consultant SASDT
Alexandre Dossou Sr. Transport specialist AFTTR
Patrick Bultynck Sr. Urban Transport
specialist AFTTR
Renee Desclaux Sr. Finance Officer AFCGH
Alaleh Motamedi Sr. Procurement
Analyst OPCR
Isaac Claude De Operations Officer AFTTR
Jocelyne Do
Sacramento Operation Analyst AFTTR
Brigitta Mitchell Sr. Transport
Economist
Jean-Noel Guillossou Program Manager AFTTR
Patrick Fourgeaud Sr. Port Specialist
Pierre Pozzo Di Borgo Principal Investment
Officer CN2SI
Bhanoumatee Ayoung Lead Procurement
Specialist OPCPR
Hubert Nove-Josserand Operations Adviser SACIN
Robert Robelus Consultant AFTWR
Supervision/ICR
Ernestina Aboah-Ndow Program Assistant AFCW1
Jean-Noel Guillossou Sr. Transport Specialist AFTTR
Siele Silue Sr. Transport Specialist EASIN
Ibou Diouf Sr. Transport Specialist AFTTR
Alexandre Dossou Sr. Transport Specialist AFTTR
Alain L. Labeau Consultant SASFP
Marie-France Anet Procurement Assistant AFCF2
Raj Soopramanien Lawyer LEGAF
Africa Eshogba
Olojoba
Senior Environmental
Specialist
AFTFM
Saidou Diop Sr Financial
Management Specialist
AFTFM
Maurice Adoni Senior Procurement
Specialist
AFTPC
Bjoern Stafbom ETWTR
Papa Mamadou Fall Transport Specialist AFTTR
35
Kignopron Coulibaly Program Assistant AFCF2
Mariame Bamba Team Assistant AFCF2
Felly Kaboyo Operations Analyst AFTTR
Daniel M. Sellen Sector Leader LCSSD
Haccandy Yao Alexis Agriculture Economist AFTAR
Lydie Anne Billey Program Assistant AFTTR
Table 2: Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
No. of staff weeks
USD Thousands
(including travel and
consultant costs)
Lending
FY87 25.44
FY88 30.82
FY89 25.43
FY90 37.18
FY91 39.81
FY92 144.89
FY93 71.25
FY94 7.69
FY95 24.35
FY96 268.95
FY97 397.04
FY98 179.29
FY99 7.83
FY00 1.10
Total: 1261.07
Supervision/ICR
FY98 41.21
FY99 138.11
FY00 221.93
FY01 130.87
FY02 130.54
FY03 83.02
FY04 125.53
FY05 67.94
FY06 27.91
FY07 8.96
FY08 81.06
36
FY09 135.59
FY10 66.34
FY11 23.52
FY12 53.43
Total: 1335.96
37
Annex 2: Beneficiary Survey Results
(NA)
38
Annex 3: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
(NA)
39
Annex 4: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Overall, the government is more positive than the Bank in regards to the project’s
performance and results. As a matter of fact the government ratings are as follows:
project’s outcomes are Moderately Satisfactory; Bank performance is rated Satisfactory;
and Borrower’s performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.
1. Project implementation: results and performance
1.1.Project global performance
2. Project global performance is rather average in so far as most project objectives
have not be achieved, despite the extended timeframe of the project’s implementation (13
years instead of three, although the implementation period included a cumulative duration
of 72 months of suspension (six years). In fact, the evaluation of the institutional reforms
related to road maintenance and financing (Component A), which is considered as one of
the key pillars of the program, did not meet expectations, as it did not permit to
significantly improve the quality and efficiency of core national road network , which is
currently in a dire condition. Concerning the institutional reforms under the other
components (B, C, D, E, F and G), results are also overall moderately satisfactory. Those
components were closed in 2003, while the project was in progress, for insufficient
results.
1.2. Bank Performance
3. Overall, Bank performance is rated satisfactory. In fact, in a context of a recurrent
crisis, Bank contribution helped the government to launch/implement major reforms for
transport sector and eventually, to leverage important resources through budget support
(more than US$100 million).
2. Borrower’s Performance
4. Borrower’s overall performance is moderately satisfactory. That’s because the
socioeconomic/political crisis context which prevailed during the project implementation
was not conducive to performance, despite the government’s willingness and
commitment which improved the project implementation status (for example measures
taken to improve project financial management).
5. In fact, initial project implementation timeframe could not be honored,
Government could not comply with Financial Agreement covenants by deadlines,
Government counterpart funds were not always made available on time, and institutional
reforms had not been always implemented as per plan.
40
3. Implementation’s agencies’ performance
6. Program Coordination Unit performance is rated satisfactory
(a) Performance in procurement is rather satisfactory. In fact, the major
delays encountered at the beginning of the project had been absorbed as the
project implementation was underway.
(b) Project financial management is satisfactory. There were neither
outstanding nor qualified audits. Moreover, the disbursement rate of 95
percent at project closure is rather commendable considering that the project
was under suspension for 6 years in aggregate.
4. Investment socioeconomic and environmental impact
7. Project socioeconomic and environmental impacts are positive and valuable,
especially with regards to benefits generated by the project, thanks to the construction of
76 bridges, as well as the installation of 12,000 concrete cross drainage pipes and 5,000
discharge pipes which maintained critical rural roads passable at all seasons.
8. Those works are scattered all over the country and will insure people accessibility
to basic services (schools, health centers, markets, production areas, etc.) and connection
between villages, rural districts, departments or regions. Report of the socioeconomic
analysis reveals the main following points:
(a) The program helped to connect a direct influence zone populated with
more than 650,000 inhabitants;
(b) The roads made accessible allowed the shipping of over 430,000 tons of
agricultural products in 2011;
(c) Benefits due to the implementation of the investment program are
valued to about CFAF 5 billion per year;
(d) The internal rate of return is estimated at 45 percent, although for N’ZI
COMOE and ZANZAN regions, the internal rate of returns is low.
5. Lessons learned
(a) Sector reforms launched through the project to support the government and
the newly created agencies have improved the transport sector efficiency
and the road maintenance management and financing framework;
(b) Despite the recurrent crisis, the government had always confirmed
support for the project and its commitment towards its implementation
with a continuous improvement of the performance status;
41
(c) Thanks to the project, the government has leveraged additional
resources amounting to US$100 million, under a budget support
mechanism; and
(d) The project has supported institutional strengthening and capacity
building in the transport sector and in the road maintenance
management and financing sub-sector.
(e) The project suffered from the complexity due to the sector wide approach,
merging investment and institutional reforms in all sub-sectors;
(f) Road maintenance and the other sub-sectors activities were unbalanced;
(g) Too much attention was paid to obtaining budget support, and not enough
attention was paid to supporting implementing agencies at the very
beginning of project implementation;
(h) The project suffered from a woefully inadequate implementation planning
of the project activities, especially the reform agenda (road maintenance
and land transport reforms); and
(i) The political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire during the past decade, that resulted in
instability at ministerial level and frequent changes of the coordinator of the
project implementation unit.
6. Conclusion and recommendations
9. For future operations similar to TSIAP-CI project, the following is
recommended:
(a) Project Coordination Unit (PCU) should be led by a champion that benefits
from a strong political support, to facilitate implementation, especially in a
context of reforms;
(b) The information and communication flow between all stakeholders is
critical in similar types of programs, in order to ensure the necessary
ownership and commitment that could guarantee achievement of the
program objectives;
(c) Assessment of human resources available to implement the project is also
critical, since qualified experts are key to projects’ implementation if the
government is in the driver seat, which should be the case under normal
circumstances; and
(d) A good communication plan and a prior agreement between the parties on
the means and objectives are necessary to achieve results on the ground.
42
Annex 5: Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
No comment received from other Co-financiers and partners/stakeholders.
43
Annex 6: List of Supporting Documents
1. Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), Report No. 17007-IVC , September 11, 1997
2. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit to the Republic of Cote
d’Ivoire for a Transport Sector Adjustment/Investment Program, May 28, 1998
3. Development Credit Agreement (Transport Sector Adjustment/Investment
Program), September 16, 1998
4. First Agreement Amending Development Credit Agreement, December 15, 1998
5. Second Agreement Amending Development Credit Agreement, March 22, 2000
6. Harmonized Evaluation Criteria for ICR and OED Evaluations
7. Aide-mémoires and Progress Reports
8. Mid-Term Review Report
9. Status of KPI by August 2011
10. Implementation Timeline
11. TCIAP-CI, Project Global Evaluation and Completion Report, Project
Coordination Unit, August 2011
44
Annex 7: Status of KPI by August 2011
Outcomes/Impacts Monitoring Indicators
Status in 2011
2002 targets
All components, except Road Investments were cancelled in June 2003.
Road Maintenance
-Transparency of budgetary
allocations and their actual use
- More cost-effective road
maintenance using greater share of local inputs
-Gov. financed annual routine
maintenance (CFAF million) -total expenditure for backlog
maintenance
-total expenditure periodic maintenance gravel roads
-works by contract
-equipment + operating costs of road maintenance
administration
12495
5107
21124
Yes
Yes
Government funding of road maintenance was practically inexistent until 2008;
since then the annual average allocation to road maintenance is FCFA 10 billion compared to an estimated need of FCFA 40 billion. The overall condition of the
road network has worsened since 1998, today it is estimated that only 30% is in
good to fair condition. Whereas the objective of the project was to strengthen road maintenance and catch up with the maintenance backlog, the reality turned
out differently: the only repair works were funded by the project at a rate largely
below the needs and it is estimated that the country lost about CFAF 800 billion of road assets since 2000 or almost half of its worth. To put things in
perspective, Cote d’Ivoire spent less than 0.4% of its GDP on average on road
infrastructure over the last decade whereas 1.5% was required to simply maintain and slightly upgrade the network.
-Correctly maintained road
network
-Improving road condition
-manual routine maintenance A
and B class of roads (km)
- manual routine maintenance C class of roads (km)
-light grading
-regravelling A and B class of roads
-regravelling C and D class of
roads -spot maintenance C and D
class of roads -percent of paved roads with
ADT>1000 with IRI<2
- percent of paved roads with 1000>ADT>500 with IRI<2
-km w/temporary traffic
interruption on A, B and C class of earth roads with
ADT<50
-km w/temporary traffic interruption on C class of
gravel roads with ADT>50
-km w/traffic interruption > 7 days on C and D class of roads
30550
10100
131000
1345
2630
2900
50%
27%
0
0
0
See comment above and the table immediately after paragraph 36 in the main
text. It should be noted that the 2002 targets refer to the overall program
whereas the table in the main text refers to the project itself.
-A lean and effective road
administration working with clear and transparent
procedures, taking
corrective actions with reasonable speed, disposing
of modern management
tools and competent staff. -Date of finalization of
annual maintenance
program -Date of annual update of
data bank -Average number of days
for contract award
-Percentage exceeding 30
days
-Average number of days
for contract payment
-Percentage exceeding 30
days
-Equipment provision to
DRV
-computerized road
management and evaluation system in place
-percent reached of staffing
levels foreseen in the new organizational chart
-satisfactory results certified by
technical audit -date of transmission to IDA
-date of publication of updated
figures -days between bid submission
and contract signature
-percentage of total number of
contracts
-number of days between
invoice submission and
payment receipt -percentage of total number of
invoices
-deadline for providing planned
equipment
100%
100%
Yes
Oct 31
Oct 31
30
10%
30
10%
Feb 28
1999
In the face of DRV shortcomings, the government decided to create a Road
Authority and a Road Fund in 2001. Starting in 2003 when these agencies were effectively staffed, this move improved the quality of road works management
and road maintenance administration in general. However, their capacity has
remained underused until now because of the sheer lack of investment funding.
A data bank is still in the process of being created.
The number of days between bid submission and contract signature went down
from an average 144 days early into project implementation to 46 days in 2003-
04 but never reached the ambitious target of 30days.
The average number of days between invoice submission and payment receipt was below 30 from 2008 until project closure: about 20 days for technical
review and 4 days for payment.
No more civil engineering equipment was purchased by DRV since all works
had been privatized since project start.
45
A robust and competent
local contracting industry has developed offering
steady employment to a
significant local work force
Number of SME’s submitting
bids and being qualified for different civil works tasks
- The work program led to the creation of about one hundred domestic contractors
between 1998 and 2002, however 16% defaulted. The reason for such high rejection rate is partly due to the difficulties to obtain commercial bank loans, to
rent equipment, and most of all to get paid rapidly or simply get paid (the
current level of arrears to the construction industry is still about CFAF 29 billion).
Private equipment rental and
leasing activity develop in
response to small contractor demand, easing their
constraints for equipment
acquisition and equipment management capacity
Number of equipment rental
companies operational
There was none.
Road Transport
-Restructuring of DTT by
end of 1998 -Elimination of all existing
temporary transport titles six
months after establishment of new structure, and
progressive reduction of
validity period of temporary titles thereafter
-new structure in place
-all existing temporary titles
eliminated
-validity of new temporary transport titles
-number of driving licenses
issued (Abidjan/Rest of the country)
100%
3 days
-
The legal, regulatory and institutional framework for transportation services was
updated in 2000 and liberalized the access to the transport business.
Directorate of Land Transport (DTT) was restructured in 2001 with the creation
of SONATT. However, this restructuring failed to separate the management of public and private interests in land transport. Consequently, the government
created a new DGTTC (General Direction of Land Transport and Traffic) in
2006 but without updating the bylaws creating the SONATT. The overlapping responsibilities between SONATT and DGTTC renew the need for an
institutional adjustment if not a restructuring.
Improved knowledge of
essential rules and their
correct enforcement
This outcome was not monitored.
Reduction of illegal
―tolling‖ through
suppression of informal road blocks
-technical audit monitoring
missions’ reports satisfactory
-number of roadblocks still in use
-infractions for selected road
sections
95%
5
-
A onetime audit report performed in 2000 confirmed that road blocks were
found only exceptionally (condition No. 5 for releasing the second adjustment
tranche). However soon after they started to reappear and since then they remained a distressing hallmark of Cote d’Ivoire. In early December 2011 they
were exposed once again in the media.
Improvement of road passengers and freight
services through more
functional bus stations
Number of passengers using bus stations
- A feasibility study for improving bus stations was completed by the BNETD in 1998 but was shelved thereafter.
-Annual increase in number
of drivers receiving
specialized training -More efficient vehicle
operation (annual mileage
per truck/bus increased)
-number of trained personnel
-number of days of training
-Abidjan region (average km/y)
-country wide (average km/y)
200
750
40000
18000
1101 drivers have been trained in 2009-11.
The other indicators were not monitored.
Increased transport enterprises efficiency
-average number of trucks/buses per enterprise
-number of truck and bus
transport enterprises
8
1000
These indicators were not monitored.
Road Safety
-Children trained
-Monitors trained -Accident rate decreased
-number of schools visited by
OSER -number of children trained by
OSER
-number of trained driving
school monitors
-number of accidents/number
of vehicles
1800
10^6
75
-
The actual restructuring of OSER (condition No.5 of the floating tranche) has
not been undertaken despite the formal adoption by the government of the recommendations of a restructuring study completed by BNETD in 2000.
287 driving school monitors have been trained in 2009-11.
Was not monitored
Increased ratio of inspected vehicles
Abidjan region Country wide -cars % -cars %
-trucks % -trucks %
-buses % -buses %
1 66
6 76
2 76
In 2000, the government launched an action plan to increase the ratio of inspected vehicles; however its implementation was interrupted because the
equipment installed in numbers of inspection centers were looted during the
political turmoil after the coup attempt of 2002. According to the April 2000 release memo of the second adjustment tranche, the 1999 target ratios were met
(i.e., 54%, 64%, and 64%). Today’s ratio is estimated around 50%.
Urban Transport
-Percent of passengers using -SOTRA on new network - Transport services to/from Yopougon and Abobo were concessioned to the
46
August 2011 status of the institutional building conditions for the release of the
adjustment tranches Institutional building conditions Status Comments
Liquidation of SGMTP’s heavy road maintenance equipment.
Completed Tranche Nr.1.
Borrower has ceased to undertake road maintenance
works by force account and arrears to private
contractors do not exceed one month.
Partially
completed
Tranche Nr.2. All road maintenance works are now undertaken by private
contractors. Arrears have crept up during the project implementation period and
have reached now a collective amount of about FCFA 29 billion most probably above one month.
Illegal road blocks are found only exceptionally Not
completed
Tranche Nr.2. See table above
DTT has been restructured Partially completed
Tranche Nr.2. See table above.
Action plan and implementation timetable to set and
collect the optimum level of taxes and user charges against road users
Not
completed
Tranche Nr.2 shifted to Tranche 3 and then to the Floating Tranche.
The Road Maintenance Fund has been established Partially
Completed
Tranche Nr.3 While the RMF operating costs are covered, its resources are
insufficient to adequately fund road maintenance activities. The government must increase the user charges collected by the RMF by a factor of three; this would fully
cover road maintenance costs and would align user charges with the internationally
recommended amount of US 0.10 cent equivalent/liter of fuel.
The Road Authority has been established Completed Tranche Nr.3
The functions and responsibilities of the Highway
Department of the MIE have been appropriately
revised.
Partially
Completed
Tranche Nr. 3. There is a need to better specify the role and mission of the many
civil servants, most of them decentralized, who still belong to the Highway
Department.
Satisfactory enactment of the law governing road passengers and freight transport activities publication
of updated regulations governing land transport
activities
Completed Floating Tranche. See table above
Satisfactory enactment of the Maritime Code and
satisfactory amendment of port regulations
Partially
Completed
Floating Tranche. See table above
Establishment of a satisfactory Urban Transport
Agency and appointment of its senior officials
Partially
completed
Floating Tranche. AGETU was created in 2000 but the law governing its resources
was only passed in 2003 and AGETU became operational in 2004. Since then the
public transport
-Amount of subsidies to
operators
-Private operators in two
suburbs -in CFAF billion
-
-
private operator SOTU in 1998. However, to this date operations have not
started yet as the operator have not been able to mobilize the funds to purchase the buses.
Transport Statistics
-Reliable information on transport supply, demand,
costs, prices, quality;
-Improved basis for investment programming;
-Identification of
bottlenecks and facilitation requirements
Annual data and by month: -vehicle fleet by type and age
-newly registered vehicles by
type and age -truck fleet for hire and own
account
-vehicle fuel consumption -vehicle operating costs by size
-operating cost per ton-km and
passenger-km
-
-
-
- -
-
Little progress if any was accomplished on that front because of some turf battle between the Ministry of Economic Infrastructure and the Ministry of Transport.
Some data on road infrastructure are now available at AGEROUTE and other at
the Ministry of Transport but they do not talk to each other and are not easily retrievable.
Port
-Improved ports’
throughput and reduction of
cargo dwell time -Improved performance for
containerized traffic
(Abidjan) -Port services at lower cost
-Improved port environment
-Enhanced capacity to fight accidental oil spill
-Modernized regulation
-annual and monthly data
provided by PAA and PASP
-annual and monthly data provided by the private
operator of the container
terminal -bi-annual report on financial
and operational indicators for
total ports transit -periodic environmental
assessment made by CIAPOL
-annual oil pollution fighting drills
-new maritime code and port
regulations
Detaile
d
financial
indicat
ors, product
ivity
ratios and
contain
ers handlin
g rates
Port regulations in Abidjan (PAA) and San Pedro (PASP) were successfully
updated. The operation of the container terminal and ship to shore cranes of the
port of Abidjan were concessioned to a private operator; however the process was controversial: the government unilaterally aborted the ongoing international
bidding process to sign a sole source contract with one of the co-bidders.
Pollution fighting equipment has been acquired in PAA and PASP
Annual and monthly data are provided by the two ports. Despite the country went through tumultuous periods and deep political crises, the ports maintained
a healthy activity and competitive productivity ratios.
A new maritime code and a merchant navy code were drafted however none of
them have been voted by the parliament yet, so the old code of 1961 is still
applicable.
47
Institutional building conditions Status Comments
level of its resources has been revised almost every year as a result of differences
between local communities, AGETU and local fiscal administrations about the share of available resources. These disputes have hampered AGETU’s coordination and
regulatory role.
Private operation of the PAA’s container terminal Partially completed
Floating Tranche. See table above.
Satisfactory restructuring of OSER Not
completed
Floating Tranche. See table above.
Privately operated bus transport services to the suburbs in Yopougon and Abobo
Not completed
Floating Tranche. See above
August 2011 Status of the components added as part of the December 2001
restructuring without specific KPI Institutional component Status Comments
Study on the causal linkages between
transport and poverty
Not
Completed
Component E.5
Study on the impact of transport on
HIV/AIDS, sensitization activities to
mitigate impact. Strengthening of the
Coordinating Unit for implementing this component.
Partially
completed
Component F. Sensitization campaigns and distribution of condoms were organized; computer
and audio-visual equipment was provided to the concerned units of the Ministry of Transport,
SITARAIL, SODEXAM and SOTRA. These activities were interrupted in 2003 with the drastic
restructuring of June 2003.
New Code of civil aviation, new financing
mechanism of the sector, restructuring of
ANAC and SODEXAM
Completed Component G. The Code of civil aviation was updated and the sector restructured through the
restructuring of ANAC and SODEXAM. Significant progress has been made in safety and
security. The government extended the concession of FHB airport to the private operator AERIA on condition that the operator would invest in the upgrading of the passengers terminal which
was successfully done.
Strengthening of the crisis command center at FHB airport and Accident
Investigation Bureau.
Completed Component G. Government purchased equipment to strengthen these two entities.
48
Annex 8: Implementation Timeline Date Susp. Crisis Event Evidence Comments
April 11,
1988
PCN review meeting
March 27,
1997
Authorization to
Appraise/Negotiate
Jun 23, 1998 Board Approval
Sep 16, 1998 DCA Signature
English and French Copy +
Report and
Recommendation of the
President
Original Closing Date: June 30, 2001
Nov 9, 1998 Declaration of Effectiveness Find evidence that conditions were met
Nov 16, 1998 Release of Tranche No1 President’s Memo for
Restructuring #1
SDR 36.3 million released because the Project was
declared effective
Dec 15, 1998 First Agreement Amending DCA
related to budgetary support only
Signed Agreement
Amending DCA dated Dec
15, 1998
Provided an additional amount of SDR 19.2 million to
the first tranche. SDR 19.2 million corresponded to the
FY99 RITO (Reflows Investments Transfers and
Others) credit.
Dec 21, 1998 Release of supplemental amount
of SDR 19.2m from Fifth
Dimension (RITO Credit) on the
first tranche
Client connection Loan IDA 31001
Nov 8, 1999 Credit Amendment #1 Letter of Oct 28
countersigned on Nov 8,
1999
Closing date extended from June 30, 2001 until
December 31, 2002 (1st ext). New Part D.5 was added
to Port Component (artificial reef pilot). Table of
withdrawal categories slightly modified: small
reductions of allocation under Category 4 Consultants;
categories Operating Costs and Activities under part
D5 added; additional SDR 19.2 million disbursed
against the first tranche ratified. PDO and key
indicators remain unchanged.
Dec 24, 1999 The President thrown out by a
mutiny which transforms into a
military coup
The President had almost completed his 5-year tenure,
when the military coup took place and one of the
General was appointed Chief of State.
Mar 22, 2000 Second Agreement Amending
DCA related to budgetary support
Signed Agreement
Amending DCA dated
Provided an additional amount of SDR 15.8 million to
the second tranche raising the total amount of the
49
Date Susp. Crisis Event Evidence Comments
only March 22, 2000 Credit to SDR 165.6 million. This additional amount
came from the FY00 RITO Credit.
Apr 4, 2000 Release of Tranche No.2 and
additional amount of SDR 15.8
million from Fifth Dimension
President’s Memo for
Restructuring #1 and Client
Connection
SDR 14.5 + Loan IDA 31002 15.8 million released, i.e.
SDR 30.3 million.
Oct 2000 Presidential Elections and post
elections crisis
Two presidential elections candidates were disqualified
by the Supreme Court; the General dissolved the
electoral commission; and ministry of interior declared
him the winner although he had only 37% of the votes.
Riots resulted. Finally another candidate was declared
the winner with 59% of the votes. New riots organized
by partisans of one of the disqualified candidates
asking for new elections were brutally repressed.
Oct 31, 2000 Start of 1st Suspension State resources probably used for electoral purposes.
Dec 2000 Legislative Elections
Mar 2001 Municipal Elections
Jul 6, 2001 Mid Term Review No Report Available Information available in paragraphs 15 to 18 and 33 to
35 in Dec 7, 2001 Amendment to the DCA.
Dec 20, 2001 Credit Amendment
Restructuring
Check date of countersigned letter
President’s Memorandum
dated Dec 7, 2001 and non
countersigned letter dated
Dec 20, 2001
Rural roads, civil aviation, HIV/AIDS and poverty
components added, artificial reef pilot removed; civil
works disbursement percentages increased from 70% to
80%; authorized allocations slightly modified; release
conditions for the 3rd
tranche modified
Jan 30, 2002 End of 1st Suspension
Signing and release of 3rd
Tranche
plus SDR 9.19m from the Fifth
Dimension
Kouakou’s report and Client
connection
SDR 14.5 + Loan IDA 31003 9.19 million released, i.e.
SDR 23.69 million.
Jan 30, 2002 Third Agreement Amending the
DCA related to budgetary support
Signed Third Agreement
Amending the DCA dated
Jan 30, 2002.
Provided an additional amount of SDR 9.19 million to
the third tranche. This amount came from the
Association’s Fifth Dimension Program established in
1998. The total amount of the Credit was raised to SDR
174.79 million.
Jun 2002 Supervision Mission Email JNG Sep 19, PSR
Sequence 13
Sep 19, 2002 Assassination of the General Favorites – Website See military and political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire.
50
Date Susp. Crisis Event Evidence Comments
(Chief of State), invasion by armed
forces who take the northern half
of the country and later named the
New Forces. Country split in two
under the control of FANCI in the
South and the North FN
Wikipedia.
Nov. 19-20,
2002
Reverse Supervision Mission in
Paris
Minutes, Sequence PSR 14
Déc. 18, 2002 Extension of the Closing Date Execution Report of CI
PAST August 2011 MIE
Closing date extended from Dec 31, 2002 until June 30,
2003 (2nd
ext).
Jan 24, 2003 Signature of the Linas-Marcoussis
Agreement
Mar 31, 2003 Annual Report 2002 Report from Coordination
unit
Jun 26, 2003 Credit Amendment
Restructuring
Cancellation of Floating Tranche
Signed Memo from CD to
VP and signed letter to
GOCI. Kouakou’s report.
Closing date extended from June 30, 2003 until June
30, 2004 (3rd ext). All components but A are closed on
June 30, 2003. Floating Tranche cancelled because
conditions not met yet.
Sep 2003 Start up Report AGEROUTE Inception Report
Feb 24, 2004 Situation Report by Coordination
unit
PPT Presentation (2) and
maps (3) (I VC Feb 4)
Jun 15, 2004 Start of 2nd
Suspension Exceptionally Credit Withdrawals (DRF) received on
Sep 14, 2004 at the latest could be paid, these
withdrawals would cover payments made against
contracts signed before June 14 and executed until
September 14, 2004.
Dec 27, 2004 Extension of Closing Date Signed Memo from CD to
MD through VP
Closing date retroactively extended from June 30, 2004
to June 30, 2005 through a request of extension of ICR
submission deadline b/c one cannot extend a closing
dated during a period of suspension.
Jun 2005 Supervision mission Aide Memoire Elec.
Dec 18, 2006 Meeting with MIE, AGEROUTE,
Coordination unit, FER
BTOR Electr., Reflection on
re-engagement strategy,
elec.
51
Date Susp. Crisis Event Evidence Comments
Mar 4, 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement
April 2, 2008 End of 2nd
Suspension Implementation report of
the CI-PAST November 98
to August 2011 (Unit
Coordination)
Sep 2, 2008 Project Reactivation
Project Restructuring
Signed Letter from CD to
MEF. Elect ―Restructuring
No3 CI PAST‖. Signed
memo from CD to VP.
President Memo. (Elect)
Component A is restructured, component B Road
Safety is added; authorized category allocations are
modified; closing date is extended until August 31,
2010 (4th
extension). PDO and KPI are revised.
Mar 2009 Launch Workshop for restructured
Project
BTOR AL Electronic
March 30,
2009
Amendment to Credit Agreement Execution Report of August
2011 MIE CI PAST
Changes to prior review thresholds.
Feb 25, 2010 Gov. request for one year
extension
July 3, 2009 Amendment to DCA Execution Report of CI
PAST August 2011 MIE
Changes to Credit Proceedings Withdrawal Table.
Aug 31, 2010 Extension of Closing Date Letter from CD to MEF
(Elect)
Closing date extended until August 31, 2011 (5th
ext).
Revised Credit Withdrawal Table and % of
disbursement (100%).
Nov 2010 Start of post-election crisis
Dec 4, 2010 Start of 3rd
suspension
Apr 2011 End of post-election crisis
May 31, 2011 End of 3rd
suspension
Jun 27, 2011 Amendment to DCA Letter from CD to MEF +
Memo to CD (Elect)
Revised amounts of Credit Withdrawal Table.
52
Annex 9: Project Costs and Financing
Table 1: Projects Costs Per Category Categories Initial allocation Allocation to the
amendment of November 8, 1999
Allocation after the mid-term
review (December 20, 2001amendment)
Allocation after the
cancellation of the floating tranche in December 2003
Allowance for restructuring
(Amendment 02 September 2008)
Allocation to the
amendment of June 27, 2011
SDR
% Of
expenditure
financed SDR
% of
expenditures
financed
SDR
% of
expenditures
financed
SDR
% of
expenditures
financed
SDR
% of
expenditures
financed
SDR
% of
expenditures
financed
1.Civil engineering Parts A, B and D 29 700 000 70% 29 700 000 70% 35 460 000 80% 35 460 000 80% 43 850 000 100% 40 451 304 100%
2. Civil works for buildings and facilities Parts B and G
2 200 000 70% 2 200 000 70% 2 400 000 80% 2 400 000 80% 230 000 100% 230 000 100%
3. Equipment and material supplying 1 500 000 80% 1 500 000 80% 2 540 000 80% 2 540 000 80% 1 640 000 100% 4 676 900 100%
(a) Part B 600 000 600 000 100 000 100 000 1 050 000 839 819
(b) Part D.2 140 000 140 000 0 0 0 0
(c) Part D.4 680 000 680 000 200 000 200 000 0 0
(d) Part E 80 000 80 000 120 000 120 000 90 000 296 181
(e Part F 0 0 30 000 30 000 10 000 3 000
(f) Part G 0 0 1 590 000 1 590 000 10 000 3 000
(g) Part A 0 0 500 000 500 000 480 000 3 534 900
4. consultants 19 000 000 80% 18 600 000 80% 10 400 000 80% 10 400 000 80% 11 130 000 100% 10 921 796 100%
(a) Part A 13 000 000 13 600 000 6 140 000 6 140 000 9 100 000 8 909 796
(b) Pat B 1 300 000 1 300 000 60 000 60 000 250 000 250 000
(c) Part C 500 000 500 000 830 000 830 000 150 000 144 000
(d) Part D 2 300 000 2 300 000 1 380 000 1 380 000 660 000 654 000
(e) sub Part E.1 et E.4 400 000 400 000 40 000 40 000 70 000 69 000
(f ) sub Part E.2 et E.3 1 500 000 1 500 000 440 000 440 000 830 000 830 000
(g Part F 0 0 810 000 810 000 50 000 49 000
(h) Part G 0 0 700 000 700 000 20 000 16 000
5. Goods ( budget support) 72 300 000 100% 72 300 000 100% 72 300 000 100% 65 300 000 100% 65 300 000 100% 65 300 000 100%
(a) First Tranche 36 300 000 36 300 000 36 300 000 36 300 000 36 300 000 36 300 000
(b) second Tranche 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000
(c) Third Tranche 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000
(d) Floating tranche 7 000 000 7 000 000 7 000 000 0 0
6. Refund of the amount used for project
preparation (FPP) 900 000
Amount due
under section
2.03( c) of the ’AC
900 000
Amount due
under section
2.03( c of the AC
900 000
Amount due
under section
2.03( c) of the AC
900 000
Amount due
under section
2.03( c) of the AC
810 000
Amount
due under sect
ion 2.03( c) of the AC
810 000
Amount
due under sect
ion2.03( c) of the ’ AC
7. Not allocated 5 000 000 5 000 000 6 300 000 6 300 000 0 0
8. Activities Part D.5 0 100 000 70% 0 0 0 0
9.exploitation charges 0 300 000 80% 300 000 80% 300 000 80% 640 000 100% 1 210 000 100%
TOTAL 130 600 000 130 600 000 130 600 000 123 600 000 123 600 000
000 123 600 000
53
Table 2: Projects Cost by Source of Funding/Donors
Source of Funds Appraisal Estimate
(US$ million)
Actual/Latest estimate
(US$ million)
Percentage of appraisal
IDA 180.00 178.20 98.87
BORROWER 390.40 111.6013
28.58
KFW 16.90 16.90 100
AFD 62.60 43.00 68.69
EU 25.20 0.0014
0
JAPAN 14.50 0.0015
0
AfDB - 30.0016
Total 649.9 379.7 58.42
13 The figures were based on reconciliation of the borrower counterpart funding and the actual costs of road maintenance,
between 2002 and 2011.
14 Cancelled contribution before disbursement
15 Cancelled contribution before disbursement
16 AfDB was not part of the project at the time of appraisal but came in much later
54
Table 3: Project Financing at Closing
Categories Original
Allocation
Revised
Allocation
Actual/Latest
Estimate
Percentage of
Original
Allocation
Percentage of
Revised
Allocation
1.Civil engineering Parts A,
Band D 29,700,000 40,451,304 39,842,671.55 134.15 98.50
2. Civil works for buildings and
facilities Parts B and G 2,200,000 230,000 212,514.70 9.66 92.40
3. Equipment and material
supplying 1,500,000 4,676,900 4,071,172.25 271.41 87.05
(a) Part B 600,000 839,819 839,818.90 139.97 100.00
(b) Part D.2 140,000 0 0 0.00 0.00
(c) Part D.4 680,000 0 0 0.00 0.00
(d) Part E 80,000 296,181 85,215.76 106.52 28.77
(e) Part F - 3,000 2,358.02 - 78.60
(f) Part G - 3,000 2,971.69 - 99.06
(g) Part A - 3,534,900 3,140,807.88 - 88.85
4. consultants 19,000,000 10,921,796 10,806,427.98 56.88 98.94
(a) Part A 13,000,000 8,909,796 8,754,894.58 67.35 98.26
(b) Pat B 1,300,000 250,000 298,064.89 22.93 119.23
(c) Part C 500,000 144,000 143,681.39 28.74 99.78
(d) Part D 2,300,000 654,000 653,643.45 28.42 99.95
(e) sub. Part E.1 et E.4 400,000 69,000 68,949.62 17.24 99.93
(f) sub. Part E.2 et E.3 1,500,000 830,000 822,710.44 54.85 99.12
(g) Part F - 49,000 48,836.57 - 99.67
(h) Part G - 16,000 15,647.04 - 97.79
5. Goods ( budget support) 72,300,000 65,300,000 65,299,973.12 90.32 100.00
(a) First Tranche 36,300,000 36,300,000 36,299,973.12 100.00 100.00
(b) second Tranche 14,500,000 14,500,000 14,500,000 100.00 100.00
(c) Third Tranche 14,500,000 14,500,000 14,500,000 100.00 100.00
55
(d) Floating tranche 7,000,000 0 0 0.00 0.00
6. Refund of the amount used
for project preparation (FPP) 900,000 810,000 801,754.02 89.08 98.98
7. Unallocated 5,000,000 0 0 0.00 0.00
8. Activities Part D.5 0 0 0 0
9.exploitation charges 1,210,000 1,133,230.86 0.00 93.66
Designated Account - A 0 39,841.03 0.00
Designated Account - P 0 -2,875.36
Total 130,600,000 123,600,000 122,204,710 93.57 98.87
Mont NimbaMont Nimba(1,752 m)(1,752 m)
KKoommooéé
NNzzii
NNzzii
KKoommooéé
BBaanndd
aammaa
BBllaann
cc
BBaaggoo
éé
LLoobboo
BBoouu
SSaassssaannddrraa
SSaassssaannddrraa
MMaarraaoouuéé
Lac deLac deKossouKossou
ManMan
DaloaDaloa
BouakéBouaké
KorhogoKorhogoOdienneOdienne FerkessedougouFerkessedougou
DabakalaDabakala
BondoukouBondoukou
AbengourouAbengourou
DaoukroDaoukro
BéoumiBéoumi
SoubréSoubré
BangoloBangolo
BoundialiBoundiali
KatiolaKatiola
SakassouSakassou
ZuenoulaZuenoula
MankonoMankonoSSééguguéélala
ToubaTouba
BiankoumaBiankouma
DananeDanane
DuekoueDuekoue
GuigloGuigloToulepleuToulepleu
VavouaVavoua
IssiaIssia
Grand-LahouGrand-Lahou
AlepeAlepe
DabouDabou
DivoDivoLakotaLakota TiassaleTiassale AgbovilleAgboville
AdzopeAdzopeGagnoaGagnoa
OuméOumé
SinfraSinfra
BouaflBouafléé
ToumodiToumodi
TiebissouTiebissou
DimbokroDimbokro
BocandaBocanda
BongouanouBongouanou
M'BahiakroM'Bahiakro
BounaBouna
TandaTanda
AdiakeAdiake
AboissoAboisso
TengrelTengrel
AgnibilékrouAgnibilékrou
DENGUÉLÉ
BAFING
MARAHOUÉ
LACS
SAVANES
WORODOUGOU ZANZAN
VALLÉE DU BANDAMA
DIX-HUITMONTAGNES
HAUT-SASSANDRA
MOYEN-CAVALLY
N’ZI-COMOÉ
AGNÉBY
FROMAGER
BAS-SASSANDRA
LAGUNESSUD-
BANDAMA
SUD-COMOÉ
MOYEN-COMOÉ
Man
Daloa
Bouaké
KorhogoOdienné Ferkessedougou
Dabakala
Bondoukou
Abengourou
Daoukro
Béoumi
Soubré
Bangolo
Boundiali
Katiola
Sakassou
Zuenoula
MankonoSéguéla
Touba
Biankouma
Danane
Duekoue
GuigloToulepleu
Vavoua
Issia
Tabou
San-Pédro
Sassandra
Grand-Lahou
Jacqueville Grand-Bassam
Alepe
Dabou
DivoLakota Tiassale Agboville
AdzopeGagnoa
Oumé
Sinfra
Bouaflé
Toumodi
Tiebissou
Dimbokro
Bocanda
Bongouanou
M'Bahiakro
Bouna
Tanda
Adiake
Aboisso
Tengrel
Agnibilékrou
Abidjan
YAMOUSSOUKRO
GUINEA
LIBERIA
GHANA
BURKINAFASO
MALI
Komoé
Nzi
Nzi
Komoé
Band
ama
Blan
c
Bago
é
Lobo
Bou
Sassandra
Sassandra
Maraoué
Lac deKossou
Gul f of Guinea
To Beyla
To Bamako To
Sikasso
To Bobo Dioulasso
To Kampti
To Batie
To Bole
To Wenchi
To Sunyani
To Prestea
To Monrovia
To Nzerekore
To Monrovia
Mont Nimba(1,752 m)
8ºW 7ºW 6ºW 5ºW 4ºW 3ºW
8ºW 7ºW 6ºW 5ºW 4ºW 3ºW
5ºN
6ºN
7ºN
8ºN
9ºN
10ºN
5ºN
6ºN
7ºN
8ºN
9ºN
10ºN
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
0 40 80
0 20 40 60 80 Miles
120 Kilometers IBRD 33393R
APRIL 2008
CÔTE D' IVOIRE
CITIES AND TOWNS
REGION CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
RIVERS
MAIN ROADS
RAILROADS
REGION BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES