Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR3183

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-4114; IDA-4770)

ON

CREDITS

IN THE AMOUNT OF

SDR59 MILLION (US$86 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND

SDR49 MILLION (US$75 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

FOR THE

NATURAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT

June 2nd, 2014

Vietnam Sustainable Development Unit Sustainable Development Department East Asia and Pacific Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective: September 1, 2013)

Currency Unit = Vietnamese Dong (VND) VND 1 million = US$47.4

US$1.00 = 21,085 VND

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF AusAid

Additional Financing Australian Agency for International Development

APL Adaptable Program Loan CAS Country Assistance Strategy CBDRM Community-based Disaster Risk Management CCCC Commune CBDRM Coordination Committee CCFSC Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control CEMMA Committee for Ethnic Minorities and Mountainous Areas CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment CFs CG

Commune Facilitators Consultative Group

CPCO Central Project Coordination Office CPMO Central Project Management Office CPMU CPO

Central Project Management Unit Central Project Office

CPS CPRGS

Country Partnership Strategy Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy

DARD Provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (of MARD) DCA DDO

Development Credit Agreement Deferred Drawdown Option

DEM Digital Elevation Model DDMFC DDMFSC DMC

Disaster Management Center

DMSFCD Dyke Management and Storm and Flood Control Department DMU Disaster Management Unit DONRE Department of Natural Resources and Environment DPI Department of Planning and Investment DPL DRM

Development Policy Loan Disaster Risk Management

DSU Dam Safety Unit EA Environmental Assessment EMP Environmental Management Plan EMDF Ethnic Minority Development Framework

EMC Emergency Management Center ERL Emergency Recovery Loan ERR FM GDHMS

Economic Rate of Return Financial Management General Department of Hydro-Meteorological Services

GDP GIS

Gross Domestic Product Geographic Information System

GOV Government of Vietnam GDP Gross Domestic Product ICB JSDF

International Competitive Bidding Japan Social Development Fund

LIDAR Light Detection And Ranging MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development MOC Ministry of Construction MOCI Ministry of Culture & Information MOD Ministry of Defense MOET Ministry of Education and Training MOF Ministry of Finance MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOFI Ministry of Fisheries MOH Ministry of Health MOI Ministry of Industry MOLISA Ministry of Labor, the Invalids and Social Affairs MONRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment MOT Ministry of Transportation MPI Ministry of Planning and Investment MPT Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications MTR NCWMF

Mid-term Review National Center of Weather and Meteorological Forecast

NCSR NDMIP

National Committee for Search and Rescue National Disaster Mitigation Investment Plans

NDMP Natural Disaster Mitigation Partnership NDRMP Natural Disaster Risk Management Project NGO Non-Governmental Organization NS NTF OOG

National Strategy for Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020 Netherlands Trust Fund Office of Government

PCU PER-IFA

Project Coordination Unit (Southern Regional Hydromet Center) Public Expenditure Review and Integrated Fiduciary Assessment

PHRD Policy Human Resource Development PIM Project Implementation Manual PIP Project Implementation Plan PIU Project Implementation Unit PPC Provincial People’s Committee PPMU Provincial Project Management Unit PPR Project Preparation Report PPSC Provincial Project Steering Committee PSC Project Steering Committee OM Operational Manual OOG Office of Government RAP Resettlement Action Plan

RPF Resettlement Policy Framework RNE Royal Netherlands Embassy SA Special Account SCP Safer Commune Plan SEDP SIL

Socio-Economic Development Plan Specific Investment Loan

SIDA Swedish International Development Agency SIO SNSDMV

Sub-project Implementation Office Second National Strategy for Disaster Management in Vietnam

SRHMC Southern Regional Hydro-Meteorological Center SBD State Budget Department STD TOR

State Treasury Department Terms of Reference

UNDP VN-Haz

United Nations Development Program Vietnam Managing Natural Hazards Project

VWRAP Vietnam Water Resources Assistance Project

Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg, EAP

Country Director: Victoria Kwakwa, EACVF Sector Director: John Roome, EASSD Sector Manager: Jennifer J. Sara, EASVS

Project Team Leader: Toru Konishi, EASVS ICR Team Leader: Dzung Huy Nguyen, EASVS

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM NATURAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design .............................................. 1

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................... 5

3. Assessment of Outcomes ........................................................................................... 14

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 20

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...................................................... 21

6. Lessons Learned ........................................................................................................ 23

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ........... 25

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 33

Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 33

Annex 3. Economic Analysis ............................................................................................ 33

Annex 4. Resettlement Impacts ........................................................................................ 49

Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................. 50

Annex 6. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 52

Annex 7. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 53

Annex 8. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 54

Annex 9. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 65

Annex 10. List of Supporting Documents ........................................................................ 66

A. Basic Information

Country: Vietnam Project Name: Natural Disaster Risk Management Project

Project ID: P073361, P119684 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-41140,IDA-47700,TF-54753,TF-55176,TF-57258

ICR Date: 06/30/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Original Total Commitment:

SDR59M Disbursed Amount: SDR104.54M

Revised Amount: SDR108M Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Ministry of Finance Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF), Policy Human Resource Development (PHRD) and Netherlands Trust Fund (NTF). B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 09/12/2002 Effectiveness: 05/30/2006 05/30/2006

Appraisal: 05/23/2005 Restructuring(s):

05/24/2010 06/17/2010 06/30/2011 12/28/2011 05/31/2012

Approval: 09/15/2005 Mid-term Review: 06/11/2007 06/11/2007 Closing: 06/30/2010 12/31/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

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Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA): None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Flood protection 70 67 General public administration sector 9 9 General education sector 7 9 Health 7 5 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 7 10

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Natural disaster management 40 50 Administrative and civil service reform 20 15 Participation and civic engagement 20 15 Water resource management 20 20 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg Jemal-ud-din Kassum Country Director: Victoria Kwakwa Klaus Rohland Sector Manager: Jennifer J. Sara Mark D. Wilson

Project Team Leader: Toru Konishi Laurent Msellati

ICR Team Leader: Dzung Huy Nguyen

ICR Primary Authors: Dzung Huy Nguyen

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F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objectives were to assist the recipient to establish and implement a comprehensive risk management framework for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation and recovery to enable it to: (i) reduce the vulnerability to flood and storm hazards in the project areas; (ii) increase the efficiency of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts; and (iii) strengthen the capacity of national and local disaster risk management institutions. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) There was a minor revision of the project development objective during the processing of Additional Financing (AF) of US$75 million in 2010 expanding the scope of Component 3 – Post-Disaster Reconstruction Support - to include “other natural hazards”. Therefore, the revised objective of the project was to assist the recipient to establish a comprehensive natural disaster risk management framework to enable it to: (i) reduce the vulnerability to flood, storm and other natural hazards in the project provinces; (ii) increase the efficiency of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts; and (iii) strengthen the capacity of national and local disaster risk management institutions. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Approval by the Government of the Second National Strategy and Action Plan (2001-2010)

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n/a Yes n/a Yes

Date achieved 05/30/2009 n/a 11/16/2007

Comments (incl. % achievement)

The Vietnamese Prime Minister approved the National Strategy for Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020 (NS) on November 16, 2007 and the subsequent national action plans for implementation of the Strategy on September 29, 2009. Target fully achieved.

Indicator 2 : Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control (CCFSC) has been strengthened Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n/a Yes n/a Yes

Date achieved 06/30/2010. n/a 02/27/2010

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Institutional arrangements and responsibilities of CCFSC and its subordinate branches in line ministries and provinces have been rearranged and strengthened by the Vietnamese Prime Minister’s Decree No. 14/2010/NĐ-CP dated February 27, 2010. CCFSC has been effective in coordinating the implementation of the National Strategy, and responding to main flood and storm events, including Typhoon Ketsana in 2009, floods in 2009 and 2010 and Wutip, Nari and Haiyan in 2013. Target fully achieved.

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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Number of provinces with completed Natural Disaster Mitigation Investment Plans Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 10 n/a 12

Date achieved 09/15/2005 06/30/2010 n/a 06/29/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

12 provinces in the Central Region and Mekong Delta developed Natural Disaster Mitigation Investment Plans (NDMIPs). Target fully achieved.

Indicator 2 : Percentage of people in targeted communities (e.g., Mekong Delta) reporting improved early warning of floods and storms

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 10 30 90

Date achieved 09/15/2005 06/30/2010 12/31/2013 06/29/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

90% of project communes have access to early warnings on floods and storms. Target fully achieved (300%)

Indicator 3 : Number of feasibility studies completed for sub-projects to be funded under the program

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 15 n/a 17

Date achieved 09/15/2005 06/30/2010 n/a 06/29/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

17 feasibilities studies were completed. Target fully achieved (113%).

Indicator 4 : Number of sub-projects completed Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 8 n/a 12

Date achieved 09/15/2005 06/30/2010 n/a 06/29/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Among 12 sub-projects funded by the project, 11 sub-projects were completed and 1 sub-project focusing on Hydromet services for Mekong Delta was partly completed. Target fully achieved (150%).

Indicator 5 : Number of Safer Commune Plans prepared Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 40 n/a 30

Date achieved 09/15/2005 05/30/2009 n/a 06/29/2012 Comments (incl. %

Lessons learnt from the initial pilot implemented in 10 communes in three provinces revealed that Community-based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) plans needed

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achievement) to be accompanied by actual investments. Additional grant funds were secured but were insufficient to meet the hard and soft investments of all 40 communes, particularly given the cancellation of US$2 million out of US$8.5 million Netherlands Trust Fund (NTF). Target partially achieved (75%).

Indicator 6 : Procedures for Damage Assessment are revised Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n/a Yes n/a Yes

Date achieved 09/15/2005 06/30/2007 N/A 09/30/2012

Comments (incl. % achievement)

The existing Damage Assessment Guidelines were revised and updated. However, the revised procedures have not been effectively used for post-disaster damage assessments due to the complexity of the methodology and the limited capacity of the Government at the national and subnational levels. Target partially achieved.

Indicator 7 : Acceptable criteria approved for prioritizing allocation of post – disaster assistance Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n/a Yes n/a Yes

Date achieved 09/15/2005 06/30/2008 n/a 09/30/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

A set of eligible, measurable and transparent criteria for determining post-disaster allocations was approved by MARD and MOF, and applied for post-disaster support. Target fully achieved.

Indicator 8 : Percentage of completed sub-projects withstanding subsequent disaster events of the same type of hazard up to the intensity of a 1-in-30 year event

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n/a n/a 95 100

Date achieved 07/17/2010 12/31/2013 12/31/2013

Comments (incl. % achievement)

This indicator was added during the period of the AF in order to promote and measure the “Build-Back-Better” approach. All reconstructed public infrastructure withstood subsequent disaster events, including Typhoon Ketsana in 2009, floods in 2009 and 2010 and Wutip, Nari and Haiyan in 2013. Target fully achieved (105%).

Indicator 9 : Length of time from the date of release of funds to the relevant provinces to completion of sub-projects

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n/a n/a 12 months 8-14 months

Date achieved 07/17/2010 12/31/2013 12/31/2013

Comments (incl. % achievement)

This is a new indicator, which was added during the period of the AF to strengthen measuring the achievement of the second development objective. Post-disaster reconstruction went through five planning cycles of post-disaster reconstruction (2008–2012). On average, it took about 8 to 14 months to complete damages assessment and budget mobilization in each cycle before reconstruction work would start. Consequently, the strengthening of government speed in the allocation and disbursement of post-disaster resources was not fully met. Nevertheless, new budget procedures have been prepared to expedite reconstruction and are pending approval. Target partially achieved.

Indicator 10 : Detailed needs assessment for the establishment of an Emergency Management Center completed

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Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n/a Yes n/a Yes

Date achieved 09/15/2005 05/30/2009 n/a 12/31/2013

Comments (incl. % achievement)

A detailed needs assessment for the establishment of an EMC was fully completed. Instead of establishing the EMC, the Government established a sustained department level Disaster Management Centre (DMC) in early 2010, which is part of the CCFSC’s Standing Office responsible for emergency response and relief. Target fully achieved.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements

(USD millions) 1 12/29/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 08/24/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.00

3 09/29/2007 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 9.03

4 06/23/2008 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 15.55

5 10/21/2008 Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 17.67

6 06/16/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 40.98 7 06/25/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 71.82 8 06/29/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 98.54 9 03/31/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 116.52

10 12/22/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 135.54 11 07/29/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 152.54 12 12/31/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 162.54

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in

USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

05/24/2010 N MS MS 69.96

Reallocation of Credit Proceeds and Extension of the Closing Date. The Development Credit Agreement was amended twice, on March 5, 2010 and May 24, 2010. An Extension was made for 12 months (June 30, 2010 - June 30, 2011) to support the completion of ongoing infrastructure works, which had been suspended due to unpredictable storms and bad weather affecting the construction progress, and the processing of the procurement of

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Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in

USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP hydromet equipment through the ICB process.

06/17/2010 Y MS MS 71.82

Additional Financing. The amount of SDR49.4 million (US$75 million equivalent) was approved by the Board to scale up Component 3 – Post-Disaster Reconstruction Support.

06/30/2011 N S MS 98.59

Closing Date was extended for 6 months (June 30 - December 31, 2011) to complete ongoing infrastructure works and procure the hydromet equipment package.

12/28/2011 N S MS 116.35

Closing Date was extended for 5 months (December 31, 2011 - May 31, 2012) to support the procurement of the hydromet equipment package.

05/31/2012 N S MS 133.47

Closing Date was extended for 28 days (May 31 - June 28, 2012) to allow supplier to deliver a major part of the hydromet equipment package.

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Country Context. Vietnam is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Due to its geographic position and topography, the country suffers from multiple natural hazards including typhoons, tropical storms, floods, drought, seawater intrusion, landslides, forest fires and occasionally earthquakes. From 1994 to 2004, natural hazards claimed almost 6,000 lives and resulted in direct material losses to the capital stock of over US$2.5 billion - on average 5 percent of gross annual capital formation - reaching 12 percent of gross annual capital formation in years with high-impact events, equivalent to 2.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). 2. Strengthening disaster risk management (DRM) has been a priority in the country’s development agenda. In 1990, the Government of Vietnam (GOV) established the Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control (CCFSC) - a cross-ministerial agency with subordinate provincial and local committees - for managing disaster mitigation, emergency response and long-term reconstruction and recovery. At project appraisal stage, CCFSC’s actions had largely focused on disaster emergency response and relief. Institutional capacity and resources available for the agency to carry out its mandate were limited. Studies carried out during project preparation noted annual funding gaps for all natural disaster-related expenditure requirements ranging between US$46 million to US$130 million for the period between 2000 and 2003. Project preparation also revealed that the institutional framework for implementing a comprehensive approach to DRM, covering both disaster risk prevention and response, needed to be further developed and expanded to fully involve key agencies and relevant stakeholders.

3. Bank Strategy and Rationale for Bank involvement. Poverty Reduction was identified as a key theme of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Vietnam for the years 2003 to 2006. The Vietnam Development Report 2004 and the Joint Staff Assessment of the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS)1 for Vietnam highlighted that many households were vulnerable to falling into poverty if confronted with an adverse shock, such as weather-related natural hazards. Vietnam’s Development Goal Number 8 of the Vietnam Development Report 2004 specifically targeted reduction of people falling back into poverty due to natural hazards. 4. Over the past two decades, the Bank has accumulated extensive knowledge and operational experience in disaster risk reduction and post-disaster recovery through engagements in more than thirty countries. Building on this body of global knowledge on disaster prevention and vulnerability reduction, the Natural Disaster Risk Management Project (NDRMP) adopted an innovative approach to mainstreaming DRM by focusing on disaster risk reduction measures, including at the community level where the disaster vulnerability and consequently demand for such measures is high, to reduce the impacts of recurring natural disasters on Vietnam’s development.

1 Vietnam Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report and Joint Staff Assessment. Report No. 27672-VN, dated January 22, 2004.

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1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

5. The project's development objective (PDO)2, as stated in the original Development Credit Agreement (DCA), was to assist the recipient to establish a comprehensive natural DRM framework to assist the GOV to: (i) reduce the vulnerability to flood, storm and other natural hazards; (ii) increase the efficiency of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts; and (iii) strengthen the capacity of national and local disaster risk management institutions. 6. Accordingly, the project’s original key performance indicators were:

• The number of provinces with completed Natural Disaster Mitigation Investment Plans (NDMIPs);

• The number of feasibility studies completed for sub-projects; • The number of sub-projects completed; and • The number of Safer Commune Plans (SCPs) completed.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by the original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

7. Additional Financing (AF) for Component 3 – Post-Disaster Reconstruction Support was approved by the World Bank Board on June 17, 2010. There were no significant changes to the objective, project design, implementation approach or institutional arrangements. Only a minor revision was made to the PDO to include “other natural hazards”. Therefore, the revised PDO was to assist the recipient to establish a comprehensive DRM framework to enable the GOV to: (i) reduce the vulnerability to flood, storm and other natural hazards in the project provinces; (ii) increase the efficiency of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts, and (iii) strengthen the capacity of national and local DRM institutions. The scope of the Project was amended under AF to scale up support for post-disaster reconstruction to help address the existing public financing gaps.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries 8. The project was expected to benefit the population living in 12 hazard-prone provinces in Vietnam’s Central and Mekong Delta regions by supporting strategic investments in disaster mitigation, post-disaster reconstruction, training and equipment for emergency preparedness and response, establishment of early warning system, and development of knowledge on local risks and Safe Commune Plan (SCP) that would reduce the human suffering and economic costs caused by natural hazards. NDRMP targeted upland and lowland coastal communities which primarily derive their livelihood from farming (wetland, cash crops and subsistence), fishing (shrimp cultivation and off-shore fisheries), and small business activities (food stalls, basic provisions). 9. The second group of beneficiaries comprised of DRM institutions and involved agencies, including CCFSC and its subordinate provincial and local (district and commune) committees, line ministries including the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

2 There was a difference in wording of the PDO between the PAD and the DCA, but no discrepancy in substance.

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(MARD), Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Education (MOE), Ministry of Transport (MOT), etc., and provincial sectoral departments. These have benefited from technical assistance provided during the development of the National Strategy for Natural Disasters Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020 (NS), provincial integrated DRM plans, the community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) model, risk mapping and modelling, feasibility studies and design of mitigation works, as well as during the series of trainings on DRM, damage and needs assessments, prioritization and implementation of post-disaster reconstruction support.

10. In addition, the project also benefited a group of NGOs and other donors in their engagement on DRM in Vietnam by improving the coordination and information-sharing network between the Government and mass organizations, donors and international NGOs under the operation framework of the Natural Disaster Mitigation Partnership (NDMP).

1.5 Original Components (as approved) 11. Component 1: Prevention and Mitigation Investments (estimated cost US$73.7 million, of which IDA Credit US$63.5 million) supported medium-sized priority prevention and mitigation sub-project investments to reduce disaster risks and strengthen prevention capabilities in areas most effected by floods and storms. 12. Component 2: Community-based Disaster Risk Management (estimated cost US$1 million), entirely funded by grants, was combined with other project components to strengthen the capacity of the most vulnerable population to carry out risk reduction measures and reduce vulnerability to disasters. (At appraisal, addition grant funding was expected to complement the IDA resources for this component – see para. #19) 13. Component 3: Post-Disaster Reconstruction Support (estimated cost US$20.8 million, of which IDA Credit US$20 million) supported post-disaster reconstruction of small-size public infrastructure, helping to address a recurrent financing gap for post-disaster recovery, and – financed under a PHRD co-financing grant – enable fast recovery and reduce the diversion of public resources from planned investments into reconstruction, as well as improve the damage assessment process and the efficiency and effectiveness of public resource utilization post-disasters. 14. Component 4: Project Management and Institutional Strengthening (estimated cost US$12 million, of which IDA Credit US2.5 million) supported project management organization and strengthened Government institutions to ensure better coordination and integration between agencies and different levels responsible for prevention, response and post-disaster recovery.

1.6 Revised Components 15. Additional Financing. AF in the amount of SDR49.4 million (US$75 million equivalent) was approved by the Board on June 17, 2010 to scale up the on-going Component 3 – Post-Disaster Reconstruction Support. The AF was provided on the premise of achieved progress of the original loan, specifically the Government’s approval of the National Strategy

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as one of the two key PDO indicators, and the emerging needs of Government and communities linked to post-Ketsana and Mirinae typhoons (in 2009) reconstruction. In addition, the AF further supported the strengthening of institutional capacity and procedures on post-disaster reconstruction. There was no significant change in the PDO, project design, implementation approach or the institutional arrangements. At the intermediate outcome level, there were two new indicators added in order to strengthen monitoring of the second development objective of the original credit and the overall PDO, and promote a “Build-Back-Better” approach in post-disaster recovery. Several intermediate outcome indicators were also revised to better capture the recent implementation progress and measure the results of the project. The closing date for the AF credit was December 31, 2013.

1.7 Other Significant Changes 16. Shift of strategic support approach from Adaptable Program Loan (APL) to Specific Investment Loan (SIL). NDRMP was designed as an APL with two phases. However, a joint decision was made by the Government and the Bank when the AF preparation was initiated that further support for DRM will not take APL form. There were two reasons for this. First, important lessons learned during the implementation of NDRMP and the rapidly changing country context meant that the APL structure would restrict necessary revisions to project modalities - a constraint alleviated by a shift to SIL. Second, it became apparent that the Government was unlikely to meet one of the three required policy development triggers (i.e. the amendment of Circular from the General Statistics Office on disaster damage statistics and assessment) which in any case was deemed in the end less significant for achieving the development objective than originally envisaged. Consequently, the option to proceed with the second phase APL including the AF was rejected in favor of (i) additional financing for Component 3 to address a financing gap in post-disaster reconstruction; and (ii) the preparation of a follow-up operation as a SIL. 17. Closing Date extensions for the original Credit. Given the decision to diverge from the APL instrument, the existing operation was extended several times in tandem with the AF. The original closing date was extended four times for a total of six years: (a) the first extension was from June 30, 2010 to June 30, 2011 (12 months); (b) the second extension was from June 30, 2011 to December 31, 2011 (6 months); (c) the third extension was from December 31, 2011 to May 31, 2012 (5 months); and the fourth extension was from May 31, 2012 to June 28, 2012 (28 days). The first extension was to support the completion of ongoing infrastructure works which had been suspended due to unpredictable storms and bad weather affecting the construction progress, and the processing of the procurement of hydromet equipment through the ICB procurement process. The extension also allowed the GOV to process the AF. In September 2010, the AF of US$75 million was approved and became effective in November 2010. Second and third extensions were granted after satisfactory completion of the tender documents for the hydromet equipment package and evaluation of relevant bidding documents. The fourth extension was to allow the delivery of a major part of the hydromet equipment package, thus enabling partial payment of the contract of about US$2.72 million from the original IDA Credit per terms stipulated in the contract. These extensions did not require extra cost for supervision as the Bank supervision missions were conducted for the implementation of both Original Credit and the AF at the same time by the same task team.

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18. Reallocation of credit proceeds. The DCA was amended twice. The first amendment was on March 5, 2010 to add Quang Tri Province to the project target area per Government’s request. The second amendment was on May 24, 2010 - as part of the first restructuring - to reallocate SDR758,365 from Category (5): Goods and works for eligible post-disaster reconstruction under Part C.1 of the Project to Category (1): Works under Part A of the Project. These amendments did not alter the overall allocation of resources to the different project components. 19. Grants allocations. In addition to the credit, the project received a grant total of US$14,460,000 from the Japanese Government (US$1,460,000 from JSDF and US$4,500,000 from PHRD) and the Government of the Netherlands (US$8,500,000 from NTF). The grant support included piloting and scaling up of the CBDRM model and institutional capacity-building. By June 29, 2012, a total of unallocated US$2,607,894 was returned to financing agencies because of slow implementation progress. Of which, US$ 2 million out of US$8.5 million NTF was cancelled by the Government of the Netherlands. AusAid also provided in-kind technical assistance through a team of three DRM specialists including a long-term Chief Technical Advisor located at the CPMO to help the Government to manage project implementation, a DRM Specialist and a Hydrodynamic Modeling Specialist for three years.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry 20. Soundness of background analysis. PHRD provided a grant for the preparation of the project in 2002. The preparation time spanned over a relatively long timeframe from June 2002 to May 2005 due to the institutional complexity and the novelty of the DRM approaches being introduced in Vietnam. In addition, during project preparation, a number of alternatives, including APL, DPL with a DDO for “Contingency Funding Facility”, and immediate relief or an Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) were discussed and eventually rejected by both the Government and the Bank since these instruments were deemed to be ill-suited for the long-term goal of designing and implementing a comprehensive DRM strategy. The preparation phase allowed for sound background analysis, and strong GOV and community ownership in the project design which was particularly important given the complexity of the Government’s institutional arrangements and the need to implement an integrated approach to DRM. During project preparation, new knowledge and lessons learned on DRM within and outside the Bank were considered and adopted3. The design of the AF incorporated information and studies generated earlier in the project as well as latest DRM knowledge, including lessons learned from on-going post-disaster recovery activities. 21. Assessment of Project design. At first, the project was designed as a long-term support program to help the Government and communities to move from focusing on disaster relief and response to a comprehensive and integrated approach to DRM encompassing development planning, disaster preparedness, forecasting, prevention, mitigation, recovery and reconstruction at the national, regional, provincial and local levels. This approach was adjusted for the country context, and its objectives partially achieved during the project

3 A list of forty-three Bank-funded projects and twenty-four projects funded by other development agencies which are related to DRM in Vietnam and other countries were reviewed.

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implementation period between 2006 and 2013. The on-going follow-up project - Vietnam Managing Natural Hazards Project (Vn-Haz) - continues to support the country to fully achieve the implementation of a comprehensive DRM framework. 22. Second, the original PDO was clearly-stated and important for the country as confirmed by the Government’s legislative actions and engagement on DRM. The PDO addressed the Government’s demands in putting disaster preparedness and forecasting as its foremost objectives, shifting the focus away from disaster response and relief. The principal strengths of the project design were: (a) strong country involvement in project designing and preparation; (b) appropriated strategic choices in supporting Government; and (c) the use of pilots which allowed the project to identify risks early on in the implementation process and correspondingly modify the program and project design. 23. Third, the Government’s commitment was strong, which was vital to be able to coordinate the implementation of the innovative DRM approaches. From the outset, the Government led the preparation process with support from the Bank and partners. This ensured strong ownership and understanding of the project by the central and local authorities. Project preparation involved an intensive planning process undertaken together with the provincial, district and commune authorities. This included participatory community assessment during the selection of the vulnerable communes to be piloted under the project, and the level of funds allocated to each area for community activities. 24. Fourth, strategic choices made in the project design reflected both lessons learned and reality on the ground. The first decision was to focus on integrated DRM instead of pure post-disaster recovery support. On this basis, the project design emphasized: (a) support to local capacity development taking into account the Bank’s competitive advantage and other development agencies’ plans to assist the central DRM agencies, (b) assistance to a selected number of vulnerable communes with a comprehensive integrated DRM approach (including CBDRM), which were identified through evidence-based analysis of disaster risks and the emerging and competitive demands to improve DRM capacity rather than assuming a general program, and (c) reliance on existing partnership arrangements to improve coordination between the Government, donors and NGOs rather than creating new ones under the project. 25. Fifth, another strategic decision was the establishment of clear eligibility criteria for the selection of sub-projects and a special procurement procedure for emergency situations at the beginning of the implementation process which helped to minimize resettlement and adverse environmental impacts as well as the complexity of normal procurement procedures to ensure the completion of the post-disaster reconstruction support within 12 months. 26. Lastly, project components were clearly formulated and conducive to PDO achievement. Project design was flexible, which allowed interested development agencies to co-finance a number of project activities (i.e. institutional capacity building, CBDRM, etc.), enabled the reallocation of fund among components (if needed), and mobilization of additional IDA funding to respond effectively to the highly dynamic post-disaster situation, as well as implementation of lessons learnt in the course of the project. In addition, the set of natural hazards initially considered – floods and storms – was also broadened to include other natural hazards, such as landslide, earthquake and tsunami, under the AF.

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27. Overall project risk identification and mitigation at entry. The overall project risk rating at entry was considered substantial, which seems appropriate for the challenges of the project related to institutional weaknesses and the innovative nature of the project. However, even when some of the challenges, which led to implementation delays, cost escalations, and inadequate project management, were correctly identified as sources of risk during project preparation, they were insufficiently mitigated in the project design. Other sources of risk were not identified (and therefore lacked mitigation measures at entry). The main shortcomings in the risk assessment were: 28. Impact of the country‘s rapid socio-economic development to the strategic approach in supporting the DRM agenda: A number of financing instrument options, including APL, SIL, ERL, DPL with a DDO were discussed by the Government and the Bank during project preparation. The APL instrument was considered the most suitable for the long term goal of designing and implementing a comprehensive DRM strategy. However, the rapid development progress in the country and changes in Government’s priorities for interventions and capacity-building affected the continuation of the APL form by not achieving one of three required policy development triggers for progression to APL II as described in para. #16. Decisions were made at the preparation of both the AF and the follow-up project to shift the strategic support approach from an APL to a SIL, as the latter provided greater flexibility to the changing circumstances in the rapidly developing country while still ensuring lessons learned from the NDRMP were fully incorporated into the project design and implementation. 29. Underestimation of the Government’s institutional arrangements. The assessment of the role of CCFSC as the key Government’s coordination body to provide overall guidance for project implementation was correct. The role of DMC, which was expected to be the key Government agency to provide coordination and integration among the various agencies and different levels responsible for natural disaster prevention, response and recovery, was not sufficiently assessed. At the project beginning, DMC was only a small division within MARD’s Dyke Management and Flood Control Department (DDMFSC), which acted as the CCFSC’s Standing Office. In this role, DMC was not in the position to provide the required coordination under the project. In addition, mitigation measures proposed to improve the speed and efficiency in the allocation and disbursement of post-disaster recovery resources were insufficient. An improvement of the existing procedures could not have been achieved by simply developing a project operational manual but required a revision of the existing laws. In this case, the existing State Budget Law would need to be revised and ratified by the National Assembly. The institutional context could have been more carefully assessed during project preparation, particularly for the AF as lessons learned had been clearly drawn out by then. 30. Inadequate implementation capacity. Even though the integrated DRM approach was a new concept for Vietnam introduced by the project, no critical risks or subsequent mitigation measures related to capacity of the management units at both central and provincial levels were identified at appraisal. This led to a delay in the start-up of the project and in also the implementation of several risk reduction investments. More preparatory work could have been carried out in order to set out a well-defined implementation strategy. 31. No Quality at Entry review was conducted for this project.

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2.2 Implementation 32. The following are several key factors that contributed to successful implementation: 33. Government’s strong ownership. NDRMP was an ambitious program with implementation challenges facing the Government administrative capacity both at the central, provincial and community levels. Implementation was delayed in the first three years until the mid-term review (MTR) due to the complexity of the project in both, the new integrated DRM approach and implementation arrangement vis-à-vis the weak institutional capacity for DRM. The MTR identified six issues that undermined implementation: (i) absence of leadership by MARD; (ii) lack of adequate capacity on the part of the Central Project Office (CPO); (iii) lack of DDMFC involvement in capacity-building; (iv) insufficient attention to CBDRM implementation; (v) slow progress on upgrading post-disaster reconstruction procedures; and (vi) insufficient communications between MARD, CPO, and the provinces. In response, MARD initiated a series of actions, including: (i) the establishment of the MARD-led Senior Working Group comprised of a MARD Vice Minister, senior officials from participating ministries and provinces together with the Project Steering Committee, (ii) timely revision of the Project Implementation Manual and Components’ Operational Manuals, which further clarified responsibilities between the various agencies and adjusted the implementation arrangement at the national, provincial and commune levels, (iii) mobilization of qualified experts and staff for the CPO/ Central Project Management Unit (CPMU) to undertake procurement, financial management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), social and environmental safeguards in July 2008, and (iv) subsequent establishment of the technical working group at DDMFSC in July 2008 to lead day-to-day implementation. MARD’s immediate actions, combined with the Bank’s close supervision, resulted in improved project performance. The project was upgraded to “moderately satisfactory” status in May 2009 and “satisfactory” status in June 2010. Moreover, the disbursement rate was significantly increased from 16 percent at the MTR to 46 percent in June 2009 and 98 percent at closing date. 34. Continuous engagement of local officials and communities. Project activities, particularly post-disaster reconstruction and CBDRM at the local level were advanced through close consultation and participation of the communities, including frequent workshops and training with mayors and officials from participating communes. The CBDRM methodology for local risk and vulnerability analysis and prioritization of mitigation measures, including application of the “Build-back-better” approach helped to bring together specialized technical expertise and local knowledge, while building beneficiaries’ commitment and ownership of results. The project recruited Commune Facilitators (CFs) under the CBDRM activities, who played the key roles in strengthening implementation, institutional linkages and information dissemination between villages and communes. As the results, the CBDRM model piloted in 30 communes under the project has been scaled-up nationwide via the National Program for CBDRM, which was approved in 2009 and launched in 2010. 35. Nevertheless, several factors – some outside the control of the Government and implementing agencies but some within their control – affected implementation negatively. As a result, the project experienced delays that required several extensions of the

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original closing date by a total of 24 months. Factors outside of the Government or implementing agencies control include: 36. Initially, the project was slowed down by delayed credit effectiveness. Several effectiveness conditions could not be met on timely basis, including delays in: (i) the establishment and staffing of the CPMO in MARD, Project Coordination Unit (PCU) in the Southern Regional Hydromet Center of MONRE and Provincial Project Management Unit (PPMU) in Ben Tre and Nghe An provinces; and (ii) approval by MARD of Project Implementation Manual (PIM) and feasibility studies of the Year-1 sub-projects. In effect, more than eight months passed between Bank’s approval in September 2005 and declaration of effectiveness in May 2006. 37. Recurrent bad weather interfered with works and unpredictable storms in 2010 and 2011 forced the contractors to frequently stop the construction of several sub-projects exposed to the sea under Component 1. 38. Evolution of the country’s legal and institutional frameworks for socio-economic development. In order to fully achieve the second specific objective of the post-disaster reconstruction support component and the AF, which was to enhance the speed and efficiency in allocation and disbursement of post-disaster resources and the effectiveness of public resource utilization, at least two existing Laws on Procurement and State Budget should have been adjusted to help establish streamlined procedures for public resources utilization and mobilization for post-disaster recovery. 4 The revised Procurement Law, which has been recently adopted by the National Assembly (No. 43/2013/Q/QH13) on November 26, 2013, and will become effective on June 1, 2014, included provisions to facilitate medium- and long-term recovery. However, the State Budget Law that would allow a faster process for allocating and utilizing funds for post-disaster reconstruction is yet to be amended. Consequently, this specific objective was not fully achieved at the AF’s closing date. 39. Leadership and capacity constraints in the project implementation agencies/units at various levels at the beginning of project implementation. While leaving the CPMU largely in charge, MARD’s leaderships could have been improved, including monitoring and, when necessary, actively and decisively engaging in addressing bottlenecks. In addition, the CPMU lacked qualified experts to undertake procurement, financial management, M&E, as well as social and environmental safeguards. Some delays were related to the weak capacity of CPMU and PMUs at national and provincial levels in some specific areas, including the management and adjustment of detailed engineering designs, and preparation of procurement package for hydromet equipment under Component 1. 40. Insufficient attention to CBDRM implementation. The CBDRM approach was introduced in Vietnam in early 2000 by a limited number of NGOs. The implementation was primarily led by NGOs rather than being mainstreamed into existing Government institutional

4 Socio-economic development in the country led the Politburo and National Assembly to prioritize the adjustment and updating of other emerging Laws. In addition, the Government also wanted to incorporate and update all other issues related to budget and procurement management, which would require time spent on more consolidated social studies, rather than updating and adjusting issues on emergency response only.

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arrangements at the national, subnational, and community levels. Therefore, both MARD (CPO and other DRM technical agencies) and the targeted communities struggled to initiate CBDRM activities. The project envisaged capacity-building for CBDRM planning, and a pilot was launched in 10 communes. Evaluations of the pilot indicated that planning alone was insufficient and needed to be supplemented by actual investments. The project team secured additional grant funds from Bank-administered sources (PHRD and JSDF) as well as project-specific co-financing from the Government of Netherlands, albeit with some delays. Once in place, this additional grant funding allowed more intensive support to CBDRM which was successfully provided to 30 communes. The roll-out to the final 10 communes was prevented in large part because of the subsequent cancellation of US$ 2 million out of the US$8.5 million NTF. 41. Additionally, the project adopted an unusual approach by providing AF while simultaneously extending the original project. The AF approved in June, 2010 was provided for Component 3 only, to be implemented by MoF. At the same time, as described in para. #17, the original project was extended in order to allow completion of works (through June, 2011) and the procurement of the hydromet equipment (through May, 2012), under Component 1 of the original project. This was a pragmatic administrative solution that did not undermine the efficiency of the project or stretch Bank supervision, since the additional supervision required by the extensions to the original Credit were incorporated into the supervision of the AF. However it did reflect, to an extent, the institutional compartmentalization of the original project across the three ministries MOF, MONRE and MARD - and contradicted the rationale for a single 'platform' for the Bank's support for DRM. (As noted elsewhere in this ICR, by the end of the AF this institutional fragmentation had been addressed, not least in the design of the follow-on Managing Natural Hazards project).

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization 42. M&E design is moderately satisfactory. M&E was challenging given the high degree of institutional complexity and the novelty of the new approach in DRM. The large number of sub-projects also posed challenges for maintaining accurate and up-to-date information on implementation progress and results. The system suffered from some weaknesses in design: (a) PDO indicators were confusing, which made the project impact and the achievement of the outcomes difficult to evaluate. In addition, the two PDO level indicators did not capture all aspects of the PDO, particularly Component 3. Enhancing the speed and efficiency in allocation and disbursement of post-disaster resources and the effectiveness of public resource utilization was one of the key objectives of Component 3 and the AF. However, (a) no revision or adjustment of the PDO indicators was made at the AF preparation to highlight the importance and capture it; (b) specific definition and methodological precision, including the difference between outputs and outcomes and different approaches in measuring quantity and quality of outputs/ outcomes were absent in the PIM; and (c) the baseline survey was not carried out until July 2009. The development of practical methodology and a baseline survey to measure some of the key economic, environmental, social, and gender impacts, particularly for CBDRM, post-disaster recovery support and sub-projects under Component 1, as identified in the PAD, could had been more carefully addressed at the time of the MTR.

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43. M&E implementation and utilization were moderately satisfactory due to methodological limitations as mentioned above. This led to delays in the establishment of an effective M&E system. The system was fully operational in July 20095, whereas the project implementation started in May 2006. From this time onwards, the system supported project implementation and monitoring, allowing for rapid informed decisions and timely resource allocation. In most cases, data was collected in time following appropriate methods through monthly and quarterly construction supervision reporting and external monitoring consultancies. It also contributed to a shift in focus within the Government concerning infrastructure investments away from measuring inputs and outputs towards measuring outcomes. All CPMU, PMUs and PPMUs benefited from progress reports prepared by a qualified independent consultant firm as well as a series of trainings on operation of the M&E system. The M&E framework of the NDRMP is considered as an example of good practice and has been used by the GOV in designing their larger M&E systems for tracking both the implementation of National Strategy for DRM and the National CBDRM Program.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 44. Safeguards Compliance was satisfactory (OP 4.01, OP 4.04, OP 4.37, OP 4.11, OP 4.12 and OD 4.20). The original project was classified as Environmental Category A and the AF as Environmental Category B. A safeguard policies package was prepared, including Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), Ethnic Minority Policy Framework (EMPF) and the Environmental Assessment (EA). A series of training on safeguards for project officers at the national and provincial levels was conducted as part of the project’s capacity-building support. 45. Environmental safeguards compliance was satisfactory. The Project triggered three environmental safeguard policies including Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), Natural Habitats (OP 4.04) and Safety of Dams (OP 4.37). To address environmental issues relating to these environmental safeguard policies, six documents as part of the environmental review were prepared for both the original project and AF, including: (a) a general EA for the entire project; (b) three specific EAs for the three sub-projects in phase I; (c) an environmental management framework (EMF) for AF; and (d) an environmental review procedure for investment under the CBDRM component. In addition, a separate environmental review procedure was developed for investments under Component 3 (post-disaster reconstruction support)6 of the original project. Regarding the policy on safety of dams, dam safety report and emergency preparedness plan were prepared for Vuc Mau sub-project in the first year by Dam Safety Unit under MARD and reviewed by an independent panel of experts. During project implementation, at central level CPO under MARD and PCU under MPI assigned a full-time staff responsible for project environmental safeguards issues and also hired an independent environmental monitoring consultant to assist in periodically monitoring contractors’ compliance with the environmental safeguard policies and preparing monitoring reports. Additionally, construction supervision consultants were also trained in environmental

5 The M&E framework was adjusted in October 2010 per recommendations made by the Bank’s 11th supervision mission conducted in June 2010. 6 For example, a proposed sub-project would be screened to determine whether it is eligible. All eligible sub-projects were then prepared with appropriate environmental assessment documents (i.e. EIA or EMP) in accordance with national environmental protection law and the Bank environmental safeguard policies.

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safeguards to undertake daily monitoring of contractor’s environmental safeguard compliance and reporting to the CPO and PCU. At the provincial level, PPMU also appointed a staff member responsible for environmental safeguards compliance issues. An environmental monitoring program was adequately carried out with involvement of locally-affected communities. Specific actions were fully incorporated into the project planning, information dissemination, community participation and implementation processes. Consultations with local stakeholders including locally-affected people, ethnic minorities, and local NGOs (i.e. the Vietnam Women’s Union, Fatherland Front, Farmer Association, and Veteran Association), and information disclosure were continuously conducted throughout project implementation to address safeguard-related issues in a timely manner. Monitoring reports prepared periodically by independent monitoring consultants and submitted to the Bank showed that there were no significant environmental issues during implementation. Adverse environmental impacts due to construction such as dust, noise, wastes, accident risks, traffic interruption, damages to local roads, cultivation interruption and ecological loss were fully mitigated through application of proper mitigation measures indicated in the detailed EMPs. As such, there were no complaints from locally-affected communities. Throughout project implementation, environmental safeguard policies were fully complied with. 46. Social safeguards compliance – Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12), and Indigenous Peoples (OP. 4.10) were satisfactory. Given that the project involved land acquisition to allow for the rehabilitation of existing civil works, RPF was prepared in accordance with the Bank’s OP 4.12. The RAPs for first-year sub-projects were also prepared in accordance with the project’s RPF. In addition, since ethnic minority peoples were present in the project area, an EMPF was prepared. As a principle, efforts had been made, during project implementation, to avoid the land acquisition. However, where not avoidable, efforts were made, through exploring various technical engineering designs, to minimize the impact of the land acquisition/resettlement. 47. During the original credit period, despite efforts made to avoid land acquisition, 265 hectare of land (primarily agricultural land) were permanently acquired. This affected 4,168 households, of which 989 households had to resettle, and 165 had their businesses and/ or more than 20 percent of their agricultural land affected. Compensation payment, financial and livelihood restoration support, and resettlement work was provided in accordance with the project’s RPF. During the AF period, since the project focused on the Component 3 - Post-Disaster Reconstruction, most of the civil works (rehabilitation and construction) took place within the existing land area. As a result, the need for land acquisition was very small. Minor land donation (for road rehabilitation works) occurred occasionally with the support from local people to enable prompt restoration of the roads/ bridges following disaster events. Although there was no significant impact on the livelihoods of affected households, guidance was provided by the Bank in such cases to ensure the land donation was legally accepted and the land acquisition was conducted in accordance with the project’s RPF. 48. The Bank’s review of the social safeguards implementation of the sub-projects (including a systematic review by an independent monitoring consultant) indicated that land acquisition and resettlement was undertaken in full compliance with the project’s RPF. Complaints were addressed well before project closure. Affected households, particularly those severely affected, restored their livelihood to pre-project levels. No ethnic minority households were adversely affected as a result of the project. These households also

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participated in the consultation during the sub-project preparation. Gender aspects were also given attention, particularly to families who were severely affected as a result of the project to support their prompt livelihood restoration. 49. Financial Management (FM) of the original credit and AF was moderately satisfactory. The weaknesses in FM capacity of the CPMU were identified at the MTR, including: (i) lack of accounting software; (ii) late delivery of interim financial reports; (iii) weak planning and budgeting; and (iv) late appointment of an external auditor. Through a series of immediate actions undertaken by MARD and its project office and units, including training provided to the CPMO, PMUs and PPMUs staff, installment of accounting software, allocation of more staff to perform financial reporting and PPMUs supervision, the FM performance of the project gradually improved from Moderately Unsatisfactory at MTR to Moderately Satisfactory toward the end of the project. The AF had better FM performance compared to the original credit, which was maintained at Moderately Satisfactory throughout the AF timespan, due to stronger FM skills of the AF CPMU situated with the MOF, and lessons learnt from implementation of the original credit. While the lack of counterpart funding proved to be a challenge for provinces during the original credit implementation, the AF demonstrated stronger performance on managing counterpart funds and did not face similar issues. The inflexible fund allocation mechanism in the AF, however, led to some unutilized funds at project closing while demand for funding from provinces still existed. The issue of ineligible expenditures due to misunderstanding the Financing Agreement occurred in both original credit and AF, which were then settled by provinces using counterpart fund. 50. Procurement was moderately satisfactory for both the original credit and AF. An 18-month procurement plan had been prepared at appraisal. In the subsequent years, detailed procurement plans were also prepared for each procurement package especially those with higher value and more technically complex. In general, the procurement performance was found to be consistent with the Bank’s Procurement Guidelines and the Legal Agreements. The Bank’s post reviews found a number of procedural deviations and non-compliance. However, these issues were adequately rectified. There were also some delays in procurement primarily due to the lack of efficiency and effectiveness in the procurement management of a few complex packages and in dealing with the price fluctuations. Bank provided support, including technical training on procurement to CPMO and PCU and guidance on the preparation of bidding documents, to accelerate the process. These packages were then successfully awarded and implemented.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

51. The transitional arrangements to post-completion operation appear to be adequate, as demonstrated by the following measures: 52. Institutional arrangement. In February 2010, the Prime Minister issued Decree No. 14/2010/NĐ-CP to rearrange and strengthen the institutional and coordination mechanism of the CCFSC and its provincial branches across the country. In addition, the DMC which was a division within MARD’s Dyke Management and Flood and Storm Control Department was separated and from 2010 onwards promoted as a National Center for DRM.

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53. Establishment of DRM legislative framework. With project support, a National Strategy for Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020 (NS) has been established and approved by Prime Minister in November 2007. The strategy lays out Vietnam’s primary DRM objectives to move away from the traditional emergency response and relief focus to a comprehensive and integrated DRM. Subsequently, a National Action Plan for implementation of the NS was also approved by the Prime Minister in September 2009. Both the NS and the action plan are currently being implemented with funding from the central and local governments, donors and international organizations. 54. Promotion of the community participatory approach in DRM. CBDRM models, including CSPs, community early warning and evacuation systems, and community-scale mitigation measures with participatory approach have been aggregated and consolidated into a nationwide CBDRM program. The National CBDRM Program was approved by the Prime Minister in 2009 and is being implemented in some 6,000 disaster vulnerable communes across the country through funding support from the central and local governments, donors and international organizations. 55. Follow-up project. Lessons learnt from the NDRMP were incorporated in the design of the follow-up US$180 million IDA-financed project titled Vietnam-Managing Natural Hazards (Vn-Haz). A similar clustering approach for CBDRM and early warning systems has been incorporated while a river-basin approach was introduced in the design in the follow-up project. Vn-Haz incorporated a flexible design to better reflect the changing circumstances and priorities for interventions and capacity-building that might occur during project implementation linked to Vietnams’ rapid development. VN-Haz became effective in December 2012 and its implementation has been satisfactory so far.

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation 56. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was and remains relevant to Vietnam’s development priorities and strategies. The country remains highly vulnerable to disasters. Almost 60 percent of Vietnam’s total land area and over 70 percent of its population are at risk to the above referenced natural hazards. Over the past two decades, extreme weather events have caused more than 13,000 deaths and property damage in excess of US$6.4 billion. DRM challenges have intensified. Climate change is projected to result in a significant increase in typhoon and flooding risks, including sea level rise in Vietnam. Moreover, Vietnam will also experience significant increased saltwater intrusion and coastal erosion, negatively impacting agricultural productivity, aquaculture production, and the vulnerability of coastal cities7. The recent World Bank Vietnam Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the period from 2012 to 2016 acknowledges these issues and reiterates the importance of improving resilience in the face of external economic shocks, natural hazards and the impact of climate change (Key Cross-Cutting Theme - Resilience). Similarly, the recently prepared NS and its National Action Plan also emphasize the importance of investing in risk reduction and management.

7 World Bank (2013). Turn Down The Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience.

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57. Project Design is consistent with the PDO and relevant to on-going and planned efforts to face the challenge of disaster risk reduction and management. Project design was flexible, allowing for the adjustment to reflect emerging good practices regarding institutional strengthening and engagement of local governments and communities, as well as inclusion of financing of post-disaster recovery works. 58. Project Implementation supported the evolution of the legal and institutional framework for DRM in Vietnam. Implementation arrangements remained relevant throughout implementation, including the AF, and at the end contributed to the institutionalization of project interventions and consolidation of CCFSC as the country’s leading DRM coordination body. Implementation also allowed for the development of approaches and methodologies that have been mainstreamed in the follow-up VN-Haz project.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

59. The project has largely achieved its development objective, which was “the establishment and implementation of a comprehensive risk management framework for natural disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation and recovery”. 60. For the first time a country-level comprehensive DRM framework has been established through project support. A National Strategy and a National Action Plan were approved by Prime Minister in November 2007 and September 2009 respectively. The Strategy lays out Vietnam’s primary DRM objectives in order to move from the traditional focus on preparedness and response with a strong emphasis on structural measures (such as dykes and seawalls) to a comprehensive and integrated approach to DRM, including structural measures (i.e. building and rehabilitation of reservoirs, dams and dykes) and non-structural measures (i.e. CBDRM, capacity building and institutional strengthening activities). The Strategy also provides guidance to sectors and provinces in formulation and implementation of their programs to achieve the overarching objectives of the Strategy. Subsequently all 19 ministries and 63 provinces developed sectoral and provincial action plans respectively for Strategy’s implementation. These sectoral and provincial action plans built upon the experiences from the project-supported Integrated Natural Disaster Mitigation Investment Plans (IDRMPs) which were prepared in 12 provinces. The IDRMPs have been highly appreciated by the provincial and local governments and incorporated into respective provincial and local plans. 61. Supporting the implementation of the NS, the project financed upgrading/ construction of 12 prioritized large-scale disaster-mitigation structures and 681 community public services infrastructure, including schools and health care facilities, which were damaged by the heavy storms and floods in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010, for the benefit of more than 3 million people living in 15 hazard-prone provinces. In addition to the structural measures, the project also provided a series of activities to build capacity of the government agencies at the national, provincial and local levels (see para. #65 for further details). Equally important, more than 210,000 villagers living in 30 communes have benefited directly from the CBDRM model, including the CSPs, community early warning and evacuation systems, and community-scale mitigation measures. As a result, the CBDRM model which reflects a participatory approach has been rolled out nationwide through the National Program for CBDRM, which was approved in 2009 and launched in 2010. The project also helped to leverage support from

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many donors to strengthen the country’s capacity in DRM. This includes improved coordination and information-sharing network between the Government, donors such as ECHO, UNDP, RNE, Embassy of Luxembourg, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), AusAID, and international NGOs, such as CARE International, OXFAM GB, OXFAM HK, World Vision, and ADPC. 62. The PDO included three complementary outcomes: (i) reducing the vulnerability of the Project Provinces to flood and other natural hazards, (ii) increasing the efficiency of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts, and (iii) strengthening the capacity of national and local DRM institutions. 63. Reducing the vulnerability of the Project Provinces to flood and other natural hazards was successfully achieved by the well prepared 17 feasibility studies, technical designs, and implementation of all 12 project-funded structural investments, vis-à-vis the target of 15 completed feasibility studies and 8 completed sub-projects originally envisaged. The completed sub-projects, including dyke systems, safe harbors for fishing boats, reservoirs/ dams, pumping station and drainage improvement, have generated good results in prompting DRM as well as reducing economic losses in the target provinces. For instance, a combination of dyke and emergency road sub-projects in Hai Lang district of Quang Tri province has helped to protect 12 communes with a total population of 64,000 people and 5,200 ha of 2-crop rice. Improved drainage system located along the Hanoi – Ho Chi Minh national railway route has significantly reduced flooding to ensure the safety of railway operations during the wet season. Construction of five safety storm shelter harbors has provided better protection against typhoons for thousand small and medium-size fishing boats, repairing and upgrading dam safety of the Vuc Mau Reservoir in Nghe An significantly reduced flood risks during the wet season and provided sufficient water in the reservoir for irrigating more than 2,000 ha of rice during the dry season. Despite delays in the procurement process, which resulted in delaying the provision of accurate and reliable forecasts to the concerned communities, the installation of an early warning system in the Mekong Delta improved the capacity of the Southern Regional Forecast Center in forecasting and early warning from 10 percent to 90 percent, in particular, information accuracy increased up to 85-90 percent. No damage in the protected areas was reported during the wet season of the subsequent years after completion of the risk reduction investments. 64. Increasing the efficiency of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts was partially achieved: guidelines for a damage and needs assessment (DANA) with a detailed set of objective and measurable criteria for allocation for post-disaster assistance were developed in close consultation with relevant agencies at national and subnational levels, NGOs and communities. Affected provinces and communities followed these detailed criteria to prioritize the sub-projects in need of reconstruction. The operational manual and criteria were frequently adjusted and improved to better fit the local context. All reconstructed public infrastructure operated well and withstood recent storms and subsequent floods in 2013. Efficiency improvements in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts have not been fully achieved as both speed and quality remain the same as before the project. Despite urgency, the current procedures are no different from normal public investment procedures. The project targeted the completion of the entire of cycle of damages assessment, budget mobilization, technical design, procurement and construction within 12 months. In reality, at end of project it still took 8-14 months to complete the damages assessment and budget

16

mobilization 8 . Consequently, the project did not fully meet its target in strengthening Government’s procedures for a rapid disbursement facility to fund post-disaster reconstruction. It is widely accepted that there is a need for a ‘fast-track’ procedure for prioritization of sub-projects and mobilization of available resources for medium and long term post-disaster recovery activities. The project financed a review of the existing procedures and recommendations for a new mechanism were submitted to the Government, relevant ministries (including MPI, MOF and MARD) and provinces for their decision. These recommendations are being discussed under (i) the on-going MOF-led revision of the State Budget Law; and (ii) the MARD-led development of a detailed Government Decree on the establishment of the community funds for DRM. Specialists from various relevant World Bank teams, including Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) and Procurement are providing technical inputs to both processes. 65. Strengthening the capacity of national and local DRM institutions. The capacity of CCFSC and its Standing Office has been strengthened. The Prime Minister’s Decree No. 14/2010/NĐ-CP dated February 27, 2010 rearranged and strengthened the institutional and coordination mechanisms of CCFSC and its provincial branches across the country. In addition, the DMC, which was a division of the MARD’s Dyke Management and Flood and Storm Control Department (as the Standing Office of the CCFSC), was promoted to be a national center for DRM from 2010 onwards. CCFSC, including its Standing Office and DMC, has been effectively coordinating the implementation of the NS. In particular, they effectively responded to Typhoon Nargis and Ilke (2008) and Ketsana (2009), to floods in the central region (2009, 2010) and in the Mekong Delta (2011), and to Typhoon Naris, Wutip and Hyain (2013). Community capacity on DRM has also been strengthened through the implementation of the CBDRM activities. Involvement of communities ensured ownership and sustained quality of investment, as well as increased local awareness. On the other hand, it also promoted partnership and collaboration between central, provincial and commune levels, and between commune officials and the local people. The CBDRM component demonstrated adaptability in implementation (i.e. the outcomes of the pilot) and leveraged substantial funding for its (modified) implementation. It guided the establishment of the Government’s National Program on CBDRM which covers 6,000 vulnerable communes across the country. Although only 30 communes received the CBDRM support versus the target of 40 communes originally envisaged at project design, this reflected the needs of communities to include the investments on structural and non-structural measures in the support of the implementation of the SCP instead of only non-structural measures as the original design during the implementation of the pilot phase in 10 communes. Between 80-90 percent of expenditures per commune were for structural measures, whereas only 10 percent for non-structural measures. This placed substantial demands on available financing which was compounded by the cancellation of US$2 million out of the US$8.5 million NTF for rolling out the CBDRM model in other 30 vulnerable communes in March 2010.

3.3 Efficiency (details are presented in Annex 3)

8 Some current steps present technical challenges in comparing the needs among different sectors, including prioritization and the development of an inter-sectoral reconstruction package, and impose unnecessarily lengthy administration at the national level. For instance, the review of MPI at national level and DPI at the provincial level should be unnecessary since most of the proposed investments were small-scale reconstruction works, which fall under the responsibility of the provinces.

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66. The overall economic analysis prepared at project closing show that the aggregate project investments are having an Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of about 25 percent. The economic analysis considered costs and benefits from the country’s perspective. The analysis considered the expected ERR from the C1 and C3 investments. At appraisal no cost-benefit analysis was done for the project as it was considered inappropriate to evaluate investments in prevention and post-disaster recovery activities. 67. Investments for enhancing disaster response capability and reducing vulnerability generate returns in terms of capital stock damage being avoided and lives being saved in the events of natural hazards. Flood maps were prepared to determine possible losses, weighted by the expected frequency of occurrence of different natural hazards their and intensities. Dynamic hydraulic models for both “with” and “without project” scenarios represented: (i) the enhanced scenario including the structural and non-structural investments completed under the NDRMP, and (ii) the pre-existing damaged and/ or precarious structures and poor preparedness capacity available before the project. By mapping the expected flooded area under different natural events together with the duration and depth of flood in the affected areas, and overlapping those maps with the land use and affected assets in the flooded areas, the corresponding expected value of project benefits were estimated. 68. Benefits were estimated from most of the sub-projects financed under C1 and from typical investments financed under C3. C1 and C3 spent about 90 percent of the project costs including the AF. Reduced expected losses considered included: (i) those directly affecting the family households (lost agricultural production and household assets); (ii) private and public infrastructure (roads, electricity, water systems, schools, etc.); and (iii) human health costs, lives saved, and environmental protection values. The C2 and C4 costs were also considered for the analysis as they contributed to the attainment of the benefits from the two core components by enhancing the effectiveness of the project interventions, by building capacity to manage risks and by coordinating implementation among stakeholders. 69. The financial assessment confirmed that by reducing the expected losses due to natural hazards the livelihood of the poor in the project areas is significantly improved. Farm models combining typical cropping patterns and livestock activities for the analyzed sub-project areas representing typical household were also prepared. The project improvements would allow for increases in household income of about 11 percent to 45 percent depending on the area and the type of works involved.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. 70. The rating for the project’s overall outcomes is considered as moderately satisfactory because: (i) the objectives, design and implementation of the project remain highly relevant to the country’s development priorities; (ii) all PDO and most intermediate outcome indicators were substantially attained; and (iii) the economic efficiency of the investments is well above the reference 12 percent opportunity cost of capital. 71. The project achieved its development objective by establishing and supporting the implementation of the National Strategy on DRM. At the intermediate outcomes level, the

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project strengthened the capacity of the Government’s institutional arrangement for DRM at various levels and communities, demonstrated by their effective response to subsequent typhoons and other hazards. Participatory CBDRM was widely promoted and recognized by the GOV through the National Program for CBDRM launched in 2010. However, the impact of project was not optimized because project outputs were fragmented and somewhat uncoordinated. For example, whereas the prioritized large-scale disaster-mitigation structure was focused in a single location, the CBDRM and the early warning system were undertaken in different locations. Consequently, the project missed potential synergies between structural and nonstructural interventions, which is an important feature of contemporary approaches to DRM. 72. Post-disaster reconstruction support significantly helped the Government and the communities in filling funding gaps for recovery activities. It also introduced a faster effective procedure for prioritization of public infrastructure and funding allocation for post-disaster reconstruction, including damage and needs assessment, and a detailed set of objective and measurable criteria for allocation for post-disaster assistance. However, mainstreaming such arrangements into GOV’s procedures was not yet achieved as it requires revisions to the Government’s exiting Laws which are yet to be fully enacted.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 73. Damage and loss assessments indicate that disasters tend to affect the poor disproportionately due to their social and physical vulnerability. The project had an impact by helping to increase the resilience of poor communities thus avoiding increased poverty levels after disasters. The project also helped to strengthen the social capital of these communities through the participatory processes for risk and vulnerability analysis and preventive planning. This social capital is reflected in mutual support systems that can help communities not only in responding to future disasters, but also in engaging in risk mitigation. In addition, after reconstructing public infrastructure such as irrigation cannels, pumping stations and rural roads, rural people subsequently improved their agricultural and livelihood activities enabling them to increase household incomes. Reconstruction of schools with more space and better facilities helped to substantially increase the school attendance. In this way, community social development has been also supported. 74. The gender approach mainstreamed into Project design, especially C2 (CBDRM) and C4 (Institutional Strengthening) have facilitated women’s participation and access to information. The number of female beneficiaries participating in the planning processes, project activities implementation and trainings significantly increased - This is an important result since women have lower literacy levels and less time available to participate in meetings due to socially and culturally assigned gender roles. The project also worked with men to promote a gender approach that attempted to balance their assumed role as “protectors” – which has often resulted in higher mortality among males as was the case during emergency responses – and the building of community wide support systems that was more inclusive of women.

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(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 75. The project substantially contributed to the institutionalization of an effective DRM system. Key agencies such as CCFSC, MARD, MONRE, MOF and MOT, as well as participating provinces and communes, were strengthened and are now working in a more coordinated manner. CCFSC’s organizational structure at the central and provincial level was reformed. DMC was established to be the focal point for DRM in the country. In addition to the improved flood forecasting network, institutional capacity of both Southern Regional Forecast Center and provincial forecast offices, as well as of the provincial DRM agencies was increased through training, flood risk assessments and hydrologic simulation modeling. Likewise, participating communes were provided with better tools and capacity to deal with local DRM issues in partnership with local NGOs and mass-organizations.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 76. As a result of the project, several additional positive outcomes have also been identified, including: (a) increased demand for mitigation investments; and (b) better understanding of the importance of territorial planning, particularly with reference to the challenge of managing growth in high risk areas.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/ or Stakeholder Workshops Not applicable. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate. 77. The Government demonstrated strong commitment to DRM policy and programs and overall sustainability is likely given the strong local ownership of project investments, and the demands from a motivated and better organized population. Integration of DRM issues into provincial and community planning processes and increased awareness of the consequences of climate change also contributed to continuity of the efforts started under the project. Development outcome, however, continues to face some internal risks:

a. Inefficient coordination between sectoral ministries and between central, provincial and commune level persists although institutional capacity and cross-coordination mechanism have been strengthened. Integrated approaches for DRM require complex coordination mechanisms and efforts from stakeholders at central, provincial and commune level, local organizations, and state-owned and private enterprises. This requires a central agency which is empowered to lead and facilitate the coordination. Instead, the CCFSC – as a coordination body for GOV – is chaired at the ministerial level (MARD), and its Standing Office – which is responsible for facilitating the cross ministry coordination – is established within MARD. The ability of MARD to leverage actions from other (peer) ministries remains a concern.

b. Sustaining technical capacities at the provincial and commune levels is challenged by the staff turnover policy. Continuous training and updating of information will be required to maintain the relevance of DRM local programs.

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c. Streamlined financing procedures for post-disaster recovery have not been

established. The current legal framework and administration procedures do not yet enable a separate process for the post-disaster reconstruction works. Therefore, despite the urgency for post-disaster recovery, reconstruction continues to take from 8 to 14 months from disaster events to the start of the reconstruction. The Government is currently considering new procedures for a rapid and efficient allocation and disbursement of post-disaster resources under an on-going MOF-led review of public expenditure.

d. Ensuring O&M of investments. There are three key risks to O&M: (i) Local communes were fully engaged in identifying, prioritizing, and supervising the investments and this promoted beneficiaries’ satisfaction. Moreover, most works are small, with low maintenance demands. However, few rural commune authorities can cover the O&M costs. Sustainable financing for O&M requires contributions not only from the local communes but also from central and provincial budget transfers earmarked for public infrastructure to complement local contributions; (ii) Although MONRE and its Southern Regional Forecast Center should assume the maintenance of the hydro-meteorological network and equipment, MONRE does not always allocate sufficient human and financial resources for this task or provide adequate training; and (iii) Community-based flood early warning systems were developed with vulnerable and poor communities. Keeping these systems active will require renewal of basic equipment and continuous engagement by local authorities which can prove challenging in the context of existing budget limitations.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory. 78. The Bank played an important role in facilitating project preparation and ensuring quality at entry during project appraisal. Positive aspects included: (a) close collaboration between the Bank and the Borrower during project preparation; (b) high relevance of the project to both the Government’s and the Bank’s strategies; (c) flexibility of project design and the inclusion of innovative elements that enhanced project impact; and (d) reasonable targets in a context of institutional evolution and experimentation. The main elements of project design, procedures and manuals were carefully prepared and reviewed by Government and Bank staff and management. Lessons derived from some forty-three Bank-funded and twenty-four other donor-funded projects, related to DRM in Vietnam and around the world, were taken into consideration. The main shortcoming was the underestimation of the risk factor regarding the Government’s institutional arrangements (refer to para. #29) and the lack of subsequent mitigation measures related to the low capacity of the management units at both central and provincial levels identified at appraisal vis-à-vis the introduction new integrated approach in DRM. The preparation of institutional strengthening activities could have been more closely aligned with the Government’s sector priorities to foster greater ownership of outcomes. Environmental and social safeguards, and fiduciary aspects were taken into

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consideration in the project design and appropriate arrangements were made to ensure compliance during implementation.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately satisfactory. 79. The moderately satisfactory rating for quality of supervision was influenced by the following positive factors: sufficient budget and staff resources were allocated, and the project was adequately supervised. Supervision mission were timely and solution-oriented. The task team prepared Aide-Memoires regularly and alerted the Government and the CPMO/ PPMUs to problems facilitating remedies in a timely manner, in conformity with the Bank procedures and trust fund-support donors’ policies. In particular, the MTR provided effective remedial measures. Critical issues affecting project implementation were adequately handled, including bringing in additional international expertise. The Bank supervision also helped to shift the strategic support approach from APL to SIL in order to respond to the implementation experience to ensure the achievement of the development objectives. The task team monitored safeguard and fiduciary compliances. Bank’s procurement and financial management staff worked effectively with the CPMO, PPMUs and other implementing agencies on procedures to be applied, procurement of goods and works, and the selection of consultants. 80. However, there were some shortcomings on the part of the Bank, such as the lack of adequate attention to the economic analysis during the supervision missions and the change of procurement method from ICB to NCB for the purchase of three project vehicles that delayed the delivery of the project activity. The Bank provided flexibility that supported the client in meeting intended objectives, though responses could have been more expedient. 81. The high turnover of TTLs also affected the implementation of the project, particularly the procurement aspects of the AF. At the beginning of the project implementation, it was agreed between the Bank and GOV that the direct contracting method would be applied for the procurement of the post-disaster reconstruction sub-projects, taking into consideration the emergency needs for immediately restoring critical infrastructure damaged after a natural disaster, and the nature and size of the procurement. Later, in the second half of the AF’s lifespan, the Bank requested that shopping method be applied in an effort to expedite the Government’s procedures for a speedy and efficient allocation and disbursement of post-disaster resources, while maintaining compliance with Bank policy.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory. 82. The overall Bank performance is rated as moderately satisfactory reflecting the above ratings on quality at entry and quality of supervision. The Bank team made a strong effort to prepare and supervise a project in a challenging sector environment. Such effort ultimately allowed the project to deliver most of its intended development objectives, but some shortcomings contributed to delays affecting performance efficiency. 83. No Quality of Supervision (QSA) was conducted by QAG for this project.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance

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Rating: Moderately satisfactory. 84. Government performance is rated moderately satisfactory considering its sustained commitment to achieving the PDO, especially the concerted effort to consolidate the legal and institutional framework for DRM while strengthening key agencies and local communities. Given the innovative and inter-sectoral nature of the project, the rating also reflects shortcomings with regard to several critical issues, such as the poor coordination between relevant Government agencies for prioritizing investments, implementation progress reporting and budgeting, and slow flow of counterpart funds for resettlement compensation. Government’s performance reveals priority areas for improvement that can inform further institutional strengthening.

(b) Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory. 85. The moderately satisfactory rating reflects the different performance levels of the various agencies that were responsible for the project. Throughout implementation, the main implementing agencies carried out project activities in a responsible manner, acting promptly on pending issues, requests and proposals. They endowed the project management units with adequate staff and equipment and independent leadership. Staff continuity in the project management units was high, and staff had access to sufficient funds for all implementation-related activities. However, during the first half of project implementation (up until the MTR), the implementation agencies did not perform as expected partly due to the innovative approach of the project that required complex institutional arrangements which led to a lack of project ownership and slow decision making, the inadequate attention to implementation of environmental safeguards staffing and monitoring requirements, and the delays in establishing the project M&E system at the central and provincial levels.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory. 86. The Borrower’s overall performance is rated as moderately satisfactory considering both the Government’s and implementing agencies’ performance. There were shortcomings in implementing agencies’ performance in the first half of project life but they were eventually overcome and the PDO was achieved. 6. Lessons Learned 87. DRM decisions should be made based on perceived risk reduction benefits and a combination of the physical and non-physical solutions in a context of larger integrated river-basin management scale. Investments under this project were scattered in many places and did not follow either geographical or hydrological approach that was most appropriate given the most common disaster types. In order to maximize their impact, the physical mitigation investments should be linked with CBDRM activities, hydromet data and early warning services. The river-basin approach could provide both the central GOV and the provinces with a better and more effective planning tool in managing water resources, and water-related disaster events. In sum, a multi-hazard risk assessment approach at the river-basin scale is important to better understand the level of vulnerability of the population and assets at

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provincial and local level, while promoting the sustainability of water use and sustainability of natural resources. 88. Existing institutional settings need to be leveraged to implement CBDRM activities. Properly trained beneficiaries are important catalysts for local intervention and ownership. The CFs played a key role in reinforcing the institutional linkages and information dissemination between villages and communes. CFs should be appointed by the Commune People Committee rather than being hired by the project so that they can continue in their duties after project completion. Building capacity at the district level is critical for facilitating effective transfer of investment ownership to communes. 89. Tailored public information and awareness-raising, including gender mainstreaming, are essential for commune participation, accountability and investment ownership. Efforts to reach vulnerable groups including women, children, elderly, the disabled and ethnic minorities at the village level should be considered. Information must be tailored to reach the diverse target groups and audiences considering ethnicity, age, gender and social status. 90. Appropriate O&M funds at local levels need to be allocated. A large number of commune-scale mitigation and public infrastructure have been constructed by the project through the implementation of the CBDRM and post-disaster reconstruction components. The O&M of these structures is the responsibility of the communes. However, most of rural commune authorities cannot cover the O&M costs. Sustainable financing for O&M requires contributions from the local communes but also from central and provincial budget transfers earmarked for public infrastructure to complement local contributions. Therefore, O&M budget should be sufficiently allocated through the government annual budget planning cycle conducted in all levels. 91. Strong institutional reform and leadership of the coordination agency is essential for project success and sustainability. Although the institutional set up for DRM in Vietnam has been strengthened through the project lifespan, efficiency and effectiveness in the leadership and coordination of the DRM agenda implementation still need to be improved further. Despite MARD’s mandated leadership role in DRM, it was sometimes difficult for MARD to influence MONRE and MOF in project implementation. Since these Ministries are on an equal footing, MARD lacked leverage to ensure compliance and had to depend on goodwill of sister line agencies. Anticipated cross-agency collaboration and coordination between MARD, MONRE and MOF on DRM was not effectively achieved at the project closing. Stronger coordinating leadership of central GOV would enable stronger institutional reforms, which would greatly influence the performance and sustainability of the project. Coordination between institutional actors, information dissemination and program management capacity are key factors for the success of an integrated, sustainable DRM program. 92. Clear institutional arrangements and responsibilities need to be determined before project start. The project included numerous innovative approaches which were complex to implement. Detailed draft TORs for all agencies at both national and provincial levels could have been developed prior to project start. The project would have benefited from

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mobilizing experienced Government officials to work at the project offices at the national and provincial levels. 93. Achievement of the sustainable goal for post-disaster reconstruction should be monitored closely and properly throughout the implementation of both Original Credit and AF. MOF – within its mandate – was expected to act at a higher level in establishing criteria for allocating funds to provinces in a quick and efficient manner for post-disaster reconstruction. Unfortunately, they were distracted from achieving this sustainable goal by the concentration in the detailed oversight of the implementation of small sub-projects scattered across the country. As such, a ‘fast-track’ procedure for prioritization of sub-projects and mobilization of available resources for medium and long term post-disaster recovery activities has been partially achieved at the project closing. 94. Comprehensive M&E framework should be prepared and put in place before the project start. An M&E system was established and put in full operation only three year into implementation. In addition, no detailed baseline assessment was undertaken under the NDRMP. As such, tracking and confirming development outcomes were difficult. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies A summary of the Borrower’s ICR is attached as Annex 7. No major issues were raised. (b) Cofinanciers The task team invited comments from co-financiers (the Netherlands Government and AusAid). No comments were received from AusAid. The Netherlands Government stated their view that the US$2 million was withheld due to the slow progress of the implementation. (c) Other partners and stakeholders Not applicable.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Prevention and Mitigation Investments 73.70 86.82 117.80%

Community-based Disaster Risk management 1.00 4.53 453.00%

Post-Disaster Reconstruction Support 95.80 92.99 97.06%

Project Management and Institutional Strengthening 12.00 6.82 56.83%

Total Baseline Cost 182.50 190.68 104.48% Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00

Total Project Costs 182.50 190.68 104.48% Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00

Total Financing Required 182.50 190.68 104.48%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 12.00 16.29 135.75% Trust funds 4.50 11.85 263.33% International Development Association (IDA) 161.00 162.54 100.95%

Note: - Credit cancellation: US$2,310,362 from the original credit at the closing date in June 2012 was cancelled due to the delayed procurement of the hydromet equipment. Also, US$3,619,714 saved from the exchange rate fluctuation under the AF was cancelled in December 2013. - Grants return: By June 29, 2012, a total of US$607,894 was returned to financing agencies. Of which, US$78,559 was to JSDF, US$517.496 was to PHRD and US$11,839.61 was to NTF

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component The project had four components: (a) Prevention and Mitigation Investments; (b) Community-based DRM; (c) Post-Disaster Reconstruction Support; and (d) Project Management and Institutional Strengthening. Main outputs by each component are detailed below: Component 1: Prevention and Mitigation Investments Appraisal Estimate: US$73.70 million Actual/Latest Estimate:

Output indicators Baseline Project Target

Actual Value

Achieved

% target

1 Number of sub-projects in conformity with the national strategy of disaster prevention and mitigation up to 2020

0 4 17 425%

2 Number of feasibility studies completed for sub-projects to be funded under the project

0 4 17 425%

3 Number of safe harbor completed 0 2 5 250% 4 Number of flood mitigation structures

completed 0 1 4 400%

5 Number of flood drainage system completed 0 1 2 200% 6 Number of sets of hydromet equipment

equipped 0 5 5 100%

7 Number of water level stations completed 0 89 89 100% 8 Number of hydrological stations completed 0 18 18 100% Number of surface meteorological stations

completed 0 12 12 100%

9 Number of building centers completed 0 8 8 100% 10 Percentage of people in targeted

communities (e.g. Mekong Delta) reporting improved early warning of floods and storms.

0 10% 90% 900%

Component 2: Community-based Disaster Risk management Appraisal Estimate: US$1.00 million Actual/Latest Estimate: 11 Number of ToTs provided 0 10 100% 12 Number of government officials participated

the ToT courses 0 226 100%

13 Number of community awareness/training events on "DRM" conducted.

0 306 100%

14 Number of people participated in awareness/training events

0 80,900 100%

15 Number of "Safer Commune Plans” (SCPs) prepared.

0 40 30 75%

16 Number of life-saving toolkits provided to communes

0 11,325 100%

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17 Number of commune EWS provided 0 1,284 100% 18 Number of commune office equipment

provided 0 263 100%

19 Total length of combined emergency relief and rural roads rehabilitated

0 16.274 m 100%

20 Total length of irrigation cannel rehabilitated 0 2.200m 100% 21 Total length of river bank protected 0 400m 100% 22 Number of culvert constructed 0 23 100% 23 Number of “Safer Community Plans”

integrated into commune SEDP 0 40 30 75%

24 Number of commune disaster integrated SEDP annually updated

0 30 100%

Component 3: Post-disaster Reconstruction Support Appraisal Estimate: US$20.80 million Actual/Latest Estimate: 25 Number of provinces received post-disaster

reconstruction support 0 15 100%

26 Number of districts received post-disaster reconstruction support

0 214 100%

27 Number of damaged schools reconstructed 0 201 100% 28 Number of damaged health centers

reconstructed 0 56 100%

29 Number of damaged rural roads reconstructed

0 242 100%

30 Number of damaged irrigation scheme reconstructed

0 182 100%

31 Number of direct beneficiaries benefited from the support

0 3,267,324 100%

32 Number of women directly benefited from the support

0 1,487,354 100%

33 Number of ethnic people directly benefited from the support

0 304,635 100%

34 Number of procedures for Damage Assessment revised 0

1 1 100%

35 Number of acceptable criteria approved for prioritizing allocation of post-disaster assistance

0 1 1 100%

36 Percentage of completed sub-projects withstanding subsequent disaster events

0 100% 100%

Component 4: Project Management and Institutional Strengthening Appraisal Estimate: US$12.00 million Actual/Latest Estimate: 37 Number of trainings/workshops conducted

for government officials on project management, DA, EMP, EIA, RAP, procurement, M&E

0 14 100%

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38 Number of government officials trained on project management, DA, EMP, EIA, RAP, procurement, M&E

0 989 100%

39 Number of domestic trainings/workshops to government officials on DRM

0 20 100%

40 Number of oversea trainings/workshops/study tours on DRM conducted

0 9 100%

41 Number of government officials trained/benefited from oversea trainings/workshops/study tours

0 1,475 100%

42 Number of river basin developed hydraulic models

0 3 100%

43 Number of commune flash flood and land slide systems installed

0 5 100%

44 Number of GIS software and equipment installed

0 1 100%

45 Number of provinces with developed hazard mapping/atlas

0 10 12 120%

46 Number of provinces with completed natural disaster mitigation investment plans

0 10 12 120%

47 Number of provinces with provincial SEDP integrated DRM

0 10 17 170%

48 Number of National Strategy for DRM and Action Plan developed

1 1 1 100%

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Annex 3. Economic Analysis Background 1. The NDRMP development objective was the establishment and implementation of a comprehensive natural DRM framework for natural disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation and recovery in Vietnam. There were four NDRMP components: C1: prevention and mitigation investments, C2: community-based DRM, C3: post-disaster reconstruction support; and C4: project management and institutional strengthening.

2. C1: Investment into natural disaster mitigation and prevention sub-projects aimed to minimize the disaster risk in regions with high risk of flood and storm and to enhance the capacity of prevention and control through the implementation of structural and non-structural investments. Twelve sub-projects were financed including construction and improvement of flood and storm control infrastructure in 11 sites, and one non-structural sub-project for enhancing the capacity of the Mekong River Delta Flood Early Warning System. From the IDA US$73.7 million budget for C1, US$68.5 million were spent (93 percent).

3. C2: Community based disaster risk management (CBDRM) sought to minimize natural disaster damages and enhance the control and prevention capacity in selected regions through community involvement. It improved the capacity of individuals and groups for preparing and implementing risk minimizing methods to manage natural risks. SCPs were developed in 30 communes. A pilot program completed in March 2009 (US$1.46 million) with 10 communes of three provinces included the development of their SCPs; training the community capacity in the DRM; and rescue equipment and small-sized work construction in the communes. Building on lesson learned from this pilot phase, C2 also supported the expansion into 20 additional communes. This second phase was developed with a budget of US$3.07 million.

4. C3: Post-disaster Re-construction Support enhanced the control and prevention capacity in regions by supplying the public infrastructure re-construction budget for assisting communities after the disasters occurred, including support to ensure faster reconstruction, minimizing the poverty and impact on economic growth and improving the funds-use efficiency. C3 targeted the recurrent financial deficit in the budgets for reconstruction activities, creating conditions for quick disbursement to support re-construction efforts for small-sized public infrastructure and other type of support for quick recovery. Implemented by MOF, the original budget for C3 was US$20 million, and the provinces originally supported were those affected by the Xangsane and Lekima storms. Investments under the original C3 financed a total of 165 sub-projects for US$18.9 million.

5. The Additional Financing (AF) effective on November 8, 2010 expanded the scope of the NDRMP adding US$75 million for C3 to fill a substantial post-disaster reconstruction financing gap in the wake of two recent storms (Ketsana and Miriniae) and further anticipated short-term reconstruction financing gaps resulting from future major natural disasters. With the AF approval, the closing date of the NDRMP was extended to December 31, 2013. The allocations for investments under C3 with the AF reached to US$95 of the overall NDRMP costs, representing 52 percent of the overall assigned budget.

6. C4: Project management and institution strengthening aimed to improve the control and prevention capacity in the regions through developing an effective management and

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implementation, and enhancing the institutional arrangements to ensure coordination between agencies at different levels towards the control, prevention, and recovery stages.

Economic and Financial Analysis

7. NDRMP expected results were to reduce vulnerability to flood and storm hazards in selected project areas, increasing the efficiency of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts, and strengthening the capacity of national and local DRM institutions. By repairing the damage of key protective facilities and/or upgrading the structures located in affected regions, disaster vulnerability of the selected areas can be clearly reduced. Investments to enhance disaster response capability and reduce vulnerability generate returns in terms of capital stock damage being avoided and lives being saved in the events of natural hazards. Conventional cost-benefit analysis method might be considered inadequate to assess investments on structures protecting areas prone to disasters, and post-disaster recovery investments and activities, as there is little empirical data to measure the correlation between pre-disaster preventing investments and reduction of future losses. However, a probability based analysis using dynamic hydraulic models allows calculating incremental benefits as the difference in expected value of losses under the alternative scenarios: before and after the project.

8. The estimation of these benefits was based on flood maps9 prepared to determine possible losses and weighted by the corresponding frequency or probability of occurrence of different natural hazards intensities. Dynamic hydraulic models for both “with” and “without project” scenarios represent: (i) the project enhanced current scenario including the structural and non-structural investments completed under the NDRMP, and (ii) the pre-existing damaged and/or precarious structures and poor preparedness capacity. By mapping the expected flooded area during an alternative hazard event, together with the duration and depth of water in the affected areas, and overlapping the land use and existing assets in each location, the expected value of damages and corresponding rehabilitation costs were estimated.

9. The economic benefit of the project was estimated from most of the sub-projects financed under C1 and from typical investments financed under C3. Both components spent about 90 percent of the project costs. Expected losses reduced included: (i) those directly affecting the family households (lost production of rice and other crops, cows/buffalos, pigs, poultry and household assets, (ii) other private and public infrastructure (roads, electricity, water systems, etc.), and (iii) human health or life and environmental protection values. The second and forth components’ costs were also considered as they contributed to the attainment

9 Flooded area is estimated based on flood maps obtained through hydraulic calculations to determine water volume linked to flood flowing into a specific region or area. Water levels are determined from the frequency curve of river water levels and frequencies of occurrence. Flood water over-toping (for both without and with project) and dimension of a break and time of a flood, allow to estimate the amount of water flowing to the area. Based on the estimated amount of water over-topped and topographical maps, the water level inundation is calculated. With each flooded water level, inundation areas are determined, and by overlaying with land use maps, the inundated area for each use (such as residential lands, agriculture or aquaculture areas, roads, etc.) is determined and inundation water level are defined into several depth flood area (0.2m, 0.5m, 1m, 2m, etc.). From local unit cost of damage, inundation depths and time of inundation, the reduced damage/benefit for each land use can be estimated. The procedure is repeated for several typical flood return periods (such as p=1%, p=2%, p=5%, p=10%, depending on category and grade), and the value of damage corresponding to its probability of occurrence is obtained. Expected value of loss/damage for asset is calculated by multiplying its frequency with the corresponding damage.

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of the quantified benefits from the two core components (C1 and C3) by enhancing effectiveness of the project’s preventive measures, building capacity to manage risks and by coordinating implementation.

10. Sub-projects under C1 minimized the disaster risks due to natural hazards, and enhanced the capacity of prevention and control in regions with highest risks of floods and storms through the effective implementation of structural and non-structural investments. The twelve sub-projects prioritized under C1, including the construction and improvement of flood and storm control infrastructure, and also one non-structural scheme aiming to enhance the early disaster warning and management systems in the Mekong River Delta area. From the US$67.2 million allocated funds for implementing sub-projects under C1, US$58.6 million were spent (about 87 percent of the original C1 cost). These C1 sub-projects expenditures represented almost 70 percent of the original project cost budgeted at appraisal.

11. C3 budget included: (i) US$20.8 million representing 20 percent of the original project costs, and (ii) US$ 75 million incorporated as AF. C3 supported the Government’s efforts for minimizing post-disaster damages and enhancing the emergency Government response, control and prevention capacities both at the central level and in the regions suffering recurrent floods and storms. By ensuring faster and more efficient post-disaster reconstruction support, C3 also contributed to minimize poverty and the impact on economic growth, and improved the speed and the efficiency of allocation and disbursement of funds after disaster. C3 was implemented in 8 provinces showing the highest risks of being hit by natural hazards. About 165 reconstruction and/or upgrading works on schools, health stations, roads and bridges, sea dyke and irrigation works were implemented under the C3 budget.

12. Since C1 and C3 costs represented about 90 percent of the investments financed under the original credit and the AF, representative cases of sub-projects from both components were selected to measure the impact attained by the project investments. Field visits were conducted to collect data on the situation before and after the project investments were operational, meeting with several stakeholders. Ten of the 12 sub-projects in C1 and a representative sub-project financed under C3 were considered for the assessment.

13. The financial assessment confirmed that the reduced expected losses due to natural hazards is contributing significantly to improve the livelihood of the poor in the project areas as losses are reduced including agricultural and livestock production, as well as their family household asset. The financial analysis focused on the beneficiaries’ income, and how by reducing the expected losses, the project improves poor families’ expected income. Crop and livestock activity budgets and farm models were developed for quantifying these effects before and after the project investments based on average yields, costs of production and existing cropping patterns. The expected reduction of lost assets for each area was introduced in the household budget models for both scenarios.

14. The economic analysis considered costs and benefits from the country’s perspective. Costs and benefits were valued at market prices in most of the cases because there are very few significant market distortions in agricultural prices and production costs in Vietnam. Shadow pricing conversion factors (CFs) were used only for the project investments, and for the family labor costs used for agricultural activities. These adjustments account for an average 10 percent of taxes included in investments in the first case, and for the low opportunity cost of rural labor in the second. Rural labor is provided mainly from the family household members which usually has very few employment opportunities. CF of 0.9 for

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investments, and 0.8 for labor were used for the economic analysis. Table 1 summarizes the financial and economic results for the selected C1 and C3 sub-project investments. The financial results represent the impact of investments in terms of the expected value of the average annual net income of benefited farmers and expressed as a percentage increase in their family income. As an economic impact indicator, the ERR expected from the analyzed sub-project investments was estimated considering the aggregate most direct benefits attained at the respective affected areas.

Table 1 Economic and Financial results of representative project investments

Sub-projects

Financial Results (in Million VND/year) Economic Results Expected Value of Beneficiary’s Income

Before Project

After Project

Increase (%)

ERR (%)

C1: Cau Khai Drainage System C1: Vuc Mau Reservoir Rehabilitation C1: Hai Lang Flood Protection C1: Ba Tri Sea Dyke C1: Hong Ngu Dyke Rehabilitation C1: Cua Sot Port Storm Sheltering C1: Cua Giannh Port Storm Sheltering C1: Phu Hai Port Storm Sheltering C1: An Hoa Port Storm Sheltering C1: My A Port Storm Sheltering C1: Mekong Delta Warning System C3: Typical Water Resources Subproj.

Overall Project Result

19.0 14.2 23.5 57.5 25.7 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

12.8

21.1 17.4 26.4 63.9 28.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

18.6

11.1 22.5 12.3 11.1 11.3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

45.3

21.6 16.2 19.7 15.8 6.1 40.6 44.8 40.1 33.3 12.1 32.7 26.7 25.1

15. Crop models for the relevant crops and activity models for livestock activities (cow/buffalo, pigs and poultry production) in each of the area showed net revenues both before and after NDRMP scenarios. As the expected percentages and value of lost production due to expected natural hazards is reduced after the project, expected net revenues increase providing net benefit that is being attained through each of the relevant agricultural activities.

16. Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 (file EconAn_ICR.xls) illustrate the wet season (summer-autumn) and dry season (winter-spring) rice crop models as an example of what was done for all relevant activities for the assessed project areas. Rice production is the most important economic activity in most of the affected areas. Table 2 below shows the results from the modeling of summer-autumn rice in Cau Khai. Market prices at the farm level for 2013 were used for products, inputs and labor in both scenarios. The “without project” columns show the situation before the project assuming that the situation would remain unchanged if the project would not be implemented, and the “with project” columns show the average results being expected under the completed project improvements.10.

10 FARMOD software was used for the assessment, which included crop and activity budgets, farm models, sub-project results and the overall project.

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17. The changes in family benefits appear mainly due to higher expected yields as production losses are reduced after the project investments, while production costs remain constant. For example, rice in the wet season in the sub-project area in Cau Khai shows a 9 percent annual expected loss due to natural hazards which results to an average yield of 6.3 MT/ha without the project. With the reduced risk of floods the expected loss are now reduced to 3 percent with the project structures in place. Consequently, the expected yield became 6.9

Rice CAUKHAI (Summer Autum) Crop Model Table 2

FINANCIAL BUDGET Existing(In VND '000 Per ha) Technology New Technology

1 to 30 1 2 3 to 30

Revenue 39,690 39,690 41,580 43,470Input costs

Plow ing 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000Seed (Rice) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000Urea 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750NPK 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210DAP 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176Kali (K) 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300Nutrilite 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200Pesticides 400 400 400 400Herbicides 240 240 240 240Other Costs 600 600 600 600

Sub-total Input costs 13,876 13,876 13,876 13,876Income (Before Labor Costs) 25,814 25,814 27,704 29,594Sub-total Labor costs 14,100 14,100 14,100 14,100Income (After Labor Costs) 11,714 11,714 13,604 15,494

YIELDS AND INPUTS Existing(Per ha) Technology New Technology

Unit 1 to 30 1 2 3 to 30Yields Ton 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.9Operating

InputsPlow ing lumpsum 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000Seed (Rice) kg 200 200 200 200Urea kg 250 250 250 250NPK kg 110 110 110 110DAP kg 120 120 120 120Kali (K) kg 130 130 130 130Nutrilite kg 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200Pesticides lumpsum 400 400 400 400Herbicides lumpsum 240 240 240 240Other Costs lumpsum 600 600 600 600

LaborBank Repairing pers/day 7 7 7 7Planting pers/day 39 39 39 39Fertilization pers/day 6 6 6 6Spraying pers/day 6 6 6 6Harvesting & bunching pers/day 62 62 62 62Threshing pers/day 20 20 20 20Drying & Other Post=harvest pers/day 17 17 17 17Other Activities pers/day 20 20 20 20

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MT/ha. Due to the expected loss reduction in rice yield, the expected net income per hectare in the summer autumn season would be increased from VND 11.7 million to VND 15.5 million (32 percent increase). Similar models were built for production activities in the different areas. All models represent average conditions for the crop or livestock activity in the respective sub-project area.

18. The expected reduced losses of production were quantified considering the expected higher average crop yields and net revenue values as shown in Table 1. These models were the basis for estimating the financial and economic benefits of the project interventions on the farming activities which is the livelihood basis for most benefited families. Average net incomes per crop/activity increased by 15–50 percent as a result of the combined effect of reduced production losses with same production costs. The data for all sub-projects used for the models were collected by the World Bank’s local consultant11 and were incorporated into the analysis.

19. Farm models combining typical cropping patterns and livestock activities for each of the analyzed sub-project areas were also prepared, representing typical rural household systems. These models measure the financial impact of the project on representative benefited households. Primary sources of income, production costs, off-farm employment, and on-farm consumption, were used to estimate the expected impact of the project on beneficiary’s incomes (see detailed household budgets in Appendix 1, Tables 3 to 9). The summary Table 3 below presents the financial results for the 7 affected households in the assessed sub-project areas.

Table 3 Farm models: estimated income increases (in ‘000 VND/farm) Typical farm models in Targeted Central VN areas

Farmers net income Income increase in VND

Income increase in %

Without project

With project

C1 - Cau Khai area household C1 - Vuc Mau area household C1 - Hai Lang area household C1 - Ba Tri area household C1 - Hong Ngu area household C3 – Ha Tin area household

18,992 14,242 23,534 57,502 25,750 12,843

21,139 17,437 26,476 63,856 28,675 18,648

2,147 3,195 2,942 6,354 2,925 5,805

11.3 22.4 12.5 11.1 11.3 45.2

20. Table 3 shows that the project improvements allowed for increases in household income of about 11 to 45 percent depending on the benefitted area and type of works implemented. Household model budgets confirmed that the financial impact of the project interventions had a significant effect on the poor beneficiary’s income. The estimations are based on the crop and activity models representing the main agricultural activities in each area and on expected value of assets lost derived from the flood maps for the previous and current scenarios. C1 Sub-projects Results 21. The Cau Khai Drainage System Sub-project could not provide sufficient drainage capacity to the served area, so about 1,000ha of rice was flooded every year as well as houses,

11 NDRMP ICR Efficiency Assessment Main Report, Nguyen Cao Don, November 2013. 42

roads, school and health facilities. Production improvements including fishery and industries in the area were not undertaken as prevailing conditions were too risky. NDRMP invested VND 102 billion through C1 and about VND 10.4 billion under C2 to reduce the risks of losses from natural hazards. The project upgraded existing key protection and drainage infrastructure in these vulnerable areas showing high poverty rates. Loss reductions due to natural hazards as project works reduce risks are contributing to improve the livelihood of the poor since recurrent losses included food crops, livestock production, and several family assets. As a result, agricultural losses were reduced by an expected value of VND 26.4 billion per year, and other losses by VND 2.4 billion (see details in Table 11 in Appendix 1). The ERR of the investment in reconstructing the Cau Khai drainage system was estimated at 21.6 percent, and the Net Present Value (NPV) at VND 73.1 billion (using 12 percent as discount rate).

22. The Vuc Mau reservoir upgrading sub-project. The reservoir was constructed in 1978-1986 on Hoang Mai River with an irrigation capacity for 4,690 ha from 14 communes with highly levels of poverty. It supplies water to Hoang Mai cement plants and about 11.4 Million Cubic Meters (MCM) per year as water for domestic use to communities in the area. The project allowed for up-grading the reservoir structure, with a significant reduction of flood risks during the wet season and providing for sufficient water in the reservoir for irrigating more than 2,000 ha of rice during the dry season. Expected agricultural productivity and production increased, allowing for better livelihood conditions in the area. There are increasing additional benefits derived from industrial and domestic water supply as well as from aquaculture activities. The ERR of the VND 134.3 billion invested under C1 was estimated at 16.2 percent and the NPV at VND 43.1 billion (see details in Table 12 in Appendix 1).

23. The Hai Lang Drainage Improvement Sub-project benefitted 12 communes in the lowlands in Hai Lang district, downstream of O Lau, Thac Ma, O Khe and Tan Vinh Dinh rivers. The target was to prevent and minimize the impact of hazards in human life, public and private assets and infrastructure, livelihoods, sustainability of the natural resource base and the environment in the area. Improvement of the socio-economic conditions and structures are now inducing development into the region as enhanced conditions protect production, increase land use intensity and contributes to environmental protection. Investment brought huge benefits to the local people, minimizing damages on more than five thousands hectares of rice in both seasons, and minimizing losses and damages on assets during the flood season. The dyke is now 80 cm higher than the older one, preventing from early floods when people have not yet harvested their rice. In addition, aquaculture has expanded to nearly 300 hectares on the 12 communes in the area. Flood warning system operates well, supplying full information to the local people and authorities at all levels to respond timely, actively prevent and fight floods, and to provide effective solutions to minimize losses and damages on people and assets. The ERR of the VND 195.4 billion invested under C1 and C2 was estimated at 19.7 percent and the NPV at VND 125.8 billion (see details in Table 13 in Appendix 1).

24. The Ba Tri sea dike Sub-project area has an economic structure which is rather rich and diversified. Production activities with economic importance in the region are: agriculture (rice, vegetables and crops, fruit trees, cows, pigs, goats, chickens, etc.), fishery (sea crayfish, oyster, fish in pond, etc.), forestry, industry (buying and processing facilities, fishing port, etc.), and several home craft services (small business activities, market, small scale industry facilities: saplings stations, seed, foodstuff for shrimp, etc.). Prawn farming has grown in most

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communes in the project area, but due to weather conditions (salinity, tides, rains, etc.), frequent losses and unstable productivity resulted in high poverty levels. With the project works increased safety for the people and for thousands of hectares of rice and aquaculture, salinity intrusion affecting the rice, crops and aquaculture diminished, and increased private investments followed. The dike construction also facilitated traffic circulation in the area, ensuring cheaper connections in the area. The ERR of the VND 196.4 billion invested under C1 and C2 was estimated at 15.8 percent and the NPV at VND 54.7 billion (see Table 14 in Appendix 1).

25. The Hong Ngu Protection Dyke Sub-project in Hong Ngu district is located in the northern province of Dong Thap, being riverhead district of the Tien River. The area was suffering from heavy damages due to frequent natural disasters, mainly by floods during the wet season and droughts in the dry season. During the flood season with water strongly running from upstream, landslides usually occurred in many local communes (Long Khanh A, Long Thuan, Phu Thuan A, Phu Thuan B and Thuong Lac, Hong Ngu town). Every year, the affected area was increasing, and more people had to move often to safer places. Damages were estimated at billions of dongs. The project invested VND 244.5 billion (80 percent under C1 and the rest under C2) and now risks from natural hazards are reduced significantly. The ERR of the VND 255 billion invested under C1 and C2 was estimated at 6.1 percent and the NPV at VND - 89.7 billion (see details in Table 15 in Appendix 1).

26. The five sub-projects on safe port storm shelters. Before the construction of the safe port shelters, fishermen had to go through long distances for finding protection from storms. Boats gather along the small rivers for safe shelters. Massive damage to boats and fishing gear were common in every rainy season. With the C1 sub-projects, accessible safe places for docking boats minimize human and facilities losses when storms hit. The new shelters also provide logistic services for fishing boats as they are well equipped with modern radio communication systems to inform about storms and contact with the boats on time for seeking for storm shelters. The five sea port safe shelter sub-projects implemented under C1, and the number of ships being protected by these shelters are detailed in Table 3:

Table 3 Safe Sea Port Shelters constructed under C1

Name of Sub-project Number of storm shelter ship as per project (ship 300CV) Beneficiary province

Cua Sot Safe Harbour 300 Quang Tri Cua Gianh Safe Harbour 800 Quang Binh Phu Hai Safe Harbour 570 Thaa Thien Hue An Hoa Safe Harbour 1200 Quang Nam My A Safe Harbour 400 Quang Ngai

27. These facilities are very practical and highly effective in preventing storms damages for the fishery boats and constitute a central prerequisite for the development of fisheries logistic services. Fisheries business now have a more adequate infrastructure, electricity, water, transportation and other logistics services for their activity, and fishing boats have less risks related to storms, saving time and travel costs, increasing productivity and income from their business. The level of risk affecting their activities, including processing and service providers in general was considerably reduced which is stimulating the development of the sector and supporting industries, creating more jobs and opportunities for the local communities. Table 4 shows the aggregate result of the VND 276 billion investment on the

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five sea port shelters constructed under C1. The ERR was estimated at 33 percent and the NPV at VND 543 billion.

28. Cua Sot Safe Harbor Sub-project invested VND 35.8 billion generating annual savings in fuel from boats seeking for protection when early warning systems announce hazard events. In addition, the reduction of damaged fishing boats and gears is estimated at about VND 25.2 billion per year. The resulting ERR is 40.6 percent and the NPV VND 106 billion. 29. Cua Gianh Port storm shelter had a cost of VND 68 billion. Before this shelter was constructed, an average of 14 fishing boats of 30 – 300 CV and 6 bigger boats of more than 300 CV were lost per year due to storms. In addition about 10 human lives were also lost. As these loses are now avoided completely, the value of benefits (or avoided losses) was estimated at 47 billion per year. The resulting ERR is 44.8 percent and the NPV VND 212 billion. 30. Phu Hai Port for stormproof and storm shelter harbors 30-40 big vessels of 200-500CV and 200 small vessels of 20-250CV. Before the project shelter people have to use subsidiary machines to push the vessel in. This machine costs an average of about 30-50 million. As the storm came, the machine had to be brought to the bank, sank boat ashore and then salvaged. Salvage cost of about 6 to10 working wages and about 1.5 million. After the project invested VND 31.4 billion, fishermen do not take too much effort to ensure the safety of ships and about VND 19 billion are saved in fuel by ships seeking for shelter. The resulting ERR is 40.1 percent and the NPV VND 81.9 billion. 31. An Hoa Safe harbor Sub-project moored regularly about 500-700 vessels, with a capacity of 20- 400CV. The harbor had no power system as well as managing house and specific operational procedures. With the project about VND 78.9 billion were invested and

Table 4 Port Storm Shelter Subprojects ECONOMIC BUDGET (AGGREGATED) Without(In VND Billion) Project With Project

1 to 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 to 30

Main Production Fish 3,234.0 3,234.0 3,234.0 3,234.0 3,234.0 3,234.0 3,234.0

Production Cost Investment

Investment into natural disaster mitigation and prevention (C1 - 154.3 116.1 6.2 - - -Operating

Purchased Inputs Losses in Human Lives 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0Losses in Fishing Boats (30 - 300 CV) 28.0 28.0 25.8 19.0 9.0 2.2 0.0Losses in Fishing Boats (> 300 CV) 18.0 18.0 16.5 12.3 5.7 1.5 0.0Operation & Maintenance of Structures - - 0.5 2.0 4.1 5.6 6.1Fishing Operational Costs 1,810.0 1,810.0 1,810.0 1,810.0 1,810.0 1,810.0 1,810.0Savings in Fuel to Reach Shelters 136.5 136.5 128.9 105.9 71.5 48.6 41.0

Sub-Total Purchased Inputs 1,993.6 1,993.6 1,982.6 1,949.9 1,900.7 1,868.0 1,857.1Labor

Labor 728.4 728.4 728.4 728.4 728.4 728.4 728.4Sub-total Operating Costs 2,722.0 2,722.0 2,711.0 2,678.3 2,629.1 2,596.4 2,585.5

Sub-Total Production Cost 2,722.0 2,876.2 2,827.1 2,684.6 2,629.1 2,596.4 2,585.5OUTFLOWS 2,722.0 2,876.2 2,827.1 2,684.6 2,629.1 2,596.4 2,585.5

Cash Flow 512.0 357.8 406.9 549.4 604.9 637.6 648.6_________________________________IRR = 33.0%, NPV = 543.05

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annual savings in fuel for seeking protection and reductions on damages were estimated at about VND 35 billion. The resulting ERR is 33.3 percent and the NPV VND 142 billion. 32. My A Port for stormproof and storm shelter established a safe place for docking boats during storms, minimizing human losses and damaged assets and facilities for the fishermen. The shelter also is a provider of logistic services for fishing, so it is possible to save time, travel costs, increase productivity and efficiency of fishing operations. The level of risk for fishing, processing, and other service providers has been lowered significantly. The new situation is stimulating the development of fisheries, increasing the scale of the activity and related industries. Funding for operation and maintenance is covered by the provincial budget. After the project invested VND 89 billion, safety of ships was ensured and VND 12.6 billion is saved in fuel for seeking shelter. If only saved fuel is considered as benefit, the resulting ERR is 10.9 percent and the NPV VND - 7 billion with 12 percent of discount rate.

C3 investments 33. C3 benefits are more difficult to quantify. Table 5 show the type of sub-projects financed under C3. In large part, C3 benefits reflect the considerable financing gap that exists for post-disaster reconstruction activities in Vietnam, even of basic public infrastructure, implying considerable needs, combined with measures to allocate the scarce available funds as effectively as possible to meet the most urgent reconstruction needs.

Table 5: List of Component 3 Sub-project, per type of sub-project

Type of Works Sub-project in provinces

Quang Da Thien Hue

Quang Ha Tinh

Nghe Thanh Ninh Total

Nam Nang Binh An Hoa Binh Schools 17 16 6 3 - - 6 5 53 Health Stations 8 2 7 3 - - - - 20 Roads & Bridges 23 - 3 2 4 5 1 4 42 Irrigation works 19 1 4 2 5 2 8 8 49 Sea Dykes - 1 - - - - - - 1 Total 67 20 20 10 9 7 15 17 165

Source: Progress report for the 1st Quarter of 2010, Service of consultancy, supervision and activities supporting reconstruction. Post-disaster (Component 3), MONACO Company.

34. For instance, the C3 road and bridge sub-projects which were 25 percent of the C3 schemes focused on reconstruction of rural networks, restoring motorized access of affected communes to neighboring ones and to the wider road network. C3 school reconstruction sub-projects representing 32 percent of the schemes financed under C3 enabled students to return to purpose-built school buildings within their own communities and a likely return to a higher quality of education, in some cases via a return to reduced class size or longer school days. In a number of cases, school reconstruction also included the enlargement of buildings to include additional classrooms, supporting a permanent switch from half-day to full-day schooling, in line with GOV education policy. Measures have also been taken to strengthen the resilience of structures supported under C3 against future hazards, with longer term social, economic and public finance benefits as well. 35. Irrigation-related sub-projects entailed a mixture of dams, dykes, reservoirs, weirs and pumping stations. For this group of sub-projects representing 30 percent of financed

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schemes, quantifying benefits is less difficult. Restoration of irrigation facilities under C3 supported agricultural livelihoods and, in some cases, they combined irrigation with flood protection or with water supply benefits. For example, a VND 850 million sub-project to repair a pumping station in Quang Nam brought the restoration of irrigation water to 300 ha of agricultural land. Prior to its repair, farmers had to leave fields fallow during the dry summer-autumn season, resulting in an annual estimated loss in earnings of VND 8.0 billion.

36. A typical water resources sub-project financed under C3 was assessed during the ICR mission visits to the benefitted areas. The sub-project involved the reconstruction of the Lang Dam in Ha Tin Province, a diversion dam broken by a 2010 storm. Irrigation to 575 small farms irrigating 115 ha was restored and the recharge of downstream aquifers was also enhanced. Typical farmers in the area increased their annual family income from VND 12.8 billion to VND 18.6 billion, a 45 percent increase. C3 invested VND 10.35 billon allowed an aggregate increase in net economic benefits of the irrigation small farmers of about VND 2.9 billion per year. The ERR of the investment was estimated at 26.7 percent and the NPV at VND 10.8 billon.

37. An independent M&E consultant completed two C3 M&E reviews, based on a desk-based review of documents and field visits to the eight provinces that have received C3 funding, including a random check of completed sub-projects. The reports covered progress in preparing and executing physical works and in disbursing funding, the quality of physical works, the compliance with the C3 Operations Manual and with Bank safeguards requirements, and an impact assessment. The report concluded that C3 had had “a great effect”. it also found that the capacity of individual PMUs played an important role in determining overall performance.

38. The US$75.0 million AF credit for C3 post-disaster reconstruction was assigned to 12 central coastal and highland provinces which were hit hard by storms and floods in 2009, 2010 and 2012, including Ketsana in 2009 and Mirinae in 2010, and the 3 provinces in the Mekong Delta that suffered from severe floods in 2011. The allocation to the 15 provinces were based on same criteria of (a) damage assessment; (b) fiscal capacity of the province; and (c) other sources of support allocated from the national Government in response to disaster response. The AF sub-projects followed the same pattern being applied under the C3 sub-projects in terms of type of sub-projects and benefits generated.

39. C3 has made clear progress in meeting its two overarching objectives, namely to help address the GOV’s recurrent post-disaster reconstruction financing gap, supporting more rapid post-disaster reconstruction; and to strengthen GOV’s speed and efficiency in the allocation and disbursement of post-disaster resources and enhance effectiveness of use. According to the provinces all completed sub-projects that were funded by both the NDRMP C3 and AF stood and operated well during the recent storms and flooding. In particular, many schools were used as a safety shelter in the communities. In terms of sectorial distribution, the largest share of funding was used for roads, bridges and related drainage (36 percent of C3 budget), followed by irrigation-related infrastructure (26 percent), schools (25 percent, including a vocational center as well as kindergartens and primary and secondary schools) and health care facilities (8 percent). 40. The overall economic analysis show that the aggregate NDRMP investments are having an Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of about 25 percent. The economic analysis considered costs and benefits from the country’s perspective valued at market prices in most

47

of the cases because there are few market distortions in agricultural prices and production costs in Vietnam. The aggregate economic impact considered the expected ERR from the most C1 sub-projects and a representative case for the C3 analyzed sub-project investments. C2 and C4 costs were also included in the analysis since they contributed to the efficiency of the overall investment.

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Annex 4. Resettlement Impacts

Actual Resettlement Impacts Relative to Plan

Province Affected people (No. of persons)

Total resettlement costs (US$)

Planned Actual Planned Actual

Thanh Hoa 386 404 125,124.70 303,909.42

Nghe An 253 282 156,749.35 162,437.01

Ha Tinh 2 3 3,076.28 3,076.28

Quang Binh 33 49 138,535.48 162,051.25

Quang Tri 1,223 1,313 179,148.81 179,148.81

Thua Thien Hue 8 8 12,275.57 12,275.57

Quang Nam 124 126 117,916.32 197,509.42

Quang Ngai 12 12 238,431.41 243,175.24

Ben Tre 390 755 2,739,227.94 2,949,374.05

Dong Thap 750 1,194 3,597,501.37 3,867,588.34

Installation of early warning system in Mekong Delta 296 9 107,262.45 129,809.83

Improvement of drainage system along Hanoi-HCM railway 167 13 13,209.82 13,209.82

Total 3644 4168 7,428,459.5 8,223,565.04

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Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending Laurent Msellati Task Team Leader EASRD Task Team Leader (1) Cuong Hung Pham Sr. Operations Officer EASRD Co-TTL (1) Yuka Makino Natural Resources Management Specialist SASES Soren Baunsgaard Economist EACVF Economics Idah Z. Pswarayi-Riddihough

Lead Natural Resources Management Specialist

EASRD Natural Resources and DRM

Lars Lund Sr. Social Scientist EASES Social Hoa Thi Mong Pham Resettlement Specialist EASES Resettlement Nina Bhatt Social Scientist EASES Social Phillip Brylski Lead Environment Specialist EASES Environment Vinh Quoc Duong Environment Specialist EASES Environment Thang Nguyen Chien Procurement Specialist EAPCO Procurement Thong Quang Tran Financial Management Specialist EACPO Financial Mgmt Hoi-Chan Nguyen Sr. Counsel LEGEA Legal Huong Thu Vu Program Assistant EACVF Administrative Minh Nguyet Khorami Program Assistant EASRD Administrative Graham Shorten Natural Disaster Specialist Consultant DRM Jan Timmerman Dam Safety Specialist Consultant Dam safety Charlotte Benson Public Financial Management Specialist Consultant Financial Mgmt Zenaida Delica Community-based Risk Management

Specialist Consultant CBDRM

Wael Zakout Lead Operations Officer ECSSD Peer Reviewer Nico Bakker Regional Water Resources Program RNE Peer Reviewer Margaret Arnold Sr. Program Officer TUDHM Peer Reviewer Hoonae Kim Sector Manager EASRD Overall management

Supervision/ICR Laurent Msellati Task Team Leader EASRD Task Team Leader (1) Severin L. Kodderitzsch Task Team Leader EASRD Task Team Leader (2) Cuong Hung Pham Sr. Operations Officer EASRD Task Team Leader (3) Xiaolan Wang Sr. Operations Officer EASVS Task Team Leader of

the AF (4) Toru Konishi Senior Economist EASIN Task Team Leader (5) Lan Thi Thu Nguyen Natural Resources Economist EASVS Social and economics Thu Thi Le Nguyen Program Assistant EASVS Administrative Hung Viet Le Financial Management Specialist EASVS Financial Mgmt Hisham A. Abdo Kahin Sr. Counsel EASVS Legal Hoa Thi Mong Pham Senior Social Development Specialist EASVS Administration Dung Thi Thuy Dao Program Assistant EASVS Administrative Son Thanh Vo Senior Rural Development Specialist EASVS CBDRM Cung Van Pham Financial Management Specialist EASVS Financial Mgmt Quynh Xuan Thi Phan Financial Officer GEFOB Financial Mgmt Khanh Linh Thi Le Program Assistant EASVS Administrative Mai Thi Phuong Tran Financial Management Specialist EASVS Financial Mgmt Ly Thi Dieu Vu Sr. Environment Specialist EASVS Environment

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Tuan Anh Le Social Specialist EASVS Social Tam Thi Do Program Assistant EASVS Administrative Dzung Huy Nguyen DRM Specialist EASVS Co-TTL (2) Son Van Nguyen Environment Specialist EASVS Environment Thang Toan Le Procurement Specialist EASVS Procurement Khang Van Pham Environment Specialist EASVS Environment Jennifer J. Sara Sector Manager EASVS Overall management

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY04 N/A N/A FY05 56.59 222,773.27 FY06 N/A N/A Total: 56.59 222,773.27 Supervision/ICR FY06 24.53 99,344.00 FY07 24.54 72,510.35 FY08 35.09 85,235.49 FY09 42.64 106,618.62 FY10 26.59 49,610.44 FY11 32.97 86,955.08 FY12 24.22 52,207.78 FY13 16.56 61,086.97 FY14 9.8 37,887.79

Total: 236.94 651,456.52

Total: 293.53 874,229.79

N/A = Not Available.

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Annex 6. Beneficiary Survey Results Not applicable.

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Annex 7. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Not applicable.

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Annex 8. Summary of Borrower's ICR 1. Project context, Development Objective and Design

1. Vietnam is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Every year, the country’s economy and population have suffered from natural disasters. Hundreds of people die every year and the average economic loss is about 1-1.5 percent of country’s GDP per year. To responding to these challenges, the GOV has established a system of Committees for Flood and Storm Control at Central and sub-national levels. The system operation focuses mostly on emergency response and relief. NDRMP was the first IDA project in Vietnam that adopted an innovative integrated approach to DRM, which considers development planning, preparedness, forecasting, prevention, mitigation and post-disaster recovery as well as CBDRM. NDRMP was designed as a strategic support program and introduced to build institutional and technical capacity of Government agencies and communities in DRM to support the country in reducing the human, economic and financial losses from natural hazards.

2. Main beneficiaries of the project include Government agencies and institutions at national and subnational levels (provincial, district and commune) and communities in 12 hazard-prone provinces of the Central and Mekong Delta regions of Vietnam. Mass organizations, enterprises and all other international organizations and NGOs also benefited from the project through enhanced coordination and collaboration on DRM efforts.

3. The NDRMP's development objective (PDO) is the establishment and implementation of a comprehensive risk management framework for natural disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation and recovery. The project assisted Government to achieve the following:

• Reducing the vulnerability to flood and storm hazards in the project areas, with two expected outcomes: (a) central Ministries and Provinces would implement structural and non-structural investments, and (b) Government would adapt its approach to disaster management to include CBDRM;

• Increasing the efficiency of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts, with two expected outcomes: (a) Government speed and efficiency in the allocation and disbursement of post-disaster resources would be increased, and (b) the State Contingency Budget would be used efficiently to support post-disaster reconstruction of public infrastructure; and

• Strengthening capacity of national and local DRM institutions, with two expected outcomes: (a) Government would develop the capacity to strategically plan structural investments for disaster mitigation based on full technical, social, environmental and economic analyses, and (b) relevant provincial and central Government agencies would have the institutional and technical capacity for collection analysis and dissemination of information for risk management.

4. Accordingly, the project’s original key performance indicators were: • The number of provinces with completed Natural Disaster Mitigation Investment

Plans; • The number of feasibility studies completed for sub-projects; • The number sub-projects completed; and

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• The number of SCPs completed. The project included four components, as follow:

• Component 1: Prevention and Mitigation Investments • Component 2: CBDRM • Component 3: Post-Disaster Reconstruction Support • Component 4: Project Management and Institutional Strengthening

5. At approval stage, the project received a total of US$ 98 million, of which US$86 million was provided by IDA and other US$12 million was provided by the GOV. During implementation, the project received additionally grant support from the Japanese Government (via PHRD, JSDF) and the Royal Government of the Netherlands (via NTF) with a fund total of about US$19 million. Government of Australia (via AusAid) also provided technical expertise support to the project through the recruitment of a Chief Technical Advisor, a DRM Specialist and a Hydraulic Modeling Specialist. 6. The structure of the project components was not revised during implementation. In June 2010, GOV and the World Bank agreed to provide an AF for post-disaster reconstruction support (under Component 3) with an amount of US$75 million. This led the total project budget increased to US$192 million of which US$161 million were financed from IDA, US$12 million from GOV, and US$19 million from trust fund donors. 2. Project implementation arrangement

7. The project included a complex institutional arrangement for the implementation that involves many institutions and agencies, as well as communities. In agreement with the World Bank, the Government assigned CCFSC to be responsible for overseeing, coordination and provision of guidance to project implementation. MARD – as the project owner – was responsible for day-to-day management and monitor the project implementation as the whole. MOF was fully in charge of Component 3 implementation through the established project reporting structure. Diagram of the project implementation is presented in Figure 1. 3. Outcomes, Effects and Impacts

3.1. Overall achievements. In overall, the project has achieved the following main results: 8. A National Strategy for Natural Disasters Preparedness, Prevention, Mitigation and Recovery to 2020 (NS) has been developed and was approved by Prime Minister on November 16, 2007. The Strategy lays out Vietnam’s primary DRM objectives, which transform the traditional emergency response focus to a comprehensive and integrated DRM approach. The Strategy requires an improved and reformed institutional setting at national and subnational levels. Importantly, NS emphasizes the critical and importance of community involvement in DRM, as well as the combination of structural and non-structural in disaster risk reduction and investment. Accordingly, a National Action Plan for Implementation of the National Strategy has also been formulated and was approved by Prime Minister on

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September 29, 2009 to guide the NS implementation steps and progress. The National Action Plan has been consolidated from all 19 sectorial and 64 provincial action plans. 12 Furthermore, the project supported 17 target provinces to integrate DRM action plan into their SEDPs. Of which 12 provinces developed their provincial-level integrated disaster management investment plans. The National Action Plan is being implemented under the guidance and supervision of the CCFSC. Implementation progress report is prepared every 1 and 5 years.

12 Today, there are only 63 provinces as Ha Tay province has been merged into Hanoi Capital) since 2009.

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9. Institutional capacity of CCFSC and its subordinate branches at the line ministries and sub-national levels (provincial, district and commune) have been significantly enhanced. The Prime Minister issued the Decree No. 14/2010/NĐ-CP dated February 27, 2010 to rearrange and strengthen institutional arrangement and coordination mechanism of CCFSC and its ministerial and provincial branches across the country. The Decree describes in detail the responsibilities and accountabilities of all DRM involved agencies and related institutions in both vertical and horizontal coordination and reporting line across line ministries and different levels. Responding to the Decree, all DRM agencies at Central and subnational levels have been strengthened with more staffs, the necessary tools and necessary experience via trainings. The central level Disaster Management Center (DMC), which was as a division of the MARD’s Dyke Management and Flood and Storm Control Department (as the Standing Office of the CCFSC), was separated and promoted as a national center for DRM from 2010 onwards. Improved capacity was noted in the response to Typhoon Nargis and Ilke (2008) and Ketsana (2009), floods in the central region (2009, 2010) and in the Mekong Delta (2011), and Typhoon Naris, Wutip and Hyain (2013). 10. Physical investments under the project such as dyke systems, safe harbors for fishing boats, reservoirs/dams, pumping station and drainage improvement etc. have been operated well and they have significantly contributed to the reduction of disaster damages and economic losses in target provinces. For instance, the combination of dyke and emergency road sub-project in Hai Lang district of Quang Tri province has helped to protect 12 communes with a total population of 64,000 people and 5,200 ha of 2-crop rice. Improved drainage system located along the Hanoi – Ho Chi Minh railway route running through 8 provinces has significantly reduced flooding situation to ensure safety of railway operations in the wet season. Construction of five safety storm shelter harbors has helped a thousand of fishery ships to be safer from typhoon impacts. Installation of early warning system in the Mekong Delta improved community information access and warning from 10 percent to 90 percent; and information accuracy increased up to 85-90 percent. No damage in the protected areas was reported during the wet season in the subsequent years after the completion of the risk reduction investments. 11. A total of 681 community public infrastructure (201 combined schools and safe shelters, 56 health care center, 182 flood protection and agricultural production structures, and 242 combined emergency route and rural roads) were reconstructed under the post-disaster reconstruction support (including Component 3 and AF). The reconstructed public infrastructure benefited over 3 million peoples living in 15 hazard-prone provinces. In addition to the CBDRM activities (described in the next para.), post-disaster reconstruction support helped the Government and the community to fill funding gaps for post-disaster recovery and provided a rapid disbursement facility to fund post-disaster reconstruction of public infrastructure. It also enhanced the ability of local communities to actively and promptly respond to natural disasters through supporting local people to quickly stabilize their living conditions and rural production activities after disaster. The support contributed to raise awareness of community in preventing and mitigating natural disasters through their participation in prioritization of investments and planning processes. 12. More than 210,000 villagers living in 30 communes have benefited directly from the CBDRM model, including the Commune Safe Plans, community early warning and evacuation systems, and community-scale mitigation measures developed by the project.

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Effective awareness raising and public information through different communication channels given to relevant agencies and local people, especially women, poor and ethnic minorities have reinforced the democratic planning processes carried out from commune level and have encouraged participation. Small-scale disaster projection structures and community early warning system have operated well and significantly reduced disaster damages in 30 target communes. Community supervision of construction and O&M of infrastructure were carried out to ensure their sustained quality and increase local awareness of their ownership rights over the investments. As the results, the CBDRM model with participatory approach has been rolled out nationwide via the National Program for CBDRM, which was approved in 2009 and launched in 2010. 13. The project has also helped to leverage support from many donors to strengthen DRM capacity in Vietnam. Efforts include improved coordination and information-sharing network between the Government, donors such as ECHO, UNDP, RNE, Embassy of Luxembourg, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), AusAID, and international NGOs such as CARE International, OXFAM GB, OXFAM HK, World Vision, and ADPC, etc. 14. Learning the successes and experiences from the NDRMP, a follow-up project Vietnam – Managing Natural Hazards (VN-Haz) has been formulated in agreement between the GOV and the World Bank. VN-Haz project will continue to build capacity of institutions and communities on DRM to ensure the successful transition from traditional emergency response and relief to integrated DRM approach. VN-Haz will focus on ten hazard-prone provinces in the Central Region and promote the river basin approach to guide priority structural and non-structural investments at different levels. Hydro-met services and early warning systems will also be upgraded and strengthened through this follow-on project. The project has been initially implemented in a satisfactory manner.

3.2. Achievements by Components

Component 1: Prevention and Mitigation Investments 15. A total of 17 sub-projects were identified based on risk and cost-benefit analysis. The identification was done in close consultation with responsible GOV agencies at the national and provincial levels and the World Bank. In the following, 17 feasibility studies were successfully undertaken and finally approved by the Government. Through the identification of sub-projects and preparation of feasibility studies, a comprehensive of skills and experiences of responsible Government agencies, including technical and academic institutions, and state management departments, were built in hydrological and hydraulic modeling, technical design, risk and cost-benefit analysis, and social and environmental impacts assessment, etc. Improved capacity helped these institutions better in preparing the Government’s and other donors’ funded projects in the future. 16. 11 disaster reduction structures were successfully rehabilitated in the Central and Mekong Delta provinces. These structures have well operated with no negative social and environmental impacts. According to the provincial reports, these structures have significantly reduced damages caused by disasters in the protected areas in the recent years. 17. 89 hydromet stations, 3 building centers and a set of hydromet equipment packages were installed in the Mekong Delta. The investment in early warning system has significantly

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improved capacity of the Southern Regional Forecast Center of MONRE on both forecasting and early warning from 10 percent up to 90 percent. Especially, the accuracy of information has reached up to 90 percent (see table below for details). Improved early warning system has also improved the accessibility of information of communities up to 90 percent. Improved early warning system helped farmers to better plan their crops and harvest, as well as to protect their life and poverty. According to the CCFSC, the economic loss caused by disasters in Mekong Delta in 2013 was reduced 10 percent in comparison with the previous years.

Evaluation of Mekong Delta Early Warning System

No. Type of Natural Disasters

Times of occurrence per years

Perc

enta

ge o

f ac

cura

te

fore

cast

ing

(%) Forecast level

2006

2007

2008

2009

Tim

ing

Un-

timin

g

Acc

urac

y

Inac

cura

cy

1 Storms 16 12 14 14 90-95 x x 2 Low-pressure 3 Monsoon 20 22 22 20 85-90 x x 4 Flood 5 6 5 5 80 5 Tides 6 Tide regime 4 3 6 6 85 7 Salinity intrusion 8 Drought 3 3 4 3 85-90 x x 9 Other disasters

Component 2: Community based DRM (CBDRM) 18. A pilot phase was introduced in the most vulnerable 10 communes of Ha Tinh, Thua Thien Hue and Ben Tre provinces with funding from JSDF. Learning from the pilot, in the scale-up phase, the pilot was expanded to other 20 vulnerable communes of Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Quang Tri, Binh Thuan and Dong Thap provinces with funding support from NTF. 19. By establishing a Commune CBDRM Committee with technical support from CFs, CSPs were prepared for all 30 communes with proactive participation of commune peoples, including the most vulnerable groups (i.e. women, children, elder and disable peoples). Prioritized investments (e.g. drill exercises, school education, hazards and risks mapping, and small-scale mitigation structures, etc.) were also determined in the CSP and implemented by the funding support from the project. Furthermore, local authorities and communities also worked together in integrating CSP into Commune Annual and 5-year Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP). The development and implementation of both CSPs and integrated Commune SEDPs engaged and promoted involvement of community peoples in planning and decision processes, monitoring quality and progress of investments. 20. In implementation of CSPs, a series of effective awareness raising activities and DRM technical trainings to commune officials were carried out. These activities built on the various

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needs and typical geographical situations and social conditions across communes, and were implemented in close consultation and collaboration with local authorities and communities. 21. In combination with the construction of small-scale mitigation structures, a commune early warning system and a set of search and rescue equipment packages were installed and provided to 30 communes. The commune early warning system was connected directly with central, regional and provincial hydromet centers and the provincial SCFC. The system helped to improve information accessibility that enhanced the emergency preparedness capacity of commune level. At the same time, hydromet centers and provincial SCFC have been strengthened in maintaining database system and issuing timely and accuracy warnings at the commune level. 22. In summary, CBDRM activities were successfully implemented. They helped to strengthen the capacity of grass-root level in DRM. By balancing structural and non-structural measures with community participatory approach, CBDRM helped the target communes significantly minimize disaster risks and damages. Involvement of the communities ensured the ownerships and sustained quality of investment, as well as increase of local awareness. At the same time, it also promoted the partnership and collaboration between the central, provincial and commune levels, and between the commune officials and community people. As a result, the CBDRM model, including CSPs, commune early warning and evacuation system, and participatory commune-scale mitigation measures, has been consolidated into a nationwide CBDRM Program. The Program was approved by Prime Minister in 2009 and is being smoothly implemented through Government support and donor funding.

Component 3: Post-disaster Re-construction Support 23. The post-disaster reconstruction brought direct benefits to local people and communities. It provided an opportunity to rebuild, reconstruct or repair the major public infrastructures damaged by natural disasters, restore living standards and socio-economic development. A total of 3,267,324 peoples (of which 1,487,354 women and 304,635 ethnic minorities) living in the vulnerable communities of 15 hazards-prone provinces have benefited from the support. 24. Complement Component 4, post-disaster reconstruction also supported building of capacity of Government agencies at the national and subnational levels through the development and implementation of the guideline on Damage and Needs Assessment (DANA) and criteria on prioritization and allocation of fund for post-disaster reconstruction. In addition, this support also helped to develop a detailed needs assessment for the establishment of an Emergency Management Centre (EMC). As a result, an EMC was established in Hai Lang District of Quang Tri province. At the national level, a department level Disaster Management Centre (DMC) was established within MARD in early 2010. 25. A total of 681 commune public infrastructures, of which 201 combined schools and safety shelters, 56 health centers, 242 combined rural roads and emergency routes, and 182 irrigation schemes, were reconstructed in 15 provinces. According to the provincial reports, most reconstructed public infrastructures operated well and withstood the recent storms and subsequent floods in 2013. In addition, those structures virtually caused no negative impact on the local population and had positive impacts on enhancing the daily living standards of local

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people by improving travelling conditions, medical care, learning conditions and irrigation conditions for agricultural production. 26. Beside the success on filling the funding gaps for post-disaster reconstruction as the first objective, the AF did not achieve its second objective on improving the speed and efficiency of post-disaster reconstruction activities through improvement of the management and effective use of resources for post-disaster recovery. Since the implementation of the original credit NDRMP to completion of the AF, post-disaster reconstruction activities had gone through five funding allocation cycles (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012). Despite the urgency of post-disaster recovery, the current legal framework and administration procedures do not provide a separate process for the post-disaster reconstruction works. Consequently, the average duration to perform the funding allocation for each cycle took from 8 to 14 months before reconstruction works start. At the closing date of the AF, a review of the existing procedures was carried out. Recommendations including a proposal for a new mechanism were made shared with MPI, MOF and MARD, as well as the provinces to consider revising existing laws and regulations.

Component 4: Project management and institution strengthening 27. Component 4 focused on two objectives, as follows: (i) to develop the practical and effective project management and implementation, given local context and management structures, and (ii) to enhance the institution of the authorities to ensure better cross-agency coordination at different levels in terms of their responsibilities in disaster the control, prevention, as well as responding and supporting recovery. 28. A series of training related to project management and implementation, such as financial management, procurement, safeguard policies and M&E, etc. was provides to all project staffs at the national, provincial, district and communes levels. Operation manuals for the project and its specific components (e.g. CBDRM and Post-disaster reconstruction) were frequently reviewed and revised based on needs. Trainings on using the manuals were also provided to all project staffs. A total of 989 project staffs at all levels benefited from these trainings. In addition, this Component helped to transfer international experiences through the engagement of international experts with various types of expertise to support project implementation. Improved project implementation reflected the enhanced capacity of project staffs. This enhanced capacity is now being continuously used in the implementation of the follow-up VN-Haz project. 29. This Component provided numerous capacity building activities (on-job trainings, class trainings, study tours, workshops and conferences) to Government officials in the area of DRM. The Component helped to build capacity of Government officials in areas of: (i) identification of risks, including establishment of geodetic reference system, acquisition of satellite imagery, and air photography, (ii) risk analysis, including upgrading existing equipment of national geographic information system (GIS), digital model, risk mapping and modelling, and (iii) risk management, including planning, forecasting and early warning systems, public awareness raising, etc. 30. Along with building-capacity of Government officials, the Component helped to formulate a strategic legal framework for DRM that allows the country to move from the

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traditional focus on emergency response and relief to an integrated DRM approach. On November 16, 2007, Prime Minister approved the National Strategy, and in 2009 the National Action Plan to guide the implementation steps and progress of the Strategy. The project supported 17 target provinces to develop their Integrated Disaster Risk Management Action Plan (IDRMAP) and integrate them into provincial SEDPs. Following the success of the provincial IDRMAP in 17 project target provinces, all other 47 provinces across the country and 19 ministries developed their own action plan under Government’s funding. Both the National Action Plan and ministerial and provincial IDRMAPs are being maintained and implemented under the guidance and supervision of the CCFSC. Implementation progress reports are prepared every 1 and 5 years. 4. Key Factors Effecting Implementation and Outcomes

Project preparation and design

31. The project, particularly CBDRM component, relied heavily on the availability of trust funds. NTF had committed to provide a grant support of about US$8.5 million for CBDRM activities. Unfortunately, due to internal financial reasons, NTF decided to cut off the amount of US$2 million. This led to a limited expansion of the CBDRM to 20 communes, instead of 30 communes as originally planned.

Project implementation

32. Government’s readiness for project implementation. The innovation and complexity of the project design required a complex institutional setting and multi-agencies coordination mechanism at the national and subnational levels. Furthermore, it also required sufficient technical and project management skills from the project management units to enable the implementation progress. Although most start-up conditions were completed theoretically, capacity of project management units, including staffs and technical skills for necessary areas (e.g. DRM, procurement, FM, safeguards, M&E) had not been fully in place at project start. In the first half of the project span, the Government struggled in settling down its project management structure and building capacity of PMUs at the national and subnational levels. This led to the slow progress and it was rated as unsatisfactory by the World Bank until the MTR mission. 33. Lack of cooperation and coordination between the central Ministries and between the central and provincial units. The project components and activities were implemented and monitored by several ministries. For instance, MARD was responsible for the project as the whole and some specific components, MOF was in charge of implementation of the post-disaster reconstruction support and the AF, MONRE was responsible for hydromet sub-project and MOT was responsible for the railway sub-project. A similar set up was also established at the provincial level. The lack of clearly defined coordination and reporting line across the ministries and various levels caused delay in the first half of the project implementation in addition to the limited capacity of the project management units. 34. In response, actions were taken by the CCFSC and MARD to clarify management responsibilities and streamline the implementation procedures. It included:

• Clarifying the responsibilities and reporting line of the CPO/CPMO, involving agencies at MARD (e.g. DDMFSC), the PCU and PPMUs in managing, monitoring and processing implementation and procurement plans.

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• Resolving bottlenecks in project management, such as procurement processes for design and construction contracts for planned civil works, limitation of CPMO and PPMUs staffs, and lack of experience in procurement processes, FM, M&E and safeguards, as well as acceleration of the process for allocating counterpart funds for resettlement and site clearance.

• Improving the effectiveness and speeding-up implementation of Component 4 – Project Management and Institutional Strengthening.

35. From the MTR (February 2008) onwards, project progress improved considerably and the annual disbursement has matched or exceeded expected annual amounts. 36. Additionally, a few additional difficulties caused numerous extensions of the original credit’s closing date by a total of 23 months and 28 days. For example, the recurrent bad weather and frequent unpredictable storms affected the construction of a number of sub-projects, particularly those exposed to the sea, under Component 1. Complexity in procurement of hydromet sub-project, and falling exchange value between SDRs, US$ and VND made it difficult to plan final activities. 5. Key lessons learnt 37. Strong coordination and ownership. In order to implement an innovative and comprehensive DRM project program, it is needed to set up a well-coordinated and simple organizational structure. The project clearly shows that smooth implementation can only be achieved when: (a) coordinating agency plays an active role of leadership, emphasizing the bottom-up approach with the participation of all involving agencies, b) there are good directions and coordination mechanisms between authorities and agencies at all levels, and c) adequately-trained and committed staff is available from the beginning of project implementation. In the first half of the project course, the implementation arrangements failed to establish a necessary degree of coordination required to guide and channel the project’s efforts towards achieving its goals. 38. Community participation. It is important to note that the active participation of local communities in project implementation, particularly in the CBDRM activities and post-disaster reconstruction, ensured successful project implementation and reinforced the participatory planning processes, community’s ownership and outcomes’ sustainability. At the same time, community participation helped to strengthen their capacity and promote local knowledge, as well as increase local awareness in project/program implementation and DRM.

39. Strong partnership between the Government, the World Bank and Trust Fund Donors as well as other international organizations. Strong coordination and partnership among partners and donors helped to resolve bottlenecks and accelerate successful project implementation. Strengthening of the NDMP Network, which was a major platform to facilitate the coordination and consultation, as well as information-sharing among stakeholders, including Government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, etc., considerably contributed to the project’s results and sustainability. NDMP has now been fully transformed into the sustained Government-led DRM Working Group (DRMWG).

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40. Putting in place a timely and adequacy of project M&E system. Although establishing an M&E system was challenging due to the high degree of institutional complexity and the novelty of the new approach in DRM introduced through the project, a timely and adequate M&E system in place could have been helped to provide timely evaluations of DRM efforts to ensure effective prioritization in the context of budget constraints and competing priorities. In addition, M&E should be integrated in Government’s regular M&E and reporting mechanism to reinforce the institutional capacity and contribute to policy dialogue on DRM. 41. Streamlining procedures for an effective system of prioritization and budget allocation for post-disaster recovery. The existing legal framework and administration procedures did not stipulate a separate process for post-disaster reconstruction works. Due to this, the Government applied normal investment procedures for post-disaster reconstruction activities under the project. Consequently, the time-gap between the disaster impact and funding allocation for post-disaster reconstruction still remained (e.g. each phase of post-disaster reconstruction took from 8 to 14 months from disaster event occurrence until reconstruction start). In the last few months before the closing date of the AF, a review of the current practices was conducted and an improved mechanism for the post-disaster reconstruction was shared with the relevant national and provincial agencies for their further review and decision. This activity provided critical input to the efforts of the Government as it continues to address its responsiveness to the disaster. 42. Establishing a culture of prevention requires dedicated efforts and resources. The NDRMP selected a simple strategy combining analytical methodology for hazard, vulnerability and risk identification, the socialization and formalization of preventive planning and the development of specific mitigation measures. This has proved to be an optimal way of capturing and maintaining the interest of stakeholders and strategic partners throughout the project and beyond, improving their perception and understanding of risk, behavior and capacity to manage the impact of adverse events.

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Annex 9. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders The task team invited comments from Government agencies (MARD, MONRE and MOF) and co-financiers (the Netherlands Government and AusAid). No comments were received from MARD, MONRE and MOF as well as AusAid. The Netherlands Government stated their view that the US$2 million was withheld due to the slow progress of the implementation.

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Annex 10. List of Supporting Documents 1. The World Bank, Natural Disaster Risk Management Project: Project Appraisal

Document, Report No. 30935-VN, August 16, 2005.

2. The World Bank, Natural Disaster Risk Management Project: Aide-Memoires, Management Letters, and Implementation Status and Results Reports, 2005-2013.

3. The World Bank, Natural Disaster Risk Management Project: Project Paper on Additional Financing, Report No. 48427-VN, May 21, 2010.

4. Vietnam, Central Project Management Office of MARD, Borrower’s Implementation

Completion Report, Draft received June 16, 2011.

5. Vietnam, Project Coordination Unit at Ministry of Finance (MOF), Borrower’s Implementation Completion Report for Additional Financing, Draft received February 12, 2014.

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