DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 082 610 HE 004 614

AUTHOR Weiss, Carol H.TITLE The Consequences of the Study of Federal Student Loan

Programs: A Case Study in the utilization of SocialResearch.

INSTITUTION Columbia Univ., New York, N.Y. Bureau of AppliedSocial Research.

SPONS AGENCY Office of Naval Research, Washington, D. C. GroupPsychology Branch.

REPORT NO NO0-14-67A-0108-0006; NR-170-174PUB DATE Oct 70NOTE 147p.

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.65 HC-$6.58DESCRIPTORS Case Studies; *Educational Finance; *Federal Aid;

*Fiaancial Support; *Higher Education; SocialSciences; Student Costs; *Student Loan Programs

ABSTRACTThis report traces the consequences of a study of

federal student loan programs. The first chapter outlines the eventsthat led up to the Loan Study, the nature of the questions posed, andgovernment preparations for letting a contract for the study. Chapter2 describes the conduct of the Loan Study: the development of aproposal, the beginning of study activities, and the pursuit of twotracks of investigation. Chapter 3 traces the decisionmaking on thefuture of loan programs. The fourth chapter identifies factors thatfacilitated and constrained utilization of the Loan Study. Appendicesinclude related data. (MJM)

FILMED FROM BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CCco

) cp

COLUMBIA UNIVER,SITYtu-1

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESTUDY OF FEDERAL STUDENT

LOAN PROGRAMS

A Case Study in the Utilizationof Social Reserareh

Carol H. Weiss

S DEPARTMENTOf NEAEINEDUCATIONg WELFARENATIONAL

:NSTITUTf OFEDUCATION

F ;-(

FILMED FROM BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BUREAU OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH

Columbia University605 West 115th StreetNew York, N. Y. 10025

The Bureau of Applied Social Research is an instrument of Columbia University'sGraduate Faculties for training and research in the social sciences. The Bureau has formany years served as the research laboratory of the Department of Sociology, and italso facilitates social research by students and faculty of other departments and schoolsof the University. The Bureau's governing board includes representative,, from all of theUniversity's social science departments and several professional schools,

The Bureau carries on a program of basic and applied research under grants andcommissions from foundations, government agencies, social welfare ' .,nd other nonprofitorganizations. and business firms. In so doing it provides experience on major empiricalstudies to graduate students and makes available data and facilities for student projects;it provides research facilities to faculty members; it offers training and consultation tovisiting scholars, especially from social research institutes in other countries; and it makesthe results of its investigations available through publications for lay and scientificaudiences.

A bibliography of Bureau books, monographs, articles, unpublished research reports,dissertations, and masters' essays may be obtained from the Bureau's Librarian.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STUDY OF FEDERAL

STUDENT LOAN PROGRAMS

A Case Study the Utilization of Social Research

Carol H. Weiss

Document B of

The Columbia-ONR Project on the Uses of Sociology

Bur.eau of Applied Social Research

Columbia University

October 1970

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Introduction 1

Utilization: Search for a Meaning 1

Organization of this Report 4

Chapter I: Prelude to the Study 6

Origin of the Study 11

Chronology - Phase I 20Themes 21

Anticipated reliance 21Decision relevance 22Timing 23

Ground shift 23

The actors and their roles 24

Chapter II: Conduct of the Study 26

The Study Begins -- April 1967 26

Conduct of the Study: Track 1 -- the Bureau 26Conduct of the Study: Track 2 -- the CEEB 35

Merger of the Two Tracks of Investigation: The Recommendations 38

Influence of field work 39

The development of study recommendations 43Report of the Study 52

The relation of the recommendations to the questionnairedata 56

Chronology -- Phase II 64

Chapter III: Decisions Are Made 66Meanwhile at the Office of Education 66The Office of Education Goes on Record on the CEEB

Recommendations 73The Higher Education Amendments of 1968 77The House Subcommittee Uses the Report 78Senate Reception of the Report: Respectful but Uninterested. 85Action on the Higher Education Amendments 91

Short bill 91House passage of the big bill 95The Senate bill 99Interim extension 100

Passage of the Bill 101The Role of the Public Health Service 104The Health Manpower Act of 1968 107Chronology - Phase III 111Scoreboard: Did Survey Data Increase the Utilization

of the Study Recommendations? 112

Other Effects of the Study 115

Chapter IV: Concluding Comments 119

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Appendix A: Task Statement for the Study of Federal Loan Programs

Appendix B:

Appendix C:

Successive Drafts of Recommendations of the Study --October 9, October 20, December 4, Final Report

Forty-four CEEB Recommendations, Classified by Degreeof Survey Support

i.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The information in this report comes largely from the partici-

pants in the research and in its subsequent consideration for adminis-

trative and legislative decisicn-making. They were uniformly magnani-

mous with their time, information, and conmentaries. It would be hard

to imagine a more cooperative and insightful group of informants.

Deep thanks go to James W. Moore, Director of the Division of

Student Financial Aid, Office of Education; John I. Kirkpatrick, study

director, College Entrance Examination Board; Peter P. MuirheaL,

Associate Commissioner for Higher Education, Office of Education; John

F. Morse, director, Commission on Federal Relations, American Council on

Education; George and Patricia Nash, Bureau of Applied Social Research,

Columbia University; Charles Lee, professional staff member, Senate Sub-

committee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare;

Roy H. Millenson, Minority Clerk, Senate Subcommittee on Education;

William Gaul, Associate General Counsel, House Committee on Education

and Labor; George Warner, Chief, Student Loan and Scholarship Branch,

Bureau of Health Professions Education and Manpower Training, Public

Health Service; David C. Bayer, Chief, Guarantee Agencies Section,

Insured Loans Branch, Division of Student Financial Assistance, Office

of_Education; Samuel Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legisla-

tion, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Donald C. Parks,

Executive Officer, Division of Health Manpower Educational Services,

Bureau of Health Professions Education and Manpower Training, Public

Health Service.

For further information, we wish to thank Mrs. Betty Pryor, Com-

mission on Federal Relations, American Council on Education; Donald

Hirsch, Special Assistant to General Counsel, General Counsel's Office,

Department of Health, Education and Welfare; Mrs. Corinne Graves, Assist-

ant to Chief, Student Loan and Scholarship Branch, Bureau of Health

Professions-Education and Manpower Training, Public Health Service; Don

Berens, administrative assistant, House of Representatives Special Sub-

committee on Education; Ann Pasanella, Assistant Director of Research,

College Entrance Examination Board; Robert Barkley, former staff member,

Health Subcommittee, Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee; James

Meager, professional staff member, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce

Committee.

I also wish to thank my colleagues on .he Utilization project

at the Bureau of Applied Social Research, particularly Professor Paul

F. Lazarsfeld for his stimulating comments and Joel Brooke for his

cheerful help.

Note: Positions and titles are given as of January 1969.

1.

IUTRODUCTION

Utilization: Search for a Meaning

The investigation reported in this paper is part of a project on

"The Utilization of Social Research." The intent of the project is to in-

crease our understanding of what happens to research studies after they

are completed. How are they "used?" Under what circumstances are they

uses? What problems interfere with their utilization?

in recent years, an increasing amount has been written on researh

utilization.* Scholars have analyzed the roles of social scientists,

speculated on the effects of the social organization of research, made

beginnings in the study of clients and potential users of research, their

values, valuations, communications behavior, and utilization activities.

Policy and operations in substantive fields have been examined in an

attempt to assess the contribution of social science research. Much of

the writing has been subjective, most of it impressionistic, a good

deal polemical.

From the welter of information and opinion, some critics conclude

that the pay-off of social research is small. At the extreme, some say

research is not only rarely utilized but rarely worth utilizing. Others,

more scholarly, are using the growing body of information to develop

*Three of the best recent anthologies are Paul F. Lazarsfeld, WilliamSewell, and Harold Wilensky (eds.), The Uses of Sociology, Basic Books,1967; Elisabeth T. Crawford and Albert D. Biderman (eds.), Social Scien-tists and International Affairs, Wiley, 1969; Research and TechnicalPrograms Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, U. S.House of Representatives, The Use of Social Research in Federal DomesticPrograms, Dinetieth Congress, 1st Sessicn, Farts 1-IV, 1967.

2.

theoretical understanding of the processes of utilization, a sociology of

social research. Practical-minded writers are trying to extract princi-

ples that will increase the use of research. Lists of necessary pre-

conditions for use include suQh various items as close contact between

client and researcher during the study, the existence of an emergency

situation facing the client, availability of money and resources in the

user organization, attractive and competent presentations of results,

engagement of the researcher in post-research decision-making, and many

more.

With all the writing that has been done, it is surprising to

find that little actual research has been done on the extent to which

social research is used or what makes some research used and some

languish neglected. The most common discussion is still the case history

of research that the writer has been involved in. The prevailing tone

(despite all the recognition of external constraints) remains one of

hurt that research results were not more effectively applied.

That so little research on utilization has been done suggests

the complexities of such study, Lot only methodologically but conceptu-

ally as well. As Paul Lazarsfeld has said, utilization is an empty word.

What does it mean? Is the only bona fide use that which takes research

results and interpretations and applies them directly to the intended

practice or policy? But no research solves all the questions. Decision-

makers inevitably face dilemmas arising from cost, politics, timing,

public acceptance, sudden (post-research) changes, the application of

abstract propositions to a concrete situation. How much effect should

research have before it can be considered "used?" What of research thet

raises.new issues or leads to redefining of existing issues? Or research

3.

that leads to further research? What are the varieties of meaning that

inhabit the word "utilization"?

Are there non-scientific uses of research that deserve to be

considered utilization? Research can provide "social vindicators" for

a federal program. It can succeed in postponing an awkward problem, or

shunting responsibility for it. "Basic" research sponsored by a federal

agency can lend prestige to the grantors and encourage further Congres-

sional appropriations. The research has had utility. Its consequences

in the real world, however nonrational, have achieved some of the sponsor's

objectives. Where must research purpose and outcome intersect before we

can talk of utilization?

As one step toward specification of the meanings of utilization,

we undertook to trace the consequences of several research studies.

This report describes the consequences of one such study, "The Study of

Federal Student Loan Programs."

The Student Loan Study was conducted by the College Entrance

Examination Board with the assistance of the Bureau of Applied Social

Research under contract with the Office of Education.

As expressed in the task statement, this study was designed to

"gather information and evaluate factors bearing on the organizations

and operations of federally supported student loan programs. The evalua-

tion will cover administration of the student loan programs,.the problems

of student loan collections, and other significant areas of student loan

operations. In total, the study will develop and propose measures to

make federally assisted student loan programs best serve the Nation's

broad educational objectives."* The study began in April 1967 and the

*"Task Statement for the Study of Federal Loan Programs," Appendix A, inA Study of Federal Student Loan Programs, College Entrance ExaminationBoard, 1968.

4.

report was submitted to tie Office of Education in January 1968. The

budget for the study was $125,304.

Organition of This Report

The report is divided into four chapters. The first chapter out-

lines the events that led up to the Loan Study, the nature of the

questions posed, and government preparations for letting a Etntract for

the study. There follows a chronology of the events of the :nen Study

from its-gleam-in-the-eye stage to its impact on later events. The

chapter concludes with a discussion of the themes that appear in our

chronicle of utilization of the Loan Study results.

Chapter 2 describes the conduct of the Loan Study: the develop-

ment of a proposal, the beginning of study activities, and the pursuit of

two tracks of investigation. The two lineS of study merged in the develop-

ment of recommendations for government action and the preparation of the

study report.

Chapter 3 traces the decision-making on the future of loan pro-

grams. The first section describes steps taken in the Office of Educa-

tion while the study vas in progress. Following sections detail responses

to the Loan Study report and subsequent actions by the Office of Educa-

tion and the House and Senate subcommittees on education that culminated

in passage of new loan legislation, the Higher Education Amendments of

1968. Loan legislation in the health field is administered and legis-

lated by different bodies. Succeeding sections therefore, are devoted

to the responses to the Loan Study and activities of these groups--the

Public Health Service and the cognizant Congressional committees. The

chapter continues with an assessment of the effect of survey data on the

5.

fate of Loan Study recommendations for legislation. The final section

discusses non-legislative effects of the study.

The fourth chapter attempts to identify the factors that facili-

tated and constrained utilization of the Loan Study.

6.

CHAPTER I

PRELUDE TO THE STUDY

The mandate to "gather information and evaluate factors bearing

on the organization and operations of federally supported student loan

programs" involved six different loan programs in effect at the time of

the study.

In 1958 the Congress passed the National Defense Education Act.

Title II of the act established a program of long-term low-interest loans

to students in institutions of higher education who had financial need.

Under provisions of the National Defense Student Loan Program (NDSLP),

the federal government contributes 90 per cent of the principal and the

institution contributes 10 per cent. The program is administered federally

by the Office of Education through the Division of Student Financial Aid,

which distributes funds annually to colleges and universities. The

colleges lend the money and collect the loans.

Students with superior academic background receive special con-

sideration. Undergraduates can borrow up to $1,000 a year with a maximum

of $5,000. Graduate and professional school students can borrow up to

$2,500, with a maximum (including both undergraduate and graduate loans)

of $10,000. A loyalty oath is required. The student does not repay the

loan (and no interest accrues) until after he has terminated his educa-

tion. Repaynent is deferred and interest suspended during military ser-

vice, Peace Corps, and VISTA service. When the student has completed his

studies, he repays the capital and pays interest of 3 per cent per year.

In 1964, eligibility for loans under the NDSLP was extended to students

carrying at least half-time academic programs.

7.

For students entering the teaching profession, up to half of the

loan will be cancelled at the rate of 10 percent for each year of

teaching. Through 1965 and 1966 amendments, teachers in low-income

school districts and teachers of handicapped children receive cancella-

tion of the entire loan, at the rate of 15 per cent per year.

The program has been enthusiastically accepted and used by the

institutions of higher education and by students and their parents. Over

1 billion dollars in loans have been made to students at over 1700 schools.

As intended, the National Defense Loans have generally gone to students

from lcwer-income families* and enabled many to attend college who would

otherwise have been unable to meet the costs.

In 1961 and 1962 a special loan program for Cuban refugees was

enacted. In 1963 its terms were made to correspond generally with those

of the National Defense Student Loan Pro3ram, although with special

considerations. Administration is through the Office of Education, but

a segment is operated by the Public Health Service.

In 1963, the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act

authorized loans for students in medicine, osteopathy, dentistry, andsubsequent legislation added

/other health professions. The Bureau of Health Manpower of the Public

Health Service administers the program. Therewas a higher ceiling on

loans ($2,500 rather than $1,000 for any one academic year), interest was

higher (the "going Federal rate" set by the Secretary of the Treasury).

Forgiveness of the total loan was authorized for practice in a low-income

*Approximately 70% of borrowers were from families earning $6,000 ayear (..x less. Nash, George, "Student Financial Aid--College andUniversity," Encyclopedia of Educational Research, Fourth Edition.

8.

rural area, and forgiveness cf part of the loan for practice in an area

designated as having a shortage of the given professional service.

Loans for nursing students were authorized in 1964. The Nursing

Student Loan Program, too, is administered by the Public Health Service.

Borrowers who work full-time ac professional nurses in public or non-

profit institutions or agencies received cancellation of up to half the

loan at the rate of 10 per cent each year.

By 1965, the student loan structure was complex, but apparently

operating to the satisfaction of the students and the educational insti-

tutions. Howevert several important factors were pressing on the student

loan system. First, it was becoming clear that the amount of funds

wide available for loans would have to continue to increase drastically;

both the costs of education and the proportion of youth going on to

higher education were increasing over time. Second, the federal bud-

get--particularly with increasing defense appropriations for the Vietnam

conflict--was not likely to increase allocations for student loans at

anywhere near the needed rate. Third, there was a pervasive sense that

the private sector of the economy, in this case the lending institutions

of the nation, should participate in student loans. Lending money was

their business; through government reinsurance of loans, risk would be

eliminated, and the supply of money for educational loans would be

greatly expanded.

Another set of factors was operating. Middle-income parents

were asking for spine relief from the heavy expenses of higher education.

The then-current loan programs for undergraduates were for lower-income

people, but what about the $10,000 or $15,000 family with two children in

college at a cost of $2,000-$3,000 per year per child? Senator Ribicoff,

9.

among others, was pressing for tax deductions for families with children

in college. The administration opposed the plan, because the individual

family would recover only a small fraction of its outlay (and colleges

might well raise tuition, since the extra cost would be painless).

Treasury estimates of lost revenue by the second year reached $1.3-1.5

billion. The Treasury would consider the sum lost in taxes as financial

aid to students and could be expected to limit other aid programs, es-

pecially for low-income students.

To .1e-..t both sets of pressures, the Guaranteed Student Loan

Program (GSLP) was established in 1965. This program, rather than using

federal money, provided for government guarantee of loans made to students

by lenders. The federal government subsidized the total interest (set

at 6 per cent) during the student's enrollment in school and subsidized

half the interest (3 per cent) during the repayment period for students

with an adjusted family income of less than $15,000. Students from

higher income families paid full interest.

The GSL program was administered by state agencies, or in states

where state agencies were not yet operating, by a private agency under

contract to the government or to the Office of Education, or as a

last resort, under direct federal insurance program administered by

the Office of Education. The Office of Education advanced "seed money"

to state agencies to help them guarantee loans by banks in their state.

The Vocational Student Loan Insurance Act of 1965 provided an

insured loan program, similar to GSLP, to students in accredited public

and proprietary vocational schools.

The Guaranteed Loan Program did serve middle-income students

as intended. Of the loans processed by December 1967, half were made to

1C.

students whose families earned $6,000-$12,000 a year.

But in other ways the program fell short of expectations. The

states that did not have a functioning state agency prior to the enact-

meet of the federal program were slow in getting the program started

and any took no action at all. Lending institutions were far from en-

thusiastic about participating in the program. Money became very tight

jurt about the time that the program began operation (1965-66) and the

number of lending institutions making student loans was lower than ex-

pected.

But even before the Guaranteed Student Loan Program went into

effect, harrassed federal budget-makers saw the program as a way to re-

duce allocations for educational loans. In July 1965 the Bureau of the

Budget sent out an edict to government agencies preparing budget re-

quests for fiscal year 1967 to reexamine budgets carefully. If possible,

new programs that cost less money should be substituted for old programs.

The Bureau of the Budget people and the Department people in HEW realized

that the National Defense Student Loan Program and the soon-to-be-enacted

Guaranteed Student Loan Program were very similar and would in essence

serve the same purpose. In the fall of 1965, a decision was made high

up in HEW to replace the 1DSLP with the GSLP in order to save $190

million from direct appropriations. As a result HEW budgeted no money

for National Defense Student Loans in its fiscal year 1967 budget.*

Although there was great opposition to the termination of the NDSL

*For a full discussion of this act, its antecedents, and the controversyit engendered, see Basil J. Whiting, Jr., "The Student Loan Controversy,"Public and International Affairs, Vol. V, No. 1, Spring 1967, pp. 5 -12.

11.

Program within the Office of Education, the HEW budgetary proposal rep-

resented acquiescence to the Bureau of the Budget and the White House.

The private sector, through the GSLP, was to take over.

The outcry was immediate. The NDLSP had political sex appeal.

It had worked well since 1958, had about 1-1/4 million borrowers, most

of whom had voting parents. The American colleges--over 1600 of them

were participants in the program--rose up in righteous indignation.

They depended on the NDSLP. What about students currently on loans?

Were they to be cut off? There was no way of knowing whether bank loans

would work at all, and if that program fell flat, where would the stu-

dents and the institutions be? Letters poured in to the Congress.

Mrs. Edith Green, chairman of the House Special Subcommittee on

Education was particularly :angry. The National Defense Student Loan

Frogram,which had enabled over a million poor youth to attend college,

was one of the subcommittees favorite programs. Moreover, the Repub-

lican members of the House were not alsinclined to make political capital

out of the issue.

The Congress, largely through the efforts of Mrs. Green and.

Mr. Fogarty of the Appropriations Committee, restored the original level

of authorization ($190 million) for NDSLP. Actual appropriations were

$179 million, The Congressional move "broke the President's budget,"

i.e. appropriated more than administration requests. The President was

not pleased. He.was annoyed at HEW for leaving him in a politically

untenable position.

Origin of the Study

Secretary John Gardner of HEW was anxious to avoid traps of this

12.

sort again. Moreover, loan programs had gone into operation iii

health field and were being proposed in other areas, and as loan pro-

grams proliferated, he wanted information on which to base effective

planning. Both political and administrative consideloxions made a study

st-am usefUl. Secretary Gardner sent a memo to Commissioner of Education

Harold Howe II in spring 1966 asking for an outside study of federal

student loan programs, to be jointly financed by the Office of Education

and the Public Health Service. The Office of Education began to develop

plans for the study in spring and summer 1966.

It was in the same summer of 1966 that the Guaranteed Loan

Program was launched. It was also a time of tight credit. There was

some immediate feedback from irate parents that banks wouldn't lend

money. The Higher Education Amendments of 1966 included an amendment,

introduced by Senator Brewster of Maryland, directing the Commissioner

of Education to study the loan insurance program.

The Commissioner of Education shall make an investigation and studyto determine means of improving the loan insurance program...par-ticularly for the purpose of making loans insured under such programmore readily available to students. The Commissioner shall reportthe results of such investigation and study, together with hisrecommendations for any legislation necessary to carry out such,improvements, to the President and the Congress no later thanJanuary 1, 1968.

Because plans for a study of loan programs were already under

way, it was not necessary for the Office of Education to contract for

a separate study. Instead the GSLP, although very new, was included

in the study plans.

An advisory committee was set up within the Department with

representatives from the Office of Education, the Public Health Service,

and the Comptroller's Office, to define the study's tasks and recommend

13.

procedures for awarding the contract. Meetings were going on durin'

the height of the budget conflict, and it was inevitable that the commit-

tee was concerned with a shift to private funding of student loan pro-

grams, its feasibility, and the administrative burdens for the federal

government of auditing, accounting, and reporting.

Another topic that received considerable attention was the amal-

gamation of the adr&nistration of all six loan programs in one adminis-

trative unit. Secretary Gardner was pressing for greater order and

rationality within the jerry-built structure of the department, and

common administration of the loan programs seemed a reasonable move.

During the summer of 1966, the advisory committee drew up a list

of possible contractors for the study. Names on the list were largely

those of management consultants--Booz, Allen and Hamilton; McKinsey and

Co.; Cresap, McCormick, and Paget, etc. In the undated document that

lists these firms, the deadline for submission of st,.th proposals was

September 16, 1966. But talk in the department dragged on for months.

What James Moore, Director of Student Financial Aid, Office of Education,

calls "bureaucratic muddling" went on for the rest of 1966 concerning

just what the study should study and who was going to pay how much toward

its cost. In January and February 1967 final decisions were made. A

"request for proposal" (RFP) was written in the Office of Education.

The study was to look into matters of policy as well as procedures, and

a new Est of prospective bidders was drawn up. Non-profit agencies with

knowledge about education--rather than commercial consulting firms--were

asked to submit proposals. It was on this list that the CEEB was included.

A bidders' conterr)ce was held, and negotiations took place with a

number of agencies.

The task statement for the study outlined federal policy on

student loans:

14.

(11 the federal government has fostered student loans)to needy students and is now extending benefits of loans to students

from middle-income families "so that additional students will attend

college," and (2) "federal policy is to minimize direct loans financed

from the Federal Treasury, and maximize loans through private financial

sources," with federal guarantees and subsidies tc keep the cost to the

student low.

The objectives of the study, as stated by the Office of Educa-

tion, were to collect information about, and evaluate, the federal loan

programs--their organization, operation, and administration--in relation

to the policy guides given above. Furthermore, the study was to make

proposals for improving student loan programs.

Several key coverage areas were itemized. These included

(1) administrative structure, responsibilities, and relationships,

(2) operating responsibilities of the educational institution, lending

institution, and loan guarantee agency, (3) administration of student

loan forgiveness because of teaching, practice of medicine in rural

areas, or other public service which the Congress has determined to be

eligible for forgiveness, (4) factors affecting the supply of private

credit, (5) measures that will assure loans to applicants with financial

need under credit shortage conditions, (6) special problems of private

credit for minority groups and families without established credit

records. A pervasive emphasis is the transition to private funding of

the loan programs and the examination of arrangements that will ensure

fairness, efficiency, and operating harmony.

See Appendix A for the complete Task Statement for the Study.

15.

The CEEB Proposal

When the College Entrance Examination Board received the "re-

quest for proposal" from the Office of Education, staff evinced interest

in undertaking the type of study described. John I. Kirkpetrickodirector

of CEEB's Col.ege Scholarship Srvice, who was to become Study director,

made a pencil note, "We could use this to become experts in field."

Mr. Kirkpatrick and two other staff members of CEEB attended the

briefing meeting held on February 24, 1967 by the Office of Education to

discuss the projected study--the govarnment's concerns, issues to be

covered, financial arrangements, schedule and deadlines. It became

clear that OE expected a survey of collcges' experience with loan ad-

ministration and their opinions of improvements needed in the programs.

The meeting confirmed the CEEB staff's interest in undertaking the

study, particularly when OE's original deadline for completion of the

study was moved from September 30, 1967 to December 31, 1967.

The decision was made at CEEB to proceed with the proposal.

John I. Kirkpatrick would plan the study and write the proposal, since

federal loan programs were closely related to his responsibilities as

director of the College Scholarship Service. The major function of the

College Scholarship Service is the development and administration of a

system for determining the financial need of college students. It

reports the family's financial circumstances to the educational institu-

tions to which the student has applied.

Mr. Kirkpatrick was new to the position, having joined the staff

on February 1, 1967 with the title of Vice President. He was not new to

CEEB. He had been a Trustee, and for 16 years served as chairman of the

Finance Committee. His previous employment was largely in university

16.

financial administration- -as vice president and treasurer of Pace College,

vice president and treasurer of Lehigh University, and vice chancellor

for administration at the University of Chicago. He also had nine years

of banking experience with the Irving Trust Company.

A meeting was scheduled for March 3, 1967 between staff of the

CEEB and the Division of Student Financial Aid of the Office of Education

to continue discussions on the proposal. A few dais before the meeting,

Kirkpatrick called George Nash of the Bureau of Applied Social Research.

He told Nash about the projected study and asked if he would be interested

in working on the survey of colleges that OE wanted. When Nash expressed

interest, he was invited to join the CEEB delegation to the meeting on

March 3 with OE in Washington.

How did the Bureau of Applied Social Research come into the

picture? Paul F. Lazarsfeld, former director and chairman of the

Administrative Board of the Bureau, had long been a member of the CEEB

Committee on Research and Development. The CEEB and the Bureau had

worked together In previous studies. The most recent cooperative study

dealt with financial aid policies and practices and the emerging pro-

fession of financial aid officer.* George Nash, the Bureau director of

that study, thus had relevant survey experience in the financial aid

field and contacts with CEEB staff.

Nash was a sociologist. Working with him would be his wife,

Patricia, also a sociologist at the Bureau of Applied Social Research.

The Nashes had collaborated on a series of studies at the Bureau, on

*George Nash, with the collaboration of Paul F. Lazarsfeld, New Adminis-trator on C;0. s: A St of the Director of Under raduate FinancialAid, Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1 7.

17.

topics ranging from Skid Row to the Peace Corps to the reactions of

New Yorkers to the 1965 blackout.

On March 3, the meeting between OE and CEEB was held in the

office of the Director of Student Financial Aid of OE, James Moore.

Staff of the two agencies discussed the requirements of a study of the

loan field. The discussion was Nash's first exposure to the issues and

problems of the study. His notes of the meeting show the uncertainties

at this stage about how data shall be collected. The notes say:

"Could geld -feet send questionnaires [cross-out in original notes]

Could go back and do a group basis--based on tilt: results of thequestionnaires maybe

Personal interview50 interviews done x 10 people

Banks--group interviews"

In the following days, the proposal for th: study on student

financial assistance took shape Kirkpatrick leaned toward interviews

and conferences as the methods for data collection. Nash pressed for

the extensive use of structured mail questionnaires. His suggestion

that educational institutions be surveyed in toto, rather than on a

sample basis, was included in the proposal. Junes Moore of OE was also

in favor of the 100% sample of educational institutions. On the other

hand, Kirkpatrick in a letter dated April 28, 1967 to Robert P. Huff,

Director of Financial Aid, Stanford University, wrote: "I agree com-

pletely with you that we may get more wisdom and help from a hundred

wise heads than from 2800 wise and not-so-wise heads. The U.S.O.E.

asked us specifically to cover the entire waterfront, including un-

accredited and junior colleges . . ."

On March 7, CEEB called in a small group of educators and a

banker to talk over the study plans. Then on March 13, Kirkpatrick

submitted the proposal to the Office of Education, including a subcon-

tract to the Bureau for preparing and processing questionnaires. On

the same day Nash wrote a "proposal letter" to Kirkpatrick outlining the

work that the Bureau of Applied Social Research was prepared to do on

the questionnaires and giving a budget.

The CEEB proposal called for the collection of data and opinions

from (1) the Office of Education and the Public Health Service (PHS) in

Washington, (2) the regional offices of-HEW, (3) colleges and universi-

ties, (4) vocational schools, (5) schools of nursing, (6) medical and

other health professions schools, (7) state and private guarantee agencies,

(8) United Student Aid Funds, (9) lending institutions, and (10) students

and parents.

For the schools (3,4,5, and 6), the lending institutions (9),

and the students and parents (10), questionnaires were to be used.

But in none of these cases would questionnaires be the only technique

for collecting information. They would be "followed by in-depth personal

interviews where considered desirable and group meetings."* The question-

naires would be "prepared, followed up and processed by a professional

Bureau under the supervision of CEEB," while the "CEEB staff plus outside

consultants will handle the individual interviews and group meetings on

a regional basis."**

*CEEB, Proposal for Study Submitted to the U.S,. Commissioner of Educa-tion, "A Study of the Administration of Federally-Assisted Student LoanPrograms," March 13, 1967, Revised March 30, 1967, p. 10.

xxibid.

19.

The Bureau sub-contract was only in a limited sense to be a self-

contained study. CEEB saw the questionnaires rather as a technical

adjunctlwhich would then form the basis for meatier analysis through

interview and conference. For some respondents--for example, staff of

OE and PHS and state and private guarantee agency personnel--only inter-

views were planned.

The CEEB proposal outlined two phases of work to follow the col-

lection of information and, opinions. TV:se were, first, the interpreta-

tion of the data and the development of "a best set of plans" for

federal loan programs. This would be dons, through discussions with

representative groups of relevant institutions and agencies. Secondly,

the best set of plans would be presented to a National Advisory

Committee of the study for review and approval, and then to the senior

officers of CEEB for their review and approval.

The budget request was approximately $160,000. This exceeded

the $110,000 that the Office of Education had available. In negotiations

it was agreed to eliminate some of the review of administrative struc-

ture, reporting, and processing. Agreement was reached on a budget of

$125,000. The proposal was revised in accordance with the agreement

and re-submitted on March 30, 1967. On April 13, OE notified CEEB by

telegram that they had been awarded the study contract.

The CEEB then formally subcontracted the questionnaire survey to

the Bureau of Applied Social Research. The amount budgeted in the pro-

posal was $27,000; Nash's proposal letter, which Kirkpatrick now agreed

to, called for $27,600. (With the subsequent addition of questionnaires

to lebding institutions and to student borrowers, the total Bureau costs

would finally come to $35,000.)

20.

Chronology - Phase I.

The study was ready to begin. The following table summarizes the events

that led up to the start of the study.

Phase I. Prelude to the Study

Congress

1958-Enactment of NationalDOEbse Student LoanProgram (NDSLP)

1961-2-Student loans madeavailable for Cubanrefugees

1963-Enactment of HealthProfessions Student LoanProgram (HPSLP)

1964-Enactment of NursingStudent Loan Program (NSLP)

1965-Enactment of GuaranteedStudent Loan Program (GLP)

- Enactment of VocationalStudent Loan Program

1966-Congress renews NDSLPauthorization, overridingHEW.

- Brewster Amendment

calls for study of Guaran-teed Loan Program

1967

Office of Education

HEW agrees to Admin-istration budgetproposal that termin-ates NDSLP in FY 1967.

Secretary Gardner asksCommissioner Howe tohave an outside studymade of federal loanprograms.

HEW committee definesstudy tasks.

Jan.-Feb. OE writesRe's for Proposal,"

holds bidders' con-ference.

April-Contract issigned for study.

CollegeEntranceExaminationBoard

March-CEEBwritesstudyproposal.

Bureau ofAppliedSocialResearch

March-Bureauparticipatesin develop-ment of CEEBproposal.

April-CEEBsubcontractsquestion-naire surveysto Bureau.

21.

Them3

This was a particular kind of study, an investigation made to

order to answer fairly specific questions that the government had framed.

It was :Policy-oriented. It was expected to produce recommendations and

a set of plans.

Furthermore, it was to be largely a survey of experience and

opinf.on. The study was not to concern itself with the effects of the

loan programs. Except for the NDSLP, federal loan programs were too new

fcr 'there to be many effects to gauge. In order for the study to provide

information on the operation of the new programs, it would inevitably

rely on informal judgments.

With all its special features of origin, time, and purpose, the

life history of the study illustrates some issues in research utiliza-

tion that appear to be endemic. Four of these issues that will appear

in the narrative deal with: the seriousness with which the client

anticipates relying on study results, the study's relevance to the

issues on which decisions will be made, the timing of the decision-

making calendar, and the shift in issues and circumstances that occur

- while the study is in progress.

Anticipated reliance. The use of research to postpone a decisionenough

is a common/phenomenon to have passed into folklore, second in importance

as a delaying tactic only to appointing a committee. But there are

cases where the client awaits the results of a study impatiently so

that he will know what action to take. In between the extremes, there

are all shades of anticipated reliance on research. In this study, the

seriousness of intent was clear. The policy-makers were the clients for

22.

the study. Both the Office of Education and the Congress awaited the

results, if not breathlessly at least with clear interest. As we shall

see, the House Special Subcommittee on Education prodded the Office of

Education for release of the report. No one was prepared to accept the

study uncritically, but all the actors were anxious to listen. There

was general confidence in the expertise and otjectivity of the College

Entrance Examination Board and its prestige in the education field.

However, reliance on the study was tempered by another factor- -

the plowed field phenomenon. Many issues of the study had been around

for a long time and the ground had been plowed over and over. Most

decision-makers had pretty well crystallized their opinions (although

the crystallized opinions differed). Unless new information was forth-

coming, which wasn't too likely in a study of existing opinions, the

latitude for change was small.

Decision relevance. That there was a decision to be made was

indisputable. New student loan legislation would almost certainly be

passed by the Ninetieth Congress, and the whole gamut of legislative

provisions would be reviewed.

The translation of the issues into answerable questions is often

a phase at which things go awry. There nay be a shift away from the

matters that decision-makers want to know toward concepts that are

theoretically interesting or easily measurable. Here the translation

was routine. No sociological concepts, no theoretical constructs, were

involved. The Office of Education wanted to know, for example, if there

were special problems in assuring private credit to minority groups,

and the questionnaires asked both lending institutions and educational

institutions, "From the experience of your institution, how much trouble

23.

do racial minority group students have getting guaranteed loans (of those

who are legally eligible for them)?"

Another kind of problem of relevance did arise. The Bureau

surveys relied to a large extent on the opinions of officials in educa-

tional institutions and lending institutions. On controversial questions,

decision-makers raised questions about the worth of these opinions.

What they wanted was hard evidence of effect. Thus, for example, the

surveys produced data on what people thought the maximum total of loans

for a student should be. But key people discounted such "data." They

wanted to know what the effects of loans of different amounts were on

the postgraduate lives and careers of different kinds of students.

Timing. Research results and decisions have to match up in

time. Here, the timing of the study was out of phase in terms of the

legislative planning cycle. The months that were lost at HEW in late

1966 planning the study put the study about four months behind the major

decision-making for legislative proposals. Even as it was, the study

was overly rushed, foreclosing any opportunity to do more intensive

research.

Just as the over-all study was on a hectic schedule, so was the

Bureau questionnaire survey. It produced its data in remarkably short

time, and the marginals were used in developing final recommendations.

But the cross-tabulations were completed at a time when little attention

could be devoted to them.

Ground shift. One of the more interesting phenomena that the

Loan Study illustrates is the change in issues while a study is in pro-

gress. The ground shifts, the questions originally considered of pri-

214.

mart' significance are resolved or disappear, and new issues take their

place. By the time the report produces data and recommendations to solve

the original problems, the problems are no longer the relevant ones.

Here, the major legislative issue motivating the study was the

search for a way to phase out the National Defense Student Loan Program

in favor of the all-private Guaranteed Loan Program. Political shifts

removed the issue from consideration. Similarly, the primary adminis-

trative issue at the outset was consolidation of administration of the

loan programs. Secretary Gardner saw this as one maneuver in his mis-

sion to bring rationality and streamlined procedures to HEW. But staff

committees met on the question while the study was in progress, and

before CEEB completed its report, they decided to let the existing

division of authority stand. The study did not catch up with the

ground shift. Further, new issues came to the fore, such as what to do

about loans held by student demonstrators and rioters, issues that were

unforeseen in the study.

Even for research as compressed in time as this was--completed

in nine months--the busy-ness in the field of study left it behind on a

number of issues.

The actors and their roles. Another theme that emerges from the

history of the study is the manner in which utilization of a study is

influenced by the roles and the goals, the backgrounds, responsibilities

and concerns of the different individuals concerned with the production

and use of the data and the findings.

The CEEB study of student loan programs offers us special ob-

servational advantages because of the variety of people and roles in-

25.

volved in its production and utilization. There were Kirkpatrick at

CEEB, Nash at the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Howe, Moore, and

others at the Office of Education, Lovett and Warner of the Public

Health Service, the members of the House and Senate subcommittees on

education and the committee staffs. Final decisions on enactment of

new legislation would be made by the whole Congress.

One of the aims of the history which follows will be to show how

these different people reacted to and used the same data, in whole or

in part, in different ways. In presenting this story considerable

emphasis will be put on the data resulting from the questionnaires

administered by the Bureau of Applied Social Research. It sho 13 -be

understood that this is not because these data had special significance

in comparison to the research data produced through personal interviews

and meetings. Our emphasis is on the questionnaire data, because, like

irradiated injections, they are more readily identified and their

paths are easily traced.

26.

Chapter II

CONDUCT OF THE STUDY

The Study Begins -- April 1967

Kirkpatrick had several immediate matters to handle: recruiting

staff for the study at CEEB and setting up the National Advisory Com-

mittee for the Study. Because of the time limits of the study, he

turned to part-time consultants to do much of the staff work. These

were largely knowledgeable people in the college loan field. They were

supplemented by members of CEEB's regional offices.

The Advisory Committee, which was scheduled to meet twice to review

the reports that would emerge from the study, was recruited from top

figures in educational administration, banking, and related fields. As

finally constituted, it was a prestigious body of 23, including college

presidents, bank presidents, and an MIT physicist who headed the Panel

of Educational Innovation of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

Work on the study began along two tracks. CEEB staff met with the

Bureau of Applied Social Research to develop the survey questionnaires.

Simultaneously, the CEEB began arrangements for its own data gathering

through conferences and interviews to be run by its staff consultants.

Conduct of the Study: Track 1 -- the Bureau

The Nashes worked rapidly on the questionnaires. After review of

the OE "task statement" and discussion with Kirkpatrick, they produced

a draft questionnaire for colleges on April 15. This draft, eleven

27.

pages and 60 questions long, inquired into policies and practices for

all loan programs, with particular attention to Guaranteed Student Loans.

Kirkpatrick circulated copies for comment to over two dozen advi-

sors. These included staff at the Office of Education and Public Health

Service, CEEB staff in regional offices, members of CEEB committees, and

experts in specialized fields (e.g., nursing loans). A few of the

advisors were uneasy about the use of financial aid officers as infor-

mants on both the institution's administrative practices for federal

loan programs and views on how the programs could be improved. "I doubt

that the financial aid officer is always best to do either," wrote one

educator.

Another called the draft questionnaire "fairly superficial and

very applied in its orientation," and he questioned whether such ques-

tions as those dealing with the type of students likely to be delin-

quent in repayment would be answered from "systematically examined

records of delinquent students, or are the respondent's prejudices being

plumbed?" Other advisors were more positive about the questionnaire

approach. Many submitted detailed comments question by question. These

ranged from the recommendation to omit questions on characteristics of

financial aid officers and questions on the institution's organizational

structure for aid, to technical suggestions for classifying responses

about satisfaction with the National Defense Student Loan Program (very

satisfactory, somewhat satisfactory, somewhat unsatisfactory, very

unsatisfactory, can't say). Kirkpatrick marked up his own copy freely.

Separate questionnaires were developed for nursing schools, health

professions schools (medicine, dentistry, etc.), and vocational schools.

28.

Kirkpatrick and his staff conferred with accrediting groups for each

type of school, and brought on expert consultants to review the ques-

tionnaires in terms of their relevance and utility for the specialized

schools.

They held further conferences in Washington with James Moore and

his staff in the Division of Student Financial Aid on the college ques-

tionnaire. Out of all the review activity, important suggestions

emerged. In response, the Nashes made extensive revisions in the ques-

tionnaires. Items were dropped, combined, rewritten, added, But the

tenor of the questionnaires did not basically change. They remained an

inquiry into practices, opinions on strengths and weaknesses of the

programs, and opinions on suggested changes.

During the revisions, Kirkpatrick offered a different type of sug-

gestion. Rather than limiting investigation to reactions to existing

programs, the questionnaire could include a "Master Plan" for federal

student assistance. Respondents would then be asked for their opinions

on its features. and their probable actions under its conditions.

Given the Office of Education "Task Statement for the Study" (see

Appendix A), such an approach appeared sensible. The Office of Educa-

tion was laying as much emphasis, or more, on proposing measures for

the future as on studying experience in the past. If there were a good

idea for a "Master Plan" to start with, the responses of colleges and

banks could assess it, elaborate on it, and improve it. The new plan

could be pretested in the questionnaire.

Kirkpatrick laid out the features of such a Master Plan. A key

aspect, given the then federal policy of minimizing direct loans

29.

financed from the Treasury, would be the substitution of the Guaranteed

Loan Program for all other programs. The other main,features were drawn

from the North Carolina system, in which banks made a pool of money

available to the state agency, and the state agency actually administered

the loans.

Kirkpatrick tried to formulate questions around the Plan. On

April 20, he drew up the following questions:

REVISION (4/20/67) OF QUESTIONS ON PAGES 10-11 OF USOE QUESTIONNAIRE

We should like to have your advice concerning the feasibility anddesirability of a hypothetical plan.

SUPPOSE: (1) That new funds were no longer available for the NDSLprogram.

(2) That the Guaranteed Loan program were set up with thesame policies and procedures as NDSL.

(3) That the Guaranteed Loan program were financed centrally(by states, for example) by a pool of credit suppliedby banks, credit unions, insurance companies, etc.

(4) That your institution applied for and received a cer-tificate of entitlement providing for an allotment offunds.

(5) That your institution determined the amount of the loanfor each student.

(6) That your institution forwarded the loan papers andnotes to the central agency, for which in return youreceived the actual funds for crediting to students'accounts and/or turning over to students for variousexpenses.

(7) That the central agency undertook the responsibilityfor the collection of the loans.

In connection with the above hypothetical plan, please give your pre-liminary opinion in answering the next three questions. Your answerswill be considered as opinions only, and definitely not as commitmentsin any way.

30.

10. Would your institution deposit with the central agency a matchingamount of 10 percent of the loan funds received by you, as youpresently provide under NDSL, to bear a share of losses caused bydefaults in payment?

1. ( ) Yes 2. ( ) No 3. ( ) Don't know

11. If the answer to #10 is not "Yes," would your institution deposit5 percent?

1. ( ) Yes 2. ( ) No 3. ( ) Don't know

12. Would your institution be willing to contribute a small amount(perhaps $1 or $2 per loan) each year to the central agency tohelp carry the administrative costs of receiving, disbursing, andcollecting the loan funds?

1. ( ) Yes 2. ( ) No 3. ( ) Don't know

13. Please give us your opinion as to the acceptability of assumptions2 through 7 listed above, and as to what weaknesses there are inthis hypothetical plan.

The Master Plan question satisfied no one. The question could not

take account of all the possibilities, the if's and when's for, different

kinds of schools in states with differing state agency arrangements.

The whole idea of getting assessments of a new plan began to seem less

useful when the necessity of specifying all the conditions was faced.

Kirkpatrick and Nash abandoned the question and the Master Plan.

Instead, the research would limit itself to past experience and assess-

ments of plans already in operation and derive its proposals from analy-

sis of experience.

The Bureau continued its close consultation, item by item, with

CkEB and then with the Office of Education as well. In the collabora-

tive effort, six questionnaires were developed, pre-tested and sent out.

Questionnaires were mailed to 2,444 colleges and universities, 325 voca-

tional schools, 195 health profession schools, 532 nursing schools and

31.

2,112 lending institutions. This included every institution of higher

education in the country, vocational schools in the eleven states where

a substantial number of guaranteed vocational student loans had been

made (all the proprietary vocational schools and half of the public and

non-profit schools in those states), all medical, pharmacy, dental,

optometry, osteopathy, and podiatry schools, a sample of collegiate,

hospital, and graduate schools of nursing, all large commercial banks

and a sample of other commercial banks, savings and loan associations,

mutual savings banks, and credit unions. Kirkpatrick played a large

role in securing cooperation, and help in developing the sampling scheme,

from the National League for Nursing, accrediting groups for business,

home study, and technical schools, and the American Bankers Association.

In addition, a pilot study was done of student borrowers of the

class of 1965 in the New York metropolitan area. Kirkpatrick convened

an advisory group, called the Task Force on Student Attitudes toward

Borrowing, which met to advise on the development of this survey.

Questionnaires were mailed to 285 graduates who were paying off their

National Defense Student Loan Program (NDSLP) loans, and 109 were

returned. The results of this small-scale study were not available

until February 1968, a month after the final report was submitted, but

they were appended as a final chapter.

The first questionnaires began to go out in May. By June, TOO

returns had come in from educational institutions. Nash had them coded

and tabulated, and sent the basic figures to both the CEBB and the

Office of Education before June was over.

32.

Nash devoted considerable time to analysis of the data. He pro-

duced cross-tabulations of responses by over a dozen different variables.

Since almost none of these analyses were used or even referred to in

later deliberations by CEEB staff on the study and its recommendations,

it may be interesting to find out how they came to be done.

In Nash's original letter to Kirkpatrick on March 13, 1967 outlin-

ing the tasks that the Bureau was prepared to assume, he stated that he

would produce "marginals" (the total answers to each question) and

"certain, specified cross-tabulations" (breakdowns by such variables as

type of institution and size of institution) of the responses to the

questionnaire. His letter stated, "We will not do an exhaustive analy-

sis."

During the summer of 1967, at least three different conferences

between Nash and Kirkpatrick and Tom Brennan of the CEEB study staff

discussed which cross tabulations should be run. Nash remembers that

Kirkpatrick and Brennan requested the cross-tabs. There are notes in

the file of a meeting of Nash, Kirkpatrick, and Brennan on August 4

that list the cross-tabs agreed upon. The notes are in Kirkpatrick's

handwriting. They include (for educational institutions) type, control,

accreditation, enrollment, types of loan programs participated in, NDSL

repayment delinquency rate, state,OE region, and for all GSLP questions,

state and type of state guarantee plan. Other variables were added

subsequently, such as per capita state income, time devoted to aid by

financial aid director, satisfaction with GSLP.

That Kirkpatrick and Brennan were active in selecting these vari-

ables is obvious, but whether they actually initiated the extensive

33.

data analysis is not so clear. Neither man was a researcher by train-

ing or experience, whereas Nash came from Columbia's Bureau of Applied

Social Research with its tradition of sophisticated data analysis.

Nash ap.)arently assumed that anybody would want to look at the responses

in the context of relevant characteristics of the respondents, and asked

not "Do you want any cross-tabs?" but "Which cross tabs do you want?"

Many of the results of the analysis are informative. For example,

they show the differing characteristics of schools that were most and

least satisfied with the NDSLP and GSLP." But these differences did

not enter the discussions or seem to affect the formulation of recom-

mendations. A possible exception might have been the issue of loan

cancellation for students who subsequently became teachers. This was so

controversial that Nash recommended, and Kirkpatrick was happy to

accept, further runs identifying supporters and opponents of the prac-

tice. These runs were considered and quoted in the CEEB final report:

... A total of 34 percent of all respondents including 58 percentof the public universities responding to the questionnaire, statedthat in their opinion the teacher cancellation provision had notincreased the number of students in their institution who havegone into teaching. Of the respondents from teachers colleges,38 percent concurred in this judgement.

But as we shall see, the analysis by type of school did not have

much effect on the recommendation which CEEB developed on the issue of

cancellation.

*George Nash and Patricia Nash, "A Report of the Opinions and Practicesof College Student Financial Aid Administrators and Bankers on theFederal Guaranteed Loan Program," November 1967, mimeographed.

34.

There was another phase of the analysis that Nash believes might

have altered the relevant recommendation in CEEB's final report, had it

been taken seriously. This was the analysis of the success of tte

Guaranteed Loan Program (according to reports of schools and banks) by

type of state agency. The data showed that the GSLP was apparently not

performing well in a number of states with strong independent agencies.

The creation and strengthening of an independent state guarantee agency

did not appear to be the cure-all that the study recommendations would

imply. But even when the data for each state and type of state agency

were later discussed with Kirkpatrick, he was not convinced that Nash's

interpretation was the only one possible, e.g., students go to school

across state lines, and reports from an Illinois financial aid officer

about students' difficulties in getting guaranteed loans may refer to

difficulties in their home states, rather than in Illinois.

Why weren't the analytic data better used? Partly it was a matter

of time, pressure, and rush. Possibly also it was a matter of complex-

ity. There was great diversity by state and type of inEtitution.

Patterns did not come through clear and clean. Finally, it was a matter

of fit. CEEB was focusing on the development of across-the-board recom-

mendations that would influence legislation and policy. In the formu-

latisn of general recommendations, there was little room for analytic

particulars. What difference did it make if private universities feel

College WcA-Study is less successful than do other schools, or more

2-year colleges find collection of loans a major problem? The recom-

mendations, as envisioned by CEEB, could not deal with this kind of

35.

variation.* It would only be later, when the reports on each loan pro-

gram reached the federal administrative agencies, that program operators

would be concerned with such details.

Conduct of the Study: Track 2 -- the CEEB

CEEB meanwhile was pursuing other data collection activities. A

large part of the CEEB inquiry dealt with issues not covered by the

Bureau surveys. For example, CEEB called together a task force to plan

interviews with directors of state guarantee agencies. The focus of

inquiry was state practices. The five-man task force met on May 15,

1967 to decide on the kinds of questions to be asked and the procedures.

Subsequent discussions were held with CEEB staff and with George and

Patricia Nash. Some standardization was introduced into the interviews.

An interview schedule was written for state agencies with questions on

state operations, problems, and opinions regarding proposed modifica-

tions in the Guaranteed Loan Program. Interviewers tended to use the

schedule as a general guide rather than as a structured research instru-

ment.

Ten consultants conducted the interviews with directors of state

guarantee agencies in 48 states and the District of Columbia. The

records of the interviews went to consultant Jack B. Critchfield, dean

of student affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and chairman of the

task force on state agencies. On August 25, 1967, he submitted a

*The situation here illustrates one aspect of "decision relevance."Some of the survey analyses may have had relevance to issues in theloan program field, but they were evidently not seen as relevant byCEEB in preparing its report and recommendations.

36.

54-page "Summary Report of Interviews with State Loan Agencies." The

narrative report focused mainly on issues of state operations (e.g.,

how the agency was established, actual administration of the loan pro-

gram, state relations to the private United Student Aid Funds). It was

a descriptive report of the interview replies, focusing on the effects

of the different structural arrangements in the states. The basic con-

clusion in the report was that state administration of the loan plan is

conducive to efficient operation and proper functioning. With a better

return to banksoand streamlined administrative procedures, there will

be sufficient private money to enable the Guaranteed Loan Program to

serve effectively.*

Kirkpatrick and his consultants also held interviews with govern-

ment staff and representatives of agencies and interest groups involved

in loan programs. For example, in July he met with James F. Kelly,

Comptroller of HEW, to discuss such issues as use of the FNMA-type of

revolving fund to finance loans (a proposal then being made by the

TreasurytE forward funding by Congress, and the relations among the

federal government, states, universities, banks, and students. With

Charles Walker of the American Bankers Association he discussed a

financial need criterion for GLP, the success of the program, and ABA

promotional efforts to increase bank participation. He talked to

Edward W. Brice, assistant to the Assistant Secretary of HEW for Educa-

tion, about making loan provisions consistent in all programs. He and

*Jack Critchfield, "Summary Report of Interviews with State LoanAgencies," August 1967, page 54.

**The Allied Health Professions Personnel Training Act, passed inNovember 1966, had authorized FNMA -type funding for health professionsand nursing loans, The first funds under this provision were disbursedin August 1967.

37-

the study staff met with officials at the Bureau of the Budget, held

over a dozen conferences at the Office of Education, read extensively

in the financial aid literature. The Office of Education opened up its

files on the loan program to them, and provided statistical reports and

new tabulations of data.

The issues that were engaging their attention through the summer

were largely administrative questions. But inevitably there was overlap

with the questions of the Bureau surveys.

A major activity of CEEB was the convening of seven one-day con-

ferences in states around the country. The first one was in Raleigh,

North Carolina in August, and was attended by high-level bankers,

educators, state officials, and foundation representatives. Conferences

followed in Harrisburg, Pa., Denver, New York City, Syracuse, San

Francisco, and Chicago. At each meeting, influential representatives

from education, banking, state guarantee agencies, and related groups

deliberated for a full day over the issues in the field. Discussions

ranged over past experience, future expectations, and suggestions for

improvement in the program. No record was made of the proceedings.

Kirkpatrick was at every meeting, and found them important in

forming his ideas. Looking back after the study was over, he said,

"Here's where we learned so much about feelings about the Guaranteed

Loan Program."

Several additional conferences were also held, such as the August

conference with college and university business officers and the meeting in

October of the Committee on Governmental Relations of the National

Association of College and University Business Officers. A meeting

38.

that Kirkpatrick remembers as particularly informative was the National

Conference of Executives of Higher Education Loan Program, attended by

representatives of 26 state loan agencies. "These men," he said,

"lived with the loan program every day of every week for ten years or

more in some states. They ate, drank, and slept it. If they didn't

know, vrho did?"

The CEEB collected a great deal of information and opinion. The

.unfortunate fact, from our point of view, is that very little of it was

recorded. Only an occasional interview was written up, and none of the

major meetings and conferences (except the Advisory Committee on the

Study) has minutes on record. While Kirkpatrick gave us free access to

pore over all his files on the study, it was possible to discover only

fragments of the substance of the discussions and very little about

what the CEEB staff learned.

Merger of the Two Tracks of Investigation.: The Recommendations

In the fall of 1967, Kirkpatrick and his staff began to plan their

report to the Office of Education. By early October, they had in hand:

computer tables on the questionnaire responses of most schools and

banks, some of the cross-tabulations of the questionnaire data, Critch-

field's report on the interviews with state agencies, the experience of

seven state meetings which had been held in all parts of the country

(the last on October 4 in Chicago), plus the results of their own inter-

views.

On October 9 Kirkpatrick drew up a five page draft summary of the

strengths and weaknesses of the Guaranteed Loan Program. It would be

39.

enlightening if we could dye-mark the various pieces of evidence and

trace them into the summary. Unfortunately, no such clear-cut identi-

fication is possible. But while we cannot tell which specific items

of information affected each recommendation, we can gauge the general

effects of the different sources of evidence.

Influence of field work. Despite the reluctance of informants to

pinpoint the specific data that affected the formation of their opinions,

it way be useful to speculate on the ways in which the CEEB field work

influenced the development of recommendations. In many research

studies, the study director is in a similar position to Kirkpatrick's,

weighing different types of evidence, experience, preconceptions, and

non-research factors in the process of drawing implications for action.

Users of research studies, too, have to weigh various research and non-

research factors in reaching decisions about the action to take or

recommend. Perhaps future studies can inquire more closely into the

process by which these conclusions are reached.

Certainly cognitive background and experience play a part. Kirk-

patrick's experience in banking and university business administration

had given him knowledge of the loan field and insight into the perspec-

tives of significant actors in the system. He was intimately aware of

business and efficiency factors and the importance of sound use of

government funds.

The directness and personal involvement that field interviews and

conferences entail are often highly important. Field interviews cam:

(a) sensitize the study director to those particular issues that

his respondents forcefully present;

140.

(b) affect the kinds of questions which he will later ask in the

more structured data collection phases;

(c) influence his preconceptions of how the data will fall and

subtly build up a preference to emphasize those items of research data

that accord with his preconceptions;

(d) affect his assessment of the relative importance of issues;

and

(e) acquaint him with the political feasibilities, the constraints

in the system, and the limits within which his recommendations should

fit if they are to stand a chance of prevailing.

In this case it is clear that over all, Kirkpatrick gave greater

weight to the field work than to the questionnaires. Field interviews

did sensitize him to issues, affect his weighting of issues, and

acquaint him with political limitations. They had some influence on

the development of questions in the questionnaires, inasmuch as much of

the very etrly field work directly dealt with discussions and criticisms

of the draft questionnaires. The field work was influential, too, as

we shall see, in determining which items of questionnaire evidence

were taken seriously, cited,and relied upon in the final report. The

questionnaire data were used to a large extent as back-up data for

positions that emerged from the whole range of data collection activi-

ties.

The field interviews appear to have been particularly influential

in the assessment of the relative importance of issues. The question-

naires--and Nash, who relied largely on the questionnaires for his

informationmere limited to the questions as asked. Kirkpatrick and

the CEEB study staff sometimes felt that the Bureau was stressing unim-

portant points and blowing up small pieces of survey data into "revealed

truths."

With regard to learning about the political climate of opinion,

Kirkpatrick believes that the field work did enlighten them about polit-

ical feasibilities. However, he felt it imperative to call the shots

as he saw them. While he recognized the resistance in Washington to

such ideas as consolidating the administration of all loan programs or

introducing a financial need criterion into the Guaranteed Loan Program,

he believed that the study should develop and abide by its own convic-

tions.

In June 1970, about two and a half years after the study had been

completed, Kirkpatrick reviewed the experience and said:

If you made me come up with a percentage on importance of thequestionnaire data, I would say the questionnaire data were some-thing between a 20 and 25 per cent factor on the report. Theother 75 to 80 per cent were interviews, opinions, conferences,talking to people, going right to the top.

Because he was extremely busy right after the Loan Study and unavailable

for more than brief discussions with us then, it is impossible to know

whether his estimate would have been the same at a point closer in time

to the events.

Kirkpatrick explained his reliance on the interview and conference

material on several grounds. The participants in the conferences were

knowledgeable and important people. They had been chosen for their

expertise. Some, like Morse of the American Council on Education,

"lived and breathed educational legislation." Particularly on the

Guaranteed Loan Program, they knew vastly more than most college

42.

financial aid officers, who had not been directly involved in the pro-

gram. Because in the GLP students dealt directly with banks, college

aid people could give only a very partial picture of the program's

operation.

Secondly, personal contact is likely to have greater impact. Face-

to-face interaction can intensify communication. Long after the study

was completed, Kirkpatrick still remembered "a red-headed chap from

Illinois State Teachers College at the midwest conference who pooh-

poohed the idea that loan cancellation had any effect on the number or

quality of students going into teaching." He recalled, too, his amaze-

ment when the staff at the Office of Education told him what a heavy

percentage of their time they spent on clerical correspondence regarding

the definition of eligibility for teacher cancellation.

Further, interviewing is two-way communication. If a respondent

does not understand a question, if he misinterprets or gives a partial

answer, the interviewer or conference participant is not limited to the

first answer (as is a questionnaire). He can rephrase and reinterpret

the question. He can also explore different aspects and factors in

the situation and increasingly specify the direction, intensity, and

conditional limits of a person's knowledge and opinions. Question-

naires, on the other hand, may be answered superficially and with little

thought.

Another possible effect of field work is that it develops a collec-

tive sense of events among the study staff and brings about a "team

consensus." As staff continue their rounds of interviewing, telephone

calls, and meetings, they confer among themselves, sharing their

43.

experiences and building up a common body of information, knowledge-

ability and opinion. There are suggestions that this in fact did occur

to some extent among CEEB study staff.

While the over-all salience of the CEEB field work seems clear, it

is still difficult to tell which sources of evidence influenced each

specific recommendation. Kirkpatrick, for all his subsequent devalu-

ation of the questionnaires, in the fall of 1967 was paying attention

to the survey tables as Nash delivered them. They were bringing

organized and systematic data to the project.

The development of study recommendations. Nash was in and out of

the CEEB office in late September and early October (and on through the

next two months as well), delivering the latest tables hot off the

computer. Nash reports that the tables as such were almost never

discussed, so that it was hard to tell how they affected Kirkpatrick's

thinking. Kirkpatrick reports that he was being given reams and reams

of uninterpreted computer runs. Some discussions on particular issues

went on, and joint meetings of CEEB and Bureau staff were scheduled

for October.

On October 9, CEEB and Bureau study staffs met together specif-

ically to discuss the report that would soon be due on the Guaranteed

Loan Program. Kirkpatrick distributed the summary that he had prepared

of the program's strengths and weaknesses. In this material, the idea

appears of separating loans of necessity for the needy from loans of

convenience for the middle-class. There is also the same stress as

will appear in the final report on the desirability of a financial need

144.

criterion for Guaranteed Loans and of involvement of the colleges in

deciding on need and amount of loan. The summary also mentions the

unprofitability to lending institutions of 6 per cent loans, and the

unavailability of Guaranteed Loans to many students because of non-

participation of many banks, limits on availability of funds, require-

ments of an established account or relationship with the bank, state

residency requirements, and reluctance to lend to low-income and minor-

ity students. Another theme that will appear in the final report is

also briefly present: the negative effects of direct federal insurance

(which is provided when there is no effective state plan) upon states'

willingness to appropriate funds for state agencies. (Appendix B pre-

sents these recommendations and the successive versions of them in the

following three drafts.)

The staff discussion went on most of the day of October 9th. The

six CEEB participants and the Mashes hammered out twenty-four recommen-

dations, or, if the recommendation itself was not clear, areas in which

recommendations should be made. Almost all of the important recommen-

conceraing the Guaranteed Loan Program that were to appear in

the final report were agreed to at this meeting: financial need should

be a criterion for Guaranteed Loans; loans of necessity to the needy

should be separated from loans of convenience to the non-needy, and the

latter should not be charged as a federal aid to higher education nor

compete for federal funds for education; banks should receive a higher

return on Guaranteed Loans.

George and Patricia Sash, the Bureau staff members in their role

as suppliers of questionnaire data, were uneasy that the CEEB people

45.

were reaching conclusions without adequate attention to the question-

naire responses. They felt it their responsibility to refer to those

data when issues came up, and to convince the CEEB staff to do likewise.

But through this and most other joint meetings, there were almost no

substantive disagreements. Where the CEEB staff was taking positions

that were not based on data, Nash was willing, after pointing out the

absence of data, to discuss their position on their own terms.

Researchers usually expect to have recommendations developed out of

the results of their research, rather than being drawn up independently

while the research is in progress. They see a logical progression:

(1) data

(2) elaborated analysis of data

(3) conclusions based on the analysis

(4) action recommendations based on the conclusions

In this case, the data and some beginning analyses were ready although

there had not been time for the researchers to go further. But the

joint CEEB-Bureau group was starting with recommendations, going to the

data, and back to the recommendations. The best that Nash could do was

be sure that the early recommendations were checked against the data

for consistency. His position was--figuratively and often literally- -

to move the piles of computer tables to stage center.

TV fact that there were so few disagreements between the recom-

mendations that the CEEB study staff offered and the questionnaire data

is probably due to two main factors. First, the CEEB staff had been

talking with key people from the same groups (educational institutions,

lending institutions) that the Bureau was systematically surveying.

46.

They were receiving much the same kind of information that the question-

naires were pulling in, as well as a good deal of additional information

that was not included in the surveys.

Secondly, the Bureau survey staff were aware that action recommenda-

tions are inevitably influenced by an estimate of the effect of other

variables not available in the survey data. They recognized the extensive

tact-gathering process in which CEEB study staff had been engaged and the

information they had gained on such matters as issue salience and polit-

ical acceptability. They realized that CEEB was bringing additional con-

siderations to their review of the questionnaire results and filtering

the information through their own knowledgeability. They were willing

to accept both the substance and the legttimacy of the CEEB role.

At this point there was one issue on which the CEEB recommendation

seemed to contradict the data: loan cancellation for teachers. The col-

leges wanted to retain cancellation. They said it did not make loan col-

lection more difficult, that their experience with it was satisfactory,

and it should not be eliminated. Nevertheless, the CEEB took the position

that it should not be extended to the GIP and might well be eliminated

from the NDSLP.

The CEEB stance was based on factors other than the opinions of the

colleges. The costs of carcellation were increasing, Other critical

prctessionsl fields, such as law enforcement and social work, were

expressing a desire for loan cancellation--with considerable justice.

Moreover, staff of the Office of Education in Washington and the regional

offices were spending an extravagant amount of time determining eligibility.

Even the questionnail:e itself could supply some support for the

CEEB position. Thus, only 13 per cent of the schools said that cancel-

lation had definitely increased the number of students going into

47.

teaching, and another 42 per cent thought it had "probably" increased

the supply of teachers. Based on this kind of "opinion" evidence,

elimination of the cancellation provision was not definitely contra-

indicated. Nash himself agreed with the CEEB position on ending can-

cellation. Despite the colleges' interest in retention, he felt it

fully justified on other grounds, e.g., the costs, administrative bur-

den, unfairness to other low-paid occupations.

At the close of the meeting, the staff allocated each of the 24

recommendations or areas for recommendation to a member of the group to

work on. The Nashes, as part of the team, were assigned to write up .

the recommendations dealing with cancellation of loans fe'r teachers,

making loans profitable for banks, need for continuation of the NDsLp,

inefficiency of income tax credits for tuition payments, plus six

technical matters on which there was little strong staff opinion and

for which the questionnaire responses were tc% be consulted.*

An Advisory Committee meeting was coming up on October 26, 1967.

It was scheduled to discuss findings and recommendations particularly

on the Guaranteed Loan portion of the study. A digest was prepared of

the recommendations and supporting material that the staff members had

written, and mailed to committee members on October 20. (See Appendix B

for the recommendations in the October 20 draft.)

*These were: maximum amount of borrowing for each student, length ofgrace period, need for co-signers for minors, whether the GuaranteedLoan should be given to the student or to the college, disbursementof loan funds once or twice a year, and whether the bank or the collegeshould supply loan application forms.

148

The October 20 materials mailed to Advisory Committee members came

in three sections. The first section was subtitled, "Federalism and

Creative Federalism," and posed the question of whether the Guaranteed

Loan Program should be a "Federal partnership, i.e., creative federal-

ism or a Federal bureaucratic operation." The paper opted for "crea-

tive federalism" with 50 strong state guarantee agencies. This was a

key concern of Kirkpatrick's, and was unrelated to the survey data.

The second section made a strong case for the separation of loans

of necessity from loans of accommodation. It cited support for a

financial need criterion for Guaranteed Loans from the colleges and

u:,iversities and lending institutions in the study, and from the Ameri-

ctn Council on Education, American Bankers Association, state guarantee

agencies, and United Student Aid Fund. A strong recommendation was

made that colleges should be responsible for determining students'

financial need and recommending to the lending institution the amount

of the loan. A third section listed 15 "other problems and findings."

The Advisory Committee discussed the statements. The meeting was

lively. Members spoke from a variety of viewpoints -- recounting their

on experiences in different states, different institutions, different

positions.

But for at least one meuber of the group, there was a sense of dis-

quiet about the function of the meeting. John F. Morse, the influential

director of the Commission on Federal Relations of the American Council

on Education, stated that the draft before the committee was more a

position paper than the result of a study based on factual analysis.*

*College Entrance Examination Board, "Highlights, Advisory CommitteeMeeting, October 26, 1967," mimeographed, p. 2.

149.

Although it spoke of evidence, little was given for the policy positions

being taken. He cited the statement on the maximum borrowing allowed a

student per year. The CEEB working paper stated: "While there exists

a certain amount of differing opinion about these limitations (i.e.,

present legislative maximums on borrowing), the evidence seems to sup-

port them as sound guidelines." What evidence? This was an important

matter, deserving of serious study, but he saw no relevant research

results.

Kirkpatrick responded, according to the CEEB minutes of the meet-

ing, that "since the study was being made so early in the life of the

Guaranteed Loan program, the views presented in the document before

the committee necessarily had to be based on opinions and judgments

growing out of the various conferences, interviews, and questionnaire

responses expressed by the several participants in this loan program."**

George Nash, who had been sitting at the meeting with a pile of

tables in front of him, uncomfortable that the survey data were being

ignored, was buoyed by Morse's statement. He saw it as a vindication

of the position he had been advocating--greater reliance on the ques-

tionnaire data. He has since said that Morse's comment, and the later

reactions to it, marked a turning point in the CEEB's manifest use of

the questionnaire data.

*CEEB, "Other Problems and Findings," working paper for OctoberAdvisory Committee.

**CEEB, "Highlights," stp... cit. This statement reflects a variation ofthe theme of "timing" as a factor in research utilization. The stageof the program at which research is begun can place limits on the typeand relevance of the research that is undertaken.

50.

But what Morse V&A objecting to here was not so much that the

questionnaire data were being bypassed as that the data themselves were

based on opinions, and not necessarily opinions of the most qualified

observers. For example, the "evidence" for maximums on borrowing

reported in the CEEB working paper did come from the responses of banks

and educational institutions that present limits were sound. Morse was say-

ing that they needed to know more than this about the effects of borrow-

ing.

The attention directed to research data, nevertheless, was suppor-

tive of Bureau efforts to keep the survey responses in view. At one

point in the meeting, Kirkpatrick mentioned a facet of banks' opinions

which he had learned through personal conferences, but which was at

variance with the questionnaire responses. Nash spoke up and cited the

data. Members of the Advisory Committee evinced interest in his state-

ment and in hearing more about the questionnaire results. He took a

few minutes to bring some of the findings on the GLP before the group.

While there was considerable diversity of Advisory Committee

opinion, and questions about the data, the meeting ended in substantial

agreement with most of Kirkpatrick's recommendations. The next draft

of study recommendation; which was mailed to Advisory Committee members

on December 4, is very close to the statement of October 20. (See

Appendix B, Coln= 3.) Almost the only change is the sharpening of

implicit positions. No additions of any significance were made.

Mr. Morse himself felt bound to resign from the Advisory Committee.

In his position at the American Council on Education, he worked with a

carefully selected commission to formulate policy positions on

51.

educational issues. If the Advisory Committee, rather than advising on

research, was also setting policy, he ran into potential conflicts.

So--amicably--he withdrew.

One consequence of the meeting was that because of discussion on

the subject, CEEB paid further attention to the maximums on borrowing

and the concept of reliance on student borrowing to finance higher edu-

catZon. In the final report, a recommendation would be made that "an

economic, educational, and social analysis of the impact of borrowing

be undertaken . . . to determne what might be considered reasonable

maximum indebtedness . . ."

In the days following the Advisory Committee meeting, CEEB study

staff met frequently to plan, draft, and revise sections of the final

report. Bureau staff sometimes joined them. The January deadline was

approaching, and there were still data to analyze and opinions to recon-

cile. Because he wanted more interpretation of the questionnaires,

Kirkpatrick asked the Nashes to produce a written report on the surveys.

The Nashes had not intended to produce a separate report, but were will-

ing to satisfy the request.

Thus in November 1967 they produced "A Report of the Opinions and

Practices of College Student Financial Aid Administrators at Institutions

of Higher Education, Health Professions Schools and Nursing Schools on

the Federal Student Loan Programs." Included for each group were the

tabulations, cross-tabulations, and interpretation of the questionnaire

responses. One of the more interesting features was an analysis of the

correlates of satisfaction with the loan programs. Obviously the timing

of these reports made them almost unusable in the preparation of the

52.

final report, which was being written simultaneously. At this point

they were for the record rather than for planning or decision making.

A second Advisory Committee meeting in December reviewed the data,

position statements, and recommendations of the total study. It was a

large group, and although diverse and important statements were made,

there were few significant changes made in the draft report. Perhaps

the clearest effect of the meeting concerned the recommendation on end-

ing the interest subsidy on Guaranteed Loans during the repayment

period. Lack of evidence on the effects of interest subsidy and lack

of consensus among the advisors led to a middle-of-the-road position:

the final report included a discussion of the pros and cons but recom-

mended only that eliminating the subsidy be considered in the future.

There were practically no changes in the recommendations after the

December 11 meeting.

In a hectic year-end marathon, CEEB almost made the December 31

deadline for the report. A pre-publication draft appeared on January 12,

1968, and the final version, almost unchanged, was transmitted to the

Office of Education in late January.

Report of the Study

The report was a mimeographed document, 1-1/4 inches thick, 230

pages long, bound in hard plastic covers. It contained 11 chapters and

9 appendices. In February, the Rashes completed the pilot study of

student borrowers, and the report of these data was added as Chapter

XII. All the questionnaires were reproduced in the appendices, and

total answers for each question were shown. A few basic cross-

53.

tabulations also appeared, e.g., type of bank, type of health profes-

sions school.

Chapter I was a statement of the purpose of the study. The second

chapter reviewed the dollar amounts of student aid. The third chapter

was the key section. It summarized all the recommendations of the study

and indicated some highlights of the supporting evidence. The following

chapters dealt with each loan program separately in detail--National

Defense, Health Professions, Nursing, Cuban, and Guaranteed Loan Pro-

grams (including Vocational Student Loans). Here pros and cons, evidence

and testimony, were discussed. The last three chapters dealt with the

concept of a revolving fund for financing federal loans, uniformity of

provisions, and central administration.

Chapter III, the summary of the recommendations, was the heart of

the report and the section most likely to be read. It contained 14

recommendations. (Appendix C of this paper lists all the recommendations.)

It is sometimes suggested that a reason for non-use of research

results is that the report stops short at the point of analysis and

fails to draw explicit recommendations for action. Clearly this was not

the case here. The whole report was organized around the recommenda-

tions. Other considerations (description, analysis) were subordinated

to the presentation of clear and specific recommendations.

Table I,shows the types of evidence cited for the key recommenda-

tions in the study report. The questionnaires of the Bureau survey

clearly-lead in mentions. Since they appear to have had only a support-

ing role in the story so far, their primacy is interesting. Perhaps the

nature of quantitative data makes them more available and easier to use

Recommendation

TABLE 1

TYPES OF EVIDENCE MENTIONED IN STUDY REPORTFOR MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

Frequency of Source Cited forEach Recommendation

Ques- Govern-tian- Inter- ment Advisorynaires views statistics Committee Other

1. Financial need cri-terion for GSLP

2. Colleges should deter-mine who receives GSL

3. Banks should have higherrate of return on GSL

4. Grace period should beshortened

5. States should establishcentral service divi-sion or central poolof credit

6. Separate administrationof loans for non needy

7. Consider ending GSLinterest subsidy

8. Combine loan programsinto two

9. Centralize loan programadministration

10. Hold NDSLP at present

4 3 1

4 1

4 2

1

1 1 1

1 1

1 1

levels of funding 6 4

11. End loan foregivenessfor teachers 3 7 4

12. End loan forgivenessfor nurses 2

Total 26 13 14

1

1 1

1 1

1

7 2

55.

than qualitative materials. Numbers provide information in highly con-

densed form, making them convenient for a pithy report. Furthermore,

because the data derive from large numbers of respondents, they lend an

aura of certainty, completeness of coverage, scientific respectability,

and legitimacy. The frequency of mention does not contradict our sense

that the choice of which questionnaire data to use was influenced by

their concordance with predilections derived from experience and field

work.

The next column of the table, "Interviews," is shorthand for the

CEEB data collection through conferences with officials, meetings with

representatives of relevant institutions, and interviews with state

guarantee agencies. The interviews were obviously important in two key

recommendations, both of which were highly controversialoind they were

mentioned once under three others. "Government statistics," the third

column, shows a relatively high frequency of citation. This column

refers to data prepared largely by the Office of Education on such sub-

jects as dollar amounts of aid and family income of students partici-

pating in the loan programs. The final column, "Advisory Committee,"

refers to specific mention of the committee in the discussion of the

recommendation. The seven mentions here are spread over seven recom-

mendations.

However, the mention of a source does not necessarily mean that

the source supports the recommendation. In the case of the recommenda-

tion to end loan forgiveness for nurses, for example, there are two

mentions of questionnaires. One directly opposes ending forgiveness

and the other leans strongly in the same direction.

56.

Therefore, it may be well at this point to look at the correspon-

dence between the report recommendations and the questionnaire survey

data. While we recognize that the survey was only part or the research

done in the study, and probably not the most influential, it is the only

part that is accessible. As noted earlier, the conferences and most

interviews went unrecorded. As we continue our investigation of the

utilization of the study, it will be important to know how firmly the

recommendations rest on evidence--and the survey evidence alone is sys-

tematically presented. Further, as we will see, questions will be

raised ty policy-makers about the basis for study recommendations. Since

the survey data are the chief support offered for the recommendations,

the users of the study in the Office of Education and in the Congress

will take them seriously. Fbr all of these reasons, then, we turn to an

analysis of the fit between the questionnaire data and the recommenda-

tions.

The relation of the recommendations to the questionnaire data. Mast

of the recommendations were unconnected with the survey data. (See

Appendix C for a classification of recommendations and survey support.)

Many dealt either with administrative matters (which were relatively

minor) or were noncontroversial. We will limit our attention to those

recommendations that (1) required legislative action, and (2) evoked

controversy. In most of these cases, there are survey data available.

The reasons for eliminating non-legislative issues are twofold.

First, almost by definition they tend to involve routine administrative

issues. Secondly, in these cases, the source of information was likely

to be the administrators of the loan programs themselves. That is,

57.

the Office of Education (and to a lesser extent the Public Health Ser-

vice) were not only the clients of the study; they were also the pur-

veyors of much of the evidence and opinion on which the administrative

recommendations were based. It would be almost impossible to say to

what extent implementation of a procedure meant that the Office of

Education was using the CEEB study recommendation. It is equally likely

that CEEB is "using" Office of Education information.*

We look only at recommendations that were likely to evoke contro-

versy on the Hill, because acceptance of noncontroversial recommenda-

tions can hardly be ascribed to anyone's influence.

Twelve recommendations meet both the "legislation" and "contro-

versy" criteria, and we will focus on these:

Three are supported by the survey:

(1) Financial need criterion for GSL

(2) Colleges' determination of receipt of GSL

(3) Higher rate of return to banks on GSL

Two receive some support from the survey:

(4) Shortening of the grace period

(5) States' establishment of central service division orcentral pool of credit for problem borrowers

*Confirmation of this po4alt comes from the Office of Education's officialcomments. In most cases, they stated, they were already implementing therecommendations that they agreed with, and as the resident experts, theywere not swayed by those they disagreed with. U.S. Congress, House ofRepresentatives, Special Subcommittee on Education, Committee on Educa-tion and Labor. "Summary of Recommendations in College Entrance Examina-tion Board Study with Comments of Office of Education," Higher EducationAmendments of 1968: Confidential Subcommittee Print No. 2, 90th Cong.,2nd seas., 1968.

58-

On three recommendations, the survey did not provide data:

(6) Separate administration of loans of accommodation fornon-needy families

(7) Consideration of ending GSL interest subsidy

(8) Combining six loan programs into two

Four were contradicted by at least some survey data:

(9) Centralization of loan program administration

(10) =LP appropriation at present level

(11) End of loan forgiveness for teachers

(12) End of loan forgiveness for nurses

Let us now look in more detail at the relation of the survey to

these recommendations.

(1) Financial need criterion for GSL, and (2) Colleges' determina-

tion of receipt of GSL. Financial aid officers in the schools were not

directly asked for their opinion on imposition of a needs test. But

they were asked if they thought that. the school should specify the maxi-

mum amount to be loaned under the Guaranteed Loan Program. Three-

quarters said yes, when the atudent zas financial need (48 per cent,

definitely; 27 per centyes, probably), aid 63 per cent said the school

should specify the amount when the student does not have need (43 per

cent, definitely; 20 per cent, probably). Sixty -five per cent were

already recommending to the banks the amount to be borrowed in most or

some cases. These findings were interpreted not only as support for a

strong role for the colleges in determining who gets guaranteed loans,

but also as implicit support for consideration of the financial aid

officer's specialtydetermination of need.

59.

Ninety-five per cent of the lending institutions believed that

students' financial need should be taken into account in deciding

whether to award a Guaranteed Loan. Eighty-three per cent wanted

colleges' recommendations on the amount of loan. Twenty -five per cent were

already in regular contact with colleges about loan applications, and

84 per cent of these accepted the colleges' recommendations on the

amount of loan in most cases.

However, "financial need" was not defined in the questionnaire.

Mr. Bayer of the Insured Loans Branch in the Office of Education sug-

gests that what banks mean by taking financial need into account is that

the loar is consistent with the expected expense; you don't lend $3,000

to meet $2,000 of college expenses. C. E. Deakins, then Chief of the

Insured Loan Branch, had pointed this out to Kirkpatrick in 1967 when

the questionnaire to banks was being drafted. "This question (Does

your institution take the student's financial need into consideration

when making loans?) needs further clarification. There is ,zonfusion

between our definition of 'educational costs or need' and the CSS

[College Scholarship Service of the CEEB) definition of need."*

(3) Higher return to banks. Banks' questionnaire supported this

position. Only 6 per cent of the responding lenders found the existing

6 per cent rate profitable. Thirty-three per cent said it was break-

even, and 61 per cent said it was a loss rate. Since the low rate of

participation of lending institutions in the program and the small

nlmber of loans made even by participating banks were already known,

*Letter from Deakins to Kirkpatrick, June 22, 1967.

6o.

these data confirmed that it was the return rate that banks found

unattractive.

(4) Shortening the grace period for all loan programs. Colleges

weren't asked for their views on the question. Banks were asked if

they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "The present 10- month

period allowed after graduation before the student must begin to make

repayment on the Guaranteed Loan is not excessive." Fifty-two per cent

of all lending institutions agreed that it was not excessive. But of

the large commercial bank;, who were as a class the most active lenders,

only 39 per cent agreed.

The decision to recommend a grace period of four months, and to

have it apply to all loan programs, was a tenuous elaboration from these

data.

(5) states' establishment of central service division or central

pool of credit for problem borrowers. No one was queried about tne

setting up of a central service .'.:vision or 4 central pool of credit.

What the survey did was show that there were students reported to have

problems obtaining a guaranteed loan. Leading institutions said that

they generally limited loans to borrowers in their "marketing area,"

and many of them gave preference to present customers (27 per cent said

without exception, 4o per cent said yes, but we make some exceptions).

A few banks owned that some students have considerable trouble getting

guaranteed loans: freshmen, ccording to 11 per cent; students from

rural areas, according to 9 per cent; students from low-income families,

according to 3 per cent.

61.

Educational institutions more often reported that students had

trouble obtaining guaranteed loans: 45 per cent said that students

unknown at the bank have considerable trouble, 23 per cent said out-of-

state students, 15 per cent said students from rural areas, 13 per cent

said freshmen, 13 per cent said students from low-income families,

10 per cent said racial minority group students. Some readers of the

data wondered whether these responses reflected the state of the

financial aid officers' records or of their prejudices.

(6) Separate administration of loans of accommodation for non-

needy families. This recommendation was the outgrowth of the establish-

ment of a financial needs test for the GSL. Non-needy families would

no longer be eligible. Therefore, if the Congress wanted to be good

guys and help families who didn't need loans, they should set up a

separate agency and system, without charging the costs against educa-

tion. No data, beyond those supporting the financial need criterion

for GLP, support the recommendation.

(7) Consideration of ending interest subsidy in the GLP during

the repayment period. No one was asked.

(8) Combining six loan programs into two: the Guaranteed Loan

Programs and all others combined. Educational institutions weren't at all

prepared to forego NDSLPI HPSLP, and NSLP and rely solely on the Guaran-

teed Loan Program, so it was not feasible to combine all the programs

into one. But nobody was asked about combining them at all.

(9) Centralization of loan program administration. This recom-

mendation in essence meant moving the Health Professions and Nursing

Loan Programs to the Office of Education. The health professions and

62.

nursing schools weren't queried about this possibility. What they were

asked was their satisfaction with the Public Health Service. They were

very satisfied. The recommendation for consolidation was based largely

on notions of efficiency.

(10) NDSLP appropriation at present level. This recommendation

ran counter to the schools' expressed desire for more NDSLP funds.

Forty-two per cent stated that the amount of NDSLP funds was inadequate;

89 per cent did not plan to decrease the size of their NDSLP loan

request because of the availability of the Guaranteed Loan Program.

The recommendation, however, was responsive to the Office of Edu-

cation guideline about minimizing direct federal loans and maximizing

loans from private sources. The wording of the CEEB recommendation

and the discussion of it show that the study staff felt that they were

being bold in defying the implicit injunction to reduce or phase out

the NDSLP. To the extent that they urged the maintenance of NDSLP at

existing levels, rather than reduction, the recommendation used the

survey data. But when the recommendation was read and discussed in

1968, the early history had grown dim ane the unintended meaning that

came through was: Don't increase NDSLP.

('1) End of loan forgiveness for teachers. Educational institu-

tions favored the forgiveness feature. In response to a question on

the future of cancellation in the NDSLP,

67 per cent of colleges said there should be no change22 per cent of colleges said eliminate all cancellation11 per cent said extend cancellation.

63.

Asked whether cancellation made collection of loans more difficult,

4 per cent said yes, definitely11 per cent said yes, probably85 per cent said no.

Asked whether cancellation increased the number of students at the

institution who went into teaching,

13 per cent of colleges said yes, definitely42 per cent said yes, probably45 per cent said no.

The respondents to the college questionnaires were financial aid

officers, and some interested readers of the report questioned the aid

officers' knowledge of the facts; deans of education, for example,

might have given different responses.

The "hardest" research data came from the pilot study of student

borrowers. Questionnaires were mailed to 285 graduates of the class of

1965, from schools in the Metropolitan New York area, who were paying

off their NDSLP loans; 109 questionnaires were returned. Of these,

`7 per cent of the borrowers expected that part of their loan would be

cancelled because they were or will be teaching. This represents

62 borrowers. Of the 62, 91 per cent said that cancellation

had not influenced their decision to go into teaching. This finding

was the strongest support for the recommendation, since it showed that

cancellation had little pull. But the figures were very small and

drew only from New York City graduates. It was hard to lean on them.

And there were even those who commented that increasing the teacher

supply by 9 per cent was no mean feat.

The interesting thing, however, is that the results of the pilot

study were not available at the time that the recommendations were

614.

formulated, discussed, and accepted. The results came in in February,

after the report was completed and submitted. They were sent to

Washington as an appendix to the final report.

(12) End of loan forgiveness for nurses. Nursing schools favored

forgiveness.

67 per cent said there should be no change24 per cent said increase the amount of cancellation9 per cent said eliminate all cancellation

Asked whether cancellation had increased the number of students who

went into nursing practice, 4,j per cent said yes.

Thus, for the twelve recoNnendations, there was wide variation in

the degree of correspondence between data and recommendation. Even at

best, however, the data were not seen as conclusive. In a later sec-

tion we will consider whether strong research support increased the

power of a recommendation. But our inquiry will be limited by the fact

that the strongest research support for a recommendation present in

this study was open to criticism and debate.

Chronology -- Phase II

The following table summarizes the events of April 1967 to

January-February 1968.

Office of Education

1967

April-May - -Advises on

survey questionnaires.

June--Receives pre-

liminary question-

naire results.

-Discussions on mer-

ger of loan program

administration; deci-

sion is made not to

merge.

Aa.--Begins planning

legislative proposals

for 1968.

-HEW task force draws

up Higher Education

Amendments of 1968.

Oct.--Attends Advisory

Committee meeting.

Dec.--Attends Advisory

Committee meeting.

Phase II - Conduct of the Study

Bureau of Applied Social

College Entrance Examination Board

Research

April- -Participates in development

of questionnaires.

June - -Receives preliminary ques-

tionnaire results.

-Holds interviews with federal

officials, representatives of

agencies, and interest groups.

May -Aug. - -Interviews with financial

aid officers, bankers, et al.

Aug.-Oct. - -State Conferences.with

financial aid officers, bankers,

et al.

Oct . -Jan. - -Develops recommendations

Oct.--Advisory Committee meets on

GLP.

Dec. - -Advisory Committee meeting.

1968

Jan.-48st minute changes

Jan.--Submits study report to

in Higher Education

Office of Education.

Amendments.

April- -Develops survey

questionnaires.

ntSends questionnaire

out to colleges.

June - -Sends out pre-

liminary results of

colleges' questionnaire.

July--Sends questionnaires

to health professions

schools.

Ala.Questionnaires to

vocational educational

institutions.

-Questionnaires to

lending institutions.

-Questionnaires to

nursing schools.

.Oct.-Jan.--Helps CLLR to

develop recommendations.

Oct.--Attends Advisory

Committee meeting.

Nov.--Prepares report on

Guaranteed Loan Program.

Dec.Attends Advisory

Committee meeting.

-Report on NDSLP and

other loan programs

Feb.--Prepares report on

study of student borrowers.

66.

Chapter III

DECISIONS ARE MADE

Meanwhile at the Office of Education

While the study was in progress, four related activities

were going on in the Office of Education. First, staff of the

Division of Student Financial Aid reviewed the experience of the

College Work-Study and Educational Opportunity Grant programs.

Second, staff were keeping in close contact with CEEB. Third,

representatives participated in Intradepartmental discussions

within HEW that considered consolidating the administration of

all loan programs, an issue that the study staff was also

pondering. Finally, beginning in August, the legislative planning

cycle began and the Division of Student Financial Aid started

drawing up proposals for 1968 legislation. OE specifications

went to a departmental task force that framed the student aid

section of the Administrations' higher education bill.

(1) Review of College Work-Study and Educational Opportunity

Grant Programs. The Division of Student Financial Aid reviewed

experience and data on these financial aid programs in-house,

with an intent similar to, although on a much more restricted

scale than, the CEEB study of loan programs. CEEB had not been

charged with any responsibility to assess these programs. How-

ever, as a service to OE, the Bureau included in the question.;

naires a few questions on schools' participation and satisfaction.

67.

OE staff drew on these data as well as their knowledge of

operations, correspondence and complaints, and statistics.

(2) Close touch with CEEB. James Moore, director of

the Division of Student Financial Aid, shepherded the CEEB

study from its earliest beginnings. He and his staff were in

constant contact with CEEB during its course, reviewing the

questionnaires, writing an explanatory letter to colleges to

urge their participation in the survey, tabulating OE data on

loans, conferring on the issues. OE people attended both Ad-

visory Committee meetings on the study.

In June, they received from the Bureau the basic results

of the first 700 questionnaires returned by colleges. (There

was almost no change in the distribution of responses when the

final number of 1700 college responses was tabulated. As Nash

stated, "After one month they knew the facts and could adjust

to reality.") It was particularly important they keep abreast

of the study in progress because legislation for 1968 would

have to be drafted before the final CEEB report was submitted.

In the legislative planning cycle, work starts on new

proposals in the sumMer so that the Presidential budget can be

ready by. January and new legislation introduced early in the

session. At the time that the study of loan programs was

first conceived in spring 1966, it was expected that the timing

would be appropriate and that the study findings would be ready

by the time legislation was being develciped. However, because

68.

of the delay in late 1966 in deciding on the focus of the study

and its funding, the due date for the study was pushed back to

January 1, 1968. OE staff proceeded with legislative proposals

without the full CEEB report, although they knew much of the

content before it was finished.

(3) Intradepartmental discussions on consolidation.

Secretary Gardner was deeply concerned with streamlining the

biiramshackle department of HEW. In his attempts to bring

order he looked into the-possibility of consolidating the

administration of all the federal loan programs. Represent-

atives of the affected agencies and the Secretary's office

met and considered the pros and cons in early-1967. It was

evident by the summer of 1967 that there was too much re-

sistance to force the OE and PHS loan programs together. PHS,

which was the likely loser, was no happier than any bureau-

cracy at the idea of losing personnel and budget from a program

it believed it was administering well and with special expertise

in health-profession education.* Pressing the point might jeopard-

ize larger schemes for reorganization in PBS.

Therefore, a more modest assignment was made. Secretary

Gardner appointed a task force to consolidate three of the OE

student aid programs,into a.single enactment--NDSLP, College

Work-Study, and Educational Opportunity Grants--and to bring

greater consistency of administration to the others. Samuel

Halperin, HEW Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation, headed

*PHS saw the health professior1S loans as serving different purposesand meeting different needs from other loan programs; they werepart of an integrated system of financial assistance to healthprofession schools (which were usually largely separate from therest of the university); consolidation would increase work andproblems, and might well jeopardize the purposes of the healthprofessions loan programs. (I thank Alice Swift, Student Loanand Scholarship Branch, Division of Health Manpower EducationalServices. for clarifyjne. t1ic PHS perspective.)

69.

the task force. Members came from the Office of Education.. Public

Health Service, General Counsel's office, Comptroller's office,

and other parts of the Secretary's office. The task force was

to draw up key provisions for the higher education legislation

of 1968.

(4) Legislative planning. OE began developing

specifications for loan program legislation in August and

September 1967. Since Secretary Gardner's new task force was

now charged with responsibility for drawing up the financial

aid title of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968, OE took

its proposals to the task force through its representatives on

the group.

OE proposals on student aid represented established

positions, in most cases not related to the issues that were

engaging the attention of the CEEB. There is one case where

it appeared that the CEEB study, along with some prodding from

other sources, influenced OE to bring in new provisions. The

issue was inconsistencies among different loan programs. OE

proposals reflected an effort to get uniform provisions in the

various programs on such matters as deferrals of repayment

during military, Peace Corps, and VISTA service,and minimum

amounts of repayment. (Senator Javits of the Senate Sub-

committee on Education, who had been interested in ensuring

greater consistency for some time, found that these efforts

were not thoroughgoing enough. When both OE and PHS loan

70.

bills reached the Senate Subcommittee, he succeeded in amending

them into further reconciliation.)

On the issue of loan cancellation to teachers, the t)ffice

of Education was willing to abandon the provision. Thay felt

that in the individual case a few hundred dollars of forgive-

ness was hardly likely to affect a person's long-term career

decision. The administrative difficulties -- and all the

correspondence involved in determining whether an individual

qualified as a full-time teacher -- were a. nuisance. Mbre-

over, the costs of cancellation were going up, reaching

$18 million in fiscal 1969, and projected at $20..million

for 1970.

The task force worked through the fall and winter of

1967. Members of the task force, other than the Office of

Education representatives, say that they knew about the CEEB

study, and after its'submission to OE in January, they were

familiar with its main recommendations. But it had no effect

on their legislative proposals except insofar as the OE pro-

posals might have incorporated the CEEB recommendations. As

one member of the task force stated, "1 can't point to

single thing attributable to the Board study. Next year or

the year after, the weight of things will begin to be felt,

and the report may be a factor."*

*As this statement suggests, the appropriate time interval is diffi-cult to determine in studying the utilization of research. Some re-search that is not acted upon early, may be put to use after the'student of utilization has left the scene. Research that appearsAmused may slowly be absorbed into the thinking of elites and pub-lics, leading over-time to significant shifts in practice and policy.

71.

Some members of the task force, particularly its chairman,

Dr. Halperin, were disappointed in the study when it arrived.

They had hoped for more rigorous data on two of the controversial

policy issues -- increase in return to banks and cancellation of

loans for teaching. The report in both cases reported opinions.

It did not show bank yields or survey the banks' alternatives.

It did not give information on the actual effects of loan

cancellation on recruitment into teaching. Those members who

agreed with the CEEB recommendations on both counts found the

evidence too thin to briig them much support.

The Office of the Secretary of HEW did not want to reverse

the department's traditional position of supporting loan for-

giveness, despite OE's desertion from the fold. The department

had held that cancellation was a good thing for a long period

of time, and it was awkward to do a complete turnabout. Further-

more, there was no sense in the department's getting into the

middle of what was surely going to be a donnybrook between the

House and the Senate. The House, led by Mrs. Green and Mr. Quie,

was out to end forgiveness, while the Senate, under the leader-

ship or Senator Morse, was looking for more and more categories

72.

of people to forgive.

This is an illustration of the theme of the "plowed field."

Cancellation of loans for teaching had engaged Congressional attention

almost from the beginning of NDSLP in 1958. The House leadership

had long since become convinced of the inefficiency of forgiveness

and the ensuing waste of public funds. The Senate subcommittee, on

the other hand, saw loan cancellation as an opening wedge in the cam-

paign for free higher education for all. It was adamant against

withdrawing financial help that had already been won.

The CEEB report was reviewed in the task force and in the

Secretary's office, and the findings on the effects of forgiveness

were deemed inconclusive. The decision was made that the depart-

ment would no longer press for forgiveness, a decision in itself

of some consequence, and one which the study helped to justify.

But neither would the department press for ending it. The new

legislation to be introduced into the Ninetieth Congress did not

mention the subject.

The Office of Education had an opportunity to go on record

directly on all of the CEEB recom.14ndations. The House Special

Subcommittee on Education, which as we shall see received the re-

port on February 16, asked Commissioner Howe for the CE position on

each recommendation. Mr. Howe's reply took exception to a number

of the key recommendations of the study. Although we must jump

ahead in the time sequence of the story--Mr. Howe's statement was

dated March 15--we present the OE statement here as evidence of tne

reaction of the major client to the study.

73.

The Office of Education Goes on Record ci the CEEB Recommendations

On March 7, 1968, Mrs. Grceu wrote to Commissioner Howe

asking for the Office of Education position on the recommend-

ations contained in the "Study of Federal Student Loan Programs"

conducted for the Department by the College Entrance Examination

Board. On March 15, Mr. Howe replied. Here we have the con-

sidered position of the department. The OE position paper,

before release, was carefully reviewed by the HEW legislative

office and other staff of the Secretary's office.

Of the twelve CUB Tt-Idy recommendations of

greatest salience, OF ag2,Jed with three, disagreed with five,

said "not now" on three others, and did not comment on the one

related to the Public Health Service's loan program.

Agreement was recorded with the following recommendations:

1. A higher rettrn to banks. Provisions to increase

bank return were included in the Administration bill

2. Shortening the grace period. OE stated its agree-

ment, but this provision had not been included in the

Administration bill.

3. Consideration of the removal of the GLP interest sub-

sidy. The Office of Education agreed to "give con-

sideration to the matter." Both the recommendation and

the OE concurrence were phrased in future tense. The

Administration bill did not remove the subsidy.

74.

The Office of Education disagreed with these recommendations

of the CEEB report:

4. A financial need criterion for the Guaranteed Loan

Program. The purpose of the program, Commissioner

Howe said, is specifically to provide assistance to

middle income families who are not eligible for loans

through the college-based programs.

5. Separate administration of loans of accomodation to the

non-needy families. The Office of Education disagreed

with some asperity. GLP should serve all families.

The cost of obtaining postsecondary education

continues to increase each year. The financialpressures now bear heavily not only on the lowmiddle income family, but also on middle andupper middle income families who only a fewyears ago were capable of paying for theirchildren's education. We believe the insuredloan program was established to meet this need...Further, we see aittle point in a further pro-liferating of student loan insurance activitiesamong other Federal agen6ies.

6. Having colleges and universities assume responsibility

for determining who should receive Guaranteed Loans

and recommending the amounts. The Office of Education

concurred "in the spirit" that colleges should have

some responsibility, but disagreed with the substance.

Aatual negotiations, said OE, "should remain between

the student and the lender." Colleges have the oppor-

tunity under current statute to provide information and

advice.

75.

7. Encouraging states to set up a central service division

or central pool of credit for students having difficulty

obtaining loans. The Office of Education stated that

where the idea had been tried, it had proved "very

ineffective."

8. Maintaining NDSLP appropriations at a level not below

the 1968 level.

If the implication is that the direct annualappropriations for the NDSLP should be held atthe 1968 level, we do not concur in thisrecommendation.

On three further recommendations, the Office of Education

said that their time had not yet come.

9.Combining the six loan programs into two. The Office of

Education said that "it is not deemed feasible to

consolidate the PHS and OE programs, at this time."

10. Centralization of all loan program administration. The

Office of Education stated that such a recommendation

is being explored by the Department.

11. Ending loan cancellation for teachers. The Office of

Education withheld judgment for the time being. It

called the CEEB study "inconclusive" on the effective-

ness of cancellation as a means of recruiting teachers.

Further study might be done, said the statement, although

at this point the educational community is sharply di-

vided. The 1968 Administration bill left the forgive-

ness provision intact.

76.

On the final recommendation, ending loan cancellation for

nurses, the Office of Education did not comment. That was the

business of the Public Health Service which administers the

nursing loan program. The Public Health. Service itself was

opposed to ending loan cancellation for students who entered

nursing.

On those issues where OE disagreed with the CEEB recom-

mendations, it is evident that both administrative and ideo-

logical considerations were involved. Thus, administrative

ineffectiveness was grounds for dissent in some cases: a

central credit pool does not work, separate administration

of loans of necessity and loans of accomodation would un-

necessarily proliferate loan activity among federal agencies.

Ideological grounds predominate in objections to the main-

tenance of the current level of VIDSLP appropriations and the

use of a financial need criterion. OE invoked not only its

own sentiments but also the intent of Congress in opposing

financial need limitations and separate administration of

loans of accomodRtion.

The CEEB had also made other less controversial recom-

mendations. On these, the agreement score was =oh higher. The

Office of Ilducation concurred with the large majority of the

technical and procedural recommendations, such as simpli-

fying and standardizing reporting procedures, strenghtening

existing state agencies, earlier notification to colleges of

77.

funds available, adoption of a write-off procedure for defaulted

loans, standardizing provisions for deferment of repayment, etc.

Now let us go back to the chronological account and the

events occurring ct the time of the January submission of the

CEEB report to the Office If Education.

The Higher Education Amendments of 1968

When the CEEB's final report on the loan study arrived at

the Office of Education in late January, 1968 loan program legisla-

tion had already been drawn up. The loan title was part of the

Administration's omnibus education bill, the Higher Education

Amendments of 1968.

Nevertheless, there was some time and opportunity for the

study to influence affairs. Don Hirsch of the General Counsel's

Office in HEW recalls that changes were being made in the bill

right up until the day it was introduced into the House of Repre-

sentatives on February 5. In the last days, several decisions were

reconsidered in the office of the Secretary of HEW, both because of

the CEEB report and because of "internal factors" within the depart-

ment. The report was mentioned by the discussants and given some

significance. However, no changes were made in its direction.

Informants have been unwilling to name exact particulars, but they

stated that one decision made prior to the report's appearance,

whicl, was in agreement with the report, was changed in a direction

contrary to the report. In another case, a decision contra r- to

the report was looked at again but allowed to Rtand. Other in-

78.

putscommunications from many interest groups and concerns about the

political palatability of the legislation to the Congress--were

having an effect.*

The House Subcommittee Uses the Report

Staff of the House and Senate subcommittees on education were

informed about the CEEB study and received copies of the report

prior to its official release on February 16. The House Special

Subcommittee on Education was particularly interested. It found

that the CEEB report agreed with many of its own positions, such

as ending loan cancellation for teachers, increasing the rate

of return to banks, even with its old (now dormant) penchant for

consolidating the administration of the loan programs.

The information on the unprofitability of Guaranteed Loans

looked particularly useful. The Congress was loathe to increase

the cost of loans to students, particularly in an election year.

But without higher returns, banks would not make sufficient loan

funds available. The American Bankers Association had pressed for

higher returns, either through higher interest rates or through fees,

but had been able to marshal scanty evidence. The data that they

presented in the 1967 House hearings were based on a study of

only twenty banks.", The CEEB, study, by.ocllecting similar

*That the use of the study at the secretarial level was so modest doesnot gainsay the good faith of the department's "anticipated reliance"on the study. The study was instigated by the Secretary's office, a siz-able sum allotted for it, in the expectation that it could prove helpfulin upcoming decisions. By this time, reliance on the study was limitedby the timing delay, the "round shift" in the relative importance ofissues, and the over-riding necessity of ensuring Congressional sup-port for 1968 legislation.

Special Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education andLabor, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 1st session, Hearingson Higher Education Amendments of 1967, Part I, p. 139.

79.

responses from about 600 landing institutions participating in

the GLP, lent the credence of numbers to the bankers' requests.

This would make it easier for the subcommittee to sell the

House on a higher return to banks, which it saw as essential for

survival of the Ouaranteed L^an Program.

The issue of consolidation also touched a sympathetic chord.

To prevent proliferation of the number of agencies administer-

ing student loan ;Tor-rams, a provision had been proposed in an

earlier Congress that no institution of higher education would

be eligible to participate in both the EDSLP and the Health

Professions Loan Program. The provision did not pass.* The

Special Subcommittee on Education had become reconciled to the

separation of OE and PHIS programs, particularly since it was ill

equipped to alter the situation. Not only is Congress rarely

eager to get embroiled in decisions on structure within the

executive department, but In this case, the issue was complic-

ated by the fact that in the House, the Health Professions and

Nursing Loan Programs do not fall within the jurisdiction of the

Committee on Education and Labor, as do the other loan programs.

The health loan programs are considered by the House Committee

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.** Therefore, consolidation of

**That public health legislation should go through a committeedealing with interstate and foreign commerce is a historicalanomaly. The first public health bill, in the 18401s, dealtwith living conditions of seamen in the merchant fleet, andforeign commerce we the logical site for its consideration.For 120 years the tradition has prevailed.

HOwever, no student hvs ever been eli:jble to receive fundsunder NDSL and aPSL NOL.

80.

the programs is particularly difficult in the House, and probably

would have to originate on the Senate side, where different sub-

committees but the same committee (Labor and Public Welfare) have

jurisdiction. The Senate, however, had shown little interest in

consolidation.

The House Special Subcommittee had also recently undertaken

a questionnaire survey of colleges and universities to learn about

their experiences with student financial aid programs. In November

1966, the subcommittee mailed questionnaires to about 600 educational

institutions. Many of the questions were similar to those in the

CEEB study. For example: Do you believe teacher cancellation pro-

visions encourage students to become teachers who will remain to

the profession? From the 470 returned questionnaires, the House Sub-

committee concluded that OE staff were doing a good job in administer-

ing the programs, colleges favor the retention of teacher cancella-

tion, some students were having problems negotiating guaranteed

loans, etc.* The tenor of the results closely paralleled the larger

CEEB inquiry. The House subcommittee members saw their own study

confirmed, and because of the mutual reinforcement, they were en-

couraged to place stock in the CEEB results.

The Administration bill was introduced into the House (as

H.R. 15067) on February 5, 1968 by Representatives Carl Perkins

and Edith Green. In the hearings held by the House Special Sub-

committee on Education, the CEEB report had a prominent supporting

*House of Representatives, Report of the Special Subcommittee on Educa-tion, Study of the United States Office of Education, 89th Congress,2nd session, 1967, pp. 141-201, 471-584.

81.

role. It was accorded full measure of respect for its obvious.. right-

mindedness.

House hearings on the bill began on February 6, and went

on for 13 days, ending on March 8. On the first day of the

hearings, Congressmen Scheuer asked Education Commissioner

Howe whether any comprehensive survey had been made of the

suggested student loan, grant, and tax programs "to give us

some indication of how all the proposals impacted the individual

students, the family, the institution, and effects on society

in general . . ."* Mr. Howe replied that although nothing so

comprehensive had been done, the CEEB had examined various student

aid efforts and a report was in. Mr. Muirhead, associate com-

missioner for higher education, said in amplification that "hope-

fully within the next week or so"**the subcommittee would receive

the report. At the conclusion of the day's hearings Congressman

Esch asked, "In the light of the present consideration--and I know

the college board's study came in some time ago--is there any reason

why we can't have it immediately?" Mr. Muirhead answered, "No

reason at all. We have the study in its preliminary form now;

the delay is that it is t4ing printed."*"

Commissioner aowe sent copies of the report to Mrs. Edith

Green, chairman c.,r the House Special Subcommittee on Education,

*Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Education of theCommittee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, onR.R. 15067, Part 1, p. 48.

**Ibid.

**Ibid., P. 51.

82,

and to Senator Wayne Morse, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on

Education, on February 16. The final paragraph of his accompany-

ing letter.

said:

While the Office of Education reserves the right to differwith any of the specific recommendations, we believe thatyou will find the study useful . . .

On March 7, John I. Kirkpatrick of the College Entrance

Examination Board, the director of the study, testified before the

House Subcommittee. (Most of the intervening hearings had dealt

with issues other than financial assistance; H. R. 15067 contained

12 titles of which student asssistance was only one.*) The first

question he was asked concerned the removal of the interest subsidy

during the payout period, a topic on which the study made no recom-

mendation. Mr. Kirkpatrick explained that there wasn't a sufficiently

strong case to warrant recommending the removal of the subsidy. In

an interesting exigesis of the outlook of the study, he explained,

. . . the study attempts to speak for quite a few groups, not only

the colleges and universities, even the bankers and State agencies

and the others that are all involved . . . (We] had to straddle the

fence on this because we were trying to speak for a half dozen dif-

ferent kinds of groups throughout the country.'

Mr. Kirkpatrick urged that the Guaranteed Student Loan

Program use a financial needs test. This was a central recommenda,

*The total bill was referred to as the Higher Education Amendmentsof 1968. Title IV, on financial assistance, was sometimes calledthe Educational Opportunity Act of 1968.

Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Education of H.R.15067, part 2, p. 802.

83.

tion of the study. He explained it to the Subcommittee in terms

of the NDSLP's inability to fulfill the needs of lower-income

families. Therefore, the :=i..? was a "very, very valuable supplement

to the National Defense Student Loan Program." A needs test for the

GLP, based on the judgment of need by the colleges and universities,

was important to keep the money for those who needed it. Loans of

accomodation to higher-income families should be handled as loans to

the parent, not the student, through direct federal insurance

without the interest subs dy.* This poiat--in about one printed

page of testimony--was the crux of Mr. Kirkpatrick's testimony.

Mrs. Green herself cited the CEEB study three times during

the day. One mention concerned cancellation of loans for teachers.

She stated:

Mr. Gaul [associate general counsel of the committee] hascalled my attention to a pilot study that was done--it wasonly 109 borrowers under the NDEA. It asked, do you ex-pect that any of your loans will be cancelled because you areor will be in teaching? The total response, yes, 57 percent, and no, 43 per cent.

Then ves) is the fact that you do not have to pay back allyour loan influence your decision [sic] to go into teach-ing? Ninety-one per cent, no.**

on the second occasion, in a discussion of participation

of pri;:ole lenders in the Guaranteed Loan Program, she again

quoted the report directly. The statement dealt with the diffi-

culty of accurately assessing the availability of guaranteed

*Ibid., p. 803.

**Ibid" p. 770.

84.

loans to students,* and continues, "Participation by lending insti-

tutions does not necessarily mean a high volume of lending activity."'"

The other citation of the study by Mrs. Green also dealt

with the Guaranteed Loan Program. She stated that the study showed

the unavailability of loans in large population centers with a con-

centration of lower economic level families, predominantly Negro.

"I think this has been one of the most damaging bits of testimony

of how successful this program has been."***

*Through some mischance, the quotation in the Hearings inaccuratelysays "NDEA loans" rather than "guaranteed loans"; "guaranteedlt. Is" is the phrase in the study report and is deaandtd. by `:piesense of the statement.

**Hearings, p. 807.

***Ibid., pp. 808-809.

65.

Senate Reception of the Report: Respectful but Uninterested

The history of the Senate's reception of the CEEB report

contrasts with that of the House of Representatives. The

Senate Subcommittee was not in sympathy either with OE's

guidelines for the study nor with the CEEB's recommendations.

Accordingly, the attention accorded the study tended toward

the ritualistic.

Charles Lee and Roy Millenson, the staff members of the

Subcommittee, read through the report before its official

release on February 16, and on their recommendation it was

printed as a "committee print." Between 4-5,000 copies

were printed on standing resolution, as part of the "Notes

and Working Papers Concerning the Annirdstration of Programs

Authorized under Student Financial Asnistance Statutes." The

report was now available in a handy 6" by 9" printed paper-

back instead of only the bulky l" -thick mimeographed original.

The committee print, unabridged, unexpurgated, unchanged, was

dated March, 1968.

Where did the copies go? Many of them were used as

"stocking stuffers" for senatorial offices. Senators are

pleased to be able to send interested constituents evidence

of their efforts in their behalf. Senator Morse, chairman of

the subcommittee, was running in a strongly contested primary

election for the Oregon Senate-seat in May, and many of the

86.

reports were dispatched to Oregon voters. Others were mailed

out by subcommittee staff on request. Senator Javits, for

example, had copies mailed to a selected list of people in

education in New York. Because the staff is small and over-

burdened, no further formal distribution was initiated. But

they alerted the Office of Education to the committee print

so that OE could order additional copies from their funds at

a reduced rate. OE sent copies to all institutions of higher

education in the country.

In March and April, the Senate subcommittee staff held

conferences on student financial aid. In attendance were

staff members of the full committee, staff from the offices

of Senator Yarborough, Senator Prouty, Senator Dominick, and

other subcommittee members, Peter Muirhead and James Moore of

the Office of Education, John F. Morse of the American Council

on Education, representatives from Treasury, and others. The

purpose of the meetings was to consider issues of financial

aid, including the CEEB report and the perspectives ofAhe

Office of Education, United Student Aid Funds, and other

groupp.

What Mrs. Green and the House subcommittee.had done

formally by correspondence with Commissioner Howe, the

Senate Subcommittee did in informal meeting. The CEEB report

and the Office of Education positions on the report re-

commendations were discussed. In the recollection of

87.

participants, however, other issues, such as the reinsurance

proposal, received top priority.

The Senate subcommittee staff's reactions to the report

were that it was too conservative in outlook. Charles Lee,

the staff member of the r mocratic majority on the Committee,

saw Kirkpatrick as having the perspectives of a student

financial aid officer, with professional and emotional ties

to the needs criterion. The senators are student-oriented,

with a much less restrictive outlook. The Senate is inter-

ested in broadening aid legislation. Over time it has liber-

alized the provisions of the National Defense Education Act,

e.g., extending loan forgiveness to teachers in colleges and

universities, in private nonprofit elementary and secondary

schools, in overseas schools of the Armed Forces, and pro-

viding full forgiveness to teachers in low - income areas and

teachers of handicapped children. It has legislated

"educational opportunity grants", which are in effect scholar-

ships based on need. Cutback in the forgiveness feature or

restrictions on NDSLP were out of tune with the Subcommittee

orientation of increasing general support to education.

Nor is the Senate concerned with administrative efficiency

at the expense of programmatic effectiveness. Rationalizing

and centralizing administration of the loan progrars was not

viewed as a higher good. The Senate, with its long-run

perspective, is willing to tolerate a certain looseness of

68.

administration, particularly when programa associated with the

names and careers of sponsoring senators remain highly visible.

The CEEB report was seen as competent and well presented.

It "received consideration", according to subcommittee staff

members, not in political or partisan terms but in terms of

the issues facing higher education. Millenson, for the

Republican minority, emphasized that the report was not dis-

missed lightly. However, much of the thinking that..had ?shaped

the objectives and issues posed for the study by OE in 1967 was

irrelevant to Subcommittee deliberations in the Spring of 1968,

as were many of the CEEB conclusions.

The Senate hearings that began in March contained no

testimony directly on the study. Mr. Kirkpatrick, the study

director, testified before the subcommittee on March 13, but

he spoke from his extensive experience and did not mention the

study.

Two other witnesses alluded to its findings. Charles W.

Walker, executive vice president of the American Bankers

Association, cited the data on income level of :families re-

ceiving guaranteed loans.

... If I could steal some figures from a survey Mr.Kirkpatrick made, 58 per cent of 200,000 loanssurveyed went to families with $9,000 adjustedincome or lass. Thirty per cent went to familiesof :6,000 or less, and 12 per cent to familiesof 3,000 or less

U.S. Senate Hearings before the Subcommittee on Education of

These data, reported in the CEEB study, had been collected and

processed by the Office of Education.

Mr. Allen Purdy, director of student financial aid at the

University of Missouri and chairman of the National Student

Financial Aid Council, in his testimony referred to

Kirkpat;ickts study" as unable to find that teacher forgive-

ness had actually encouraged students to go into teaching.*

All other references to the CEEB study in the voluminous

Senate Hearings record (which ran to 6,584 pages with appen-

dices, 1,780 pages being directly on S. 3098) came from the

Department of Health, Education and Welfare concerning the

teacher cancellation provision.** In all three messages,

the position of the Office of Education and, the Department is

the same: The CEEB study found the evidence inconclusive on

the effectiveness of loan cancellation, and the Department is

not recommending its expansion.

There was one interesting exchange; between Commissioner

of Education Howe snd Senator Morse. Asked about extension of

forgiveness to the Guaranteed S4,Aident Loan Program, Commissioner

Howe gave what was now the stancrard answer.

the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Ninetieth Congress,Second Session, on S. 3098 and i. 3099, Education Legislation,1968, Part 2, p. 387

Ibid., p. 393

**Ibid., pp. 299, 543-44, 843.

90-

...We had an independ%nt study made on the for-giveness feature this past year. It is availablefor the record should you wish to enter it there.The study was done fr:, us by the College EntranceExamination Boar.; ca various aspects of loanprograms, including this one. The evidence is notconclusive concerning the effectiveness of forgive-ness features in bringing about the results thatthey try to achieve. It is apparently the judgmentof most student aid administators in colleges anduniversities that forgiveness programs are notparticularly effective, but that is again a matterof judgment rather than hard evidence.

SENATOR MORSE: I am aware of that study. We havealready pranted it as a committee print. I thoughtit was a very worthwhile study. The study itself,however, gives rise to some of these proposalsfor expansion.*

Senator Morse thus found support in the study for his position

of extending forgiveness, even though the recommendation was

antithetical. The study, before recommending the elimination

of the forgiveness feature, did indeed mention the equity of

extending it ta other "critical" professional fields and to the

Guaranteed Loan Program. And the data could be read as "in-

conclusive" on the positive side as readily as they could be

interpreted a$ negatively inconclusive. After all, 55 per cent

of the institttions of higher education replied that teacher

cancellation increased or probably increased the Lumber of

students at -she institution who went into teaching.

Ibid., pp. 543-544

91.

Action on the Higher Education Amendments

March was over and April passing. The loan programs would

expire unless new legislation was forthcoming, and neither house

had yet reported the education bill out of committee. The

chronicle of the next four months will involve (1) House passage

of a short form of the Higher Education Amendments dealing only

with financial aid, which soon dies, (2) House passage of the

omnibus bill with amendments, (3) Senate passage of a rather

different version of the bill, and then, faced by impending

adjournment for the political conventions and the expiration of

current legislation, (4) passage of a 90-day stopgap extension

by both houses. In the 1...gislative bustle, the House keeps

referring to te CEEB report and incorporating into its bills

provisions consonant with the recommendations. The Senate

ignores the report and passes contrary provisions.

(1) Short bill. On April 25th, in the House of

Representatives, the Committee on Education and Labor reported

out H.R. 16729, a new bill that sidestepped the controversies

around other educational proposals and provided the necessary

monies to continue only the aid programs. The bill extended

for two years the student aid programs (NDSLP, work-study,

educational opportunity grants, vocational student loan pro-

gram, and guaranteed student loam program) with minimal

92.

amendment. The bill had been reported by the subcommittee by

unanimous vote and by unanimous vote was approved by the full

committee.

In the report to the House that accompanied H.R. 16729,

the Committee offered a short background of the legislation.

It cited the 12 days of hearings during the 1967 session, 4 days

of which were concerned exclusively with amendments to the

guaranteed student loan program; 13 days of hearings in 1958;

mrneOUB communications from college administrators and local

lending, agencies, and in a sentence by itself:

The Committee has also given very careful considerationto an extensive study of federally assisted student aidprograms conducted by the College Entrance ExaminationBoard.*

One of the main changes incorporated in H.R. 16729 was

the increase in the maxim= interest in the Guaranteed Student

Loan Program from 6 to 7 per cent. The report cites four

sources of information. First was the House Subcommittee's

own study in 1967; results showed that there was difficulty

finding banks that would lend money under the GSLP and that

banks said the problem was the interest rate. Second was the

CEEB study. Data were cited from the bankers' questionnaire

showing that very few large or small lenders find GSL pro-

House of Representatives, Report No.1319, Extension ofHigher Education Student Assistance Programs, Report toaccompany H.R. 16729, p.3.

93

fitable. The third source of information was the "Barr Study",

the review of the GSLP by the interagency committee composed of

HEW, Treasury, Bureau of the Budget, and the Council of Economic

Advisors, headed by Joseph Barr of the Treasury. Finally,

testimony from the hearings was quoted in support of higher re-

turns to lending institutions. The CEEB study, thus, was one

of support among many for a position that practically everybody

now agreed was necessary.

The bill also adhered to the study recommendation that

NDSLP funds not be increased. The amount authorized for 1969

was $200 million, more than the $190 million appropriated for

1968 but less than the $225 million authorized for 1968. The

study was not cited. The study, in making its recommendation,

was responding to the same financial restrictions that con-

strained the committee in its budget proposal.

The report to the House also justifies the legislative

provision for advanced funding authority (i.e., including

appropriations for loan programs in the appropriation acts for

the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which funds are

made available), so that colleges can have early notificaticn

of funds available. This provision and its rationale are

consonant with the study recommendations, but the study is not

mentioned.

On May 9th, the House passed the bill extending the aid

programs. In Mrs. Green's statement in support of the bill,"41r,f,

she discusses -- as did the report from the committee -- the

Subcommittee's own study, the Barr interagency study, the CEEB

study, and the hearings testimony. All support the higher in-

terest rate. During the floor debate, Congressman Schwengel,

not a member of either the subcommittee or the full committee,

cited "a study by the College Entrance Examination Board" on the

costs of college for the student. Such information appears 3.n

the current report, but the figures are somewhat different. .

Apparently he was referring to an earlier CEEB publication. No

other mention of the report was made on the floor of the House.

So, with amendments growing out of the current anguish

over student demonstrations -- barring loans to students con-

victed of crimes against college property, to students who

refuse to obey college regulations and disrupt college ad-

ministration, and to persons convicted of rioting -- the bill

was passed.

There was still the big bill to consider and pass. This

included all, the controversial features on the loan programs

that H.R. 16729 had finessed, as well as titles dealing with

work-study and educational grants, cooperative education,

libraries, strengthening developing institutions, facilities,

etc. The subcommittee, in continuing its deliberations,

decided to put the little bill (H.R. 16729) back together with

the big bill. The student unrest amendments were the major

reason. The subcommittee wanted the opportunity to reconsider,

and probably water down, disciplinary amendments that had been

--4-ded on the floor.

95.

H.R. 16729 was now dead. The student assistance program

would make its next appearance before the House as part of the

omnibus bill, H.R. 15067.

(2) }.iSs22A.ssaeofttiilebibill. Titled the Higher

Education Amendments of 1968, the bill included the provisions

of the earlier version with only minor changes. Again it

provided for an increase in the interest rate for Guaranteed

Loans to 7 per cent, and again the Committee report cited the

CEEB study as one of the sources of support. The bill pro-

vided for advanced funding so that commitments to student

borrowers could be made in the spring. The amount of total

authorization for NDSLP went up from the $200 million of H.R.

16729 to $210 million in 1969, primarily to make VDSLP loans

available to vocational school students who were made eligible.

For 1970, authorization was $275 million.

Important new provisions appear in the bill. The interest

subsidy in guaranteed loans was eliminated during the re-

payment period; after he graduated, the borrower would pay

the full interest. This was an issue which the CEEB study

discussed sympathetically but did not take a position on.

No questionnaire data were collected relevant to the issue.

The big change was the removal of loan forgiveness for

teachers. Here the Committee report relied heavily on the

CEEB study. That Mrs. Green and the subcommittee had been

96.

resolved to end teacher forgiveness long before the study

appeared was a well-known fact. The study gave them prestigious

support and a little data.

The Committee Report states:

The committee has been unable to find statistical in-formation which shows that the forgiveness provision isan incentive to attracting or keeping teachers in theprofession. A study of Federal Student loan programsconducted by the College Entrance Examination Board ex-amined the problem. In title III of the study entitled"Summary of Findings and Recommendations", the CollegeEntrance Examination Board recommends that the "teachercancellation provision should be phased out." This studydiscusses the teacher cancellation in some detail andreveals that the staff was unable to find any clear-cutevidence that the teacher cancellation provision hasmaterially contributed to an increase in either thenumber of quality of teachers. The study also dis-cusses the administrative difficulties and confusioncaused by the provision ...*

The Committee Report goes on to cite the pilot study of

student borrowers from the class of 1965 in the metropolitan

New York area.

* House of Representatives, Report to accompany H.R. 15067,the Higher Education Amendments of 1968, Report No.1649,90th Congress, 2nd Session, July 8, 1968, p.43

97.

The language in the Committee Report wns succinct:

In discussing the CEEB study, mention was made of theresponse received to one questionnaire: 91 per centof the people responding replied that they were notinduced to go into teaching because of the teachercancellation provision.*

The Committee Report also dealt gracefully with the

Office of Education paper on the recommendation for loan forgive-

ness. It quoted the OE statement that

... Further study and evaluation of this aspect ofthe NDEA loan program might be done although thearray of attitudes and opinions in the educationalcommunity on this point is sharply divided, as forinstance, among deans of education, financial aidofficers, or loan recipients themselves.**

This was an indication that the Office of Education, which

called the CEEB study intonclusive, was not maintaining its

old opposition to cancellation. In saying that it had "no

additional information or data which will or will not support

the recommendation made by the college board," t.g* the Office

of Education could even be suspected of aid and comfort in the

effort to end cancellation.

Ibid., p.44

**Ibid., pp. 43-44

***House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on Educ.ation of the Committee on Education and Labor, HigherEducation Amendments of 1968, Confidential Subcommittee,Print No.2, 1968, p.24.

98.

In the CEEE report, the House Subcomnittee had the first

solid information on which to stand. The study was a "salable

item", in the words of one informant, that provided justific-

ation for the committee's opinions. It 1,73.: therefore quoted

liberally.

The House 'All ended loan cancellation for general teaching.

On the other hand, it provided for full forgiveness for teachers

in slum schoo:s and teachers of the handicapped. This was a

modification If the so-called ProuiyAmendment (named for the

senator who originated it). Its rationale was clear: if loan

cancellation kss not an effective way of recruiting teachers,

it might still be an effective way to affect the distribution

of teachers -- and increase the numbers serving the poor. The

subject had not been considered in the CEEB Study.

On July 25, the House passed the bill by the lopsided

vote of 389-15. The CEEB study was not mentioned. Of the amend-

ments made on the floor, only one concerned the loan programs.

This was the amendment introduced by Mr. Scherle of Iowa on

student unrest. The committee had left to the discretion of

the college the cutting off of federal funds to student rioters.

The Scherle amendment required cut -off 'of loans and loan guarantees,

if the college or university determined that the student had

"willfully refused to obey a lawful regulation or order" of

the institution and "such refusal was of serious nature and

contributed to the disruption of the administration ". The House

was insisting on punishment for disorderly protesters.

99.

(3) The Si.;,14.e bill. Meanwhile, on the Senate side, the

education s.ibcomnittee was busy on its own amendments. The CEEB

study was nowher.! in evidence. No one during these busy days re-

members hearing the study even alluded to.

When the Senate bill was reported out of committee, it was so

altered from the administration-proposed version, S.3098, that it

was re- numbered. It was now S. 3769. The report accompanying the

bill made no mention at all of the CEEB study.

Little wonder. The major provisions in the Senate bill ran

counter to CEEB recommendations. Teacher forgiveness was not

dropped; forgiveness was extended. Teachers in poverty-area

schools would have their total NDSLP loan forgiven at the rate

of 20 per cent per year. Moreover, a new category of borrowers,

entrants into the armed forces, would receive loan cancellation- -

at the rate of 25 per cent for each year of military service.

These provisions were to apply not only to NDEA loans but were

extended to the Guaranteed Loen .Programs as well. Nor was NDSLP

to be held at its present level. The bill authorized $250

million for fiscal 1969, $275 million for 1970, and $300 million

for 1971 and 1972. Furthermore, a Presidential commission was to

be appointed to submit a plan for providing "universal educational

opportunity at the post-secondary level", presumably free to all

students.

The bill reached the floor of the Senate on July 15. No

mention was made there of the CEEB study. With two minor amend-

100.

molts unrelated to the loan programs, the bill was passed

unanimously, 83-0.

By the end of July, there were thus two omnibus education

VAen they were referred to conference committee, there

we seen to be approximatelyonehundred differences between

the House and Senate bills. The job facing the conference

committee was staggering. And the Congress was to adjourn on

August 3 for the political conventions.

(4) Interim extension. The staffs of both committees,

aware of the impossibility of reconciling the bills before

adjournment, asked the Office of Education what was absolutely

essential to pass. The answer: extension of the Guaranteed

Student Loan Program, which was expiring. In a few hours a

bill was put together to extend the GSLP for three months

and raise the maximum interest to 7 per cent. These provisions

were substitu:c.1 in the Senate for the language of the old

House-passed bill H. R. 16729. Without debate, both chambers

agreed to the interim extension.

101.

Passage of the Bill

When the Congress recc'rtvened after the political con-

vention, the Conference Committee returned to work on the

"Higher Education Amendments of 1968". In four days of meetings,

the last one running on into the night, it reached a series of

compromises between the House and Senate versions. During the

negotiations, the CEEB report faded from view -- except in one

instance. As we shall see, arguments on the issue of loan

forgiveness for teaching were so finely matched that the issue

teetered in the balance, and the report was brought into the

discussion.

The Conference Comndttee compromised on the amount

authorized for the National Defense Student Loan Program.

Authorization for NDEA loans was set at $210 million for 1969.

This was the figure in the House bill, rather than the $250

million set by the Senate. It exceeded the $190 million

appropriated for 1968. Higher sums were authorized for the

following years: $275 million for 1970, $300 million for 1971.

The CEEB study recommendations that NDEA loans remain at the

current level was by now outmoded; in 1968 there was little

controversy about a modestly increasing rate of federal ex-

, penditure.

The maximum interest rate on insured loans was raised

from 6 to 7 per cent. The CaB study was one iLtat of many

that led to what gas by now nearly unanimous agreement on

102.

increasing the return to banks.

Loan fo-giveness was the intractable issue. On two or

three different days, the conferees tried to resolve the

gaping differences between the House and Senate versions.

Finally, they agreed to settle all the other matters and return

to forgiveness at the end of their sessions. In the course of

the bargaining, the CEEB study was mentioned. Mr. William Gaul,

associate general counsel of the House Committee, recalls an

exchange between Senator Prouty and Mrs. Green. The senator

referred to the study to support loan forgiveness. Mrs.

Green's rejoinder was that the very study he was citing ended

by recommending that forgiveness be phased out. Apparently, the

"inconclusiveness" of the data was reflected in the arguments

of this ultimate decision-making body.

It was late at night on September 18 when, after further

fruitless discussions, the conferees decided that they could

not reconcile the opposing viewpoints. They felt that they

had a good bill, and "you can't do everything at once", so

they would stay with existing law. Thus, the final bill

left the existing provisions for forgiveness basically un-

changed. The study had had a chance to influence policy, but in

the final event it did not prove persuasive enough.

Two small revisions were made. One, forgiveness was ex-

tended for only two years although the loan program was ex-

tended for three. This is an indication of the unsettled

nature of the settlement. Second, a technical revision

103.

was made to allow more than 25 per cent of the schools in any

given state to be designated as poor schools, so that teachers

in the schools could become eligible for forgiveness, provided

that more than half the children enrolled met the proverty

criterion.

Other provisions of the final bill that accorded with

CEEB recommendations included forward funding, merger of the

Vocational Student Loan Program with the Guaranteed Student

Loan Program, further seed money to state agencies, federal

reinsurance of state loans, eligibility of additional lending

institutions such as pension funds, and elimination of the re-

quirement for special consideration in ND:ci.P loans for students

of superior academic background. On most m! these issues

(except forward funding), there were no reltreant data in the

study.

The bill ended subsidy of interest during the repayment

period. This was an acceptance of the House provision. While

the CEEB report had not actually recommended endimc the sub-

sidy, it discussed the subject sympathetically and concluded

that this was a "matter of possible future consideration".

Several of the important recommendations of the CEEB study

were barely considered. The study invested a good bit of

effort in making a case for a financial need criterion for

guaranteed loans, and for separation of loans of necessity

from loans of accomodation. In neither the executive nor

legislative branch did this proposal make any headway.*

The recommendation to consolidate administration of all

federal loan programs was also ignored. Actually the con-

solidation issue had been long and carefully considered in the

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. One of the

questions posed to CEEB for study concerned the merger of the

loan programs, but the department had reached a decision be-

fore the study was completed that the health professions and

hursing programs should be kept separate from the OE -run

programs.

The Conference Committe bill was passed by both houses

of Congress. On October 16, 1968, it was signed by the

President and became law.

The Role of the Public Health Service

While the Office of Education and the Education Subcommit-

tee of the Congress were acting on the National Defense Student

Loan Program and the Guaranteed Loan Program, another federal

agency and other subcommittees were at work on revision and ex-

tension of the loan programs in the health field. The CEEB study

had examined these programs, the Health Professions Loan Program

(HPLP) and the Nursing Loan Program (NLP), which were the province

of the Public Health Service. But for a number of reasons, the

Public Health Service made relatively little use of the report.

The Public Health Service, through its Bureau of Health

Manpower, was a part-sponsor of the CEEB study: it paid $35,000

*A late note on delayed impact. William Gaul, after reading a draftof this report, reported in September 1970 that the concept of loansof necessity and loans of accommodation is by no means dead. It isbeing seriously considered for the higher education legislation of1970 or 1971. Apparently some recommendations have a longer ges-tation period than others.

105.

toward study costs. But the initiative was not its own. Direc-

tion had came from the Secretary's office. The $35,000 allot-

ment appeared in its budget along with the justifying paragraph:

A contractual study by the Office of the Secretary willsoon be made of all the Department's student loan programs.The study will determine the best methods of minimizingdirect Federal loans and maximizing the use of privateloan sources assisted by Federal credit such as guaranteesand subsidized interest rates. Cost to the student willbe maintained at a low level and access to loan assistancewill not be impaired by the new method of financing to bedeveloped. The study will also examine problems related tothe Feder State, and local administration of student loanprograms 81.1: e:e collection procedures, operational sim-plicit;1, azd il!t.errelationships with other forms of studentfinancial aid.'4

James Lovett, director of the Student Loan and Scholarship

Branch within the Bureau of Health Manpower, was involved in

early discussions of the study. He sat on the HEW advisory

committee that defined the issues that the study was to address.

Once the contract was let to CEEB, he participated in the review

of early drafts of the questionnaires. His PBS associates re-

call that he had reservations about the procedures and some of

the questions of the study, but he was reportedly told to "go

along" with the Office of Education.

When Lovett left his position for a job in the Chicago

Regional Office of PHS, his successor was not as closely involved.

George Warner became director of the Student Loan and Scholar-

ship Branch in July 1967, when the study was in midstream. He

inherited the file folders on the study, but it was his under-

Senate, Hearings before the SublvmmAttee of the Committeeof Appropriations, on H. R. 10196, PLstal Year 1968, Departmentsof Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations, 90thCongress, first session, Part 1, Avril 10, 1967, p. 1228.

1o6

standing that OE was handling relations with CEEB. He was not

invited to the October Advisory Committee meeting in New York.

Shortly afterward, however, Thomas Brennan, special staff con-

sultant to CEEB, came down to PHS and consulted with Warner and

his branch. Marginals of the schools' questionnaire responses

on the health professions and nursing loan programs arrived

early in November, a month in advance of the Nashes' report.

Warner attended the December meeting of the Advisory Committee.

The flurry of involvement, however, never overcame PHS's sense

that this was OE's study, into which it had been reluctantly

dragged.

When the final report came in in January, the first two

recommendations were hardly calculated to gain the support of

PHS. The recommendations were to merge the operation of all

federal loan programs into a single administrative agency and

to merge the National Defense, Health Professions, and Nursing

Stucker:;:, Lima Programs into one. The Public Health Service, which

was obvit,zty not to be the beneficiary of the merger, might be

forgiven for viewing the rest of the report with some reserva-

tion. Although the staff did not say so directly, there were

intimations that they harbored suspicions that empire-builders

at OE might have influenced the CEEB to see such recommendations

as logical and efficient.

The CEEB study was more cursory in its attention to the

Health Professions and Nursing Student Loan Programs than to

NDSLP and GLP. Relatively few of the recommendations dealt with

the health programs. Besides the first two on the merger, there

were seven recommendations that were relevant. They were: re-

107.

vising the institutional allocation procedure for health profes-

sions schools, earlier availability of loan funds, consideration

of factors to make the revolving fund acceptably operable, pro-

ceudres for improving loan collection (although HTSLP and NSLP

were too new for collection to be much of an issue), greater

uniformity of provisions among loan programs, ending nursing

cancellation, and greater efforts to disseminate information on

nursing loans. PHS staff viewed most of these recommendations

as either superficial or as afterthoughts from the study of

NDSLP and GLP; that is, recommendations relevAnt to OE programs

were being tacked on to their programs without any sensitivity

to the special needs in the health field. For example, there

was reason to believe that nursing students, recruited fro;

lower-income groups than teachers, found loan forgiveness an

important incentive to entering nursing.

The Health Manpower Act of 1968

None of the CEEB recommendations directly incorporated

into the new legislation that PHS drafted--the Health Manpower

Act of 1968. The bill, introduced into t1 Congress in Marc._

provided federal assistance for health education and trcining,

including extension (with some modification) of the Health

Professions and Nursing Loan Programs.

In the Senate, the bill was referred to the Health Sub-

committee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. This

was the same committee that, through its Education Subcommittee,

had had the CEEB report printed as a Senate document. The

1o8

Health Subcommittee therefore was aware of the report's existence

and its general nature. In fact, Senator Javits, who sat on both

the Education and the Health Subcommittees, found support in the

report for one of his pet projects. For some time his aieLe,

Roy Millenson, had been pressing for greater consistency of pro-

visions among loan programs. They saw the CEEB report as a tool

to prod the Department of HEW to move toward that end. They

asked the Public Health Service to comment on the CEEB recommenda-

tions regarding consistency. When the department did not come

in with much improvement in consistency, Senator Javits brought

together the majority and minority members of the Senate commit-

tee, staff of OE, PHS, and HEW. He got agreement to a set of

amendments to align discrepant provisions. The Javits Amend-

ments to the Health Manpower Act were accepted by the Congress.

The exact provisions recommended by the CEEB report were

not always adopted. For example, the report recommended a

grace period of four months after graduation before repayment

began. The Congress agreed to a period of nine months for nurses

(down from one year) to make the NSLP equivalent to the NDSLP,

and one year, rather than three years, for health professions

students. But the report focused on discrepancies, which the

Javits Amendments to some degree resolved. The Health Manpower

Act achieve, ereater conformity in length of the grace period,

loan ceilings, minimum repayment, interest rate, and deferment

of repayment during VISTA service. Interest rates, for example,

were reduced to the level of the NDSLP. As Millenson said, "The

109.

report gave us ammunition to hit the department in order to bring

the support programs into line."*

The consistency recommendations were the only CEEB recom-

mendations to have an impact. The recommendation that forgive-

ness of nursing loans be terminated, which was opposed by PHS,

WAS not accepted. In fact, the bill, as passed, liberalized

the forgiveness provisions. The total nursing loan could now

be cancelled at the rate of 15 per cent for each year of service

as a nurse in a hospital in a highly populated area with a

"substantial shortage" of nurses. The existing provision,

allowing cancellation of 50 per cent of the loan at the rate of

10 per cent a year, was retained for professional nurses employed

in any public or nonprofit institution. The CEEB recommendation

that administration of all loan programs be consolidated was not

considered. The CEEB report was not mentioned in the Senate

report on the Health Manpower Act, nor did it figure in debates.

By the time the bill was taken up in the cognizant sub-

committee in the House of Representatives (the Public Health and

Welfare Subcommittee of the Jommittee on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce), the Javits amendments had already been incorporated.

House staff member James Menger had seen the CEEB report and was

aware of its recommendations, but since the Javits amendments

were already in the bill, he saw no reason to bring the report

to the attention of overworked subcommittee members. The loan

provisions were only one small part of a large and complex bill,

*Subsequently, when the Higher Education Amendments of 1968 werepassed, some of the new consistency disappeared. Lg., VISTAservice was not included in the list of grounds for defermentof repayment in HPSL and IWL.

110.

and the changes proposed were relatively minor. Moreover, leg-

islative staff members seemed to have a general skepticism

about the practicality of "academic studies." Immersed in

pv,4ticalities, they are very of academic preoccupation with

theory, logic and neatness.

The House subcommittee accepted the Senate version on the

loan provisions. No changes were made by the full committzq or

0.1. the floor of the House. In August the House passed the Health

Manpower Act, the Senate acceded to the House bill, and the

President signed the bill into law.

Chronology - Phase III

Decisions Are Made

Congress

1968

Feb. - Higher Education Amendmentsof 1968 introduced into House.

March -Bill introduced intoSenate.

Senate prints CEEBreport as govern-ment document.

Feb.-March-Hearings in bothhouses.

March-Health Manpower Actintroduced.

May-House passes extension ofloan programs.

June-Senate passes HealthManpower Act.

July -House passes Higher EducationAmendments of 1968. Senate passesits version.

Bureau ofOffice of College Entrance Applied SocialEducation Examination Board Research

March-OEtakes positionon CEEB recom-mendations

Feb. - Sends copiesof report to Houseand Senate sub-committees on edu-cation.

March-Kirkpatricktestifies beforeHouse and SenateSubcommittees.

Mu-MailsCEEB report tocolleges and uni-versities.

-Both houses pass interim extensionof Guaranteed Loan Program for 90 days.

hm.-House passes Health Manpower Act.Senate concurs in House version. Presi-dent signs.

fut.-C,)eer4nce Committee reconcilesdivergent LIUs; both hoves pass theHigher Education Amendments.

Oct.- President signs the bill.

112.

Scoreboard: Did Survey Data Increase the Utilization of the

AzaStuRecoez.dais?

With the deciaions on loan legislation made (at least for

the next two or three years), it is possible for us to examine the

question of whether the survey data had an impact on policy. Be-

cause some CEEB recommendations were backed by quantitative data

and others were not, we can compare the fate of the:two sets of

recommendations to see whether this kind of research backing in-

creased the likelihood of utilization. Figure 3 presents the

relevant information.

Figure 3, and Figure 4 which summarizes the information,

show that in this case it made little difference whether or not

there were data to support the recommendation. One of the three

recommendations supported by research findings, and one out of

three recommendations with no research support, received Office

of Education acceptance. Identically, one out of three recom-

mendations supported by research findings and one out of three

with no research support, were enacted into law.

On the other hand, where there were data antithetical to tree

recommendation, none--out of four--was enacted. It may be doubted,

however, that this indicates the reverence of the Congress for

research. Some of the inaction on survey-contradicted recommen-

dations was happenstance. The increase in NDSLP was made possi-

ble by the loosening of the budget restrictions. The lack of

consolidation of loan program administration probably reflected

Congress' disinclination to meddle with executive administrative

arrangements that were functioning adequately. Teacher forgive-

ness was a near thing.

Figure 3

Fate of Twelve Controversial Recommendationszdf the CEEB Study That Required Legislative Action

Recommended by CEEB

Financial need should be a criterionfor GSL.

Colleges should determine who receivesGSL and recommend amount.

Banks should receive higher returnthan 6 per ceal..

Grace period should be shortenedafter graduation.

States should set up central servicedivision or pool of credit for studentshaving difficulty obtaining guaranteedloans.

Loans of accommodation for non-needyfamilies should be separately adminis-tered.

Supportedby survey

data?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Somesupport

Somesupport

No data

Removal of interest subsidy during re- No datapayment period might be considered forthe future.

Combine 6 loan programs into two

All loan programs should be adminis-tered in one federal agency.

NDSLP should not be cut or increased.

Loan forgiveness for teachers shouldbe ended.

Loan forgiveness for nurses shouldbe ended.

No data

Accepted byOffice ofEducation?

No

113.

Passed,

by the

2925E2E11

No

No (although Nothey can andshould beconsulted)

Yes Yes

Yes, but notproposed inthe Adminis-tration bill

No--veryineffective

No

Yes--willconsider

No

Some Not atcontradiction this time

Somecontradiction

Somecontradiction

No

OE said datainconclusive;did notrecommend

Some Did not corn -

contradiction went on PHS

Program.PBS opposed.

In healthprogremsonly andthe% notdrastically

Direct fed-eral insur-ance made'mailableto meetsuch prob-lems

No

Yes--subsidyeliminated

No

No

No

No

No

114.

Figure 4-

Relationship of Research Supportto Enactment of CEEB Recommendations*

CEEBrecommendation was:

Passed Notinto law Fused

Supported by data 1 2

No data 1 2

Contradicted. by data - 4

*Two recommendations, grace period and state credit pool, are notincluded because they defy classification.

115.

On balance, the surveys do not appear to have made much dif-

ference in utilization. But two qualifications should be added.

The recommendations that lacked surrey support were based on CEEB's

own fact-gathering and opinion-gathering interviews and meetings.

As such, they were not markedly different in origin from the survey-

supported recommendations. Secondly, as indicated on page 64,

even the strongest and most relevant survey backing for a recommen-

dation in this study hardly constituted conclusive evidence. At

worst, the survey support was tangential and inferential; at best

it was based on the opinions of respondents whom some deemed in-

sufficiently informed to have the final say.

Other Effects of the Study

If t1' study had some limited effects on the 1968 legislation,

it also had other conszquences. It informed staff members of the

Office of Education's Division of Student Financial Assistance and

the Public Health Service's Student Loan and Scholarship Branch of

the views of institutions affected by the program. Several staff

members in both PHS and OE turned to the computer tables, the

detailed cross-tabulations, to help understand who was satisfied

or dissatisfied with various aspects of the programs--by state,

size of institution, type of program, auspices.

There were a good many detailed questions in the question-

naires that provided important information. For example, institu-

tions of higher education were asked how they determine a student's

financial need, what their criteria are for awarding NDEA loans and

educational opportunity grants, whether they make repayment arrange-

116.

ments for loans before the student leaves school, how often they

bill, whether they assess penalty charges to delinquent borrowers,

whether they release transcripts of students delinquent in repay-

ment, whether they use collection agencies, etc. Much of the data

was closely analyzed by staff, so that it contributed, to some

degree, to better informed management of the programs.

Although they find it hard to point to any administrative de-

cision that was directly influenced by the study, officials indicate

that they benefited from the study data. Dr. Peter Muirhead,

Associate Commissioner for Higher Education, thinks that administra-

tively the study was particularly useful in highlighting the charac-

teristics of students obtaining assistance, in collecting data on

the packaging of loans with Educational, Opportunity Grants and

College Work-Study, on problems between OE and state agencies, and

on the unavailability of guaranteed loans to out-of-state and part-

time students. As Dr. Halperin said, had there been any real

scandalssay, NDEA loans going in large numbers to middle-income

students--immediate and drastic action would have been taken. But

there were no real surprises in the report. The programs were

working well. Even the Guaranteed Loan Program, which was signed

into law only on November 8, 1965 and was very new in operation,

was succeeding relatively well. So the kinda of administrative

steps called for were small and undramatic. But for the managers

of the programs, the report was useful nonetheless.

The Public Health Service staff also used both the report

and the more complete Nash data in analyzing current practice and

attitudes in health professions and nursing schools. They found it

117.

very useful to learn the criticisms and comments of their consti-

tuents.

The Office of Education has already used the study in connec-

tion with proposals of other agencies that affect the NDEA loan

program. Over the years there ;lave been many proposals to extend

loan forgiveness to scarcity pzfessions besides teaching and

nursing. The latest was incorporated in a bill sponecred by the

Department of Defense, which provided loan forgiveness to men who

become Army officers. The Bureau of the Budget consulted OE on

the provision. OE, leaning on the CEEB study, replied that there

is no conclusive evidence that forgiveness increases the supply of

teachers, so it is not likely to work for Army officers. The

Bureau of the Budget then did not clear the bill as an Administra-

tion bill.

Copies of the study were mailed to every institution of higher

education in the country by the Office of Education. To the extent

that financial aid officers learned more about current practices,

alternatives, and proposals for improved administration, it is at

least remotely possible that the study helped them in their prac-

tices. It is more probable that filling out the questionnaire had

an impact. Financial aid officers at every institution of higher

education were asked to complete the study questionnaire, and as

Patricia Nash suggests, the very consideration of the question is

likely to have an educational effect. It would no doubt be diffi-

cult to locate and identify changes in the practice of any financial

aid officer stemming from confrontation with the questionnaire or

with the report. But the possibility of such changes exists.

118.

Banks, too, were not unaffected. Mr. Kirkpatrick recalls re-

ceiving an inquiry from the officer of a Virginia bank who had

read about the study in a publication of the Boston Federal Re-

serve Bank. He wanted to learn more about the Guaranteed Loan

Program and his bank's possible participation in it.

As for further policy impact, it is certainly possible that

the study will be referred to in future years as new legislation

is considered. Roy H. Millenson, Minority Clerk of the Senate

Subcommittee on Education, said, "There are always a few nasty

people like me around who keep old reports and bring them up."

He suggested that much depends on the election and on changes in

personnel. If the next Commissioner of Education served on the

CEEB study Advisory Committee, he may come in strongly committed to

some of the study's views.*

Members of OE staff feel, too, that the study will have in-

fluence in the future. They say that in some areas it provides the

best data to date and will keep being referred to.

Members of the Public Health Service staff also expect to use

the report further. One use they foresee is to meet, in part, the

requirement of the Health Manpower Act of 1968 that calls for "ap-

praisal of the programs . . . in the light of their adequacy to

meet the long-term needs for health professionals . . ." by July 1,

1970. The CEEB study gives some information on what health pro-

fessions schools are currently doing and provides a baseline for

study of changes in ensuing years.

*William Gaul's report of the surfacing of the distinction betweenloans of accommodation and loans of necessity in 1970 (see foot-note, page 104) is an illustration of later utilization of thestudy report.

119.

Chapter - IV

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Amid all the complexities in the situation, there were certain factors

that fostered utilization of the CEEB study. First was the nature of the

College Entrance Examination Board itself. It is a prestigious organization

recognized as a legitimate spokesman for the interests of the higher educa-

tion community. It had, with the Bureau of Applied Social Research, done

previous research on financial aid that was well received. Its staff, advisors,

and consultants were knowledgeable, often recognized and respected authorities

in the field.

However, in some respects the "educational identification" could

have been a handicap. Those persons whose constituents were not institutions

of higher education (e.g. staff of the Insured Loans Branch of OE who deal

with banks, Senators, Representatives, staff of the Public Health Service)

occasionally had twinges of suspicion that because of CEEB's character and

history, colleges were being overrepresented at the expense of other groups

in the system. There was an occasional worry that CEEB would "play it safe"

so as not to antagonize its constituent institutions. Voiced once or twice

was the suspicion that OE was calling the shots too closely, with a view to

shaping the nature of the conclusions. CEEB might stand still for this because

they have to maintain a continuing relationship with OE in the course of many

of their operations.

As it turned out, none of these incipient suspicions had much of a

career. Thy battle lines were never drawn in terms of educators vs. every-

body else. Early doubts about fairness and neutrality evaporated.

Another support for the study came from its agreement with the results

120.

of an earlier questionnaire survey conducted by Mrs. Green's subcommittee.

The tenor of these results closely paralleled the much larger inquiry of

CEEB and lent credence to both sets of data.

The style of the CEEB report can be credited with some positive re-

actions. Although not many people read the whole report unless their job

required them to, the style was clear and readable, and the organization of

the report around the recommendations facilitated easy referral. This was

lay language, designed for a lay audience, written by Kirkpatrick with an

eye on the needs of the client. The original questions of the study were

not bent or subverted by research professionals writing for a professional

research audience. Nash comments, "No one asked: What is sociological about

this?" The study served the purposes for which it was funded, rather than as

a source for academic prestige and rewards.

In its concentration on the client's questions, the study never stepped

back and took a look at the issues from a higher level of abstraction. It

did not reflect either a theoretical sense of structure and process, nor did

it deal with the overarching political concerns. For example, it did not"

consider such larger and important issues as ways of financing higher education

over the long run--and how student loans figured in the pattern. It looked

at practical issues, operational issues, not at what was the best approach to

assistance. Because of its practical stance, the study avoided some of the

political hot potatoes. It gained in "objectivity." It may well have lost

in relevance and long-run illuence.

That the conclusions of the study were largely favorable to the

*House of Representatives, Report of the Special Subcommittee on Educa-

tion, Study of the United States Office of Eaucat*ion, 89 Congress, 2nd session,1967, pp. 141-201, 471-584..

121.

federal loan programs certainly had some effect on utilization. They evoked

little resistance from staff and legislators committed to the programs. On

the other hand, neither did they provoke any immediate and active response.

The programs were functioning well enough, according to the study, to need

relatively little change. Legislators found it hard to see much real pay-off

in the lives of people by tinkering with minor provisions of the law.

One of the factors that Kirkpatrick cited as fostering use of the

study was the government's need for answers. Questions were pending, and

the "users" were waiting for results to come in. In actual fact, the users

were not waiting in quite such breathless anticipation as the OE task state-

ment suggested. Staff work was not halted while the study was in progress.

In fact, some of the most basic decisions on the programs were made before

the data were in: merger of loan administration was dropped, 1968 legislation

was drafted. The frame of the debate was changed during 1967, so that phasing

out of NDSLP, which was initially a major issue for the study, became irrele-

vant. In January, 1968, the report was answering some questions that no one

was asking and fighting some battles that had faded from sight.

The timing of the study was poor from the point of view of the legis-

lative planning cycle. Had it been completed four months earlier on the

schedule originally proposed, it would have arrived when new legislative pro-

posals were being prepared. There is little question that it would have been

used more extensively in developing and legitimating legislation.

Nevertheless, many of the issues were still alive and pressing. If

the users were not avidly expectant, they were still interested. The history

of some of the provisions (e.g. teacher cancellation) bears witness to the

fact that relevant data were pounced upon and cited repeatedly.

122

The ability of the study to chsea opinions is nowhere in evidence.

Its capacity to reinforce existing positions is repeatedly seen. Senator

Javits found support for conforming provisions. Mrs. Green found support

for ending teacher cancellation, OE found support for quietly easing out from

teacher cancellation, Senator Morse found support for extending cancellation.

Bankers found support for higher interest rates.

In some cases the study identified problems, and new solutions were

found. One example: out-of-state students had a lot of difficulty getting

guaranteed loans. The Higher Education Act of 1968 has a new provision to

remedy the situation. In cases where the borrower, by reason of his resi-

dence, does not have acceos to the state's GSLP, the Commissioner of Education

can insure the loan directly.

Would the study have had greater impact if it had collected more

objective, rigorous evidence? Asked this question directly, most informants

begged the question by saying that, given the newness of the programs and the

restrictive time schedule, the study was the best that could have been done.

Several informants claim that harder data would have strengthened the in-

fluence of the study. It would have given proponents of positions better

ammunition and might have had significant consequences, such as ending teacher

forgiveness. The most outspoken informant claims that it was on the forgive-

ness issue that the study had its main chance of influencing events because

the pro and con positions were so evenly matched. By relying so heavily on

opinion, it muffed its chance.

Whether any study can alter commitments based on strong ideological

considerations remains moot. Stember in a recent article on evaluating class-

room integration makes explicit what many people suspect.* Evaluation of

Wrtr.mmws,

*Charles Herbert Stember, "Evaluating Effects of the Integrated Class-

room," The Urban Review, Vol. 2, June 1968, pp. 3 -4, 30-31.

123.

the balanced classroom, he says, is not likely to show positive results on

racial attitudes. Whether or not it shows that learning improves, or at

least does not decrease, "remains inconclusive." But why should decisions

be affected by poor evaluation results on criteria of either racial harmony

or learning? Integration is ethically and legally right as a principle of

democracy.

In just such ways can the basic rationale be shifted on any question.

If loan forgiveness does not increase the supply of teachers, it can still

be justified as rewarding members of low-paying but vital professions, or

as a step toward free higher education for all. Research results that con-

flict with strong commitments or strong interests of actors in a social

system are unlikely to make m4ch headway unless aided by strong allies.

In this case, allies existed ready-made. It will be important to see, in

other cases, what it takes for research to create allies (out of neutrals,

out of opponents) who will utilize its conclusions.

A-1

APPENDIX A

TASK STATEMENT FOR THE STUDY OF FEDERAL LOAN PROGRAMS

A. Federal Policy on Student Loans

1. The Federal Government. as a matter of public policy, has fostered

studbnt loans as a principal means of providing assistance to needy students,

and is now extending benefits of loans to students from middle-income

families not previously eligible so that additional students will attend

college.

2. The Federal policy is to minimize direct loans financed from the

Federal Treasury, and maximize loans through private financial sources as-

sisted by Federal credit such as guarantees and subsidized as to interest

rate in order to keep the cost to the student low, and minimize the dif-

ference in cost to the student between a direct Federal loan and guaranteed

loan.

3. The Federal Government has provided for student loans under- -

(a) Public Law 85-864, title II of the National Defense Education

Act of 1958, the NDEA student loan program;

(b) Public Law 88-129, title III, part C, of the Public Health

Service Act, as amended, the health professions student loan program;

(c) Public Law 38-581, title VIII, part B, of the Public Health

Service Act, as amended, the nursing student loan program;

(d) Public Law 89-329, title IV, part B, of the Higher Education

Act of 1965, Federal, State, and private programs of low-interest loans

to students in institutions of higher education;

(e) Public Law 93-287, the National Vocational Student Loan

Insurance Act of 165, Federal, State and private programs of low-

interest loans and direct Federal loans to vocational students;

(f) Public La:, 87-510, Refugee and Migration Assistance Act of

1962, 146, loan program for Cuban students.

-2

B. Objective of Study of Federally Assisted Student Loan Programs

This study is to gather information and evaluate factors bearing on the

organizations and operations of federally supported student loan programs in

relation to the policy guides given above. The evaluation will cover ad-

ministration of the student loan programs, the problems of student loan col-

lections, and other significant areas of student loan operations. In total,

the study will develop and propose measures to make federally assisted student

loan programs best serve the Nation's broad educational objectives.

To the extent these measures call for revisions in existing legislation

specific phasing plans for the transition will be formulated for action on

a step-by-step basic to avoid any setback or disruption in meeting this ex-

panding need for student financial aid.

The optimum operational conditions desired from the federally assisted

student loan programs will- -

(1) assure students eligible under Federal policies access to loans

to be used to enter upon or further their college education;

(2) provide maximum administrative simplicity with the cost of

operation of the program held to an economical level;

(3) assure a businesslike approach that will result in collection

of loans with minimum collection losses;

(4) create effective administrative relationships and harmony among

the parties; that is, the Federal Government, the educati,,,nal institu-

tion, the State or private guarantee agency, and the lender, in meeting

the needs of the student;

(5) facilitate maintenance of appropriate interrelationship with

all other forms of student financial aid, scholarships, grants, work-

study or other student employment programs, or precollege savings

programs.

4'-3

C. Key Study Problems

The study of etudent loans should- -

(1) determine appropriate administrative structure, responsibilities,

relationships for Federal participation, including measures for cefective

decentralization of operations in student loan programs through :!nvolvement

of State and private nonprofit institutions, educational institutions, direct

or indirect Federal involvement with lending institutions, or some combina-

tion of these arrangements;

(2) consider the operating responsibilities of the educational in-

stitution, the lending institution, the loan guarantee agency (Federal or

non-Federal) in financial dealings with the student borrower. Among the

factors involved for which responsibilities among the parties are to be

determined are (a) financial eligibility, (b) amount of loan, (c) disbursement

of loan funds, (d) repayment arrangements, (e) collections, (f) determination

of default, (g) application of penalties and default provisions, and (h)

institution of guarantee provisions;

(3) examine alternative arrangements for administration of the student

loan forgiveness because of teaching, practice of medicine in rural areas,

or other elements of public services which the Congress has determined to be

eligible for forgiveness;

(4) assess factors affecting supply of private credit to meet needs

of applicants for student loans, and evaluate measures to increase supply of

credit, including, among others, interest rates, reserves to meet defaults,

coverage of guarantees, eligibility of student loan obligations for dis-

counting in the credit market, repayment conditions, streamlining administra-

tive processing and reporting;

(5) assess existing restrictions facing educational institutions in

t-4

borrowing for purposes of financing student loans with Federal guarantee of

repayment of principal and interest. Propose measures to assure that loans

under credit shortage conditions will be made to applicants having greater

needs, giving consideration to modifying eligibility standards for Federal

loan assistance, including availability of liquid assets of the family, as

well as income in determining eligibilities, use of sliding scales of

Federal assistance related to financial conditions of family, or other means

of establishing priority or preference for student loan applicants in need;

and

(6) examine special problems of and propose measure for assuring

private credit to minority groups, and students from families without favor-

able or established credit records.

APPEBDIX B

Successive Drafts of Recommendations of the Study of Federal Student Loan Programs

on the Guaranteed Student Loan Program

OCTOBER 9

Direct federal insurance

where :were is no effective

state plan militates against

state funding of guarantee

agencies, and in all cases

works against appropriation

of state funds.

Lack of financial need cri-

terion in GSLP prevents

lending institutions from

using limited funds for the

more needy students.

Threatens to dry up avail-

able credit.

Loans of convenience should

not be charged as federal

aid to higher education.

Such loans "will be taken

advantage of and used for

other than educational ex-

pensea.

Colleges and universities

should have the responsi-

bility for meeting finan-

cial needs of needy

students.

OCTOBER 20

Direct federal insurance has

been a deterrent

to action in

many states.

*End direct federal insurance

after June 30, 1970.

*Bring in incentives to en-

courage strong state agencies:

-Enact proposed SO% fedora;

reinsurance plan.

-Make additional seed money

available to the states.

-Task force should visit states

with weak or no guarantee

agency to explain methods.

Financial need should be a

criterion of OSLP.

Separate loans of necessity

from loans of accommodation.

The latter should be adminis-

tered by a separate federal

agency.

Colleges and universities

should he responsible for de-

termining which students

should rec(!ive GSL and recom-

mending how much they should

get.

DECEMBERS

Strengthen state agencies.

*End direct federal insurance

after June 30, 1970:

*Bring in incentives to en-

courage strong state agencies:

-Enact proposed 80% federal

reinsurance plan

-Make additional seed money

available to states

-Consider federal sharing of

costs of administering

state program.

Financial need should be a

criterion of GSLP.

Separate loans of necessity

from loans of accommodation.

The latter should be adminis-

tered by a separate federal

agency.

Colleges and universities

should be responsible for de-

termining which students

should receive GSL and recom-

mending how much they should

get.

FIMAL REPORT

Strengthen state agencies.

*End direct federal insurance

after June 30, 1970.

*Bring in incentives to en-

courage strong state agencies:

-Enact 80% federal reinsurance.

-Make additional seed money

availetle to states

-Consider federal sharing of

costs of administering state

programs

-Hold conferences on OLS

with state officials.

Financial need should be a

criterion of GSLP.

Separate loans of necessity

from loans of accommodation.

The latter should be adminis-

tered by a separate federal

agency or through direct

federal insurance.

Colleges and universities

should be responsible for de-

termining which students

should receive GSL and reel.,

mending how much they should

get.

APPENDIX B - continued

CCTOBER 8

Loans at 6 percent are

not profitable for many

lending institutions

Loans are not available in

many cases because many

banks don't participate,

banks have loaned their

maximum, they require an

established account or

relationship with the

lender, they discourage

students from low-income

families and racial

minorities, and/or state

residency requirements

rule out loans for out-

of-staters.

OCTOBER 20

GLP cannot be soundly based

unless loans are put on a pro-

fitable or, at least a break-

even basis for lending in-

stitutions.

A study should be made of fac-

tors to be considered in pro-

jecting demands for loans un-

der GLP.

Clear-cut need to

broaden sources of loan funds,

e.g. pension funds, insurance

companies, college funds, re-

venue bond issues, state credit

pool, etc. States might set up

a central service division, or

central pool of credit to

handle special cases.

DECEMBER 4

Loans should provide a rea-

sonable profit to lending

institutions.

A task force should identify

elements to be considered in

projecting need for funds and

each state should prepare 5

year projections.

OE should enter into agree-

ments with insurance com-

panies, credit unions, uni-

versities, to increase loan

funds.

States should be encouraged

to set up central service di-

vision, or central pool of

credit, to provide loans for

students having difficulty

obtaining loans.

States should be advised of

methods for providing new

and supplementary sources

of funds.

FINAL REPORT

Loans should provide a rea-

sonable profit to lending

institutions.

A task force should identify

elements to be considered in

projecting need for funds and

each state should prepare 5

year projections.

OE should prepare projec-

tions of demand for student

loans for next 5 years with

assistance of state agencies

and institutions of higher

education.

OE should enter into agree-

ments with insurance companies,

credit unions, universities,

to increase loan funds.

States should be encouraged

to set up central service di-

vision, or central pool of

credit, to provide loans for

students having difficulty

in obtaining loans.

States should be advised of

methods for providing new

and supplementary sources of

funds.

States should make

greater efforts to gain in-

created participation by

lending institutions.

APPENDIX B - continued

OCTOBER 9

(Nothing on

occupational

forgiveness)

(Nothing on

interest

subsidy)

OCTOBER 20

Loan forgiveness for teachers is

difficult to administer. To add

it to GLP would be "very burden-

snme." Questions have been raised

about removing it from NDSLP be-

cause it is difficult to prove that

it attracts individuals to teaching

and because other professions want

cancellation.

Some advocate removal of interest

subsidy during the repayment period.

Removal would increase the incentive

to repay promptly.

Inotttutions of higher learning

would like GSL eligible for matching

with educational opportunity grants.

Proposed merger of Vocational Student

Loan Program and GSL -is very desir-

able.

Larger banks think the grace period

should be reexamined and recommend

reduction to 90 days after gradua-

tion.

Educational institutions favor a

change in the once-a-year disburse-

ment of GSL to each semester, tri-

semester, or quarter.

Payment of GSL directly to students

is criticized by many colleges and

universities.

Maybe GSL should be

mailed directly to the institution.

DECEMBER 4

Occupational forgiveness,

especially teacher forgive-

ness, should not be extended

to GLP.

Reexamine and consider end-

ing the interest subsidy

during the repayment period.

Make GSL eligible as match-

ing funds for educational

opportunity grants.

Enact proposed merger of

VSLP and GLP.

Shorten grace period.

Make loans payable in two

installments a year.

Loans should be sent to the

student in care of the in-

stitution.

FINAL REPORT

Do not extend forgiveness to

GLP. Eliminate occupational

forgiveness for teaching and

nursing from NDSLP and NSLP.

Removal of interest subsidy

during the repayment period

is a matter of possible

future consideration.

Make GSL eligible as matching

funds for educational oppor-

tunity grants.

Enact proposed merger of VSLP

and GLP.

Shorten grace period to four

months.

Make loans payable in two

installments a year.

Loans should be sent to the

student in care of the

institution.

C-3.

APPENDIX C

FORTY -FOUR CELB RECCMMENDATIONS CLASSIFIED BY DEGREE OF SURVEY SUPPORT

Supported by the Survey

Financial need should be a criterion for GSL.

Colleges should determine who receives GSL and recommend amount.

Banks should receive higher rate of return on GSL.

Forward funding by Congress to allow earlier notification to institutions of

amount of loan funds.

New maximum loan limits.

Some Support from the Survey.

Shorten grace period after graduation to 4 months for all loan programs.

(Half the banks say 10-month grace period not excessive for GLP, but 3/5 of

large commercial banks who do most lending say it is. Colleges weren't

asked.)

Encourage states to set up.central service division or pool of credit for

students having difficulty obtaining loans. (Survey documented problem, not

solution.)

Simplify and standardize reporting procedures. (Colleges weren't very dis-

satisfied.)

Extra-legal loan restrictions on NDSL should be discouraged. (Survey showed

only that restrictions exist.)

Change procedures in GLP, e.g. send money care of college, make payments twicea year. (Colleges favored, banks split.)

Strong encouragement should be given to use of centralized collection agenciesfor NDSL: HPSL: NSL. (Half the schools favored, but few used or were consider-ing use.)

States should encourage greater participation in GIP by lenders.

Survey Irrelevant

Separate loans of accommodation from loans of necessity and administer theformer separately. (Follows from need criterion for GSL if middle-incomefamilies are to be served.)

Appendix C - continued C-2

Change federal allocation formula for NDSLP.

Work toward standardization of policies among the states with regard to GLP.

Study the impact of borrowing.

Colleges should have adequate aid staffs, OE should offer training.

OE should make 5-year projections of need for loans.

Task force should identify elements involved in forecasting, states shouldmake projections for 5 years of future loan requirements.

Hold meetings to increase attractiveness of revolving fund for loans.

Strengthen state agencies by federal re-insurance, further seed money, lapseof direct federal insurance, etc.

Consider ending subsidy of interest in GLP during repayment period.

Enable OE to enter into agreements with nationwide insurance companies, creditunions, etc. to increase participation of lending institutions.

GSL should be eligible for matching with Educational Opportunity Grants.

Merge Vocational Student Loan Program with GLP.

Revise method for computing loan delinquency.

Adopt effective write-off procedure.

Do not extend forgiveness feature to GLP.

Make loans available to half-time students.

Numerous deferment provisions should be standardized.

Interest payments should be standardized.

Reinbursement to institutions for administrative expense., should be provided.

Provisions affecting cancellations and late payment charges should bestandardized.

Merge Cuban Loan with other programs.

Procedure for allocating NDSLP funds should be revised.

No state allocation should be allowed to lapse.

Special consideration for superior students in NDSLP should be eliminated.

Revise institutional allocatio' procedure for HPSLP.

Appendix C - continued C-3

Disseminate information about availability of nursing loans.

Combine six loan programs into two.

Contradictory Evidence from Survey

Centralize all loan program administration in one federal agency.(Healthprofessions and nursing schools satisfied with PHS.)

NDSLP appropriation should not be cut or increased. (Schools wanted largerappropriations.)

End loan forgiveness for teachers.(Schools favored forgiveness; borrowerssaid forgiveness not a motive for teaching.)

End loan forgiveness for nurses. (Nursing schools favored forgiveness.)

DISTRIBUTION LIST 4522

Defense Documentation CenterCameron Station, Building 5Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Commanding OfficerOffice of Naval Research Branch OfficeBox 39FPO Nev York 09510

DirectorNaval Research LaboratoryNaval Research LaboratoryWashington, D. C. 20390

Attention: Technical Information Officer

Head, Neuropsychiatry DivisionNaval Medical Research InstituteNational Naval Medical CenterBethesda, Maryland 20014

Head, Aviation Operational PsychologyBureau of Medicine and Surgery (513)Department of the NavyWashington, D. C. 20390

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (3131)Department of the NavyWashington, D. C. 20390

Commanding OfficerAviation Psychology DivisionNaval Aerospace Medical InstituteNaval Aerospace Medical CenterPensacola, Florida 32512

Chief of Naval Research (Code 452)Department of the NavyWashington, D. C. 20360

DirectorOffice of Naval Research Branch Office495 Summer StreetBoston, Massachusetts 02210

DirectorOffice of Naval Research Branch Office1030 East Green StreetPasadena, California 91101

DirectorOffice of Naval Research Branch Office219 South Dearborn StreetChicago, Illinois 60604

20 copies

20 copies

6 copies

2 copies

3 copies

Distribution List - Page 2

Center for Research in Social Systems5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.Washington, D. C. 20016Attention: ISB

Science and Technology DivisionLibrary of CongressWashington, D. C. 20540

Behavioral Sciences DepartmentNaval Medical Research InstituteNational Naval Medical CenterBethesda, Maryland 20014

Chief of Naval Operations (0P-07TL)Department of the NavyWashington, D. C. 20350

Dr. G. D. MayoNaval Air Technical Training CenterNaval Air StationMemphis, Tennessee 38115

Director, Personnel Research DivisionChief of Naval Personnel (Pers A3)Department of the NavyWashington, D. C. 20370

Technical DirectorU.S. Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric Research UnitSan Diego, California 92152

DirectorPersonnel Research LaboratoryAttention: LibraryWashington Navy Yard, Building 200Washington, D. C. 20390

DirectorAir University LibraryAttention: AUL - 8110Maxwell Air Force BaseAlabama 36112

Director, Office of Military Psychology and LeadershipU. S. Military AcademyWest Point, New York 10996

Special Assist., Behavioral & Soc. SciODDR&ERoom 3D1021, The PentagonWashington, D.C. 20301

3 copies

3 copies

Distribution List Page 3

Human Resources Research Office300 North Washington StreetAlexandria, Virginia 22314

remote Area Conflict Information CenterBattelle Memorial Institute505 King AvenueColumbus, Ohio 43201

Department of StateINR/RFX/XR, Room 8733Washington, D. C. 20520

Assistant Director for Social ScienceNational Science Foundation1800 G Street, N.W.Wachington, D. C. 20550

Pirector, Behavior SciencesAdvanced Research Projects AgencyThe PentagonWashington, D. C. 20310

B. M. BassUniversity of RochesterRiver Campus StationRochester, N.Y. 14627

F. K. BerrienDepartment of PsychologyNew Jersey HallRutgers UniversityNew Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

R. D. CampbellThe Matrix CorporationTavern Square421 King StreetAlexandria, Va. 22314

A. CohenDepartment of PsychologyGeorgia State CollegeAtlanta, Georgia 30303

M. DeutschTeachers CollegeColumbia UniversityNew York, New York 10027

H. H. Kelley

University of CaliforniaLos Angeles, California 90024

F. E. FiedlerDepartment of PsychologyUniversity of IllinoisUrbana, Illinois 61803

Distribution List - Page 4

E. E. GloyeOffico of Naval Research Branch Office103n East Green StreetPasadena, California 91101

H. GeutzkowInternational Relations Program1C34 Sheridan RoadNorthwestern UniversityEvanston, Illinois 60201

C. Harsh

Office of Naval Research Branch Office495 Summer StreetBostor, Massachusetts 02210

F'. n. ravronHuman Sciences Research, Inc.!Iestgate Industrial Park7710 Old Springhouse Roadm.cLean, Virginia 22101

R. L. relmreichDepartment of PsychologyUniversity of TexasAustin, Texas 78712

E. P. Hollander

State University of New York at BuffaloDepartment of PsychologyBuffalo, New York 14214

Dr. R. R. MackieHuman Factors Research, Inc.Santa Barbara Research ParkGoleta, California 93017

E. 1% McGinniesPsychology DepartmentUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, Maryland 20742

R. LikertInstitute for Social ResearchUniversity of MichiganAnn Arbor, Michigan, 48106

R. C. NorthDepartment of Political ScienceStanford UniversityStanford, California 94305

14. T. OrneInstitute of Pennsylvania HospitalUnit for Experimental Psychology

111 North 49th StreetPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania 19139

Distribution List - Page 5

P. LazarsfeldColumbia UniversityNew York, New York 10027

D. PruittDepartment of PsychologyState University of New York at BuffaloBuffalo, New York 14214

H. M. SchroderDepartment of PsychologyPrinceton UniversityPrinceton, New Jersey 08540

P. P. SchultzThe University of North Carolina at CharlotteP. 0. Box 20428Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

D. ShapiroDepartment of PsychiatryHarvard Medical SchoolMassachusetts Mental Health Center76 Fenwood RoadBoston, Massachusetts 02115

S. StreufertDepartment of PsychologyPurdue UniversityLafayette, Indiana 47907

R. C. TeevanDepartment of PsychologyState University of New YorkAlbany, New York 12224

J. W. ThibautInstitute for Research in Social SciencesUniversity of North CarolinaChapel Hill, North Carolina 27515

H. C. TriandisDepartment of PsychologyUniversity of IllinoisUrbana, Illinois 61803

R. E. UlrichHead, Psychology DepartmentWestern Michigan UniversityKalamazoo, Michigan 49001

G. R. PattersonDepartment of PsychologyUniversity of OregonEugene, Oregon 97403

Distribution List - Page 6

J. H. WeaklandMental Research Institute555 Middlefield RoadPalo Alto, California 94301

W. WeissHunger College of the City University of New York66th and Park AvenueNew York, New York 10021

S. S. ZalkindDepartment of PsychologyThe City College of the University of New York17 Lexington AvenueNew Yoxl-., New York 10010

Dr. E. K. Karcher, Jr.OCRD Attn# Social Science BranchDepartment of the AruyWashington, D. C. 20310

Professor John SengerDepartment of Business, Administration S EconomicsU.S. Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, California 93940

Advanced Research Projects Agencyresearch and Development CenterAttention: Col.John V. Patterson, Jr.APO San Francisco 96346

Dr. James J. Reganhead, Psychological Laboratory (Code 55)U.S. Naval Training Device CenterOrlando, Florida 32813

Director of ResearchHUMRRO Division No. 4 (Infantry)Post Office Box 2086Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

AFOSR (SRLB)1400 Wilson BoulevardArlington, Virginia 22209

Dr. A. J. DruckerAssistant Directof for OperationsOffice of the DirectorU.S. Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory (BESRL)Washington, D. C. 20315

Technical LibraryNaval Training Device CenterOrlando, Florida 32813

Distribution List - Page 7

Technical LibraryNaval Ordnance StationIndian Head, Maryland 20640

Library, Code 0212Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, California 93940

Technical Reference LibraryNaval Medical Research InstituteNational Naval Medical CenterBethesda, Maryland 20014

LibraryNaval Electronics Laboratory CenterSan Diego, California 92152

N. MacCobyInstitute for Communication ResearchStanford UniversityStanford, California 94305

Director, Psychological Operations DepartmentU.S. Army Special Warfare SchoolFort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

Dr. E. E. Inman, Jr.Medical DepartmentBancroft HallU. S. Naval AcademyAnnapolis, Maryland 21402

Mr. 'Luigi Petrullo2431 N. Edgewood RoadArlington, Virginia 22207

Dr. M. D. Dunnette208 Psychology BuildingUniversity of MinnesotaMinneapolis,Minnesota 55416

Dr. S. B. SellsInstitute of Behavioral ResearchTexas Christian UniversityFort Worth, Texas 76129