does law have and outside? *janet halley

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696244

OSGOODEHALLLAWSCHOOLComparativeResearchinLaw&PoliticalEconomy

RESEARCHPAPERSERIES

ResearchPaperNo.2/2011

DoesLawHaveanOutside?JanetHalleyEditors:

PeerZumbansen(OsgoodeHallLawSchool,Toronto,Director,ComparativeResearchinLawandPoliticalEconomy)

JohnW.Cioffi(UniversityofCaliforniaatRiverside)

LisaPhilipps(OsgoodeHallLawSchool,AssociateDeanResearch)

NassimNasser(OsgoodeHallLawSchool,Toronto,ProductionEditor)


2OSGOODECLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL.07NO.01

OsgoodeCLPEResearchPaper44/2010

Vol.06No.10(2010)

JanetHalley*

DoesLawHaveanOutside?

Abstract: I’vebeenponderingthisproblemas Iparticipated inthissparkingconferencetitled“BeyondtheLaw”:What,ifanything,is“beyondthelaw”?Thebetterparent’sriskaversion;thepropertylessman’shunger:shouldweinsistthatthesearenon‐legalattributesaboutthesecharacterswhich interactwith legal rules to condition legally important decisions? Are theyinsideoroutsideofthelaw?

Wecanthinkofiteitherway.Mostofthetime,tobesure,I’mengagedindescriptiveprojectsthatarebasicallyattemptstoextendthereachoflaw.NotthatIwantittobebig;I’mtryingtounderstandhowbig it is.But in therestofmyremarks I’d liketospooloutmyambivalenceaboutthis.Whydoesitfeelmorecritical,moredecisive,toinsistonthecoercivecharacterofbackgroundrules,nomatterhowfarinthebackgroundtheylurk?Andwhydoestheresultingpictureof theworldseemsonarrowed, so reduced,oncewehavesucceeded indrawing it?What’satstakeinpositingthatlawiseverywhere–orthatthereissomethingbeyondit?

Keywords:law,beyondlaw,outsidelawJELClassification:K39

JanetHalleyRoyallProfessorofLawHarvardLawSchool

Email:[email protected]

*©JANETHALLEY.DONOTQUOTE,CITEORCIRCULATEWITHOUTPERMISSION,[email protected]/22/2010


2010] DOES LAW HAVE AN OUTSIDE? 3

DoesLawHaveanOutside?

JanetHalley*

Let’simagineawomansittingatthekitchentable.Thehouseisdark,everyoneelseisasleep.Ithasbeenareallybadday. Shesuspectsthatthismayturnouttobetheday inwhichshefinally,irrevocablylosesfaithinhermarriage.Shehasbeenherebefore,andfeelsitiswithinherpowertoreenterthemarriagespiritually,totryonemoretimetomakeitwork–ortogiveup,tothrowinthetowel,tomakeaplanforleavingherhusband.Whatishernextstepinlife?As we know, there is no way out of marriage that does not involve the law. It is a legalrelationship,andthestatejealouslyretainsamonopolyoverthepowertodissolveit.Butdoesourwomanthinkaboutlegaldivorce,sittingatthekitchentable,inthesilenceofthesleepinghouse?Ordoherthoughtscenteronreligiousideas,onherneedforsafetyandsolace,onaweattheprospectoffundamentalchange,onherloveforthismanwhohassodisappointedher,ontheeroticthrillprovokedbytheideafreedomfromhim?ThewayIteachFamilyLaw,shethinksaboutlaw–eventhoughIknowshedoesn’talways.Shegathersuptheideasshehasaboutdivorce,andmakesacost/benefitanalysisofhersituation.Iwantmystudentstoimaginethatsheasksherself:whatwouldhappenifwedivorced,wouldIlandonmyfeetorbedestroyed?CouldIkeepthehouse?DoImakesurethechildrengettohavehislove,ordoIneedtosavethechildrenfromhisbadinfluence,andineithercasecouldIdoit?CouldI increasethenumberofhoursIworkorwouldI losehishelpwiththekidsandhavetoworkless,earnless? ThewayIteachFamilyLaw,shelosesorsavesherfaithinthemarriage in part becauseofwhat this cost/benefit analysis tells her. And if she stays in themarriage,thelawofdivorce,asshehasimaginedit,conditionsherbargainingpowerwithherhusbandfromhereonin:themarriagewillhavetogetevenworsebeforeshewillhitherstrikepriceandleavehim,andshe’llhavetoabsorballthemarriage’scostsplusthatdeterioration,ifithappens.Thelawofdivorcewillconditiontheamountofmisery,orviolence,orforbearance,or despair shewill have to endure; itmay route both of themback into a slow, painful butgenuine reconciliation; it will also condition small things, like who takes out the garbage. Iteachmy students to think of the legal rules asmattering evenwhen they are not applied,becausepeopledoimaginetheirapplicationandguidetheirconductinlightofwhattheyhaveenvisioned.IhavesomelegaltheoryonmysidewhenIdothis.IstartmycoursewithRobertHale’sessay“Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly NonDistributive State”1 and thenmove to Lewis *RoyallProfessorofLaw,HarvardLawSchool,Email:[email protected],“CoercionandDistributioninaSupposedlyNon‐CoerciveState”(1923)38PoliticalScienceQuarterly470;Hale’sessayisreprinted,withaveryusefulintroductionandbibliography,inDavidKennedyandWilliamW.


KornhauserandRobertMnookin’s“BargainingintheShadowoftheLaw.”2Here’showthesetheoreticalpreparationsgo.Hale confronted a legal academy and policy universe which imagined that contract was thepreeminentlegalrelationship,andthatfreedomofcontractwasatitscore.AccordingtoHale’slaissezfaire interlocutors,thewagepaidtoaworkerbyan industrialistwasfreelynegotiatedbetweenthem;ifthestateintervenedinthatfreedomtoregulatethetermsoftheircontract,thewillofthestatehadsupplantedthewilloftheparties,andthefreedomofboththeworkerandtheindustrialisthadbeencurtailed.Haleshiftedhisfocusfromcontracttoproperty.Thisisthemovefromtheforegroundrulestothebackgroundrules.Theworkerandtheindustrialistbecamethepropertylessmanandtheproperty owner. And the rules of property, sitting there in the background, didn’t merelyinfluencethewage;theycoercedit.Thepropertylessmancomestothesituationwithoneandonlyonenonlegalattribute:heisabeingwhomusteatordie.Everysinglestrategyhemightactually adopt to get food confronts him with a world paved wall to wall with the rules ofproperty.Shallheeatthatbagofpeanutssittingonthecounter?Ithasanowner,andthoughthatownerhasthelegalpowertogiveittothepropertylessman,healsohasthelegalrighttorefuse todoso,and toconvey it tohimonly foraprice. In theactualworld, theownersofpeanutsareallinsistingonaprice.Ok,sonopeanuts.Thepropertylessmancouldgrowsomefood. But that requires land, and this means of production is also within the power of apropertiedman,whocanpermitthepropertylessmantostartagardenonhis land,butwhoneednot.Thelandownercaninsteadrefuseaccesstoitunlessheispaidafeeforitsuse–andalltheactuallandowners,asithappens,doinsistonthepaymentofrent.Ok,sonofarming.Thepropertylessmancouldmake somethingvaluable tosell formoney,and tryagainat thepeanuts:butthefactorsofindustrialproductionare,again,property.Theirownerscanpermitourhungryherotousethem,butalltheactualownersrefusetodosointheformofrent;theyinsistonwage laborthatresults intheirownershipof thethingsproduced. Thepropertylessman,aswe’vesaid,musteat:sohesellshislabortotheindustrialistandtakeshomeawage.Thatwage,Hale insists, though it is negotiated between the employer and the employee, iscoerced– its size isdeterminedby the rulesofproperty. It isa legal artifact;and law,evenwhenithoversinthebackgroundandmerelyconditionsratherthandictatestheoutcomeofabargain,coercesitintoexistenceandcoercesitsterms.

FisherIII,TheCanonofAmericanLegalThought(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006)at85‐110[Kennedy&Fisher,Cannon].2LewisKornhauserandRobertMnookin,“Bargaining in theShadowof theLaw:TheCaseofDivorce” (1979)88YaleL.J.954.


Halewas at pains to insist that coercionwasn’t necessarily bad; he thought that thewidelysharedreluctancetousethetermtodescribethelaw’scontributiontolaborcontractswastheresultofitsbeingunnecessarilyfreightedwithmoralnegativity.Dropthenormativebaggageand we could talk about degrees and kinds of coercion as endemic, not special. WhenKornhauser andMnookin returned toHale’s idea, and incorporated it specifically in a classicarticle on the law of divorce, they rejected this: for them, a husband and wife negotiating(ratherthanlitigating)theirdivorcewereengagedinprivateordering.IfweextendKornhauserand Mnookin, and imagine the husband and wife to silently decide who will take out thegarbagebasedontheirsilentsenseofeachpartner’sstrikepricefordivorce,thistooisprivateordering.Inbothsettings,thehusbandandwifearebargainingintheshadowofthelaw.ForHale,bargainingintheshadowofthelawislegallycoerced;forMnookinandKornhauser,it’slegallyconditionedbutfree.Ithinkit’smuchmorepowerfultothinkofthelawofdivorceasconditioningnotonlydivorcenegotiations but garbage decisions; and to think of it as coercive rather than as setting thecontextforprivateordering. First,this isthe legalrealistwayoftryingtoputacheckontheliberalideathatlaw’spurposeisachievedwhenlawrunsoutandfreedombegins.Itexposestheideaoffreedomofcontracttobeideology,liberalideology.Ifbeingaleftistisstandingtotheleftofliberalism,whereverliberalismisatanyparticularmoment,thenHale’sinsistenceoncoercionopensuppossibilitiesforaleftcritique.Second,thisexpansiveviewof lawasksustodosomethingverydifficult,somethingthathasbecomeevenmoredifficultafter thepartial convergenceof left legalismwithsubordination‐focused identitypolitics: itasksus to thinkofcoercionasmorallyneutral,andtogroundourmoraland/orpoliticaljudgmentsonsomethingotherthanthefactthatpowerhashadeffects.OnceagainHalecanguideus.Itisnotonlythepeanutownerandthefactoryownerandthelandownerwhocanrefusetoenterintoalaborcontract:so,upuntilthepointofstarvation,canthepropertylessman. He isactingcoercivelywhenherefusesaproposed laborcontractbecausehethinkshecangetahigherwageorbetterworkingconditionselsewhere.Halepositsthatthewageearner ispaidmorethantheentirelyself‐interestedslaveownerwouldpaytomaintain a slave, and that that increment is precisely the mark of the wage earner’scountercoercivepower.Thismoveopensupan idea thathasbeenanathema to the strong structural‐ subordinationthesesoftheidentity‐politicalwingofthelegal left. Theyseepowerasbeingoverandtheiridentity groups as being under; power is bad; and the solution for the identity groups isemancipation,liberation,equality.Theideathatthesolutionfortheidentitygroupsmightbetounderstandandmarshalltheircountercoercivepowerhasbeenhardforpeopleinvestedinstructuralsubordinationpremisestoimagine.Theunnecessarypresumptionthatpowerisbadblocksbothanalysisandstrategy.Third,Hale’smoveshiftsresponsibilityforoutcomesbackontolaw.Itasksustothinkoflawashavingdistributionaleffects. AsHaleconcludes,themyriadinteractionsofallthepropertiedmenandpropertylessmenas theynegotiate labor contractsdetermines thewealthofevery


maninthatsocialorder. Seeing lawas intrinsictothis immensesortingprocessallowsustoseeitasdistributive.These theoretical orientations ask us to look at law but also through it, to a world that iscontingenton it. Here is an exampleofwhy lookingat lawalone canbemisleading, drawnfromKornhauserandMnookin.Whenmarriedparentsdivorce,thestateprovidestherulesforwhogetsthekids.IntheUS,ourcurrentmainlineruleistoallocatecustodyaccordingtothe“bestinterestsofthechild.”Ifweonlylookatlaw,thisbitofitisnicelyreassuring:itmakesitlook likewereallycareaboutthewelfareofchildren. ButasKornhauserandMnookinpointout, best interests is a completely open‐ended standard: if the husband and wife were tolitigate custody, theywould do so under insurmountable uncertainty aboutwhowouldwin.ThenMnookinandKornhauserposit(andthisisjusthypothetical)thattheparentwhoshouldgetcustody–theonewhoshouldwinabest‐interestscontest–isalsotheonewhoisthemostriskaverseonthispoint.Taketherule(orrather,inthiscase,thestandard),addonebasicideafrombargainingtheoryandshezam:yougetaparentwhoistooscaredtolitigatecustody.Heorshewillnegotiateifpossible,andinthenegotiationsheorshewillcaveonotherissuestosecureprimarycustodyoratleastmoretimewiththechildren.Heorshemayimpoverishhim‐orherselftogetcustody–andmayimpoverishthekidsintheprocess.Ifthathappens,youget a divorce negotiation in which the parent whomwe have designated, ex hypothesi, thebetterparentsuffersadebilitatingblowdealtbytheveryrulethat–onitsface–favoredhimorher.Bestinterestssoundslikepolicyfavoringthechildren;butinactionitcanbetheexactopposite. Itdoesn’thavetobethatway,butitcanbe.Bestinterestsisascoerciveasarulerequiringnonowners toget theconsentofownersbeforeeating theirpeanutsorusing theirtoolsorcultivatingtheirland.Wewon’tknowwhetherthat’sgoodorbaduntilwelookattheoutcomes.ThoseareatleastsomeofthereasonsIliketoteachFamilyLawasawebofbackgroundrulesthat condition people’s intimate dealing not only on the night of crisis, but in everydayhumdrum decisions, even on the first serious date. You could say that my approach isimperialisticforlaw;thewayIteachit,lawalwaysmatters.Letme take you down a different route to the same point. Let’s say that, becausewe arelawyers,weregarditasanimportantthingtobeabletosaywhatthelawis.Andherethesettextfor legalrealism,theuber‐canonicalgranddaddypieceofwriting issurelyOliverWendallHolmes’“PathoftheLaw.”3 Inthatessay,Holmescounseledthat, ifwereallywanttoknowwhatthelawis,weneedtoseeitastheBadMandoes.Holmes’BadManisnotanoutlaw:hewantstoavoida legalsanction,andthustoavoidbreakingthe laworat leasttoavoidbeing

3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457; For a useful introduction andbibliography,seeKennedy&Fisher,Cannon,supranote1at21‐43.


sanctionedforbreakingthelaw;buthealsowantstoactasself‐interestedlyashecanshortofthat.Hereadsthelawnotforitsaspirationalreachbutforitslimits;notforitsmoralclaims,but for its implicitpermissions. This iswhatmakeshimBad. TheBadManthusdividestheworldintotheLawandtherangeofpermittedactionthathecanindulgeinbeyondthelaw–andifwewouldseethelawthatway,Holmesargues,wewouldseewhatthelawis.Let’sgobacktobestintereststoseewhatthismightmean.Bestinterestspurportstosaythatchildrenofdivorcingparentswillget thecustodyarrangement that isbest for them. Butweallowdivorcingparentstonegotiatethetermsoftheirdivorces,andthusweallowBadParentstoinsistongettinga lotofcustodyfromriskaverseGoodOnesandthentotradetheirchild‐timebackforconcessionsonpropertydivision,alimony,andevenchildsupport. Withinveryexiguous limits,courtswillapprovetheiragreementsandevenadoptthemasdecrees. That,Holmeswouldhaveusknow,isasmuchthelawasthepredictionthatabenevolentjudgewillascertainthechild’sbestinterestsandsecurethem.Andit’snotaperversionofthelaw;it isthelaw.This is an important move in legal realist thought, and in critical legal analysis. It is almostexactlytheoppositeofHale’sprocedure,whichwastopavethepropertylessman’sworldwithlaw. For Holmes, the goal is “a right study and mastery of the law as a business with well understood limits, a body of dogma enclosed within definite lines.”4 At some point, thelawrunsout.ButitwouldnotberighttosaythattheBadManisfreetoactinthedomainwherelawrunsout.TheBadManisbydefinitionactingwithinlaw.Aslongashemodifieshisconductindeference to a fear of legal sanction, he occupies a space of permission, not freedom. Thescopeofthatdomain,itscontents,everythingaboutitslandscape,arecreatedbythelaw.It’salittleliketheimageofthevasethatisalsotheimageofaface,butneverbothatthesametimebecause our heuristic incapacity keeps us from seeing both at once. The law defines thedomainofpermittedaction,butwecan’tknowtheformerexceptasthenegativeofthelatter.Holmeslimitedhimselftothepredictionofwhatcourtswilldo,butofcoursetherealistswerefirmthatthewholepanoplyofwhatKarlLlewellyncalled“lawmen”constitutedtherelevantsetofactors.HereisLlewellyn’sextensionofHolmes’idea,tobefoundinhisargumentthattheriseofdivorcewasgoingtochangemarriage:

Whatwill inthispaperhereafterbemeantby"law" is…. infirst instanceand especially all that the lawmen do, as such. And in second instance,what one may reasonably anticipate that they will do. And in thirdinstance,therules laiddownfortheirdoing.Fourthly,the ideologyabouttheir doing prevalent among them (following precedent, e.g.). Lastly, theideology of other folk about the law comes into the discussion. Wherenecessary,someoneormoreoftheseveralphaseswillbesingledoutforemphasisorcontrastwithanother.Andthequestionnowrecurs,haveanyofthephasesanyeffectsonotherpeople,inregardtomarriage?5

4Ibid.at459.5KarlLlewellyn,BehindtheLawofDivorce”PartI(1932)32Colum.L.Rev.1281at1297.


ComparedtoHolmes’,Llewellyn’sisasignificantlyexpandedlegaldomain.Allthethingsthatall the lawmendo,all the thingsonecan reasonablypredict that theywilldo, the rules theyapply, the ideologies they hold, and the ideologies that “other folk” have about them – nomatter how contradictory, these are all “law”; and ultimately they matter because of “anyeffects”thattheyhaveon“otherpeople.”“Otherpeople”existbeyondthelaw;butonceanyof theelementsof lawhave“anyeffects”onthem,theycome inas thenecessaryobjectsoflegalstudy.Iwanttocallthislawasitseffects.Oneofthemostdifficultchallengesofdoinglegalstudyinthis tradition is finding some way of containing and ordering the almost crazy‐makingcomplexityoflawseenthisway.Hereisanexample,frommyownworkinprogressonsame‐sexmarriageaswehaveit intheUS. Whensame‐sexmarriageadvocatesbegantoseethattheywouldwin recognition for same‐sexmarriage in some state courts, they also began toarguethatmarriagesvalidinafirst‐moverstatewouldbevalidinalltheotherstates,throughtheoperationoftheFullFaithandCreditClauseoftheFederalConstitution.6Nevermindthatthere is no basis in positive Full Faith law for this claim; it’s not absolutely contradicted bypositivelaw,andittookthelawreviewsquiteawhiletoprintallthespinthatadvocateswerewilling to put on that gap in the rules. By that time, opponents to same‐sexmarriage hadgottenreallyalarmedandangry:wouldredstateshavetorecognizefirst‐mover‐statesame‐sexmarriages, despite adamant popular, legislative and judicial oppositionwithin their borders?Theydiscoveredarulethatsitsquietlyinjudicialdoctrine,sayingthatamarriagevalidwhereitisperformed is valid inanother stateas longas this second statedoesnotmake it illegalorconsideritaseriousviolationofitspublicpolicy.ThisisthepoliticaloriginoftheDOMA’s–theDefenseofMarriageActsstipulating,for40statesplusfederallaw,thatmarriageisarelationbetweenamanandawoman.Thesearedeclarationsofrepugnancytopublicpolicy,andtheirpurposewas to tell state courtsnotonly that therewill beno same‐sexmarriagewithin theDOMA state, but also that same‐sex marriages travelling in from elsewhere cannot berecognizedasvalidmarriagesthere.Theywillfallnotwithintherulerequiringrecognition,butinitsexceptionpermittingnonrecognition.Let’sgobacknowtoourwomansittingatakitchentablewonderingwhetherhermarriageisfalling apart, but this time let’s give her a woman for a spouse. Let’s say they married inMassachusetts,andlivethere.FarawayisthestateofVirginia,astatewithaferociouslystrongDOMA.TheVirginiaDOMAnotonlybarsrecognitionofsame‐sexmarriages;itbarsrecognitionof same‐sex civil unions, same‐sex partnership contracts and even any “other arrangement

6Forthestoryindetail,withcitations,seeJanetHalley,“BehindtheLawofMarriage,PartII:TravellingMarriage,”–Unbound:AHarvardJournaloftheLegalLeft–(Forthcoming2011).


entered intobypersonsof the same sex”!All of theseare voidandunenforceable;normaytheygiverisetocontractrights.7IfwefollowLlewellyn,theinvalidityofourwoman’smarriagein40statesoftheUnionandinalmostallapplicationsof federal law isan intrinsiccharacteristicofhermarriage. Youmightthinkthismakeshermorevulnerable,butlet’smakeheraBadWoman.Let’ssupposeitdawnsonherthat–ifsheandherspousemovedtoVirginia,shecouldjustwalkoutonherpartner,taking farmore of their shared assets thanwhatMassachusetts divorce lawwould give her.She could even take far more than Virginia contract law would give her, because Virginia’sDOMA blocks contract enforcement in their “relationship.” Even if her spousemoved to asame‐sex‐marriage‐recognizingstateandsuedfordivorce,andeventuallygotadivorcedecreethatyouwouldthinkVirginiacourtswouldhavetoheedundertheFullFaithandCreditclause,there’scaselawgivingthemanout. TheirmarriageisbothvalidinMassachusettsandinvalidalmosteverywhereelse,andwhereit’sinvalid,dependingonthefacts,it’salsoindissoluble.If we follow Holmes and Llewellyn again, the complex richochet pattern of powers andvulnerabilities that thischoiceof lawregimecreatesbetweentheparties toaMassachusettssame‐sexmarriage are part of thesemarriages even if they never leaveMassachusetts andeveniftheyneverbreakup.TheBadWomanexercisehasshownusthepermissionsbuiltintothesystem,andtheyarejustasrealasitsprescriptions.ThelineofthinkingthatI’vebeenpursuingsofarisboldinitsambitionsforlaw:notmuchis“beyond”it.Itanimatesmywork;itanimatesworkIadmire;thesensethatitisdifficultandnewandthatalotofpeoplearetryingtofigureitoutgivesthelietotheideathatcriticallegalstudiesaredead.Butthereisabigproblemwiththiswayofdoingthings:it’softenjustsimplywrong.Let’sgobacktoHale,wherewestarted.Hispointthatcoercionisubiquitouscollapsesifweundo theenclosuresand restore thecommons. Theonly reasonhispropertylessmancan’t grow his own food is because the legal order Hale knew best imagined the wholeterritorialworldtobemappedonagridofrecordeddeeds.Also–ourpropertylessmancaneatifhemarriesarichwife,orwinsthelottery,orjoinsamonasteryorcommune.Ofcourseallthosemoves–tothecommons,tomarriage,tothewelfarestate,tocommunallife–throwhim intocontactwithother background rules, soperhapsHale’sworld‐paved‐with‐lawvisioncanberestoredsimplybypitching it1,2,3…….“n” levelsofgenerality lower. But ifwearegoing togoall theway,don’twehave toadmitat somepoint that someof thebackgroundsystemsthatmatteraren’t legal? Afterall, thefactthathemusteat isnotaproductof law.What ifhispsyche,hisaestheticsense,hisageandstaminaplayarole? Maybemysolitarywomandecidestostayinhermarriagenotbecausesheanticipatesthatdivorcewouldbetoo

7Va.CodeAnn.§20‐45.3(2004).TheargumentabovedependsonthecontinuingconstitutionalityoftheDOMAs.IftheyaredecisivelyheldtobeunconstitutionalbytheUSSupremeCourt–andlitigationcurrentlyunderwaymaywell eventually result in this holding – then the entailments elaborated above will no longer be a plausiblepredictionofwhatthelawmenwilldo.SeePerryv.Schwarzeneger,702F.Supp.2d1132(N.D.Cal.2010).Ontheotherhand,iftheSupremeCourteventuallyfindsaplaceintheUSConstitutionalorderfortheDOMAs,thenthepredictionsmadeabovewillcontinuetocometrue.


costly but because she likes her husbandwhen he isn’t drunk and doesn’twant to lose thepleasureofhiscompany.Whatifshebargainsintheshadownotoflawbutofherownhedonicvitality?I’vebeenponderingthisproblemas Iparticipated in thissparklingconferencetitled“Beyondthe Law”: What, if anything, is “beyond the law”? The better parent’s risk aversion; thepropertyless man’s hunger: should we insist that these are nonlegal attributes about thesecharacterswhich interactwith legal rules to condition legally important decisions? Are theyinsideoroutsideofthelaw?Wecanthinkofiteitherway.Mostofthetime,tobesure,I’mengagedindescriptiveprojectsthatarebasicallyattemptstoextendthereachoflaw.NotthatIwantittobebig;I’mtryingtounderstand how big it is. But in the rest of rest of my remarks I’d like to spool out myambivalenceaboutthis.Whydoesitfeelmorecritical,moredecisive,toinsistonthecoercivecharacterofbackgroundrules,nomatterhowfarinthebackgroundtheylurk?Andwhydoestheresultingpictureoftheworldseemsonarrowed,soreduced,oncewehavesucceededindrawing it? What’s at stake in positing that law is everywhere – or that there is somethingbeyondit? Let’s take a break from law completely to see what can be said on the other side of thisambivalence.Let’sgo“beyondlaw.”I’vegottenmyselfinhotwaterwithsomefeministsofmygeneration by arguing that it might be useful, might be revealing, might open us up tounforeseensocialunderstandingsandnew, importantpoliticalalliances to takeabreak fromfeminism.8AndI’mthecoeditorofacollectionofessayswithEnglishprofessorAndrewParkerinwhichweaskedagroupofnotableproducersofqueertheorywhetherthereisanythingintheirworkthatcouldbedescribedas“beyond”sexand/or“beyond”queertheory.9I’vegottensomeprettysharprebukesforthese“beyond”moves.Forsomepeoplewhoareworkinghardtoexpandtheexplanatorypowerandsocialspaceforfeminismorqueertheory, it isnothingshortoffrighteningandenragingtohearsomeoneontheleft‐‐someonewhohasbenefittedina million ways from feminism and queer theory and who wouldn’t have ever gotten anacademicpostfromwhichtoquestionthemwithoutthem–suggestingthatitmightbegoodtopositalimittothem.Whydoit?Whydoittwice?OnereactionIgettothese“takeabreak”proposalstipsmeoffthatI’mright:theclaimthatit’simpossibletotakeabreakfromfeminismorfromqueertheorywithoutgoingseriouslywrongbecausewomen’ssubordinationorendangeredsexualdesireistheprimummobileofwhatever

8JanetHalley,SplitDecisions:HowandWhytoTakeaBreakfromFeminism(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006).9 JanetHalley&AndrewParker,eds.,After Sex?OnWritingSinceQueerTheory (Durham,N.C.:DukeUniversityPress,2011).


needsexplainingorfixing.Thesearestructuralisthypotheses;thosewhoespousethempositadeep structure to human life, and dedicate themselves to discovering it and its pervasiveinfluence in parts of life that seem utterly innocent of it. They demand of themselves ahermeneutics of suspicion, awill to unmask; a vigilance to undo common sense. But evenmore,theydemandacertainepistemicfixity:theworldmaylookasthoughwe’rebeyondmaledomination,beyondsexualrepression–butwe’renot.Oneof theoddthingsaboutthiswidelysharedreaction, though, is thatthirdwavefeminismbecamepossibleonlythroughabreakwithintellectualandpolitical ideasofsexandsexualityprevailing in the 1960’s; andqueer theory becamepossible onlywhen somepolitical, social,intellectual and libidinal energies that were effervescing in the late 1980’s and early 1990’sfocusedthemselvesonadesiretounderstandsexualityintermsotherthanfeminist.Feminismwasbornsaying“No”totheideasaboutgenderinwhichitemerged.Queertheorywasmoreambivalent; the idea behind about half of queer theory at the time it emerged wasn’t tocontradictfeminism,buttoaddtoit.Toworkonanotherdimension.Touseotherkeyterms.Ok, so contradictions might emerge; but that could be good for feminism, good for ourunderstandingofsexuality.Thequeerbreakwasanimatedbyananti‐structuralistimpulse;itfomentedastrongcritiqueofidentity,of“categories,”ofknowledge,andoftruth.Oneofthemostproductivethingsaboutit, inmy view,was theway it shookupour ideas aboutpower. Coming into it,manyof itsinventorswereall feministsall the time,andour feminismwasaboutbad, top‐downpower.Wewerecommittedtoananti‐subordinationproject.Someofusimaginedwomen’spowerasredemptive; some thought that power itself was irredeemable. We ran smack dab intoFoucault’s History of Sexuality Volume 1, one of the canonical texts of the queer break.10Foucaultwrotethatbook– itwasfirstpublishedinFrenchin1976–tofindanalternativetotheFreudianideathatsexualdesirewasthedeepest,truest,mostpersonalthingabouteachofus,andthatintheinfancyofeachofusithadboweddowntotheLawoftheFatherbyallowingitselftobecomerepressed.Foucaultthoughtinsteadthat,attheverytimethatthisrepressiveforce was supposedly in its most magnificent heyday, sexuality was being produced –proliferated–intheprofusionofrepressiveapparatusesthatspannedVictoriansociety.Theyweren’t effectively repressive – if anything, theywere immensely productive. The problemwassexualityitself,notitsrepression.Heimaginedthatwecouldloosenthe“grip”ofsexualityonourbodiesandourpleasuresifweimaginedpowerotherwise.Power,heposited,mightnotbe the Law;we needed to get beyond the idea that it primarily resides in the King and hisSword;itmightbeanimmanentwebofhighlymobileimpulsesrunningthroughouthumanlife,congealingsometimesinconcentratedforcefulenergiesthatcouldamounttodomination,butmore usually dispersed, small, and fluid. Power might include rather than oppose itself toresistance.

10MichelFoucault,HistoryofSexuality:AnIntroduction,Volume1,trans.byRobertHurley(London:VintageBooks,1990;1stprinting1978).Error!MainDocumentOnly.


Thisisapictureofpowerbeyondlaw,andasmuchasFoucaultyearnedtobelieveitwhenhewrote Volume 1, he didn’t really. The idea that sexuality had a grip on our bodies andpleasuresandthatwemustengageinadeepstrategytogetfreeofit–thatveryideaisbuiltonthe formofpower‐over;ofdomination;of theLawas theLawof theFather, theLawas thesword of the prince. The Foucault of Volume One had not achieved the transformation ofpowerthatHalehadsuccessfullywroughtmanyyearsbefore,workingoncoercion.11AmericanQueer Theory inherited this partially achievedbreakwith the Law, andoneof thereasonsithasneverfittoowellintocriticalstudiesinthelawschoolisthatthisimageoflawisso unlike the onewe inherit from legal realism. The paranoid attitude that the Foucault ofVolume1managed topreserve toward the confessor, thepsychiatrist, and theKingwithhisSword–despitehisfamousreformulationsaboutpower–hastroubledqueertheoryacrossitsentireexpanse,anddrasticallynarroweditsexpectationsofwhatitmighthearfromqueersinlaw.Allthemoreimportant,then,toobservethecompletetransformationinFoucault’sideasabout law and about power in Volume 2 of his History of Sexuality. This book was firstpublished in French in 1984 – almost a decade after Volume 1.12 Studying late antiqueconductbooks,Foucaultdiscoveredtheunimportanceofwhathecalledthe“moralcode”–therulesaboutwhatsexualthingsoneshouldandshouldnotdo.Instead,theemphasisofthesebooks fell on inculcating an attitudeof self‐observation, self‐management; the experienceofsexualityasproblematicresultedinanideaoftheselfasself‐governing.Becomingthesubjectofsexualdesireswasbecominganethicalsubject,asubject inrelationshipto itself;asubjectwhose characteristic form of power is self‐observation and self‐management. “I am notsupposingthatthecodesareunimportant,”Foucaultwrote.Buttheywerenotlegalmandates;they gave shape to practices of self‐governance, practiceswhichonewouldperform in theirshadowinawaythatwasconditionedonthembutneitherliberatednordominated.“[T]hisisthehypothesisthatIwouldliketoexplorehere–thatthereisawholerichandcomplexfieldofhistoricityinthewaytheindividual issummonedtorecognizehimselfasanethicalsubjectofsexual conduct.”13 Thus the rule requiring the husband to confine his sexual conduct to hiswife,forexample,wasnotarepressiveprohibition;itwashisopportunitytoachievenotself‐denialbutanethicalrelationshiptohimself–andthat,nottheunleashingofforbiddendesireorasubsidenceintobodiesandpleasures,offeredhimfreedom.

11DuncanKennedy,“TheStakesofLaw,orHaleandFoucault!” (1991)15LegalStudiesForum327;Reprinted inDuncanKennedy,SexyDressingetc.(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1993)at83.12MichelFoucault,HistoryofSexuality:An Introduction,Volume2,TheUseofPleasure, trans.byRobertHurley(NY:Viking,1985).13Ibid.,at32.


ThisisacompletebreakwithVolumeOne,asFoucaulthimselfadmittedinaparagraphthatItreasure.Itcomesintheintroduction,whereFoucaultisexplainingwhyittookhimsolongtoproduceVolumeTwo.Towriteit,hesaid,hehadto“thinkdifferently”–andthiswasnoteasy:

And as to those for whom to work hard, to begin and begin again, toattemptandbemistaken, to gobackand reworkeverything from top tobottom,andstillfindreasontohesitatefromonesteptothenext–astothose, in short, for whom to work in the midst of uncertainty andapprehension is tantamount to failure, all I can say is that clearlywearenotfromthesameplanet.14

Do we have the courage to loosen our hold on what we think we know because we arestudentsoflaw,andgoonasimilarvoyage?I propose thatwhat Foucaultwent through intellectually between1974 and1984was a trip“beyond the law.” Hewaswilling, almost literally, to takeabreak from the ideaof, andhischronicresentmentof,LawastheSword. Theresultwasdisorientation,yearsof research inthe mode of profound doubt, and ultimately an image and a genealogy of power thatcorrespondedwiththetheoryofitthathehadadvanceinthebeginning.Thisbreak‐takinghadatransformativeeffectonhisideaof law–broughtitmuchclosertotheoneIderivedinthebeginningofthisessayfromlegalrealism.Inclosing,Iwonderwhatitwouldbelikeforus,asstudentsoflaw,toseektoimitateFoucault’sefforttogetbeyondwhatweknowaboutlawbygettingbeyondlawitself.Alltheformulationsoflaw–Hale’s,KornhauserandMnookin’s,Holmes’s,Llewellyn’s‐‐thatIgaveinthebeginningofthislecturedohaveanoutside.Theywouldnotnecessarilyhavetobetrashedifwetookabreakfromthem.Whatif,forinstance,weconductedthe“lawandhumanities”interdisciplinewithoutthepersistent,never‐spokenbutomnipresentrulethatgoodworkofthiskindhadtoidentifyanoverlapbetweenlawandthehumanities?Whatiftheverypurposeoftheexercisewereinsteadtofindelementsofhumanlifethatcouldbecalledaestheticorsimplybeautifulthathadnothingtodowithlaw?Thelawschoolshaveprettymuchgivenuponthepsyche–wehaverationalactorswiththeircognitivebiases,butwedon’tlistenfortheterrifying,roaringpoundingof thehumanheart. Andpolitics:wehardlyever teachor studypolitics:westudypoliticsasitisgoveredbylaw.Toahammereverythingisanail–andtolegallytrainedpeople,every political problem is a legal problem. In the course of doing this – it’s almost a fullemploymentactforourselvesandourgraduates,soweaningourselvesof itwouldbehard‐‐wehavecontributedtotheemaciationofpoliticsonalocal,nationalandinternationalscale.Ifwetookabreakfromlaw,couldwefindwaystostopdoingthat?

14Ibid.,at7.

does law have and outside? *janet halley

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