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J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 44 (2013) 165e171

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Journal of Behavior Therapy andExperimental Psychiatry

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Does mode of processing during a positive experience have consequences foraffect?

Kate Hetherington*, Michelle L. MouldsThe University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 3 April 2012Received in revised form7 August 2012Accepted 10 October 2012

Keywords:Processing modeDysphoriaRuminationPositive affect

* Corresponding author. School of Psychology, ThWales, NSW 2052, Australia. Tel.: þ61 2 9385 8249; f

E-mail address: k.hetherington@student.unsw.edu

0005-7916/$ e see front matter � 2012 Elsevier Ltd.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2012.10.002

a b s t r a c t

Background and objectives: Rumination about negative material (e.g., depression symptoms, currentproblems) contributes to the course and maintenance of depression. More recently, studies have shownthat it is not rumination per se, but rather the mode of processing (i.e., abstract/analytical versusconcrete/experiential) adopted during rumination that is critical in determining whether rumination hasadaptive or maladaptive outcomes. To date, only one study has examined the affective impact of adoptinga particular processing mode with positive material; specifically, when recalling a happy memory. Thecurrent study extends this line of investigation by examining whether adopting an abstract or concreteprocessing mode during a positive experience (i.e., a success task) has consequences for subsequentaffect.Methods: High and low dysphoric participants (N ¼ 136) were randomly allocated to abstract, concrete orno training conditions prior to a success experience. Affect was measured before and after success.Results:We found that neither processing mode condition nor dysphoria status had consequences for theaffective impact of success.Limitations: Our findings are based on an analogue sample. Further research is required to enablegeneralisation to depression.Conclusions: This study provides some initial indication in a non-clinical sample that processing modedoes not have the same differential affective impact when combined with a positive experience (e.g.,success) as when combined with a negative experience (e.g., failure).

� 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Depressive rumination refers to a pattern of responding to sadmood by focussing attention on one’s symptoms, and their causes,meanings and consequences (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, &Lyubomirsky, 2008). Numerous experimental studies have foundthat instructing individuals to engage in rumination, as comparedwith distraction, exacerbates depressed mood (Nolen-Hoeksema,Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993) and maintains deficits includingpoor problem solving (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995),impaired executive functioning (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008), andconcentration difficulties (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003).

The ‘processing mode theory of rumination’ (Watkins, 2008)suggested that it is not rumination per se, but rather the mode ofprocessing (i.e., abstract/analytical versus concrete/experiential)

e University of New Southax: þ61 2 9385 3641..au (K. Hetherington).

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adopted during rumination that is critical in determining whetherrumination has adaptive or maladaptive outcomes. Whilst bothprocessing modes have equivalent focus on mood, symptoms andself, they differ in the degree to which they are characterised by ananalytical, evaluative cognitive style. Consistent with this theoret-ical distinction, in the context of negative mood and when pro-cessing negative material, there is evidence that adopting anabstract mode of processing results in a range of maladaptiveoutcomes relative to adopting a concrete-experiential processingmode. For example, in non-clinical samples adopting an abstractprocessing mode combined with failure has been associated witha greater increase in negative affect (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004) anda greater decrease in positive affect (Moberly & Watkins, 2006),relative to concrete processing. Similarly, in depressed samples, thepresence of persistent low mood combined with adopting anabstract processing mode has been associated with an increasedtendency to recall overgeneral memories (Watkins & Teasdale,2001), poorer social problem solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005)and increased global negative self-judgements (Rimes & Watkins,2005) compared to adopting a concrete processing mode. It is

K. Hetherington, M.L. Moulds / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 44 (2013) 165e171166

important to note that there is evidence that manipulating pro-cessing mode itself does not have any direct mood-inductioneffects (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds,2008) suggesting it is not an inherently maladaptive form ofthought. Rather, it is the combination of abstract, analytical self-focus and dysphoria (either naturally occurring or experimentallyinduced) that is maladaptive.

The current study aims to examine the consequences ofadopting an abstract or concrete processing mode during a positiveexperience (i.e., success). While a number of studies have examinedthe interaction between mode of processing and negative material(e.g., dysphoric mood, failure experiences), the consequences ofadopting a particular mode of processing with positive materialremains largely unexamined. Understanding the emotionalconsequences of the way in which positive material is processed indysphoria has potential implications for psychological treatmentsfor depression (e.g., the impact of deliberately engaging in positiveexperiences in behaviour therapy).

Only one recent study has investigated the consequences ofadopting a particular processing mode with positive material(Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2012). The researchers manipulatedwhether depressed and recovered depressed participants recalleda happy memory (to repair sad mood) in an abstract or concreteway and found that while concrete recall improved sad mood,abstract recall did not (Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2012). Theauthors proposed that the tendency for current and recovereddepressed individuals to spontaneously adopt an abstract pro-cessing mode (including in response to positive material) may bea mechanism that underpins the observed absence of mood repairfollowing happy memory recall in depression (Joormann & Siemer,2004; Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007). Linking these findings tothe mode of processing theory outlined above, they are consistentwith the hypothesis that for depressed and recovered depressedindividuals, adopting an abstract processing mode with positivematerial may have maladaptive consequences.

While no other studies have directly examined this issue, indi-rect support for the hypothesis that thinking about positive mate-rial in an abstract way dampens positive mood comes fromexperimental work with non-clinical samples. For example,Holmes, Lang, and Shah (2009) compared the affective impact ofimagining (i.e., creating images of) positive events with verballyprocessing such events (i.e., thinking about their meaning). Theyfound that participants who imagined positive events reportedimproved positive mood, while participants in the verbal process-ing condition reported reduced positive mood (Holmes et al., 2009;Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). While thesemanipulations are not identical to the abstract and concrete pro-cessing modes detailed above, they share considerable conceptualoverlap and hence speak to the issue of whether abstract process-ing of positive material has beneficial or detrimental consequences.

Interestingly, the broader literature also provides some indirectsupport for the alternate hypothesis, that abstract processing ofpositivematerial may have the opposite effect (Feldman, Joormann,& Johnson, 2008; Johnson, McKenzie, & McMurrich, 2008;Marigold, Holmes, & Ross, 2007). This alternate hypothesis predictsthat abstract processing of positive material (e.g., positive memo-ries) may lead people to draw more generalized meanings fromthem, resulting in more cognitive elaboration of positive moodstates or positive feedback, and thereby amplifying positive affec-tive consequences (Marigold et al., 2007). Once again, the manip-ulations used in this study were not identical to abstract andconcrete processing, but shared considerable conceptual overlap.This alternate hypothesis is also consistent with the broaden andbuild theory of positive emotions that proposes positive emotionresults in broadened cognition, which in high enough ratios can

result in “upward spirals” of adaptive thoughts, feelings andbehaviours (Garland et al., 2010).

These competing hypotheses highlight the need for research tounpack the conditions under which abstract processing is adaptiveversus maladaptive. One possibility that has been put forward isthat abstract processing of positive material is generally adaptivebut becomes maladaptive in the context of dysphoria (Watkins,2008). Consistent with this idea, Watkins et al. have hypothesisedthat currently depressed individuals may be impaired in theircapacity to flexibly regulate the way they engage with material inresponse to situational demands, becoming ‘stuck’ in a moreabstract processing mode (Watkins, 2008, 2010; Watkins, Moberly,& Moulds, 2011). Indeed, there is evidence that in general, positivemood is associated with a tendency to engage in abstract pro-cessing, while negative mood triggers a shift to more concreteprocessing (Bless, Schwarz, Clore, Golisano, & Rabe, 1996; Forgas,2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). One recent study has providedsupport for the hypothesis that depression status may moderatethese default tendencies (Watkins et al., 2011).

The literature to date suggests that the way in which positivematerial is processed, that is whether an abstract or concrete pro-cessing mode is adopted, is likely to influence its affective impact.In the current study we used a paradigm developed in previousresearch examining the consequences of processing mode adoptedwith negative material (using a failure task), and manipulated thevalence of the experience (to include a success task). The inclusionof both low and high dysphoric groups allowed examination ofwhether processing mode during success interacts with dysphoricmood. We examined whether adopting an abstract or concreteprocessing mode during a positive experience had differentialconsequences for affect. Participants were randomly allocated totraining in abstract or concrete processing, or neither (controlcondition), before undergoing a success manipulation.

Our hypotheses were generated on the basis of studies that havedemonstrated that dysphoria interacts with abstract processing toresult in maladaptive outcomes. We were also guided by findingsthat the capacity to repair sad mood through the recall of a positivememory is impaired in dysphoric and depressed participants(Joormann et al., 2007), possibly as the result of abstract processing,as well as the findings of the only empirical study in the clinicalliterature to have examined the affective consequences of abstractand concrete processing of positive material (Werner-Seidler &Moulds, 2012). For low dysphoric participants, we hypothesisedthere would be a similar increase in positive affect in all threeconditions following success. For high dysphoric participants, wepredicted that those in the abstract conditionwould report reducedpositive affect in response to success relative to those in theconcrete condition. While we acknowledge that there is somesupport from the broader literature for the alternate hypothesisthat abstract processing would lead to increased positive affect,given the basis of our research in the clinical literature we wereguided most strongly by the findings of work in the clinical field.The no training (control) condition was included for use asa comparison. We made no specific predictions about the impact ofthe no training control condition.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

Participants (N ¼ 236) were recruited from the undergraduatepsychology student pool at the University of New South Wales andthe local community via advertisements. Students participated inexchange for course credit, while community members werereimbursed $20 for participation. Participants were excluded if; (i)

K. Hetherington, M.L. Moulds / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 44 (2013) 165e171 167

they were not low or high dysphoric (n ¼ 73); or responses indi-cated they (ii) were outliers (n ¼ 1), (iii) had not complied withinstructions (n¼ 1), or (iv) the successmanipulationwas ineffective(n ¼ 25). Chi-square analyses indicated there were no differencesbetween participants for whom the success manipulation wasineffective and those who were included in the total sample(ps > .05).

Following these exclusions, the final sample included 136participants (102 students, 34 community members), comprised of89 female (65.4%) and 47male (34.6%) participants with amean ageof 22.11 years (range ¼ 17e53, SD ¼ 6.84). A series of one-wayANOVAs indicated that community participants tended to beolder than student participants (students: M ¼ 20.57, SD ¼ 4.73,community: M ¼ 26.74, SD ¼ 9.67, F (1, 134) ¼ 24.317, p < .001), aswell as more dysphoric (students:M¼ 9.20, SD¼ 8.90, community:M ¼ 15.79, SD ¼ 12.59: F (1, 134) ¼ 11.24, p < .001). Importantly,there were no differences in the distribution of communityparticipants across conditions (c2 (2, N ¼ 136) ¼ 3.74, p > .05).

No previous studies which have manipulated mode of pro-cessing and found significant differences have reported effect sizes.In the absence of such information, the current study was designedwith a sample size comparable to these previous studies (Moberly&Watkins, 2006; Watkins et al., 2008) in order to provide adequatepower to detect any significant effects.

2.2. Materials and measures

2.2.1. Beck Depression Inventory e second edition (BDI-II; Beck,Steer, & Brown, 1996)

The BDI-II is a 21 item self-report measure of depressionsymptomatology with scores ranging 0e63, where higher scoresindicate more depressive symptoms. It has demonstrated highinternal consistency (Beck et al., 1996) and adequate validity(Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). Scores on the BDI-II were usedto define a low dysphoric group (score of �6) and a high dysphoricgroup (score of �13).

2.2.2. Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) of the response stylequestionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991)

The RRS is a 22 item self-report questionnaire that assesses anindividual’s tendency to engage in rumination. It has goodconstruct validity, good internal consistency and moderate test-retest reliability (Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006).

2.2.3. Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, &Tellegen, 1988)

The PANAS consists of two 10 item scales, one measuring posi-tive affect (e.g., “interested”, “excited”), the other negative affect(e.g., “distressed”, “upset”). Participants are asked to rate on a 5point scale the extent to which each item reflects how they feel atthat point in time (from 1 very slightly/not at all to 5 extremely).The PANAS is a reliable and valid measure of mood (Watson et al.,1988) that has been used extensively in experimental research.

2.2.4. Mode of processing inductionsMode of processing training was modelled on that used by

Moberly andWatkins (2006) inwhich participants worked through12 scenarios (6 positive and 6 negative), spending 1 min concen-trating on each and 1minwriting down answers to questions aboutthe scenario. Images were removed from the original concretemanipulations to ensure equivalence across conditions in the use ofonly verbal (i.e., text) based instructions. The way in whichparticipants worked through the scenarios was manipulated toinduce abstract processing, concrete processing or neither. In theabstract condition, participants were instructed to think about the

causes, meanings, and implications of each scenario and wereasked to providewritten responses to questions that focussed themon the abstract implications of the event. In the concrete condition,participants were presented with the same scenarios and instruc-ted to imagine what was happening in each and write responses toquestions that focussed them on the concrete, sensory details of theevent. In the control condition (modelled on that used by Watkinset al., 2008) participants were presented with the same 12scenarios for equivalent time andwrote responses to questions thatencouraged neither an abstract or concrete way of thinking (e.g.,How many words associated with time are there in the presentedtext?).

2.2.5. Success taskParticipants were given the easy version of the Remote Associ-

ates Test (RAT) which has been shown to be an effective manipu-lation of success which minimises the use of deception and theassociated risk of arousing suspicion (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984).Participants given an easy version of the RAT have been found toreliably do better at the task (compared with a difficult version)while also perceiving they have performed well (Brown & Dutton,1995; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984; Seery, Blascovich, Weisbuch, &Brooke Vick, 2004). The success version of the RAT has beenshown in previous studies to effectively induce positive mood(Brown & Dutton, 1995; Jarry & Kossert, 2007; Marshall & Brown,2006). Participants are presented with a list of three words (e.g.,Shelf-Read-End) and asked to think of a fourth word that hassomething in common with the other three words (e.g., Book).Participants are given ambiguously easy items and led to believethat the task is difficult and performance predicts positive lifeoutcomes. Test items were amended slightly after pilot testingindicated participants found some items more difficult than USsamples (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984).

2.2.6. Manipulation checksIn order to check that the mode of processing inductions were

effective, responses to induction task prompts were analysed fornumber of causal-typewords (e.g., because, reason). This was basedon the procedure used in previous studies (Moberly & Watkins,2006; Watkins, 2004). It was predicted that participants’responses to the questions about the scenarios would include morecausal-type words in the abstract processing mode, reflectinga thinking style that was more focussed on the causes, reasons andconsequences of situations, relative to participants’ responses inthe concrete mode.

A visual analogue scale was used to assess participants’ degreeof self-focus (based on Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Participantsrated how much they were focussed on themselves using a 0e100scale (0 ¼ not at all focussed on myself, 100 ¼ totally self-focussed)before and after the mode of processing training.

Visual analogue scales were also used to check that the successtask was effective. After reading through the task preamble,participants rated their creative intelligence (1 ¼ very low, 7 ¼ veryhigh) and indicated how many problems (out of 10) they expectedto solve. Following completion of the task, participants again ratedtheir creative intelligence.

2.3. Procedure

Testing was carried out in individual or small group sessions(with groups ranging in size from 1 to 5 participants) and tookapproximately 50 min. There were no differences by condition orgroup in the proportion of participants tested alone (c2s < 1.48,ps > .05). Participants initially completed the BDI-II to check foreligibility. Eligible participants were then randomly allocated to

Table 1Sample characteristics at baseline by condition and dysphoria group.

Condition

Abstract Concrete Control

LD HD LD HD LD HD

N 25 21 24 18 29 19Age 22.52 (6.80) 23.05 (7.88) 21.58 (3.92) 23.50 (9.74) 19.21 (1.95) 24.32 (9.09)BDI-II 3.48 (2.28) 21.29 (7.88) 3.04 (2.03) 20.83 (7.94) 3.10 (2.16) 21.21 (7.44)RRS 37.80 (9.82) 55.62 (14.08) 36.71 (9.16) 53.78 (11.46) 35.83 (6.39) 56.53 (8.44)

Note. LD ¼ Low dysphoric group, HD ¼ High dysphoric group, BDI-II ¼ Beck Depression Inventory e second edition, RRS ¼ Ruminative Response Scale. Except where noted,values refer to mean and (standard deviation) scores.

K. Hetherington, M.L. Moulds / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 44 (2013) 165e171168

one of the three conditions (abstract, concrete, no training) andcompleted pre-inductionmeasures of affect (PANAS) and self-focus,followed by the processing mode induction. Following this,participants completed post-training measures of affect (PANAS)and self-focus before being administered the success task, followedby post-success measures of affect (PANAS), manipulation checks,and self-report scales (RRS and additional measures not reported inthe present study1). Participants were asked what they thought thepurpose of the experiment was before being debriefed andthanked. No participants correctly identified that the mode ofprocessing induction was hypothesised to influence the impact ofthe subsequent success experience.

3. Results

3.1. Participant characteristics

A series of 2 (Group: low dysphoric, high dysphoric) � 3(Condition: abstract, concrete, control) analyses of variance(ANOVAs) with depression symptoms, age and levels of traitrumination as the dependent variables were conducted to checkwhether there were (i) differences in the expected direction bygroup, and (ii) no differences by condition. Means and standarddeviations are presented in Table 1. For BDI-II, as expected, therewas a main effect of group, F (1, 130) ¼ 376.71, p < .05, such thathigh dysphoric participants reported significantly more depressivesymptoms than low dysphoric participants. There were no othersignificant effects (all Fs < .08, all ps > .05).

For age, there was a main effect of group, F (1, 130) ¼ 4.61,p < .05, such that high dysphoric participants were older than lowdysphoric participants. There were no other significant effects (allFs < 1.39, all ps > .05). As a result of the difference in age betweengroups, age was entered as a covariate in all subsequent analyses.

A 2 (Group) � 3 (Condition) ANCOVA with trait rumination(RRS) as the dependent variable indicated a significant main effectof group, F (1, 129) ¼ 106.96, p < .05, in the expected direction.Importantly, there were no other significant effects (all ps > .05).

3.2. Manipulation checks

3.2.1. Mode of processingThe number of causal-type words participants generated in

their written responses to the induction prompts was used to indexdegree of abstractness. A 2 (Group) � 2 (Condition) ANCOVA withcausal-type words as the dependent variable indicated a maineffect of condition, F (1, 83) ¼ 29.34, p < .05, such that participantsin the abstract condition used more causal-type words in responseto the induction prompts (M ¼ 2.68, SD ¼ 2.60) than participants in

1 We also examined the consequences of processing mode for negative self-judgements; however, these findings are not reported here.

the concrete condition (M ¼ .39, SD ¼ .76). Importantly, there wasno main effect of group, and no group � condition interaction (allFs< 1.06, all ps> .05) indicating the inductionwas effective for lowand high dysphoric participants.

3.2.2. Self-focusA 2 (Group) � 3 (Condition) � 2 (Time) ANCOVA with repeated

measures on the third factor and self-focus as the dependentvariable was conducted to check that self-focus during training didnot differ as a function of group or condition. The main effect oftime did not reach significance, F (1, 122) ¼ 2.76, p > .05. There wasa significant time � condition interaction, F (2, 122) ¼ 14.09,p < .001, as well as a main effect of condition, F (2, 122) ¼ 3.81,p < .05. There were no other significant effects (all Fs < 2.83, allps > .05).

We followed up the significant time � condition interactionwith two ANCOVAs with self-focus pre- and post-training asdependent variables. Prior tomode of processing training therewasno difference in self-focus by condition, F (2, 125) ¼ .38, p > .05,however, following training there was a main effect of condition onself-focus, F (2, 132) ¼ 13.00, p < .001. Consistent with ourprediction that abstract and concrete training would not differen-tially influence self-focus, pairwise comparisons following-up thismain effect indicated no difference between the abstract andconcrete conditions (p > .05); however, participants in the controlcondition were significantly less self-focussed than participants inthe other two conditions (both ps < .01). A series of repeatedmeasures ANCOVAs run separately for each condition with self-focus pre- and post-training as the dependent variables indicatedno main effect of time in the abstract or concrete conditions (allFs < .60, all ps > .05), however, there was a significant reduction inself-focus in the control condition, F (1, 46) ¼ 5.62, p < .05.

3.2.3. Success taskOn average, participants reported that they expected to solve

3.70 out of 10 problems (SD¼ 2.06). They actually solved an averageof 6.82 problems (SD ¼ 1.80). A series of 2 (Group) � 3 (Condition)ANCOVAs indicated no differences by group or condition in thenumber of problems that participants expected to solve (allFs< .70, all ps> .05), or actually solved (all Fs< .80 and all ps> .05).

A 2 (Group) � 3 (Condition) � 2 (Time) ANCOVA with partici-pants’ ratings of their perceived creative intelligence before andafter the success task as the dependent variable indicated a trendtowards an increase in perceived creative intelligence, F (1,128) ¼ 3.70, p ¼ .057. There were no other main effects or inter-actions (all Fs < 2.64, all ps > .05), indicating that this trend wasobserved irrespective of group or condition.

3.2.4. Emotional responses to trainingTo ensure that the affective impact of success did not reflect any

direct mood induction effects of mode of processing training, wefirst examined positive and negative affect during training. We

Table 2Positive affect scores (from the PANAS) by condition and dysphoria group.

Condition

Abstract Concrete Control

LD HD LD HD LD HD

Pre-training 29.84 (9.05) 24.33 (6.28) 30.29 (6.95) 27.67 (8.08) 28.76 (8.24) 22.16 (5.81)Post-training 28.40 (10.93) 25.95 (8.85) 27.46 (8.66) 25.67 (6.95) 21.52 (8.06) 17.84 (4.92)Post-success 32.33 (10.65) 31.05 (8.19) 30.96 (8.61) 30.61 (7.82) 27.21 (9.54) 22.47 (6.84)

Note. LD ¼ Low dysphoric group, HD ¼ High dysphoric group, PANAS ¼ Positive and Negative Affect Scale. Values refer to mean and (standard deviation) scores.

2 We also followed up the significant 3-way group � condition � time interactionfor negative affect during training with separate condition � time ANCOVAs for thehigh and low dysphoric groups. In the low dysphoric group there was no effect oftime and no condition � time interaction (all Fs < 1.01, all ps > .05). In the highdysphoric group there no effect of time but there was a significant condition � timeinteraction, F (2, 54) ¼ 3.59, p < .05. Follow-up repeated measures ANCOVAs runseparately for each condition indicated no significant effect of time on negativeaffect in any condition (all Fs < .87, all ps > .05). Separate one-way ANCOVAs acrosscondition at pre- and post-training indicated no effect of condition on negativeaffect at either time (all Fs < 1.97, all ps > .05).

K. Hetherington, M.L. Moulds / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 44 (2013) 165e171 169

conducted two 2 (Group)� 3 (Condition)� 2 (Time) ANCOVAswithrepeated measures on the third factor and positive affect andnegative affect (PANAS scales) as the dependent variables. Themean positive and negative affect scores at each assessment pointare presented in Tables 2 and 3.

3.2.4.1. Positive affect during training. There was a significant con-dition� time interaction, F (2, 129)¼ 11.07, p< .01, and a significantgroup � time interaction, F (1, 129) ¼ 4.71, p < .05. There was alsoamain effect of group, F (1,129)¼ 10.33, p< .01, and amain effect ofcondition, F (2, 129) ¼ 6.18, p < .01, but no other significant maineffects or interactions (all Fs < 1.85, all ps > .05).

We followed up the significant condition � time interactionwith separate one-way ANCOVAs across the three conditions atpre-training and post-training. There was no effect of condition atpre-training, F (2, 132) ¼ 1.52, p > .05, however, there was at post-training, F (2, 132) ¼ 9.98, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons indicatedno difference in positive affect in the abstract and concrete condi-tions (p> .05), however, in the control condition positive affect wassignificantly lower than in both of the other conditions (ps < .001).Separate repeated measures ANCOVAs for each condition indicatedno main effect of time in either the abstract or concrete conditions(all Fs < .03, all ps > .05), however, in the control condition positiveaffect decreased significantly from pre- to post-training, F (1,46) ¼ 14.76, p < .001.

We followed up the significant group � time interaction withseparate one-way ANCOVAs across group at pre- and post-training.Pre-training there was a main effect of group, F (1, 133) ¼ 16.15,p < .001, such that the low dysphoric group reported more positiveaffect than the high dysphoric group. Post-training the groupdifference was not significant, having reduced to a trend in thesame direction, F (1, 133) ¼ 3.30, p ¼ .07. Separate repeatedmeasures ANCOVAs for low and high dysphoric groups indicated nomain effect of time in either the low or high dysphoric group (allFs < 3.70, all ps > .05).

Taken together, these results indicate that there was no differen-tial impact of abstract and concrete training on positive affect,however, positive affect reduced significantly in the control conditionduring training. The difference betweenpositive affect in the lowandhigh dysphoric groups at pre-training was also reduced at post-training, although there were no differences by group in the magni-tude of the change inpositive affect. As a result of these differences inemotional responses to training (i.e., between the control and theactive conditions), post-training positive affect was controlled for insubsequent analyses examining post-success positive affect.

3.2.4.2. Negative affect during training. There was a significantcondition � time interaction, F (2, 128) ¼ 3.08, p < .01, a significantgroup � time interaction, F (1, 128) ¼ 9.82, p < .005, as well as a 3-way group� condition� time interaction, F (2, 128)¼ 4.33, p< .05.There was also a main effect of group, F (1, 128) ¼ 41.89, p < .001,but no other main effects or interactions (all Fs < 2.66, all ps > .05).

To follow-up the 3-way interaction we conducted 2 (Group) � 3(Condition) ANCOVAs separately for pre-training and post-training.

Pre-training there was a main effect of group, F (1, 128) ¼ 44.18,p < .001, but no other main effects or interactions (all Fs < 1.69, allps > .05). Post-training there was a main effect of group, F (1,128) ¼ 28.30, p < .001, a main effect of condition, F (2, 128) ¼ 4.15,p < .05, but no group � condition interaction, F (2, 128) ¼ .99,p > .05. Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that post-training there was no difference between the abstract andconcrete conditions (p > .05); however, negative affect wassignificantly higher in the control condition than both the otherconditions (ps < .05).2

These results suggest that following training there was nodifference in negative affect between the abstract and concreteconditions, however, participants in the control condition reportedsignificantly more negative affect than those in the other condi-tions. As a result of these differences, we controlled for post-training negative affect in subsequent analyses examining post-success negative affect.

3.3. Emotional responses to success

3.3.1. Positive affect following success (PANAS scale)A 2 (Group) � 3 (Condition) ANCOVA (including pre-success

positive affect and age as covariates) with post-success positiveaffect as the dependent variable yielded nomain effect of condition,F (2, 127) ¼ .24, p > .05. That is, the processing mode adopted didnot have differential consequences for the impact of a successexperience on positive affect, after controlling for differences inpre-success positive affect and age. Contrary to expectations, therewas no main effect of group, F (1, 127) ¼ .02, p > .05, and nogroup � condition interaction, F (2, 127) ¼ .71, p > .05.

3.3.2. Negative affect following success (PANAS scale)A 2 (Group) � 3 (Condition) ANCOVA (including pre-success

negative affect and age as covariates) with post-success negativeaffect as the dependent variable indicated no main effect ofcondition, F (2, 127)¼ .80, p> .05, or group, F (1, 127)¼ .00, p> .05,and no group � condition interaction, F (2, 127) ¼ .22, p > .05.

4. Discussion

Our aim was to examine whether the processing mode adoptedby low and high dysphoric participants during a positive experi-ence had differential consequences for affect. We expected that for

Table 3Negative affect scores (from the PANAS) by condition and dysphoria group.

Condition

Abstract Concrete Control

LD HD LD HD LD HD

Pre-training 11.67 (1.58) 19.48 (7.88) 11.83 (2.62) 16.17 (6.19) 12.14 (2.91) 19.26 (7.66)Post-training 11.50 (1.56) 14.81 (5.10) 11.00 (1.62) 14.50 (6.07) 12.17 (3.16) 18.05 (6.65)Post-success 11.00 (1.35) 13.81 (5.54) 10.50 (.98) 12.89 (4.99) 11.00 (2.19) 15.58 (5.98)

Note. LD ¼ Low dysphoric group, HD ¼ High dysphoric group, PANAS ¼ Positive and Negative Affect Scale. Values refer to mean and (standard deviation) scores.

K. Hetherington, M.L. Moulds / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 44 (2013) 165e171170

high dysphoric participants, adopting an abstract processing modeduring success would reduce its positive affective impact relative toadopting a concrete processing mode. We found that processingmode condition and dysphoria status did not have consequencesfor the affective impact of success. This study provides some initialevidence that adopting an abstract processing mode does not havemaladaptive consequences for the immediate affective impact ofa positive experience in low and high dysphoric individuals.

These results suggest that processing mode does not have thesame differential affective impact when combined with a positiveexperience (e.g., a success task) as when combined with a negativeexperience (e.g., a failure task) (Watkins, 2004; Watkins et al.,2008). Our results were contrary to hypotheses and inconsistentwith the only previous study to have examined whether processingmode has consequences for the affective impact of positivematerialin depression (Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2012). However, we notea number of differences between the studies that may explain ourdiscrepant results. Most notably, the current study examined theimpact of processing mode during a positive experience (i.e.,success), while Werner-Seidler and Moulds (2012) compared theconsequences of abstract versus concrete recall of a happymemory.It may be the case that adopting a particular processing mode hasdifferent consequences with different positive stimuli. Anothernotable difference between these two studies was the levels ofdysphoria participants were experiencing. As an initial investiga-tion of the consequences of processing mode during success thecurrent study employed an analogue sample, whereas the previousstudy included a clinical sample. In addition, in Werner-Seidler andMoulds’ (2012) study, recovered depressed participants receiveda sad mood induction prior to the manipulation of processingmode. It is possible that sad mood induction or higher levels ofnaturally occurring dysphoria are a critical component of situationsin which abstract and concrete processing of positive material havedifferential impacts. Further experiments systematically manipu-lating levels of naturally occurring dysphoria and experimentallyinduced sad mood are needed to address this issue.

While our results suggest that abstract and concrete processingmodes do not have the same differential affective impact whencombined with positivematerial as with negative material, it is alsopossible that although no overall effect of condition was observed,abstract and concrete processing influenced affect via differentprocesses. While this account remains speculative, it is possible, forexample, that concrete processing may have acted as an emotionalamplifier of positive material, while abstract processing may haveinfluenced emotion via cognitive elaboration and generalisation.Previous researchers have also suggested that the process ofcomparisonmay be a potentially critical component in determiningresponses to positive material. For example, Joormann and Siemer(2004) and Joormann et al. (2007) hypothesised that engaging incomparison between a happy past event and current depressedstate may contribute to depressed participants’ inability to repairsad mood via happy memory recall. Similarly, the comparison ofvery positive imagined scenarios with one’s less positive actual

situation has been suggested as a mechanism that may account forreduced positive mood as a result of verbally thinking about (ratherthan imagining) positive events (Holmes et al., 2009). While weconceptualize comparison as a component of abstract processing,other researchers may not, highlighting the need for specificity inthe definition of the constructs of abstract and concrete processingand further elucidation of the mechanisms via which each of theseprocessing modes influence affect.

The absence of an interaction between processing mode anddysphoria status was also contrary to our hypotheses and some-what puzzling. Previous research has found that abstract process-ing combined with low mood (either naturally occurring orexperimentally induced) hasmaladaptive consequences, yet we didnot find this in our study. It is possible that for high dysphoricparticipants, the impact of the positive experience washed out theeffects of an interaction between depressive symptoms andabstract processing that has been reported in previous research. Ifthis was indeed the case, it provides a reassuring clinical message inthat it suggests that high dysphoric individuals may have been ableto derive immediate affective benefit from success despite thepresence of depressive symptoms and the instruction to adopt anabstract thinking style.

The current study has a number of limitations that need to bekept in mind when considering the results. Firstly, this study didnot include a clinical sample. While our results suggest that themode of processing adopted does not have differential conse-quences for the affective impact of a positive experience in ananalogue sample, it is possible that a different pattern of resultsmay be seen in a depressed sample. Another aspect of the currentstudy which warrants mention is the positive experience used.While manipulation checks indicated that our success task wasgenerally effective, it did seem difficult to experimentally inducea meaningful success experience. The current study applied themethodology of previous experiments (looking at responses tofailure) to success; however, it is possible that creating a powerfulsuccess experience requires an alternate methodology. Whilemanipulation checks also indicated that our mode of processingmanipulation was effective, it is possible that these manipulationswere not sufficiently powerful for differences between processingmodes to emerge. Before concluding that mode of processing doesnot have consequences for the affective impact of a positive expe-rience, we believe that replication of these findings with an alter-native positive experience manipulation and mode of processinginduction are warranted.

Notwithstanding these limitations, this study provides an initialindication in a non-clinical sample that the processing modeadopted during a positive experience does not have consequencesfor the experience’s immediate affective impact. This conclusion isconsistent with the proposal that abstract processing is not aninherently maladaptive form of thought, and highlights the needfor further research determining the conditions under whichadopting a particular mode of processing results in maladaptiveconsequences.

K. Hetherington, M.L. Moulds / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 44 (2013) 165e171 171

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Nick Moberly and Ed Watkins for kindlyproviding the processing mode induction materials. We would alsolike to thank Aliza Werner-Seidler and Julie Krans for generouslyproviding comments and suggestions.

This study was supported by an Australian Postgraduate Awardto Kate Hetherington, and also received support from a NHMRCProject Grant (1004151) awarded to Michelle Moulds. MichelleMoulds is supported by an Australian Research Fellowship from theAustralian Research Council.

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