doing violence to ethnography a response to catherine besteman's representing violence by: i.m lewis

7/29/2019 Doing Violence to Ethnography a Response to Catherine Besteman's Representing Violence by: I.M Lewis

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Doing Violence to Ethnography: A Response to Catherine Besteman's "Representing Violenceand 'Othering' Somalia"Author(s): I. M. LewisReviewed work(s):Source: Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 100-108Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/656690 .

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Doing Violence to Ethnography: AResponse to Catherine Besteman's"Representing Violence and 'Othering'Somalia"I. M. Lewis

London School of Economics

In "RepresentingViolence and'Othering'Somalia,"Besteman claims thatU.S.media coverage of the collapse of the Somali state was based on "racist"and"evolutionary" assumptions, presenting the Somalis as "savages" in order toboost the "American self-image" (1996:120-133). No serious evidence isoffered in supportof this functionalist argumentexplaining how, exactly, the"American self-image" was actually strengthenedas a consequence of suchreporting.Moreover,Besteman's characterizationof the often poorly informedandsimplistic mediareports s not based on any systematiccontentanalysis butmerely on apt,anecdotalcitations.

War and Feud in Somali Political CultureMy chief concerns here, however, are with Besteman's inaccuratediscus-sion of Somali politics and,moregenerally,hermisconceptions aboutsegmen-tary lineage political systems, which, despite their well-known rarity, she bi-zarrely supposes to be widespread "throughoutAfrica" (Besteman 1996:129).She starts from the endearing assumptionthat recourse to violence in Somalipolitics, rather hanbeing a matterof "internal tribal' dynamics,"has to be ex-plained in diffusionist terms as a consequence of "global economics and poli-tics." "Werepre-colonial Somalis really trappedwithin destructive spirals ofkin-based warfare and feuding?"she rhetorically asks (Besteman 1996:123).This is an odd question to ask of a segmentary ineage society, which by defini-tion inscribesthe institution of feud-a query,moreover,which anyoneat all fa-miliar with Somali history and culture,and however untutoredin segmentarysystems, would be bound to answeraffirmatively.For betteror worse,violence is actuallyendemicin thispervasivelybellicoseculture hat raditionally nly distinguishesbetweentwo maleroles-waranleh, orwarrior,andwadaad, orpriest.'All availablehistoricalevidence and recordsofCulturalAnthropology 13(1):100-108. Copyright? 1998, AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation.

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VIOLENCE IN SOMALIA: AN EXCHANGE 101

Somali values, coinciding with my own extensive field observations, confirmthatin the battles of the 1990s, Somalis were indeed"doingwhat they have al-ways done-only with greater access to more lethal weapons" (Besteman1996:122). This is also how contemporarySomalihistorians,social anthropolo-gists, and novelists themselves view the clan violence of today (see, for exam-ple, Ahmed 1993; Djama 1992; Farah 1993; Issa-Salwe 1996; Osman 1996;Samatar1996; Xusseen et al. 1996).In fact, as is well-known to serious studentsof Somali history, the earliestwrittenrecorddetailing individual Somali clans and theirparticipation n the Is-lamicjihadsof the period(the Futuhal-Habasha, from the 16thcentury)extolsSomali expertise in guerrillawarfare and theirnotoriousskill in mountingroad-blocks (Shihabad-Din 1897-1909). This well-authenticatedwritten source alsomentionsspecific clans andlineages (andcontemporarywarlords),thusprovid-ing invaluableinformationfor the reconstructionof the historicaldevelopmentof the Somali lineage system over time (Lewis 1962, 1988, 1994:95-112).To reportall this is not, of course, to imply, as Besteman seems to think,that Somalis are mindless macho robots locked into an unremittingdance ofdeath.The lineage system provides inherentlyoppositionaland confrontationalbasic identities that aremobilized when competitionandconflict develop overmaterialresources,power, personalsecurity,andreputation-yes, even "honor"(which, significantly, is one of the connotations of thecommon Somali termma-gac, usually translated as "name").

The Somali Segmentary Lineage SystemIt is thusirrelevant o invoke, as Besteman(1996:123) does, interpretationsof "tribal"warfare n Amazonia to understandSomali patternsof conflict. Whatis needed, in the first place, is an understandingof the operationof the Somaliversion of segmentary ineage politics. As the anthropologistwho 40 years agofirst introducedsegmentary lineage organizationinto the discourse on Somali

politics, perhapsI may try to correct some of hermisconceptions. I appliedthisconcept to the primarilydecentralized and highly fluid Somali political struc-ture, which is based on kinship units, defined by genealogical reckoning (ab-tirsiinyo, in standard,or northern, Somali, or abtirsi, in southern Somali: liter-ally, "ancestorcounting").Individual Somalis thusbelong to a series of groupsmobilized, as the needarises, in opposition to each other andfollowing the genealogical relationshipsof theireponymous ancestors. Although all the divisions areformally lineages,I applieddifferentterms to different levels of groupingto indicatevariations inbehavior which are partly a function of demographicsize and scale. Besteman(1996:125) follows my terminology but does not fully understand ts implica-tions. Thus, I described the five main primarydivisions of the Somali nation(Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Daarood, andDigil andRahanweyn[also known as Digil-Mirifleh]) as "clan-families," each comprising a variable number of "clans."Withinclans, the most clearly defined level of action is that of the minimal line-age, whosekinsmenpay andreceive damagesforinjuriesand deathcollectively.



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Thisdiya,orpaying group(those who pay andreceive blood-compensationcollectively), is based on a specific heer or xeer, a contractual reatyor agree-ment,and constitutes theprimary ocus of politico-juralidentity.It is thegenea-logical level atwhich the diffuse bonds of tol, orpolitical kinship,are most com-monly mobilized in daily life. Contractual reaties can thusbe used to extend aswell as to narrowthe bounds of kinship; and, as I have repeatedlyemphasizedin my writingsover the years, all of these genealogical units arerelative, withsolidaritymobilizedsituationally accordingto the contextand the machinationsof local political impresarios.

Clan and Clan-FamilyThis flexible system of groupingshould surpriseno one familiar with seg-mentarypolitics. But Bestemanperversely invests these essentially fluid levelsof genealogically invoked identity with much greater solidity and immobilitythan they actually possess. She reifies the "clan"excessively, and this appar-ently leads her to invoke what she calls "praxis"(to explain actual behavior),which she imagines is a recent development in lineage studies. In fact, I delib-erately employed the term lineage paradigm (Lewis 1957, 1958, 1959, 1961a,1961b, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1969, 1976, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1993a, 1993b,1993c, 1994, 1995, in press) to emphasize that this is fundamentallya politicalideology manipulatedby lineage leaders and would-be leaders.Similarly, failing to grasp the fluid, genealogical relativity of politicalidentification, Besteman also asserts that the "clan-family [the largest lineagedivision withinthenationin my terminology] has never actuallybeen the basisof political mobilization"(1996:125). I am afraidthis is quite wrong.To cite anotable example, the Somali National Movement, which successfully liberatedthe self-declared SomalilandRepublic in 1990, was directlybased on the Isaaqclan-family. Once its members had recovered control of their own territoryand

establishedtheirown Isaaq-based(but not exclusively Isaaqi) government,in-ternalsegmentarypressuresbecame acute, since they no longerconfrontedtheDaarood enemy. Thus, the solidarity of the victorious Isaaq clan-family dis-solved into the rancorousclan competition for power which has since causedsuch acute divisions and problems in the Somaliland Republic (Compagnon1990; Gilkes 1993; Lewis 1994:177-219; Prunier1992).With a parallel mobilization of cohesion, Hawiye clan-family membersformed the Hawiye Party in the 1950s run-up to Somalia's independence in1960. This clan-family also more recently formed the basis for the United So-mali Congress,whose guerrillaforces, led by GeneralMohamedFarahAydeed,successfully ousted theDaaroodPresident,MohamedSiyadBarre, n 1990. TheHawiye Partythen fell apart n the interclanconflict of the 1990s described inthe media reportsthat Besteman discusses.Clan-familypolitical mobilization is even morestrongly exemplified in thecase of theDigil-Miriflehagro-pastoralists.These are thepeoplewho occupy thefertile landbetween the Jubaand Shebelle rivers which has been so devastated



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by militias of the better-armedand more warlikepastoralistclans in the courseof the recent destructionof southern Somalia.But before discussing Besteman's misrepresentation of their politicalstructure, et us note in passing the exception to clan-family mobilization that,as it were, proves the rule. This is the case of the Daarood,the largestandmostwidely scatteredof the five Somali clan-families, who-with a populationwellover one million in number-are simply too numerous and too dispersedto actas a single political unit. They do, however, display diffuse sentiments of soli-darity, and in keeping with theirwide dispersal throughoutthe Somali region,their members today, as in the past, tend to exhibit greaterenthusiasm for na-tional Somali unity than othergroups.The Agro-Pastoral Digil-Mirifleh

In contrastto these mainly pastoralistgroups, the southernDigil-Miriflehhave been less enthusiastic Somali nationalistsand illustratethe most outstand-ing example of clan-family mobilization of all the divisions of the Somali na-tion. Their Digil-Mirifleh Party actually campaigned in the 1950s and 1960s(when I attendedsome of theirrallies) for local independenceandheld a numberof seats in Somalia's national assembly (Lewis 1961b:285 f., 1988:155 ff.).Digil-Mirifleh clan-family solidarity is still a significant, if fluctuating, force,and led in 1994 to the formationof an autonomousregional administration,un-der a clan-family-wide council.Although Besteman (1996:125) urges her readersto believe that "race" sa dominantmotive in Somali politics, Somali lineage distinctionsare,in princi-ple, invisible, andthere are no knowngenetic (i.e., "racial")differences betweenmembers of the pastoralistgroups (Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, and Daarood). Ethnicdifferencesonly enter the picturewith the Digil-Mirifleh.These agro-pastoralistsspeak what is arguablya separate(andonly partiallymutuallyintelligible) lan-guage called maymay.Theyhave a slightly morehierarchicalpolitical structure,with more formalized political leadership than their belligerent pastoralistneighbors by whom they are surroundedon all sides (Helander 1988, 1996a,1996b; Lewis 1966, 1969, 1994; Luling 1971). Theirmost significant politicalfeature is that,unlike the other Somali groups, they constitute a veritable melt-ing pot, containing people drawnfrom almost every other (pastoralist)Somaliclan and clan-family. This is based on the open-door policy, over the genera-tions, of systematically adoptingand assimilating foreign settlers andrefugeesas client citizens (sheegad, literally "claimants").

Here, contrary o Besteman's assertions, it is actuallythe ideology of clan-ship (tol) and shared,fictitious genealogical descent (abtirsi) that are used tobind people together.Through his process of interclanadoption, ocal politicalgroups are formed that transcendthe original clan and lineage allegiances oftheir members (Colucci 1924; Helander 1988, 1996a, 1996b; Lewis 1961b,1966, 1969). Amongst these comparativelypeaceful farmers,political solidar-ity expandsas theirsyntheticclans actcollectively asunitspayingandreceiving



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blood-compensationandmanagingland and otherresources-according to thetermsof theirconstitutional treaties(heer).Paradoxically, in a sense clanship is actually more politicized here than

amongst the more genealogically freewheeling pastoralists, who regard thefarmers as less aggressive and weaker than themselves. The less militaristicDigil-Mirifleh are thus vulnerable to attackby maraudingpastoralists,and thedevastationof theirfertile interriver erritoryby rival militia forces of nomadicorigin was the maincause of theSomali famine in theearly 1990s. As anunwar-like and partly sedentary people, they-and the adjacentBantu, who occupysmall, scatteredriverinesettlements(amongwhichBestemanapparentlydid herfieldwork)-are traditionallydespised by thearrogantpastoralists.These Bantugroups derive in part from probably indigenous pre-Somali populations andfrom Swahili slaves, imported n the 19thcenturyto work the arable landalongthe riversthat various Somali pastoralistclans hadrecently conquered.After thesuppressionof the slave tradein southernSomalia, the riverine communitiesformedby ex-slaves andpre-SomaliBantu were allied in client-patronrelation-ships with the adjacent Somali clans (Cassanelli 1982:163-165; Luling1971:45-47).The Digil-Mirifleh themselves include a substantialproportionof peopleof non-Somali origin (Bantu, Oromo, and other minority groups), whom theydistinguish as boon, or commoners,as opposed to bilis, or nobles, and claim tobe visibly different from themselves. The presence of this non-Somali elementreinforces the superiority complex of the pastoralist clan-families (Helander1996a).There is no evidence, however, thatthese discriminatoryattitudes(whichare extended to other non-Somalis-including Europeans and Americans aswell as Arabs) were in any way a motive for the conquest and exploitation ofthese southern,disadvantaged groups by Somali militias of pastoralistorigin.The pastoralistswere not inspiredby raceor class hatred.They were simply af-ter territory,livestock, and loot, which they believed they could easily seizefrom people who seemed, militarily, an easy prey."Race" and "class" are thus irrelevanthere, even in the conflict betweenpastoralistSomali groupsand the most ethnicallydistinctDigil-Mirifleh.Amongthe pastoraliststhemselves, "class" ikewise plays no significant role as a basisfor groupconflict or solidarity,nor does "race"-unless Besteman is proposingthatdescent groups should be defined as races!It would thus be interestingto know on what evidence Bestemanbases herassertion that "for most of the twentiethcentury,status(derived from collectivesocial constructionsof race, language, and purity) has presented a far greaterconstrainton individualagency andidentitythanclanmembership" 1996:125).While quite inapplicableto thegeneralSomalipopulation,this statementwouldhave some, but by no means complete, relevance to the Bantu minority groupwith which Besteman herself worked.



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Cultural and Politicized NationalismBesteman is equally misinformed about the rise andnatureof modern So-mali nationalism.Disapprovingly citing the title of Laitin and Samatar's valu-able book Somalia: Nation in Searchof a State(1987), she asserts that academicstudies of Somaliahave "reflectedevolutionaryassumptionsabout thedirectionin which ... therelationship(between 'kinshipandcontract')... should move"(Besteman 1996:129). Yet thisevolutionary anguageis not actuallyto be foundin Laitin and Samatar. This issue is, however, explicitly examined in Lewis(1961b:300). There, in adiscussion of the possible relevance(or irrelevance)ofcontracttheory to Somali institutions,I state that "there s no evidence that So-

mali heer is in a historical sense a development away from lineage status"(1961b:300).In truth,Laitin and Samatar's title refers to a different kind of quest forstatehood-the struggleto bringtogetherall theSomali territoriesdismemberedby colonialism within a single state,whose boundarieswould be those of the So-mali nation. Until the overthrowof MohamedSiyad Barre's infamousregime in1990, this was the central drama of the Somali saga. The terribleirony, unno-ticed by Besteman, is that this pan-Somali struggle unleashedforces, focusingon clanrivalry,thatultimatelyplayedamajorrole in destroyingthe Somali stateitself.Harpingon the fundamentalopposition that she sees between "state"and"tribe,"Besteman (1996:129) is evidently determinedto projecther ratherold-fashioned evolutionist standpointonto the sources she cites. She clearly holdsthatkinship in general, andsegmentary ineage structure n particular,represent"pre-civilized," dark "primeval"forces that determine people's behavior. Ithink this is nonsense. The reality is rather hat Somali kinship, althoughideo-logically endowed with suprememoral force and conceived of as a "natural"fact (blood), is, as elsewhere, deployed tactically as a multipurpose,culturallyconstructed resource. While thus apparentlysharingthe evolutionary assump-

tions she attacks,Besteman prefersthe purportedlyprogressive stereotypes of"race" and "class" which, as features of modernplural societies, she seeks toproject onto the Somali political scene, thus rescuing it for "modernity."This maybe a laudable aim. Butit does greatviolence to the facts of Somaliethnography.The point here, it may be added, is not that Somalis reject mo-dernity. On the contrary, they embraceit, adoptingandadaptingwhat intereststhemfor theirown purposes.Inthis spirit,fierce poeticexchanges currently akeplace on theInternetas Somali poets exalt the fame of theirown lineages and de-nounce their clan rivals.It would, of course, not be difficult to find excuses for the ignoranceof theintricacies of Somali politics displayed by the journalists whom Besteman at-tacks. But more is properly expected of anthropologistswhen they write abouta foreign culture. It thusseems ratherpertinent o considerwhatspecific empiri-cal research informs Besteman's conclusions about Somali politics. In thisregard,Besteman(1994) reportsthat over a periodof 12months,she carriedoutfield research n a government-organized illage settlementamongthe WaGosha



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riverine Bantu on the middle Juba in 1987 and 1988. It would be interesting toknow in what language she conducted her fieldwork in this marginalized com-munity on the fringes of Somali society, and on what basis of systematic re-search she feels equipped to generalize from it and to write with such misplacedconfidence about the dynamics of macro-Somali politics.

Notes1. All non-English terms in this article are in standard Somali. In a few cases,where relevant,I indicate local Somali dialect variants as well as the standardSomali

expression.References Cited

Ahmed,HassanOsman1993 MorireaMogadiscio.Special ssue 2. Africae Mediterraneo /93 gennaio-marzo.Besteman,Catherine1994 Individualisation and the Assault on CustomaryTenurein Africa: Title Reg-istrationProgrammesand the Case of Somalia. Africa 64(4):484-515.1996 Representing iolenceand"Othering"omalia.CulturalAnthropology 1:120-133.Cassanelli,Lee1982 The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a PastoralPeople, 1600-1900. Philadelphia:University of PennsylvaniaPress.Colucci,Massimo1924 Principidi dirittoconsuetudinariodella SomaliaItalianameridionale.Florence:Societa Editrice"LaVoce."

Compagnon,Daniel1990 The Somali Opposition Fronts.Hornof Africa Journal13(1-2):29-54.Djama,Marcel1992 Sur la violence en Somalie: genese et dynamique des formations arm6es.Politique Africaine 47:147-152.Farah,AhmedYusuf,with I. M. Lewis1993 The Roots of Reconciliation: Peace-making Endeavours of ContemporaryLineage Elders. London: ActionAid.Gilkes,Patrick1993 Two Wasted Years:The Republic of Somaliland, 1991-93. London: Save theChildren Fund.

Helander,Bernhard1988 The SlaughteredCamel:Coping with Fictitious Descent among the Hubeer ofSouthern Somalia. Ph.D. dissertation,Uppsala University.1996a The Hubeer in the Land of Plenty: Land, Labor and Vulnerability in aSouthern Somali Clan. In The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The Warbehind the War. CatherineBesteman and Lee Cassanelli, eds. Pp. 47-69. Boulder,CO: Westview Press.1996b Rahanweyn Sociability: a Model for Other Somalis? In Voice and Power:The Cultureof Languagein North-EastAfrica.R. J. HaywardandI. M. Lewis, eds.Pp. 195-204. African Languages and Culture,supplement3. London: School ofOriental and African Studies.

Issa-Salwe,AbdisalamM.1996 The Collapse of the Somali State. London:Haan.



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Laitin,DavidD., and Said S. Samatar1987 Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Lewis, I. M.1957 The Somali Lineage System and the TotalGenealogy: A GeneralIntroductionto Basic Principles of Somali Political Institutions.Hargeisa,Somalia: SomalilandGovernment.1958 Modern Political Movements in Somaliland (Parts 1 and 2). Africa 28(3):244-261; 28(4):344-363.1959 Clanship and Contractin Northern Somaliland.Africa 29(3):274-293.1961a Force and Fission in Northern Somali Lineage Structure.American Anthro-

pologist 63:94-112.1961b A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among theNorthern Somali of the Horn of Africa. London: Oxford University Press.1962 Historical Aspects of Genealogies in Northern Somali Social Structure.Jour-nal of African History 111(1):35-48.1963 Dualism in Somali Notions of Power. Journalof the Royal AnthropologicalInstitute93(1): 109-116.1965 Problems in the Comparative Study of Unilineal Descent. In The Relevanceof Models for Social Anthropology. Michael Banton, ed. Pp. 87-112. London:Tavistock.1966 Conformity and Contrastin Somali Islam. In Islam in Tropical Africa. I. M.Lewis, ed. Pp. 253-267. London:OxfordUniversity Press.1969 From Nomadism to Cultivation: The Expansion of Political Solidarity inSouthern Somalia. In Man in Africa. Mary Douglas and Phyllis Kaberry,eds. Pp.59-77. London: Tavistock.1976 The Nation, State and Politics in Somalia. In The Search for National Integra-tion in Africa. David Smock and KwambaBentsi-Enchill, eds. Pp. 285-306. NewYork: Free Press.1985 Social AnthropologyinPerspective. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.1986 Literacyand CulturalIdentityin the Hornof Africa: The Somali Case. In TheWrittenWord: Literacy in Transition. Gerd Baumann,ed. Pp. 133-149. Oxford,England:Clarendon Press.

1988 A Modern History of Somalia. 2nd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.1993a Making Historyin Somalia: Humanitarian ntervention n a Stateless Society.Centre for Global Governance Discussion Paper, 6. London: London School ofEconomics.1993b Misunderstandingthe Somali Crisis. Anthropology Today 9(4):1-3.1993c Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture,History and Social Institutions.London: Haan.1994 Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society. Lawrenceville, NJ:Red Sea Press.1995 Introduction:The Uncentralised Somali Legacy. In A Study of DecentralisedPolitical Structures or Somalia. I. M. Lewis and J. Mayall, eds. Pp. 1-13. London:London School of Economics for the EuropeanUnion.In press Adventures in Somali Anthropology:Reflections on a Long Engagement.In A PastoralDemocracy. 3rd edition. Munster,Germany:Lit Verlag.

Luling, Virginia1971 The Social Structureof SouthernSomali Tribes. Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof London.



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Osman,A. Y.1996 In the Name of theFathers. London: Haan.Prunier,Gerard1992 A Candid View of the Somali National Movement. Horn of Africa Journal

14(1-2): 107-120.Samatar,Said S.1996 Somalia's Horse that Feeds His Master.In Voice and Power: The CultureofLanguage in North-EastAfrica. R. J. Haywardand I. M. Lewis, eds. Pp. 155-170.African Languages and Culture, supplement 3. London: School of Oriental andAfrican Studies.

Shihab ad-Din1897-1909 Futah al-Habasha.R. Baset, ed. andtrans.Paris: Publicationsde l'ecoledes Lettresd'Alger.Xusseen,Musa,MohamedRiirash,and IbrahimWacays1996 Spared from the Spear: Somali Traditional Behaviour in Warfare. Nairobi:InternationalCommitteefor the Red Cross-Somalia Delegation.

doing violence to ethnography a response to catherine besteman's representing violence by: i.m lewis

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