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  • 8/8/2019 Dollar Has Depreciated Sharply

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    How can we explain the fact that the dollar has depreciated sharply since the

    summer of 2010, while the long-term interest rate on Treasuries has continuedto fall?

    If there were pronounced financial market mistrusttowards the United States (due to the prospects for publicfinances, continued deleveraging, household insolvency,stagnation in construction and consumption, inability toreduce unemployment, useless excess corporate savings,deindustrialisation and external deficit, etc.), there should beboth a depreciation of the dollar and a rise in long-terminterest rates on the public debt, as investors would stopbuying dollars .

    But since the summer of 2010, there has been a differentconfiguration: a depreciation of the dollar, but a fall in long-term interest rates.

    This shows us that investors do not react to a concernabout the economic and financial situation in the UnitedStates, but to the prospect of very marked growth inliquidity (in the money supply) in the United States : it hasled to both purchases of Treasury bonds (carry on the yieldcurve), which has driven down long-term interest rates, andshort-term capital outflows attracted by higher returns inthe rest of the world , which has depreciated the dollar.

    1- Investors could be very concerned about the UnitedStates

    Investors could be very worried about the economic andfinancial situation in the United States , due to:

    the deterioration in public finances (Charts 1Aand B, Table 1 in the Appendix);

    Chart 1AUnited States : Public debt fore casts

    (as % of GDP)

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    120

    140

    160

    00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 3020

    40

    60

    80

    100

    120

    140

    160

    Sources: Datastream, CBO, Nati xis

    Chart 1B

    United States: Fiscal deficit (as % of GDP)

    -12

    -10

    -8

    -6

    -4

    -2

    0

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12-12

    -10

    -8

    -6

    -4

    -2

    0

    United States (ex equity transactions)

    United States*

    Sources: Datastr eam, Nati xis f orecasts

    (*) Federal government's borrowingrequirement (incl. equity t ransacti ons)

    continued deleveraging (Chart 2A) , linked to theexcess debt relative to wealth (Chart 2B) ;

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    Chart 2AUnited States : Loans to hous eholds and

    companies (Y/Y as %)

    -15

    -10

    -5

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10-15

    -10

    -5

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20HouseholdsCompanies

    Sources: Datastream, FoF, N atixis

    Chart 2B

    United States: Household de bt-to-financial andproperty w ealth and corporate debt-to-market

    capitalisation ratios (as %)

    10

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    70

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1010

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    70Ratio: Household debt-to-financial and property wealth ratioRatio: Corpor ate debt-to- market capitalisation ratio

    Sources: Datastr eam, FoF, FIBV, Nati xis

    insolvency among many indebted households(Chart 3A), which explains the stagnation inresidential investment (Chart 3B) andconsumption;

    Chart 3AUnited States : House hold default rate and

    number of foreclosures

    4

    5

    6

    7

    8

    9

    10

    11

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

    50

    100

    150

    200

    250

    300

    350

    400Household d efault rate (mort gages, LH scale)

    Foreclosures (i n thousands p er month, RH scale)

    Sources: Datastream, BLS, Nati xis

    Chart 3BUnited States : Retail sales and housing start s

    0

    300

    600

    900

    1,200

    1,500

    1,800

    2,100

    2,400

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10-4

    -3

    -2

    -1

    0

    1

    2

    3

    4

    Housing st arts (t housands per year, LH scale)Retail s ales (M /M change as %, RH scale)

    Sources: Datastr eam, BEA , Natixis

    the inability to reduce unemployment (Chart

    4A), due to the weak job creation and the recentilliquidity in the residential property market (Chart4B);

    Chart 4AUnited States: Unemployment rate and number of

    wage e arners in involuntary part-time w ork

    3

    4

    5

    6

    7

    8

    9

    10

    11

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

    3

    4

    5

    6

    7

    8

    9

    10

    11

    Unemployment rate

    Number of wage earners in involuntarypart-time work (in millions o f persons)

    Sources: Datastream, B LS, Nat ixis

    Chart 4B

    United States: Monthly change in employmentand time needed to s ell a house

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12

    14

    16

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10-800

    -600

    -400

    -200

    0

    200

    400

    600Average time needed to sell a house (number of months, LH scale)M onthly change in emplo yment (t housands of persons, RH scale)

    Sources: Datastream, Natixi s

    useless excess corporate savings , as thedistortion of income sharing to the detriment of employees has led to a uselessly high self-financing rate (profits-to-investment ratio) ( Charts5A and B);

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    Chart 5AUnited States : Per capita productivity and w age

    (Y/Y as%)

    -4

    -2

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10-4

    -2

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8Per capita prod uctivityReal per capita wage (deflated by GDP deflator, incl. benefits)

    Sources: Datastream, B LS, Natixis

    Chart 5B

    United States: Self-financing rate

    70

    80

    90

    100

    110

    120

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1070

    80

    90

    100

    110

    120

    Sources: Datastr eam, BEA, Nat ixis

    deindustrialisation (Chart 6A) and a persistentlyvery high external deficit (Chart 6B) .

    Chart 6AUnited States : Manufacturing s ector

    em ployment and output (1998:1 = 100)

    707580859095

    100105110115120125

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10707580859095

    100105110115120125

    EmploymentM anufacturing output

    Sources: Datastream, BLS, Fed, Nat ixis

    Chart 6BUnited States: Trade balance

    (in USD bn per year)

    -900

    -800

    -700

    -600

    -500

    -400

    -300

    -200

    -100

    0

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10-900

    -800

    -700

    -600

    -500

    -400

    -300

    -200

    -100

    0

    Sources: Datast ream, Census, Nati xis

    We would therefore understand it if investors were

    extremely pessimistic about the United States.

    2- But there is an incoherence between the exchangerate and the long-term interest rate

    If investors were very pessimistic about the UnitedStates, there should be a sell-off in all dollar-denominated assets, and hence a depreciation of thedollar and a rise in long-term interest rates in the UnitedStates.

    Since the summer of 2010:

    the dollar has definitely depreciated (Chart 7A) ;

    but dollar interest rates continue to decline (Chart 7B).

    there is no across-the-board mistrust towards the UnitedStates.

    Chart 7AExchange rates

    80

    90

    100

    110

    120

    130

    140

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100.8

    1.0

    1.2

    1.4

    1.61.8

    2.0

    2.2JPY/ USD (LH scale) USD/EUR (RH scale)USD/GB P (RH scale)

    Sources: Datastream, Nati xis

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    Chart 7BUnited States: Interest rates

    0

    1

    2

    3

    4

    5

    6

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

    1

    2

    3

    4

    5

    62-year interest rate 10-year interest rate30-year interest rate

    Sources: Datastream, Natixi s

    3- So we are looking at excess liquidity in the United

    States and not a widespread mistrust towards theUnited States

    If there were mistrust towards the United States (whichwould be legitimate, for all the reasons seen above), there would have been both a depreciation of the dollar and arise in dollar long-term interest rates since the summer of 2010.

    Now, there is a depreciation of the dollar, but not a fall inlong-term interest rates.

    This means that the cause of the developments :

    is not mistrust towards the United States, whichwould have stopped the purchases of Treasuries(Chart 8) ;

    but an expectation of huge additional liquiditysupplied by the Federal Reserve, due to thevery likely new cycle of quantitative easing , ontop of that already implemented in 2008 (Chart 9) .

    Chart 8United States: Net purchases of Treasuries

    (as % of GDP)

    -4

    -2

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10-4

    -2

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8By institutional investo rsBy non-residents

    By banks

    Sources: Datastream, FoF, Nat ixis

    Chart 9United States : Monetary base ( USD bn)

    500

    750

    1,000

    1,250

    1,500

    1,750

    2,000

    2,250

    2,500

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10500

    750

    1,000

    1,250

    1,500

    1,750

    2,000

    2,250

    2,500

    Sources: Datastream, Fed, Nati xis

    The excess liquidity clearly explains the situation

    observed: ease of setting up carry trades in Treasuries,

    which drives down long-term interest rates;

    short-term capital outflows looking for higher returns in emerging countries (Chart 10) , whichexplains the weakness of the dollar.

    Chart 103-month interest rate

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12

    02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12United States

    Emerging count ries as a whole ex Russia and OPEC

    Sources: Datastream, Nati xis

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    Appendix

    Table 1Total FY2010 Budget Gaps

    State FY2010 totalTotal gap as percent

    of FY2010 GeneralFund

    Source of gap estimates

    California* 45.5 52.8 Governors budget, Legislative Analysts Office, Dept of Finance, Controller New York 21 38.8 Division of BudgetIllinois 14.3 43.7 State budget/Voices for Illinois Children analysisNew Jersey 11 40.0 Governors office/ FY12 Treasurer Washington* 6.2 27.9 Governors Budget/WA Budget and Policy Center/FY12 OFM Six Year OutlookFlorida 6 28.5 Revenue Estimating ConferencePennsylvania 5.9 23.6 Governors office/ Budget Director Massachusetts 5.6 20.4 FY12 Governors Budget/ FY11 MA Budget & Policy Center Arizona 5.1 65.0 Joint Legislative Budget Committee, Financial Advisory CommitteeNorth Carolina 5 26.2 North Carolina Fiscal Research Division/ FY12 NC Budget and Tax Center Connecticut 4.7 27.0 CT Voices for Children analysis of Office of Fiscal Analysis data/ Comptroller Georgia 4.5 28.8 State budget, Georgia State University/ FY11: Georgia Budget and Policy InstituteOregon* 4.2 32.4 Jt. Committee on Ways & Means/May Revenue Forecast/ FY12 OR Reset ReportOhio 3.6 13.9 Office of Budget and Management/ FY12 Community SolutionsVirginia 3.6 24.1 House Appropriations/Governors office

    Texas 3.5 10.7 Center on Public Policy P riorities analysis of Legislative Budget Board, Comptroller andHHS Commission data.Minnesota 3.4 22.7 Management and Budget forecastMichigan 3.3 15.8 Consensus Revenue Forecast, Senate Fiscal AgencyWisconsin 3.2 23.7 Legislative Fiscal BureauMaryland 2.8 20.3 Department of Legislative Services/ State Board of Rev EstimatesLouisiana 2.5 27.8 Revenue Estimating Conference/Governors budget

    Notes: * Californias mid-year gap is included in the total shown for FY11 in Table 1.Oregon and Washington have two-year budgets. For Oregon, the size of the combined shortfall before budget adoption for FY10 and FY11 is shown here.

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