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RSAF Safety Magazine Issue 81 | October 2014

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>> HF in the RSAF - A Snapshot >> Risk Management - Red Flag Alaska 14-1 >> Operational Maintenance Support - A Vital Part of Exercise Safety>> The Search for MH370 - Managing Risks

Inside:

Issue 81Republic of Singapore Air Force Safety MagazineFOCUS

Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success

Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success

MANAGING RISK

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The RSAF today, has some of the world’s most technologically advanced weapons systems, opera-ted by a tribe of dedicated men and women who, imbued by a strong safety culture, guard our skies 24/7 without fail. This safety culture did not happen overnight, and it was made possible only through years of safety education and command emphasis. This can be easily lost if we become indifferent or complacent towards our work.

This issue’s theme looks at Human Factors (HF) and Risk Management. In the first article, I gave a snapshot of the organisation’s view regarding HF errors and how we can continue to sustain and grow our strong safety culture. Following that, a pilot from Peace Carvin II shares his view on the importance of proper risk management during his inaugural participation at this year’s Exercise Red Flag 14-1

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EDITORIAL BOARD

EditorMAJ Khoo Pak Syn

AssistantsME3 Philippe Ashley LimLCP Lee Xun’An

Layout, Design & Printed ByV&C Printers

FOCUS is published by Air Force Inspectorate, HQ RSAF, for accident prevention purposes. Use of information contained herein for purposes other than accident prevention, requires prior authorisation from AFI. The content of FOCUS is of an informative nature and should not be considered as directive or regulatory unless so stated. The opinions and views in this magazine are those expressed by the writers and do not reflect the official views of the RSAF. The contents should not be discussed with the press nor anyone outside the armed services establishment. Contributuons by way of articles, cartoons, sketches and photographs are welcome as are comments and criticisms.

FOCUS magazine is available on these sites:

http://webhosting.intranet.defence.gov.sg/web/AirForce/AFI/index.htm (intranet)

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/rsaf (internet)

Cert No: 2007-2-1606SS ISO 9001:2008

Cert No: OHS. 2007-0179BS OHSAS 18001:2007

Front Cover Image: RSAF Super Puma conducting underslung operations during an exercise.

FOCUS Issue 81 - October 2014

02 Foreword COL Philip Chionh, Head Air Force Inspectorate

17 Operational Maintenance Support - A Vital Part of Exercise Safety ME4 Gerald Lee, 809 SQN, ADOC

27 Safety Activities

29 Safety Awards

30 Crossword Puzzle

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03 HF in the RSAF - A SnapshotCOL Philip Chionh, HAFI, AFI

2311The Search for MH370 - Managing RisksCPT Koh Jun Xiang, 121 SQN, ACC

Risk Management -Red Flag Alaska 14-1 CPT Samuel Lee, PCII, ACC

ChairmanCOL Philip Chionh

MembersLTC Tay Kok Ann ME6 Lim Choon Peng MAJ Tay Lai Huat MAJ Freddie Teo MAJ Marcus Woo CPT (DR) Magdalene Lee MS Audrey Siah Yushu

at Nellis. We then have an Air Force Engineer from 809 SQN sharing on his challenges and lessons learnt during his participation as Dy Detachment Engineering Officer for an overseas air defence exercise. Lastly, a pilot from 121 SQN reflects on how operational risks are managed, from his unit’s activation at short notice to deploy and assist in the search for MH370 earlier this year.

The RSAF is in a good position to build on its strong safety culture as we continue on our transformation. It is a delicate balance between operations and safety that we must maintain, and it is incumbent upon us to ensure that we never take things for granted and allow ourselves to become complacent.

COL Philip ChionhHead Air Force Inspectorate

FOREWORD

RSAF Safety Magazine Issue 81 | October 2014 RSAF Safety Magazine Issue 81 | October 2014

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DEFINING OUR POSITION

As the RSAF continues its journey into the 2nd spiral of transformation, it is crucial that our people continue to build on our strong safety culture and fundamentals to ensure safe operations. However, despite the Command emphasis, education and training on Human Factors (HF), the repeated occurrences of preventable HF incidents has continued. While the RSAF does not espouse a Zero HF policy, it does not mean that we accept a careless attitude towards HF errors either. If unchecked, my concern would be that people would insidiously start to be nonchalant towards their duties and work, and brush off HF incidences as minor or one-off, until something tragic occurs. So, are we becoming unafraid and complacent?

Many of us may be familiar with the Big M, small m phrase regarding HF errors, but not many may fully understand the rationale behind it. When this phrase was coined, it was in the context of pushing our boundaries while actively managing the risks

involved. It meant that we had to prioritise our efforts and work within our limited resources to mitigate and manage risks for events that if not well handled, could cause serious HF errors and result in accidents or fatalities. It did not mean that we would tolerate “small mistakes” without question, or punish “big mistakes” with impunity. It is not just about the outcome of an error; we are also concerned with the processes being conducted from planning through to execution and one’s attitude, discipline, knowledge, and professionalism towards his/her duties and work.

While we have done relatively well to risk manage thus far, we need to be wary of extremes in either direction. For example, we may end up taking up too much risk in the long term if we continuously direct too much resource from training to operational

development. Likewise, we could be overly risk-averse by adding layers of checks and supervision, to the point that it becomes too cumbersome to implement and saps overall capacity.

We invest time and resources to identify and risk mitigate when we develop and induct new capabilities into the RSAF. But our operating context evolves over time, and as our systems mature, we cannot maintain the status quo and wait for problems to surface. When that happens, we will find ourselves fire-fighting and not able to move forward. Rather, we should periodically evaluate the relevance of processes and review outdated practices in our respective areas to remain effective and relevant. We must be aware that any innocuous changes made in one area could affect another area that we might not have thought about or considered in our planning.

Let me illustrate this point with an example with the introduction of data- link to their F-16 fleet, a foreign air force had decided to do away with the Ops Check call for tactical considerations. Sometime after the implementation, an incident occurred where an F-16 had a Trapped Fuel warning alert during departure, but the pilot assumed it was a nuisance indication and cancelled it. He proceeded to the training area and prepared for the exercise. Luckily, just prior to “Fights-On”, there was a weather recall and at that point, the pilot received a Bingo fuel warning and only then realised that he did have an actual trapped fuel emergency. He then executed his emergency fuel recovery profile and managed to land safely. Had it not been for the weather recall, he may not have

We must be mindful of what we are doing at all times.

Striking the right balance is critical to achieving sustained mission success

had sufficient fuel to make it back to the air base. This incident highlights the potential undesirable effects when making changes to procedures and processes.


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COL Chionh is currently Head Air Force Inspectorate. He holds a Bachelor of Science (Merit) degree from the National University of Singapore and recently obtained the Certificate in Aviation Safety Management System, University of Southern California. A fighter pilot by vocation, he is also a graduate from the USAF Test Pilot School. As a fighter pilot and Test Pilot, COL Chionh has flown various types of aircraft throughout his career, including serving 2 tours as a member of the RSAF Black Knights.

COL Philip Chionh, HAFI, AFI

HF in the RSAF - A Snapshot

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extreme ends of the experience spectrum. At the low experience level, training or weak fundamentals may be the causal factor, whereas at the other end, perhaps complacency and over-confidence are the contributory factors. It is important to outline a systemic way of preparing ourselves to reduce the

as to identify weaknesses and high risk areas in our training and operations. To balance our need to learn from failure with appropriate accountability, we have processes in place to assess each incident/accident based on the context and findings. We advocate that the organisation and individuals are not blamed for honest errors that commensurate with their experience and training, but are held accountable for gross negligence, errors due to indifferent attitude and willful violation and not justified by system-induced failures. Taking that into consideration, I believe that we need to clarify some terms to better guide and manage the appropriate behaviours of our people. We must make it clear that the RSAF will not tolerate deliberate unsafe acts, gross negligence or recklessness from our servicemen, regardless of the outcome. To expand further, Unsafe Acts are actions committed by individuals that could directly result in a mishap, and may be generally grouped into what we term as Violations and Errors.

Violations are wilful disregard of rules and regula-tions. Examples may include blatant TR violations (e.g. height blocks, minimum altitude), unauthorised manoeuvres, and exceeding operating limits.

On the other hand, Errors involve unintentional actions and are generally committed without malice. They can be further classified as decision error

Strong fundamentals are important in being able to break the error chain and recover from a dire situation.

Statistically, active failures occur to individuals at the extreme ends of the experience spectrum.

We need to actively be aware of this and ensure that we actively have measures in place to address them as we continue in our development.

No matter how detailed and comprehensive our planning, safety policies, SOPs, technical orders, maintenance and engineering procedures may be, the final executor of that plan lies with us. Even as we arm ourselves with the correct knowledge and necessary measures, our safety ultimately depends not only on our ability to contextualise the situation and exercise good judgement when called upon, but requires us to be focused on the task at hand and be present. The recent incident where an F-15SG was allowed to taxi back after the de-arm crew had noticed it had a flat-spot on the tyre was to me another wake-up call, when the tyre burst 15 minutes after shut-down. It could very well have been a costly lesson for us.

Whether we fly an aircraft, operate an air defense system, or perform maintenance tasks, we must be mindful of what we are doing at all times. When we don’t, we may find ourselves losing situation awareness and make mistakes. In a worst-case scenario, the consequences of those mistakes can result in severe injuries or death. When that happens, it will not only derail the RSAF’s development, but also result in the loss of public confidence and trust

in our Air Force as a whole. We cannot afford to allow this to happen to us!

HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS

An error is a deviation of action from some intended or required standard of performance. The RSAF’s Human Factors Analysis Model (HFAM), with 5M4L, was developed in-house specifically to analyse HF errors beyond just the Individual level, to include Team, Unit and Management. Errors at the individual/team level are also known as active failures while errors at the unit/management levels as latent failures. Research has shown that about

The types of failures at the different levels.

Active failures can occur at any experience level, but the contributory factors may be different.

80% of aviation mishaps are due to human errors. It is important to review and pay attention to possible process or latent issues as these can be difficult to detect and could lead to catastrophic outcomes. Some examples of latent failures would be when squadron standards erode unchecked, shortcuts taken in work processes become the norm, and the regular acceptance of unwarranted high risks. This explains the emphasis RSAF places on periodic audits, process reviews and monitoring of lead indicators to uncover any latent issues in our systems.

While targeting the latent failures, active failures errors at the individual (and team) level are normally more predominant and can have serious outcomes. Statistically, active failures occur to individuals at the

possibilities of committing HF errors at the individual and team levels. Thereafter, should errors still occur, hopefully the high standards and training of our people would enable that individual or his team to realise it and recover from the error without mishap. The incident in Mar 2013 where an ATC controller erroneously cleared a pilot to roll on an active runway while another aircraft was still taxying back in the reciprocal direction could have ended in a disaster, had the pilot on approach not spotted the taxying aircraft and initiated a go-around. While we trust our colleagues to perform their duties as fellow professionals, we must still maintain good situation awareness and stay vigilant to respond to unexpected situations. This is a good reminder that strong fundamentals are important in being able to break the error chain and recover from a dire situation.

In the RSAF, we rely on our open reporting culture to share and learn from one another’s mistakes, as well


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apply. Ultimately, if we fail to properly plan, we plan to fail.

Proper Risk Assessment means checking the relevant training guidelines have been met at all stages of planning, and ensuring potential hazards have been identified and mitigating measures in place to reduce the risk levels. After applying mitigating measures, for risks that are beyond what the individual/unit can accept based on the training guidelines, approval must be sought from higher command/HQ. For example, for conducting extensive flying training over waters without an appropriate seat harness water actuated release system, the acceptance of residual risk cannot be accepted by the unit management, but by higher command/HQ. As we move towards more cross-unit exercises and introduce more dynamic scenario-based training in the coming years, we will need to identify other potential risk areas and mitigate them accordingly and at the appropriate authority level.

When Due Diligence is exercised, we should assume that a degree of constant and earnest effort to accomplish a given undertaking is expected from the respective individual or group. The effort should include, but not limited to Careful Planning, Proper Risk Assessment as well as operational discipline and supported by good system knowledge and professionalism. When

That said, repeated errors are not acceptable, as they would indicate that the organisation or individual has not learnt from past errors, and reflect poor attitude and standards, as well as the lack of proper planning and risk assessment.

While the SIS II serves as a good tool to disseminate lessons learnt to avoid making the same mistakes, research has also shown that retention

levels of the lessons tend to dip over time. That is why we need to refresh ourselves periodically on those lessons as part of effective knowledge management.

At the front-end, individuals and teams would need to know about and ensure Careful Planning, Proper Risk Assessment, and exercise Due Diligence.

Careful Planning would entail that the appropriate HQ regulations (AFOD, AFLO and SOP) and planning guidelines have been adhered to, taking into account the individual or crew’s relevant training competencies and experience levels. An example of non-careful planning is when a mission is planned without due consideration of the crew composition/ experience vis-a-vis mission demands and complexity of task. Another example would be when a pre-flight brief fails to include contingency plans prior to the execution of the mission. While we may build on the corporate knowledge and experience gained from previous events or exercises and factor them in our planning processes, we should still verify with the appropriate regulations to ensure compliance and do not assume the old norms still

conducting a pre-flight self-check, an individual must ensure that he or she is not only fit to fly, but also legal to fly.

When towing an aircraft, the team must not only ensure that the aircraft is properly secured to the tow bar, but that the path is clear and everyone is ready before commencing the towing operation. Supervisors and/or checkers must exercise their responsibilities dutifully and ensure that a task has been fully completed prior to certifying it. Instructors

(procedural, choice, problem solving), skill-based error (attention, memory, technique), and perceptual error (visual and spatial disorientation). Such errors may still occur even after careful planning, proper risk assessment and due diligence are exercised from planning to execution. An example may be when a pilot operates near the limits of his platform in a planned manoeuvre, but inadvertently exceeds it due to unforeseen circumstances beyond his control, such as clear air turbulence. Errors due to lapses in concentration may also occur, when we momentarily lose focus on the task at hand, usually due to distractions. Commanders must take into consideration the context of the scenario when the error was committed, to fully analyse the causes.

We should still verify with the appropriate regulations to ensure compliance and do not assume the old norms still apply.

Reviewing processes ensures relevance in an evolving operating context.

The RSAF will not tolerate deliberate unsafe acts, gross negligence or recklessness from our servicemen.

The SIS II portal


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and examiners are expected to ensure that a high level of competency and standards are maintained.

An individual who does not exercise due diligence may show a lack of interest, care or concern (Indifferent Attitude), or carelessness which is in reckless disregard for the safety or lives of others, and is so great it appears to be a conscious violation of other people’s rights to safety (Gross Negligence).

A KNOWLEDGEABLE AND RELEVANT AIR FORCE

Just knowing the guidelines and SOPs are not enough to ensure safety. As a professional Air Force, we must first and foremost be disciplined to ensure strong fundamentals and demand high standards from ourselves, and the same of our people.

A strong and effective Knowledge Management system, where lessons learnt are captured and shared, would help to prevent the potential loss of tacit or corporate knowledge due to personnel movement in an organisation. Our airmen should be

periodically refreshed on not only on the “hows” to carry out their tasks, but also the “whys”.

It is often easier to remember processes and rules when we know what the considerations were behind them. By understanding the “whys” and reflecting on their relevance to their current operating context, the lessons learnt can be better internalised, or lead to a review of processes if found to be no longer valid or applicable. Importantly, our airmen would then be able to apply the correct or most appropriate actions when faced with different or unknown situations.

We must continue sharing lessons from FAIRs/GAIRs reported by others. Not only will we raise the collective awareness of the incident, but our people may draw the relevant points and relate them to their respective work areas, and prevent repeat occurrences.

CONCLUSION The RSAF is in a good position in our transformation and our safety processes are in place. However, we cannot afford to let our guard down. In order to maintain the delicate balance between operational development and safety, we must continually assess how we define what acceptable risk is and manage

An individual who does not exercise due diligence may show a lack of interest, care or concern (Indifferent Attitude), or carelessness which is in reckless disregard for the safety or lives of others.

it accordingly, especially as the RSAF continues to push the operational boundaries and induct new capabilities and systems. This will require sustained effort, dedication and commitment from everyone in our Air Force, from the senior leadership to the ab-initio airmen.

Commanders will always have to exercise good judgement and be deliberate in assessing HF errors, and continue to educate and develop the right attitudes in our people. This process over time would help them understand the rationale, and in turn aligns their actions accordingly to sustain the strong RSAF safety culture.


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CPT Samuel Lee is a F-16C/D fighter pilot in the 425th Fighter Squadron in Peace Carvin II, USA who recently participated in Red Flag Alaska 14-1. He currently has approximately 550 hours on the jet and is undergoing his upgrade training.

Background

Red Flag-Alaska (RF-A) is a series of Pacific Air Forces commander-directed field training exercises which provides joint offensive counter-air, interdiction, close air support, and Large Force Employment (LFE) training in a simulated combat environment. Our Peace Carvin II (PC II) detachment in the United States based in Luke Air Force Base (AFB), Arizona deployed to Eielson AFB up north in Alaska from 8 to 23 May 2014 for the exercise.

RF-A was originally named Exercise Cope Thunder, before it was re-designated in 2006. The RSAF first participated in Exercise Cope Thunder in 1984. These combat training exercises allow the participants to execute air defence and strike operations in a realistic and high-threat environment, to enhance their combat readiness and operational capabilities. It enhances professionalism and interoperability among the participating forces, providing the RSAF an opportunity to benchmark itself against other leading air forces. The exercise also underscores the

excellent and long-standing defence relationship between the United States and Singapore.

Red-Flag exercises are well known for the large number of dissimilar type participating aircraft as well as the high intensity of the missions, constructed from various war scenarios to enhance the realism of training. Although we were still in a training environment, the risk levels of our daily routine in RF-A were significantly higher than an average day back in Luke AFB.

“Risk management plays a crucial role in fulfilling our safety mission of achieving zero accident. It is thus important for all to have a basic understanding on the intricacies associated with the identification and management of risks”- RSAF Safety Management Manual Part III Chapter 1

“Risk is the future uncertainty from a hazard that is not controlled or eliminated. An examination of risk is a practical approach to managing uncertainty.”

– FAA Risk Management Handbook

CPT Samuel Lee, PC II, ACC

During RF-A, my squadron management placed a great emphasis on safety. Decision-making processes were in place to consistently identify hazards, assess the degree of risk, and determine the best course of action. As there were no aircrew or logisticians alike, risk management was unique to every individual. Differing experience levels, state of minds and abilities were some of the factors that varied the degree of risks, and therefore the perceived level of risk acceptability. My article will highlight some of the key areas where there were increased risks and how we, as a squadron handled these situations with some principal guidelines to manage them. The detachment operated in a safe and controlled environment for those two weeks and at the same time, ensured mission success.

Preparing for the Risk in RF-A – Adequate and In-depth Knowledge

More than half of the personnel deployed were first-timers to Alaska. Including myself, it was also the first ever experience at a Red Flag exercise. Working in a totally new and unfamiliar environment presented us with a great challenge. The focus was on improving our knowledge on how to operate in a setting that we were unaccustomed to, in terms of understanding the local procedures and restrictions that we had to abide by. We also had to prepare for the physical aspect of environmental conditions that we were going to operate in. Transitioning from an average 35oC sunny day in Arizona to a 35oF (1.7oC)

or colder day in Alaska posed another test for us. Numerous briefings and cross sharing of information from those with prior RF-A experience enabled the squadron to be well prepared going in-theatre. The seamless transition into daily operations at RF-A was a testament to our efforts in being well prepared for the various risks mentioned.

Step-Up Approach – Complex Mission Scenarios with Junior Mission Commanders on Upgrade

RF-A was an excellent opportunity for young and inexperienced flight leads to level up their skills, especially playing mission commander roles in various complex mission scenarios. To mitigate the risks involved arising from inexperience and unfamiliarity, the highest levels of threat replicated by both the ‘Red Air Aggressors’1 and Surface to Air Missile (SAM) threat replications did not start from day one. Instead, a step-up approach was utilized to

1The ‘Red Air Aggressors’ are made up of F-16s from the 18th Aggressor Squadron (AGRS) based in Eielson AFB. They are trained to provide realistic replications of the various air threats that we can expect in today’s context.

Risk Management - Red Flag Alaska 14-1

Decision-making processes were in place to consistently identify hazards, assess the degree of risk, and determine the best course of action.


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introduce new levels of threats only after the current one was manageable. Any potential unsafe situations that developed due to an inability to handle the task at hand were ruled out through good sets of restrictions set in play by the ‘Airboss’2. It was only towards the end of the exercise whereby, if manageable, the full effects of the highest levels of threats were presented for the participants to tackle with a logical plan and the acceptable level of risk.

Supervision and Establishing Boundaries – Managing the Young Supervisor

Another objective of RF-A was to expose the inexperienced wingman and flight lead to more complex and large scale missions. Certain lessons from the LFE Vuls cannot be simulated and learnt back at home with just typical 4vX type missions. Even though newly minted flight leads were qualified to lead up a formation of two or four of any experience level, sensible crew pairing was still important to ensure that the amount of supervision was adequate for the complexity of the mission. The guidance from

the management was to schedule the inexperienced flight lead with an experienced senior pilot as the wingman; putting an inexperienced wingman on the wing of an inexperienced supervisor during a LFE was a no-no. The more seasoned pilot can now play the role of the wingman for the new flight lead’s training benefit, allowing him or her to explore within the established boundaries and at the same time, act as the safety monitor.

Flight Discipline and CRM - De-confliction and Mid-Air Collision Potential

Although the RF-A training area spanned approxi-mately 180,000 square kilometers3, there were a total of 67 participating aircraft4 integrating operations in the airspace at the same period of time. Furthermore, all aircraft departed out of and recovered to only two

2The ‘Airboss’ is the overall director of the mission and usually an experienced pilot from the host base. From the planning phase to the execution, he or she will identify any potential unsafe situations and will ensure that certain measures are imposed to mitigate these safety risks before it becomes un-manageable. 3Singapore is approximately 720 square kilometers.4Other than the RSAF, the USAF’s F-22, F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft and the E-3 airborne early warning aircraft were also in participation.

5TRs and SPINs are a set of rules in play to govern the exercise conduct that apply to all participating aircraft, regardless of air force or base.

Any potential unsafe situations that developed due to an inability to handle the task at hand were ruled out through good sets of restrictions set in play by the ‘Airboss’.

air bases; a sequencing challenge too for Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Air Control Intercept (ACI) Controllers. Aircrew and controllers alike needed to ‘keep their heads on a swivel’, maintaining full Situational Awareness (SA) especially during domestic phases of flight. Un-controlled taxi was also one of the procedures adopted by the AFBs, where pilots needed to increase their lookout for other aircraft in the vicinity. Flight leads also had to take the responsibility to follow the designated taxi and takeoff times in order not to congest the end of runway with their formation.

During the war scenario play in the airspace, every formation had to abide by strict de-confliction plans, operating mainly in their assigned blocks and following the set of Training Rules (TRs) from the USAF Air Force Instructions (AFI) 11-214 publication and Special Instructions (SPINs)5. Although the complexity of the missions increased as the days passed and boundaries were pushed with acceptable risk levels increased, it was managed by the TRs and SPINs serving as our established limits and safety valve. For PC II, we also had Weapon Systems Officers (Fighter), also known as WSO (FTR)s on board the back seat of the F-16D to fulfill their operational role, as well as to share the responsibilities of CRM, both intra and inter-cockpit. The very few TR and SPINs violations noted throughout the 19 Vuls reflected the high levels of flight discipline amongst the aircrew of the various

air forces.

“It was an eye-opener to see so many aircraft out at the line being launched at the same time at a Red Flag exercise. The good supervision of us younger guys, eager and excited to accomplish our duties

at the flight line, ensured our capability to launch all our jets without defect and in a safe manner. This was what motivated me to continue the hard work and effort I put into my daily tasks.”

– ME1 Quek Kwang SoonWinner of the PC II Outstanding Performer Award

(Dedicated Crew Chief ) for RF-A 14-1

During the war scenarioplay in the airspace, every formation had to abide bystrict de-confliction plans.

Contingency Planning and Knowing the ‘Outs’ - Challenging Weather

Conditions and Terrain

The Alaskan Weather in May saw frequent gloomy skies with low cloud bases which often

affected in-flight meteorological conditions and visibility. The inability to maintain visual

with both the ground as well as other aircraft posed a threat to flight safety. Usage of

on-board sensors for de-confliction and the increase in cross-checking scans

of flight instruments took up more capacity of the aircrew, reducing his or her effectiveness in accomplishing other missionised tasks. However,


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At any point when the no-go conditions were imminent, the formation would execute the predetermined ‘out’ maneuver on instruction from the flight lead.

with the knowledge of what we were up against, many weather contingency options were planned and briefed ahead of time to aid in our decision-making processes after assessing the situation real-time. Every formation was clear of the weather backup plans stepping out from the brief and was able to continue executing the mission in a safe and risk-mitigated environment.

“As an upcoming flight lead in the squadron, I observed the processes of contingency planning leading into its execution during RF-A. When presented with a challenge, I was able to weigh my options and select the best course of action, without compromising safety or mission success. With more experience, I am sure to be able to improve my judgment of the fine balance between accepting a higher risk level and being too conservative.”

– LTA Shawn Tan – Winner of the PC IIBest Wingman Award for RF-A 14-1

One of these contingency plans was to perform the ingress, attack and egress at low level. However, the high and undulating terrain of the Alaskan mountain ranges increased the challenges and uncertainties

Tackling New Risks, One at a Time – Dropping of Munitions Within a Compressed Timeline

What is an LFE without the actual dropping of munitions? The satisfaction of getting bombs spot on the target and on time is phenomenal, considering all the hard work and preparation that was put in for that event to happen. Logisticians from the Weapons Load Crew (WLC) worked tirelessly to mount the bombs in between waves of flying, in order to meet

Additionally, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) from the Army were situated in restricted areas near the vicinity of the target areas. Although far away from ‘Danger Close’6 distances, flight discipline was paramount to ensure the safety of lives on the ground. Strict adherence to drop criteria could not have been emphasized more during the briefings and every aircrew established a 100% positive ID of the target before the pickle button was depressed. Although it was heart racing and stressful, we were confident of our training and decision making processes to achieve mission success. The two first time droppers achieved 100% hits on time on target.

“Given the opportunity to sit in an ops debrief, I was able to appreciate how the aircrew performed the strike on the target with the bomb I prepared on the aircraft. Seeing how accurately the laser-guided bomb hit the centre of the target, gave me confidence in the effectiveness of the weapons that I painstakingly install on the aircraft. The thumbs up from the aircrew after each successful drop spurred me on to take pride in my responsibility and contribute to mission success.”

– ME2 Tan Kok ChinWinner of the PC II Maintainance Award (Best Weapons Load Crew) for RF-A 14-1

Conclusion

As nobody knows when Murphy will strike, we must safeguard ourselves from the unexpected. Daily routines of filling out the RSAF standard Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) Forms may not be adequate for these processes. It takes the internalization of the overall situation and consideration for every aspect before formulating a game-plan or decision. Managing risk does not necessarily mean don’t do, or do less. It is identifying and knowing the extent of the hazard, being prepared for it, executing and pushing boundaries within the limits, having ‘out’ options, and establishing good supervision to ensure mission success.

we had to face. It took tedious but essential planning of low level routes, determining Minimum Safety Altitudes (MSAs), fuel calculations and terrain study to allow the aircrew to discern the potential areas of higher risk and manage them accordingly. Supervisors too, ensured that a no-go decision point was planned, briefed and understood by the entire formation. At any point when the no-go conditions were imminent, the formation would execute the predetermined ‘out’ maneuver on instruction from the flight lead. These processes safeguarded everyone from placing themselves in a square corner with no ‘out’ options, which may have potentially developed into dangerous situations.

the operational requirements of the next mission. The aircrew that were selected to drop the bombs had to undergo several Work-Up Training (WUT) programmes and briefs prior to the actual drop itself. Emphasis on reduced G and airspeed limits, heavy-weight considerations and other contingency handling were all part of the package to ensure that the bomb drop was executed safely in a controlled environment. First time droppers were also paired with an instructor pilot who primarily performed the duty of the safety monitor and chase during the Air-to-Ground attack strike missions.

6 Danger Close is a term most commonly used during close air support missions. It is the term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of the target. The close proximity distance is determined by the type of munitions.


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ME4 Gerald Lee is a senior Air Force Engineer who is currently the Officer-In Charge for IMF Weapons (HIMAD), 809 SQN, 9 Air Engineering and Logistics Group. He graduated from the University of Bath (UK) with a Master’s Degree in Aerospace Engineering in 2013. He is involved in the operational maintenance support of the I-HAWK Ground-Based Air Defence System.

ME4 Gerald Lee, 809 SQN, ADOC

Operational Maintenance Support -A Vital Part of Exercise Safety

Introduction

“You will be going for Exercise Copr Tiger 14 as Deputy Detachment Engineering Officer (Dy DEO).” These words caught me by surprise as I did not expect that I would be sent for an overseas exercise so early in my fledging career in the Air Force. I was filled with a mixture of anticipation and trepidation. As much as I was looking to my very first overseas exercise, the magnitude of the task at hand seemed intimidating. Complex systems such as I-HAWK, SPYDER and PSTAR [hereon referred to as Major Items (MI)s] would be deployed. I would be part of the team that would be responsible for the serviceability and maintenance of these systems. However, I was assured as I had the entire 9 AELG (then AELS-ADOC) whom I could turn to for advice and help.

Most of the members of the team were experienced personnel, which helped to allay my concerns. The

initiatives that were carried out to ensure that the safety ethos was adhered to throughout the different phases of the exercise.

Pre-Exercise Preparation Phase

Now that the exercise is over and the dust has settled, I realised that the pre-exercise preparation phase was the most critical and intensive phase.

MI Selection and PreparationThe MI selection and preparation phase has a great bearing on the outcome of the exercise as the MIs have to be serviceable and reliable to fulfil the mission. Thus, selecting the right MIs and putting them through a rigorous preparation regime is critical to the success of the exercise.

The MI selection was carried out by analysing the recent defect history over a 3-year period. Factors such as Mean Time Between Critical Failure (MTBCF) and complexity of faults encountered were considered. MIs with longer MTBCFs and less complex defects encountered were selected for the exercise as they were proven to be more reliable to meet operational requirements.

Detachment Engineering Officer, ME5 Tan Cheng Kang, would be going for his fifth overseas exercise. My role was to assist the DEO in technical matters for the exercise and I had to work quite closely with him and learn the ropes from him along the way.

We met on several occasions to plan and prepare for the exercise. The key message that was driven through to me was that as much as mission success was imperative, doing it safely was important as well. Safety is part of the RSAF’s core values, and should be imbued in everything that we do. Thus, all our preparations for the exercise to the actual conduct of the exercise and the recovery of the systems after the exercise were carried out with safety engraved into our minds.

The following sections illustrate the work required at the Pre-exercise Preparation, Exercise Proper and Recovery phases of the exercise, including the

Once the MI selection was done, the MIs were scheduled for higher level maintenance preventive maintenance servicing such as 12 monthly servicing and early reliability enhancement checks. This provided added assurance that the MIs would be able to fulfil their mission safely.

Ample time must be set aside for MI selection and preparation due to the number of MIs involved to prevent rush factor from setting in, which would increase the risk of damage to MIs and personnel. For this exercise, we made it a point that this process must start early and we started the MI selection and preparation at least 3 months before the exercise. I was thankful that we started this process early because with one week left till the shipment date for the exercise, we were still making finishing touches to the preparation work. Thankfully, we managed to finish all our preparation work in time, without which things could have turned out differently.

Spares PreparationWhile the MI selection and preparation was ongoing, the spares preparation was carried out concurrently. Each system has a Fly-away Kit (FAK), which is a list of spares identified to support overseas exercise.

I have come to realise that the pre-exercise preparation phase is the most critical and also the most intensive phase.

A Hawk HPI deployed during the exercise.


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In order to mitigate the risk of damage to spares and MIs, the aluminium crates were strapped down in the containers before shipment and the MIs were properly secured onto the truck trailers before they embarked on their road journey to the exercise site.

During the journey from the unit to the seaport and from the seaport to the exercise location, there were RSAF personnel accompanying the ship-ment, to ensure that the MIs and containers were delivered safely.

A lesson learnt from previous exercises was to ensure that there were

proper height clearances during the shipment phase, especially on foreign land. Recce trips were conducted during the planning phase of the exercise and the route taken from port to exercise location was planned out to ensure that it was free from potential height hazards.

The AFEs would have to create an exercise Storage Location List (SLOC) before demanding the required spares from the warehouse. Due to the number of systems committed for the exercise, a large quantity of spares movement was involved. It was a logistical challenge for the AFEs.

Once the spares were delivered, the AFE conducted serviceability checks on critical spares to confirm their serviceability for added assurance, before they were organised and packed into aluminium crates. The crates were clearly labelled with the contents they were carrying for easy accessibility during the exercise.

It is noteworthy that the SLOC creation process takes time. Therefore, sufficient time has to be anticipated and catered for the spares demand and serviceability check. The large amount of spares required for the

Exercise Phase

Initial DeploymentThe AFEs deployed the MIs with the operators so that if there were any issues that arose during the deployment stage, they could be dealt with expeditiously. One of the key things to carry out during the deployment was to ensure that all the cable connections were fitted properly as some of the connections could be loose during the long journey.

This phase involves a lot of logistical movement to get the MIs to the deployment site and

set up for operations. Although it takes less time, the entire day was set aside for the deployment to negate the risk of rush factor, so that everything could be set up safely. The message of not rushing was emphasised to the servicemen so that they would not be too anxious and could focus on completing the task safely.

Daily Pre-Ops CheckThe AFEs were deployed with the operators every morning to provide the added Operational Maintenance (OM) support to the Air Defence Systems Specialists (ADSS). This was done so that if there were any MI issues that were found during the pre-operations check, it could be quickly resolved by the AFEs before operations.

The AFEs were required to wake up early to deploy with the operators. The job demanded extensive attention to detail and alertness. Therefore, efforts were made to ensure that the AFEs had the necessary rest the night before every working day. The logistics team provided proper shelter in the form of an air-conditioned container office for the AFEs to carry out their administrative work, and also serve as a shelter to shield the crew from the heat.

Another point to note was that the AFEs were reminded on the need to bring along and use their Personal Protection Equipment (PPEs) when working

To prepare the MIs and spares for the journey, the MIs were mounted or hooked up to their vehicles. The aluminium crates containing the spares were loaded into the containers together with other MI accessories.

The containers were then loaded onto low-bed or truck trailers and together with the vehicles towing the MIs, they made their way to the seaport to be loaded onto the ship.

Once the ship reached their port of call, the containers and vehicles were unloaded, formed a convoy and made their way to the exercise location.

exercise, entailed several trips to and from the warehouse. Command emphasis was made to ensure that the drivers and vehicle commanders adhered to the MT safety regulations and speed limits to ensure that safety was not compromised. On top of that, we scheduled different pairs of drivers and vehicle commanders for each day to prevent them from getting fatigued.

MI and Spares ShippingThe shipping phase was the most hazardous phase as different modes of transportation were involved and long distances had to be covered to get the MIs and spares to the exercise location.

Command emphasis was made to ensure that the drivers and vehicle commanders adhered to the MT safety regulations and speed limits to ensure that safety was not compromised.


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with the MIs. For example, the AFEs were constantly were constantly reminded to use ear plugs when they worked in close proximity to MIs that generate loud noises such as power generators, to prevent deterioration of their hearing or noise-induced deafness.

Fault RectificationThe main role of the AFEs during the exercise was to provide OM support to ensure that the MIs were serviceable for mission. We had to deal with unforeseen MI faults over the period of the exercise. When a fault was reported, especially during the operations window, there was a pressing need to recover the affected MI expeditiously so that they could remain in play for the exercise. In order to aid the expeditious recovery of the MI, an accurate diagnosis of the fault and quick access to the required spares were

Rush factor was a constant watch area during this phase. There were a lot of MT and logistical movement in a short span of time and in close proximity with one another. To mitigate the rush factor and the associated risks, personnel were reminded to maintain a high level of situation awareness and guard against distraction.

Climate ConditionsThe operating conditions differed from the familiar conditions in Singapore. The temperature hovered around 40 degrees Celsius, but due to the low humidity which resulted in faster evaporation of perspiration, the amount of fluid loss was often underestimated by our servicemen.

There was a risk of dehydration amongst servicemen. Therefore, emphasis was constantly given to drink beyond the point of thirst to keep hydrated. Servicemen were also reminded to use the urine colour chart pasted in the toilets as a gauge of their hydration level.

Maintaining a delicate balanceWhen operating overseas, we may be tempted to let our guard down let our guard down, become less stringent in maintaining standards and take shortcuts to get the job done. On the other extreme end, we may be tempted to “throw caution to the wind” and be missionitis, pressing on to meet the objectives, regardless of the risks involved. Both approaches are risky and undesirable. As the saying goes, we train as we fight. There should not be any difference in the way we train or operate, whether locally or in overseas locations.

To ensure that the high maintenance standards were met, command emphasis was provided during the exercise, through regular walk-the-ground visits and interactions with the servicemen at the various deployment sites.

Recovery Phase

While the conclusion of a successful exercise was what everyone looked forward to, the job was not complete until the MIs were shipped and personnel safely redeployed back to Singapore. The shipment schedule was tight, as the operational requirements back in Singapore meant that the MIs had to be shipped back as soon as possible. Arrangements were made to prepare the MIs and spares for shipping as soon as the exercise was completed.

Rush factor was again an area of concern here. Knowing that the exercise was already over and they were essentially redeploying to return home, personnel may be tempted to let their guard down and become complacent with their

checks and processes. To mitigate the possibility of incidents or accidents during this period, the respective teams and ICs were briefed on the potential safety watch areas. Commanders were also on hand to provide their safety emphasis and oversight, before the teams commenced with the preparations to pack up.

Packing-upThe demand of 24/7 local operations required a number of MIs to be back in Singapore as soon as possible. Therefore, there was a tight shipment schedule to meet for the transport of MIs and spares back to Singapore after the exercise. To meet the shipment schedule, the MIs and spares had to be packed up on the day the exercise ended.

On top of the rush factor during this phase, there was a tendency for the servicemen to let their guard down upon the completion of the exercise, and that increased the possibility of accidents happening. In order to mitigate the risk, safety emphasis was made

and potential risk areas were briefed to the respective teams by their ICs. Commanders were also on the ground to ensure that things were done safely to ensure that the whole exercise was accident free.

Conclusion

It was a tiring yet fulfill-ing exercise! Throughout this time, every individual played a significant role in ensuring safety in the different phases of the exercise. It was incredibly satisfying to know that all the initiatives taken had contributed to a safe and successful exercise!

There was a tendency for the servicemen to let their guard down upon the completion of the exercise.

The AFEs were constantly reminded to use ear plugs when they worked in close proximity to MIs that generate loud noises such as power generators, to prevent deterioration of their hearing or noise-induced deafness.

necessary. In order to achieve that, the aluminium crates containing the spares were arranged and laid out within the containers in a logical and easily-accessible manner.

Active Redeployment

Due to exercise requirements, the MIs were redeployed to other sites. During these scenarios, additional AFEs were deployed to ensure that the redeployment was completed as quickly as possible.


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CPT Koh Jun Xiang is an Operational Pilot in 121 SQN with over 700 hours on the Fokker 50. He is currently pursuing his Master’s Degree in Aeronautical Engineering in the Imperial College, London. Prior to this, he was also involved in the Search and Locate (SAL) operation of a capsized barge in 2013.

CPT Koh Jun Xiang, 121 SQN, ACC

The Search for MH370 - Managing Risks

SAL Standby

“Take calculated risks. That’s quite different from being rash.” - General George S. Patton, Jr.

As aviators, we must realise that the complete elimination of risk in flight operations is impossible. Unlike birds, we are not designed for flight. Flight is unnatural to us. Each time we fly, we are accepting a certain level of risk. To fly safely, we have to manage the inevitable risks that come with flying.

The RSAF has an established 5-step risk management process to help airmen manage inevitable risks. You identify the hazards, assess the risks, develop control options, implement the control options, and finally supervise the implementation and then assess if it is indeed effective. While it seems easy to adopt this process of risk management in theory, it is less straightforward when the heat of the moment degrades that common sense within us and any logical model can be easily overlooked. I would like to share my experience from activation to the deployment to Butterworth as part of the search for MH 370, and detail how the deployment crew managed the risks throughout the operation.

After MH370 went missing on 8 Mar 14, a massive multinational effort was mounted to search for the aircraft. RSAF C-130s from 122 SQN quickly responded, being among the first to arrive. Fokker 50s operated by 121 SQN were later tasked to deploy within 6 hours’ notice to Butterworth, Malaysia, to join in the search efforts along the Straits of Malacca.

Managing Enthusiasm and Rush Factor

Having witnessed the various other agencies in action for the past week, the squadron wanted to be involved. The excitement and eagerness to help with

the search operations could be felt throughout the squadron. A deployment crew was identified and I was lucky to be part of this select group. Almost immediately, there was a flurry of activity within the squadron. The deployment crew scrambled home, packed their bags, and bid goodbye to their families. Nobody knew at that juncture how long the deployment would last. It could be days, or weeks, depending on the outcome of the search. At the same time, the rest of the squadron was helping with the planning and preparation for the deployment. Flight planning was done for the deployment crew to facilitate the ferry flight to the staging air base. Considerations for poor visibility due to haze, as well as high terrain in the staging area were also carried out to mitigate the risks involved in the deployment. Separately, maps of the potential search areas were sourced and carefully packed together with other essential publications to ensure that the crew can run operations smoothly upon arrival. Logistics such as aircraft spares lists were scrutinized and forecasted carefully to prevent serviceability from being the limiting factor in the operation. Crew composition, currency and fatigue management were areas reviewed, discussed and thought through to avoid running into trouble in-theatre. 6 hours was all we had to complete these tasks.

Cognisant of the time constraints, the squadron leadership made sure time was set aside to gather and talk to the deployment crew. Information was then disseminated centrally to ensure all members

were up to speed with the latest situation updates. A checklist was run through to cover all areas of preparation, eliminating unnecessary doubts. The deployment crew was also relieved of their respective responsibilities and duties to allow them to focus on the deployment. The excitement and rush factor threats were kept in check by constant pep talks and positive guidance. If allowed to manifest, these emotions could post additional risks to a deployment already riddled with uncertainties. We eventually launched in good time.

Understanding Before Executing

Arriving at Butterworth Air Base, the crew was eager to get going. The energy level was surprisingly high despite the long day that everyone already had. The detachment office was set up quickly with the enthusiasm to commence the search efforts immediately. The local coordinating agency, Rescue

Sub-Centre, was also very keen to know when we could start assisting with the search. It felt as if we should have dove straight into the search efforts that very evening.

But we didn’t. There were just too many unknowns for a safe operation to commence. Since the information being fed to us was constantly changing, it was important that we fully understood the latest developments before acting. The search effort was further complicated by the presence of multiple search teams already operating out of

Nobody knew at that juncture how long the deployment would last.

Frequent visits to the Rescue Sub-Centre became necessary to keep situation awareness of the search areas and search profiles of the various search tems.

Subang and Butterworth Air Base. With more teams expected to arrive in the coming days, it was vital that we coordinate efforts to ensure safe operations. Frequent visits to the Rescue Sub-Centre became necessary to keep situation awareness of the search areas and search profiles of the various search teams.

We conscientiously made efforts not to be complacent with local ATC procedures. ATC briefing notes were obtained from the local liaison officer and the deployment crew familiarized themselves with the local ATC procedures. Separately, we approached the Royal Australian Air Force detachment in Butterworth to gain a better understanding of the hazards in the operating environment. The Australians provided insights to the bird hazards and weather trends around Butterworth Air Base. More importantly, they shared their experiences and lessons learnt conducting search operations in the operating area. The information they shared helped us shape the mission planning, by allowing us to better optimise our assets to best support the overall search effort.

Risks Versus Benefits

Upon arrival, we were requested to launch two search waves each day; one in the day and one in the night.


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While it would stretch the crew to their maximum allowable crew duty limits, it was feasible to do so in principle. Given the urgency of the search, it was deemed most advantageous to commit maximum capability to augment the search effort.

Strictly weighing the risks against the benefits, the answer to that request was not exactly straightforward. As search and locate is a visual operation, it would be much less effective to conduct a search at night given the lack of a specific splash point. As we were still trying to assimilate into the ongoing search efforts, committing our crew to the limits of their flight duty period from the onset of the deployment would have resulted in additional stress for limited operational gains.

With the immediate areas surrounding Butterworth Air Base already searched, the search areas of interest were now more than 400 nautical miles away from Butterworth Air Base. Transiting to and from the search area would take up to 4 hours which left little fuel for the actual search. To maximise the effectiveness of each sortie, we improvised and reconsidered our fuel planning. Improvising meant allocating more fuel for the search profile at the expense of other areas. For instance, additional fuel was carried at the expense of taking fewer observers onboard. Holding fuel was also reduced and re-allocated to extend search endurance.

Here, the tension between flight safety considerations and operational effectiveness were managed carefully. With fewer observers on-board, there would be fewer personnel to rotate, increasing the fatigue level of the entire crew. With less holding fuel, pilots would have fewer options when faced with undesirable situations such as bad weather during recovery.

While we recognized the need to extend our on-station time available for the search, we had to balance this with considerations for aircraft contingencies as well.

Identifying Special Watch Areas

Before commencing the first mission, extensive effort was deliberately spent to identify the special interest items for the flight. This was especially important in preparing the deployment mentally and devising control options to avoid potential pitfalls.

“Missionitis” was one of the key watch areas. With the enthusiasm to find the missing aircraft, the temptation to deviate from established orders and procedures was high. For instance, one could be easily lured into descending below the minimum altitude prescribed in AFOD to obtain a closer look at a suspicious object. To guard against this, the OB (out-of-bounds) markers were re-emphasised prior to the actual mission. The resulting effect was to eliminate possible doubts and ensure the crew operated within the established limits. We made it clear that operations would not be our convenient excuse to disregard the established standard operating procedures and orders.

Fatigue management was another special interest item. Search and locate operation involves constant scanning from the observers and pilots and can take a heavy toll on the crew. As the search was conducted at low levels, the heat further aggravated the fatigue issue. To manage fatigue, the crew on scanning duty were rotated at regular intervals. Regular adequate hydration was also emphasised in an effort to reduce the risk of heat-related injuries.

Slow Is Fast

While the deployment was just 3 days duration, it allowed me to appreciate the intricacies of risk management in a real operation. As a junior operator, I found this learning experience to be something that cannot be replicated in training.

As the tasking orders flowed, emotions ran high as crews rushed to prepare within the stipulated time. It was against instinct to slow down, take stock, and act accordingly. We were fortunate to have very experienced personnel in the deployment to stop the rush, sit the crew down, and organise our preparations. The process allowed us to identify areas previously overlooked and risks that could be easily identified when not affected by the rush factor.

Being aware of our mental state was also important in ensuring that the deployment was executed safely and successfully. The eagerness to help, coupled with the pressure from the local rescue agency, could have impaired our cognitive ability to identify and mitigate the risks involved. Impaired decisions driven by unchecked emotions could ultimately lead to dangerous risks from unsound methods taken. Hence, it was of utmost importance to identify

these emotions and implement the respective countermeasures before the cracks manifested.

Conclusion

Consciously slowing down when in pressurizing situations allowed us to be deliberate in our planning and precise in our executions. Identifying and mitigating the potential emotional risks in the highly compressed charged environment enabled us to successfully execute our mission safety and effectively.

We were fortunate to have very experienced personnel in the deployment to stop the rush, sit the crew down, and organize our preparations.

We made it clear that real operations would not be our convenient excuse to disregard the established standard opearting procedures and orders.

Coordinating with search efforts with our RMAF

counterpart at the rescue sub-centre


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The 01/14 RSAF Safety Warriors’ Course (RSWC) was conducted from 11 Aug to 22 Aug 14. A total of 59 participants completed the course successfully. Targeted at specialists and Junior Military Experts who are 1SG/ME1-2 and above, this course aims to equip participants with the knowledge, tools and techniques necessary to assist their safety officers in maintaining an effective safety management system in their respective units and work centres. The 9-day programme included the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) module conducted by Capital Safety Pte Ltd.


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Changi Air Base West Auditorium Quarterly Safety Forum (2/14 – 24 Jul 14) AFTC

Human Factors Awareness Programme(31 Jul 14) AFTC

Human Factors Management Workshop (29 – 30 Jul 14) AFTC

Safety ActivitiesSa

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AFI Safety Workshop UAV Community(11 Jul 14) TAB Spec Mess

C2 Community(7 Aug 14) PLAB Officers’ Mess

RSAF Safety Warriors’ Course(11 – 22 Aug 14) AFTC


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Chief of Air Force Safety Award

2WO Koh Kim Keng, ACS Instructor, 127 SQN1SG Gaspar Melvin Terencio, ACS, 127 SQN

On 15 April 14, 2WO Koh Kim Keng and 1SG Gaspar Melvin Terencio were tasked to fly as ACS instructor and ACS respectively in a night underslung sortie as part of the work-up training for Exercise GOLDENSAND V 14. With the hookup process completed for the first pick-up and the aircraft coming to a 40 ft hover with the load (2 x Land Rovers) still on the ground, 2WO Koh and 1SG Gaspar noticed that one of the 10,000 lbs chain-sling sets had become detached from the reach pendant. They immediately stopped the aircraft from picking up the load and released the reach pendant as per SOP. Further investigations found that the load was improperly rigged. Challenges posed by the dark operating environment made it difficult to visually detect the anomaly in-flight, even with NVG. Furthermore, as the load was tied together to prevent oscillation, the remaining chain-sling set would be severely strained and the load could have separated and dropped off in-flight, causing injuries to the public or damaging public property. For having displayed exceptional professionalism and vigilance during a critical phase of flight and preventing a potential major mishap, 2WO Koh and 1SG Gaspar were awarded the Chief of Air Force Safety Award.

CPT Tay Chee Wee, Pilot, 124 SQNOn 20 May 14, CPT Tay proceeded to start-up his EC-120 aircraft after the pre-flight checks revealed no anomaly. Upon engaging the Fuel Booster Pump switch, CPT Tay detected an unusually strong fuel smell and immediately queried the flight line crew. When the crew reported that fuel was observed to be dripping from the fuel drain line, CPT Tay ordered a detailed check of the engine compartment during which fuel was found on the engine deck. CPT Tay’s high level of professionalism and meticulousness prevented a potentially serious incident. For his vigilance and alertness, CPT Tay was awarded the Outstanding Safety Award.

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Safety Crossword Puzzle

Outstanding Safety Awards

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• Email your answers with your Rank/Name, NRIC, Unit and Contact details to AFI (ME3 P Ashley Lim) before 28 November 2014.

• All correct entries will be balloted and 3 winners will receive a $30 Popular Voucher each.

• The crossword puzzle is open to all RSAF personnel except personnel from AFI and the FOCUS Editorial Board.

Across2. Most of the members of the team were _____ personnel,6. More than _____ of the personnel deployed were first-

timers to Alaska.8. A _____ learnt from previous exercises was to ensure that

there were proper height clearances10. _____ management was another special interest item.11. Arriving at Butterworth Air Base, the crew was _____ to

get going.13. The RSAF has an established 5-step _____ management

process14. RF-A was originally named Exercise Cope _____ ,15. As nobody know when _____ would strike, we must

safeguard ourselves from the unexpected.

Down1. During the _____ scenario play in the airspace, every

formation had to abide by strict de-confliction plans,3. An _____ is a deviation of action from some intended or

required standard of performance.4. An individual who does not exercise due _____ may show

a lack of interest,5. Whether we fly an _____, operate an air defense system,

or perform maintenance tasks,7. Violations are willful _____ of rules and regulations.9. The conclusion of a successful _____ was the time that

everyone was looking forward to.12. To prepare the MIs and spares for the _____, the MIs were

mounted or hooked up to their vehicles.

FOCUS #80 Crossword Puzzle Winners LTA Lee Wenxiao Spencer, 200 SQN CPL Clement Ng Yeow Ee, AMD PTE Chan Xiang Li, AMD

RSAF Safety Magazine Issue 81 | October 2014

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