download report (pdf) - environment california

Environment CaliforniaResearch & Policy Center

Spring 2006

ChallengingNuclear Power

in the StatesPolicy and OrganizingTools for Slowing the

“Nuclear Renaissance”

Tony DutzikRob Sargent

Environment CaliforniaResearch & Policy Center

Spring 2006

Challenging Nuclear Powerin the States

Policy and Organizing Tools forSlowing the “Nuclear Renaissance”

The authors wish to thank the many people who shared perspectives and information orprovided review for this report, including Sara Barczak, Peter Bradford, Scott Cullen,Suzanne Leta, David Lochbaum, Pete McDowell and Jim Warren. Thanks also to SusanRakov and Elizabeth Ridlington of Frontier Group for their editorial assistance.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarilyreflect the views of those who provided review. Any factual errors are strictly the responsi-bility of the authors.

© Copyright 2006 Environment California Research & Policy Center

Environment California Research & Policy Center is a 501(c)(3) organization. We are dedi-cated to protecting California’s air, water and open spaces. We investigate problems, craftsolutions, educate the public and decision makers, and help Californians make their voicesheard in local, state and national debates over the quality of our environment and our lives.

For additional copies of this paper or for more information about Environment CaliforniaResearch & Policy Center, please visit www.environmentcalifornia.org

Acknowledgments

Cover photo: Trojan nuclear power plant, Oregon. (istockphoto.com/Richard Foote)

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 4

Introduction 7

Nuclear Power: Reasons for Concern 9Cost 9Toxic Waste 12Safety and Security 13Water Consumption and Local Environmental Impacts 15The Nuclear Regulatory Commission: An Ineffective Watchdog 15“New” Nuclear Facility Designs: Are They the Solution? 16Conclusion 17

Challenging Nuclear Power in the States 18Outright or Conditional Bans 18Environmental and Land Use Permitting 19Energy Facility Siting Processes 22Public Utilities Commission Processes 23Energy Policy Decisions 27Climate Policy and Market-Based Environmental Regulations 31Organizing Opportunities 33

Conclusion 37

Notes 38

4 Challenging Nuclear Power in the States

Executive Summary

C apitalizing on rising energy prices,growing concern about global warm-ing, and a favorable political climate,

the nuclear industry is working to achievea “nuclear renaissance.” After 30 years with-out a single new order for a nuclear powerplant in the U.S., several companies are nowin the early stages of proposing new nuclearpower plants. Meanwhile, federal officialshave begun routinely approving requests torun existing nuclear plants harder andlonger than ever.

A “nuclear renaissance” would be a baddeal for American consumers, the environ-ment, public safety and national security.Nuclear power is an expensive and riskyway to address global warming—especiallywhen compared to alternatives such as im-proved energy efficiency and the expansionof renewable energy production. Moreover,the nuclear industry’s shoddy safety recordand insufficient response to the growingthreat of terrorism suggest that new nuclearpower plants—or the continued operationof aging plants—could cause more prob-lems than they solve.

Citizens who attempt to raise these con-cerns about nuclear power face increasingdifficulty in getting their voices heard. TheNuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC)

relicensing and new reactor licensing pro-cesses are essentially of the nuclearindustry’s own design. For example, theNRC’s relicensing procedures for existingplants forbid the consideration of the ad-equacy of evacuation plans in determiningwhether a plant should be allowed to con-tinue to operate for another 20 years. Inaddition, the U.S. Congress and the Bushadministration have staked out an aggres-sively pro-nuclear stance, providing billionsof dollars of additional taxpayer subsidiesto the nuclear industry through the EnergyPolicy Act enacted in 2005.

Citizens concerned about nuclear powerdo have other forums in which to raise theirconcerns: local and state governments.While the power to license and regulate theoperation of nuclear power plants is exclu-sively in the hands of the federal govern-ment, state governments have manyopportunities to influence whether, whenand how nuclear power plants may operate.

Among these opportunities are the fol-lowing:

Legislative Moratoriums

• At least six states—California, Ken-tucky, Montana, Maine, Oregon and

Executive Summary 5

Wisconsin—have placed conditionalbans on the construction of newnuclear power plants. Most of themoratoriums expire when and if apermanent solution for the storage ofnuclear waste is discovered.

Environmental and Land UsePermitting

• Nuclear power plants are copiousconsumers of water. Plants using“once-through” cooling systems have amassive impact on the environment—trapping fish and other marine animalsin their intakes and changing thetemperature of local waterwaysthrough the discharge of heated water.The Clean Water Act provides stateswith the opportunity to require thatnuclear power plants use coolingsystems that are more protective ofwaterways and wildlife.

• States also regulate the use of land,particularly in the coastal zone, wherefederal actions (including the licensingof nuclear power plants) must beconsistent with states’ coastal zoneplans.

Energy Facility Siting

• In most states, energy facility sitingboards determine whether powerplants may be built in a particularlocation. In addition to considerationssuch as environmental impact, theseboards often consider whether a givenpower plant is needed and sometimeswhether other alternatives can servelocal energy needs at a lower cost.

Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs)

• PUCs and their equivalents regulatethe electric industry in the states. In

states with traditional regulatorystructures, PUCs pass judgment onwhether a power plant is needed toserve local energy demand, whether itis a reasonable expenditure of rate-payer dollars, and how a utility mayrecover construction funds fromratepayers. These decisions effectivelydetermine whether a regulated utilitycan build a nuclear power plant.

• PUCs in states that have “restruc-tured” their electric industries canshape the power purchasing practicesof utilities that distribute power toconsumers in order to protect consum-ers from excessive risk. California’sPUC, for example, requires utilities toprioritize energy efficiency andrenewable sources of energy over newfossil fuel power plants in planning toserve these customers.

• PUCs and regional bodies also engagein planning for the future of the powergrid and set policies regarding howalternative sources of energy—such asrenewable energy and distributedgeneration—will be treated in themarketplace. Policies that treat renew-able energy and other alternativesfairly, and that factor in the true costsof nuclear power, can reduce theattractiveness of nuclear power plantsas an energy source.

Energy Policy

• State governments have the power toestablish energy policies that servetheir citizens’ needs. Renewableenergy standards, efficiency standardsfor appliances, financial support forenergy efficiency and renewables, andother clean energy policies can reducethe demand for power from newsources and allow for the shutdown ofexisting nuclear power plants withouteconomic disruption.


Climate Policy and Market-BasedEnvironmental Regulation

• The nuclear industry has pushed toallow nuclear power plants to obtaincredits under a variety of state-admin-istered, market-based programsdesigned to reduce air pollution andglobal warming emissions. Thesecredits represent a financial windfall tothe nuclear industry and should beopposed on the grounds that technolo-gies like nuclear power that have major

environmental impacts should notbenefit from environmental programs.

Organizing Opportunities

• Citizens seeking to challenge nuclearpower also can direct their efforts atnuclear power companies themselves,using tools such as shareholder resolu-tions, organizing of power consumers,and publicity drives to educate thepublic about nuclear power and buildbroader coalitions around moresensible energy policies.

Introduction 7

R ising energy prices, instability in oiland natural gas markets, and increas-ing concerns about global warming

all point to one conclusion: America musttransition to a new energy future that is lessreliant on fossil fuels and that reduces emis-sions that cause global warming.

Proponents of nuclear power claim thattheir technology can meet these challenges—an echo of the claims of 50 years ago thatnuclear power would meet America’s grow-ing demand for energy at prices that were“too cheap to meter.”

America’s first experiment with nuclearpower has been a disaster. Tens of billionsof dollars were spent on the constructionof nuclear power plants, some of whichwere cancelled in mid-stream and nevergenerated a kilowatt of electricity. Seriousaccidents at Three Mile Island and laterChernobyl caused many Americans to haveserious (and justified) concerns about thesafety of the nuclear reactors in their midst.And the nation’s nuclear power plants havegenerated tens of thousands of tons of haz-ardous nuclear waste, which still does nothave a permanent and safe home.

In the wake of this experience, citizensare right to be skeptical about the potential

role of nuclear power in serving America’sfuture energy needs. Before new nuclearpower plants are built in the United States,Americans must be convinced that:

a) nuclear power plants are the mosteconomical way to achieve the goals ofenergy independence and reducedimpact on the global climate;

b) new nuclear power plants will be builtand regulated in such a fashion as tomake the possibility of a catastrophicaccident or serious environmentalharm vanishingly small;

c) the long-term storage problem ofnuclear waste is resolved in a perma-nent and environmentally sustainableway;

d) there are solid safeguards in place toprotect the public against the prolif-eration of nuclear material resultingfrom commercial nuclear activities.

Unfortunately, proposals for new nuclearpower plants (or the relicensing of existingplants) are unlikely to receive this level ofcritical scrutiny from the federal govern-ment, which holds primary authority for the

Introduction


licensing and regulation of nuclear power.As demonstrated by the 2005 federal En-ergy Policy Act, Congress has singled outnuclear power for “go to the head of theclass” treatment, lavishing generous subsi-dies on the nuclear industry at the expenseof cleaner, more sustainable alternatives.The Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC) has altered its licensing andrelicensing procedures so as to provide thenuclear industry with a fast track to ap-proval, while squelching legitimate publicconcerns about safety and terrorism. Andthe NRC has continually fallen short in itsefforts to ensure that the nation’s currentfleet of nuclear reactors operates safely—aconclusion shared by the federalgovernment’s chief watchdog, the Govern-ment Accountability Office, and the NRC’sown Inspector General.

Former NRC commissioner PeterBradford puts it succinctly: “The NRCnever errs on the side of safety, of environ-mental protection, or of public involve-ment. If we were discussing accounting

regulation, this would be the SEC in theyears before Enron.”1

Citizens who are concerned about theimpacts of a “nuclear renaissance” do haveoptions other than relying on a special in-terest-dominated Congress and a moribundNRC to protect the public interest. Stateand local governments hold much of thepower to determine when, and under whatcircumstances, nuclear power plants maybe built. That power may be exerted di-rectly—in areas of permitting and land-useregulation—or indirectly through the set-ting of energy policies that give preferenceto cleaner, less expensive alternatives tonuclear power.

This paper describes some of the toolsthat citizens and state and local govern-ments may use to challenge the construc-tion of nuclear power plants. With thenuclear industry already seeking approvalfor sites for new reactors and pushing forrelicensing of its existing, aging reactors,the time for citizens to become acquaintedwith these tools is now.

Nuclear Power: Reasons for Concern 9

T he original wave of nuclear powerplant construction in the U.S. duringthe 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was an

economic and environmental disaster, gen-erating more than 50,000 tons of toxicnuclear waste and imposing billions of dol-lars in unnecessary costs on electricityratepayers—costs that are still being paidoff today.2 The nuclear power plants thatwere built during that period pose seriousand continuing threats to public safety.

As a result, citizens have ample reasonto be concerned about the impacts of a so-called “nuclear renaissance” in theircommunities.

CostNuclear power remains a very expensive op-tion for satisfying the nation’s energy needs.

Existing Nuclear ReactorsThe nation’s existing fleet of nuclear reac-tors was built between the 1960s and themid-1990s. For years, poor management,frequent shutdowns, and operationaldifficulties made nuclear power plants an

economic albatross. When restructuring ofthe electric industry began in the early1990s, it was widely assumed that manynuclear power plants would be unable tocompete and would eventually shut down.

In recent years, however, the nuclearindustry has achieved a remarkable turn-around in the existing plants. The cost ofpower from existing nuclear reactors hasdipped to less than 2 cents per kilowatt-hour—less expensive than most fossil fuelgenerated power.3

But the operating costs of nuclear powerplants are just the tip of the iceberg. Belowthe surface lurk many hidden costs thatsaddle ratepayers and taxpayers with muchof the total bill for nuclear power, makingnuclear reactors of dubious economic value.

Capital CostsProponents of nuclear power have pointedto the low cost of operating the currentgeneration of nuclear plants as proof thatnuclear power is not expensive.4 However,focusing on operating costs alone ignoresthe tens of billions of dollars that have beenpaid—and that continue to be paid—byelectricity ratepayers to finance the capitalcosts of building those plants.

Nuclear Power: Reasons for Concern


Under traditional regulatory systems,electricity ratepayers assume the full capi-tal cost (including financing costs) of build-ing power plants, provided that investmentin those plants was prudent and that thefacility is “used and useful.” (See “PublicUtilities Commission Processes,” page 23.)Today, however, most of the nation’snuclear power plants are in states that havechosen to “restructure” their electricity in-dustries by deregulating the retail side ofthe electricity business and the generationof power.5 This is not an accident: the mo-mentum for restructuring during the 1990swas greatest in states that had the highestelectricity rates. These states were, not co-incidentally, among those that had made thebiggest and most costly gambles on nuclearpower.6

At the outset of restructuring, the archi-tects of the new electricity system werefaced with a problem: nuclear power plantswere judged to be profoundly uneconomic.In a restructured market in which consum-ers could buy power from any generator,no one would pay enough for power tocover the capital and operating costs of anuclear power plant—particularly when lessexpensive natural gas-fired power plantswere free to enter the market and compete.Inevitably, it was thought, someone wouldhave to be saddled with the “stranded” shareof the plants’ capital costs—either the utili-ties themselves or ratepayers.

The amount of money at stake ran tothe billions of dollars—in the case of Cali-fornia alone, more than $20 billion. 7 Moststates allowed utilities to recover some orall of these stranded costs through a “tran-sition charge” that would remain on con-sumers’ utility bills either for a definedperiod of time or until all the stranded costswere recovered. In most states, the amountof stranded costs was determined at theoutset of restructuring or when a utility’snuclear power plants were sold, and couldnot be revised later if conditions changed.

The initial wave of nuclear power plantsales in restructured states amounted to a

fire sale of plants at well below their bookvalue. Massachusetts’ Pilgrim nuclearpower plant, for example, was sold by Bos-ton Edison to Entergy for $81 million (in-cluding the cost of the plant’s remainingfuel)—less than 15 percent of its book valueof $700 million. Boston Edison was able topass $500 million in stranded costs on toratepayers.8 The Pilgrim experience wasrepeated throughout the early years of re-structuring: nuclear power plants were soldfor pennies on the dollar, with consumers,in most cases, picking up the stranded costs.Some analysts suggested that, when all thefinancial conditions were taken into ac-count, the initial wave of plants was soldfor zero or negative value.9

Contrary to early expectations, nuclearpower plants have proven to be quite valu-able. A combination of rising natural gasprices, improved plant performance and theNRC’s liberal granting of requests forpower uprates and license extensions havemade existing nuclear power plants a some-what better investment than they seemedto be in the late 1990s. In 2004, New York’sR.E. Ginna nuclear plant was sold for $422million—the first time a nuclear powerplant has sold for above its book value anda price more than 40 times higher on a per-megawatt basis than the price fetched byPilgrim in 1999.10

Despite the recent increase in plant saleprices, many ratepayers in both tradition-ally regulated and restructured states con-tinue to pay off the remaining capital costsof nuclear reactors—in addition to thehigher costs they’ve paid for electricity overthe past several decades due to poor invest-ments in nuclear power. Ignoring thesecosts makes nuclear power plants look farcheaper than they actually are.

Federal SubsidiesNuclear power plant owners also benefitfrom generous public subsidies, mostly atthe federal level. Indeed, the nuclear indus-try likely would not exist were it not for


the federal government’s underwriting ofnuclear research and development, liabil-ity insurance and other aspects of nuclearpower plant operation. According to oneestimate, the nuclear power industry re-ceived upwards of $145 billion in federalsubsidies between 1947 and 1999—or morethan $1 billion for every operating nuclearreactor in the U.S.11 And the subsidies con-tinue to the present: the recently enactedfederal Energy Policy Act adds an addi-tional $4.8 billion in direct subsidies to thenuclear industry, as well as up to $7.3 bil-lion in tax incentives.12

Among the largest ongoing subsidies isthe liability protection provided under thePrice-Anderson Act. The act caps the li-ability of the nuclear industry in the caseof a catastrophic nuclear accident, mean-ing that either the victims of a nuclear di-saster, taxpayers or both would be heldresponsible for any additional costs. Thenuclear industry denies that Price-Ander-son represents a “subsidy,” but the amountof additional insurance coverage nuclearpower plants would be required to hold tocover their full liability would be signifi-cant—if they could find a willing insurer atall. The value of the Price-Anderson Actsubsidy has been estimated at between $3million and $33 million per reactor peryear.13 Again, these are costs that are notincluded in the cost that the nuclear indus-try charges for power from its plants, mak-ing nuclear power artificially cheap. Inaddition, the availability of Price-Andersonprotection acts as a disincentive for the cre-ation of safer reactor designs, a point ac-knowledged even by some in the nuclearindustry.14

Security CostsAmong the most difficult-to-quantify ad-ditional costs of nuclear power are the costsof providing security and emergency sup-port services to nuclear power plants, par-ticularly in the wake of the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks. Nuclear power plant

owners are responsible for the cost ofsecuring their plants. However, the needto protect against attacks on nuclear powerplants has created the need for increasedplanning at the local, state and federal lev-els. In addition, in the immediate wake ofthe September 11 attacks, National Guardand Coast Guard units were dispatched tosecure nuclear power plants.15 In 2005,approximately $65 million in homelandsecurity funding was allocated to theNRC.16 These costs for emergency plan-ning, emergency military response orhomeland security funding for the NRC arefurther additional costs that are paid by tax-payers and hide the true cost of nuclearpower.

New Nuclear Power PlantsThe economics of nuclear power have notchanged substantially since the disastrousexperience of the 1960s through the 1980s.Indeed, new nuclear power plants remainan economically uncompetitive source ofpower.

Estimates of the future cost of nuclearpower plants vary. A 2003 interdisciplinarystudy by researchers at the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology estimated the costof energy from new nuclear power plantsat 6.7 cents/kWh, compared to 4.2 cents/kWh for new coal-fired power plants and5.6 cents/kWh for natural gas combined-cycle plants under a high gas price sce-nario.17 These costs are significantly higherthan the cost of new wind power in muchof the country and far higher than the costof avoided energy use through improvedenergy efficiency.18 The MIT study alsoassumed capital costs for new nuclear powerplants of $2,000 per megawatt, a cost levelthat has been exceeded in the constructionof several new plants in Japan and SouthKorea over the last decade.19

The U.S. Energy Information Admin-istration (EIA) made a similar comparisonof energy costs from new power plantsassumed to be constructed in the 2015


timeframe. Even with lower assumed capi-tal costs for new nuclear plants than theMIT study, nuclear power remained a moreexpensive option than coal, natural gas orwind. (See Fig. 1.) The EIA estimate alsodid not include the current production taxcredit for renewables, which would reducethe cost of wind power significantly.20

plant investments makes them even moreexpensive. Due to the risk of cost overrunsor a sudden devaluation of a nuclear plant(as would occur after an accident), inves-tors demand a higher rate of return—push-ing up the cost of capital. The only way toreduce those costs is to guarantee the in-vestment, either through assurances thatratepayers will pick up additional costs (ashas traditionally been the case) or throughfederal loan guarantees. Both alternativesrepresent yet another subsidy for nuclearpower and serve only to conceal, not re-duce, its ultimate cost.

Toxic WasteThe operation of nuclear power plants gen-erates highly toxic radioactive waste, whichmust be safely stored for thousands of yearsto contain the discharge of radiation. Un-fortunately, there are no perfect options forthe long-term storage of nuclear waste.

Centralized repositories—such as theproposed Yucca Mountain facility in Ne-vada—require the transport of high-levelnuclear waste across highways and rail lineswithin proximity of populated areas. TheYucca Mountain facility itself has been criti-cized for its location on an active earth-quake fault, among other weaknesses.24

Even if Yucca Mountain is eventually com-pleted, it is likely that the amount of nuclearwaste generated by U.S. power plants willexceed its capacity, leading either to callsfor an additional centralized storage site orthe continued on-site storage of waste atnuclear power plants.25

On-site storage can be dangerous as well.Nearly all U.S. nuclear reactors store wasteon site, often in water-filled pools at densi-ties approaching those in reactor cores.Should coolant from the spent-fuel poolsbe lost (as a result of earthquake, terroristattack or human error), the fuel could ig-nite, spreading highly radioactive com-pounds across a large area. In 2005, the

$0

$10

$20

$30

$40

$50

$60

$70

Coal GasCombinedCycle

Wind Nuclear

In addition to the high cost of nuclearpower, there is also the issue of risk. Nuclearpower plant construction projects duringthe 1970s and 1980s saw cost overruns ofas much as 700 percent.22 The credit rat-ing agency, Standard & Poor’s, recentlyconcluded that cost overruns in the con-struction of new nuclear power plants are“highly probable” and that “[i]n general,nuclear plant ownership tends to be lesssupportive of credit quality because it in-troduces added levels of operating, regula-tory, and environmental risk to a businessprofile.”23

The high risk involved in nuclear power

Fig. 1. Costs of Various Alternatives forElectricity Generation, 201521

Leve

lized

Cos

t of

Ene

rgy

($/M

Wh)


National Academy of Sciences (NAS)warned that “[s]pent nuclear fuel stored inpools at some of the nation’s 103 operatingcommercial nuclear reactors may be at riskfrom terrorist attacks,” and recommendeda series of actions to reduce the danger.26

One study estimated that a loss of coolantaccident that resulted in a spent-fuel poolcatching fire could result in between 2,000and 6,000 additional deaths from cancer.27

Safety and SecurityThe history of nuclear power in the UnitedStates is filled with technical glitches andnear-misses. While the Three Mile Islandaccident in 1979 was the nation’s most se-rious and most well-known nuclear acci-dent, many other incidents have posedserious threats to workers and residents ofsurrounding communities. The safetythreats posed by nuclear power have onlybeen magnified by the increasing threat ofterrorism.

Nuclear Incidents and Close CallsThe nuclear industry has experienced nu-merous equipment malfunctions and otherincidents over the past several years withthe potential to harm public health andsafety.

In 2002, the most significant nuclear in-cident in the U.S. since Three Mile Islandtook place at the Davis-Besse nuclear plantin Ohio. Workers discovered a football-sized cavity in the reactor’s vessel head. Leftundetected, the problem could eventuallyhave led to leakage of radioactive coolantfrom around the reactor core and, possi-bly, a meltdown. The U.S. GovernmentAccountability Office (GAO) concludedthat the NRC “should have but did notidentify or prevent the vessel head corro-sion at Davis-Besse” and that the NRC’s“process for assessing safety at nuclearpower plants is not adequate for detecting

early indications of deteriorating safety.28

In 2004, a pipe burst at the Hope Creeknuclear plant in New Jersey, resulting inthe release of a small amount of radioac-tive steam into the turbine building.29 In2003, elevated levels of radioactive tritiumwere found in groundwater near NewJersey’s Salem nuclear power plant, whichis owned by the same utility as HopeCreek.30 Both plants have experienced avariety of problems and a 2004 NRC in-vestigation found that “there were numer-ous indications of weaknesses in correctiveactions and management efforts to estab-lish an environment where employees areconsistently willing to raise safety concerns”at the two plants.31 The Union of Con-cerned Scientists (UCS) noted that thesafety problems encountered at the twoplants were originally identified by theNRC as early as 1998.32

In fall 2005, a small leak of radioactivewater was discovered from the spent fuelpool at the Indian Point nuclear powerplant just up the Hudson River from NewYork City.33 Tritium and strontium-90 havebeen detected in groundwater just 150 feetfrom the Hudson River and may havereached the river itself.34 The event camefive years after the unplanned release of

Nuclear power regulators failed to prevent thecorrosion of the reactor vessel head at Ohio’sDavis-Besse nuclear power plant.

U.S

. Nuc

lear

Reg

ulat

ory

Com

mis

sion


radiation to the atmosphere from the plantfollowing a mechanical problem.35 Nuclearwatchdogs have also identified problemswith a safety mechanism at Indian Point andmore than 60 other nuclear power plantsthat could reduce the plants’ ability to pre-vent a meltdown in case of an accident.36

Along with the leaks of contaminatedwater at Salem and Indian Point, there havebeen at least six other incidents in the lastdecade—including five others within thepast year—of leakage of contaminated wa-ter from nuclear power plants. 37 At theExelon-owned Braidwood plant in Illinois,for example, low levels of tritium werefound in a drinking water well at a homenear the plant in late 2005. Officials esti-mated that several million gallons of taintedwater had leaked from the plant more thanfive years earlier.38 Most recently, in March2006, tritium was discovered in groundwa-ter at the Palo Verde nuclear power plantin Arizona.39

In addition, problems have been identi-fied at plants that have undergone NRC-approved “uprates”—increases in theirlicensed capacity. Three boiling water re-actors owned by Exelon in the Midwestsuffered vibration-induced damage imme-diately following increases in their ratedcapacity.40

The continued technical problems ex-perienced by nuclear power plants lead toserious questions about how the plants willperform in the future. The NRC has beenregularly approving 20-year license exten-sions for nuclear power plants across thecountry, meaning that many will operatewell beyond their original 40-year lifespans.In addition, the NRC has approved numer-ous power uprates that allow the plants togenerate more power and operate closer totheir margins of safety. Finally, the com-petitive pressures imposed by deregulatedelectricity markets could push plant opera-tors to keep plants running in the face ofknown or suspected safety problems. Forexample, FirstEnergy, the owner of theDavis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio, recently

agreed to pay a $28 million penalty to re-solve charges that its employees lied toregulators about safety problems at theplant.41 All of these developments poten-tially threaten the future safe operation ofnuclear power plants in the U.S.

Terrorism and SabotageNuclear power plants make attractive po-tential targets for terrorists—either via ex-ternal assault or internal sabotage. Thesecurity record of nuclear power plants isfar from reassuring. In tests at 11 nuclearreactors in 2000 and 2001, mock intruderswere capable of disabling enough equip-ment to cause reactor damage at sixplants.42 A 2003 GAO report found signifi-cant weaknesses in the NRC’s oversight ofsecurity at commercial nuclear reactors.43

In September 2004—three years after theSeptember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks—theGAO reported that the NRC had not yetimplemented some of the GAO’s earlierrecommendations and that the NRC is notyet in a position to assure that plants areable to defend against terrorism.44 And inMarch 2006, the GAO was unable to con-clude that all nuclear power plants werecapable of defending themselves against aplausible terrorist attack, since only aboutone-third of the plants had conducted thenecessary force-on-force inspections.The GAO also questioned changes madeto the NRC’s standards for protectionagainst terrorist attacks, noting “the appear-ance that changes were made based onwhat the industry considered reasonableand feasible to defend against rather thanon an assessment of the terrorist threatitself.”45

ProliferationThe waste materials produced by nuclearpower are of potential interest both to ter-rorists and to nations that might want toproduce nuclear weapons. Conventionalnuclear fuel cycles produce radioactive


spent fuel that could be used directly in a“dirty bomb.” Spent fuel contains pluto-nium, which can be separated from othernuclear waste and used to fuel a secondnuclear reaction—thus producing morepower—or to create a nuclear weapon.

The nuclear industry has done an im-perfect job of keeping track of spent fuel.Since 2000, at least three nuclear powerplants reported “missing” spent fuel. Whilethe spent fuel was eventually accounted forin two of three cases (and a plausible casefor safe disposal was made in the third), theepisodes showcased the lack of effectivetracking of spent fuel. The GAO criticizedthe NRC’s regulation of spent fuel, notingthat “NRC regulations and oversight ac-tivities are insufficient to ensure control ofall spent fuel.”46

Reprocessing of spent fuel for use in asecond nuclear fuel cycle is potentially aneven greater danger. Reprocessing separatesthe plutonium and uranium in spent fuelfrom other radioactive waste. Since pluto-nium is not highly radioactive, it is poten-tially susceptible to theft (which is far moredifficult for unseparated, highly radioactivespent fuel). And since it takes less than 20pounds of plutonium to make a nuclearweapon, loss of even a small amount ofseparated plutonium would pose a severeproliferation danger.47

Due to the danger of nuclear prolifera-tion, the United States has barred the re-processing of spent fuel for three decades.However, the Bush administration has pro-posed a radical change of course, including$250 million in funding for nuclear spentfuel reprocessing in its fiscal year 2007 bud-get. Bush’s plan would not only use spentfuel currently stored at U.S. nuclear reac-tors, but would also import spent fuel fromabroad.48 At a time when nuclear prolifera-tion and the disposal of America’s ownnuclear waste are of great concern, the no-tion of bringing more spent nuclear fuel tothe U.S. and creating more material thatcould be used in nuclear weapons appearshighly dubious.

Water Consumption andLocal Environmental ImpactsPower plants are major consumers of water,responsible for nearly half of all water with-drawals in the United States.49 Nuclearpower plants are especially profligate usersof water, consuming more than a quartermore water per unit of energy produced thancoal-fired power plants and more than twiceas much as combined-cycle natural gas plants.50

Nuclear power plants can damage eco-systems and wildlife both through the with-drawal of water and the release of heatedwater back into waterways. When water iswithdrawn from oceans or estuaries, ma-rine creatures can become trapped in aplant’s cooling system. At one Floridanuclear reactor, for example, more than5,000 sea turtles were found in the plant’swater intake system over a 20-year period,of which 190 died.51 In New Jersey, a 1990study estimated that water intakes from theSalem nuclear power plant resulted in fourtimes more fish losses than the commer-cial fishing industry in the area.52 Damageto marine ecosystems from both the dis-charge of heated water and the entrapmentof adult and juvenile marine animals hasbeen documented in multiple cases acrossthe country.53 In 2002, for example, dischargeof heated water from New Jersey’s OysterCreek nuclear power plant caused morethan 5,000 fish to die from heat shock.54

Other technologies for cooling nuclearreactors (such as the cooling towers thathave become widely recognized as a sym-bol of nuclear power) can reduce water con-sumption and environmental impactssignificantly.

The Nuclear RegulatoryCommission:An Ineffective WatchdogThe safety and security problems posed bynuclear power would be less troublesome


if citizens could count on an effectivewatchdog to probe for potential problemswith nuclear power plants and require op-erators to fix them promptly. Unfortu-nately, little in the NRC’s history instillsconfidence that it can play this watchdogrole effectively.

The NRC’s failure to identify the prob-lems at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plantis symptomatic of broader problems in theNRC’s development and application ofsafety regulations. Over a period of just twoyears, the GAO issued seven reports thatdetailed the need for improvement in NRCpractices to ensure the safety and securityof nuclear power plants, the safe storage ofradioactive waste, the collection of adequatefunds for nuclear decommissioning, and theeffective operation of nuclear reactors.55 Ina 2002 internal survey, nearly half of allNRC employees responding thought theircareers would be harmed if they raisedsafety concerns, and nearly one-third ofemployees who had reported safety con-cerns replied that they had suffered harass-ment or intimidation as a result.56

The NRC’s reviews of nuclear powerplant safety are fundamentally flawed. A2003 Union of Concerned Scientists docu-ment identified numerous problems withthe reviews, which, combined, lead to anoverly optimistic view of the safety of indi-vidual reactors.57

While the NRC has taken some actionto protect reactors against terrorism, thecommission has refused to take public con-cern about terrorism into account in its li-censing decisions, calling the threat of aterrorist attack at any single reactor “toospeculative and remote.”58

The NRC’s track record does not in-spire confidence that the agency will be ableto protect Americans from a malfunctionat one of the nation’s aging nuclear reac-tors, safety problems at any new nuclear re-actors, or a terrorist attack or act ofsabotage.

“New” Nuclear FacilityDesigns: Are They theSolution?Proponents of nuclear power claim thatnew, “advanced” nuclear reactor designswill avoid the safety and operational prob-lems that plagued the first generation ofU.S. nuclear reactors.

Lost in the hype around advancednuclear reactors is the fact that most of thenew designs are similar to previous designs.The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)is one of the most frequently touted newreactor designs. The PBMR is a closecousin of the high-temperature gas-cooledreactor, two of which were operated in theU.S.: the experimental Peach Bottom 1 re-actor in Pennsylvania and the Fort St. Vrainreactor in Colorado, which was plagued byoperational problems.59 PBMRs are pro-moted as being meltdown-proof, since thefuel does not reach the temperature neededto provoke a meltdown. However, PBMRshave other potential safety problems, in-cluding the release of radioactivity in theevent of a fire.60 In addition, some PBMRproponents propose that the reactors bebuilt without a secondary containmentstructure, which would reduce costs but alsoleave the reactors far more vulnerable toterrorism and reduce the safety margin inthe event of an accident. Since no PBMRshave entered commercial operation, prac-tical experience with the technology is lim-ited. And there has not yet been an applicationsubmitted for certification of the PBMRdesign in the United States, though an ap-plication could be forthcoming soon.61

Other new designs likely to be proposedfor the U.S. are largely based on existingdesigns, such as the pressurized water re-actor and boiling water reactor. However,these designs are touted as “advanced” dueto simpler (and theoretically more cost-ef-fective) designs and the use of “passive”safety measures. Passive safety measures use


natural forces, such as gravity, rather thanelectric-powered safety systems such aspumps to provide emergency cooling to thereactor core in case of an accident. Whilesuch systems may be improvements overcurrent reactors, nuclear power plants re-main complex systems containing radioac-tive material and can thus never beconsidered inherently safe.

ConclusionAny one of the problems listed above—highcosts, safety problems, susceptibility to

terrorism, lack of safe long-term storage fornuclear waste, and environmental harm—should be enough to call into question thewisdom of continuing to operate thenation’s existing nuclear reactors and build-ing new ones. However, as noted earlier,federal officials have acted to smooth theway for new nuclear power plants and therelicensing of old ones.

The following chapter describes waysthat citizens can use state and local gov-ernmental processes—as well as political or-ganizing—to challenge the so-called“nuclear renaissance.”


C itizens have numerous opportunitiesto challenge nuclear power throughtheir local and state governments. In

order to understand which tools are mostlikely to bear fruit, it is necessary to under-stand how nuclear power is regulated in theUnited States.

The 1954 Atomic Energy Act gave thefederal government sole responsibility forlicensing and regulating the operation ofnuclear power plants.62 State or local gov-ernments may not impose additional licens-ing procedures, safety requirements, orexcessively burdensome regulations thatimpinge on federal authority over safety.

On the other hand, the federal govern-ment cannot force a state to accept a nuclearpower plant against its will. States largelyretain the power to determine how andunder what conditions the energy needs oftheir citizens will be met. In addition, stateand local governments enforce numerousenvironmental and land-use regulations withwhich nuclear power plants must comply,just like any other major industrial facility.

The sections that follow suggest manytools that can be used at the state or local levelto challenge the construction or operationof nuclear power plants. Not every tool isequally suited to every situation, and some

tools are more limited in their applicationthan others. But all should be consideredas part of citizens’ “toolbox” for challeng-ing nuclear power in their communities.

Outright or Conditional BansWhile federal law gives primary authorityfor the regulation of nuclear power to thefederal government, state governments re-tain the authority to decide how to providefor the electricity needs of their citizens.This authority extends to the decision ofwhether to allow nuclear power plants tobe built within the state, and under whateconomic conditions.

At least six states—California, Kentucky,Montana, Maine, Oregon and Wisconsin—have adopted conditional moratoriums onnew nuclear power plants. The conditionsvary from state to state. The California,Kentucky, Maine, Oregon and Wisconsinlaws are similar in that the main conditionset for the permitting of new nuclear powerplants is the availability of technology topermanently store high-level nuclearwaste.63 The Kentucky and Maine laws alsorequire that a high-level nuclear waste

Challenging Nuclear Powerin the States

Challenging Nuclear Power in the States 19

storage facility be in operation at the timethat disposal of nuclear waste must occur,while the Oregon law also requires thatnuclear power proposals be placed on thestatewide ballot for approval by voters. TheWisconsin law also requires that a nuclearpower plant be judged to be economicallyadvantageous to ratepayers compared withother feasible alternatives.

The Montana law goes several stepsfurther, requiring that no legal limits existto nuclear plant financial liability in case ofan accident, that there be “no reasonablechance” of the discharge of harmful radio-activity, that the safety systems of the plantbe demonstrated as effective, and thatnuclear facility owners post a bond equalto 30 percent of the capital cost of the plantto cover decommissioning expenses.64

In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court con-sidered whether California’s conditionalmoratorium on nuclear power plant con-struction was legal. In a 9-0 decision, theSupreme Court ruled that the state’s con-ditional moratorium was not pre-emptedby federal law. Writing for the Court ma-jority, Justice Byron White stated:

Even a brief perusal of the AtomicEnergy Act reveals that, despite itscomprehensiveness, it does not atany point expressly require theStates to construct or authorizenuclear power plants or prohibitthe States from deciding, as anabsolute or conditional matter, notto permit the construction of anyfurther reactors.65

However, the decision went on to saythat states cannot reject nuclear powerplants on the grounds of safety, since theregulation of nuclear safety is reserved tothe federal government. Rather, the rejec-tion must be based on non-safety criteria,such as economics.

Similar state laws could be adopted thatconstrain further construction of nuclearpower plants, if they have a substantial

nonsafety rationale. The poor economictrack record of nuclear power, the unre-solved problems of nuclear waste storage,and the availability of energy sources withlower economic costs all provide reasonsfor states to adopt such policies.

State legislation and regulations alsohelp to create the economic playing fieldon which nuclear power must compete withother sources of electricity generation andconservation. For example, states mightconsider adopting legislation requiringnuclear power plant owners to assume moreof the “hidden” costs of nuclear power, suchas the emergency planning costs incurredby state and local governments to preparefor potential nuclear accidents. For moreon strategies to ensure that the full costs ofnuclear power are considered in utility de-cision-making, see “Public Utilities Com-mission Processes,” page 23.

Environmental andLand Use PermittingStates may not have the ability to rejectnuclear power on safety grounds, but theydo have the ability to set conditions onwhere and how nuclear power plants mayoperate in order to limit their impact onthe environment.

Environmental PermittingNuclear power plants—like most other in-dustrial and energy facilities—must receivea series of environmental permits in orderto go into operation.

Plants that withdraw or discharge waterfor cooling from waterways must obtain apermit under section 316 of the federalClean Water Act. In 45 states, Clean Wa-ter Act permitting authority is administeredby state environmental agencies, whichhave the authority to grant or deny permitsaccording to EPA guidelines.66


Section 316(a) authorizes limits on ther-mal discharges to waterways “that will as-sure the projection and propagation of abalanced, indigenous population of shell-fish, fish and wildlife in and on that bodyof water.”67 Section 316(b) requires that“the location, design, construction and ca-pacity of cooling water intake structuresreflect the best technology available forminimizing adverse environmental impact.” 68

As noted above, cooling water intake andthe discharge of heated water can have se-vere, damaging impacts on ecosystems andwildlife. Section 316 permitting processesgive advocates an opportunity to raise thoseconcerns and to ensure that any newnuclear power plant is maximally protec-tive of waterways. The process also givesadvocates an opportunity to force techno-logical changes that reduce the impact ofexisting nuclear power plants on the envi-ronment.

The environmental problems caused bycooling water intake and discharge are mostsevere in power plants that use a “once-through” cooling system, in which water isdrawn in large quantities from waterways,used for cooling, and then discharged backinto the same waterway. About half of thenation’s nuclear power plants use a once-through system, while the others use sys-tems that are not quite as environmentallydestructive, such as cooling towers andcooling ponds and canals.69

For decades, the EPA determinedwhether power plants complied with Sec-tion 316(b) on a case-by-case basis, despitethe “best technology available” require-ment for cooling-water intakes. A coalitionof environmental groups sued the agency,resulting in a 2000 settlement that requiredthe EPA to propose national standards forcooling water intakes.70 However, the stan-dards ultimately proposed by EPA allowedfor the continued use of once-through cool-ing under certain conditions, despite theready availability of other technologies. Asubsequent lawsuit resulted in closed-cyclecooling being deemed the best technology

available for new power plants.71 More re-cently, attention has turned to EPA’s “PhaseII” regulations for cooling systems of ex-isting power plants. In 2004, six state at-torneys general filed a lawsuit challengingEPA’s “Phase II” rule, which again allowedfor the continued use of once-throughcooling systems.72

Requiring the replacement of once-through systems at the 416 U.S. powerplants (including several dozen nuclearpower plants) that have them could cost asmuch as $2.3 billion annually (2001 dol-lars), though this figure may be over-stated.73 In some cases, the cost of installingcooling systems that are protective of wild-life may alter the economics of therelicensing or continued operation of anuclear power plant. In any case, citizensshould work to ensure that nuclear powerplants’ cooling water intake does not dam-age wildlife or the environment. Regard-less of the fate of the legal challenge to EPA’sproposed rule, the Section 316(b) processgives states an opportunity to reduce thedamage inflicted by nuclear power plantson marine ecosystems.

States also have the ability to regulatethe thermal discharge of power plants un-der section 316(a) of the Clean Water Act.Power plants—particularly those withonce-through cooling systems—dischargelarge amounts of heated water to water-ways, posing a potential threat to ecosys-tems. Some nuclear power plants raise thetemperature of surrounding waters by asmuch as 30°F.74 In addition, some nuclearpower plants use chemicals to remove ma-rine organisms from their cooling systems,which are then discharged into water-ways.75 However, EPA has interpreted sec-tion 316(a) relatively loosely, settingstandards for thermal pollution on a case-by-case basis, instead of imposing a strongstandard for the amount of thermal pollu-tion that can be discharged into waterways.Challenges under section 316(a) are diffi-cult, but can be used to raise public anddecision-maker awareness about the impacts


of thermal discharges on ecosystems and,on occasion, to force technological changes.

Land Use RegulationStates, counties and localities are primarilyresponsible for regulating the use of land.The extent of state and local land-use regu-lation is limited by state and federal lawsand the federal constitution.

States’ authority to regulate land use is a“police power” that may be exercised onlyto protect the “public health, safety, mor-als and general welfare” of the people.76

Land-use regulation is typically carried outthrough zoning, in which local govern-ments establish zones of the municipalityin which certain activities are permitted orprohibited. For example, a factory may bepermitted to be built in an industrial zone,but not within a residential zone. In somelocalities and states, zoning laws must com-port with an overall land-use plan.

In theory, local land-use regulation is apotent tool to limit the potential for nuclearpower development. In practice, the powerof local land-use regulation is limited.

First, there are several constitutionallimitations on local zoning authority. Zon-ing laws may not amount to an unconstitu-tional “taking” of private property byrendering the land devoid of economicvalue. They may not be “exclusionary”—that is, they may not ban legitimate uses ofland outright. Zoning may not be dis-criminatory, nor may it be applied retro-actively.

As a result, local governmental land-useregulations may not ban nuclear powerplants outright, but merely determinewhich parts of the locality are most suit-able for development and the conditionsunder which that development might oc-cur. Second, there is no way for a munici-pality to retroactively revise zoning to forcethe shutdown of a plant that already exists,although there may be ways to challengenew activities on the site of an existingplant—such as the construction of a new

reactor or of expanded waste storage facilities.Second, in many states, local zoning au-

thority can be superseded by state energyfacility siting boards. In approximately 36states, these statewide bodies share juris-diction with local governments or exercisefinal decision-making authority over thesiting of power plants and other energy fa-cilities.77

Third, the NRC, in its site review pro-cess, considers the degree to which a pro-posed power plant or other nuclear facilitycomports with local land-use regulations.While a local government’s interpretationof its land-use laws might differ from thatof the NRC, the NRC process would, atleast in theory, weed out most potentialpower plant locations where zoning con-cerns would be an issue.

Coastal Zone RegulationMany states have additional regulations andprocesses that govern development in par-ticular areas—for example, coastal zones.The 1972 federal Coastal Zone Manage-ment Act (CZMA) and subsequent amend-ments require states to develop a planningprocess for energy facilities in a coastal zoneand to give consideration to the “nationalinterest” in the construction of such facili-ties.78 Federal actions, including the grant-ing of siting permits and licenses for nuclearpower plants, must be consistent with theenforceable policies of the state’s coastalzone plan.

Either the federal licensing agency or theapplicant for a license must notify the stateagency responsible for determining consis-tency with the plan. The state agency maythen reject the proposal if it is found to beinconsistent with the state’s coastal man-agement plan. Should an applicant disagreewith the state agency’s decision, it may ap-peal to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce.

The CZMA process provides anotheropportunity for citizens to challengenuclear power plant operation and associ-ated development—even during the


relicensing of existing nuclear reactors.However, federal primacy in enforcing thelaw limits states’ flexibility in rejecting pro-posed nuclear plants outright.

Energy FacilitySiting ProcessesIn most states, energy facility siting boardshave a role in the permitting of powerplants, including nuclear facilities. The roleof these boards varies by state. In somestates, the siting board has sole jurisdiction,

superseding the jurisdiction of municipali-ties or counties. In others, the board sharesjurisdiction with local governments, by al-lowing the applicant the option to choosebetween state and local jurisdiction, by re-quiring the state board to ensure that theproject meets local land-use requirements,or by giving the local government a voicein the decision.

Siting boards also have links with otherstate bodies. For example, many states re-quire that an energy facility be deemed nec-essary before a state siting board can grantits approval. These “determinations ofneed” or “certificates of public convenienceand necessity” are typically issued by the

Restructuring and Nuclear Power

The restructuring of the electricity industry has profound implications for thefuture of nuclear power in the United States.Many existing nuclear power plants have seen their ownership shift from regu-

lated utilities to unregulated merchant generators. The economic pressures cre-ated by competition have made plants more efficient, but also pose potential safetyconcerns as plant owners are pushed to run their plants closer to their operatingmargins for longer periods of time with fewer staff. The shifting of nuclear powerplants to the unregulated sector has also seen ratepayers in many states continue tobe saddled with paying the “stranded costs” for utilities’ uneconomic nuclear in-vestments, which were originally approved based on unrealistically low projectionsof costs.

The changes wrought by restructuring could either promote or hinder the con-struction of new nuclear power plants. On one hand, restructuring laws in the stateseither eliminated or circumscribed states’ authority to block the construction ofnew power plants on the basis of need, and restructuring at the wholesale levelnationally has opened the possibility that nuclear power plants can serve larger,regional markets.

On the other hand, however, the reduction of the role of regulated utilities inpower plant construction means that any new nuclear power plant built in a re-structured state would likely have to be built by an unregulated merchant genera-tor. These companies and their investors would likely face the majority of thesubstantial financial risk involved in building a new nuclear power plant. That riskmight be enough to prevent the construction of new plants—unless federal policiesshift enough of the risk to taxpayers or ratepayers to tip the balance.


state public utilities commission (PUC). Insome cases, there is no independent sitingboard, but siting board functions are dis-charged by the PUC itself.

The criteria that power plants must meetin order to receive approval from the sit-ing boards vary from state to state. Amongthe determinations that frequently must bemade are that the plant:

• Is needed to satisfy the energy needs ofthe state or region.

• Minimizes harm to the environment,compared with alternatives.

• Is economically justified, comparedwith alternatives.

• Is consistent with local and regionalland-use plans.

• Is consistent with the state’s long-termenergy plan.

• Is in the public interest.79

In recent years, some states that haverestructured their electric utility industrieshave weakened or eliminated some criteriafor power plant siting. States such as Cali-fornia have eliminated the requirement fora demonstration of need.80 Other stateshave eliminated or scaled back their elec-tric system planning processes in the wakeof restructuring.

In any case, the breadth of the criteriaconsidered by siting boards gives advocatesseveral opportunities to challenge nuclearpower plants on the basis of their economicmerits, the “need” for energy in a particu-lar area, or their consistency with the long-term energy and land-use plans of a region.Siting agencies typically provide publichearings or opportunities for public com-ment, enabling citizens to make their casein the public record. In states where sitingprocesses do not include the evaluation ofalternatives or the consideration of cost-effec-tiveness, advocates can work to have thesecriteria included in energy facility siting laws.

Public Utilities CommissionProcessesIn the 32 states that remain under tradi-tional public utilities regulation, the statePublic Utilities Commission (or its equiva-lent) must ultimately sign off on the con-struction of nuclear power plants by publicutilities. State PUCs may or may not havethe power to approve the construction ofnuclear power plants by non-utility powergenerators within their states’ borders.

PUCs exercise their authority overnuclear power plants in several ways. ManyPUCs have the authority to reject a powerplant outright if it is judged not to serve alegitimate need. In addition, PUCs in tra-ditionally regulated states have the author-ity to deny cost-recovery for power plantexpenses that are not prudently incurred.PUCs also have the ability to reduce theneed for nuclear power through the crite-ria they use for evaluating utilities’ resourceplans and through the policies they imple-ment with regard to energy efficiency andalternative sources of power.

Certificate of PublicConvenience and NecessityIn many traditionally regulated states, utili-ties must seek and receive a “certificate ofpublic convenience and necessity” (a “cer-tificate of need” or, more simply, a “certifi-cate”) before building a power plant. Statelaws give PUCs varying levels of jurisdic-tion over different types of power plants.In some states, the PUC must issue a cer-tificate for any power plant built within thestate, regardless of its owner. In others, thePUC has authority over plants proposed bypublic utilities only.

The criteria proposed power plants mustmeet to obtain a certificate also vary.Florida, for example, requires that a plantboth be needed and be the most cost-ef-fective option before a certificate may begranted.81 Other states simply require ademonstration that the plant would serve a


need either within the state or within alarger region.

Because of the great variation in statecertification requirements, the certificationprocess may represent either a useful ve-hicle for raising concerns over nuclearpower plants or a mere formality. OtherPUC proceedings, however, are among themost effective potential handles for citizensto use in challenging nuclear power plantconstruction.

Rate CasesHistorically, the most important role ofstate PUCs has been in the regulation ofelectricity rates. PUCs were established asan antidote to the “natural monopoly”

inherent in providing electricity service.Their historic statutory mission has beento ensure that the rates charged for elec-tricity are “just and reasonable”—both tothe utility and its investors and to consumers.

In traditionally regulated states, electric-ity rates are set based on the cost of pro-viding service; that is, utilities are entitledto recover, dollar-for-dollar, the cost of pro-viding electricity (including payment ofinterest and fair profit to shareholders). Todetermine the cost of service, PUCs mustdecide which facilities are included in theutility’s “rate base.” Generally, facilities in-cluded in the rate base must be judged tohave been prudent investments at the timethose investments were made, and to be“used and useful”; that is, in active use and

Resources for Citizens:Ratepayer Advocates and Intervener Funding

Formal participation in utility rate cases is a time-consuming and expensive en-deavor, often requiring specialized expertise. To ensure balance in the process,

states have created a series of mechanisms to guarantee that consumers’ points ofview are heard in PUC hearings.

• Ratepayer advocates – Most states have professional advocates charged withrepresenting the interests of consumers before utility regulatory bodies. Insome cases, ratepayer advocates operate independently. In other cases, the jobof advocating for ratepayers is delegated to the state attorney general or to anemployee of the PUC.

• Intervener funds – Some states have created intervener funds to ensure thatmunicipalities or public interest groups have the resources to represent them-selves in PUC proceedings. In California, for example, interveners are eligibleto recover their expenses, including attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees, ifthe PUC determines that they couldn’t otherwise afford to participate.84

• Citizen utility boards – In Illinois, Oregon, Wisconsin and the city of SanDiego, independent “citizen utility boards” exist to advocate for ratepayers.Funded through citizen contributions and non-profit foundations, CUBs arerun by democratically elected boards and have a track record of success. TheCUB in Oregon, for example, claims to have saved ratepayers more than $1billion in the first 20 years of its operation.85


contributing to the provision of service.82

The disastrous experience with nuclearpower plant construction in the 1970s and1980s posed a major challenge to the util-ity regulatory system. During the 1980s,PUCs made the first widespread use of pru-dence reviews and the used and useful testin order to protect ratepayers from billionsof dollars in excess costs resulting fromnuclear power plant construction. Accord-ing to an early 1990s analysis by the EdisonElectric Institute, approximately $14.4 bil-lion in investment in nuclear power plantswas disallowed by state PUCs under oneor more of these tests.83

In the wake of the nuclear plant con-struction debacle, PUCs and utilities cre-ated new tools to prevent a recurrence. Asa result, while struggles over the after-the-fact inclusion of a new nuclear power plantin a utility’s rate base are possible, the realdebate is likely to occur before ground isbroken on a new nuclear plant.

Integrated Resource Planning

Historically, cost-based rate-making putPUCs in a reactive posture—passing judg-ment on utilities’ investments after the fact.The experience of high nuclear power plantconstruction and operating costs and the1970s energy crises led many state PUCsto develop long-term planning require-ments to guide future utility investmentdecisions.

Integrated resource planning (IRP) re-quires utilities to periodically develop long-range plans for the adequate provision ofreasonably priced electricity with minimalimpacts on the environment or publichealth. Under IRP, utilities identify the “re-sources” (including both new sources ofgeneration and conservation and demandmanagement resources) that could be har-nessed to meet an area’s energy needs, andthen assemble a portfolio of those resourcesinto a long-range plan.

While the comprehensiveness, enforce-ability, and degree of PUC oversight over

IRPs differ from state to state, the plan-ning process is a useful and important placefor advocates to raise concerns about par-ticular sources of power, for several reasons:

• In some states, the IRP is used by thePUC in determining whether a giveninvestment will eventually be eligiblefor cost recovery (though inclusion inan IRP is not an absolute requirementfor later cost recovery).

• In some states, the IRP process re-quires the consideration of alterna-tives—such as other forms ofgeneration, energy efficiency improve-ments and demand-side managementprograms.

• In some states, environmental andsocial “externalities” are incorporatedinto consideration of how to provideenergy supply at the “least cost” toratepayers and the public generally.86

As noted above, the IRP is not the finalword on whether a utility will be able torecover costs for a given investment. Thefinal determinations typically come with theissuance of a certificate of public conve-nience and necessity and PUC decisions oninclusion of the facility in the rate base. Insome states, decisions made in the IRP pro-cess play a significant role in those deci-sions; in other states, they have a much lessimportant role.

The IRP process provides several oppor-tunities to challenge plans for new nuclearpower plants. The high relative cost ofnuclear power versus energy efficiency im-provements (and even some forms of re-newable power) and the large social andenvironmental externalities posed bynuclear plants make it unlikely that nuclearpower would be considered a “least cost”method of supplying a state’s energy needsunder any rational planning process. Forc-ing the PUC or a utility to concede thatnuclear power is not a least-cost solutionmakes it far more difficult for a utility tojustify its inclusion in the rate base.


Project FinancingNuclear power plants are among the mostcapital-intensive forms of generation andrequire among the longest lead times forconstruction. Capital costs for nuclearpower plants easily run to the billions ofdollars and construction times of five yearsor more are common. The traditional regu-latory practice of allowing cost recoveryonly for facilities that are “used and use-ful”—that is, already producing power—puts utilities and their investors attremendous financial risk during the con-struction process. Given nuclear power’strack record during the 1970s and 1980s, itis unlikely that a traditional utility or itsinvestors would choose to build a nuclearpower plant without a guarantee of costrecovery and, preferably, the ability to re-cover some of the plant’s cost during con-struction.

Some state PUCs have made exceptionsto the used and useful doctrine by allowingutilities to recover costs for “constructionwork in progress” (CWIP). In effect,CWIP financing reduces the financial riskto the utility and lowers the carrying costof the debt utilities must incur to build aplant. Unfortunately, CWIP financingshifts that risk directly to ratepayers.

Any attempt to provide CWIP financ-ing—or to make other guarantees of costrecovery for nuclear power plants—re-quires a formal decision by the state PUC.Citizens can and should challenge such fi-nancing arrangements on consumer pro-tection grounds. By so doing, they canensure that the risk of investment in nuclearpower plants is fairly allocated among utili-ties and the public.

Utility Regulatory ProcessesUnder RestructuringIn 18 states, legislatures or public utilitiescommissions have deregulated the retailside of the electricity business. At the sametime, the federal government has been

moving forward with deregulation ofwholesale electricity markets. These twindevelopments—lumped together as “re-structuring”—have brought about a dra-matic shift in how power is produced andsold in the U.S., and have major implica-tions for the future of nuclear power.

The nation’s first generation of nuclearreactors was built by traditional, integratedutilities operating under traditional regu-lation. While there is some chance that newnuclear reactors will be built by utilities, itis also possible that they will be proposedby unregulated “merchant generators” whosell their power on the open market.

Historically, utilities generated the vastbulk of the power they supplied their con-sumers. Now, many utilities in both restruc-tured and traditionally regulated states buysignificant shares of their power on theopen market. For prospective merchantnuclear power plant builders, having a firm,long-term commitment for the purchase ofpower is likely to be an essential part of se-curing financing for the plants. PUCs intraditionally regulated states generally havethe authority to set the rules regarding util-ity purchases of power. Even in states withretail restructuring, PUCs play a rolethrough their regulation of “standard of-fer” service—the electricity service pro-vided by distribution utilities to consumerswho do not choose an alternative electric-ity provider (which, given the failure ofstrong retail markets for electricity to de-velop in restructured states, includes virtu-ally all residential electricity customers).States have a variety of strategies for pro-curing power for standard offer service—ranging from competitive auctions tolonger-term contracts with generators.

In both traditionally regulated andrestructured states, citizens should holdpower purchase agreements—and particu-larly long-term agreements with facilitiessuch as nuclear power plants—to a highlevel of scrutiny and force utilities to jus-tify those contracts on the basis of cost.

Restructuring has involved other


regulatory changes at the state level. Manystates that have undergone retail restruc-turing have removed or loosened require-ments that power plant buildersdemonstrate the need for their facilities.And because PUCs in these states have areduced role in the setting of rates for elec-tricity generation, there are fewer instancesin which a utility must come before thePUC to justify the inclusion of a nuclearpower plant in its rate base.

However, in addition to their role inmonitoring power purchase agreements,PUCs and other bodies (such as regionaltransmission organizations and indepen-dent system operators) still make a varietyof decisions that affect the future shape ofthe electric industry—and the role ofnuclear power within it. We will discusssome of these decisions in the section on“Energy Policy Decisions” that follows.

Energy Policy DecisionsOne of the most effective ways to challengenuclear power is to reduce the need for itin the first place. America has vast amountsof unrealized energy efficiency potential aswell as abundant wind and solar power re-sources. In many cases, energy savings canbe obtained at lower cost than the construc-tion of new power plants—particularly ex-pensive nuclear plants. The declining costof wind power and the inherent cost ad-vantages of clean, local power sources makethem attractive competitors with nuclearpower. There are numerous ways that ad-vocates can promote these clean alterna-tives to nuclear power.

Efficiency andRenewables PoliciesOver the past decade, states across thecountry have taken aggressive actions toimprove the energy efficiency of their

economies and promote the use of renew-able sources of energy. Among the policiesstates have adopted are the following:

Appliance Energy EfficiencyStandardsStates have latitude to impose energyefficiency standards for residential andcommercial appliances where the federalgovernment has failed to do so. States mayalso petition the federal government for awaiver to implement stronger energy effi-ciency standards for appliances subject tofederal regulation. In 2004 and 2005, 10states adopted stronger energy efficiencystandards for a range of appliances. By2030, those standards will reduce powerdemand by more than 4,800 megawatts, ornearly five nuclear power plants.88 Thestate actions also led to the enactment ofnew federal efficiency standards for manyof the same appliances, which will elimi-nate the need for about 30,000 megawattsof generating capacity in 2030—the equiva-lent of about 30 nuclear power plants.

There remain significant opportunitiesfor states to push forward with new effi-ciency standards for appliances—standardsthat will save energy and reduce the needfor all forms of power generation. TheAmerican Council for an Energy-EfficientEconomy and Appliance Standards Aware-ness Project have identified 15 appliancesfor which standards could be adopted in thenear term. Adopting standards for thoseappliances would reduce demand by about12,000 megawatts, or about 12 nuclearpower plants.89

Energy Efficiency FundingIn the 1970s, utilities (often at the requestof regulators) began to create energy efficiencyand demand-side management (DSM) pro-grams in order to reduce the aggregate costof delivering electricity to consumers.These programs grew to the point whereutilities were spending nearly $1.8 billionannually on energy efficiency programs by


1993.90 In the wake of electric industry re-structuring, however, many states assumedthat market forces would take over the jobof driving improvements in energy effi-ciency and, as a result, allowed utility en-ergy efficiency programs to wither or expirealtogether.

In the late 1990s, however, states began

to experiment with new ways to ensure thatthe benefits of energy efficiency would con-tinue to accrue to ratepayers and society asa whole. At least 20 states now assess “sys-tems benefit charges”—small surcharges onelectricity bills—that are used to raise fundsto support energy efficiency programs. In2003, these programs, along with utility-

Regional Transmission Organizations and IndependentSystem Operators (RTOs/ISOs)

Regional transmission organizations and independent system operators (RTOs/ISOs) are powerful new players in the utility regulatory scene. Since the cre-

ation of the first ISOs in the mid-1990s as part of restructured electricity markets,these organizations have come to play an increasingly important role in setting therules for electric power markets, operating those markets, planning for the futureof the grid, and shaping the energy future of the regions they serve. Citizens con-cerned about nuclear power should become acquainted with RTOs/ISOs and howthey work.

RTOs/ISOs are billed as “independent” organizations, meaning that they arenot controlled by any particular player in the market. However, RTOs and ISOsare not publicly accountable bodies; rather, they are typically non-profit organiza-tions whose governance is dominated by electricity generators, transmission own-ers, utilities and large customers.87 While RTOs/ISOs typically allow some advisoryrole for consumer, environmental or public interest “stakeholders,” industry par-ticipants typically hold the lion’s share of decision-making power. Moreover, RTOsand ISOs—unlike state PUCs and federal regulators—face no statutory or otherrequirement to act in the public interest.

RTO/ISO rules and planning processes have major influence on the shape of aregion’s energy system. Through the transmission planning process, RTOs/ISOsinfluence whether a region will continue to receive power from large, centralizedpower plants, smaller power plants located closer to sources of demand, or im-proved energy efficiency and conservation. RTO/ISO rules for interconnection tothe grid influence whether renewables and smaller-scale sources of power will beable to take advantage of the ability to sell their power on the open market. AndRTO/ISO pricing and market rules determine whether these alternative sources ofpower will be treated equitably.

RTOs and ISOs have limited ability to determine whether a nuclear power plantcan be built. But the rules, procedures and plans they establish for regional trans-mission grids can determine whether nuclear power plants will appear to be fea-sible or infeasible options for serving a region’s electricity demand. For that reason,citizens concerned about nuclear power should become familiar with the opera-tions of the RTO/ISO in their region.


operated energy efficiency and demandmanagement programs in states with tra-ditional regulatory models, had resulted insavings of 67,000 gigawatt-hours ofpower—equivalent to the annual output ofabout eight nuclear power plants.91

Yet, the potential for further efficiencyimprovements is immense. Of the approxi-mately $1.1 billion spent on energy efficiencyprograms in 2003, more than 80 percentwas spent in just 10 states.92 In 21 states,including populous states such as Illinois,Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia andGeorgia, energy efficiency spending rep-resented less than one-tenth of 1 percentof utility revenue.93

Expanding energy efficiency funding andprograms in the states can reduce futuredemand for power—thus reducing the per-ceived need for nuclear reactors. In addi-tion to winning better programs, however,advocates must also push for energy plan-ners—including utilities, PUCs and ISOs/RTOs—to recognize the impact of energyefficiency in their demand growth forecasts,which are often used to justify new powerplants.

Renewable Energy Standards, Fundsand Other PoliciesIn addition to reducing consumption ofenergy, demand for nuclear power can bereduced by promoting the use of clean, re-newable sources of energy such as wind andsolar power. States have taken a variety ofactions over the last decade to dramaticallyramp up the generation of power from re-newable sources.

At least 19 states have adopted renew-able energy standards (often called “renew-able portfolio standards”) that require agrowing percentage of a state’s electricityto come from renewable sources. Themost aggressive standards call for gradualincreases—on the order of 1 percent peryear—in the share of power coming fromrenewable sources. In addition, at least 15states devote some funding to the develop-ment of renewable energy sources, with the

funding often coming from small systemsbenefit charges on utility bills. The combi-nation of renewable energy standards andstate funding is projected to lead to the in-stallation of about 22 gigawatts of renew-able electricity capacity by 2020—enoughto offset at least seven nuclear power plants.94

Other public policies can also smooththe way for renewable energy sources:

• Solar incentives and new homestandards – The California PUCrecently approved the nation’s largestinvestment in solar photovoltaic (PV)power; a $3.2 billion incentive pro-gram, funded through a surcharge onutility bills, that is anticipated to resultin the installation of as much as 3,000MW of solar photovoltaic systems inCalifornia over the next decade.95

California has also contemplatedpolicies to require the installation ofsolar PV systems in new homes or torequire that new homes be “solar ready.”

• Net metering – Solar PV systems aremore economical for homeowners andbusinesses when the rules for sellingpower back into the grid compensatePV owners fairly. Strong “net meter-ing” policies (as well as rules thatrequire utilities to respond quickly tocustomers’ requests to connect PVsystems to the grid) can encourage theinstallation of solar power systemsand other forms of on-site powergeneration.

• Fair standards for wind power – Inmany parts of the country, new windpower projects face an array of eco-nomic obstacles resulting from out-moded regulations and market rules.Wind power projects are often unfairlypenalized under old market rulesdesigned for conventional powerplants.96 In addition, many states thathave undergone retail restructuringnow require utilities to purchase poweron the open market in short, one- to


three-year long contracts. Becausewind power is capital intensive, thelimits on long-term contracts reducethe attractiveness of wind as an invest-ment. State PUCs and regionaltransmission organizations shouldadopt policies that allow wind powerto play a growing role in supplyingenergy.

Power System PlanningNuclear power plants face a series of fun-damental problems as a source of electric-ity. First, electricity is generally in greatestdemand in centers of population—areaswhere large numbers of people live, work,shop and carry out their daily activities.Nuclear power plants, however, are bestsuited for areas where population densityis low. High population density, for ex-ample, would make efficient evacuation dif-ficult, if not impossible, in the event of anuclear accident.

Nuclear power plants are also generallymassive in scale, supplying power for largenumbers of homes and businesses. To movepower from the nuclear power plants whereit is generated to the places where it is used,utilities must invest in transmission lines.Adding transmission capacity is expensiveand frequently engenders local opposition.In addition, expanding the transmissionnetwork and adding new, centralizedsources of power enhance dependence onthe nation’s interconnected power grid—agrid that failed spectacularly during the2003 blackout in the Northeast and on sev-eral other occasions.

Large-scale nuclear power plants faceanother disadvantage as a source ofpower—they require the maintenance oflarge amounts of backup generating capacityfor times when the plant is shut down forrefueling or routine maintenance or due tounexpected problems. All sources of powerare susceptible to sudden shutdown. Butbecause nuclear power plants are so large,the potential disruption to the grid is

greater. As a result, power systems that relyon large nuclear power plants must main-tain higher reserve margins and/or more“spinning reserves” than they would if theyrelied on a greater number of smaller gen-erators. The discovery of a technologicalproblem common to several nuclear reac-tors could lead to serious reliabilityproblems.

Finally, nuclear power plants could proveless resilient in the event of a widespreadpower outage like the 2003 blackout in thenortheastern U.S. and Canada. Nuclearpower plants are designed to shut down (or“trip”) when a blackout occurs. Restartingthose plants after the blackout requiresthem to draw power from the grid, mean-ing that power first has to be restored tothe nuclear reactors before they can restartand contribute power to the restoration ofthe grid. Ontario’s heavy reliance onnuclear power during the 2003 blackout,for example, led to electricity shortages inthe province well after power to U.S. con-sumers had been restored.97 In the U.S.,the first shut-down nuclear plant to restartbegan generating power three days after theblackout, with the last not returning to ser-vice until eight days after the blackout.98

By contrast, most fossil fuel and renewablepower plants were able to generate poweras soon as conditions on the grid were sta-bilized.

A decentralized and diversified powergeneration system that takes greater advan-tage of local sources of power provided bya mix of technologies and resources wouldprovide greater reliability and stability tothe electricity system than the current reli-ance on large, centralized power plants.“Distributed generation” technologies—such as solar power, fuel cells, natural gas-fired microturbines and combinedheat-and-power technology—hold the po-tential to deliver electricity more efficientlyand with greater reliability than traditionalpower generation.

The question of whether to invest incentralized power generation or distributed


generation arises in power system planning.Planning for the electricity system is car-ried out at several levels—at state PUCs,at the regional level through multi-state or-ganizations, and through independent sys-tem operators and regional transmissionorganizations (ISOs/RTOs). In addition,the siting and construction of transmissionlines is also influenced by the decisions oflocal governments and state energy facilitysiting boards (in some states).

The benefits of distributed generationare often not considered in power systemplanning processes that are geared towardtoday’s centralized system of power genera-tion. A 2002 study by the Rocky MountainInstitute found that small-scale distributedgeneration technologies frequently producegreater value than centralized sources ofgeneration because they are less risky, lessdependent on fossil fuels (which are vola-tile in price), are more efficient, and makethe power grid more reactive.99 In addition,a number of significant barriers—includ-ing high fees, cumbersome technical re-quirements, and burdensome and one-sidedcontracts—have kept distributed genera-tion from gaining more of a foothold.100

Advocates can reduce dependence onnuclear power (as well as other centralizedsources of electricity with environmentalimpacts, such as coal-fired power plants) byworking to ensure that the benefits of dis-tributed generation are considered fairly inthe utility planning process and by work-ing to remove unjustified barriers to thespread of clean, local forms of power gen-eration.

Portfolio ManagementSome states that had moved toward retailderegulation are now recognizing that mostconsumers will continue to buy their powerfrom traditional utilities indefinitely andthat those utilities should be required tocome up with balanced, long-term plans forsecuring power for those customers. Thisprocess is called “portfolio management.”

California’s PUC, for example, now re-quires utilities to submit long-term powerprocurement plans. The PUC has requiredthose plans to give energy efficiency anddemand management top priority, followedby the development of renewable powerresources and distributed generation.101

Only after energy efficiency, demand man-agement, renewables and distributed gen-eration are considered can fossil fuel-firedpower plants be proposed.102

In states that have restructured theirelectric industries, but where most custom-ers remain served by traditional utilities,portfolio management can ensure that utili-ties make sensible choices for the procure-ment of power. This, in turn, reducesdemand for nuclear power by ensuring thatless costly and lower-risk options are con-sidered first. States with open retail powermarkets but little competition should beencouraged to adopt portfolio manage-ment processes similar to those in place inCalifornia.

Climate Policy andMarket-BasedEnvironmental RegulationsThe nuclear power industry touts its prod-uct as being clean and safe. The industry’slong history of safety problems, its devas-tating impact on marine ecosystems, andthe long-term environmental challengesposed by nuclear waste storage give lie tothat claim. But nuclear power does havesome legitimate environmental advantagesover coal-fired power plants and, to a lesserextent, those fueled by natural gas. Unlikethese power sources, nuclear power plantsdo not release soot or smog-forming pol-lutants into the air. And the life-cycle im-pact of nuclear power plants on the globalclimate is relatively low.103

As a result, the nuclear industry has beenaggressive in seeking to make its technol-


ogy eligible for credits under a variety ofmarket-based environmental programs.“Market-based” programs are those thatuse market mechanisms—such as the trad-ing of emission credits—to achieve envi-ronmental goals at the lowest aggregatecost. In northeastern states that fail to meetnational health standards for ozone, forexample, credits for the release of smog-forming pollution are traded. European na-tions have chosen to implement an emissiontrading system to reduce global warmingpollution. A similar “cap and trade” system forglobal warming pollution is in the process ofbeing launched in the northeastern U.S.

Market-based policies for the control ofair pollution and global warming givenuclear power plants an inherent leg up inthe marketplace. Unlike the owner of a coalor natural gas power plant, nuclear powerplant owners are not required to buy al-lowances to emit carbon dioxide or to payfor pollution reductions elsewhere. How-ever, the nuclear industry is pushing aggres-sively for its plants to receive even morefinancial advantages by making the plantseligible for consideration as “offsets” or forfunding through “set-aside” programs forzero-emission sources of electricity.

“Offsets” allow facilities required tocomply with emission limits to pay foremission reductions elsewhere, rather thanreducing their own emissions. For example,the owner of a coal-fired power plant could

contribute to the construction of a nuclearpower plant in another state or country onthe premise that doing so would avoidenough pollutant emissions to compensatefor the continued operation of the coal-fired power plant.

“Set-asides” are allocations of valuableemission credits made to jump-start“cleaner” technologies. For example, a cap-and-trade program might require that 5percent of all emission permits be allocatedto the government, with the proceeds fromthe sale of the permits used to support zero-emission technologies. Ideally, the fundsraised through such a sale would be usedto promote renewable energy and othertechnologies that are clearly in the publicinterest. But a poorly designed set-asideprogram could also allow nuclear powerplants to receive these funds.

Both offsets and set-asides have the po-tential to become direct subsidies to nuclearpower—unless nuclear power plants areexplicitly disqualified from receiving theseincentives. The parties to the Kyoto Pro-tocol have specifically barred countries withglobal warming emission reduction targetsfrom using nuclear power projects in othercountries as offsets.104 However, in theUnited States, the state of New Hampshirehas allowed the Seabrook nuclear powerplant to qualify for set-aside funding in thestate’s nitrogen oxide control program.105

And the recent cap-and-trade agreement in

Nuclear Power and Hydrogen

To date, nuclear reactors have primarily been used as a source of electricity. But therecent run-up in oil prices and concerns about long-term oil supplies have led

some to push nuclear power as a source of hydrogen fuel for vehicles.A number of states, including California and Florida, are proceeding with pro-

grams to promote the development and use of hydrogen as a vehicle fuel. Citizensneed to watch these state programs and federal hydrogen development programscarefully in order to ensure that they prioritize renewable, and not nuclear or fossilfuel-based, hydrogen generation, and that they do not provide a further “back door”subsidy to the nuclear industry.


the Northeast leaves open the possibilitythat nuclear power plants could be consid-ered eligible for funding under its set-asideprovision.

Nuclear power plants ought not to re-ceive undue financial advantage from pro-grams designed to reduce emissions ofother pollutants. As a matter of principle,technologies with environmental and safetychallenges as significant as nuclear powershould not be eligible for subsidies underthe guise of environmental protection. Andas a practical matter, nuclear power isamong the most expensive solutions to glo-bal warming and air pollution. Allowingmajor nuclear facilities to qualify for thesefunds will tend to crowd out smaller-scale—and often more economically appealing—competitors.

Advocates can take several steps to en-sure that nuclear power does not undulybenefit from these programs. First, they canwork to ensure that only clean, renewablesources of energy and not “zero-emission”forms, are eligible for financial support. Ifthat fails, they can ensure that offsets andset-asides not be used to support projectsthat would have occurred anyway withoutthe additional financial incentives.

Organizing OpportunitiesCitizens looking at the political and regu-latory climate surrounding nuclear poweroften have reason to feel discouraged. Largeutilities and power generation companiesare wealthy and politically powerful. Mu-nicipalities that host nuclear power plantsmay depend on them for tax revenue andoppose efforts to shut the plants down.Powerful business interests may see nuclearpower, incorrectly, as the most realistic so-lution to the long-term energy needs oftheir region. Utility regulators and systemplanners often appear pre-disposed towardlarge additions of generation and transmis-sion capacity, rather than smaller-scale

generation or efficiency improvements.The NRC process for licensing nuclear re-actors ignores many key concerns and lim-its the public’s opportunity to have a voice.And generous federal subsidies supportedby Congress and the president add furthermomentum to nuclear power.

In short, in some parts of the country,none of the many opportunities to chal-lenge nuclear power listed in this paper islikely to be successful unless it is matchedby vigorous and sustained action on the partof the public. Only by taking their case di-rectly to the public can advocates ensurethat elected officials, regulators, utilities andgenerating companies are forced to defendproposals to expand nuclear power capacity.

The anti-nuclear movement of the 1970sand 1980s was successful in awakening andchanneling public concern over nuclearpower. And in recent years, a revitalizedmovement has brought additional scrutinyto nuclear proposals in a variety of states.To follow are several organizing strategiesand techniques that can be used to raise themany serious problems posed by nuclearpower in local and state political debates.

Local ResolutionsLocal and county governments have manyreasons to be concerned about the opera-tion of nuclear power plants. Local emer-gency personnel have the immediateresponsibility as “first responders” to pro-tect the public in the event of a nuclear ac-cident or terrorism. Municipalities andcounties must concern themselves withevacuation plans and other emergency mea-sures. In addition, while nuclear powerplants represent an economic boon to somecommunities, they often saddle communi-ties with an aesthetically unpleasant landuse that crowds out other opportunities forresidential and business growth.

As a result, many communities are will-ing to lend their support to resolutions op-posing the operation, relicensing orconstruction of a nuclear power plant.


Passing anti-nuclear resolutions throughtown and city councils or county govern-ing bodies can add great legitimacy to anadvocate’s claim to represent the public in-terest in opposing a nuclear power pro-posal. In New York, for example, dozens ofmunicipalities, county governments, schoolboards and other groups have passed reso-lutions calling for the shutdown of the In-dian Point nuclear reactor on the HudsonRiver above New York City.106

Local resolutions are an important dem-onstration of local opposition to nuclearpower in and of themselves. But they alsocreate an opportunity to build supportamong political leaders at both the state andlocal level. State representatives, senators,governors and members of Congress tendto be responsive to public concerns in waysthat agency officials are not. Elected offi-cials can be important allies in an effort tochallenge nuclear power plants, with thepower to demand information from gov-ernment agencies and to put pressure onregulators to do their jobs effectively.

Alliances with EmergencyOfficialsThe increased risk of terrorism in the wakeof the September 11, 2001 attacks, coupledwith the failure of evacuation proceduresin response to Hurricane Katrina, have gen-erated concern among citizens and electedofficials about how public safety would beprotected in the event of a terrorist attackon a nuclear reactor or spent fuel pools. As“first responders,” local and county emer-gency personnel have a strong interest inensuring that adequate plans are in placeto evacuate citizens in a nuclear emergency.

Incredibly, the issues of terrorism andevacuation plans are not formally consid-ered in the NRC’s relicensing process. In-stead, the NRC only requires nuclearpower plants to maintain adequate levelsof safety “under requirements of their origi-nal licenses.” In other words, any changesthat took place over the initial 40-year lifetime

of the plant—other than aging of the plant’scomponents—are generally not consideredin relicensing.

As residents living near nuclear reactorscan attest, much can change in 40 years.Nuclear power plants that were built inonce-remote areas are now in the midst ofgrowing population centers. Populationgrowth in some areas has made evacuationin the event of a sudden nuclear accidentvirtually impossible. For example, threecounties near the Indian Point plant haverefused to certify the emergency responseplans for the plant because they believe theplans would be ineffective in the event ofan actual emergency.107

Emergency officials and governmentagencies may or may not be able to be en-listed in outright opposition to relicensingof a nuclear power plant. They are, how-ever, potentially key allies in ensuring thatlegitimate issues regarding plant securityand emergency planning are at least voicedwithin the license renewal process, if notactually taken into account by the NRC.

Corporate CampaignsOne way to challenge the construction orrelicensing of a nuclear reactor is to con-vince the corporation proposing the planto change its mind. This, as might be ex-pected, is not an easy thing to do. But theprocess of organizing a corporate campaigncan identify unlikely allies who can be in-fluential in other forums.

Organizing ShareholdersCorporate management is ultimately re-sponsible to the shareholders. Sharehold-ers can influence the conduct of managersdirectly through the filing of resolutions atcorporations’ annual meetings. While fewshareholder resolutions ever receive a ma-jority vote, resolutions that attract even arelatively modest vote can draw media at-tention to the issues surrounding nuclearpower and convey shareholder discontentto the management. And in some cases,


shareholder resolutions have helped lead tochanges in corporate policy.

Several organizations representing thoseconcerned about nuclear power have filedshareholder resolutions. Typically, theseresolutions call attention to the financialliabilities inherent in operating nuclearpower plants, particularly the risk of anuclear accident or issues related to long-term nuclear waste storage. Other advo-cates have used shareholder resolutions tochallenge companies to increase their pro-duction of clean, renewable fuels.

Organizing CustomersUtility customers are also an importantpotential target for an organizing campaign.In the 1990s, for example, New Jersey or-ganizations seeking to close the Salemnuclear power plants encouraged custom-ers of the plant’s utility owner to put stick-ers on their utility bills urging the utility to“Unplug Salem.” But residential custom-ers are not the only potential target of anorganizing effort.

Industrial customers were among thosemost badly burned by the 1970s and 1980sexperiences with nuclear power. Some in-dustrial consumers would likely welcomethe addition of nuclear power (or any ma-jor increase in generation capacity) in thehopes that it would deliver cheap and stableelectricity over the long haul. But indus-trial customers in traditionally regulatedstates have ample reason to worry that ad-dition of nuclear power plant costs to therate base would increase the prices they payfor power, just as it did during the first waveof nuclear power plant construction. Evenin restructured states, some industrial cus-tomers might have concerns over the im-pact of nuclear power on grid reliability orhave reasons to support cleaner alternativessuch as distributed generation, combinedheat and power, or improved energy effi-ciency.

Industrial consumers may wind up tak-ing positions for or against nuclear power.But in either case, their support or opposi-

tion is likely to have great weight withpolicy makers, RTO/ISO boards, PUCsand the corporations proposing nuclearpower expansion. Finding out where theystand early on, and working to influencetheir position, can be a useful strategy.

Creating PublicityGenerating media attention is a key part ofany corporate-focused campaign. Manyadvocates have extensive experience withdirecting the attention of the media to theirissues. But the content of publicity in a cor-porate campaign is just important as thequantity of publicity received.

A major goal of publicity in a corporate-focused campaign is to put a name and faceon objectionable conduct. In the case ofnuclear power, this is straightforward: allnuclear power plants have a corporateowner and these owners typically have apublic face, the CEO. Increasingly, thesecorporate owners and CEOs do not live inthe communities or states where theirplants are located. As a result, a good dealof publicity must be generated around whothe companies are and how they dobusiness.

In New Jersey, for example, campaign-ers opposing relicensing of the OysterCreek nuclear power plant have focusedtheir attention on the plant’s owner: ExelonCorporation of Chicago. Advocates havepublicized the company’s record in its op-eration of nuclear power plants in otherstates, and charged the company with put-ting profits over public safety in its opera-tion of nuclear plants.

Presenting solid, factual research canalso generate publicity. There are manysources of information detailing the cor-porate practices of nuclear power plantowners. Sources of information that shouldbe consulted include NRC filings, reportsfrom labor unions and insider “whistle-blowers,” and Securities and ExchangeCommission reports and other regulatoryfilings.

One key to achieving the best results


from organizing and publicity efforts is tobegin them early—well before a relicensingapplication is filed or plans for a newnuclear plant are announced. Acting earlyachieves several goals. It establishes theterms of the debate in the public mind atthe outset. It also raises the bar for the cor-poration proposing the relicensing or ex-pansion, demonstrating to them that theywill need to marshal more resources toachieve their goals. Acting early can alsoforce proponents to delay their applicationfor relicensing or the licensing of a newreactor, which can play to the advantage ofopponents.

Building Support for AlternativeEnergy SourcesAny campaign to challenge nuclearrelicensing or the construction of newnuclear power plants is likely to require analternative response to a region’s energyneeds. As described above, energy effi-ciency, renewable energy, and distributedgeneration are often cleaner, cheaper andless risky alternatives to nuclear powerplants.

Campaigns for alternative energy sourceshave the potential to bring unusual alliesinto the fold. Local solar and wind powermanufacturers, as well as energy servicescompanies, might be willing to participate

in such a campaign. Advocates for low-in-come consumers similarly have an interestin protecting consumers against high prices.Rural communities, which will benefit fromexpansion of renewable power sources suchas wind, also have a stake in the issue, as dosome labor unions, which stand to benefitfrom the large number of jobs created byenergy efficiency and renewable energy.

Advocates would do well to identify part-ners and build support for a clean energyagenda at the same time they challengenuclear power proposals. Presenting a bet-ter, and often more popular, alternative tonuclear power allows decision-makers torefute arguments that nuclear power expan-sion is necessary for a region’s economichealth and enable advocates to shift thedebate in the media to friendlier turf.

Intervention in NRC ProceedingsNRC licensing proceedings, as notedabove, are often stacked in favor of thenuclear industry. However, these proceed-ings give provide a forum to raise criticalissues about nuclear power plants, to enlistthe support of like-minded groups and in-dividuals, and to create a public record thatcan later be used to challenge nuclear powerin other forums. As such, they provide auseful organizing opportunity—even if thechances of winning outright before theNRC are small.

Notes 37

There are many reasons for citizens tobe skeptical about a “nuclear renais-sance” in the U.S. Level-headed

analysis of the current state of nuclearpower suggests that the safety, security, costand environmental concerns that haveplagued nuclear power over the last 50 yearshave not gone away.

Each one of these issues leads to a po-tential policy handle or organizing oppor-tunity that concerned citizens can use tohold nuclear power plants to a higher levelof scrutiny. While winning battles at thefederal level over safety issues may be diffi-cult due to the pro-nuclear slant of the

NRC and many federal decision-makers,there are ample opportunities to raise theeconomic, environmental and security con-cerns at the state and local levels.

With the passage of the pro-nuclearEnergy Policy Act of 2005, the acceleratedplanning for new nuclear power plants bysome utilities, and continued concerns overAmerica’s energy future, now is the timefor citizens to raise the legitimate concernsabout nuclear power in public policy forumsand to develop and work for a vision of acleaner energy future that can satisfyAmerica’s energy needs using clean, secureand stable sources of energy.

Conclusion


1 Peter A. Bradford, Nuclear Power’s Prospects,Power Point presentation to California EnergyCommission Nuclear Issues Workshop, 16August 2005.2 50,000 tons of nuclear waste: U.S. GeneralAccounting Office, Spent Nuclear Fuel: OptionsExist to Further Enhance Security, July 2003.Electricity rates have typically been higher instates with greater reliance on nuclear powerthan in non-nuclear states. See Public Citizen,States Pay the Price for Relying on Nuclear Power,12 June 2001.3 Nuclear Energy Institute, QuantifyingNuclear’s Economic Value, downloaded fromwww.nei.org/index.asp?catnum=2&catid=49, 24January 2006.4 See, for example, Patrick Moore, “GoingNuclear: A Green Makes the Case,” WashingtonPost, 16 April 2006. Moore claims that nuclearpower “is in fact one of the least expensiveenergy sources,” citing only the cost of operat-ing existing reactors.5 Nuclear Energy Institute, Nuclear Plants inStates Implementing Retail Competition, down-loaded from www.nei.org/documents/nuclearplants.pdf, 24 January 2006.6 States with nuclear power plants have amongthe nation’s highest electricity rates. As of 2001,rates were approximately 25 percent higher instates with nuclear power plants than in stateswithout. Source: Public Citizen, Consumers inNuclear States Pay 25 Percent More for Electricity,

Analysis Shows, [press release], 12 June 2001.7 Nuclear Information and Resource Service,Talking Points on Bush/Cheney Energy Plan,downloaded from www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/bush/talkingpointsonbush.htm, 24 January 2006.8 Laura Maggi, “Making White Elephants Fly,”American Prospect Online Edition, 28 February2000.9 Edward P. Kahn, “A Folklorist’s Guide to theUsed Plant Market,” The Electricity Journal,12(6): 66-77, 1999, cited in Paul L. Joskow,“Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in theU.S. Power Sector,” in Sam Peltzman andClifford Winston, eds., Deregulation of NetworkIndustries: What’s Next, AEI-Brookings JointCenter for Regulatory Studies, Washington,D.C., 2000.10 Price of Ginna sale and book value fromPlatt’s POWER, “RG&E Gets Nod for Sales470-MW Ginna Nuclear Plant,” 10 June 2004.Price per megawatt based on sales price of plantonly (not including fuel) from Nuclear EnergyInstitute, U.S. Nuclear Plant Sales, updatedAugust 2005.11 $145 billion from Marshall Goldberg,Renewable Energy Policy Project, FederalEnergy Subsidies: Not All Technologies Are CreatedEqual, July 2000.12 $4.8 billion from Taxpayers for CommonSense, Nuclear Subsidies in the Energy Bill: ASpending Explosion, downloaded fromwww.taxpayer.net, 14 December 2005; $7.3

Notes

Notes 39

billion from U.S. PIRG and Friends of theEarth, Final Energy Tax Package OverwhelminglyFavors Polluting Industries, 27 July 2005.13 Jill Lancelot, Taxpayers for Common Sense,Price-Anderson Act: Special Subsidies and Protectionsfor the Nuclear Industry, downloaded fromwww.taxpayer.net/energy/priceanderson.htm, 18January 2006.14 In July 2005 testimony before a congres-sional committee, General Atomics Senior VicePresident David Baldwin agreed that Price-Anderson was a “disincentive for safety” andshould be phased down over time, noting thatreactors that were truly “inherently safe” wouldnot need the protection Price-Andersonprovides. See The Next Generation of NuclearPower, Hearing Before the Subcommittee onEnergy and Resources, Committee on Govern-ment Reform, U.S. House of Representatives,29 June 2005.15 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Frequently Asked Questions About NRC’s Responseto the 9/11/01 Events, downloaded fromwww.nrc.gov/what-we-do/safeguards/faq-911.html, 24 January 2006.16 Doug Koplow, EarthTrack Inc., NuclearPower in the U.S.: Still Not Viable Without Subsidy,Power Point presentation to Nuclear Power andGlobal Warming Symposium, Nuclear PolicyResearch Institute, November 2005.17 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, TheFuture of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MITStudy, 2003.18 See Amory Lovins, Rocky MountainInstitute, Nuclear Power: Economics and Climate-Protection Potential, 11 September 2005. The costof energy efficiency improvements varies, butthe life-cycle cost of electricity saved as a resultof state public benefits energy efficiencyprograms has been estimated at between 2.3 and4.4 cents/kWh. Source: Martin Kushler, DanYork and Patti White, American Council for anEnergy-Efficient Economy, Five Years In: AnExamination of the First Half-Decade of PublicBenefits Energy Efficiency Policies, April 2004.19 Bruce Biewald, Affidavit of Bruce Biewald inthe Matter of Exelon Generating Company LLC(Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), beforethe Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, docket no. 52-007-ESP.20 Levelized cost estimates: U.S. Departmentof Energy, Energy Information Administration,Annual Energy Outlook 2006, February 2006,

Figure 58. Capital cost and other assumptions:U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Informa-tion Administration, Assumptions to the AnnualEnergy Outlook 2006, March 2006.21 U.S. Department of Energy, EnergyInformation Administration, Annual EnergyOutlook 2006, February 2006, Figure 58.22 Public Citizen, Consumers in Nuclear StatesPay 25 Percent More for Electricity, Analysis Shows,[press release], 12 June 2001.23 Standard & Poor’s, Credit Aspects of NorthAmerican and European Nuclear Power, 9 January2006.24 See Kevin Kamps, Nuclear Information andResource Service, The Science and Politics of theProposed High-Level Radioactive Waste Dump atYucca Mountain, Nevada, USA, 28 November2003.25 See Environmental Working Group, Marks the Spot: We Can’t Solve America’sNuclear Waste Problem if We Keep Making More,downloaded from www.ewg.org/reports/nuclearwaste/exec_summ.php, 24 January 2006,which suggests that recent NRC relicensing ofnuclear power plants will produce wastes thatwill well exceed the capacity of Yucca Mountain.26 National Academy of Sciences, Spent FuelStored in Pools at Some U.S. Nuclear PlantsPotentially at Risk from Terrorist Attacks: PromptMeasures Needed to Reduce Vulnerabilities [pressrelease], 6 April 2005.27 National Academy of Sciences, Board ofRadioactive Waste Management, Safety andSecurity of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage:Public Report, National Academies Press, 2005.28 U.S. Government Accountability Office,Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggres-sively and Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related tothe Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant’s Shutdown,May 2004.29 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Information Report – October 22, 2004.30 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EventReport for July 28, 2003.31 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Frequently Asked Questions About Hope Creek andSalem, downloaded from www.nrc.gov/reactors/plant-specific-items/hope-creek-salem/faq.html,25 April 2006.32 David Lochbaum, Union of ConcernedScientists, Letter to Mr. A. Randolph Blough,Director of Reactor Projects, U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Region I, Re: Same Problems at Same


Nuclear Plant Deserve Same Protection for thePublic, 21 June 2004.33 Riverkeeper, Riverkeeper Calls on GovernorPataki and Senator Clinton to Investigate LatestSafety Problem at IP [press release], 21 September2005.34 Greg Clary, “Indian Point, NRC OfficialsMet With Skepticism,” The Journal News, 29March 2006.35 New York State Public Service Commission,Report on February 15, 2000 Event at Indian Point2, 16 May 2000.36 Riverkeeper, Union of Concerned Scientists,Indian Point Energy Center – Petition Pursuant to10 CFR 2.206 – PWR Containment Sump Failure,8 September 2003.37 Five of the six other incidents identified inDavid Lochbaum, Union of ConcernedScientists, Petition Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 –Enforcement Action – Longstanding Leakage ofContaminated Water, submitted to Luis A. Reyes,Executive Director for Operations, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, 25 January 2006. Thesixth incident is the leak of water containingtritium from the Palo Verde nuclear plant inArizona.38 David Lochbaum, Union of ConcernedScientists, Petition Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 –Enforcement Action – Longstanding Leakage ofContaminated Water, submitted to Luis A. Reyes,Executive Director for Operations, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, 25 January 2006.39 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Preliminary Notification of Event or UnusualOccurrence: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station:Followup for Tritium Contamination Found inWater Onsite, PNO-IV-06-001, 17 March 2006.40 Union of Concerned Scientists, Snap, Crackle& Pop: The BWR Power Uprate Experiment, 9 July2004.41 Michael Erman, Reuters, “FirstEnergyAdmits to Nuclear Power Plant Cover-Up,” 20January 2006.42 Union of Concerned Scientists, NuclearReactor Security, downloaded fromwww.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/page.cfm?pageID=176, 24 July 2003.43 U.S. General Accounting Office, NuclearRegulatory Commission: Oversight of Security atCommercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to BeStrengthened, September 2003.44 U.S. Government Accountability Office,Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National

Security, Emerging Threats and InternationalRelations, Committee on Government Reform, Houseof Representatives: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:Preliminary Observations on Efforts to ImproveSecurity at Nuclear Power Plants, 14 September 2004.45 U.S. Government Accountability Office,Nuclear Power Plants: Efforts Made to UpgradeSecurity, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’sDesign Basis Threat Process Should Be Improved,March 2006.46 U.S. Government Accountability Office,Nuclear Regulatory Commission: NRC Needs to DoMore to Ensure that Power Plants Are EffectivelyControlling Spent Nuclear Fuel, April 2005.47 Union of Concerned Scientists, ExtractingPlutonium from Nuclear Reactor Spent Fuel,downloaded from www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/extracting-plutonium-from-nuclear-reactor-spent-fuel.html, 8 February 2006; Union of Con-cerned Scientists, Fissile Material Basics, down-loaded from www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/fissile-materials-basics.html, 8February 2006.48 Bloomberg, “Bush Budget Seeks $250 Millionfor Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plan,” 6 February2006.49 Susan Hutson, Nancy Barber, et al., U.S.Geological Survey, Estimated Use of Water in theUnited States, 2000, revised February 2005.50 American Wind Energy Association, WindEnergy and the Environment, downloaded fromwww.awea.org/faq/tutorial/wwt_environment.html, 24 January 2006.51 Linda Gunter, Paul Gunter, Scott Cullenand Nancy Burton, Licensed to Kill: How theNuclear Power Industry Destroys EndangeredMarine Wildlife and Ocean Habitat to Save Money,2001.52 Ibid.53 Ibid.54 New Jersey Office of the Attorney General,New Jersey Reaches $1 Million Settlement withOwner of Oyster Creek Nuclear Power PlantRegarding Fish Kill Caused by Thermal Discharge,press release, 8 April 2004.55 U.S. Government Accountability Office,Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air,Climate Change and Nuclear Safety, Committee onEnvironment and Public Works, U.S. Senate,Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Challenges FacingNRC in Effectively Carrying Out its Mission, 26May 2005.

Notes 41

56 See note 1.57 David Lochbaum, Union of ConcernedScientists, Nuclear Plant Risk Studies: Failing theGrade, August 2000.58 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Memoran-dum and Order CLI-02-24: In the Matter of DukeCogema Stone & Webster, Docket No. 70-3098-ML,18 December 2002.59 Arjun Makhijani and Scott Saleska, Institutefor Energy and Environmental Research, TheNuclear Power Deception, April 1996.60 Arjun Makhijani, Institute for Energy andEnvironmental Research, The Pebble Bed ModularReactor, downloaded from www.ieer.org/com-ments/energy/chny-pbr.html, 24 January 2006.61 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Design Certification Pre-Application Review –PBMR, downloaded from www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/design-cert/pbmr.html, 24January 2006.62 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, P.L. 83-703, ascited in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Office of General Counsel, Nuclear RegulatoryLegislation: 107th Congress, 1st Session, June 2002.63 CA Pub Res Code § 25524, ME Rev Stat§4374; KY Rev Stat § 278.610, WI Stat Ann §196.493.64 MT Code § 75-20-1203; 35-A ME Rev Stat§4374; KY Rev Stat § 278.610, OR Rev Stat469.597.65 U.S. Supreme Court, Pacific Gas & ElectricCo. et al v. State Energy Resources Conservation andDevelopment Commission et al, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).66 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,State Program Status, downloaded fromcfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm, 23 January2006. The states without Clean Water Actpermitting authority are Alaska, Idaho, Massa-chusetts, New Hampshire and New Mexico.67 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Sec.316(a).68 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Sec.316(b).69 See note 51.70 Ibid.71 Riverkeeper, Seeking Federal Regulations forCooling Water Intakes, Phase I Lawsuit, down-loaded from riverkeeper.org/campaign.php/biodiversity/we_are_doing/100, 24 January2006.72 Rhode Island Department of the AttorneyGeneral, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware,

Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York Sue OverEPA’s Failure to Protect the Nation’s Waters, pressrelease, 26 July 2004.73 David Schlissel, Geoff Keith, et al., SynapseEnergy Economics, Comments on EPA’s ProposedClean Water Act Section 316(b) Regulations forCooling Water Intake Structures at Phase IIExisting Facilities, 7 August 2002. Estimate isbased on an EPA estimate for replacing allcurrent once-through systems with coolingtowers.74 Dick Munson, Northeast-Midwest Institute,Water Use by Electric Utilities in the Great Lakes,January 2005.75 See note 51.76 U.S. Supreme Court, Village of Euclid, Ohio v.Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).77 Kevin E. McCarthy, Connecticut Office ofLegislative Research, Siting Agencies in OtherStates, 13 August 2002.78 16 USC 1455 (d)(8).79 Tony Dutzik, Jasmine Vasavada, TravisMadsen, National Association of State PIRGs,Toward a Consumer-Oriented Electric System, June2004.80 See 77.81 Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.,Regulatory Requirements Database for SmallElectric Generators, downloaded from www.eea-inc.com/rrdb/DGRegProject/index.html, 26January 2006.82 William G. Rosenberg, Dwight C. Alpernand Michael R. Walker, Deploying IGCC in thisDecade with 3Party Covenant Financing: Volume II,May 2005, Chapter 7.83 Figures from Edison Electric Institute RateRegulation Department cited in NationalAcademy of Sciences, Commission on Engineer-ing and Technical Systems, Nuclear Power:Technical and Institutional Options for the Future,National Academies Press, 1992.84 Harriet Burt, California Public UtilitiesCommission, Bibliography of CPUC IntervenerCompensation Decisions from 2002, downloadedfrom www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/report/34768.pdf, 4 April 2004.85 Citizens’ Utility Board of Oregon, CUBMembership, downloaded fromwww.oregoncub.org/membership.html, 24March 2004.86 Based on the Regulatory Assistance Project’sstate IRP surveys, downloaded from


www.raponline.org /Feature.asp?select=14#IRP%20Survey, 5 May 2006.87 The California ISO, whose board is ap-pointed by the governor, is an exception.88 Appliance Standards Awareness Project,Savings from Recent State and National Standards,Excel spreadsheet, 12 January 2006. Nuclearreactors based on 1,000 MW reactor operatingat a 90 percent capacity factor.89 Steven Nadel, Andrew deLaski, MaggieEldridge and Jim Kleisch, American Council foran Energy-Efficient Economy and ApplianceStandards Awareness Project, Leading the Way:Continued Opportunities for New State Applianceand Equipment Efficiency Standards, March 2006.90 Dan York and Marty Kushler, AmericanCouncil for an Energy-Efficient Economy,ACEEE’s Third National Scorecard on Utility andPublic Benefits Energy Efficiency Programs: ANational Review and Update of State-Level Activity,October 2005.91 Ibid.92 Ibid.93 Ibid.94 Assuming that the bulk of renewable energyinstallations are wind power, operating at a 33percent capacity factor.95 Environment California, “It’s Official!”CPUC Approves $3.2 Billion Solar Program, pressrelease, 12 January 2006.96 Randall S. Swisher, “Bringing Wind EnergyUp to ‘Code,’” Public Utilities Fortnightly, June 2004.97 Public Citizen, The Big Blackout and Amnesiain Congress, undated.98 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage TaskForce, Final Report on the August 14th Blackout inthe United States and Canada: Causes and Recom-mendations, April 2004.99 See Amory B. Lovins, E. Kyle Datta, et al.,Rocky Mountain Institute, Small Is Profitable:The Hidden Economic Benefits of Making ElectricalResources the Right Size, 2002.

100 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Prospectsfor Distributed Electricity Generation, September2003.101 California Public Utilities Commission,PUC Adopts Long-Term Power Purchase Plans forUtilities to Ensure Adequate Energy Supply forState, press release, 16 December 2004.102 Ibid.103 See, for example, Joseph V. Spadaro,Lucille Langlois and Bruce Hamilton, “Green-house Gas Emissions of Electricity GenerationChains: Assessing the Difference,” IAEABulletin, 42:2, 2000. Some researchers, however,suggest that the life-cycle energy use of nuclearpower is commonly underestimated and that,should the world’s supply of high-grade uraniumbe exhausted and lower-grade ores be required,the life-cycle carbon dioxide emissions fromnuclear power would exceed those of gas-firedpower plants. See Jan Willem Storm vanLeeuwen and Philip Smith, Nuclear Power: TheEnergy Balance, downloaded fromwww.stormsmith.nl/, 17 January 2006.104 United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change, Report of the Conference of theParties in its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakechfrom 29 October to 10 November 2001, Addendum,Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of theParties, 21 January 2002.105 Scott Peterson, Nuclear Energy Institute,Nuclear Energy as an Environmental Answer[PowerPoint presentation], downloaded fromwww.nei.org/documents/Speech_Peterson_9-19-03_EA-slides.ppt, 24 July 2004.106 See Riverkeeper, Mobilizing Support fromMunicipalities, NYC Community Boards, LaborGroups, School Boards and Civic Groups, down-loaded from riverkeeper.org/campaign.php/indian_point/we_are_doing/26, 26 January2006.107 Riverkeeper, Three Out of Four CountiesReject Indian Point Emergency Plans for FourthConsecutive Year, press release, 11 January 2006.

Har

riet

Eck

stei

n G

raph

ic D

esig

n

download report (pdf) - environment california

Documents