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MEKELLE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

MEKELLE, ETHIOPIA

www.abyssinialaw.com

http://www.mu.edu.et/

ONSTITUTIONAL SPECIAL INTEREST OF ONRS IN AACA:

PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

BY: BETRU DIBABA ENTELLIE

ADVISOR: HASSEN MOHAMMED (LLB, LLM)

EVALUATOR: TEKLE HAGOS (LLB, LLM, ASS. PROFESSOR)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR

OF LAWS (LLB), AT COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE, DEPARTMENT OF LAW

C


BETRU DIBABA: CONSTITUTIONAL SPECIAL INTEREST OF ONRS IN AACA: PRESENT STATUS & FUTURE CHALLENGES, 2012

I

ACKNOWLEGMENT

ONSTITUTIONAL SPECIAL INTEREST OF ONRS IN AACA: PRESENT STATUS AND

FUTURE CHALLENGES is a research which is inspired by Constitutional, Federalism

and Fiscal Federalism Courses taken at different semesters. For the development and production of this research, in particular, I feel a deep sense of gratitude to:-

My precious and tolerant family; my father Dibaba Entellie, my mother Docco Gizaw, my

brothers (including my lovely late brother) and my sisters, who have been helping me

continually in the accomplishment of my educational career far away from home;

Negash Tola, Caffee Oromia, Communication Affair, higher officer; for his constant

comfort during the conduct of interview;

Dinku Lemessa, St. Paul Gospel Theology Institute, Minnesota, USA, priest; for his

devotion and demonstration of love that inspired me to pursue this project possible;

Beteselassie Mekonnen, Sebsibe Walga and Yemane Mamo, friends at Mekelle Law

School; for their friendly nourishing contribution;

Hassen Mohammed, (LLB, LLM), Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance,

Department of Law, lecturer; my gifted and diligent advisor, who shepherded the

research from its early formless stage to its present form;

Tekle Hagos (LLB, LLM, Ass. Professor), Mekelle University, College of Law and

Governance, Department of Law, lecturer; diligent person I know ever, my close

academic tutor and evaluator at the end, and

Fasil Alemayehu, (LLB, LLM), Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance,

Department of Law, lecturer; my transcriber, and editor who patiently pursued me to

keep to the schedule and meet the deadline.

C



II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS PAGES

ACKNOWLEGMENT--------------------------------------------------------------------------------I

ACRONYMS----------------------------------------------------------------------------V

MAP OF FDRE-------------------------------------------------------------------------V

INTRODUCTION------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VI

CHAPTER ONE

FEDERALISM: SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO THE FDRE, ONRS AND AACA

1.1. Overview of Federalism---------------------------------------------------------------------------1

1.2. Intergovernmental Relations in Federalism ----------------------------------------------------3

1.2.1. Importance of Intergovernmental Relations--------------------------------------------------3

1.2.2. Models of Intergovernmental Relations-------------------------------------------------------4

1.2.3. Channels of Intergovernmental Relations-----------------------------------------------------5

1.3. The Origin of FDRE-------------------------------------------------------------------------------6

1.3 1. Intergovernmental Relations in FDRE--------------------------------------------------------7

1.4. The ONRS-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9

1.4.1. Emergence of ONRS----------------------------------------------------------------------------10

1.4.2. ONRS under FDRE Constitution--------------------------------------------------------------11

1.4.3. The Constitution of ONRS---------------------------------------------------------------------11

1.5. The AACA-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13



III

1.5.1. AACA under FDRE Constitution-------------------------------------------------------------13

1.5.2. The Charter of AACA--------------------------------------------------------------------------14

1.5.3. Intergovernmental Relations of AACA------------------------------------------------------15

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONTEXT OF SPECIAL INTEREST OF ONRS IN AACA

2.1. Concept of State Interest-------------------------------------------------------------------------17

2.2. Types of State Interest----------------------------------------------------------------------------19

2.3. Contents of State Interest-------------------------------------------------------------------------20

2.4. Grounds of Special Interest----------------------------------------------------------------------22

2.4.1. Social, Economic, and Historical Grounds--------------------------------------------------22

2.4.2. Geographical Ground---------------------------------------------------------------------------24

2.4.3. Legal Ground------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24

2.5. Recognition of ‘Special Interest’ ---------------------------------------------------------------26

2.6. Elements of Special Interest---------------------------------------------------------------------29

2.6.1. Provision of Social Services-------------------------------------------------------------------29

2.6.2. Utilization of Natural Resources--------------------------------------------------------------31

2.6.3. Joint Administrative Matters------------------------------------------------------------------33

2.6.4. Other Similar Matters---------------------------------------------------------------------------35

2.7. Connotations of Special Interest-----------------------------------------------------------------36

2.7.1. AAC Part of ONRS Vs Independent City---------------------------------------------------37

2.7.2. Peaceful War: Horizontal Relations----------------------------------------------------------40

2.7.3. Peaceful War: Spillover Effects---------------------------------------------------------------41

CHAPTER TREE

FUTURE CHALLENGES OF SPECIAL INTEREST



IV

3.1. Cases of Future Challenges of Special Interest------------------------------------------------44

3.1.1. Future AACA: Spatial Expansion-------------------------------------------------------------44

3.1.2. Conflicting Constitutional Rights of ONRS and AACA-----------------------------------46

3.1.3. Tragedy of Fiscal Double Taxation------------------------------------------------------------51

3.1.4. The Legal Limbo---------------------------------------------------------------------------------52

3.1.4.1. Scope of the Law-------------------------------------------------------------------------------53

3.1.4.2. Authority to Enact the Law-------------------------------------------------------------------55

3.1.5. Under Multi-Political Party System------------------------------------------------------------56

CHAPTER FOUR

ENFORCEMENT OF SPECIAL INTEREST

4.1. Overview of Enforcement of Special Interest---------------------------------------------------59

4.2. Institutional Enforcement--------------------------------------------------------------------------59

4.2.1. House of Federation------------------------------------------------------------------------------60

4.2.2. House of Peoples’ Representatives-------------------------------------------------------------62

4.2.3. Ministry of Federal Affairs----------------------------------------------------------------------62

4.2.4. Special Joint Committee-------------------------------------------------------------------------64

4.3. Technical Enforcement----------------------------------------------------------------------------65

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------67

Recommendation-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------71

BIBLIOGRAPHY------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VIII

ANNEXES



V

ACRONYMS

FDRE: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

ONRS: Oromia National Regional State

AACA/G: Addis Ababa City Administration/Government

MAP OF FDRE

Source:http://www.google.com.et//www.ethiopia.gov.et//Information/Publish, 28 December, 2011



VI

INTRODUCTION

The Constitutional Special Interest of Oromia National Regional State, (ONRS hereinafter), in

Addis Ababa City Administration, (AACA hereinafter): Present Status and Future Challenges, in

the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, (FDRE hereinafter), is the central theme of this

research. Under FDRE Constitution, we can see nine federating states of which ONRS is one,

being recognized, and AACA, the capital city of the Republic being granted full measure of self-

governance. To make matters complicated, the Constitution grants the Region with special

interest regarding provision of social services, utilization of natural resources, joint

administrative matters and other similar matters over AAC without listing it exhaustively,

Article, (Art. hereinafter), 49(5).

The very phraseology of special interest is technical employment. The geographical location,

historical and socio economic underpinnings and legal grounds attract the attention of ONRS and

Oromo people; inspire them to know, if not to know more, about the City and special interest.

The Constitutional Special Interest is not only ethical, political or legal issue. It is also a human

issue, involving the people of the Region; indigenous people are the base of the Constitutional

Special Interest. They are the gate keepers, of success or failure to husband their interest. And it

is the base of the Region itself as independent Regional State and as member of the federation.

Constitutional Special Interest is, therefore, a particularistic extraordinary privilege, power, right,

interest or immunity recognized and guaranteed, almost the same, when the Constitution come

into scene. It is particularistic extraordinary because it is of single state interest that it shares with

no other constituent regional states and the catalogues of particular are there.

Today, we do not watch concrete job being done to enhance and pursue this interest and things

are left to stay in paper and in limbo. After the enactment of the Constitution, two Charters have

been issued for the City. But still, both of them have failed to state the relationship between

ONRS and AACA along with the Constitutional Special Interest. Even if both Charters empower

the City government and Federal government to reach an agreement with the Region, this has not

been materialized yet. For the people, therefore, the past decades have meant a major loss of



VII

control over special interest. The Region and its people are still the first to know about changes

in the Constitutional Special Interest; they are now the first to be asked or consulted.

Despite, the above stated laws and Draft Proclamation, (proc. hereinafter), of Constitutional

Special Interest, it is hard to find any document of relevance in order to exhaust the issue. Still,

this paper will serve as a stepping stone for potential researches on the topic.

In order to fully understand the Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS over AACA, the study is organized into chapters. Each chapter is divided and subdivided into titles and subtitles. The research is accompanied by conductive interviews, comparative references and practical observations. Accordingly, four chapters are accorded.

The first chapter introduces the idea of federalism at glance, shades light on intergovernmental

relations in federalism with due emphasis to FDRE, ONRS and AACA. This chapter opens an

entry to the research.

Chapter two is devoted to deal with special interest; comparative concepts, grounds, recognition, elements and connotations. As such, it is the thoroughly investigation based.

Chapter three tries to analyze the potential challenges the Constitutional Special Interest

presents. It pinpoints complicated issues surrounding the special interest such as spatial

expansion of the City, conflicting constitutional rights, tragedy of double taxation, legal limbo

and challenges under multi political party system.

Chapter four tries to complement the enforcement of special interest, to be employed institutionally by the two Federal Houses, Ministry of Federal Affairs and the anticipated Special Joint Committee. And technical enforcement is proposed. So, this chapter is institutional and technical responses to the challenges identified.

At the end, the paper comes to an end with conclusion and recommendation, which are the findings of this research. It may have great impacts on the healthy functioning of Constitutional Special Interest in the realm of functioning federation.



VIII

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Thomas. J. Anton, American Federalism and Public Policy, New York, 1998.

2. Abdulrahim P. Vijapur, Dimensions of Federal National Building, (LLM Thesis), Hamdard

University, New Delhi, 1998.

3. Tsegaye Regassa, Ethic Federalism and the Right to Self-determination asa Constitutional

Legal Solution: the Case of Ethiopia, (LLM Thesis), Amsterdam University, 2001.

4. David Turton, Ethic Federalism: the Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective,

Eastern African Studies, 2006.

5. Gadaa Melba, Oromiya: An Introduction, Khartoum, 1998.

6. G/Egziabher G/Mariam, The Power of Executive Body in AACA and its Practical

Problems, (LLB Thesis), Ethiopian Civil Service University, 2000

7. Evan Caminker, State Sovereighty and Subordinance, Columbia Law Review, 2009.

8. John D. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism, University of Oklahoma, 2009.

9. Bryan A. Gamer, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed, 1990.

10. Asefa Fiseha, Multi Culturalism and Federalism; In First National Conference on

Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, 2003.

11. Garth Stevenson, Federalism in Canada, 1989.

12. Jisha Guddissa, Intergovernmental Relations as Means for Managing Interethnic

conflicts: Assessing the Role of Ministry Of Federal Affairs, (LLM Thesis),Ethiopian

Civil Service University, 2011.

13. Fasil Nahum, Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect, the Red sea

Press, Asmera, 1997.



IX

14. Christopher N. May, Constitutional Law: National Power and Federalism, Loyola Law

school, 3rd ed. 2004.

15. Gebreab Barnabas, Ethnic and Religious Policy of the FDRE, In First National Conference on Federalism, 2003.

16. Mulugeta Mengist, Reading Materials for Administrative Law, Mekelle University, Facultry of Law, 2002.

17. Tarikua Getachew, State Formation by Secession and Problems of Border Delimitation, (LLB Thesis), AAU, Law Faculty, 2002.

18. Frederik KirgisJr, The Degress of Self-determination in the United Nations Era, 1996.

19. Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience, 1991-

2000, 2002.

20. Milki Ayele, Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Oromiavis-a-vis Court Litigation, (LLB Thesis), Mekelle University , Law Faculty, 2008).

21. Dr. Kinfe Abraham, Ethiopia from Empire to Federation, New York, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development, 2001.

22. Tefera Felesa, Seenaa Finfinnee Durii, 2007

23. Dan Corry, Public Expenditure: Effective Management and Control, Institute for Public

Policy Research, London, 1997.

24. Abebe Mekesha, Action Professional Association for the Peoples’ Experience in Profession

of Legal Aid: Approaches and Challenges, (Unpublished), 2007.

25. Nassisse Chali, Oromiya Today: Published by ONRS, President Office, Pocket Guide,

2008/09.

26. Teshome Yami, The Role of Intergovernmental Relations Between Oromia National

Regional State and Addis Ababa City Administration, (LLM Thesis), Addis Ababa

University, 2010.

27. Gemechis Temesgen, Status of Self-determination in the Post-colonial Era, (LLB Thesis),

Mekelle University, 2009.



X

28. Mekonnen Fisseha, Group Rights Under the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: With

Particular Emphasis on the Right to Self-determination, (LLB Thesis), Mekelle

University,2007

29. Dalu Abdo, Applicability of Right to Secession During State of Emergency Under FDRE

Constitution, (LLB Thesis), Mekelle University, 2008

30. Yohannes Mesfin, The Status of Addis Ababa Under FDRE Constitution, (LLB Thesis),

Mekelle University, 2007

31. Tikikle Kumalechew, Protection of National Minorities in the National Regional State, (LLB

Thesis),Mekelle University,2007

32. Assefa Fiseha, (PhD), Federalism, 2008

Laws

1. South African Constitution Act 108, 1996

2. National/Regional Self-government Establishment, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc. No. 7/1992

3. AACG Central, Sub-city, and Kebele, Executive and Municipal Services Organs Re-

establishment, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc. No. 4/2000.

4. AACG Charter, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc. No. 87/1997

5. AACG Revised Charter, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc. No.361/2003

6. Dire Dawa City Council Charter, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc. No. 416/2004.

7. ONRS Revised Constitution, Magalata Oromiya, Proc. No. 46/2001.

8. The Constitution of FDRE, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc. No. 1/1995.

9. Systems for the Intervention of the Federal Government in the Regions, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc.

No. 359/2003.

10. Reorganization of the Executive Organs of FDRE, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc. No. 256/2001.



XI

11. Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of FDRE, Fed. Neg.Gaz, Proc. No.471/2005.

12. AACG Executive and Municipal Service Organs Establishment, Fed. Neg.Gaz, Proc. No.

2/2002

13. AACG Sub-cities and Kebeles Establishment, Fed. Neg.Gaz, Proc. No.1/2003.

14. Consolidation of House Of Federation and Definition of its Powers and its Responsibilities,

Fed. Neg. Gaz, Proc. No. 25/2001.

15. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of FDRE, Fed.Neg. Gaz, proc. No.

4/1995.

16. Universal Declaration of Human rights, UN General Assembly, Resolution 217 A (III), 1948

17. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, UN General Assembly,

Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 1966.

18. International Covenant on Civil, and Political Rights, UN General Assembly, Resolution

2200 A (XXI) 1966.

19. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU, Doc. CAB/LEG/ 67/3 rev. 5,

21 ILM. 58 (1982), 1986.

Magazines

1. Heber Biher, the FDRE, House of Federation, Annual Magazine, Hidar 29, 2003.

2. Addis Standard,Vol.1 issue No.6,Weekly Magazine, Jakenn Publishing PLC, August 2011.

3. Killolee, ONRS, Office of the President, Annual Magazine, 2011.

Documents

1. FDRE, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Information and Public Relations Department, 2007.

2. የኢ.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ: አረተኛው፡ የፌዲሬሽን፡ ምክር: ቤት: የብሔረሰቦች: ውክልና፡ ዝርዝር፡ መግለጫ: (ፕሮፋይል) (2003

ዓ/ም)



XII

3. Draft Proclamation on Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS in AAC, Finfine, 2009.

4. Constitutional Constituent Assembly, Compilation No.24, Addis Ababa, 1994.

Official Letters

1. ONRS, Office of the President, Concerning the Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS over

Finfine, BMNO 1/302/M1, Yekatit 24, 1998.

2. FDRE, House of Federation, Advisory Opinion on Special Interest of ONRS over Finfine,

መ/ቁ/አ/ጉ/1/01/98,Miyaziya 16,1998

3. AACA, AA Water Sewerage Authority, ውዓፕ/ 2411/02, 08/03/2002.

Interviews

1. Dawano Kedir, ONRS, Office of the President, Legal Advisor, 14 Sept. 2011.

2. Abat G/Tsadik, FDRE, Ministry of Justice, Law Research and Drafting, Director, 15 Sept.

2011.

3. Fantaye Gezahgn, FDRE, Ministry of Federal Affairs, the Former Intergovernmental

Relations, Officer, 13 Sept. 2011.

4. Shimelis Abdisa, ONRS, Office of the President, Communication and Protocol, Director, 22

Sept. 2011.

5. Desalegn Weyessa, FDRE, House of Federation, Council of Constitutional Inquiry,

Constitutional Interpretation and Rights, Director, 19 Sept. 2011.

6. Meseret Tsehay, AACA, Justice Bureau, Law Research and Draft Preparation, Officer, 20

Sept. 2011.

7. Abebe Fixe, ONRS, Justice Bureau, Law Research and Draft Preparation, Director, 14 Sept.

2011.

8. Fekadu Seboka, AACA, Police Commission, Commissioner, 19 Sept. 2011.



XIII

9. Habtamu Sisay, ONRS, Special Zone around Finfine, Peace and Administration Office,

Head, 19 Sept. 2011.

10. Ewnetu Bilata, FDRE, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Directorate of Intergovernmental

Relations, Head, 20 Sept. 2011.

Web Sites

1. http://www.google.com.et//www.ethiopia.gov.et//Information/Publish, 28 December, 2011

2. htt://www.theoromopeopleandfinfinnee.com/Oromia, 11 July, 2011



XIV

ANNEXES



1

CHAPTER ONE

FEDERALISM: SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO THE FDRE, ONRS AND AACA

1.1. Overview of Federalism

In order to fully understand the nature of Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS over AACA

one should start studying the subject by looking into the political, legal and socio economic

circumstances that led to its recognition as a distinct subject at a certain point in history; the

science of federalism.

Before its political nature came into existence, the term ‘federalism’ had occurred as a

theological concept employed to illustrate the necessary relationship between God and mankind.1

The Federal Theology perceived God and mankind tied by covenant in lasting yet limited union;

planned to make both parties commonly responsible for the world’s prosperity without ignoring

their respective integrities.2

The term ‘federal’ is originated from the Latin word ‘foedus,’ which sees the Hebrew word

‘brit,’ meaning binding formal agreement.3 Federalism oriented writings give different

definitions. The writings depend on what do the federal states expect from the federal

arrangements. Answers to this are conditioned once again by the socio economic, historical and

political factors prevailing in particular country.4

In short, this is to mean federations can be born, either when different political entities join

together for whatever reasons, but mainly for economic and military advantage, (coming

together), or when the formerly unitary states constitutionally devolve powers to regions, or

states, (holding together), in response to various pressure. Federal principles are the summation 1Teshome Yami, The Role of Intergovernmental Relations Between Oromia National Regional State and

Addis Ababa City Administration, (LLM Thesis), Addis Ababa University, 2010, p-8

2Thomas J. Anton, American Federalism and Public Policy, New York, 1998, P-3.

3Abdulrahim P. Vijapur, Dimensions of Federal Nation Building, (LLM Thesis), Hamdard University, New

Delhi, 1998, P-25. 4Id. P-26



2

of ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared-rule.’ This is intended to preserve respective identity of all members

on one side and to achieve common goals on other side.5

With intent to distinguish the federal arrangement from other forms of government, scholars

agreed on the following common structural features of federations:-6

Existence of minimum of two tiers of governments, one for the entire federation, the

other for constituent units, each acts directly on the people,

Formal constitutional division of powers,

Fair regional representation, within the federal policy making institutions,

Supreme written constitution impossible to amend unilaterally,

An umpire in different forms to resolve conflicts, and

Institutions to facilitate and conduct inter-governmental networks.

Further, among some others, Preston King and Ronald Watts distinguish federalism from

federation.7 Accordingly, federalism is defined as a value concept, including ideological and

philosophical views enhancing the federal arrangement. Federation is descriptive concept

describing the actual practice and particular kind of institutional structures. Federalism is

accommodative concept; encompasses shared rule and self-rule, while federation directs to show

empirical institutional reality.8 Hence, the “what” of federation is that the constituent units

called states, provinces, regions, lander, republics, cantons, mutatis mutandis, are constitutionally

see themselves in the federal government institutions which cannot be altered by unilateral

decision of the federal government. Based on this, federalism as a normative concept would

emphasize on enhancing the view that constituent units should be participated in the legislature

at the federal level.9 It is noted above that federalism encompasses principles of shared rule and

self-rule. The principle of shared rule, (more than two governments interact for common

concerns), is governed by rules of intergovernmental relations which come next.

5Id. P-29 6Supra note 1, p-10 7Id. P-14 8Ibid. 9Id. Pp-14-15



3

1.2. Intergovernmental Relations in Federalism

Though, there is a scarcity of evidence concerning the right historical incidence when the

concept of intergovernmental relations came into existence, some literature reveals, it was

originated in the 1930’s in the United States.10 Beyond this, the prevalence of the term in most

federal states has resulted in intergovernmental relation being confused with federalism. In fact,

they are different in that intergovernmental relation can be found both in federal and unitary

countries. But, federation without intergovernmental relation is sick.11 This shows the great and

inevitable role of intergovernmental relation in federation. Many define intergovernmental

relation with different words but, more or less conveying similar maneuver. For instance, the

designation of intergovernmental relation, from the Constitution of South Africa reads, “In the

Republic, government is constituted as National, Provincial and Local sphere that are

distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.”12 And these three last words are common elements

in most definitions. While governments could be distinctive, still interdependence and

interrelation are inescapable.

1.2.1. Importance of Intergovernmental Relations

As far as federalism in the existence of minimum two tiers of governments which constitute the

whole federation is opted, it would be impossible to assume that each level of government can

execute all the responsibilities independently. In short, this is to mean an overlap of

responsibilities, so that interdependence and interpenetration is an inevitable truth within

federations where the constituent units implement federally legislated laws and programs; where

the type of grant from the central government is conditional. Intergovernmental relation

enhances coordination of policies.13 It facilitates the advised against less successfully

mechanism. It also enhances trust between groups that may be originally distrustful one to

another. Moreover, interactions have enough room for flexibility which intern enables to attain

the national versus sub national goals. Taking into account the nature of the federal systems

cooperation, friendly relations, consultation, coordination and informing one another on matters

10Id.p-15 11Ibid. 12South Africa Constitution Act 108, 1996, 540 13Supra note 1, pp-16-17



4

of common interest, and supporting one another to cope up with dynamism, and conflict

managements are among the major importance of intergovernmental relation.14

1.2.2. Models of Intergovernmental Relations

There are several models depicting the relationships among different levels of governments.

But, Wright identifies three general types.15 As unavailability of overlap of responsibilities and

interest and interests necessitates intergovernmental networks, one country may not limit only to

one of the models. There is an opportunity of hybrid.16

The Co-ordinate Authority Model: This model depicts clear distinct boarder; divide the central

government and the constituent units.17 Again, it shows the absence of formal recognition of

local governments.18 Thus, and the fate of local governments is fall under the competence of

constituent units. Furthermore, the coordinate authority model indicates none overlapping or

high extent of independence between the center and sub-units governments.19 Accordingly,

Wright argues, this model was exercised in South Africa, following the 1909 Constitution and

still followed in countries like Australia, where state governments have demarcation of power

from the central government.20 Contrary to this model, the writer of this thesis argues, emanating

from unavoidability of responsibilities mainly in federal system, the practical reality of this

model seems dubious.

The Inclusive Authority Model: This model shows the existence of necessary hierarchical nature

of authority.21 Thus, constituent units and local governments are highly subject to the national

government. Hence, their pressure on national politics and public policy is little or nothing.22 As

practical reality of the former model is uncertain, in active or passive role of the sub-units also

make this model ineffective in federal systems. Because, both sub-national units and local

14Id. P-17 15Id. P-20 16Ibid. 17Id. P-21 18Ibid. 19Ibid. 20Id. P-2o 21Id. P-22 22Ibid.



5

governments exist only for sham, and the model indicates centralized system which ignore

differences.

The Bargaining Authority Model: This model has vital role in linking the separate entities within

close and overlapping of duties and authorities.23 This model attempts to produce compromise

that paves the way in flourishing the sense of win-win approaches in complex political situations.

The bargaining model depicts non-hierarchical but, interdependent, interrelated, and also

separate entities.24 This interdependence and interrelatedness of entities produce shared areas that

represent common and/or concurrent competencies. This interaction also indicates the existence

of relations. This model shows the existence of joint responsibility through cooperation on one

side. It is known for its joint and separated powers; reasonable areas of autonomy; and great

degree of interdependence. It is also known for cooperation, competition, bargaining, and

negotiation, as a mechanism to attain consensus on their joint concern.25

1.2.3. Channels of Intergovernmental Relations

Intergovernmental relation may happen through one or more of the following four channels:-26

Arriving at an agreement with each other through consultation and coordination with

major role of executives and administrative organs;

Legislatives of each governments has also significant role, mainly in enacting

matching legislations and ensuring its implementation in their jurisdiction;

Probably the most widely known and vital in most multilevel government is inter-

governmental financial transfers grant mainly from the center, to sub-national

governments; and

The fourth channel of intergovernmental relation involves negotiation, and/or

judicial process with intent to manage disputes among them.

23Id. P-23 24Ibid. 25Ibid. 26Id. P-24



6

Accordingly, with intent to achieve cooperation in multi-level governments, the roles of the

executives (consultation and coordination), legislatives (enacting laws and ensuring its

implementation), intermediates (grant of inter financial transfer), and courts (negotiation and

adjudication) are extensively dominant.

1.3. The Origin of FDRE

Our constitutional framers were aware of the paradoxes in our history and had a clear sense of

where the polity of the new Ethiopia is to walk off. The text of the Constitution was drafted by a

Constitutional Commission established by the Transitional Government as per its mandate under

Art.10 of the Charter, 1991, which came into force in August 1995.It created FDRE, Art.1 of

FDRE Constitution. It divides powers and its exercises between the federal and state

governments, Arts. 46, 47, 51 and 52.

Indeed, Ethiopia is a state of federal system comprising of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of

complex cultural make ups of which each deserves its own specific in geographical, historical

development, socio cultural, legal practices and languages, though the exact number and real

life style of many of them are not well-studied.27 The need for constitutional reform in Ethiopia

is underscored by the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the political history of the

country.28 The preamble of the Constitution gives the impression that the federal state is a union

formed through the free consent of each of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia,

paragraph one.

The basis of state-formation is a mixture of territory and ethnicity although it leans much more

towards the latter.29 Art. 46(2) of the FDRE Constitution endorses the same. Further, it is evident

in the nomenclature of the nine states. The states are Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia,

Benishangul/Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and People, Gambela and Harari,

Art.47(1). Moreover, there are two cities falling under federal jurisdiction; AACA, Art.49(3) and

27Milki Ayele, Customary Dispute Resolution in Oromia vis-a-vis Court Litigation, (LLB Thesis), Mekelle University, 2008, p-1 28Dr. kinfe Abraham, Ethiopia from Empire to Federation, New York, Ethiopian Institute for Peace and Development, 2001, p-493 29Tsegaye Regassa, Ethnic Federalism and Right to Self Determination as Constitutional Legal Solution _ the Case of Ethiopia,

(LLM Thesis), Amsterdam University,2001, p- 97



7

Dire Dawa City Council, the latter lacking constitutional basis except Charter proc. No.

416/2004.

The members of the federation are entitled to what some called internal sovereignty.30 The

preamble begins with the phrase, “We the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia…are

strongly committed in full and free exercise of our right to self-determination.” Art.8 states, “As

sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and that the

constitutions is an expression of their sovereignty.” These provisions cum Art. 39 are clear

manifestations of coming together of Ethiopian federation.

It would be an exaggeration, however, to see the Ethiopian federation as a straight forward

example of coming together form of federation. This is because, although some parts of the

country experienced de facto autonomy in the pre-1991 period, many of states that now form the

federation had no such previous experience.31 There is now territorial adjustment among other

things.

1.3.1. Intergovernmental Relations in FDRE

The relationship of two sets of governments must be based on the principle of independence-

cooperation, i.e. the two entities must be autonomous in their field of jurisdiction as provided

under federal compact. If either of the two entities becomes dependent on the acts of the other

then either shared-rule or self-rule necessarily is defective.

In Ethiopia, under Art.9 of the FDRE Constitution each level of government is required to

respect the Constitution. Art. 50(8) of the same law expressly provides that each sets of

government are required to respect the power of the other, i.e. no superior or subordinate. The

writer would like to explore the FDRE Constitution so as to answer this relation.

Accordingly, there are three types of federal intervention provided for the Constitution.

1. Federal intervention on the basis of the request of member states is provided under Art.

51(14). It is done when a member state finds the existence if a security situation beyond its

30Id. P-98

31David Turton, Ethnic Federalism, the Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, Eastern African Studies, 2006, p-132



8

capacity to control it and makes a request to the federal government. The phrase under the

Constitution, ‘deteriorating security situation’ is however, broad and vague. As per proc.

No. 359/2003, the phrase under the quotation is defined to mean:-

“Any disturbance of public peace and safety, and the executive and judicial organ

of the region are unable to control it,” Art.4

The proclamation also provides a duty to the state council or executive organ of the region to

present its request to the Prime Minister when it is unable to control the problem. When a state

by its own consent asks assistance to the federal government there is no problem at all.

Therefore, the principle of cooperative federalism is applicable.

2. Concerning the federal intervention on the basis of the joint decision of the two houses,

Art. 55(16) of the FDRE Constitution. Here the ground of federal intervention is the

failure of state authorities to control ‘violation of human rights’ occurred in its

jurisdiction. In such condition, the House of Peoples Representative is empowered to give

directives consistent with the joint decision of the two houses.

“Violation of human rights’ means the breaking of the constitutional or

parliamentary provisions of human rights and if both the executive and judicial

organ of the concerned state fails to control it,” Art. 7.

At this point, the conflict is between the principle of autonomy of states in their jurisdiction and

the protection of human rights. Both of them are the most important principle of the Constitution.

The writer believes that the protection of human rights is a must for each regional state, as per

Art. 10(7) of the Constitution; human rights are inherent or natural rights.

3. Federal intervention on the basis of the order of the House of Federation is provided under

Art. 62(9) of the Constitution. The proc. No. 359/2003 has tried to define the phrase

‘endangering the constitutional order’ as:-

“Any act carried out by the participation or consent of regional government is

violation of the Constitution or the constitutional order, in particular, armed

uprising, resolving conflicts between another Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples

or another region by resorting to non-peaceful means, disturbances of peace and



9

security of the federal government, or violation of directives provided by the

House of Peoples Representative deemed to be endangering of the constitutional

order,” Art. 12.

Having employed the word ‘in particular,’ the law provides a number of lists to define what is

endangering the constitutional order, as a result it includes so many other subject matters.

To sum up, the relationship of the two sets of government in Ethiopia is not based on the

principle of independence cooperative relationship. Rather it seems based on voluntary-

cooperation, if not, dependency of regional states on the federal government.

1.4. The ONRS

Oromia is the homeland of Oromo people for centuries. Its name is derived from its people or for

the people belongs to Lowland Eastern Cushitic linguistic family.32 Trace back to history, the

Oromo nation had its own social, political and economic system. Geda egalitarian system is a

highly developed self-sufficient system which used to influence every aspect of Oromo life. It is

further said to be the law of the society; a system by which Oromo administer, defend their

country and through which all their objectives are fulfilled.33 Moreover, it is indicated that the

Geda system has served the basis of democratic and political system whereby the power to

administer the affairs of the nation and the power to make laws belongs to the people. The

Region is also known with its concept of Oromo calendar based on astronomical observations

of the moon in conjunction with seven or eight particular star or groups of stars called

guiding stars, ‘urjii dhaabaa’.34

Though there is no updated data available the number of Oromo people is estimated to be 27,

158,471.35 This counts for almost 40%, the largest group, of the Ethiopian total population.

Oromia is hardly homogenous as it hosts a population of Oromo (87.8%), Amhara (7.22%),

32Nassisse Chali, Oromiya Today, Published by ONRS, President Office Directorate of Protocol and Public Relations, a Pocket

Guide,2008/09, p-4

33Gadaa Melba, Oromiya: An Introduction, Khartoum, 1998, pp-10-11. 34Id. P-11 35Central Statistics Authority, 2007



10

Gedeo (0.91%), Sebatbet Guraghe (0.93%), and other (3.25%).36 So, figures of full ethnic

background are disputed, since many ethnically mixed Ethiopians are found to be difficult to

categorize, or not well studied.

Pertaining to the physical characteristics of the Region, it lies in the central part of FDRE.

Geography, it extends from 3040’N to 10045’N latitude from 34008’E to 42055’E longitude with

an area of 353,690 km2 and accounts for almost 32% of the country; it ranks first out of the

nine regional states and the two city administration and council.37 And the Region has 17

administrative zones, 196 district centers and 375 urban centers.38 It has common boundary with

all regions except Tigray State, Art. 2(1) of Revised Constitution of ONRS, 2001.

1.4.1. Emergence of ONRS

The Peaceful and Democratic Conference, convened from 01 to 05 July, 1991, adopted the

Transitional Charter. At its outset, the Charter launched calling for the people of Ethiopia with

the opportunity to rebuild and for restructuring the Country democratically. Freedom, equal

rights, and self-determination were thereby affirmed. The principle of democratic government

elected by people and accountable to the same has been introduced. Thus, the Transitional

Charter dedicated itself to come back with those subjects. The Charter also warranted to the

people’s right to determine their own affairs by themselves. Nonetheless, the ipso facto warrant

of self-determination did not indulge in the Ethiopian people with the opportunity to rebuild the

country. It further needs to issue a law defining regions thereby establishing self-governments

and people’s self-determination. As a result National/Regional Self-Government Proclamation,

proc. No.7/1992 was issued. This proclamation defined the self-government in terms of nation or

regional entity with legislative, executive and the judicial power under Art.2(3). Here in, the

imperative concepts of separation of power among the three state organs has been introduced.

The idea of nation self-determination was defined. It is to mean, nation governments established

by a Nations, Nationalities, and People for self-determination of its own within its defined

geographical territory as per Art.2(4).

36Ibid. 37Heber Biher, the FDRE, House of Federation, Annual Magazine, Hidar 29, 2000, P-15

38Ibid.



11

Indeed, starting a new chapter in Ethiopian history as the Charter claimed in its preamble.

Therefore, the ONRS has been established as a result of the imperative nation’s coalition with

new chapter to live together under Art.3(1) of Self-Government Proclamation.

1.4.2. ONRS under FDRE Constitution

The long lasting history of Ethiopia reveals that the Country has been led by a centralized state

only under strong emperors. However, as has been attempted here in above, the point of

departures for regional state setup was introduced during the Transitional period Charter, 1991-

1994.

This Charter was the precursors of the FDRE Constitution. This is so that the Constitution in its

preamble verifies the Charter’s expression. The Constitution declares as it has intention to rectify

the unjust relationship and thereby further the common interest of Nations, Nationalities, and

People of Ethiopia on equal basis. Thus, it proclaimed as it renders strong commitment for a

democratic order in which full and free exercise of self-determination would be maintained.

This in turn, would help to build a political community found on the rule of law and capable of

ensuring a lasting peace.

Being established by the Transitional Charter, the ONRS has been recognized by FDRE

Constitution as one of constituent states of federation, Art.47(1(4)). Therefore, the Region’s

people as a nation perhaps, for the first time in history of the country since the consolidation of

the Empire, has acquired constitutional right to administer its own state.

Interestingly enough, the Constitution has granted particularistic special interest to the Region in

AAC. The special interest includes provision of social services, utilization of natural resources,

joint administrative matters and other similar matters which is the innermost subject of this

research, Art.49(5).

1.4.3. The Constitution of ONRS

In Ethiopia, regional states have the power to adopt their own Constitution, Arts. 50(5) and 52(2)

(b) of FDRE Constitution. Oromia as a regional state, after a right granted to it by the

Constitution to set up its own government, has passed two constitutions. These are the 1995



12

Constitution, which is enacted for the first time and the 2001 Revised Constitution. Let’s talk

about the latter one.

This Constitution has come into effect on 27th October, 2001 after ‘Chaffe’ adopted at its

extraordinary meeting, Proc. No. 46/2001. It is a clear document with a total of 113 articles. This

proclamation is issued for the enforcement of the Constitution indicated as there was

disagreement in the previous Constitution. It further pointed the ensuring of separation of power

between state organs and specifying their accountability thereon necessitated revision.

According to the Constitution, which starts in its preamble, ‘We the Oromo People…’ provides:-

“ONRS is the uninterrupted territory inhabited by the people of the Oromo nation

and other peoples who made a choice to live in the Region, the borders of which

are: to the North- the Afar and the Amhara Regions, to the South- the Region of

the Southern Nationalities and Peoples and Kenya, to the East the Somali

Region, and to the West-the Benishangul/Gumuz and Gambela peoples Regions

and the Sudan. [T]he current borders of the ONRS may be reviewed having

regard to the interests of the people of the Region and in due consultation with the

concerned Regional States,” Art.2(1 and 2).

Afan Oromo is the working language of the Regional State, it is written in the Latin alphabet,

Art. 5.

There upon, the Revised Constitution provides different nomenclatures for the legislative and

executive organs of the state. Accordingly, the legislature is called the ‘Caffee Oromia’ while the

executive is termed as ‘Administrative Council’. The legislative power in the Region is vested in

the ‘Caffee’ as per Art. 46(2) of the Constitution; the ‘Caffee’ is the supreme organ of the

Regional State.

The Constitution has two amendments. The first one includes about the capital city of the

Region. Prior to 2001, the Region’s capital city was AA, also known as ‘Finfine’ (hot springs);

the original name in the Oromo language. The relocation of regional capital city to Adama

spanked considerable controversy. Critics of move believed that the Ethiopian government

wished to deemphasize AA’s location within the center of Oromia. On the other hand, the



13

government maintained that AA has been found inconvenient from the point of developing the

language, culture and history of the Oromo people. Accordingly, Art. 6 of ONRS Revised

Constitution of 2001, provided Adama as its capital city, which is later amended as per Proc.No.

94/2005 for there were continuous peaceful demonstrations. This is the first amendment made to

it. It has 3 articles.

The second amendment made to the Revised Constitution is by proc. No. 108/2006. It tries to

rectify the problem related to election of Woreda and Kebele Councils. This too has 3

articles.

1.5. The AACA

The name city is given to certain urban communities by virtues of some legal or conventional

distinction. It also refers to a particular type of community, the urban community and its generic

culture, often called urbanism in legal terms in US for example a city is an urban area

incorporated by special or general act of a state legislature.39

Ethnic Oromo Ethiopians had lived on the land before the foundation of AA. They lived in a

small settlement known under the Oromo name ‘Hora Finfine’ (hot spring). The history of AA

formally begins with the founding of the City in 1886 by Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II and his

wife Empress Taytu Betul; the Emperor came to ‘Dildila,’ Entoto Mountains with his

followers.40

Geographically, AA is perched at an altitude of between 2,200 and 3000m above sea level

surrounded mostly by a range of mountains located at 90 longitude N and 380 latitude E,

sprawling over a mostly rugged area of 540 km2 with in ONRS.41

1.5.1. AACA under FDRE Constitution

The Constitution has provisions concerning AAC. It is not partner of the federation and does not

enjoy the autonomous status as of the region. However, it is common to regard it as a region for 39G/Egziabher G/Mariam, the Power of Executive Body in Addis Ababa City Administration and its Practical Problems, (LLB Thesis), Ethiopian Civil Service University, 2000, P-19. 40Supra note 1, p-64 41AACA, AAC Government Investment Authority, 2005



14

some legal purposes.42 It is semi-autonomous authority accountable to the federal government,

Art.49(2) of FDRE Constitution. Thus, AA is federal district without full autonomy accorded to

regions. AA is the capital city of the Country, Art. 49(1).

The residents of the City have guaranteed full measure of self-governance. Hence, being

administered without a Charter for some time, the federal government has come up with a law

regulating its governance. The residents would be represented in the House of Peoples’

Representatives, Art. 49(2, 3 and 4). As a Chartered City, ‘res gez astedader,’AA has the status

of both a capital city of federal government and self-rule city. Indeed, it is incorporated as

AACG, which its status emanates from Arts. 49(2) and 88(7) of FDRE Constitution.

The capital city of the federal government is also the capital of one of the constituent units, Art.

2(3) Amendment Proc. No. 94/2005of Revised Constitution of ONRS which seems in line with

Art. 49(5) of FDRE Constitution. The latter Constitution protects the special interest as provided

above.

1.5.2. The Charter of AACA

As to the legal place of AAC and sub-cities the chief legal regimes governing their status are the

Charters, AACG Charter, proc. No. 87/1997 and Revised Charter, proc. No. 361/2003. The

former one is the first Charter of the City. As we can understand from the connotation, the latter

one is revision of the former. And as such it commands more authority than the former Charter.

However, the former is still applicable as long as it does not contradict with the provisions of the

Revised Charter.

The Revised Charter has created three tiers of governmental system, Art.2(1, 5 and 6). These are

the City, sub-cities and kebeles, the latter currently reordered as woredas. If we include the

federal government, there will be four levels of governments in AACA.

Each AA sub-city is a municipality, Art.30(7)of the Revised Charter. It has legal personality to

sue and be sued in its own name. It should act under the central leadership of the City, Art.30(1).

The City Council decides the organization or reorganization of the sub-cities. They are the

42For instance, Art. 2(7); Labor proc. No. 377/2003, Art. 2(7); Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority Establishment proc. No. 587/2008



15

creation of both the Charter and the City. Thus by default, AA sub-cities are extension of the

City.

Currently, there are ten districts or municipalities according to AAC Government sub-cities and

kebeles Establishment Proc. No. 1/2003; AA Re-establishment Proc. No. 13/2004, Art.4. These

are, Arada, Addis Ketema, Ledeta, Kirkos, Yeka, Bole, Akaki Kaliti, Nifassilk Lafto, Kolfe-

Keranyo and Guelele sub-cities. However, the sub-cities do not have a separate Charter as they

are part of the City. The Charter and the laws of the City serve as their incorporating document.

They are not independent city, but still accountable to the City.

1.5.3. Intergovernmental Relations of AACA

An intergovernmental relation of AACA is governed under Arts.61-63 and other related

provisions of the Revised Charter in line with Art. 49of FDRE Constitution.

Federal-City: Sub-cities do not have direct relationship with the federal government organs, such

as the House of People’s Representatives, Office of the Prime Minister, House of Federation,

Federal Ministries and Authorities. The federal government uses the City as a medium. The City

is part of the federal government, Art. 61(2) of the Charter. In concrete terms, by the by same

law the City is accountable to the federal government in respect to security, diplomatic relations

and enforcement of federal policies, laws and standards. Failure to fulfill may entail the

dissolution of the City by the Federal government, Arts. 17(1) and 61(3) of the Charter. The

latter article gives us a clear understanding of the status of AAC and in a way also explains the

rationales behind the level of involvement of the government in the administration of the City.

City-Sub-city: There is a superior-subordinate relationship between the City and its ten districts.

Besides, observing the policies and laws of the City, sub-cities should respect and implement

decisions of upper organs of the City, Re-establishment Proc. No.13/2004, Art.58(2). The

relationship between the City and sub-cities is a centralized unitary type. There is no area left to

the executive jurisdiction of the sub-cities with full autonomy. Each sector office and organs of

the sub-cities are expected to act in line with the direction of its counterpart bureau, authority,

agency, and commission at the City level, Arts.43(3) and 61(3) of same proclamation. This

makes sub-cities more of a concentrated structure.



16

Sub-city–Woreda: Woredas are sub-divisions of the ten municipalities of the City, Art.30 of the

Charter. They are accountable to their respective residents and sub-city councils, Art. 38(1) of

the Charter. Institutions of sub-cities and woredas are designed to make the latter sub-servient to

the former. It is a replica of the City-sub-city relationship.

The sector office of a woreda is accountable to their counterpart office at the sub-city level for

professional and technical assistance and supervision, Art.73(3) of the Re-enactment

Proclamation. Thus, the relationship between sub-cities and their woreda is hierarchical.

ONRS-City: Here, two scenarios may be envisaged while dealing with relations. Firstly, the

FDRE Constitution guarantees special interest of ONRS in the City as a whole on matters of

provisions of social services, utilization of natural resources, administrative and other similar

matters, Art.49(5). Hence, given the constitutional protection of special interest pertaining to

those mentioned, the horizontal contact should be strengthened as rests upon fruitful cooperation.

Art. 62(1) of the Charter.

Secondly, those sub-cities bordering ONRS require cooperation with the special zones Around

Finfine, Art.5 of the Charter. Upon now, there is limited joint effort concerning security affairs in

this regard. To effectively fight illegal land holding, control security problems, etc. there should

be a close tie between sub-cities and neighboring Special Zones, Art.62(2) of the Charter. The

second proviso of same article adds ‘agreement’ and the coming of subsequent law as means of

interrelation between the two governments.



17

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONTEXT OF SPECIAL INTEREST OF ONRS IN AACA

2.1. Concept of State Interest

“Even after decades of talk about the political safeguards of federalism, there

is a lot we do not know about the formal even informal ways in which states’

interests influence parliamentarian decision making. What seems clear,

however, is that there are avenues of influence, often very strong ones.”43

“The true essence of federalism is that the states as states have legitimate

interests which the national government is bound to respect.”44

The first quote implies the strong state even to influence the parliament with regard to its interest

while the second one connotes the obligation of the central government to respect the interest of

state. Both are modes of safeguarding state interest which are qualities of federalism.

Although their personal motives may vary, governors, state legislators, and other state officials

seek public office to try to remedy what they perceived to be public problems in their states.

Once in office, however, many learn that they are not entirely free to tackle state problems

in any way they would like. The federal government has legislated laws in many areas of public

concern, and overtime those federal policies have circumscribed or eliminated state authority in

some policy areas. The conjoint governing arrangement cause state and federal officials to view

policy issues in certain ways and to perceive their respective political interests accordingly.

Some of the interests perceived by state officials as they do their jobs concern what is best for

their states in their dealings with the federal government. It is these state-governmental interests

that are at stake in the state-federal contests for authority that collectively determine the nature of

state’s federation in general and in Ethiopia in particular.

43Evan Caminker, State Sovereignty and Sub ordinance, Columbia Law Review, P-1086. 44Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Garcia vs. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 1985, P-546.



18

Developing a premise for talking about state interests with special emphasis to special interest is

a critical first step toward writer’s ultimate aim in this research. It is surprising that the

federalism and intergovernmental relations literatures lack a concise state stand up at federal

constraints in their autonomy; we need to know much more than this to fully understand how and

why state officials try to check and balance the federal government today.45

In the introduction, it is noted the similar ways that the leading framers of the FDRE Constitution

viewed the dynamics of the so-called intergovernmental relations. According to Madison Ian

logic, the institutional interests of parliament, executive and courts are promoted by the exercise

of power exerted in the service of the personal, political, and policy ambitions of the individuals

within those institutions.46

Although federalism scholarship frequently refers to the states as if they all shared the same

set of interests when dealing with federal government, (unlike the case of Constitution of

Ethiopia which announces the special interest of ONRs in AAC), many federal policies result in

new or renewed alignment of like-minded states.47 A typology of state-agreement interests

should reflect variations in the scope of state agreement and the writer will refer to these

different interests as special interest, bestowed to one state.

Despite frequent scholarly and journalistic use of the term ‘state interest,’ political scientists and

legal scholars have not provided a precise term in literatures. Anyway, ‘special interest’, or

‘interest’ is preferred here because it is more analytically precise as well as easier to identify as it

is used in FDRE Constitution.

Special interest of ONRS in AAC is a very hot issue between and among Oromo people and City

analysts and has been point of getting attention during election campaign since the issue of state

governmental interest is involved. According to Ato Desalegn Weyessa,48 this issue has to be

45John D.Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism, University of Oklahoma Press, 2009, P-20. 46Ibid. 47Id. PP-21-22, bracket added.

48Interview: FDRE, House of Federation, Council of Constitutional Inquiry, Constitutional Interpretation and Rights, Director, 19

Sept, 2011.



19

dealt critically and seriously at highest level even before election campaign because people need

some start to have awareness, and governments have been censured for it.

2.2. Types of State Interest

In policy disputes with their federal counter parts; state concerns cluster around issues of legal

authority, money and administrative processes. On any particular policy issue, these interests

may be perceived by all or most states, by group of states, or by one state only.

Universal state interests are the institutional preferences that all states perceive vis-à-vis the

federal government.49 By this, AAC being the capital city of the FDRE; Nations, Nationalities

and Peoples of the Country, i.e. all states are necessarily interested in the general provisions, Art.

49(1) of FDRE Constitution.

Categorical state interests are perceived by all or most of states share a certain category of

interests; a characteristic such as geographical location, benefits received under various federal

programs or grants in aid, demographic characteristics, or large tracts of federally owned land.50

There is good start by Oromia, Somale, Afar, Harari National Regional States and Dire Dawa

City Council which aimed to make the City corridor of development and to ensure peace in the

regions.51 Thus, Dire Dawa City owes the categorical interest to the five governments according

to their agreement.

In Particularistic state interest, federal legislations may affect a single state only or the same

piece of legislations may have differential effects on states. A particularistic state interest is

perceived either by a single state or by different states in different ways.52 Although it is rare that

a single state government perceives an interest vis-à-vis the federal government that it shares

with no other state government, there are some instances in which this is a clearly the case. The

study at hand is of this type.

49Supra note 45, P-28 50Id. P- 32

51Supra note 1, p-73 52Supra note 45, P- 34



20

The special interest of ONRS in AAC falls to this category of state interest, particularistic state

interest. The FDRE Constitution, under Art.49(5) mentions single state government, State of

Oromia, with regard to provision of social services, utilization of natural resources, joint

administrative matters and other similar matters. The single state is ONRS; the interest is special.

This development is not inimitable to the Ethiopian federation. One example involves the US

Department of Energy’s efforts to locate an underground repository for spent nuclear fuel and

high level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain in Nye County, Nevada.53 In its 1987

amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Congress directed the Department of

Energy to study and develop the Yucca Mountain site exclusively.54 As a result, the state of

Nevada perceives this issue in a way that no other states does and has deep concerns about

whether the federal government can impose a storage site on the state over the objections of

state. It means Nevada has special/particularistic interest on the site. This is not to compare AAC

and Yucca Mountain. Rather, the common case is exploitation of natural resources.

Another example of a particularistic state interest involves the complex legal relationships

established by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 among the federal government,

the state of Alaska, and the native peoples of that state.55 In other words, the natives have

particularistic interest in Alaska.

2.3. Contents of State Interest

The varying contents of state interest are legislative, fiscal and administrative interests. However,

Art. 49(5) of FDRE Constitution mentions special interest in general-constitutive terms.

Generally, the Contents of state governmental interest can be categorized as follows.

Legislative state interest involves states desire to be recognized as the authoritative decision

makers in a given area of public policy without the threat that their decisions will be preempted,

i.e. overridden, by the federal government by parliament legislation or agency rule making.56

53Ibid.

54Ibid. 55Ibid. 56Id. P-36



21

The notion of legislative state interests is used here as an alternative to widely used but less

analytically powerful concepts such as ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘state’s rights’.57 The decision to

avoid such terms here in warrants some explanation given the long history of their use as

the organizing principle of a great deal of thinking about constitutional federalism.

With regard to special interest, the second proviso of Art. 49(5) of Constitution further says,

“Particulars shall be determined by law”. The officials of the Region need to participate in

the formulation, or at least in the initiation of the particular despite the fact that this power is

vested to federal legislative body at the end of the day. This subject is discussed in Chapter Four.

Fiscal state interest is another content of state interest. State rarely rest easily over their financial

health. During economic upturns, state leaders must make decisions between spending, saving

for rainy days to come, or cutting taxes. During economic downturns, state governments are hit

hard because their tax systems are leveraged so highly on the bases those are sensitive to

economic changes.

The fiscal interest, revenue and expenditure, therefore, in AAC, whose administration is

accountable to the federal government, and ONRS having special interest are the mutual

interests. ONRS is given special interest over the City on matters of social service. This involves

the fiscal interest, mainly its expenditure aspect, of the Region in the City because service is the

counter part of fiscal interest. Further, administrative matters normally extend to fiscal interest.

In other words, there is no service and administration without expending.

Administrative state interest is involved where state implements a great deal of matters that also

involve the federal policy. This role in policy implementation means that state officials have

stake in how the state does the job. In other words, state officials want flexibility to carry out

these matters in a way that accord with their own state’s circumstances. Joint administrative

matter, whether the region is implementing a great deal of matters that involve federal policy in a

way that accord with its interest, is another interest the Constitution mentions as one catalogue of

special interest.

57Ibid.



22

2.4. Grounds of Special Interest

In actual operation, special interest is individualized, that is, choices are made in each case,

within limits, and laws are not automatically legislated and applied. The recognition of special

interest has social, economic and historical, geographical and legal grounds.

2.4.1. Social, Economic, and Historical Grounds

Ethnic Oromo Ethiopians had lived on the land before the official foundation of AA. They lived

in a small settlement known under the Oromo name, ‘Finfine,’ as provided in Chapter One.

The present day AA had an Oromo name- ‘Finfine,’ attests the abundance of hot springs at

the heart of the City. The area was solely inhabited by Oromo clans of Gulale, Eekka, and Galan

Abichu and was divided into 12 counties or districts; each county was being administered by the

local clan chiefs like, Tufa Muna, Duta Harra, Jimma Jatani, Guto Wasarbi, Jimma Tikse, Abebe

Tufa, Ware Golole, Tufa Araddo and Mojo Botora.58 The history of former ‘Finfine’ shows Afan

Oromo naming for each re-named sites. To mention; Genda Hurusa Rare, Genda Sokoru, Genda

Sulula Garbi, Genda Garbi, Genda Hurufa Rare, Genda Sokoru, Genda Gersa, Genda Boru

Korma, Genda Burayu, Genda Golba, Genda Adami, Genda Didimtu, Genda Qalle, Genda

Fiche, Genda Karra, Genda Harbu Irrecha, Genda Dire Arara, Genda Burka Ejere, Genda

Beda Ejersa, Genda Ruma, Genda Doka Bora, Genda Bole Bulbula, Genda Birbirsa, Genda

Kersa, Genda Dhoke Bore, Genda Lubu, Genda Oda, etc.59 Now, it has become difficult to

locate these naming exactly to the current respective sub cities and woredas.

During the late 18th and early 19thC, the neighboring Amhara community were wedging

incessant predatory raids and looting expeditious against Oromo people.60 Some of these raids

were documented by Major W.C Harris, a British diplomatic mission in his book, ‘The

Highlands of Ethiopia, (1844).’61 Consequently, the Oromo people’s relation with AA has been

minimized due to expansion or invasion carried out by previous regimes. Oromo people lost their

land and were culturally oppressed under the administrations that emerged.62 The fact that

58http//www.theoromopeopleandfinfinnee.com/Oromia, 11 July, 2011 59Ibid. 60Ibid. 61Ibid. 62Ibid.



23

historically Oromo people lived in AA and due to the central position AA has in Oromia, it is

part of Oromo people’s historical, social and economic identity. Thus City has special value and

meaning for Oromo people. Historically, Oromo people living in and around AA have been

evicted from their land by force, military conquest or other means.63 Dr. Bahru Zewde, in his

book, ‘History of Modern Ethiopia, AA University, 1991,’ has mistakenly asserted that the 16th

century migration of Oromo people to AAC from South Eastern settlement patterns as one

factor preventing urbanization in Ethiopia.64 However, the other side of history does not provide

that the people are not there from early time long-established, nor there was migration as such.

Therefore, the Oromo people having been the original inhabitants of the land have been forced to

live in an environment that does not reflect its historical and cultural values. It is true that Oromo

children living there were not educated by their own language. Furthermore, they were made to

feel as secondary citizens, separated from City administration. Despite the City’s expansion

through forced eviction of indigenous Oromo farmers without compensation, AA is the heart

land of ONRS where the most of cultural sites for the major Geda gathering from all over

Oromia take place.65

Another historical incident was that of the 2001, where the governing party passed resolution to

move the capital of ONRS from AA to Adama.66 The resolution was unanimously opposed by

the Oromo people from all corners of all walks of life. The opposition parties speculated that the

move was intended as a way to split them among ethnic lines by inciting the non-Oromo

residents of AA to oppose the return of the ONRS to the Ethiopian capital city. In any event,

non-Oromo groups did not oppose the return of ONRS office to AAC.

In 2005, the party officially announced plan to move the Region’s capital back to AA,

Amendment proc. No.94/2005, Art. 2(3) provides ‘Finfine’ as the capital city of the Region.

Therefore, ONRS is the natural owner of the City from the early time immemorial. The FDRE

Constitution recognized and guaranteed the special interest having these social, economic and

historical incidents in effect.

63Ibid. 64Ibid. 65Ibid. 66 Art. 6 of Revised Constitution of ONRS, proc. No. 46/2001



24

2.4.2. Geographical Ground

Geographically, AAC is surrounded by ONRS. It is found within the latter and serves as a capital

city of both the Federal and the Regional governments, Arts.49(1 and 2), and 49(5) respectively

of FDRE Constitution where the latter provision is broadly taken. The interest of joint

administrative matters is accompanied by the 2001 Revised Constitution of ONRS, Amendment

proc. No. 94/2005, Art.2 (3) which provides the seat of Regional administration in Finfine.

The City’s location within ONRS can be necessarily impressed for the former is perched at an

altitude of between 2200 and 3000m above sea level surrounded by a range of Oromia mountains

located at 90 longitude N and 380 latitude E.67 Originally, Oromia is located at 3024’20’ North

to 10023’26’ N and from 3407’37’ E to 42058’51’ E.68 To date, the establishment of Special

Zone of ONRS Around Finfine currently at the peripheral outskirts of the City is manifestation

of this fact, the fact that in the past the City has been part of the present Region and the present

action is the move to a new era.

According to Ato Abebe Fixe,69 AAC being geographical center and heart of ONRS is one basis

of recognizing the special particularistic interest. The fact that Oromo people lived in AA and

due to the central geographic position AA has in the ONRS, it is part of Oromo people’s

constitutional right. Thus, geographically AA has special value and meaning for Oromo people;

that why the Constitution mentions, “The special interest of Oromia state…arising from the

location of AA within state of Oromia…would be respected.” The use these words, location and

within, are the geographical reaffirmation.

2.4.3. Legal Ground

According to Proc. No. 94/2005, a proclamation issued to amend proc. No. 46/2001, Art.2(3),

“Art. 6, (Adama shall be the capital city of ONRS), has been amended as, Finfine shall be the

capital city of ONRS,” (bracket added).

The writer of this research believes AA being capital City of ONRS contributes legally to the

furtherance of recognition of special interest. It is reactive action. This is so, though the re- 67

Supra note 41 68Supra note 32, P-V 69Interview: ONRS, Justice Bureau, Law Research and Draft Preparation, Directorate, 4 sept, 2011



25

establishment of the State’s capital city in AA is a recent phenomenon. It can be considered as

one positive response to the recognition of special interest.

The recognition is in line with International Bills of Human Rights and regional human rights

instruments to which Ethiopia is a party. For that purpose, Art. 2(1) of International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

reads:-

“Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to

all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights

recognized in the present Covenant without distinction of any kind, such as race,

color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,

property, birth or other grounds.”

Further, common Art.1 reads:-

“1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they

freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and

cultural development.

2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and

resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international

economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit and

international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of

subsistence.”

A related provision of African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights under Art. 2 says:-

“1. All people shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This

right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a

people be deprived of it.

2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the rights to lawful

recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.”



26

To equalize the term ‘people’ under the Charter with ‘Oromo people,’ the Charter neither

defined the ‘people’; what the Charter tries to do is to establish a link between the

inalienable rights of human person and of people in contextual manner in societies with

different political, social and cultural backgrounds; the Charter’s preamble paragraph 6 is

complementary concept.

The writer’s purpose to invoke these versions here is to lean the concept of self-determination in

once territory, which is broad concept, with the recognition made under the FDRE Constitution

and the Revised Constitution of ONRS, Arts. 39, 40 and 41 in addition to explicit provisions

dealing with City. The recognition under the Constitution, therefore, is the due effect to the

instruments, knowingly or not, having regard to the grounds of recognition.

2.5. Recognition of ‘Special Interest’

Here, the writer would emphasize the phrasal name, ‘Special Interest.’ The special interest has

constitutional basis despite the absence of subsequent law to detail the interest. There further be

an attempt to consider the recognition course.

The next fair questions the above discussions beg are how the Constitution derives its power and

influence? What constitutes special interest? What is interest? What is special? While bringing

the Constitution into scene the framers of our Constitution used a technical and sensitive phrase

‘special interest’.

Black’s Law Dictionary attaches the following meanings to the terms of the Constitution.

“Special: of relating to, or designating a species, find or individual thing; of

status, rule designed for a particular purpose, unusual extra ordinary.”70

“Interest: a legal share something, all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or

right in property. Collectively, the word includes any aggregation of right,

privilege, power or immunity.”71

70Bryan A.Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8thed. 1990, P-1431 71Id. P-824



27

Accordingly, the very phraseology of special interest is purposively employed. It is

particularistic extraordinary which itself is relative expression. It connotes right, privilege, power

or immunity relating to species or individual thing; of statute, rule designed for particular

purpose. Rights and power are inherent while privilege and immunity are relative. The interest is

particularistic for it is listed though illustrative. It is extra ordinary relative to ordinary interest.

Ato Abat G/Tsadik72 hardly understands whether provision of social interest, utilization of

natural resources, and administrative matters are really special. More, he is not clear whether

these interests are equally special.

The interest of ONRS in AAC is special interest relative to the interests other states do have over

the same. Hence, one may argue that ONRS, Oromo people and inhabitants have privilege, right,

power, opportunity and immunity to influence legislation. The technical usage of special interest

connotes beyond ordinary interest, the latter being the interest of all nine National Regional

States including ONRS over the capital city, the City being the capital of all Nations,

Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia, Art. 49(1) of FDRE Constitution. This is so because when

the Constitution refers to Ethiopia it includes by default the nine regional states. Regional states

include Nations Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia, Arts. 39(5), 45, 46, 47.Hence, special

interest is relative.

The recognition has been the point of hot discussion during the drafting of the FDRE

Constitution. There were differences in opinions:-73

“Ato Mulugeta G/Hiwot, Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Right Committee

Secretary, said even though the City is not recognized as units of federation,

residents have got rights of self-determination of self-governance, being

accountable to the Federal government. In addition, for AAC being within ONRS,

things of calling for interaction; a lot of services provision and usage of natural

resources causing perhaps conflicts of interests and hence, to solve these

conflicts the recognition of special interest and necessity of detailing law is

inevitable.

72Interview: FDRE, Ministry of Justice, Law Research and Drafting, Directorate, 15 Sep, 2011 73Constitutional Constituent Assembly, No.24, Compilation No.000106-000108,1994, pp-21-22,(translation mine)



28

Then, Ato Adamu Degefu, from former Region 14, said when the city develops

it is not for few, rather it would be for Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, the

common estate, the inclusion of Art. 49(5) may further include interests in tax

and revenue collection and such sub-article is not fair and has to be deleted.

Further, Ato Demeke Mekonnen, member of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples

Committee, affirming the position of Secretary of the Committee argued in favor

of the recognition.

Ato Tesema Gadissa, from Region 4, regarding the inclusion of Art. 49(5);said

AA being the palace of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, where continental and

international issues are accustomed is not disputed, and the location of the City is

of the Region and the dared others to know the history. Further, he added, AAC

being the capital of ONRS except where the executive body of the Region decides

otherwise AAC is the capital city of the Region, with regard to the City’s

expansion it is necessary to have relation-some dealing with the region; hence,

should include all such interests; the article has included the heartbeat of all

Nations, Nationalities and People and has to be approved.

Again Ato Mulugeta G/Hiwot said, it seems important point that AAC is for all

and its development is for all, but could not be in general and it is clear that for

City’s development ONRS faces negative externality as we hear from the media.”

Therefore, according to Ato Mulgeta, it is factual reconciling recognition if special interest of

ONRS in the City is acknowledged. The Director of the Commission pointing that the article has

got detail discussion and finally the recognition has been approved by 507 votes for and 6 votes’

abstentions.

The Constitution having recognized the special interest by general terms; provision of social

services, utilization of natural resources, joint administrative matters and other similar matters, it

further goes providing the coming of law detailing the particular. However, despite the

commitment of the same there is no law enacted hitherto. This much discussion on recognition

suffices.



29

2.6. Elements of Special Interest

As already pointed out, the study intends to assess the Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS

over AAC. The grounds discussed above led to the establishment and recognition of special

interest. The values of these interests are not disputed. The exact elements and many of them are

not premeditated. Almost all of them have not undergone considerable social, economic, political

and legal changes and as such remained paper value.

To use Art. 49(5) of FDRE Constitution, special interest includes provision of social services,

utilization of natural resources, administrative matters and other similar matters arising from

AA’s location within ONRS. And practically, there are different types of forums which bring

them together.

2.6.1. Provision of Social Services

Social services concern us all. We complain about the lack of it when the tube breaks down or

the schools are crumbling. We complain about too much of it when tax bill arrives and we have

not got enough money left for a new service.

The combination of social services in which government plays a role as purchaser and/or

provider, may be categorized into four types of activity:-74

The core functions of law, order, income support and redistribution,

Defense and other public goods,

Merit goods, services that society believes individuals should have access to at

uniform price and without the usual market constraints such as having the service

cutoff if payment is not made on time. The definition of these varies over time; and

Services such as education and health.

It is difficult to envisage the core functions being performed by anyone other than government.

In practice it seems that public intervention goes far beyond providing the classic public goods.75

These are goods that are non-rival; one person’s use does not reduce their value to someone else,

and non-excludable; where it is impossible to get anyone to pay. One rational for this is that 74Dan Corry, Public Expenditure, Effective Management and Control, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 1997, P-20 75Ibid.



30

such services are provided by professional that society does not want to be guided by

profit-maximizing considerations.

Approaching back to the position, the provision of social services to be assumed by ONRS in

AAC, sectors of peace keeping, water, the interactions in health, education, road and

transportation sectors are by far limited to informal exchange of information when the need

arises.76 It is common to see using wood and other traditional means to cook food and also for

light in the peasant associations adjoining the capital. This indicates weak coordination between

the two governments in facilitating rural electrification to the surrounding people. By similar

token, due to the absence of transport route except the inlet outlet, to and from AA, it is

common to see the people found nearby the City using traditional means to transport goods to

and from AA. Regarding education, there are cross boundary students, mainly from Oromia

to AAC for various causes, by the virtue of self-rule, federalism has room for local

innovations which the education sectors of the two governments are supposed to share

experiences, conducting competition of sports, question and answer. This may enable the

younger generation to think widely and to develop sense of unity at early stage.

Similarly, it is normal and logical to assume, any epidemic occurred in either governments can

spread to the other. But, as hinted above, the interaction and collaboration of these sectors is

no more than information exchange while the dangers occurred. No joint plan or readiness to

combat epidemics jointly. At least, an epidemic occurred in 2009, Ethiopian summer,77 could

be practical lesson to combat and project trans boundary epidemic, diseases jointly.

Again without ignoring some latterly started activities of mutual benefit, such as peace keeping,

drinking water, and acquisition of land for various constructions of ONRS, the joint meeting

of higher officials of the two governments admitted in comparison with what are supposed to

do; it is possible to say, they are very low.78 Again, this witnessed intergovernmental relation is

not well understood and practiced. Key informants of Ministry of Federal Affairs, including

Ewnetu Bilata,79 share this idea. Recognizing this hypothesis to the federal system, the higher

executives of the two governments again accepted and also regretted to the already lost time,

76Supra note 1, p-77 77Ibid. 78Ibid. 79Interview: FDRE, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Directorate of Intergovernmental Relation, Head, 20 Sept. 2011



31

resources and capacity, which could benefit the two peoples in particular, and contribute

to attain the national goal in general.

2.6.2. Utilization of Natural Resources

Natural resources are any material from nature having potential economic value or providing for

the sustenance of life.80 It includes timber, mineral, oil, water, wild life, and other environmental

gifts.81 Currently, there are a numbers of firms engaged in industry, manufacturing and other

similar activities in AA. These institutions have major roles in producing industrial waste, so as

in polluting rives and environment.82 Pollution, scarcity, and misuse of water inflict a serious

danger to human health.

This contrasts with people’s right to clean and healthy environment, Art. 44(1) of the FDRE

Constitution. Historically, rivers have been the most vulnerable for industrial and municipal

wastes on one side, and source of water for various purposes. Contaminated water ranked third

of all death causing factors and water related disease counted for 80% of all disease in

developing countries.83 It is usually mentioned that movement of water and air transporting

waste materials and dust particles is not limited or bound to boundaries. Based on this fact, the

poorly industrialized African countries are claiming compensation for the environmental

pollution and global warming caused by industries of developed countries.

When we come to the environmental pollution caused by industries, manufacturing sectors,

social services providers and households in AA, the damage on the people in and around

the City is not simple. As the study conducted by ONRS, Land and Environmental Protection

Bureau, downstream users of Akaki River indicated new health problems. Because, most of the

industries in the City are found on the rivers courses and virtually all of them discharge their

waste mainly to rivers. Physically observable, the rivers are periphery crossing carrying the

waste.

80Supra note 70, p-1056 81Supra note 1,p-78 82Asefa Fiseha, Multi Culturalism and Federalism: On First National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, 2003, P-29 83UN, Chronicle, 1992, P-60



32

Table 1: Types of Industries and Volume of Their Effluents84

Types of Industry Volume of Waste water/m3/year/

Iron and Steel 146,239

Non-ferrous Metals 2,217

Food and Beverages 1,795,252

Paper and Printing 45,967

Petro Chemicals 11,421

Soap and Detergents 205,746

Tobacco 50,089

Textiles 1,098

Leather and Foot Wear 31,080

Wood 1,992,597

Rubber 547,860

Pharmaceuticals 47,805

Total 4,877,371

Akaki Riveris completely changed to dark. But the downstream community is using it for

various reasons or purposes. It has adverse effect on the social and economic rights of people.

With regard to water resources for AA, the vicinity areas of ONRS have paramount role.

According to the data obtained from AA Water and Sewerage Authority, Gefersa Dam

since 1944, Lega Dadhi Dam since 1970, and its extension, Dire Dam since 1999 are the

major surface water sources to the City. The same authority described this surface water and

even recently drilled ground water does not quench the demand of the City; of total demand,

only 60% is covered; Ato Getachew Eshete,85 and Ato Fekadu Asrat86. To meet this demand,

the Authority has designed short and long term plans. The plans include drilling of 40 deep

wells in the surrounding areas of Oromia woredas and towns. To this effect, the Authority has

signed memorandum include: Alemgena, Manjeroguro, Tatek, Gefersa, Lega Dadhi, and Burayu

84AACA, Environmental Protection Authority, 2005 85Interview: AACA, Water and Sewerage Authority, Head, 15 sept, 2011 86Interview: AACA, Water and Sewerage Authority, Higher Expert of Study and Design Department, 15 sept, 2011



33

as sites to develop ground water to the City. Based on reference No.4.1 (2) of their agreement,

the Authority is expected to pay proper compensation for usage for the people living around the

project. Accordingly, the letter, dated 08/03/2002, referenced ውዓፕ/2411/02, written from

Authority to Water Desk of Oromia Special Zones around Finfine describes the following:-

“With intent to make beneficiary, the people living around the water, joint

projects conducted in Burayu and Gelan Towns have been accomplished. Two

wells are on drilling for Lege Tafo Town. Actions have been arranged to do the

same for Sebetta Towns and Akaki Woredas.”

As that of peace keeping sectors, collaboration between the water sectors of the two

governments, is good start to be encouraged. This is because, they are on the way to address

house demands of the City, investments, and the people living around the source areas. In

addition to their joint plan aimed to enhance mutual benefit, Oromia Water Bureau and Oromia

Special Zones around Finfine are members of AA Water Sewerage Authority.87

2.6.3. Joint Administrative Matters

It is clear that AAC residents have given right to self-governance, Art. 49(2) of FDRE

Constitution. It is clear that AAC is capital city of FDRE, Art. 49 (1). ‘Finfine’ is also the capital

city of ONRS, Art. 2 (3) of Proc No.94/2005 of ONRS Revised Constitution. Under Art. 33(2) of

the first Charter of AAC, proc. No. 87/1997, Oromia has been given the right to make the City its

capital city. This creates the upshot of joint administration. In effect, this matter encompasses

other element of special interest.

Administrative matters involve the tasks of two layers, the upper or political and the lower or the

non- political.88 In public law, it is the practical management and direction of the executive

department and its agencies.89

Higher executives of the two governments themselves admit that administrative matters between

AACA and ONRS is little understood; informal, very limited in operation, unable to satisfy the

need of people and national goal. Similarly, without ignoring some informal practices

87Supra note 1, p-78 88Mulugeta Mengist, Reading Materials for Administrative Law, Mekelle University, Faculty of Law, 2002, P-29 89Supra note 70, P-46



34

including an exchange of information conditionally and good start of water and peace

keeping sectors, initiation, attention and practices of higher level executives to address their

common concerns in common is also little. Emanating from these, they are not in a position to

exploit relatively skilled labor, finance, large market, and between technology of AA on one

side, and other potential resources from Oromia side for their common good. The joint

administrative matters of ONRS and AACA is not different from other member regional

states right to self-administration, which may occur as the need arises only.

ONRS, which has good opportunity in attracting administration, owing to geographical link

to AA on one hand and which is victim of liquid wastes that could be considered as a

burden from AA, has more formal and institutionalized intergovernmental relation with

Somalia, Afar, Harari National Regional States and Dire Dawa City Council, which is aimed

to make City corridor of development and to ensure peace in the regions. It could be a model

for the entire Ethiopian federation. Considering both good opportunities, legal, historical,

social, political and economic ties , and problems related with environmental pollution, the

intergovernmental relations between ONRS and AACA lack due attention of administrative

organs of both governments.

Of the sectors visited by the researcher, the Police Commission of AACA, Peace and

Administration Bureau of Oromia Special Zone Around Finfine from Oromia side could be

mentioned, and found on good beginning. These sectors have joint plan aimed to ensure peace

both in the Region and the City since the establishment of Special Zone. According to the

interview the researcher held with Ato Fekadu Seboka,90 and Habtamu Sisay,91 they have joint

plan to keep peace in their jurisdiction, which is the corner stone for sustainable development,

democracy, and stable life. Very interestingly, their joint plan recognizes the already

mentioned strong social and economic linkages of the people of the two governments. It

seems to strengthen this tie in peace keeping, under the watchword of ‘Selam Yegara Guday

New,’ ‘peace is common affair’, is good start. With intent to achieve this goal, their joint

90Interview: AACA, AAC Police, Commissioner, 17 sept, 2011 91Interview: ONRS, Special Zone Around Finfine, Peace and Administration Office, Head, 17 Sep, 2011



35

plan includes the following common tasks which could be taken as promising start to joint

administrative matters:-92

Investigating and gathering information that may cause conflicts between the two

people and trying to address the issue before it grows to serious stage with the

concerned body,

Preventing and managing crimes occurring around the boundary,

Exchanging continuous and reliable information,

Extradition of criminals crossing the boundary,

Cooperation to enforce court’s decision and orders from both sides,

Joint activity of traffic control around the boundary, and

Exchange of skilled man power and logistics as the case may be, for instance during

national and international meetings, spiritual celebrations and the likes.

Joint interaction enables to present and reduce cross boundary criminal activities in particular

which are indeed leads to good administrative beginning and an input in creating economic and

political community in general. To this effect, Justice Bureau and Police Commission from AA

side and Oromia Special Zone, from Oromia side have joint program of performance evaluation

and discussion once every two months even though the plan is not deep rooted at grass root

level, not equally understood.

2.6.4. Other Similar Matters

There are characteristics which are inherent to all constitutions. One is its generality nature, to

accommodate all virtues. The FDRE Constitution under Art. 49(5) is not exception to the

generality nature of constitutions.

While recognizing special interest, the FDRE Constitution at the end used the illustrative-list-

showing-phrase ‘other similar matters.’ The use of the ‘other similar matters’ indicates the

catalogues of special interest are not intended to be exhaustive. From the outset the phrase ‘other

similar matters’ is not clear. It has no objective constitute for everyone who reads the

Constitution. And it has got different interpretations. Further, it has been point of debate during

92Supra note 1, p-74



36

the preparation of the draft of particular; arguments are divided following two lines of

interpretations.

The first line of interpretation is that the phrase ‘other similar matters’ has to be meant to show

matters that are imminent and necessary for the implementation of the other explicit special

interests. Accordingly, participation in administration of land, access to land without lease

payment, access to infrastructure, buildings, tourism and cultural halls, industry, naming of the

City, security issue, trading and others which are necessary for the implementation of explicit

interests can be mentioned. This is narrow line of interpretation.

The second line of argument during the preparation of draft is somewhat broad one.

Accordingly,‘other similar matters’ include participation in representation of AACA in Federal

Houses, in structural make up of AACA Council, sharing of revenues and taxes from the City

and etc.

According to Ato Abebe Fite,93 the first argument was somewhat broad and we need to

remember rules of interpretation, the first interpretation is beyond the intention of the

constitutional framers. However, the Minute of Constitution does provide no little tip-off as to

what constitutes the phrase. ONRS has its own research in this regard which is incorporated in

the Draft Proclamation of Constitutional Special Interest according to Ato Dawano Kedir,94 the

researcher deals with it under Chapter Three. This argument will be solved in the particular

subsequent law, which is on process, has zero draft status today according to Ato Abat

G/Tsadik,95 he added.

2.7. Connotations of Special Interest

In the preceding sections, it is posted out that the special interest of ONRS in AACA is

constitutional basis based on those grounds mentioned. The preceding discussion begs fair

question, what about the connotations of Constitutional Special Interest? The assumption is

every provision of law has purpose and connotation to achieve. In line with the provisions of

93Supra note 69 94Interview: ONRS, President Office, Legal Advisor, 16 sep, 2011 95Supra note 72



37

FDRE Constitution dealing with AAC, other counter laws are too considered. Let us deal with

these connotations as much as sufficient.

2.7.1. AAC Part of ONRS Vs. Independent City

Comments of legal analyst are powerful in that they tell us the will and desire of the people.In

reporting a comment forwarded on Art. 49(5)by a delegate from the ONRS, which is found in a

paragraph of Minute of the Constitutional Constituent Assembly reads as follows:-96

“[A]fter pointing out the national and international character of the City

owing to the fact that it is home to the different Nations, Nationalities and Peoples

of the Country and also the different international events the City hosts and in the

end everybody including those who founded the City at time should know that the

City lies in the territory of the Region. Since AA is found at the center of ONRS,

unless there is a contrary decision by the Regional Council (Chaffe) to that effect,

the City shall be the capital of not only the Federal Government but also as well

as of the Region and as such the further expansion of the City is entwined with

that of the Region, [bracket added].”

The comment of this politician is not based on any legal ground it is not supported by Proc.

No.7/1992 and also the then draft Constitution which they were deliberating upon to enact.

Rather it is based on a strong historic, geographic and nationalistic basis and does not give due

consideration, at least in the writer’s opinion, to what the country was embracing to accept.

A critical observer into Art. 2(1) of Revised Constitution of ONRS would see that the State of

Harari and AAC has been left out from being neighboring State and City respectively. It is not

clear what the implication of such an omission is. And also at the beginning of this same article

we would find the phrase which reads, “The ONRS is the uninterrupted territory….” In the

opinion of the writer, constitutionally speaking, the phrase indicated means a land mass, the

territory of which is connected from one point to the next without being interrupted by another

land mass or territory. Assuming it is the meaning which is close to what the drafters had in mind

in coming up with the phrase, it would give us the idea of denying the legal personality given to

96Supra note 73, pp-21-23



38

the two territories and rights of the people within, under the FDRE Constitution. Indeed, it may

imply that AAC is part of the Region. If this provision is upheld, the City would have double

standards of status under each of the constitutions which has far reaching effect.

The Constitution provides nowhere that AAC is part of ONRS; rather it recognizes the

Constitutional Special Interest; it further provides the constitutional rights of AAC resident’s to

self-governance. The Constitution under Art. 49 (5) provides, “[t]he special interest of…Oromia

in AA…arising from the’ location’ of AA ‘within’ the state of Oromia.” It does not spell out the

location of AA as part of Oromia. Despite the defacto claim as ‘part’ of Oromia, there is no

dejure ‘part’ recognition. The notion of geographical or historical belongingness of AA to

ONRS or ‘anybody’ is the most ill-informed idea the writer ever heard. One Ethiopia

Television provider currently said, ‘AA is the smallest Ethiopia.’97It is important to consult

history and the law.

At this juncture, it is important and instructive to comparatively see other federal capital cities. In

most parts of the world capital cities are unique and pride themselves on symbolizing the entire

country. This symbolism has great role particularly in multinational federations, which are trying

to build unity from diversity. They also attract interests of one or more member units and

entertain more public protest than other cities, mainly due to the action of federal governments.

There are conflict of interests between the federal governments that usually tries to control

the capital’s program, economy on one hand and the city’s administration trying to get more

autonomy on the other. Furthermore, clash of interests include one or more federated units,

which have some kind of interest in the capital.

Table 2: The Status of Capital Cities in Some Federations98

Cities Country Governing Structure

Abuja Nigeria Federal District

Canberra Australia Federal District

Caracas Venezuela Federal District

Delhi India Federal District

97ETV, አዲሰ: ምዕራፍ, TV program ፣ (translation mine), 04 Aug, 2011 98Supra note 1, p-59



39

Mexico city Mexico Federal District

Washington, DC USA Federal District

Islamabad Pakistan Federal district

Berlin Germany City State

Brussels Belgium City State

Moscow Russia City State

Vienna Australia City Sate

Bern Switzerland City in a Canton

Ottawa Canada City in a Province

Pretoria/Cape Town South Africa City in a Province

Federal districts are found out of the territory and jurisdiction of any states/province. It is under

the exclusive authority of the federal government and this reduces the possible dispute of interest

between the federal government and states. As a consequence, it is known for center domination

and ignoring of local interests.

City states have double duty of a federal capital and constituent member of a federation

simultaneously. They are constitutionally guaranteed to exercise both rights of a capital and state

together; it is less influenced by federal governments. AAC had this status between proc. No.

7/1992 and proc. No. 1/1995.

In city in a state, the capital city falls under the competence of a member state of a federation.

This model highly restricts direct influence of the federal government.

When one observes AA through the above criteria of federal capital cities, it is a federal district

as perArt. 49 (1 and 3) of FDRE Constitution. It seems autonomous City administration as per

Art. 49(2 and 4); and it seems a City in a state attributed to its geography entirely within the State

of ONRS as per Art. 49(5). Emanating from these overlapping truths, the city is expected to

entertain and harmonize conflicts of interest of the federal government, AACA and ONRS

simultaneously.



40

Most government experts have the idea that AAC is a federal district accountable to the same

government. For instance, according to Ato Dawano Kedir,99 the status of AAC and the

recognition of special interests are constitutionally undisputable, because the Constitution is

clear. He added the recognition of special interest connotes great opportunity, because the

Region gets market. Both the expertise response and the officials’ interview of the two

governments and response of Oromia Investment Commission, clearly indicate opportunities

created to ONRS owing to its connection with AAC. Just to remind, both sides agreed on mainly

the flow of wastes from AAC to the surrounding areas and rarely displacement of the people as

negative externality. The opportunities include, relative availability of infrastructures, access to

large domestic and international market, and short distance from the City can be mentioned.

The FDRE Constitution grants of full-measure of self-government which shall be determined by

the law, Art.49(2). AA received its latest and updated Charter in 1997 and it is revised

through the AACG Charter proc. No. 361/2003. There is clear governmental demarcation

between the Region and City and that has to be respected. Yes true, Oromo people represent 37%

of the population of the City.100 Therefore, both the Constitution and the Charter hold the side

which claims AAC as independent City.

Having the close reading of Art. 49(2 and 5) of FDRE Constitution, the writer thinks, this part of

the Constitution is meant to benefit the ONRS from special interest. Therefore, the Constitution

tries to address not anti or pro-Oromo racist ideas, which most Ethiopians by default try to

develop. The Constitution rather tries to benefit the Region from the provisions of social

services, utilizations of natural resources, matters of joint administration and other similar

matters from the City.

2.7.2. Peaceful War: Horizontal Relations

For all reasons, federalism inevitably implies intergovernmental relations. Horizontal relation,

one among others, is important as the network of human nervous systems does, for the proper

functioning of the federal system. It deals with inter- units and inter-local governments.

99Supra note 94 100Supra note 35



41

The scenario of recognizing the special interest is not exceptional to Ethiopia. It exists in every

nation representing horizontal relation. We know the Arizona charges LA or Colorado State

Charges California for most of their water and electricity supply, Alaska Native Claims

Settlement ACT of 1971 among the federal government, and Nuclear Waste Policy Act of

1982 Nevada of Yucca Mountain.101 Such interest may be a means of establishing horizontal

intergovernmental relation.

Intergovernmental relations seen the least developed and little understood dimension of

federalism between ONRS and AACA. Indeed, this is not unique to these two governments; it

also extends at federal level. The roles of the executives of ONRS and AACA, their level of

understandings, so that interactions varies. This is to mean, interactions of majorities of sectors

of the two governments is ad hoc, not beyond an exchange of information. The absence of well-

established and continuous interaction between these governments on common interests,

belonging to one party, Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, hints two points.

One, they did not realize intergovernmental relations as a work horse in federal polity and

as a tool of cooperation on common concern to prevent, manage and to respond conflicts.

Because, federalism is unfinished project highly relied on continuous cooperation, compromise,

negotiation and bargaining. Two, the task of intergovernmental relation could be done through

other mechanisms, that is, informal party channels, which could be difficult if either of AACA,

ONRS or the Federal Governmental is governed by political party opponent to Ethiopian

People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.

2.7.3. Peaceful War: Spillover Effects

Federation has many dimensions. To the researcher of this paper, it is a problem of explanation

and interpretation. In the connotation of peaceful war one more noteworthy to mention is the

spillover effect of special interest. Spillover effects are externalities of economic activity or

processes those who are not directly involved in it. It is caused by flows from one land to

another. This may include; rivers flow carrying wastes, transportation route, jointly maintaining

of peace and security, joint control of epidemics, managing boundary dispute, usage of some

101Supra note 45, P-34



42

natural resources in common, and conducting joint activities which are costly to each of them.

Let us see some of them.

As the study conducted by Action Professionals’ Association for the People, indigenous non-

governmental organization established in1993 with main objectives of providing legal and

professional services to the poor, women and children in Ethiopia, indicated downstream users of

Akaki and Mojjo rivers face new health problem; whereby in 2005, it has initiated public interest

litigation which is the first case ever in history of Ethiopia to bring an endto the environmental

and human suffering incurred due to the pollution by liquid and solid products of the

governmental and nongovernmental industries, and the garbage of dwellers of AA.102

Measures have to be taken to inform the relevant government authorities to check the suffering

of people living in the Akaki and Mojjo rivers basin taking the right to a clean and healthy

environment, Arts. 44(1), 92(1) and 92(4) of FDRE Constitution, and Art.11 of Environmental

Pollution Control Proc. No. 300/2002. The same things are also provided under the Revised

Constitution of Oromia, Arts. 44(1) and 107(1) and 107(4).

A reply from Environmental Authority include among others, a study on the pollution of Akaki

river due to various pollution sources has been carried out in collaboration with Oromia

Environmental Protection Office and AA Environmental Protection Authority in August 2005.103

In line with this, an action plan has been prepared to prevent sources of pollution.104

It is quite possible to witness that most of the industries in the City are found on the rivers

courses and virtually all of them discharge their waste mainly to the rivers. These industries

discharge pollutants that harm humans, animals and environmental resources as well. It is

certain that vegetables are grown with such waste water and present for use both for the

surrounding people and residents of the City which are dangerous for health.

The joint cabinet’s summit including the Mayor of the City and President of Region, held in

December/January, 2009/10, admitted the unorganized activity to reduce, if possible, to

102Action Professional Association for the People, Press Release, 20/12/2005 103Abebe Mekesha, Action Professional Association for the Peoples’ Experience in Profession of Legal Aid: Approaches and Challenges, (Unpublished), 2007, p-1 104Ibid



43

recycle the wastes, and regretted as the ‘lost golden chance’.105 In relation with the topic

under investigation, there are some trees around, but no river left unpolluted to be fished,

flow from AA to Oromia. Though it seems not alarming, the number of economic migrants

from various corners of the country to the City alone could raise the figure. Eventually, this may

result in population pressure and eviction of the surrounding farmers from their homeland.

There should be readiness to use the non-renewable resource of land and others properly on one

side and to maintain the environment on the other side. More, coordinated activities in the area

help to reduce or control negative externalities. Of course, this requires smooth

intergovernmental relation with continuous communication, consultation and conducting joint

study and decision for every common concern.

105Supra note 1, p-83



44

CHAPTER THREE

FUTURE CHALLENGES OF SPECIAL INTEREST

3.1. Cases of Future Challenges of Special Interest

Challenges of the future are a new white paper offering cases of the future difficulty, survival

or/and growth of independent Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS in AAC. The FDRE

Constitution is perceived as a recognizing Constitution; but it is an interest at stake that is not

matched by the realm of federalism unless wisely regulated. These challenges constitute those

already found on the ground on one hand and still others are predictions. Now, it is time to deal

with these cases of possible challenges coming across around the interest with likely achievable

way outs.

3.1.1. Future AAC: Spatial Expansion

Once a boundary line is fixed, party is stopped from exceeding the settled boundary. This then

justifies the immediacy with which governments respond to an infringement of the right

accorded to them by a boundary line. It also represents the modern form of sanctity which we

accord to our boundaries.

Most contemporarily, disputes, among governments of a single federation have become

common. Boundary dispute is, about who should be in control of population and territory. Of

course, boundary dispute is common in capital cities that are federal districts or city states, Table

2 of Chapter Two. This is to mean boundary dispute is not unique to ONRS and AAC, the latter

being the capital City of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and quarter of

international and continental institutions, which necessitate expansion. This is to indicate the

need of continuous interaction and negotiation among them.

AAC is the center of three entities ONRS, FDRE and Africa, and need to be long-drawn-out, the

preamble of the Charter of the City, Proc.No.361/2003.Art. 49(5) of FDRE Constitution which

deals with the issue of special interest and joint administration in particular is such issue which

could become a source concern for the City and Oromia. The territorial limit of the City is



45

provided under Art.5 of the Charter. It is also clearly given under the Revised Master Plan of the

City. The City is an autonomous encircled by the Region then why do we need provisions that

deal with joint administration? It is when a need arise for the City to be expanded and in doing

so; the City can only expand by lands to be seceded from its only neighboring State. Since the

administrative structure we are currently following is based on ethno-linguistic line and territory,

the City would be incorporating the Oromo population that has already settled on the land as

their own; the Oromo population found in the territory is the concern of the State and thus a part

of a compromise to be reached between the two; they may come up agreeing on joint

administration of the territories to be taken by the City for its future spatial expansion.

It seems to address this issue, the Revised Charter of AACA, Art.5 states as:-

“Without prejudice to the existing one, the boundary of the City shall be delimited

by an agreement to be made between City Government and ONRS or pursuant to

the decision of the Federal Government and ONRS or pursuant to the decision of

the Federal Government.”

Thus, there are three options to reach at the result sought; firstly, the concession to be

reached between the City and Regional governments; secondly, the decision to be

reached between the Federal and Regional governments; thirdly, the unilateral decision to

be granted by the Federal government.

Accordingly, AAC’s spatial expansion is currently limited by the establishment of Special Zone

Around Finfine: Dukem, Gelan, Lege Tafo, Sendafa, Sululta, Burayu, Holeta, and Sebeta,106 at

the outskirt of the City to strategize, smooth the relations between the two governments, and to

ensure mutual benefit.

Despite the above plan, there is boundary dispute around Kolfe Keranyo and Nifas-silk Lafto

Sub-cities from AAC side with Burayu and Sebeta Towns from Oromia side.107 There is also

a dispute over jurisdiction between Oromia Mines and Energy Resources Development Agency

and respective Authority from AACA caused with absence of clear boundary.108 The issue is the

106Supra note 32, P-174 107Supra note 1, P-84 108Ibid.



46

former institution provides mining land to investor based on the license Proc. No. 617/2002. On

its part the latter institution wrote a letter to Yeka Sub-city Environmental Protection Sector, who

wrote a letter to Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation to halt the process of electric installation

to the investor, reasoning the area is reserved forest site. This is also another indicator to the

absence of smooth, compatible zoning of land, and clear boundary.109

Corruption surrounding the use and management of land has been rampant. Corruption in the

Zonal Administration is expressed in the form of selling or exchanging the common property

through preparing false documents to support the illegal transfer of land from one person to

another person.110

The disputes and problems are seemingly not violent. Here, it seems logical to argue, the absence

of violent disputes and problems could be attributed to the two governments’ similar source;

Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, and its channels. So, these present problems

remind us that the issue of future spatial expansion of AACA needs formal and predictable

reconsiderations mainly the articulation of law.

3.1.2. The Conflicting Constitutional Rights of ONRS and AACA

Another normative fact that made me to name this Chapter “…challenges…” is the geographic

descriptions of ONRS and AAC given under Art. 2(1) of Revised Constitution of ONRS and

Art.49(5) of FDRE Constitution respectively on one hand and consequential constitutional rights

guaranteed under Arts.39 and 49(2) of FDRE Constitution.

What if the territory that is attempting to secede contains resources which are vital to economy of

entire country? In such cases the right of self-determination may conflict with some other human

rights, like the right to an adequate standard of living. How do we choose between two or more

equally authoritative human rights? Can someone strike between the two?

Recognition of self-determination is a bell that reminds governments that they are amenable to

rule of law and justice and must respect and protect the right of people. The people and the

109Ibid. 110Supra note 58



47

government must strive for a possibility of contractual peaceful co-existence and gone must be

the days of forced unity.

No right enshrined in the Constitution has been more hotly debated within society than the right

to self-determination. It has aroused passions and conjured visions of the end of the Ethiopian

state or alternatively of a better managed new Ethiopia depending on the leading role attitude.

Despite the fact that there is a tendency in contemporary debates in Ethiopia to take right to self-

determination as a synonymous with secession and self-governance, the right is far more than

that.

“By virtue of the principle of rights and self-determinations of the peoples, all by

peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they

wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference and

to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural

development.”111

Fredrik Kirgis, Jr. identifies about eight forms of expressions of right to self-determination, the

right to secession and self-governance being only two of the faces of self-determination. He thus

enumerates the faces as follows:-112

1.Freedom from colonial domination;

2.Right to remain independent;

3.Right to peaceful dissolving of state;

4.Right to secede;

5.Right of divided state to re-unite;

6.Right of limited autonomy;

7.Right of minority groups; and

8.Right to internal self-determination to one’s chooses form of government.

The right to secession and self-governance are two of the peculiar features of the Constitution

that again emanates from the overriding significance given to the ethno-linguistic Nation of

Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. The right to secession is the ultimate extension and

111Gemechis Temesgen, Status of Self-determination in the Post-colonial Era, (LLB Thesis), Mekelle University, 2009, p-14 112Fredric Kirgis, Jr, the Degress of Self-determination in the United Nations Era, 1996, PP-980-985



48

expression of the right to self-determination and the FDRE Constitution provides a detailed set

of procedures by which this right may be exercised if necessary, Art. 39(4). It is considered as

a basis for unity in diversity and serves as litmus test for democracy. Linguistically, the

Constitution interprets self-determination to mean that every Nations, Nationalities or Peoples in

Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write, and to develop its own language, Art.39(2). The

Constitution nowhere explains the difference between Nations, Nationalities and People. For that

matter, neither does the Constitution explain which is a Nation, as contrasted with a Nationality

or a People nor Nationality and People. The issue is academically interesting as it is from socio-

anthropological point of view, has no direct constitutional bearing or significance since all

three entities are assumed to be equal.

Specifically speaking, though there are many other ethnic groups within the ONRS, the Regional

Constitution guarantees only for the people of Oromia. The Constitution in its preamble does talk

about, “We the Oromo People…” The Constitution defines what the Oromo Nation means in

Art. 39(6) and it reads:-

“For the purpose of this Constitution, the expression of “the people of the

Oromo Nation” shall be construed as a meaning those people who speak the

Oromo language, who believe in their common Oromo identify, who share a

large measure of a common culture as Oromo’s and who predominantly in habit

in a contiguous territory of the Regional State.”

From this it follows that under this Constitution, it is onlythe Oromo Nation that enjoys the right

to self-determination including secession if one reads Art.39 exhaustively. The Constitution

attaches condition to exercise the right to self-determination, including secession, Art.39(4). It, to

vote for the demand for secession, as stipulated in Art. 39(5)(a), empowers the demand for

secession, as stipulated in Art. 39(5) (2) empowers the ‘Chaffe’, the supreme organ with

legislative power, Arts. 46(1) cum 49(1). The challenge, interalia; here is what would happen to

the residents of the City who are not belonging to the people?

Further to add injury, Art 2(1) of Revised Constitution of 2001 reads as follows:-



49

“The Oromia Region is the uninterrupted territory in habited by the people of

Oromo Nation and other peoples who made a choice to live in the Region the

borders of which are:

to the south-regions of southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples

to the North-Afar and Amhara Regions

to the East-Ethiopian Somali Region and

to the West-Benishangul/Gumuz, Gambella Regions and Sudan.”

What makes this provision to be cited here is its seemingly apparent contradiction with Art.

49(5) of FDRE Constitution. The latter emphasizes the location of AA within ONRS, while the

above reproduced provision presumably emphasizes the status of AA as part of the Region.

We know that Harari State and AAC are geographically engulfed by Oromia. So, what the

Omission of this by very Constitution entails? Does it mean that AAC has double status from the

perspectives the two Constitutions which in turn leads to inconsistency where these rights, right

to secession and self-governance, go to be exercised as per Art.39 of FDRE Constitution? Could

one boldly move to say the provision of the latter Constitution is unconstitutional as per Art.9(1)

of the FDRE Constitution? Or could one evasively at highest level say the Region has special

interest over the City, (forgetting the case of Harari State since it could not be handled here), and

nothing else?

With regard to AAC, the FDRE Constitution speaks, “The residents of AA shall have a full

measure of self-government”. It further reads, “Particular shall be determined by law.” Art.

39(3) again says:-

“Every Nation, Nationalities and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full

measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of

government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in

state and federal governments.”



50

Constitutionally speaking, hence, AAC residents have only right to internal self-determination to

their choices form of government. According to Cassese, internal self-determination is defined

as:-

“The right of authentic self-government is the right for the people really and

freely to choose its own political, social and economic regimes. This core consists

of the right of the community, which has a distinct character to have this

character reflected in the institution of government under which it lives.”113

The AACA was designed as a Region along with 14 other National Regional State under the

National Regional Self-government Establishment, Proc. No. 7/1992. The field of legislation

regulated under this proclamation, however, has been taken over by the new FDRE

Constitution since 1995. AAC became an administrative area of Federal Government,

accountable to the same. Therefore, it suffered a diminution of its previous powers under the

Proclamation, Art.49 (2) of Constitution and Art. 61(2) of the Charter Proc. No. 361/2003.

Despite the fact that a new Constitution had entered into force, Proc. No.7/1992 continued to

operate for this formerly Region 14 administration until the House of Peoples Representatives

adopted the AACA Charter Proc. No. 87/1997, revised by Proc. No. 361/2003 and Proc. No.

7/1992 were repealed and ceased to be operational.

The idea that the right to self-determination including secession and the right to self-rule can best

be realized through the creation of state whose borders coincide with the Nations, Nationalities

or Peoples. It would be difficult where there is territorial overlapping of borders of different right

holders. Anyway, the Ethiopian federal system takes territorial principle seriously.

Spearing to the point, AA historically, geographically and legally; domestic and international,

belongs to ONRS; as provided in Chapter Two. Now, the contradiction lies between the right to

self-determination including secession of Region and self-governance of City excluding right to

secession, Arts. 39(1) cum 47, and 49(2) of FDRE Constitution respectively. AA being

territorially the heart of ONRS, the latter’s secession without the former is non-sense and brutal.

Secession of Oromia without the City creates it without heart; AAC is geographically the center

of ONRS.

113Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of People, a Legal Reappraisal, 1995, p-101



51

Both rights are equally Constitutional rights; constitutional right to self-determination including

secession, and Constitutional Special Interest. That is why in 2001, the decision by ONRS to

move its capital from AA to Adama became grave issue among Oromo people from all corners

of Oromia and all walks of life.

If the state simply says, this is merely an exercise of our constitutional rights to self-

determination which is unconditional and non-derogable, Art. 39(1) and 93(4,c), a number of

propositions may be forwarded as solutions to the question in issue. The primary task now is

to determine the scope of the right to self-determination with regard to territorial jurisdiction

including secession and self-determination, then to identify the possible limitations to its

exercise, if any, and lastly to check the propriety of the limitation. This raises a constitutional

dispute which shall be resolved only by the decisions of the House of Federation as may be

presented to it via the Constitutional Council of Inquiry; the technical and advisory body of

the House, Arts. 83 cum 84 of FDRE Constitution.

The possible way-out may be to restrict Art. 49(5) to issue of special interest and to leave issue

of self-determination to Art. 39. And further to let the post issue to be determined under the

principles of State Succession in Public International Law. Anyway, proactive measure is the

wisest course to be taken.

3.1.3. Tragedy of Fiscal Double Taxation

The assignment of taxing power is a thorny issue in fiscal policy and its application is influenced

by a number of considerations especially in federation. First, despite the legislative assignments

of taxes, the actual potency of the tax network depends on the nature and development of the

national and regional economy, the relative distribution of economic activities across

jurisdictions and administrative efficiency of the taxation system. Second, the practice of fiscal

federalism especially when citizens across regions with diverse economic and demographic

situations are treated unequally, gives rise to the violation of one of core principles of horizontal

fiscal equity.

In Ethiopian federation, those revenue stuffs or sources to joint taxation of both ONRS and

AACA may prone to double taxation owing to the special interest and right to self-administration

and accountability to the federal government respectively. This is mainly caused by unclear



52

constitutional clauses. For instance, the FDRE Constitution made provisions under Art. 49(5),

‘Other similar matters,’ as an element of special interest. If it is interpreted to include the

right to levy and collect taxes or where other interests; ‘provision of social services,

utilization of natural resources or joint administrative matters,’ in its selves constitute same

right and Art. 98 to concurrent power of taxation where the Federal Government; AACA under

accountability reason and the State jointly levy and collect some taxes enumerated.

The problem arises for there is no detail laws as to what constitutes ‘other similar matters’

under the guise of special interest or there are no joint house and executive for City and State

to legislate tax laws and to collect taxes respectively. Or there is no room for framework method

of sharing power by which the center may legislate tax laws and state collect to share jointly.

In the absence of these arrangements, both governments may levy and collect separately on the

same matter they own jointly. This results in double tax burden imposed by both level of

governments on single tax payer and on same tax base.

3.1.4. The Legal Limbo

The FDRE Constitution provides that the particular of special interest shall be determined by

law, which until this year has not been addressed, proviso of Art. 49(5). In giving recognition to

particulars of provision of social services, utilization of natural resources, joint administrative

matters or other similar matters, to be determined by law, application there need to be a great

care as far as people rights are involved. In view of this, the framers looked into the most modern

constitutional law that embodied the latest thinking of special interest.

The detail or separate particular of special interest is a formal statement to be prepared by

legislature. The facts to be stated in the bills of particular shall be specific facts up on which the

law shall be based. The legislative organs of the Federal Government, House of Peoples

Representatives has passed legislations, of which Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS in

AAC is not one for unknown reason. Despite some attempt, it is remained as a draft since 2009

having 12 articles.

Special interest is recognized by the Constitution that is, choices are made in each case,

providing the coming of detailing law within limits; laws are not automatically applied. Given



53

the nature of Ethiopian federation, special interest available and the often conflicting purposes of

special interest the presentation of subsequent law is inevitable. Yet, these interactions lacked

articulated law and workable organizational structures. To make the relations effective, there

should be a coordinating law.

3.1.4.1. Scope of the Law

From the outset, the writer asks; how does the subsequent law drive their power and influence?

What determines the extent to which it can able to affect policy outcome of special interest?

What happens when laws with differing objectives in scope compete for guidance?

Another virtue of challenge under the subsequent determining law in this special interest

recognized is regarding the scope of application of same law. The challenge is areas of

application the law encompasses; the Constitution lists some matters and also gives reservation

clause for other special interests of similar matters. The law on its coming should incorporate the

following points which have to be in line with Constitution, the writer of this research proposes.

In this regard the Draft Proclamation, 2009, is almost entirely used.

Administrative Matters: For ONRS to efficiently provide governmental and public services to the

community, it is necessary to formalize the existing conditions. More, to implement and continue

the investment entry in AACA and ONRS there needs the insurance of peace and security. The

two governments need to have joint plan aimed at ensuring good administration in the City. The

decision of City Council should be in the way that not affect the interest of the Region has in the

former. For proper implementation of joint administrative matters, there would be a pressing

need for the establishment of joint committee which assumes the role of intermediary.

Provision of Social Services: In order to implement administrative duties and rights the provision

of social service is condition precedent. In this regard, the following things can be things can be

mentioned:-114

1. Electrical, water, telecom, etc,

2. Lands for the construction of governmental offices, and bureaus,

3. Lands for residential houses for governmental employees,

114Draft Proclamation on Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS in AACA, proc.___/2009, Art.5



54

4. Construction of schools teaching in Afan Oromo for who needs,

5. Halls for meeting,

6. Lands for construction of theatre and cultural centers, and others.

Cultural, Economical, Historical Interest and Naming of AAC: The City having cultural,

economic and historical ties with Oromo people, cultural, historical and economical interactions

should accommodate these ties. The researcher would say, the joint session should decide the

erection of some squares, roads and others reflecting the cultural, historical, and economical

interest of Oromo people over their land to reinforce the interest.

It is provided under Art. 4 of the Charter proc. 361/2003 that the name of City is AA. As we

have seen in Chapter One, this is the name which was given to it more than century ago

when the City was founded as the nation’s capital. Thus, it is not a new name rather it is the

name by which it has been known for more than a century. It is also by this name that the FDRE

Constitution refers to the City, Art. 49.

It is understandable for lay citizens to call the City by whatever name they find it convenient for

them; this is because it does not entail any administrative infringement over the City. But for

reasons of historical, geographical and of course economical, the ONRS officially prefers to call

the City as ‘Finfine’. A name as we have seen in Chapter One is claimed to has been used to

refer to the place on which the City currently lies on prior to its founding. Further, it is this name

which was provided under Art.6 of the 1995ONRSConstitution and Amendment Proclamation to

the 2001 Constitution, Art.2(3), proc.No.94/2005.

In the writer’s opinion, this is one way of forwarding the claim over the City. Taking lesson from

history, with regard to the name of AA, the original name of AA was ‘Finfine’ as discussed in

Chapter One and Chapter Two. Therefore, the subsequent law would include the name, in

addition to the name currently in use, ‘Finfine,’ at least which depicts the political, historical,

economical and legal manifestation.

Utilization of Natural Resources: AAC being the capital city of ONRS, FDRE and African

Union quarter, there are complex trade and economic interactions in the City, pollution, scarcity

and misuse of natural resources inflict a serious danger to human health, the damage on the

people in and around the City is nothing simple.



55

The Draft Proclamation almost depicts the lists of acts the governments, AACA and ONRS

would deliver:-115

1. Treatment and recycling of hazardous water from the City,

2. Necessary treatment and conservation for natural resources around kebeles, rivers,

and other natural resources, and

3. Providing and helping for the access to clear water for victim community of waste

products of the City.

In this regard lastly, the most thing to be noted here is neither this research nor the draft proposed

could be limitation to the general recognition by the FDRE Constitution under Art.49(5).

3.1.4.2. Authority to Enact the Law

Comparatively to start, structures and processes designed to enhance intergovernmental

legislative network are less prevalent than the executive one. But they deserve great role in the

channel of intergovernmental relations. Another approach that is common in most federations

and unique in Ethiopia is the role of the Upper House, House of Federation. This is to mean the

Ethiopian House of Federation lacks two elements to serve more as substitution of

intergovernmental relations. One, it has no legislative power. Second, even though it is indirectly

elected by regional legislatives, its role is by far less in serving as a tool of intergovernmental

relations, Art. 61(3) of FDRE Constitution. Having matching legislations, to ensure acceptance

in both sphere is another area of interaction and cooperation.

Finally, in multitier government with parliamentary arrangements, cooperation through

legislature branch may be undertaking by the structures founded for executive cooperation.

Again, this indicates the dominant role of the executive branch in intergovernmental relations.

But in multitier government, where there is the division of power between executives and

legislatives as well as other, other channels for intergovernmental relations have to be

established.

The above being general, proviso of Art. 49(5) of FDRE Constitution says, “particular shall be

determined by law”. Further, Art. 62(2) of the Revised Charter provides the House of Peoples

115Id. Art.7



56

Representative would pass the law on Constitutional Special Interest. However, though it is

clear from the Constitution that it is ‘law’ decades passed no enforcement law of special

interest until this data was collected. The House of Peoples Representatives has power to ratify

or enact the particular, Art.55(1) FDRE Constitution. The House may ratify the bills initiated by

another concerned body or enact the law on its own motion and initiation. Regarding

Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS in AAC, there is a draft prepared.116 And it is submitted

to the House for approval. The House has not yet dealt with the draft for unknown reason

according to Ato Abat G/Tsadik.117 The people are now zealous to see the constitutional version

being ratified or enacted.

3.1.5. Under Multi-Political Party System

Under multi political party, the writer assumes that individuals, groups and parties act in their

own self-interest and that political and socio economic outcomes can be identified with the

game. Throughout, they progress from the simple to the more complex and challenging. The

question envisaged here is what happens when parties with differing objectives which affect

policy out comes compete for effect?

“If one homogenous political party controlled all governments, both federal and

states, there would be no occasion for intergovernmental conflicts. If on the other

hand, if all constituent governments were controlled by one homogenous political

party and the central government by another, the degree of federal conflict would

be tense. Between these two extremes lie all existing federations.”118

Thus, party is like a train, interest and demands feed the engines which convert these into energy

and drives to a predetermined goal. The engine is government, through and by which political

power is actualized.

The influence of political parties on federalism and of federalism on the parties is fascinating

subject that has not yet been adequately studied in Ethiopia.119 Most proceed from the premise

that parties are irrelevant to the sources of conflict between federal and provincial governments, 116Supra note 114. 117Supra note 72 118Supra note 31, P-156 119Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience, 1991-2000, 2002, p-81



57

that intergovernmental relations are mainly between non-partisan bureaucracies and that

premiers are mainly between federal and provincial governments, that intergovernmental

relations are mainly between nonpartisan bureaucracies and that premiers and prime ministers

treat their counter parts impartially regardless of whether or not they share a party label.

Quarrels within a political party can usually be traced to differences over policies and objectives,

to conflicts of personalities and ambitions, or to differences in the perception of problems and

their most appropriate solutions.120 It should be recognized, however, that these same differences

impart vitality as well as discord to the system. The problem is to keep the expression of these

differences within bounds, a task which becomes even more difficult if the party has an open

tradition honoring healthy debate and the expression of diverse and even radically different

viewpoints.121

Inter-parliamentary Union, the international organization of parliaments of countries in most

parts of the world, believes representatives of the opposition must be able to denounce freely

in parliament and before public opinion the abuses which they have noticed or which have

been brought to their attention by their constituents.122 That realized, we will remain united-

for better and worse, through prosperity and poverty, in peace and war.

Ethiopia is ruled at present by a coalition, composed of several regionally based ethic parties.

Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front was the creator of Oromia Peoples

Democratic Organization in ONRS.123 That means the founding party and that of the Region

have almost similar objectives or the latter implements the policies of the former in the Region

and in where it has interest. Going to the troubles of explaining the meaning of a multi-

political party system, partially fledged in the FDRE Constitution, Art. 38, Hon. Abadula

Gemeda, said it is not where by elected members feel the need to share votes and seats to

ensure the presence of various parties; there is nothing more important than earning the

public trust and there is no bigger problem for a party than losing this trust. A single party

dominated the parliament.124

120Ibid. 121Garth Stevenson, Federalism in Canada, 1989, P.-305 122Addis Standard, Private Magazine,Vol.1 Issue No. 6, Jakenn Publishing PLC, August 2011, P-6 123Ibid. 124Ibid.



58

The challenges here are where the following scenarios are assumed:-

1. Multi-political parties governing FDRE and ONRS; the case where both interest

holders, ONRS and FDRE being governed by multi-party with different policy-

objectives;

2. Multi-political parties governing FDRE and AACA; where differing parties win seat

in FDRE and AACA; like the case of 2005 election though Coalition for Unity and

Democracy political party refused or not accepted the result;

3. Multi-political parties governing AACA; where AAC is being held by multi-

party system, the ONRS citrus paribus; and

4. Multi-political parties governing ONRS; the case where multi party governs

ONRS, the AAC citrus paribus.

The assumptions may work cumulatively or independently. Or generally, what would happen if

the Region or/and City fall under opponent political parties against party at the center or vice

versa? Which parties deal with which parties regarding the Constitutional Special Interest for

effective implementations? From the current trend, there is inevitable potential for Oromo

Peoples Democratic Organization, (ruling party), Oromo National Congress, Coalition for Unity

and Democracy, Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement and Geda Party to come to power both

in the Region and the City.125

The relations between Federal Government under auspices of AAC’s accountability and ONRS,

therefore, are unlikely to be difficult when both are in office under the umbrella of same party.

But subsequent events suggest that things would be difficult when the current situation is not the

case. Therefore, Constitutional Special Interest may be enunciated so often and in so many

different circumstances, are subject to internally divisible forces unless it is formally and

practically treated, at least in the near future.

125Supra note 32, p-vi



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CHAPTER FOUR

ENFORCEMENT OF SPECIAL INTEREST

4.1. Overview of Enforcement of Special Interest

In Chapter Three the main theme of discussion has been identifying potential challenges special

interest presents in the working federation of Ethiopia. Then, this Chapter ripostes to the

challenges identified.

The most vital and requirement for effective intergovernmental cooperation is having a political

and legal culture of collaboration and respect of each other. The existence of institutional

multilevel of governments in a sovereign country witnessed significant role of political legal

trends of cooperation and mutual respect even than legally devoted provisions to

intergovernmental collaborations.

In Ethiopia, the need for intergovernmental cooperation, competition and sometimes conflicts

emanate from the impossibility of parallel division of powers which is the mark of almost all

federations on the globe today. Thus, the institutional and technical intergovernmental relations

are an inescapable to address overlapping hands of any federal system. They are important to

plan, decide and implement shared interests, programs and responsibilities. While dealing with

the enforcement of special interest of ONRS in AACA the researcher has considered both

institutional and technical enforcements.

4.2. Institutional Enforcement

When a law provides for an action framework to carry out action services and enforcement it is

likely to develop an institution. Institutions are created to carry out designated tasks in a defined

program. With regard to Constitutional Special Interest, the writer is interested to mull over the

following institutions which are thought to have connection in one way or another with the same.

All except the last one are federal institutions already established. The last one is in the course of

establishment.



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4.2.1. House of Federation

There are technical questions of constitutional interpretation which Ethiopian law does not

entrust to academics nor even to the ordinary courts. The FDRE Constitution vests sovereign

powers with the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia, Art.8(1). The House as a

representatives of the Country’s diverse ethnic groups, will act in the best interest of the

National, Nationalities and Peoples in discharging its duties, as the final arbiter of the

constitutionality, Arts. 62(1 and 4) and 83(1) of FDRE Constitution. Hence, House of Federation

is the champion of ethnic groups of Ethiopia, thus the ultimate power of interpreting the

Constitution rests with nobody but with it.126

Regarding Art. 49(5) of FDRE Constitution, there was request from ONRS to the House to

clarify the points generally mentioned.127 According to the letter for request, due to the central

geographic position of AAC there are joint administrative matters and thus, special interest of the

Region has to be respected in such cases.128 Furthermore, the provision of social services,

utilization of natural resources, administrative matters and other similar matters are to be dealt

keeping special interest in focus.129 The speaker of the House sent the matter to Constitutional

Council of Inquiry for further deliberation with its own comments.130

The House forwarded the following Opinions:-131

1. The special interest of ONRS over AA is put in general terms in the Constitution, Art.

49(5). It further says, “Particulars shall be determined by law”.

2. Under Art. 62(8) of the Constitution and Art. 34 of enforcement proclamation, the

House has power to investigate and propose bills on areas of civil law in order to

create one economic society. This may be set into motion by the House of Federation

itself or upon request.

126Fasil Nahum, Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect, the Red Sea Press, Asmera, 1997, P-56 127ONRS, Concerning Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS in Finfine, Ref. No.BMNO1/302/M1, Finfinnee,1998 E.C 128Id. (translation mine), p-1 129Id. (translation mine), pp-1-2

130FDRE, House of Federation, Advisory Opinion on Special Interest of ONRS inFinfine, to Council of Constitutional Inquiry, መ/ቁ/አ/ጉ/1/01/98, Addis Ababa, 1998 E.C 131Id. (translation mine) pp-1-3



61

3. According to Art. 83 of the Constitution, the Council is vested with the power to

investigate and suggest solution on questions raised as constitutional disputes. Art. 84

of the Constitution stipulates that the Council shall propose its solution on

matters when state laws or federal laws are deemed unconstitutional. It shall

present the solution for the House’s decision. The question raised by the Region is

not presented as a constitutional dispute according to Art. 83. The absence of any new

laws that are found unconstitutional makes Art. 84 inoperable. Thus, both Arts. 83

and 84 are inapplicable to this question.

4. The House of Federation is vested with the power to propose a bill to the parliament

about the benefits due to ONRS from AAC in areas of natural resources, public

services and administrative matters. The bill shall be based on previous proposal of

the Region.

5. Proc. No. 361/2003, Art. 62(2) stipulates, according to Art. 49(5) of the Constitution,

that the special interest of ONRS shall be respected and specific laws shall be made

upon agreement between ONRS and the AACA or by law to be passed by the

legislature.

6. Accordingly, the question raised can be solved. If the proposed law is

unconstitutional the issue shall be dealt with in the future.

For the present situation, the House’s opinion is that there is no need for any constitutional

interpretation. Equally enough, Ato Desalegn Weyessa,132 said the special interest is a

constitutional right; the Constitution is clear. There is no law enacted yet and found

unconstitutional regarding the particular of special interest.

Had there been developed indigenous jurisprudence as to the concept of intergovernmental

relations we could have ascertained the intention of framers of the Constitution for that purpose.

It is clear that ONRS has special interest over AAC, it is clear that AACA falls under federal

jurisdiction.

Therefore, it involves umpire task of investigation. The investigation may result in a prima facie

case calling for interpretation of the said provision, in which the Council is required to submit its

132Supra note 48



62

recommendation to the House or remand the case and render a decision if it finds there is no

need for constitutional interpretation, Arts. 83(1) and 84(1) of FDRE Constitution.

4.2.2. House of Peoples’ Representatives

Attributed to scarcity of skilled man power in regional states, the federal government puts its

influence on states so that on intergovernmental relations, through the power of policy

formulation.133 While constitutionally states are empowered to design their own policy which

matches local diversities, in practice the lion’s share of policy making is in the hands of the

federal government. It is assumed that, higher regional officials representing member political

parties of Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front have an opportunity to reflect

their own particular circumstances, though it is not accommodative during the policy

design.134 Policy formulation by federal government in some circumstances may also be

constitutional power.

House of Peoples’ Representatives is the lower non-political house of the Federal House,

(emphasis added), Art. 53 of FDRE Constitution. Among many important roles, which are vested

to the House includes the legislative, financial, deliberative, informative and representative

aspects. Taking into account its power to legislate laws, the Constitution provides that all matter

assigned to federal jurisdiction falls with the legal capacity of the House. Its legislative

jurisdictions are enumerated under Art. 59(1 and 2) the Constitution.

In regard of the study at hand, Art. 49(5) of FDRE Constitution reads, ‘particulars shall be

determined by law.’ The details of Constitutional Special Interest of Region shall be set out

by agreement to be made between the City Government and Regional State or by law to be

issued by the House of Peoples Representative, Art. 62(2) of Revised Charter. According to

these laws, therefore, this House has legislative power to detail the Constitutional Special

Interest of ONRS in AAC. The scope of law to be made by the House could not be limitation to

Art. 49 (5) of FDRE Constitution’s constituents of special interests.

133Supra note 1, p-58 134Ibid.



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4.2.3. Ministry of Federal Affairs

The political relationship between the center and states may be semi-formal mechanism,

inadequately defined in the Constitution. One such mechanism is the Ministry of Federal Affairs.

Currently, the Ministry has structured into four directorates; Intergovernmental Relation,

Conflict Management, Religious Affairs, and Equitable Development.135

The powers and duties of the Ministry may be summarized as follows as per Art. 11 of Proc. No.

256/2001:-

1. In cooperation with the regions, ensure that public peace and order is maintained,

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Arts. 48 and 62(6) of the FDRE Constitution,

facilitate the resolution of misunderstanding arising between regions,

3. Give assistance to the regions, with particular emphasis on the less developed ones,

4. Supervise and coordinate the executive organs mainly the Federal Police

Commission, the Federal Prison Administration, the National Urban Planning

Institute and AA and Dire Dawa City Council.

Therefore, the role of the Ministry is stipulation of fertile ground and facilitating favorable

forums so as to solve misunderstandings and conflicts that a rise between states. However, if

conflicts cannot be resolved through political or administrative measures and become beyond

capacity of it, the House of Federation may involve. Thus, the House being a quasi-judicial organ

solves such conducts based on relevant provisions of the FDRE Constitution, Arts.62 and 64.

According to W/ro Fantaye Gezahgn,136 there is no conflict raised yet involving the

Constitutional Special Interest, regardless of the laxity of ONRS and AACA to come together

and initiate about their concern. According to Proc. No. 251/2001 and 47/2005, the Ministry has

a mandate to serve as a focal point in creating good Federal-Regional relationship and

cooperation based on mutual understanding and partnership which is one of the cardinal features

of federalism. Its role as an instrument of intergovernmental relations between the center and all

the states is explicitly set.

135FDRE, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Information and Public Relations, 2007, P-21 136Interview: Ministry of Federal Affairs, Directorate of Intergovernmental Relation, Officer, 13 Sept. 2011



64

Given great responsibilities in strengthening the federal system in Ethiopia, the attention of the

Directorate of Intergovernmental Relations in Ministry is as usual providing technical assistance

to the emerging regions. Hence, both an expertise response and the key informants told that the

most vital and requirement for effective intergovernmental cooperation is having a political and

legal culture of collaboration and respect of each other.137

In addition, the Directorate is highly understaffed not more than five experts to load these

nationwide responsibilities.138 To the worst, there is an instance when higher officials of Ministry

of Federal Affairs fears to call the relatively developed regional states for discussion. Instead,

they prefer to use lobbyist than calling them directly.139

Due to all these limitations, the Ministry has no role in providing any institutional assistance for

ONRS and AACA. All these witnessed an argument that the name ‘Ministry of Federal Affairs’

is misnomer. As per an interview with Ato Ewnetu Bilata,140 intergovernmental relations in

Ethiopia are little understood, given little attention, so that least practiced. From this, one can

conclude that the relation is informal party channels. The Ministry is not formal institution of

intergovernmental relations between the two governments.

4.2.4. Special Joint Committee

In multitier government, where there is division of powers between executives, legislatives and

judiciary, other channels of intergovernmental relations have to be established for particular

sensitive purpose. The Joint Committee of ONRS and AACA in AAC, for its valuable role in

facilitating forum for exchange of views concerning special interest among legislatives,

executives and judicial organs of both governments has to be established. It would be simple

management about Constitutional Special Interest if the members to this potential Committee are

from executive organs of respective governments.

The governments of ONRS and AACA are rethinking of the establishment of Special Joint

Committee dealing with special interest.141 If the plan becomes successful in that regard, it

137Ibid. 138Supra note 1, p-88 139Ibid. 140Supra note 79 141Supra note 114, Art.4(2)



65

would be actually expression for good model of intergovernmental relation in the federation. It

may act as channeling institution between the two governments in different spheres including

special interest.

4.3. Technical Enforcement

As long as federalism is opted in the existence of minimum two tires of governments which

constitute the whole federation, it would be impossible to assume that each level of government

can execute all the responsibilities independently.142 In other words, an overlap of

responsibilities, including in the case at hand, interdependence and interpenetration is an

inevitable truth within federation.

Working together on common interests enhances the benefit of the two governments and peoples

in particular. It creates economic and political community and ensures the stability of the federal

system in general. Drawing this general lesson, practices of intergovernmental relations to

address their joint matters vary from federation to federation. ONRS and AACA should draw

lesson in having formal techniques of relations, to replace ad hoc and informal channels of

relations. Having horizontal treaty aimed to ensure environmental quality is the most lesson

ONRS and AACA should draw from the Canadian intergovernmental relations. Lesson can be

also drawn from limitations, unhealthy competition and rivalry resulted in conflicting relation

and federal disturbances in Nigeria.143

According to John D. Nugent, the success of state in promoting its interests will depend on the

following factors:-144

1. Is state defending existing authority against the federal government or trying to win it

back?

2. To what extent does state possesses demonstrable competence or expertise in the

policy area in question?

3. To what degree does state law, regulation, administrative practices exist in policy

area?

142Supra note 45, p-216 143Supra note 1, p-94 144Supra note 45, PP -217-219



66

4. To what degree is there a long history of state occupying the field in a particular

policy area?

5. To what degree does bipartisan consensus exist on a policy position?

6. To what extent are different sorts of state officials united behind a particular

policy position?

7. To what extent are there strong interest groups aligned with or against the position

taken by state officials in a policy making or implementation episode?

8. To what degree does a particular bill given legislature an opportunity to off load

unpopular or expensive implementation duties on states?

These questions which require full-fledged answers have to be considered fairly for effective

enforcement of special interest. The two governments under the study should be alert enough in

avoiding unhealthy competition and rivalry.

In addressing their joint concerns, using formal institutions supported with formal techniques has

significant value. To this effect, they have to develop culture of continuous negotiation targeted

to build unity from diversity.

In general, at highest liberal thinking, in order to shrinkage, if not possible to avoid, the practical

and psychological confusions, suspicions, failure to internalize and fear, proactive measures has

to be taken. ONRS is needed to bring to bear its rights, powers, privileges and immunities in

order to serve the people of the Region from the City concerning special interest guaranteed by

the Constitution.



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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion

Moments come, which come in history, when quite perceptibly one age draws to an end another

dawns; when we stand poised between a collapsing past and an indeterminate future. But what

we are now involved in will certainly be the most crucial and difficult of all the transactions that

we have encountered so far: - transition to federalism.

Federal principles are the summation of ‘self-rule’, something to do with self-determination, and

‘shared rules’, dealing with common concerns. Beyond this, federation includes on interaction of

individuals, groups, and polities in lasting but limited union. This is intended to achieve common

goals on one side and to preserve respective identity of all members, on the other side. As a

political concept, federalism is mainly concerned with constitutional devolution of powers,

between the center and the constituent governments, structured to protect the existence and

authority of all stake holders in a polity.

In Ethiopia, since 1995, the state system is formally declared a federal state by coming together

of nine Regional States, at least constitutionally speaking. Federalism is, thus for Ethiopia, a

mechanism that would not only just provide for power sharing as a political concept, but also is

expected to be legal concept; complement to the principle of unity in diversity and as an

arrangement that keeps things from falling apart. Once more significant value that federalism

seeks to embody is democracy and liberty.

Intergovernmental relation is bound to exist in every system of governments and, inter alia, in

federation whatever the models may be, co-coordinative authority, inclusive authority, or

bargaining authority. It is a trained horse let into the system. Interdependence and cooperation

are inevitable and needed in every federation despite the difference in structure and nature.

In federation intergovernmental relation is usually effected by legislation. Distinctively, the

legislation may create state interest; universal, categorical or particularistic. The interest may

include legislative, fiscal or administrative interest. In Ethiopia it is found to be undeveloped



68

launch and informal practice. The practice may persist nonviolently until the actors in the

federation stand to be hostile to each other’s policy consideration.

The relation between ONRS, one of the constituent states of federation and AACA,City

Administration accountable to the federal government, under auspice of special interest is not

devoid of the utter of affairs. As a paradigm channel of horizontal relation between the two

governments and also serving as capital city of the Republic and Region, regarding the latter

there is particularistic special interest, right, power, immunity or privilege guaranteed when the

Constitution is ratified, Art. 49(5) of the FDRE Constitution.

The Constitutional Special Interest includes provision of social services, utilization of natural

resources, joint administrative matters, and other similar matters. Each of these elements has its

own scope. Especially the last one is capricious and subject to debate. Any way, it shows the

catalogues of special interest are not exhaustive which in turn creates sides of interpretations.

The recognition by the Constitution has social, historical and economical, geographical and legal

grounds. Therefore, it is of a state interest that it shares with no other constituent state

governments.

The very phraseology of special interest is methodological preference opted for by the framers of

the Constitution. Special interest is complex package deals. Its inclusion in the Constitution has

attained the status of recognition or disintegration during the debate on the draft of the

Constitution. There are/were confusion, suspicion, fear and inability to internalize the

technicality of the Constitution, at least in brainpower, continued then after.

This scenario is not unique to Ethiopian federal system, as it exists in every nation with multi

state entity; Arizona Charge LA or Colorado State Charges California in for most of their water

and electricity supply; Alaska Native Claims Settlement ACT of 1971 among the federal

government; and Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 of Nevada on Yucca Mountain; Washington

DC of USA; Bern of Switzerland; Ottawa of Canada; Cape town of South Africa; to mention few

in terms of interest or interests owing to cities’ status.

Without ignoring some lately started activities of mutual benefit such as peace keeping, drinking

water and acquisition of water lands for various constructions, the joint meeting of the higher

officials of the two governments under study admitted, in comparison with what is supposed to



69

be done by the Constitution it is possible to say, they are very slow. The practice lacks continuity

and formality. There seems absence of due courtesy, or the debates during the negotiation have

continued to be unresolved, at least in the mind of the officials.

For Oromo people are the usual title-holder of the City, owing to its central geographical

location, historical attachment that they have, the Constitution has already recognized it as

special interest. By that, it is not a manifestation of pro or anti-Oromo racist idea. It is rather a

mirror of peaceful war; horizontal relation or spillover effect. These are inevitable junctures in

intergovernmental relations. More, that part of the Constitution does not connote the status of

AAC as independent City or part of Oromia. What the Constitution tries to do is, to benefit

ONRS from the City regarding provision of social services, utilization of natural resources,

administrative matters and other similar matters, if one closely reads the Constitution.

State and local officials, and experts who care about the esoteric subject of federalism worry that

the relationship between ONRS and AACA recognized by Constitution as special interest is

deteriorating, at least in the near future, because of different factors.

Accordingly, some challenges are actually on the grounds. For that purpose, some interests have

brought radical changes positively or negatively; others remained paper value. In the running

federation it is an interest at stake unless wisely regulated.

Most contemporary, boundary dispute has become common a rush to control population and

territory. Seemingly to tackle this problem, currently there is Special Zone established around all

the outskirts of AAC, though it lacks practical continuity to the plan anticipated.

As an extension to this challenge, where the who-knows-the-future is taken for grant, the

constitutional right to self-determination including secession of ONRS and AAC resident’s right

to self-governance practically are conflicting since territory is seriously taken by the

Constitution when one intimately reads Arts. 39(1) cum 39(5) and 49(2) cum 39(3). Art. 2(1) of

Revised Constitution of the Region further complicates by employing the term which asserts

AAC as part and parcel of the former. If that is not the case, ONRS and/or its people would

secede without its heart, AAC, which owes special interest, if the need arises.



70

Revenue sources to joint taxation of ONRS and AACA may prone to double, if not multi

taxation, for there is Constitutional Special Interest of the former and right to self-governance

of the latter, mainly caused by general constitutional clauses including Art. 49(5): ‘other similar

maters’ or/and Art. 98.

The Constitution provides the coming of subsequent law detailing the interest of the Region.

Following the scene of the Constitution, the legislature has passed different legislations of which

Constitutional Special Interest is not one for unknown reason. The request for interpretation and

Draft Proclamation of particular are not greeted by the Federal Houses still which lacks clarity

for its lateness. On its coming, everyone has to care of limiting the constitutionally guaranteed

rights, powers, immunity rights and/or privileges. The scope of subsequent law could not be

limitation to the Constitutional mention for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, Art.

9(1).

It is an overwhelming verity that Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization political party is the

member of Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front political party. When there is a

potential move from single political party system to multi system of political party there would

be a progress from simple to the more complex and challenging. Should the situation is

continued; the today’s practice is the challenges of the future generation. It may happen at four

folds; firstly, multiparty governing FDRE and ONRS; secondly, multiparty governing FDRE and

AACA; thirdly, multiparty governing ONRS; fourthly, multi-party governing AACA. What

would happen if the Region/City falls under opponent political party against the ruling party at

the center or vice versa?

The challenge will be triggering in the absence of clear detail law and formal institutions and

techniques. Institutions such as House of Federation, House of Peoples’ Representatives, and

Ministry of Federal Affairs have something to do with the enforcement of special interest. Some

institutions are reluctant and while the functions of others are still misnomer. This research

suggests the pressing need for the establishment of Special Joint Committee acting between the

two governments on collective concern. Hence, unless princely institutionaland technical

enforcements are involved and employed, the present exigent status of special interest remains to

be the future challenges.



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Recommendation

The study has vindicated the contexts, progress achieved, problems encountered with foreseeable

potential challenges in realizing the Constitutional Special Interest of ONRS in AAC. With intent

to fill the gaps mentioned; to pursue special interest to the surrounding, to attract and host, the

commitment of Oromia, and the collaboration of AACA on the subject matter should be formally

established with the sense of urgency.

To this effect, the following are forwarded as possible elucidations to ensure effective

implementation of the Constitutional Special Interest and safe-guarding federalism:-

1. The ONRS should possess and develop demonstrable competence and expertise;

different sorts of State officials united; strong interest groups aligned with the

particular policy position. In addressing this interest using formal institutions

supported with technical practices has significant value so that fair competition and

game would be resulted.

2. ONRS and AACA should be alert enough in avoiding unhealthy rivalry and

competition. To this effect, they have to develop culture of continuous negotiation

targeted to build unity from diversity giving effect to the dictation of the Constitution.

Lesson should be drawn from the interaction in South Africa and other experienced

federations; existence of the forum of provincial formal horizontal intergovernmental

relations and networks of interaction side by side.

3. The perception regarding this Constitutional Interest is almost confused officially and

in all walks of life. The constitutional order for determination of particular by

subsequent law has to be effected by concerned legislative body right away either on

its own motion or ratify the bills assumed to be initiated by joint meeting of ONRS

and AACA in response to the confusions on the ground .The powers and

responsibilities of the two governments should be clearly delimited by the law

concerning special interest and common concerns. And the Region should participate

in federal policy making concerning AAC to safeguard its interest.



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4. The idea that the right to self-determination including the right to secession and self-

governance can hardly be realized practically where there is the creation of state and

government whose borders coincide with each other. The Ethiopian federalism has

taken territorial principle seriously. The right to self-determination having double

standard; territorial and population create conflict with regard to AAC. In this regard

neither the Constitution is clear or there is no subsequent law in response thereto. The

FDRE Constitution under Art. 49(5) incidentally used the words such as the location

of AA within ONRS. This does not match with what is provided under the Revised

Constitution of the Region under Art. 2(1), which describes ONRS as uninterrupted

land mass running from north to south and from east to west. Given the Oromo

Peoples right, there may be neither satisfaction nor willingness to continue with the

existing system, they may resort to secession upon wise calculation of effects of

secession. The possible way-out under the existing situation is to limit Art. 49(5) to

issues of special interest, to leave other interpretation about self-determination

including secession and self-governance to Art. 39 and subject post secession issues

to principles of State Succession under Public International Law. Or it calls for

constitutional amendment in this regard. The amendment, if opted, should focus on

the historical, geographical and legal grounds which entitle the Region to say about

the historical and legal homeland, means of proactive action.

5. The horizontal relationship between AACA and ONRS should be formally

strengthened. To replace some ad hoc and informal interactions particularly, the

party channels, it seems due time to look for formal autonomous institutions of

intergovernmental relations at Federal, Regional and City levels which can

survive crises and differences. To perform fully as its name, the focal Federal

institutions responsible in creating unity from diversity and to strengthen the federal

system in Ethiopia, particularly, powers given to Ministry of Federal Affairs should

be revised so as to include horizontal intergovernmental relations. Accordingly,

Directorate of Intergovernmental Relations in the Ministry should also have a

division devoted to facilitate horizontal intergovernmental relations among the

members of federation and City Administration.



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6. Higher executives of ONRS and AACA including Regional President, Mayor of the

City and mainly the Head of Special Zone around Finfine should create room or

forum to hold regular joint discussion on joint matters. The number of representatives

from each government should be equal. This is because the most contentious issues in

intergovernmental relations are generally of political and not technical nature.

7. To strength the mutual benefit of the two peoples, to expand positive externalities and

to manage negative externalities, participation of the surrounding local community

deserves due attention. It enables them to reflect their views in the social cultural,

economic planning and implementation of environmental activities that affect and

benefit them directly or indirectly. Hence, cabinet members from the neighboring

Special Zone of Oromia sharing border with AAC should be members among active

participants. This is pursuant to Arts. 44(1) and 92(2) and (3) of FDRE Constitution

on one side and Arts. 44(1) and 107(2 and 3) of the Revised Constitution and 9(2) of

the Statute No. 115/2008 of ONRS to facilitate social and economic interactions at

local level on the other side.

8. In addition to the Federal, Regional and, City legislative, executive and judicial

organs that have roles in intergovernmental relations and other channels, the

researcher there found the necessity for the establishment of Special Joint Committee

of Constitutional Special Interest. It would be alliance of ONRS and AACA in AAC

for its valuable role in facilitating forum of intergovernmental relations between the

two governments.



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