Download - 101040605 Admin Law Case Digest
VI. Adjudicatory Powers
A. Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone
Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission,
an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-
2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call
cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular
is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition
against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular
will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call
cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers
and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed
that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was
pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners
were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to
assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is
assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
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legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon
the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules
issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which
includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of the acts of the political departments.26 Judicialx power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis
for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
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Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary
school. As the school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the
Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned
at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its
graduating class. With the school Principal, as chairman, and the members
of the committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia
Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May
21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel,
sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by
instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, committee members along with the District Supervisor and the
Academic Supervisor of the place.
Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION”
"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of
teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to the real
grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by
means of certiorari.
WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS? It is difficult, if not
impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and
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there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in
connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. it is clear,
however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the
office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is
the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that
the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in
which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient
if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making
their decision, whatever may be their public character.
The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial
duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may
be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter
in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. VS. Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA
433
Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a
"Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the
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year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed and
registered with the OIC.
While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel
B. Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of
gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand
letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these
demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to
terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required
90-day written notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5
of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement."
Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts,
OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision
stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of
petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the
existence of such right because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous
trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable
time from receipt of the decision within which to pay his judgment debt to
petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a
reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.
Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.
Held: the OIC has no jurisdiction. The contentions of petitioner are well-
founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no
express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and
decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil
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company. It is of course a well-settled principle of administrative law that
unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like respondent
OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.
As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):
" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative
boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment
and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions,
but in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that
would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be
limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to, or in connection
with, the performance of administrative duties which do not amount to
conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts."
B. Distinguished from judicial power
Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483
Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as amass
concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from
the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them
they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the
protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the
granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the
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mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to
return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing
the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's
report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807."
Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction,
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violation involving civil or political rights.
Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no
such power.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission
the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules
of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite
for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity
from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office,
or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
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investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes)
as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. "x x 'It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law
is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely
the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA
162
Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank
(LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees
(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining
Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April
1994, on promotion.
Held: It is to be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary
arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the
original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. The state of
our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award
or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory
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after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or
decision by the parties," while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there is an express mode of
appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent
with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
What’s the ruling?
C. Distinguished from administrative function
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348
Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the
President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar
salting" activities in the country. PADS issued search warrants against
certain companies.
Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants
under the 1973 Constitution?
Held: the court ruled that PADS was not granted by law to issue a warrant
of arrest. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making
It is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to
determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the
proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become
executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's
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organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant
to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and
execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the
vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign
exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of
such activities, but nothing more.
Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226
Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to
prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds.
Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force
to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in
the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG
under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG was charged with the
task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of illgotten wealth or
unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the
investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may
assign to the Commission from time to time and to prevent a repetition of
the same in the future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary
investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without
violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law,
and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.
Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and
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corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.
Held: the court ruled in the negative. Considering that the PCGG, like the
courts, is vested with the authority to grant provisional remedies of (1)
sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is
indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and receivership, there
exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order,
freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest
it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured
under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the PCGG.
The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG may be
divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the
criminal investigation stage is the fact finding inquiring which is usually
conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence
and interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they
find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary
investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of
the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is
ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.
It is in such instances that we say one cannot be "a prosecutor and
judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the
complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with
impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as
a public prosecutor.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be
promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for
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intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the
Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary
investigation and take appropriate action.
Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80
Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio
Sarenas and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right
to the use of the waters flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes.
The claim of Sideco goes back to 1885 when the predecessor in interest of
his father constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the dam was
afterwards interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war,
but again reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two
Sarenas' contention is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it
appears that they made application to the Director of Public Works, only to
meet with the opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications,
granted the two Sarenas the right, in preference to all other persons, to
use the waters of the estero Bangad. Sideco then took the proceedings to
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment was
entered, dismissing the complaint and the appeal of Sideco and confirming
the decision of the administrative authorities, with the costs against the
plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the
correctness of the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its
judgment.
Issue: WON the Director of public works has jurisdiction over the case?
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Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use
of waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies
must be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications
through the Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the Secretary
thereon is final "unless appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court
within. thirty days after the date of the notification of the parties of said
decision. In case of such appeal the court having jurisdiction shall try the
controversy de novo." (See. 4.) A more extensive method is also provided,
somewhat akin to our cadastral system, which makes it the duty of the
Director of Public Works to make a technical examination of streams and
to prepare a list of priorities. In the performance of this work, the Director of
Public Works or any official especially authorized by him, may examine
witnesses under oath, and can issue for this purpose subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications are then granted each
appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the Director
of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the
property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety days of the
date of the publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)
DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF
JUDICIAL RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works,
affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, containing
as it does the technical findings of officers especially qualified in irrigation
engineering, should invariably be made a part of the judicial record
because (1) the determination of these officials would be most useful to the
courts, and (2) the exact date of the decision is of moment since it decides
whether the appeal was taken in time.
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Ocampo vs US 234 US 91
D. Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No.
105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or
any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately
preceding every examination day including the examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the
sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional
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Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No.
105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the
examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or
preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be
refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes
and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination
day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch.
What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel
should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers
should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners
should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be
suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent
commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all
means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate
means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
E. Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-
judicial power
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268
Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville
Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private
respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been
completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the
subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he
filed a complaint against them for specific performance and damages in
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the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case was set for initial
hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and
decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The
motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending that it had
jurisdiction over the matter.
Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.
Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as
"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides
that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to
regulate the real estate trade and business.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the
National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement
of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction
of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
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B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is
justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly
and competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.
F. Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six
(6) employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly
been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies
and materials. Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the
Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal
because affected without formal charges having been filed or an
opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of
the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution, the Commission
ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the
SC and affirmed the decision of the CSC with a modification that it
eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome of the
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investigation and reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two
had died. The heirs of the deceased sought execution of the order from the
CSC which was granted. GSIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari
contending that the CSC does not have any power to execute its resolution
or judgment.
Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.
Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by
the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the
civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear
and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal.
The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779
adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on
administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority
granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions. The provisions are
analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in
the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by
the Commission. In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission
the power or authority to enforce or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising
through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide
cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has
been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,
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should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless
the law otherwise provides.
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation
of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then
pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the
binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and
purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a
condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an
impossible performance or decree a useless exercise.
Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Commission.
Issue : WON Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
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Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule
of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power
to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463
Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a
Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas
trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local
match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with
the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree
plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on
entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against
importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A.
J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches
from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more
containers of matches from Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural Resources and
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Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available
softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable
price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order
against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the
latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and the
Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC
moved to dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import
ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the
exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner
to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to
enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting
the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an
administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court
from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . .
. the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered.
21
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse
of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable . . .
Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164
Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Bañez offered to sell to petitioner
Enriqueto F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent
corporation. Private respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation
fee of P20,000.00, which would form part of the consideration in case they
reach a final agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to
the petitioner should the parties fail to reach an agreement. After paying
the reservation fee, the respondent corporation changed the terms of
monthly amortization which resulted in the demand of the petitioner for the
return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the same and
petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money.
Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of
the RTC to hear the case. The same was denied and respondents
appealed to the CA who decided in their favor. Petitioner argues that
inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the parties, the
claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.
Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.
Ratio : The RTC has no jurisdiction. Under Presidential Decree No. 1344,
the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving
22
refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said
provision of law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one
that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be
understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money. Under the
circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as
one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said powers have
since been transferred to the HLRB.
Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein
provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving
refund filed against project owners, developers, and dealers, among
others.
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its
specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said
administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this
case the action for refund of reservation fee arose from a proposed
purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.
Cariño vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483
Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely
the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even
23
if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the
question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by
the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted
by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those
actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and
return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts
done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly
be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
G. Classification of adjudicatory powers
2. Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective powers of
public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the
revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws and awards
under;
3. Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit or
authorization;
24
1. Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt from or
relax a general prohibition, or authority to relieve from
affirmative duty. The licensing power sets or assumes a
standard, while the dispensing power sanctions a deviation
from a standard;
2. Summary powers. To designate administrative power to
apply compulsion or force against person or property to
effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to
authorize such action;
3. Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal having
power to determine the law upon a particular state of facts has
the right to and must consider and make proper application of
the rules of equity.
VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena
Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836
Facts :
Issue :
Ruling :
Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390
25
Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which
required her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic
was surprised for she was not aware of any case filed against her. When
she appeared at the date, time and place stated in the subpoena, she was
berated by the respondent and demanded 8K from her. Said amount was
the amount of the life insurance policy of one Edgardo Sandagan. Said
subpoena was issued upon request by Generosa Sandagan who sought
the help of respondent because she could not get a share of the proceeds
of the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose beneficiary was
Caamic.
Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.
Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under
Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed
to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial
of an action, or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the
Philippines, or for taking of his deposition." Although the subpoena he
caused to be issued purports to be in a form for criminal cases pending in
his court, it was not, in fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for
any other pending case in his court nor for any investigation he was
competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of this Court. It was
designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative conference. That
purpose was, in no way connected with or related to some of his
administrative duties because he knew from the beginning that it was for a
confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for
the latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which
was received by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in
respondent's court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's
26
court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for
respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible
compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and
absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely related to
his official functions and duties, accommodating the request and using his
official functions and office in connection therewith was, by any yardstick,
improper.
In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the
questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded
his full rights of redress.
Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104
Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair
competition in the lower court. During the trial and after the presentation of
some of private respondents’ witnesses, they requested the court for a
subpoena duces tecum as regards to the books of herein petitioner.
Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it can only be
regarded as a “fishing bill” to discover evidence against herein petitioner
and that such is not applicable in a case for unfair competition. The trial
court denied the same.
Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case
for unfair competition.
Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and
damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of
27
a trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of
defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a
part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair
competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity
to account for and yield up his gains on a principle analogous to that which
charges as trustee with the profits acquired by the wrongful use of the
property of the cestui que trust, and defendant's profits are regarded as an
equitable measure of the compensation plaintiff should receive for the past
harm suffered by him.
in order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum, " it
must appear. by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document
sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the
issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document
containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may
be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum" once issued by the court may be
quashed upon motion if the issuance therof is unreasonable and
oppressive, or the relevancy of the books. documents or things does not
appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to
advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.
In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the
subpoena duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the
complaint of private respondent for unfair competition.
Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27
28
Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged
with several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3
boxes without the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its
Resolution. After appearing and showing cause why they should not be
punished for contempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for
imprisonment and imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review
with the SC.
Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his
acts.
Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot
exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is
inherently judicial in nature. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged
a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the
case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated
in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power
to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission,
although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of
the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative
body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.
29
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the, administration of justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary
incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has
been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony.
And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of
its administrative function has been held invalid.
VIII. The Power To Punish For Contempt
People v. Mendoza 92 Phil 570
Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152
IX. Power to impose penalties
Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762
Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's
Department Store situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned
and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang.
Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed
charges of unfair labor practice against her above employers alleging that
she was dismissed by them because of her membership in the National
Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said employers had been
30
questioning their employees regarding their membership in said union and
had interfered with their right to organize under the law.
The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was
dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious
disrespect to the management and her co employees so much so that
several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila
who, after investigation, filed the corresponding information’s against her
and the same are now pending trial in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller and impose
fine against the petitioner.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.
Ruling: This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It
may be contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court
of Industrial Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal
cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this would be
tantamount to amending the law which is not within the province of the
judicial branch of our Government.
In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the
penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in
ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations,
notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a)
of said Act. Hence, the decision of the industrial court in so far as it
imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.
31
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial
Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those
constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among
other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Act that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members
and Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without
regard to technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that
"the Court shall not be bound solely by the evidence presented during the
hearing but may avail itself of all other means such as (but not limited to)
ocular inspections and questioning of well-informed persons which results
must be made a part of the record". All-this means that an accused may
be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be
convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and not beyond
reasonable doubt.
CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524
X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases
Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction
A. Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600
32
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He
filed an appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his
criminal liability should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an
opposition to said petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448
of the Penal Code and Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature
amending said article, he concluded that the marriage of the accused with
the offended party cannot extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime
of abuse against chastity.
Issue: Whether or not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of
abuse against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is
extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the offended party.
Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was
that the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should
extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and
rape and those involving offenses included in said crimes, such as
frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and
logical. If the liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must
be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes.
Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated rape, it
is only for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in
every other respect, though of different degrees of gravity. We therefore
conclude that the crime of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of
rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773 and, consequently, the
marriage of the accused with the offended party in the present case has
extinguished his criminal liability.
33
B. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing quasi-
judicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the
absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the
Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino
Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales.
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,**
protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its
mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was
conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the
election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989
and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be
presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was
denied by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us,
petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null
and void.
34
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to
entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the
Federation of Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the
respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or
not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction
to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules
and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
"(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;"
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly
empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers. The
jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the
provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it
upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations."
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even
by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local
Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect
involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the
constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the
President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has
no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the
officers of the katipunan.
35
To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the
law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local
government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic
and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic
component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest
autonomy may be achieved.
I. Procedure to be followed
Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
A. Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure
Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution
Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner
as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office.
Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion
of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
and praying, among other things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
the election of said position be nullified.
36
Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. If
we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said
body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut
off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which
protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be
ineffective.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei
the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also included. The incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
37
B. Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of procedure
First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30 –lourdes
C. Technical rules not applicable
Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337
Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of
employment of publics respondents. The arbitration’s decision is appealed
to the NLRC. Public respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of
the NLRC’s decision on the ground that the NLRC erroneously, patently
and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its
Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following
reasons: (1) there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio
and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent
petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent
Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission
are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were
rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.
Issue: WON publics respondents’ claim is tenable.
Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due
process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules
which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just,
expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. The decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and
38
set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch,
Iligan City for further proceedings.
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not
be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties
to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order
or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary
or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by
the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before
it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements
of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757
Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision
of the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch
VI, which declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48
39
dismissing private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered then
Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said
respondent to his former position as policeman of the same municipality
with back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his
actual reinstatement.
Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent
Simplicio C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police
Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without
stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of the case.
Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling
short of the legal requirements of due process, because it decided the
subject administrative case without stenographic notes (which were not
taken by the Board of Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in
error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Board of Investigators
shall be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for office
personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take
note of the proceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is
merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle
that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and
defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be
present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties are
heard and gven the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence.
D. Justiciable controversy and forum shopping
40
SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738
Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of
its powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock
transfer agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition
for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting
aside the decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of
the certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY
and CUALOPING.
Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both
regulatory and adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities,
the SEC may pass upon applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after
due notice and hearing), certificates of registration of corporations,
partnerships and associations (excluding cooperatives, homeowners'
associations, and labor unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances;
conduct inspections; and impose fines or other penalties for violations of
the Revised Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and directives of
the SEC, such as may be warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly
replace the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof
in the names of the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's
adjudicative jurisdiction. The stockholders who have been deprived of their
certificates of stock or the persons to whom the forged certificates have
ultimately been transferred by the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to
initiate, if minded, an appropriate adversarial action. A justiciable
controversy such as can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive
jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right by a proper party
41
against another who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties that can
bring the controversy and can cause an exercise by the SEC of its
original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who
are adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of
stock. Any peremptory judgment by the SEC, without such
proceedings having initiated, would be precipitat.
The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a
P50,000 fine on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely
different matter. This time, it is the regulatory power of the SEC which is
involved. When, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter set aside the
fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its instant petition, can no
longer be deemed just a nominal party but a real party in interest sufficient
to pursuant appeals to this Court.
Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Int’l Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
F. Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
G. Hearing
42
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
H. Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2. Clear and convincing evidence
Black’s Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3. Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4. Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I. Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1. Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2. Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3. Finality, promulgation and notice of decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
43
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5. Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963
Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
J. Administrative appeal in contested cases
Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965
PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560
Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283
De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92
Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261
Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673
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K. Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235
II. Due process of law in administrative adjudication
A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined
Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948
B. Cardinal primary requirements of due process
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256
Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489
C. Necessity for notice and hearing
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers’ Association vs Premiere Productions,
Inc., G.R. No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
D. Cold neutrality of a judge
Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261
E. Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due
process
Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34
RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420
Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103
F. Notice and hearing, when dispensed with
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1. Where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like
the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, the preventive
suspension of public servant facing administrative charges;
Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536
Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595
Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action;
where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right
to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the
person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
property of a delinquent taxpayer and the replacement of a
temporary appointee;
Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but
the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921
Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767
G. Notice and hearing in rate-fixing
Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46
H. Motion for reconsideration as a cure
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
i. Right to counsel, not a due process requirement
Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125
III. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
A. Definition and objective
Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
B. Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
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Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220
C. Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176
Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463
Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139
D. When doctrine does not apply
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
IV. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
A. Definition and purpose
Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344
Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657
Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132
B. Effect of failure to exhaust remedies
De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224
Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438
Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530
C. When applied
Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952
D. Exceptions to the doctrine
Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482
Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802
Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167
Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works
8 SCRA 179
Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794
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Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151
Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92
Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796
Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553
Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210
Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116
Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338
Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623
Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490
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