MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME109Docket: Cum-20-181Argued: August5,2020Decided: August13,2020Panel: GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,andHORTON,JJ.,andHJELM,A.R.J.
AVANGRIDNETWORKS,INC.,etal.v.
SECRETARYOFSTATEetal.PERCURIAM
[¶1] Avangrid Networks, Inc., the company that owns Central Maine
PowerCompany(CMP)asasubsidiary,andintervenorsMaineStateChamber
of Commerce and Industrial Energy Consumer Group (IECG) appeal from a
judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County,Warren, J.) dismissing
theircomplaintsforadeclaratoryjudgmentandtoenjointheSecretaryofState
fromplacingacitizen initiativeon theNovember2020ballot. The initiative
proposesa“resolve”thatwouldreverseaMainePublicUtilitiesCommission
order granting CMP’s request for a certificate of public convenience and
necessityfortheNewEnglandCleanEnergyConnectTransmissionProject(the
Project)—“a 145.3-mile transmission line, proposed to run from the
Maine-QuébecborderinBeattieTownshiptoLewiston,thatwilldeliver1,200
2
megawatts of electricity from Québec to the New England Control Area.”
NextEraEnergyRes.,LLCv.Me.Pub.Utils.Comm’n,2020ME34,¶1,227A.3d
1117.TheSecretaryofStateandintervenorsMainersforLocalPowerandnine
Mainevoterscross-appeal.1
[¶2] We conclude that the Superior Court erred by dismissing the
declaratory judgment count of the complaint, and we therefore vacate that
portionofthejudgmentandremandthematterfortheSuperiorCourttoenter
a declaratory judgment that the initiative fails to meet the constitutional
requirements for inclusionon theballotbecause it exceeds the scopeof the
people’s legislative powers conferred by article IV, part 3, section 18 of the
Maine Constitution. Because the Secretary of State has expressed his
willingnesstoheedaclearlystateddeclarationfromus,weseenonecessityfor
injunctiverelief.
I.BACKGROUND
[¶3] The citizens’ initiative at issue here is responsive to a decision
issued by the Public Utilities Commission in 2019. Id. ¶ 10. We begin by
1WehavereceivedamicicuriaebriefsfromformerMainelegislatorsMarkN.DionandKennethC.
Fletcher; formerCommissionersof thePublicUtilities CommissionThomasL.Welch,WilliamM.Nugent, and Mark A. Vannoy; Dmitry Bam, professor of law; and Orlando E. Delogu, emeritusprofessoroflaw.
3
summarizing the proceedings before the Commission and our review of the
Commission’sdecisiononappeal,afterwhichwefocusonthecitizens’initiative
andthelitigationbeforeustoday.
A. Proceedings Before the Public Utilities Commission and Appeal to theLawCourt
[¶4] Thismatter has its origins in a petition that CMP filedwith the
Commissionin2017seekingacertificateofpublicconvenienceandnecessity
for the Project. Id. ¶ 3; see 35-A M.R.S. § 3132 (2018).2 After holding an
extensivepublichearingandconsideringavoluminousamountofevidence,the
Commission’s hearing examiners issued a report in March 2019 containing
their recommendations. NextEraEnergyRes., LLC, 2020ME34,¶¶6-9,227
A.3d1117. In a lengthywrittenorder issued inMay2019, theCommission
adopted the examiners’ recommendations and findings. Id. ¶ 10. The
Commission concluded that the Project meets the statutory public need
standard and is in the public interest, and it issued the certificate. Id. We
affirmedtheCommission’sdecisioninMarch2020.Id.¶¶1,43.
2Section3132hassincebeenamended.SeeP.L.2019,ch.298,§§7-11(effectiveSept.19,2019)
(codifiedat35-AM.R.S.§3132(2-D), (3), (3-A), (5), (6) (2020));P.L.2019,ch.205,§4(effectiveSept.19,2019)(codifiedat35-AM.R.S.§3132(1-B)(2020)).
4
B. Citizens’Initiative
[¶5]AftertheCommissionissueditsdecision,opponentsoftheProject
gatheredsignaturesforacitizens’initiativeproposingtheadoptionofaresolve
directing the Commission to amend its order and issue the opposite
determinations—thattheProjectisnotinthepublicinterestandthatthereis
no public need for the project—and to deny the request for a certificate of
publicconvenienceandnecessity.Theinitiativereads,
Sec.1.Amendorder.Resolved:Thatwithin30daysoftheeffectivedateofthisresolveandpursuanttoitsauthorityundertheMaineRevisedStatutes,Title35-A,section1321,thePublicUtilitiesCommission shall amend “Order Granting Certificate of PublicConvenienceandNecessityandApprovingStipulation,”enteredbythe Public Utilities Commission on May 3, 2019 in Docket No.2017-00232 for the New England Clean Energy Connecttransmission project, referred to in this resolve as “the NECECtransmission project.” The amended order must find that theconstructionand operationof theNECEC transmissionproject arenotinthepublicinterestandthatthereisnotapublicneedfortheNECEC transmission project. There not being a public need, theamended order must deny the request for a certificate of publicconvenienceandnecessityfortheNECECtransmissionproject.
Resolve, To Reject the New England Clean Energy Connect Transmission
Project (emphasis added) (available at the Secretary of State’s website:
https://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/citizens/index.html).3 The initiative’s
3Thesummarytotheinitiativeprovidesasfollows:
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proponents submitted petitions bearingmore than the required number of
signaturesverifiedbytheSecretaryofState.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,¶18,
cl.2;Reedv.Sec’yofState,2020ME57,¶10,---A.3d---.Inanactionchallenging
thatverification,thecourt(Murphy,J.)enteredajudgmentintheBusinessand
ConsumerDocket affirming theSecretary’sdetermination inApril 2020. Id.
¶¶1,11.WeaffirmedthatjudgmentonappealonMay7,2020.Id.¶¶12-24.
[¶6]Inthemeantime,theSecretarypresentedtheproposedinitiativeto
theLegislatureinacommunicationdatedMarch16,2020.SeeMe.Const.art.
IV,pt.3,§18,cl.2;Sen.Jour.(129thLegis.Mar.17,2020)(reportingS.C.1058);
HouseJour.Supp.No.10(129thLegis.Mar.17,2020)(reportingH.P.1548).
The Legislature, however, adjourned sine die the next day as a result of the
COVID-19pandemicanddidnotenacttheproposal.SeeSen.Jour.(129thLegis.
Mar. 17, 2020) (reporting S.C. 1059, 1060); House Jour. Supp. No. 4 (129th
Legis.Mar.17,2020)(reportingH.C.384,385).
ThisinitiatedbilldirectsthePublicUtilitiesCommissiontoamend“OrderGranting
CertificateofPublicConvenienceandNecessityandApprovingStipulation,”enteredbythePublicUtilitiesCommissiononMay3,2019fortheNewEnglandCleanEnergyConnecttransmissionproject. TheamendedordermustfindthattheconstructionandoperationoftheNECECtransmissionprojectarenotinthepublicinterestandthatthereisnotapublicneedfortheNECECtransmissionproject.Therenotbeingapublic need, the amended ordermust deny the request for a certificate of publicconvenienceandnecessityfortheNECECtransmissionproject.
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C. ThePresentLitigation
[¶7]OnMay12,2020,daysafterweaffirmedtheSecretary’sverification
ofthepetitionsignatures,Avangridfiledtheverifiedcomplaintthat initiated
the present litigation. The complaint, naming the Secretary of State as the
defendant,sought
• Adeclaratoryjudgmentthattheinitiative
o Exceedsthescopeoflegislativepowersreservedtothepeople,seeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18;
o Usurpsthepoweroftheexecutiveandjudicialbranches,seeMe.Const.art.III,§2;and
o Isillegalasaspeciallawthatsinglesoutonecorporationtoexemptfromthegenerallyapplicablelaw;and
• InjunctivereliefpreventingtheSecretaryfromincludingtheinitiativeontheNovember3,2020,ballot.
Avangrid simultaneouslymoved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
initiative from appearing on the ballot. The court grantedmotions filed by
MaineStateChamberofCommerceandIECGtointervene,andeachentityfiled
acomplaintjoininginAvangrid’srequestsfordeclaratoryandinjunctiverelief.
ThecourtalsograntedmotionstointervenefiledbyNextEraEnergyResources,
LLC;MainersforLocalPower;andnineMainevoters.
[¶8] Mainers for Local Power and the nine Maine voters moved to
dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including that (1) the requested
7
relief is barred because the Maine Constitution requires the Secretary to
include the initiativeon theballot, seeMe.Const. art. IV, pt. 3, §18; (2) the
claimswerenotripebeforetheelection;and(3)theinitiativeisconstitutional
becauseutilitiesregulationisalegislativefunction.
[¶9]Afterconductingcommendablyexpeditedproceedings,includinga
hearing,theSuperiorCourtissuedajudgmentonJune29,2020,concludingthat
the initiative’sconstitutionalitywasnotsubject to judicial reviewbefore the
election and dismissing Avangrid’s complaint in which the Chamber of
CommerceandIECGhadjoined.Avangrid,theChamberofCommerce,andIECG
appealed from the judgment, and the Secretary of State, Mainers for Local
Power, and the nine Maine voters filed cross-appeals, all of which are now
beforeus.
II.DISCUSSION
A. PositionsoftheParties
[¶10] The issuebeforeus is narrow—whether the proposed citizens’
initiativefallswithinthescopeofthecitizens’constitutionalpowertolegislate,
createdinsection18ofarticleIV,part3oftheMaineConstitution.Thiscase
cannot—andthereforedoesnot—prospectivelyaddresstheconstitutionality
or legality of the initiative itself as an independent issue. Any such
8
determinationnecessarilycouldbemadeonlyiftheissuebecameripe,which
wouldbeafteraninitiativeisenacted.SeeWagnerv.Sec’yofState,663A.2d
564,567(Me.1995).Furtherbutimportantly,itgoeswithoutsayingthatour
analysisandconclusionsareentirelydivorcedfromthemeritsoftheinitiative
becausethemeritsoftheinitiativehavenothingtodowithwhetheritshould
appearontheballot.
[¶11] Avangrid, the Chamber of Commerce, and IECG argue that we
should review the constitutional proprietyof submitting themeasure to the
electorsatall.Theyarguethattheinitiativefallsoutsidethescopeoflegislative
powerconferredonthepeopleofMainethroughthedirectinitiativeprovisions
oftheMaineConstitutionbecausetheinitiativeusurpsexecutiveandjudicial
functions.
[¶12] The Secretary of State agrees with Avangrid that the initiative
exceedsthecitizens’legislativepowerbutargues,asitdidinthetrialcourt,that
Avangridhasnotsatisfiedeveryelementnecessarytoobtaininjunctiverelief.
MainersforLocalPower,thenineMainevoters,andNextEracontendthatthe
dismissalofthecomplaintwasproper.MainersforLocalPowerandthenine
Maine voters additionally argue that the substance of the proposed resolve
comportswithMaine’sConstitutionbecausetheLegislaturemerelydelegated
9
legislative power to the Commission, and the Legislature remains free to
interposeitselfinproceedingswheretheCommissionhasacted.4
4MainersforLocalPowerandthenineMainevotersalsoarguethatAvangrid’scomplaintwas
untimelybecause itwasnot filed in time to satisfy the100-day limitprescribed in the followingconstitutionalprovision:
TheLegislaturemayenact lawsnot inconsistentwith theConstitution toestablishprocedures fordeterminationof the validity ofwrittenpetitions. Such laws shallincludeprovision for judicialreviewofanydetermination,tobecompletedwithin100daysfromthedateoffilingofawrittenpetitionintheofficeoftheSecretaryofState.
Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§22;see21-AM.R.S.§§901(7),905(2020). Weareunpersuadedbythistemporal argument because it is not the Secretary’s determination of “the validity of writtenpetitions”thatisatissuehere,andthereforethe100-daylimitonthecompletionofjudicialreviewofthatdecisiondoesnotapply.NeithertheMaineConstitutionnortheadoptedstatutesgoverninginitiativessuggestthattheSecretaryofStatewouldhavethepower,whendeterminingthe“validityofwrittenpetitions”pursuanttoarticleIV,part3,section22and21-AM.R.S.§905,todecidewhetherthesubjectmatterofapetitionexceedsthelegislativepowerconferredonMainecitizens.Rather,thestatutesfocustheSecretary’sattentiononthepetitioner’scompliancewiththerequirementsofa“writtenpetition”assetforthintheMaineConstitutionandthestatutes.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§§18,20,22;21-AM.R.S.§§901-905(2020). A“writtenpetition”isspecificallydefinedinMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§20:
“[W]rittenpetition”meansoneormorepetitionswrittenorprinted,orpartlywrittenandpartlyprinted,withtheoriginalsignaturesofthepetitioners,or,asauthorizedbylaw,thealternativesignaturesofpersonswithphysicaldisabilitiesthatpreventthemfrom signing their own names, attached, verified as to the authenticity of thesignaturesbytheoathofthecirculatorthatallofthesignaturestothepetitionweremade in the presence of the circulator and that to the best of the circulator’sknowledgeandbeliefeachsignature isthesignatureof thepersonwhosename itpurportstobe,andaccompaniedbythecertificateoftheofficialauthorizedbylawtomaintainthevotinglistortocertifysignaturesonpetitionsforvotersonthevotinglistofthecity,townorplantationinwhichthepetitionersresidethattheirnamesappearonthevotinglistofthecity,townorplantationoftheofficialasqualifiedtovoteforGovernor....
TheelectionstatutesconferalimitedgatekeeperfunctionupontheSecretaryofStatetoreviewtheformofanapplicationfordirectinitiativepetitionsandtorejectanapplicationthatdoesnotmeettheformalrequirementsforproposedlegislation.See21-AM.R.S.§901(requiringthosepursuingadirectinitiativeto“submitawrittenapplicationtotheDepartmentoftheSecretaryofStateonaformdesignedbytheSecretaryofState”topresentthe“proposedlaw”totheSecretary).ThestatutelimitstheSecretary’sreviewofanapplication tomattersof form. See id.§§901(3-A),905(1);seealsoWymanv.Sec’yofState,625A.2d307,311(Me.1993)(statingthattheSecretaryofState’s“refusaltofurnishthepetitionformbasedonthecontentoftheproposedlegislationimpermissiblyviolated
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B. StandardofReviewandRulesofConstructionforInterpretingtheMaineConstitution’sDirectInitiativeProvisions
[¶13] This appeal requires us to construe the Maine Constitution to
determinewhethertheinitiativeshouldbedeclaredinvalidandtheSecretary
ofStateshouldbeenjoinedfromsubmittingtheinitiativetoMainevoters.We
reviewthelegalissuespresentedonappealdenovo.SeeMcGeev.Sec’yofState,
2006ME50,¶5,896A.2d933(constitutionalinterpretation);Johnsonv.Crane,
2017ME113,¶9,163A.3d832(ripeness).
[¶14] To interpret the Maine Constitution, we “look primarily to the
languageused.”Voorheesv.SagadahocCounty.,2006ME79,¶6,900A.2d733
(quotationmarksomitted).Weconstrueconstitutionalprovisionsbyusingthe
same principles of construction that we apply in cases of statutory
interpretation.Id.Thus,wewill“applytheplainlanguageoftheconstitutional
provisionifthelanguageisunambiguous,”and“[i]ftheprovisionisambiguous,
we [will] determine the meaning by examining the purpose and history
surroundingtheprovision.”Id.
Wyman’srightsprotectedbythefirstamendment”(emphasisadded)).BythetermsoftheMaineConstitution,the100-daylimitonjudicialreviewpertainstothisdeterminationonly.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§22.Thecourts,however,havetheauthority“todeclarerights,statusandotherlegalrelationswhether or not further relief is or could be claimed,” and there is no constitutional orstatutory limitationon that authority that constrainsour action in thismatter. 14M.R.S. §5953(2020).
11
[¶15]Inpertinentpart,theconstitutionalprovisionregarding“[d]irect
initiativeoflegislation”providesthat“electorsmayproposetotheLegislature
foritsconsiderationanybill,resolveorresolution,includingbillstoamendor
repealemergencylegislationbutnotanamendmentoftheStateConstitution,
bywrittenpetitionaddressedtotheLegislatureortoeitherbranchthereof.”
Me.Const.art. IV,pt.3,§18,cl.1. Wehaveheld,“Thebroadpurposeofthe
directinitiativeistheencouragementofparticipatorydemocracy.Bysection
18thepeople,assovereign,haveretakenuntothemselveslegislativepower,
and that constitutional provision must be liberally construed to facilitate,
rather than to handicap, the people’s exercise of their sovereign power to
legislate....[S]ection18cannotbesaidmerelytopermitthedirectinitiativeof
legislationuponcertainconditions.Rather,itreservestothepeopletheright
to legislate by direct initiative if the constitutional conditions are satisfied.”
McGee,2006ME50,¶25,896A.2d933(quotationmarksomitted).Withthese
standards inmind,we now considerwhether pre-election judicial review is
properinthiscase.
C. RipenessandPre-ElectionJudicialReview
[¶16]Achallengetotheconstitutionalityofthesubstanceofaproposed
citizen initiative is ordinarily not ripe for judicial consideration before an
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electionbecause“[j]usticiabilityrequiresthattherebearealandsubstantial
controversybaseduponanexistingsetoffacts,notuponastateoffactsthat
mayormaynotariseinthefuture.”Lockmanv.Sec’yofState,684A.2d415,
420(Me.1996)(quotationmarksomitted).Wewillnotopineon“thefuture
effect,enforceability,andconstitutionalityof[an]initiativeifenacted”because
“theinitiativemayneverbecomeeffective.”Wagner,663A.2dat567.Thereis
no“concrete,certain,orimmediatelegalproblem”insuchcircumstances.Id.
“[T]o express a view as to the future effect and application of proposed
legislationwould involve [us] at least indirectly in the legislativeprocess, in
violationoftheseparationofpowersmandatedbyArticleIII,Section2,ofthe
MaineConstitution.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶17]Similarly,JusticesoftheSupremeJudicialCourthaveopinedthat
aninitiativeproposingabillthatissubstantivelyunconstitutionalisnotsubject
topre-electionchallengeandmustbesubmittedtotheelectorsbecauseofthe
constitutionaldirectivethatan initiative“shallbesubmittedtotheelectors.”
Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18,cl.2;seeOpinionoftheJustices,673A.2d693,697,
698 (Me. 1996); Opinion of the Justices, 623 A.2d 1258, 1264 (Me. 1993)
(answerofGlassmanandClifford,JJ.);butseeOpinionoftheJustices,623A.2d
at1261-63(answerofWathen,C.J.,andRoberts,Collins,Rudman,andDana,JJ.)
13
(reaching the question before the Legislature decidedwhether to enact the
proposalorsendittothevotersandopiningthataninitiativefellwithinthe
citizens’ legislativepower);seealsoWagner,663A.2dat566n.3 (“Since the
Legislaturehasnotenactedtheinitiativewithoutchange,itmustbereferredto
theelectors.”);Wymanv.Sec’yofState,625A.2d307,310(Me.1993)(same).
[¶18]Incontrast,courtsareauthorizedbytheMaineConstitutionand
state statutes to determine whether the proposed initiative satisfies the
proceduralprerequisitesforadirectinitiative.Forexample,wehavereviewed
whether the Secretary of State erred in failing to invalidate certain petition
signaturesfortheinitiativenowbeforeus,Reed,2020ME57,¶1,---A.3d---,
andwhethertheSecretaryofStatewasrequiredtoreceivepetitionsinvoking
apeople’svetoreferendumonabillenactedasanemergencymeasurein1951,
Morrisv.Goss,147Me.89,90,83A.2d556(1951)(construingMe.Const.art.IV,
pt.3,§16).5
5Notably,inbothMorrisv.Goss,147Me.89,90,83A.2d556(1951),andthemorerecentcaseof
Friends of Congress Square Park v. City of Portland, 2014 ME 63, ¶¶ 1, 91 A.3d 601, we wereconsideringwhethergovernmentactorsimproperlydeniedballotaccessforacitizens’initiative—decisions thatwere ripe for reviewbecauseof a live controversy calling for adecisionwith realconsequences. In Friends of Congress Square Park, we affirmed the Superior Court’s judgmentorderingtheCityofPortlandtoplaceacitizens’ initiativeon theballotbecause itwaswithinthescopeoftheinitiativepowersetforthintheCityCode.Id.¶¶1,19.
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[¶19]Atissuehereiswhether,aswithissuesregardingtheadequacyof
compliancewiththepetitionprocess,courtsmayproperlydecide,pre-election,
whether a proposed initiative must be excluded from the ballot because it
exceedsthescopeofthecitizens’ legislativepower. Althoughwehavenever
expresslydecided the issue,manyotherstatecourtshavereachedquestions
pre-election about whether an initiative exceeds the people’s legislative
authority.See,e.g.,AFLv.Eu,686P.2d609,614-15(Cal.1984);CityofIdaho
Springsv.Blackwell,731P.2d1250,1253(Colo.1987);Garvinv.NinthJud.Dist.
Ct.,59P.3d1180,1190-91(Nev.2002);TownofHiltonHeadIslandv.Coal.of
Expressway Opponents, 415 S.E.2d 801, 805 (S.C. 1992); Philadelphia II v.
Gregoire, 911 P.2d 389, 394 (Wash. 1996). Such pre-election review is
authorized because a court is not called upon to review the substantive
constitutionalityofproposedlegislationbutratheriscalledupontodetermine
whetherlegislationhasbeenproposedatall.SeeJamesD.GordonIII&DavidB.
Magleby,Pre-ElectionJudicialReviewofInitiativesandReferendums,64Notre
Dame L. Rev. 298, 302-03 (1989) (distinguishing among pre-election
argumentsthat“themeasure, ifpassed,wouldbesubstantivelyinvalid”;that
the proponents failed “to meet the procedural requirements to qualify the
15
measure foranelection”; and that “theballotmeasuredoesnot fallwithina
propersubjectmatterfordirectlegislation”).6
[¶20]UnlikethecasesinwhichMaineJusticeshavedeclinedtoconduct
pre-election review of direct initiatives on the ground that the substantive
constitutionalityofproposedlegislationwasnotripeforreview,seeOpinionof
the Justices, 673 A.2d at 697, 698;Opinion of the Justices, 623 A.2d at 1264
(answerofGlassmanandClifford,JJ.),thiscasepresentsthequestionwhether
the subject matter of the initiative is even eligible to proceed as a direct
initiative.
[¶21]InWagnerv.SecretaryofState,wereviewedthesubjectmatterof
adirectinitiativetodeterminewhetheritwaswithinthescopeofthepeople’s
right to initiate legislation and, after confirming that it was, we declined to
reviewthesubstantiveconstitutionalityoftheproposedlaw.663A.2dat567.
InWagner, opponents of an initiative proposing the enactment of a statute
assertedthattheinitiativewasoutsidethescopeofarticleIV,part3,section18
because itproposedaconstitutionalamendmentrather than legislation,and
6Thestatesthathavedeclinedtoreachconstitutionalissuespre-electionhave,ingeneral,done
so either because additional facts may become relevant or because the issues pertained to thesubstantive constitutionality of the proposed legislation, as opposed to the constitutionalprerequisitesforacitizens’initiativetobesubmittedtothevotersinthefirstplace.See,e.g.,Stewartv.AdvancedGamingTechs.,Inc.,723N.W.2d65,77(Neb.2006);Carterv.LehiCity,269P.3d141,164(Utah2012).
16
alsobecausetheproposedstatutewouldbesubstantivelyunconstitutional if
enacted.Id.at566-67.Weaddressed,onitsmerits,thequestionofwhether
the initiative proposed a constitutional amendment, holding that “[t]he
SuperiorCourtspecificallyaddressed,andcorrectlyrejected,theargumentthat
theinitiativewasadisguisedconstitutionalamendment.”Id.at567.Basedon
thatconclusion,wesaid,“Theproposedinitiativelegislationdoesnotpresent
uswithasubjectmatterbeyondtheelectorate’sgrantofauthority.”Id.Having
decided that the subjectmatterof the initiativewaswithin the scopeof the
people’s rightof initiative,wedeclined, on ripeness grounds, to address the
substantiveconstitutionalityoftheproposedstatute.Id.at567-68.
[¶22] Wagner illustrates that the courts’ limited involvement in the
direct initiativeprocesscan, inadditiontoproceduralmatters,extendtothe
questionofwhetheradirectinitiativeiswithinthepeople’sconstitutionalright
to initiate legislation. Plainly, a proposal that is outside the scope of the
people’srighttoinitiatelegislationcannot,asaconstitutionalmatter,proceed
totheelectorateasadirectinitiative.Seeid.at567.Wethereforeconcludethat
thequestionofwhetherthesubjectmatterofthisdirectinitiativeiswithinthe
scopeofthepeople’srighttoinitiatelegislationisripeforjudicialreview.See
Gordon&Maglebyat314(“Proceduralandsubjectmatterrequirementscould
17
be viewed as jurisdictional limitations; government officials do not have
jurisdictiontoconductanelectiononameasureiftheserequirementshavenot
beenmet, and this issue is immediately justiciable.”). We now turn to that
constitutionalissue.
D. Constitutionality of Submitting the Subject Matter of the ProposedInitiativetotheVoters
[¶23] We begin by outlining the separation of powers in the Maine
Constitution and then turn our focus to the constitutional provisions
authorizingadirectinitiativeoflegislationtodeterminewhetheraninitiative
requiringthePublicUtilitiesCommissiontoalteradecisiononacertificateof
publicconvenienceandnecessityiswithinthescopeofthecitizens’initiative
power.
1. ConstitutionalSeparationofPowers
[¶24] The Maine Constitution establishes three separate branches of
government:
Section 1. Powers distributed. The powers of thisgovernment shall be divided into 3 distinct departments, thelegislative,executiveandjudicial. Section 2. To be kept separate. No person or persons,belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any of thepowers properly belonging to either of the others, except in thecaseshereinexpresslydirectedorpermitted.
18
Me.Const.art.III. AswestatednotlongafterMainehadbecomeastate,the
more that the “independence of each department, within its constitutional
limits,canbepreserved,thenearerthesystemwillapproachtheperfectionof
civilgovernment,andthesecurityofcivil liberty.” Lewisv.Webb,3Me.326,
329(1825).Thequestionatissuehereiswhethertheinitiativeproposesan
actthatisnotlegislativeandisthereforenotwithinthepeople’srighttoinitiate
legislation. We thus turn to the scope of that right as defined in the
constitutionalprovisionsauthorizingthedirectinitiativeoflegislation.
2. LegislativeNatureofaDirectInitiativeProposingaResolve
[¶25]Aswenoteabove,theconstitutionalprovisionregarding“[d]irect
initiativeoflegislation”statesthat“electorsmayproposetotheLegislaturefor
its consideration any bill, resolve or resolution, including bills to amend or
repealemergencylegislationbutnotanamendmentoftheStateConstitution,
bywrittenpetitionaddressedtotheLegislatureortoeitherbranchthereof.”
Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18,cl.1(emphasisadded).Theterms“bill,”“resolve,”
and“resolution”arenotdefinedintheMaineConstitution.Butcf.Me.Const.
art.IV,pt.3,§20(definingothertermssuchas“electors,”“people,”and“written
petition”).
19
[¶26] Our previous cases indicate that a “resolve,” like a “bill” or
“resolution,”isalegislativeact.Wehaveexplicitlyandrepeatedlydescribeda
resolve as “having the force of law.” Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me. 428, 448,
89A.944(1914);seealsoLockman,684A.2dat419(construingMe.Const.art.
IV,pt.3,§16);Dayv.Bishop,71Me.132,133(1880).Wehavealsointerpreted
thelanguage,“everybillorresolutionhavingtheforceoflaw,”toreferto“what
iscommonlyknownaslegislativeactsandresolves,whicharepassedbyboth
branches, are usually signed by the governor and are embodied in the
Legislative Acts and Resolves, as printed and published.” 111 Me. at 448,
89A.944 (emphasis added) (quotationmarks omitted). In stating that it is
withinthepoweroftheLegislaturetoadoptaresolve“withoutanypurposeor
intention to abrogate, annul or repeal any existing general law,” we
acknowledgedthataresolveisnonethelesslegislativeaction.CityofBangorv.
InhabitantsofEtna,140Me.85,89-91,34A.2d205(1943).Thus,section18,
although not explicitly using the term “legislation,” requires that a citizens’
initiativeconstitutelegislativeaction.SeealsoLeagueofWomenVotersv.Sec’y
ofState,683A.2d769,771(Me.1996)(statingthat“[w]henthepeopleenact
legislation by popular vote,” they engage in the “exercise of their sovereign
powertolegislate”).
20
[¶27]Thisconstructionofsection18isconsistentwithareadingofthe
provisioninthecontextofpart3ofarticleIVoftheMaineConstitution,entitled
“Legislative Power,” and, importantly, the title of section 18 itself, “Direct
initiative of legislation,” Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 (emphasis added).
Legislative power is, at its core, the “full power to make and establish all
reasonablelawsandregulationsforthedefenseandbenefitofthepeopleofthis
State, not repugnant to this Constitution, nor to that of the United States.”
Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§1;seeLeagueofWomenVoters,683A.2dat771(“The
exercise of initiative power by the people is simply a popular means of
exercisingtheplenarylegislativepower‘tomakeandestablishallreasonable
lawsandregulationsforthedefenseandbenefitofthepeopleofthisState....’
Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§1.”(emphasisadded)).7Thus,thecitizens’powerof
directinitiative“appliesonlytolegislation,tothemakingoflaws,whetheritbe
apublicact,aprivateactoraresolvehavingtheforceoflaw.”Moulton,111Me.
at448,89A.944.
7AswithlegislationproposedbytheLegislature,courtswillnotordinarilydeterminewhether
thesubstanceofthelegislationis“repugnantto[theMaine]Constitution”beforethelegislationhasbeenenacted.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§1;seeGuardianshipofChamberlain,2015ME76,¶35,118A.3d 229 (holding that the standard of proof in a statute passed by the Legislature wasunconstitutional);cf.OpinionoftheJustices,2017ME100,¶¶55,60-68,162A.3d188(opining,onasolemn occasion, that citizen-initiated legislation that had been approved by voters violated theconstitution). Thisdetermination isdistinct fromthequestionofwhether an initiativeproposesactuallegislation.
21
[¶28]JusticesoftheSupremeJudicialCourthaveopined,inresponseto
questionspropoundedbylegislativebodies,thatitisnotwithinthepowerof
theelectorstoinitiate
• Abondissue,seeOpinionoftheJustices,159Me.209,214-15,191A.2d357(1963)(citingMe.Const.art.IX,§14);or
• AdefactoamendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitutionbypetitioningto initiate legislationdirectingmembersof theState’s congressionaldelegation,thegovernor,andstate legislatorstoapplytotheUnitedStates Congress for a constitutional convention, see Opinion of theJustices,673A.2d693,697(Me.1996)(citingU.S.Const.art.V).
In each instance, the Justices concluded that thesematterswerewithin the
exclusive province of the Legislature and therefore beyond the legislative
powerofthecitizens.
[¶29] Sitting as the LawCourt,we have also addressed the extent of
legislativepower.Fiveyearsaftertheconstitutionalamendmentadoptingthe
initiative process took effect in 1909, see Resolves 1907, ch. 121 (effective
Jan.6, 1909), we declined to delay the effect of the Legislature’s resolve
adopting an address to the Governor to remove the Sheriff of Cumberland
County,holdingthattherewasnoneedtoaffordtheopportunityforapetition
forapeople’sveto,seeMe.Cont.Art.IV,pt.3,§§16,17,becausetheLegislature’s
resolve constituted an exercise of its power of impeachment pursuant to
22
articleIXoftheMaineConstitutionandnotitslawmakingpowerpursuantto
articleIV.Moulton,111Me.at431,447-51,89A.944.
[¶30] Morerecently,welistedcharacteristicsofactsconsideredtobe
legislative in determining whether a municipal citizen initiative had to be
presentedtothevoterspursuanttothatmunicipality’scharter:
[C]ourtsconsideranacttobelegislativeifit:(1)makesnewlaw,rather than executes existing law; (2) proposes a law of generalapplicability, rather than being based on individualized,case-specificconsiderations;(3)relatestosubjectsofapermanentorgeneralcharacter,asopposedtosubjectsthataretemporaryinoperationandeffect;(4)declaresapublicpurposeandprovidesforthe ways and means to accomplish that purpose, rather thanimplementingexistingpolicyordealingwithasmallsegmentofanoverall policy question; (5) requires only general knowledge,rather than specialized training and experience or an intimateknowledgeofthefiscalorotheraffairsofgovernment;(6)doesnotinvolveasubjectmatterinwhichthelegislativebodyhasdelegateddecisionmakingpowerforlocalimplementation;(7)establishesoramends zoning laws; (8) is informed by historical examples oflegislativeacts,suchaslongstandingparallelsinstatutesenactedby legislative bodies, rather than traditionally executive acts; or(9)isanamendmenttoalegislativeact.
FriendsofCong.SquareParkv.CityofPortland,2014ME63,¶13n.7,91A.3d
601(citationsomitted).
[¶31] Todecidewhethertheinitiativeat issuehereisconstitutionally
permissiblebyproposing legislationwithin themeaningofarticle IV,part3,
23
section18oftheMaineConstitution,wenextconsiderthenatureofthepowers
heldandexercisedbythePublicUtilitiesCommission.
3. Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Executive Powers of the PublicUtilitiesCommission
[¶32]TheLegislaturecreatedthePublicUtilitiesCommissionin1913so
that the Commission—constituted of individuals who would have greater
expertise in the field than legislators—would regulate and control public
servicecorporations.SeeP.L.1913,ch.129(approvedMar.27,1913;survived
people’svetoSept.14,1914);Legis.Rec.907(1913);InreSearsportWaterCo.,
118Me.382,392,108A.452(1919);seealsoAuburnWaterDist.v.Pub.Utils.
Comm’n,156Me.222,225,163A.2d743(“Theregulationofpublicutilitieslies
withtheLegislatureandnotwiththeExecutiveorJudiciary.”).TheLegislature
“delegated its entire authority over the [regulation of public utilities] to the
Commission.”NewEnglandTel.&Tel.Co.v.Pub.Utils.Comm’n,470A.2d772,
778 (Me. 1984); see 35-A M.R.S. § 111 (2020) (granting the Commission
rulemaking authority). “The power of the Legislature was not, however,
surrendered,butdelegated.TheCommissionhasnolifeexceptaslifeisgiven
bytheLegislature.”AuburnWaterDist.,156Me.at226,163A.2d743.
[¶33] Although legislative authority has been delegated to the
Commission, the Commission also functions as an executive agencywith its
24
membersappointedbytheGovernor,“subjecttoreviewbythejointstanding
committee of the Legislature having jurisdiction over public utilities and to
confirmation by the Legislature,” to execute its statutory obligations. 35-A
M.R.S.§105(1)(2020).Also,theGovernor—nottheLegislature—designates
onememberasthechair.35-AM.R.S.§106(1)(2020).TheCommissionhasan
administrative adjudicatory role that is traditionally regarded as a
quasi-judicialfunctionofaStateagencyinexecutingthelaw.See35-AM.R.S.
§§104, 1301-1323 (2020); see Forest Ecology Network v. Land Use Regul.
Comm’n,2012ME36,¶45n.11,39A.3d74(“Abasictenetofadministrative
law is that rulemaking is a quasi-legislative act, and that adjudication is a
quasi-judicial act.”); Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution 70 (2d ed. 2013)
(“Ingeneral, the firstbranchenacts laws, the secondapproves andexecutes
them,andthethirdexpoundsandenforcesthem.”(citingExparteDavis,41Me.
38,53(1856)));seealsoFriendsofCong.SquarePark,2014ME63,¶13n.7,91
A.3d601(statingthefollowingasindiciaoflegislativeactivity:thataproposal
“requires only general knowledge, rather than specialized training and
experience or an intimate knowledge of the fiscal or other affairs of
government”;thatitdoesnotinvolveamatterastowhichthelegislativebody
25
hasdelegateddecision-makingpower;andthatitdoesnotinvolveactsthatare
traditionallyexecutiveacts).
[¶34]Thus,separatefromitsroleinlegislatingthroughrulemakingto
regulatepublicutilities,theCommissionfunctionsinanexecutivecapacityas
anadministrativeagency, includingbyholdingapublichearing—sometimes,
asintheproceedingatissuehere,ahearingsubstantialbothindurationandin
thevolumeofinformationsubmittedtoandconsideredbytheCommission—
andrenderingadecisioninaparticularcasewhenautilityhasappliedfora
certificate of public convenience and necessity. See 35-A M.R.S. §§1304,
3132(2), (6) (2020);8 see also 5 M.R.S. §§9051-9064 (2020) (Maine
AdministrativeProcedureAct);cf.Cent.Me.PowerCo.v.Me.Pub.Utils.Comm’n,
395A.2d414,427(Me.1978)(distinguishingtheCommission’s“substantive
powertoregulate”fromits“lawfulauthoritytoconduct[an]investigation”).By
statute,theCommission’sadjudicatorydecisionsmaythenbeappealeddirectly
totheLawCourt“inthesamemannerasanappealtakenfromajudgmentof
the Superior Court in a civil action.” 35-A M.R.S. § 1320(1) (2020). The
Commission’s adjudicatory decisions therefore are subject to judicial—not
8Although35-AM.R.S.§3132(6)(2018)wasamendedaftertheproceedingsatissuehere,itwas
notchangedinanywaythataffectsourreasoninghere,andwecitethecurrentstatute.SeeP.L.2019,ch.298,§11(effectiveSept.19,2019)(codifiedat35-AM.R.S.§3132(6)(2020)).
26
legislative—review.9Seeid.;NextEraEnergyRes.,LLC,2020ME34,227A.3d
1117.
[¶35]Theinitiativeatissuehereisnotlegislativeinnaturebecauseits
purposeandeffectistodictatetheCommission’sexerciseofitsquasi-judicial
executive-agency function in a particular proceeding. The resolve would
interfere with and vitiate the Commission’s fact-finding and adjudicatory
function—anexecutivepowerconferredontheCommissionbytheLegislature.
See35-AM.R.S.§3132(6).AlthoughtheLegislaturemayproperlyconstrainthe
Commissioninits legislativefunctionsandmayaltertheauthorityconferred
on the Commission, the Legislaturewould exceed its legislative powers if it
were to require the Commission to vacate and reverse a particular
administrative decision the Commission hadmade. See 35-AM.R.S. §1323;
Grubbv.S.D.WarrenCo.,2003ME139,¶11,837A.2d117(“TheLegislature
maynotdisturbadecisionrenderedinapreviousaction,astothepartiesto
thataction;todosowouldviolatethedoctrineofseparationofpowers.”).Thus,
9TheLegislaturehasenactedanarrowexceptiontotheexclusivegrantofreviewtothecourts,
bymeansof a statute allowingautility to apply to theLegislature “to granta right, privilegeorimmunitywhichthecommissionhaspowertogrant”aftertheutilityhasexhausteditsrightswiththeCommission.35-AM.R.S.§1323(2020).Here,CMP,theutility,isnotapplyingtotheLegislatureortothevotersthroughthisinitiative.Becausetheissueisnotbeforeus,wedonotaddresswhethertheLegislature’s reviewofan adjudicatorydecisionof theCommissionpursuant to section1323wouldbeaconstitutionalexerciseoflegislativepower.
27
theactionthatwouldbemandatedbythedirectinitiativewouldbeexecutive
innature,notlegislative.
4. Conclusion
[¶36] Althoughwemust“liberallyconstrue[]”section18“tofacilitate,
rather than to handicap, the people’s exercise of their sovereign power to
legislate,”McGee,2006ME50,¶25,896A.2d933(emphasisadded)(quotation
marksomitted),whatisproposedhereisnotlegislation.Thecitizens’initiative,
althoughlabeleda“resolve,”directstheCommission,inexercisingitsexecutive
adjudicatorypowers,toreverseitsfindingsandreachadifferentoutcomeinan
already-adjudicatedmatterinviolationoftheconstraintsofarticleIV,part3,
section18oftheMaineConstitution.SeeGrubb,2003ME139,¶11,837A.2d
117;FriendsofCong.SquarePark,2014ME63,¶13n.7,91A.3d601.Directing
anagencytoreachfindingsdiametricallyoppositetothoseitreachedbasedon
extensiveadjudicatoryhearingsandavoluminousevidentiaryrecord,affirmed
onappeal,isnot“mak[ing]andestablish[ing]”alaw.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,
§1.10
10Evenwithrespecttospeciallegislation,theLegislaturemaynotenact“aprivateresolvesingling
outanindividualforuniquetreatment.”MacImageofMe.,LLCv.AndroscogginCounty,2012ME44,¶37,40A.3d975;seealsoBrannv.State,424A.2d699,704(Me.1981)(holdingthatthespeciallegislation clause is “violated by special legislation attempting to exempt one individual fromgenerallyapplicablerequirementsofthelaw”).ThecaseofAuburnWaterDistrictv.PublicUtilitiesCommission,156Me.222,163A.2d743(1960),doesnotundermineourreasoningbecausethere,theLegislature’sexemptionofawaterdistrict fromthegeneralregulatorypowerwas througha
28
[¶37] Although an initiative “shall be submitted to the electors” if
legislationisproposed inaccordancewiththeprocesssetforthintheMaine
Constitution,Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18,cl.2;seeWagner,663A.2dat566n.3;
Wyman, 625 A.2d at 310, here, no legislation is proposed. Consequently, a
constitutional prerequisite to a citizens’ initiative is not satisfied—a
determinationthatisproperforustomakebecauseitislimitedtothenarrow
questionofwhethertheinitiativeiswithinthecitizens’constitutionalpowerto
enactlegislation.SeeWagner,663A.2dat567.Accordingly,wereachtheissue
pre-electionandconcludethattheconstitutionalprerequisitethataninitiative
proposinga“bill,resolveorresolution”—meaninglegislativeaction—hasnot
beenmet.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18,cl.1.11
special lawestablishingacharter for thewaterdistrict—a function thatisdistinctly legislative innature. See also Taylor v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2016ME71, ¶ 8, 138A.3d 1214 (“As a legislativeenactment,wefirstexaminetheplainlanguageofthecharteraswewouldanyotherstatute.”).Weheld that theCommissionwasboundby the charterbecause theLegislature retains the right tolegislatetoregulatepublicutilities.AuburnWaterDist.,156Me.at228-29,163A.2d743.Here,incontrast, the initiative targets nonlegislative activities of the Commission, as we have explainedabove.
11 Althoughthe tight timeline for thecurrent litigation isnot ideal,weacknowledge that it isunclearwhetherthequestionwehavedecidedtodaywouldhavebeenripeforadjudicationbeforetheSecretaryactedandhisdecisionwasaffirmedafterjudicialreview.SeeLockmanv.Sec’yofState,684A.2d415,420(Me.1996)(requiring,foramattertoberipe,“thattherebearealandsubstantialcontroversybaseduponanexistingsetoffacts,notuponastateoffactsthatmayormaynotariseinthe future” (quotationmarks omitted));Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d564, 567 (Me. 1995)(“Ripenessconcernsthefitnessoftheissueforjudicialdecisionandthehardshiptothepartiesofwithholdingcourtconsideration.”).Aswehaveobservedinfootnote4above,theSecretary’spowertoreviewawrittenpetitionislimitedtoformalreview.Beforethatreviewhadbeenpursuedtoitsconclusion,however, itwasnotclearthatthemeasurewouldbepresentedtothevotersunlessacourtenteredadeclaratoryjudgmentontheissueweaddresstoday.
29
[¶38]WethereforeremandfortheSuperiorCourttoenteradeclaratory
judgment that the initiative fails tomeet theconstitutional requirements for
inclusionontheballotbecauseitexceedsthescopeofthelegislativepowers
conferredbyarticleIV,part3,section18oftheMaineConstitution.Because,
accordingtotheSecretaryofState,ballotsfortheNovember2020electionneed
beprintedstartingattheendofthismonth,themandateofthisopinionwill
issue five days after the date it is published, with any motion for
reconsiderationtobefiledwithinthattime.SeeM.R.App.P.14(a)(2),(b),(c).
[¶39]Aswehavenoted,inthetrialcourtandindeedduringmuchofhis
oralargumentonthisappeal,theSecretaryofStatehasopposedtheissuance
of injunctivereliefthatwouldenjoinhimfromincludingtheinitiativeonthe
ballot.Ultimately,however,counselfortheSecretarystatedthatifwewereto
concludethattheinitiativeisunconstitutionalandcannotbesubmittedtothe
electorsforpopularvote—whichispreciselyourclearholdingtoday—onhis
own accord, he will not include the initiative on the ballot. Based on the
SecretaryofState’sclarificationofhisposition,weareconfidentthathe“will
complywiththelawonceitisdeclared”andpreventtheinvalidinitiativefrom
beingplacedontheballot.GreatN.Paper,Inc.v.PenobscotNation,2001ME68,
¶64n.21,770A.2d574.Thus,weseenoneedfortheissuanceofinjunctive
30
relief.SeeLittlefieldv.TownofLyman,447A.2d1231,1235(Me.1982)(holding
that injunctive relief against amunicipal planning boardwas “unnecessary”
whenweremandedforthetrialcourttoenteradeclaratoryjudgmentthata
specificversionofanordinanceappliedandtherewas“noevidencesuggesting
anunwillingnessonthepartoftheBoardtoacceptajudicialdeterminationof
thatquestion”).
Theentryis:
Judgmentvacated. Remanded for theSuperiorCourt to enter adeclaratory judgment that theinitiative fails to meet the constitutionalrequirementsforinclusionontheballotbecauseit exceeds the scope of the legislative powersconferredbyarticleIV,part3,section18oftheMaineConstitution. Mandatetoissuefivedaysafterpublicationofthisopinion,withanymotionforreconsiderationtobefiledwithinthattime.
31
JohnJ.Aromando,Esq.(orally),JaredS.desRosiers,Esq.,JoshuaD.Dunlap,Esq.,andSaraA.Murphy,Esq.,PierceAtwoodLLP,Portland,forappellantAvangridNetworks,Inc.GeraldF.Petruccelli,Esq.,andNicoleR.Bissonnette,Esq.,Petruccelli,Martin&Haddow,Portland,forappellantMaineStateChamberofCommerceSigmundD.Schutz,Esq.,AnthonyW.Buxton,Esq.,andRobertB.Borowski,Esq.,PretiFlahertyBeliveau&PachiosLLP,Portland,forappellantIndustrialEnergyConsumerGroupAaronM.Frey,AttorneyGeneral,andPhyllisGardiner,Asst.Atty.Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forcross-appellantSecretaryofStateDavid M. Kallin, Esq., Adam R. Cote, Esq., and Elizabeth C. Mooney, Esq.,DrummondWoodsum,Portland,andPaulW.Hughes,Esq.(orally),andAndrewLyons-Berg,Esq.,McDermottWill&EmeryLLP,Washington,D.C., for cross-appellantsMainersforLocalPowerandnineMainevotersChristopherT.Roach,Esq.,RoachRuprechtSanchez&Bischoff,P.C.,Portland,forappelleeNextEraEnergyResources,LLCTimothyC.Woodcock,EatonPeabody,Bangor, foramicicuriaeMarkN.DionandKennethC.FletcherJames L. Costello, Esq., and Rebecca Gray Klotzle, Esq., Curtis Thaxter LLC,Portland, foramicicuriaeformercommissionersoftheMainePublicUtilitiesCommissionDmitryBam,amicuscuriaeproseOrlandoE.Delogu,amicuscuriaeproseCumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2020-206FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY