Download - Administrative Law Cases - Chapter 2
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Classification of Administrative Bodies
1) PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE
vs. CA, Gr. No. 83578, 171 SCRA 348, March 16, 1989
2) UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILLS, INC. vs.
COSLAP, 353 SCRA 689, G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001
3) LEYSON vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
331 SCRA 227, G.R. No. 134990, April 27, 2000
4) MALAGA vs. PENACHOS
213 SCRA 516, Gr. No. 86695, September 3, 1992
5) BEJA SR. vs. CA
207 SCRA 689, G.R. No. 97149, March 31, 1992
6) BLAQUERA vs. ALCALA
295 SCRA 336, G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
7) DELA LLANA vs. ALBA
112 SCRA 294, G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982
8) IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs. CA
249 SCRA 538, G.R. No. 102976, October 25, 1995
9) BARBO ET AL vs. COA
Gr. No. 157542, October 10, 2008
10) CHAVEZ vs NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY ET AL
530 SCRA 235, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
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PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs. CA
Gr. No. 83578, 171 SCRA 348, March 16, 1989
Facts:
The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve as
the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of dollar salting
or the black marketing and salting of foreign exchange. State
Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who was assigned with the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task. The President's arm assigned to investigate
and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country.
PADS issued search warrants against certain companies.
Issue:
Whether or not the PADS is a quasi-judicial body to issue
search warrants under the 1973 Constitution.
Held:
No. The court ruled that PADS was not granted by law to issue a warrant
of arrest. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making.
It is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims
and/or to determine rights, and unless their decisions are
seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same
attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No.
1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the
Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to
try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's
arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the black
marketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the
Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing
more.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making." The most common types of such bodies have been
listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the
government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like
the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for
Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like
the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the
Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil
Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is performing some business service for the public, like
the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to regulate business affected with public
interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent
Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking under the police power to regulate private
business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission,
Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures,
and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of
some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor
Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional
Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission,
Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau.
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to
adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision
are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the
same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential
Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise
quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute
its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice
of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign
exchange
UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILLS, INC. vs. COSLAP
353 SCRA 689, G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001
Facts:
The property being fought over by the parties is a 10.36-
hectare property in Baguio City called Dominican Hills, formerly
registered in the name of Diplomat Hills, Inc. The property was
mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) which
eventually foreclosed the mortgage thereon and acquired the same
as highest bidder.
On April 11, 1983, it was donated to the Republic of the
Philippines by UCPB through its President, Eduardo Cojuangco. The
deed of donation stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized
for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements
and economic development and governmental purposes" of the
Ministry of Human Settlements.
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 85
abolishing the Office of Media Affairs and the Ministry of Human
Settlements. All agencies under the latter's supervision as well as all
its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the
Presidential Management Staff (PMS).
On October 18, 1988, the PMS received an application from
petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC to acquire a
portion of the Dominican Hills property. HOME INSURANCE
GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC) consented to act as originator for
UNITED. A Memorandum of Agreement was signed by and among
the PMS, the HIGC, and UNITED. The Memorandum of Agreement
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called for the PMS to sell the Dominican Hills property to HIGC which
would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED. The parties agreed on a
selling price of P75.00 per square meter.
Private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property
allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was
able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor.
Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents,
under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS
ASSOCIATION filed an action for injunction, in the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 4. Private respondents were able to
obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction was later denied in an Order dated March 18,
1996.
While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION,
this time represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries Association,
Inc filed a complaint praying for damages, injunction and annulment
of the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED and HIGC.
Demolition Order No. 1-96 was subsequently implemented by
the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio
City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned
and reconstructed the demolished structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order,
private respondents filed on September 29, 1998 a petition for
annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining
order in the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office,
the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On
the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued the contested
order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid
status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
Issues:
Whether or not the commission on the settlement of land
problems [coslap] created under executive order no. 561 by the
office of the philippines empowered to hear and try a petition for
annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining
order and thus, arrogate unto itself the power to issue status quo
order and conduct a hearing thereof?
Assuming that the commission on the settlement of land
problems has jurisdiction on the matter, is it exempted from
observing a clear case of forum shopping on the part of the private
respondents?
Held:
1. COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the
controversy. It may not assume jurisdiction over cases which are
already pending in the regular courts.
Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of any resolution,
order or decision of the COSLAP as having the "force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or decision." The
qualification places an unmistakable emphasis on the administrative
character of the COSLAP's determination, amplified by the
statement that such resolutions, orders or decisions "shall be
binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having
jurisdiction over the same."
An agency is defined by statute as "any of the various units of
the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein."
A department, on the other hand, "refers to an executive
department created by law." Whereas, a bureau is understood to
refer "to any principal subdivision of any department."
In turn, an office "refers, within the framework of
governmental organization, to any major functional unit of a
department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to
any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions
are defined by law or regulation."
An instrumentality is deemed to refer "to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations."
section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that
the COSLAP's dispositions are binding on administrative or
executive agencies.
2. Private respondents, in filing multiple petitions, have mocked
our attempts to eradicate forum shopping and have thereby upset
the orderly administration of justice. They sought recourse from
three (3) different tribunals in order to obtain the writ of injunction
they so desperately desired.
A scrutiny of the pleadings filed before the trial courts and
the COSLAP sufficiently establishes private respondents' propensity
for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the certification against
forum shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party,
and not by his counsel. Hence, one can deduce that the certification
is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal
party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there
are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties,
issues and causes of action. In the case at bar, private respondents'
litany of omissions range from failing to submit the required
certification against forum shopping to filing a false certification, and
then to forum shopping itself. First, the petition filed before the
COSLAP conspicuously lacked a certification against forum shopping.
Second, it does not appear from the record that the ASSOCIATION
informed Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City before
which Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, that another action, Civil
Case No. 3382-R, was filed before Branch 61 of the same court.
Another group of homeless residents of Dominican Hill, the LAND
REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the latter case.
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LEYSON vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
331 SCRA 227, G.R. No. 134990, April 27, 2000
Facts:
Respondent Oscar A. Torralba, president of the CIIF,
committed a breach in his contract with P. P charged D with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Ombusdman. P also filed a collection case before the RTC against D.
public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its finding that
the case was a simple case of breach of contract with damages
which should have been filed in the regular court. The Office of the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity
of the termination of the contract entered into by Coconut Industry
Investment Fund - CIIF and International Towage and Transport
Corporation - ITTC. Besides the entities involved are private
corporations (over) which this Office has no jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over the case. Or Whether or not the contention of the
Office of the Ombudsman is correct in dismissing the complaint.
Held:
Yes. The jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in
support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned
and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to
the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation"
contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly,
or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first,
any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second,
vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly,
or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising
the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-
CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares
of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT.
Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes
this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled
corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and
UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite.
Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to
substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT
and/ or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike
PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF
companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations
not within the scope of its jurisdiction.
MALAGA vs. PENACHOS
213 SCRA 516, Gr. No. 86695, September 3, 1992
Facts:
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-
qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the
publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the
Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened
on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the
name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively,
submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the
afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his
own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not
allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were
considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint
with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal
without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in
the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the
December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their
documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been
conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project
pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining
order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the
project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on
the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order,
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in
government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They
also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot
and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded
and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining
order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared
that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage
of the subject law.
Issue:
Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality
subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
Held:
ISCOF is a government instrumentality but it does not
automatically follow that it is covered by the protective prohibition
in PD 1818 on injunctions.
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
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enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or
operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary
authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a
chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a
government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated
fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation.
Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its
accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or
its duly authorized representative.
Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of
the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or
supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional
amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the
National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the
funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be
included in the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is
covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are
irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the
injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the
project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
BEJA SR. vs. CA
207 SCRA 689, G.R. No. 97149, March 31, 1992
Facts:
Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports
authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975. and later on
appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the
General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against
Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they
were preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary
investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X,
administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of
merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed
against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave
misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being
notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807.
The case was redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-
AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for
appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave
Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20,
1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later,
he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the
hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of
the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB
denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the
certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.
Issue:
Whether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC
has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel below
the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports
Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.
Held:
The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who
may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of
Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not
only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807
granting the heads of agencies the Jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and
employees in the PPA.
With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in
favor of the petitioner. The PPA was created through PD no. 505
dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA
were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the
Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave
the council the power to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority
and other personnel. On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was
substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine
Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive
order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of
Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
attached status.
Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached
agency to the DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,
the other two being supervision and control and administrative
supervision, Attachment is defined as the lateral relationship
between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency
or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
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An attached agency has a larger measure of independence
from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under
departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision.
This is borne out by the lateral relationship between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for
policy and program coordination.
With respect to administrative matters, the independence
of an attached agency from the department control and supervision
is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a
Departments administrative supervision is free from Departmental
interference with respect to appointments and other personnel
actions in accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions under the administrative Code of 1987.
The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the
approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to investigate its
personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged
with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA
General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to
preventive suspension.
The investigation should be conducted in accordance with
the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the
Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the
PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive
suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of
the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA
AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared
NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose
General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
BLAQUERA vs. ALCALA
295 SCRA 336, G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
Facts:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which
granted each official and employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to
30% of the employees one month basic salary but which amount
not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity
incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991.
Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the
result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of
the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits
for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued
AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the
year1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the
prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of
productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the
President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices
and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive
bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately
cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the
heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned
caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of the
amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
Petitioner contends that the Philippine Tourism Authority
is a government-owned and controlled corporation performing
proprietary function, and therefore the Secretary of Labor and
Employment and Secretary of Finance exceeded their authority in
issuing the aforestated Supplemental Rules Implementing RA 6971.
Issues:
Whether or not the PTA is within the purview of RA 6971
and AO 29 does not apply.
Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid
exercise of presidential control over the executive departments.
Held:
No. Government-owned and controlled corporations may
perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending
on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose, is
to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the
function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for
the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in
general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as
"proprietary" are those intended for private advantage and benefit.
The powers and functions of PTA are predominantly
governmental, principally geared towards the development and
promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago. But it is
irrefutable that PTA also performs proprietary functions, as
envisaged by its charter. Reliance on the above analysis of the
functions and powers of PTA does not suffice for the determination
of whether or not it is within the coverage of RA 6971. For us to
resolve the issues raised here solely on the basis of the classification
of PTA's powers and functions may lead to the rendition of
judgment repugnant to the legislative intent and to established
doctrines, as well, such as on the prohibition against government
workers to strike. Under RA 6971, the workers have the right to
strike. To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971,
there is need to find out the legislative intent, and to refer to other
provisions of RA 6971 and other pertinent laws, that may aid the
Court in ruling on the right or officials and employees of PTA to
receive bonuses under RA 8971.
Government corporations may be created by special
charters or by incorporation under the general corporation law.
Those created by special charters are governed by the Civil Service
Law while those incorporated under the general corporation law are
governed by the Labor Code.
The legislative intent to place only government-owned and
controlled corporations performing proprietary functions under the
coverage of RA 6971 is gleanable from the other provisions of the
law. The Court finds no reversible error in the finding by respondent
Commission that PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971. As
regards the promulgation of implementing rules and regulations, it
bears stressing that the "power of administrative officials to
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promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is necessarily
limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment." 26 In
the case under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA
6971 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the
Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and provisions of
RA 6971. Consequently, not being covered by RA 6971, AO 29
applies to the petitioner.
Yes. The Pres. is the head of the government.
Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented
through him. His power includes the control of executive
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review,
modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in
the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of
incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from
granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing
the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was
just exercising his power of control over executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of
productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by
committing limited resources of government for the equal payment
of incentives andawards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of
control by modifying the acts of the heads of the
government agencies whogranted incentive benefits to their
employees without appropriateclearance from the Office of the
Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government
resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional
origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.
DELA LLANA vs. ALBA
112 SCRA 294, G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982
Facts:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget,
the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of
Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates
that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of
their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character,
it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of BP 129
(Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980) for, among other things,
undermining the independence of the judiciary by violating the right
of incumbent lower court judges to security of tenure. The law
decreed that all justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to
municipal courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals, unless appointed to inferior courts established by said law
would be deemed separated from the judiciary upon the completion
of the reorganization. The said BP 129 was enacted as a direct
response to the public clamor for judicial reform.
The petitioners main argument is that the decision to
discipline or dismiss from the service lower court judges is the sole
prerogative of the SC, just as the power of Congress to determine
disorderly behavior of its members is exclusive. Hence, it is
contended that the law had the effect of circumventing security of
tenure by indirection; the abolition of courts was a mere ploy for
removing judicial officers who should only be removed by the SC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not BP 129 suffers from constitutional
infirmity.
2. Whether or not the reorganization violates the security
of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the
Constitution.
Held:
1. No. The authority of the Congress to abolish offices is
implicit in its express power to create offices. Well-recognized is its
power to create courts and allocate their respective jurisdictions and
as can be necessarily implied therefrom, the authority to abolish
courts. Obviously, the abolition of a court results in the termination
of the tenure of the judicial officer who occupies the office
abolished.
However, in order to be valid, abolition must not be
employed as a scheme for circumventing the guarantee of security
of tenure. Abolition will be justified when done in good faith and not
for political or personal reasons. In such case, it can be logically said
that there is no removal from the office because a removal
presupposes that the office exists after the officers ouster.
If created by the Constitution itself, the administrative
body can be altered or abolished only by constitutional amendment;
but where the body was created only by statute, the legislature that
breathed life into it can amend or even repeal its charter, thereby
resulting in its abolition, which is justified if made in good faith and
not attended by grave abuse of discretion.
BP 129 does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity
because the abolition of certain judicial offices was done in good
faith. This being the case, the executive is entitled to exercise its
constitutional power to fill the newly created judicial positions
without any obligation to consult the SC and to accord its views the
fullest consideration.
2. No. What is involved in this case is not the removal or
separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is
important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. Well-settled
is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
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illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be
valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue
of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint
of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise.
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs. CA
249 SCRA 538, G.R. No. 102976, October 25, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by
Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in order, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.
P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years, and
when ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was
extended for another 10 years.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, which is itself
an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on
an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the
expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by
the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing
from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan
City and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of
NSCs.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter of
Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational
chemical fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated 16
November 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the
owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject
land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private
respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of
60 days from the date of the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its
power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate
expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private
respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the
plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC
did fail.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled
to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term.
Held:
Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or
attributes normally associated with juridical personality but did not
possess general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the
Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISA may thus be
properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the
Philippines.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency
expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and
liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the
Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of
law specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g.,
devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to
some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an
incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked
for in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in
the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the instant case,
ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,
its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly
regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no
special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated
succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation
proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative
of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under
P.D. No. 272.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic
of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's
statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings.
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BARBO ET AL vs. COA
Gr. No. 157542, October 10, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners are officials of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) and designated members of the Interim
Board of Directors of the San Fernando Water District (SFWD).
On December 4, 1995 and February 12 1996, the LWUA
Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995
and Board Resolution No. 39, Series of 1996 respectively. These
Board Resolutions authorized the Board of Directors of SFWD to
receive reimbursable allowances in the form of Representation and
Transportation Allowance (RATA), Travel Allowance, and
Extraordinary & Miscellaneous Expense (EME); Christmas Bonus;
Uniform Allowance; Rice Allowance; Medical and Dental Benefits;
and Productivity Incentive Bonus.
Pursuant to the said Board Resolutions, petitioners
received EME, Rice Allowance, Christmas Bonus, and Productivity
Bonus from SFWD during the calendar years starting 1994 until
1996.
On June 30, 1997, a Special Audit Team of COA Regional
Office No. III at San Fernando, Pampanga audited the financial
accounts of SFWD for the period covering January 1, 1994 to July 15,
1996. The COA Special Audit Team disallowed the payment of the
above-mentioned benefits and allowances received by petitioners
after the same were found to be excessive and contrary to Sections
228, 162 and 163 of the Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual (GAAM) and to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution
No. 954073 in relation to Section 13 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973) as amended. Thus,
petitioners were directed to refund the benefits and allowances
subject of the disallowance. The Regional Director, affirmed the
Special Audit Team's Notice of Disallowance No. 97-004 (94, 95, 96).
COA denied the petition for review and affirmed the ruling
of the COA Regional Director as contained in its First Indorsement.
The COA stressed that the Directors of local water districts (LWDs)
were prohibited from receiving compensation other than per diems
and that LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 were contrary to
the law which it intended to implement, specifically, Section 13 of
PD No. 198, as amended. Citing the case Peralta v. Mathay, the COA
declared that the subject bonuses and allowances received by
petitioners constituted additional compensation or remuneration.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent has jurisdiction to moto propio
declare LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 as amended by Resolution
39 to be totally in conflict with Sec 13 of PD 198 as amended.
2. Whether or not Sec. 13 of PD 198 as amended, prohibit
petitioners entitlement to RATA, EME, BONUSES and OTHER
BENEFITS and ALLOWANCES.
3. Whether or not Petitioners are liable to settle / refund the
disallowed allowances, Bonuses and Other Benefits received by
petitioners.
Held:
1. Petitioners contend that the COA lacks jurisdiction to
declare whether or not LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 are
consistent with Section 13 of PD No. 198, as amended, on matters
pertaining to the compensation and "other benefits" of the Directors
of the LWD. This is allegedly the function of the courts.
The Court has already settled this issue in a myriad of
cases. Particularly, in Rodolfo S. de Jesus [Catbalogan Water District]
v. COA, the Court upheld the authority and jurisdiction of the COA to
rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds by a
water district and declared that such power does not conflict with
the jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA. Citing Section
2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution the Court
declared that it is the mandate of the COA to audit all government
agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters. Indeed, the Constitution specifically vests in
the COA the authority to determine whether government entities
comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds,
and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government
funds. This independent constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant
and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property.
2. A water district is a government-owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter since it is created pursuant to a
special law, Presidential Decree 198. It is undeniable that PD 198
expressly prohibits the grant of RATA, EME, and bonuses to
members of the board of Water Districts. Section 13 of PD 198, as
amended, reads as follows:
Compensation. - Each director shall receive a per diem, to
be determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually
attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any given
month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four
meetings in any given month. No director shall receive other
compensation for services to the district. Any per diem in excess of
P50 shall be subject to approval of the Administration.
In Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit, the
members of the board of Baybay Water District also questioned the
disallowance by the COA of payment of RATA, rice allowance and
excessive per diems. The Court ruled that pursuant to PD 198,
members of the board of water districts cannot receive allowances
and benefits more than those allowed by PD 198. Construing Section
13 of PD 198, in Baybay, the Court declared:
xxx Under 13 of this Decree, per diem is precisely
intended to be the compensation of members of board of directors
of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a statute must be
given their natural, ordinary, and commonly-accepted meaning, due
regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases
are used. By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled
to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in
a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing "No director shall
receive other compensation" than the amount provided for per
diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors of water districts
are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and
no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.
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Section 13 of PD 198 is clear enough that it needs no interpretation.
It expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the
payment of per diem, thus pre-empting the exercise of any
discretion by water districts in paying other allowances and bonuses.
3. While we sustain the disallowance of the above benefits
by respondent COA, however, we find that the SFWD affected
personnel who received the above mentioned benefits and
privileges acted in good faith under the honest belief that Board
Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 authorized such payment.
Petitioners here received the additional allowances and
bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board
Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time
petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the
Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no
knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in
good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses
they received but disallowed by the COA.
CHAVEZ vs NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY ET AL
530 SCRA 235, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
Facts:
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA)
and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and
reclamation area to be converted into a low cost medium rise
housing complex and industrial/commercial site. The Project will
involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially 40 hectares but
the JVA was amended). The JVA also provides that as part of the
consideration for the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the
reclaimed lands to RBI. The reclamation of the area was made; and
subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying the reclaimed
land to NHA.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to
declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and the
Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all
other agreements in relation thereto, for being Unconstitutional and
Invalid.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the NHA and RBI have been granted the
power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain. (Chavez
claims that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is vested
exclusively with PEA).
2. Whether or not the NHA and RBI were given the power and
authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands, as
required (Chavez claims that they were not).
3. Whether or not the RBI, being a private corporation, is
barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain.
Held:
1. Yes. Although PEA was designated under EO 525 as the
agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does not mention
that it has the exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim
lands of public domain. In fact, EO 525 provides that reclamation
projects may also be undertaken by a national government agency
or entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land.
There are 3 requisites to a legal and valid reclamation
project:
a. approval by the President;
b. favorable recommendation of PEA; and
c. undertaken by any of the ff:
i. PEA
ii. any person or entity pursuant to a
contract it executed with PEA
iii. the National government agency or
entity authorized under its charter to
reclaim lands subject to consultation
with PEA.
Applying the above requirements, the SC concluded that
the Project has met all 3 requirements:
a. There was ample approval by the President of the
Philippines. Presidents Aquino and Ramos issued Proclamations
approving and implementing the reclamation of lands.
b. There was an implied grant of a favorable endorsement
of the reclamation phase from PEA. This is shown in the fact that
PEA was a member of the EXECOM which was in charge of
overseeing the implementation of the Project.
c. The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a national
government agency authorized to reclaim lands under its charter
and other laws. While the charter of NHA does not explicitly
mention reclamation in any of its listed powers, such power is
implied since it is vital or incidental to achieving the objective of an
urban land reform and housing program.
2. Yes. The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of the public domain. As
such, it decides whether areas, like foreshore or submerged lands,
should be reclaimed or not and whether they should be classified as
alienable and disposable.
In this case, when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the corresponding
reclamation work, making DENR a member of the EXECOM
(committee tasked to implement the project), the required
authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed
satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental Compliance
Certificates by the DENR shows its ratification of the reclamation
project.
3. No. RA 6957, as amended (BOT Law), states that a
contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed
land subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire
the same. In this case, RBI is a private corporation wherein Filipino
citizens own at least 60% of its shares.