Download - Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
1/21
The
Theory
of
Obiects
uv
ALEXIUS
MEINONG
(rneNsrerrD
By
IsAAc
LEvI,
D.
B.
TERRELL,
ND
RODERICK M. CHISHOLM
fne
fneort ol Obiects
"hesitatingly
concede
hat
we
are
happy
about something,
n
in something,and, at least in the majority
of cases,do
not
intend without wishing pr or intending
something.
To
put
it
no
one
fails
to recogniz-dhat
psychological vents
so
very
co
have
this distinctive
"character
of
being
directed
o
somethi
etwas Gerichtetsein)
as
to suggest ery
strongly
(at
least)
should
take
it to be
I
characteristicaspect
of
the
psychol
opposed
o the non-psychological.
The
purpose
of the following remarks
is, nevertheles
explain why I hold this way of looking at the matter to b
established,despite the many
difficulties
confronting
it. T
so
many cases n which reference,
ndeed
explicit directedn
richtetsein), to that
"something,"
or
(as
we
say
quite natu
an object,
unquestionably orces tself
upon
our attention
th
if
they
alone
were to
be
considered,
he
question
would
answered or
anyone
who investigated
hese matters
scie
The
partitioning
of whateverdeserves
nd needs
heore
sideration
nto difterent
scientific ealms,and
the
careful del
of
these realms,
may
often be of little
practical importanc
vancing
the researchconnected
with it. What
matters
in
analysis
s
the
work that
is
accomplished,
nd
not
the bann
which it is done. However, obscuritiesas to the boundari
diverse
areas of
science
can become significant
n
two co
ways:
either
the
areas
which
are actually
nvestigated
ncro
one
another, or they are separated rom
each other,
an
quently
leave
an
intermediate area
untouched./The
signif
such obscurities, within
the sphere
of our
theoretical in
exactly
the opposite of
their
significance
within the sphere
tical
affairs. n the latter, the
"ieutral
zone" is a
guarante
desired
but rarely capableof being reahzed)
of amicable
n
relations, while the overlapping
of territorial
claims
pre
typical case
of conflict of
interests.But
in the realm
of th
activity, where such conflicts, at least,
have no
justificatio
gain,
objectively considered, f
the frontier districts
coincid
a result
they are
investigated rom different
sides.A
sepa
the
other hand, is always a
disadvantage,
he seriousness
depends
on
the size
and
significanceof
the intermediate
The intent of the
problem
raised here
is to call attentio
such an area of knowledge,T hich
is sometimes verlooke
times not sufficiently appreciated
n its
distinctive chara
question
concerns he
proper place
for the scientific
nvest
l.
Tne
Pnosr.BM
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
2/21
[78]
ALEXIUS MEINONG
the
Object
(Gegenstand)
aken as such and
in
general-we
wish
to
know whether,
among the sciences
hat are accredited
by
scientific
tradition,
there
is
one
within
which
we
could attempt
a
theoretical
consideration
f the
Object
as such, or
from
which
we
could
at least
demand
his.
2. Tnu Pnr.ruprcp rN FAvoR oF THBAcruar,
It was
no
accident hat the foregoing account
ook cognition as
its
starting
point
in order o
arrive
at
the Object.
To be
sure,
cognition
is not unique
in
"having" an
Object.
It
has
it in
such a distinctive
manner,
however, that
whenever we
are
speaking of Objects,
we
are influenced
to think
first of all of the
Object
of
cognition. For,
to
be
precise,
he
psychological
event
we
call
cognition does not
con-
stitute the
cognitive
situation in and
of
itself:
knowledge
s,
so to
speak,
a double fact
(Doppehatsache)
n
which what is known
confronts
the
act of knowing as something elatively
independent.
The act of knowing
is
not merely
directed toward what is
known,
in the way
in which
a
false
judgment
may
be
directed
toward
its
Object. In knowing, on the
contrary, it is
as
though what
is
known
werg seized
or
grasped
by the
psychological
act, or however
else
one
might attempt o
describe,n
an
unavoidably
pictorial
way, some-
thing
which
is
indescribable.
f one concentrates xclusively
on the
Object
of knowledge, he
problem
about the science of
Objects
which
was
raised above
s initially
placed
in
a
rather
unfavorable
light. A
scienceof the
Objects of
cognition: does this
mean
any-
thing more than
the demand that what
is
already known
as
the
Object of cognition
be
now
made the Object of a science,and
thus
the
Object of cognition for
a second
ime?
In other words,
are we
not asking or a sciencewhich either is made up of the sum-totalof
the sciences
aken together,
or one which would
have
to accomplish
all over
again what the
recognizedsciences.
ointly
accomplish
any-
way?
We
should
guard
ourselves
against concluding rom these
con-
siderations
hat the idea of
a
universal
science, n addition to
the
special
sciences,
s abstrd. This understandingof the nature of
the
world
in its entirety and of
its ulrimate
foundations,which the best
The Theory ol Objects
discipline
which
goes
under
the
name
of metaphysics
ha
thought to be
exactly such a science.
No matter
how
many
pointments
have
been associatedwith
this
name,
and are
ass
with
it, the responsibility
or
them
lies with our intellectual
ties,
and not with the idea of such a science.
May one
go
therefore,
as
to take metaphysics o be
the
science
whose eg
function is to deal with
Objects
as such-or Objects n
their to
I If we rememberhow metaphysics as alwaysbeenconce
including n
its subject
matter the farthest and the nearest,
he
est and the smallest
alike,
we
may
be surprised
o be told tha
physics
cannot
take on such a task. It
may sound strange
that metaphysics
s not
universalenough
or
a
science
of
O
and hence cannot
take
on
the
task
just
formulated. For
the
tions
of metaphysics ave been universal
(a
fact which has s
been
disastrous
o its success).
Without
doubt,
metaphysics
do
with everything
hat exists.However,
the totality of what
including what has
existed
and
will
exist, is infinitely small
in
parison
with
the totality
of
the Objects
of knowledge. Th
easily
goes
unnoticed,
probably
because he lively interest n
which is part of our nature tends to favor that exaggeratio
finds the non-real
a mere
nothing--or, more
precisely,
whic
the non-real to be something or which science
has
no app
at all or at least
no application
of
any
worth.
How little truth there
is in
such a view
is most
easily sh
ideal Objectss hich
do
indeedsubSist
bestehen),
ut
which
by any means
exist
(existieren),
and consequently
cannot
sense e rcal
(wirklicft).
Similarity and
difference re
exam
objects
of
this
type:
perhaps,
under certain
circumstances,
he
sist between
ealities;
but
they are not
a
part
of replity them
That ideas, as well
as assumptions nd
judgments,
are neve
concerned with
such Objects
(and
often
have
reason
to b
intimately concerned with them) is, of course,beyond qu
Similarly,
number does
not
exist n
addition
o what is
num
supposing he
latter does
exist;
this we clearly
know from th
that
we can also count what does
not
exist. Again,
a connecti
not
exist in
addition\to what is connected, upposing he latte
exist: That their
existence s not
indispensable
s
proven
b
3.
Concerning
the sense
in
which I
intend
to\mploy the
expression
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
3/21
[80]
I
AIE)(IUS
MEINONG
connection
between
he equilaterality
and
equiangularity
of a
tri-
angle.
Moreover, where
existing
objects are concerned, such as
atmospheric
and thermometric
or barometric conditions, the con-
nectedness
oes
not unite these
realities themselves o much as it
does
heir being
or even
heir non-being.
n knowing such a connec-
tion, we
are
already dealing with
that special
ype
of Object
(mit
jenem
eigentumlichen
Gegenstandartigen),
hich,
as I
hope-
have
shown,a
s
related
to
judgment
and assumptions
Urteilen
und
An-
nahmen)
in the rvay
in
which
the Object,
in
a
strict
sense,
(der
eigentliche
Gegenstand)
s
related
o
presentations
Vorstellungen).
I
haye recommended
he
name
"Objective"
(Obietkiv)
for this
type of
Object, and
I
have
shown
that the
Objective itself
can
assume he functions
of
an
Object in
the
strict sense.
n particu-
lar,
it can become
he
Object
(Gegenstand)
of
a
new
judgment,
or
of some
other intellectual
operation, which is related to it as
to
an
ordinary
object
(Obiekt).
If
I
say,
"It
is true
that
the
antipodes
exist,"
truth
is
ascribed
not to the
antipodes,but
to the
Objective,
"that
the
antipodes
exist." But
this existenceof the antipodes
s a
fact
(Tatsache)
which,
as everyone
sees
mmediately,can
very
well
have
a subsistent
tatus, but cannot be still
another
existent entity
in its own tufn,
as it
were.*
This holds, likewise,
or all other ob-
jectives,
so that
every
cognitive
act
which
has
an Objective
as its
Object represents hereby a caseof knowing somethingwhich does
not
exist.
What
has been stated
here only
in
terms
of isolated examples
is supported
by
the testimony of
a very highly
developed
cience-
indeed the
most highly
developed one: mathematics.We would
surely
not want to speak
of mathematics as alien
to
reality,
as
though
t had
nothing to do
with what exists. ndeed,
we cannot
ail
to
recognize
hat
mathematics
s
assuredof
an
extensivesphere
of
application
n
practical
ife
no less than
in
the
theoretical
reatment
of reality.
However,
pure
mathematical
nowledge s
never
concerned
with anything
which must, in
the nature of the cage,be actual. The
form of
being
(^Seiru)
ith which
mathematicsas such
is occupied
is
never
existence
(Existenz).
In this respect, mathematicsnever
transcends ubsistenceBestand): a straight ine hasno more exist-
ence
than a right
anglg a regular
polygon,
no more
tlan
a
circle.
It
can be regarded
only
as
a
peculiarity
of the mathematical
use
4. Uber Annahmen,
chap.
vii.
*
ld,ass
ie
zwar
sehr
wohl bestehen, ber nicht ihrerseits
sozusagen och
einmal
existieren ann.'l
The Theory of Objects
[
8
of language hat
this usage
rnakes
quite
explicit
existence-cla
Even
though
the mathematician
may
use
the term "existence,"
cannot
but concede hat
what
we
would
otherwise
call "possibil
is,
in the final analysis, all
that he requires
of the
objects
of
theoretical consideration; t is
very
noteworthy,
however,
tha
positive
urn
is
being
given
o
this ordinarily merely
negative
conc
Together
with
the
prejudice
n
favor
of
our
knowledge
of rea
alluded
to
previously,
he
basic
independence
f nnathematics
r
existenceenables
us
to understand a fact
which
would
be
fa
-surprising f thesepoints were not considened. ttempts to syst
atizn the sciences s
parts
of a
whole usually
find
themselvesn
embarragsing
position
in
connection with
mathematics, and
t
must be
extricated,
with varying degrees
f success,
y
more
or l
artificial expedients.This is in striking
contrast
o the recognitio
one might
straightaway
say
popularity-which mathematics
acquired
or
itself even in
lay circles by
its achievements. ut
organization of
all knowledge
nto
the science of nature
and
science
of mind
(Natur-
und
Geisteswissenschaft),
ppearing
o
an exhaustivedisjunction,
realtry
akes
into
account only
the
s
of
knowledge
which has
to
do
with reality
(Wirklichkeit).
C
sequently,
when
we
look
at the rnatter more
closely,
we should
be
at all surprised to
find that
this organization
does not
do
justice to mathematics"
3. Sosew ANDNrcHTsErN
There is thus
not
the
slightestdoubt that what-is
supposed o
the
Object
of
knowledge
need
not exist at all.
But our accoun
to now
may seem o leave
room
for the conjecture
hat where
existence s
absent, t not only can be
but
must be replaced
subsistence.
ut even his
restriction
s inadmissable, s may
bp s
by contrasting
he
characteristic
unctions
of
judging
and assum
a distinction
have attempted o
maintain
by contrasting
he
"th
and synthetic unction" of thought.€ n the former case, he ac
thought
grasps
a Sein, n the latter
a
"Sosein."
n
each
case,natnra
it is an
Objective
that
is
grasped;
t
is
reasonable o speak
o
5. Cf. K. Zindler:
"BeitrZige
zur
Theorie
der
mathematischen
Erkenntn
Sitangsberichte der l
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
4/21
[82]
{
ALEXIUS MEINONG
[83
house
or
the land
does
exist, has
existed,
or will
exist. However, he
light
might
be
shed
on domains
which
are especially
mportant
for us
to
know.
-
But
such
things
may
be
alien to
our
natural
way of thinking;
it
is even
more
instructive
to recall
this
trivial
fact,
which
does not
yjt go
beyond
the
realm
of the
Seinsobjektiv.'
ny
particular
thing
that isn't
real
(Nichtseiendes)
must at
least be
c-apiUte
f
serving
as the
Object
for
tlose
judgments
which
grasp
ts
Nichtsein
It does
not matter
whether
this
Nichtseln
is neces$ary
r
merely
factual;
--Jllil-ro*i.nate. translations
of the
German terms
in the
text
are the
following.
The sein
of
an object
is
its existing,
or its being
real;
its Nichtseln
is its
not exisr-
ing' or
its being
unreal;
its ,sosein
is its
having
characteristics.
A seinsobJektiv
is
an
objective
consisting
of
sopething
existing,
or of
something
being
reai; anaro-
gously
for Soseinsobjektiv
and Nichtseinsobiektiv.l
7, This
principlt
was
first enunciated
by E. Mally
in
his treatise which
was
honored
by the
Wartinger
prize
in 1903,
and
which
appears
in completely
revised
form as
No. III of
tlese
papers;
see chap. i,
$
3,
of
Mally's
paper.
[Meinbng
here
refers
to thc volume
in which
his own
essay originally
appeared.
Mally's
paper
is
entitled
"Untersuchungen
zur
Gegenstandstheorie
des Messens."l
nor
does t matter
in the
first
case
whether
the
necessity
tems
ro
the
essence
f
the object
or
whether
it
stems
rom
aspects
whi
are external
o
the
Obiect
in
question.
n order
to
know
that
the
is no round
square,
must
make
a
If
physics,physiology,and
psychol
ideal
character
of sense-qualities,
about
color as
well
as
about
soun
more
than
the other.
Those
who
l
sion
could very well say:
"There
i
there are no
such
objects."
The
fa
is meant
by this
statement
hrows
of objects
to reality,
or
their
relation
to
being,
genglaly:
that
somewhat
loser eximination
of
the matter,
which
is
of
fundamen
importance
n its
own right,
is entirely
n
place n
our
present
stu
4.
Tnr AussrnselN
oF
THE
Pune
Oslncr
A recourse
o
certain
psychological
experiences
uggests-
ls
as
p
natural
way
of resolving
tre
paradox
which seems
o lie
bet
us.I have attempted o preJent he most
essential
oints
pertain
to
this
problem
n another
work.8
But,
according
9 my-a:count
he
if
we
were
now
to maintain
the
aforementioned
ubjectivity
of
sen
qualities,we could speak
of the
object
of
a
Presentation
f
blue
o
in
ttre sense
of
something
which
is
a
capacity
of
that
presentat
from
which reality
withholds,
as
it
were,
the
opportunity.
for
realization.
considered
rom
the
standpoint
of
the
presentation,
still
seems
o me
to
touch
on
something
of
essential
significa
However,
I cannot
conceal
rom
myself
at
present
he
fact
that it
no more
necessary
o an
object
that
it
be
presented n
order
n
to exist
than
it is
in order
for
it to
exist.
Further,
even
if there
w
a
reference
o
it,
the
most
that
could
result
from
its
being
presen
would be
a
sori
of
existence-"s;d5fsngs
by
way
of
idea
(in
d
Vorstellung)"-21d 5s, more precisely, "pseudo-existence"'.
express
t more
exactly:
If
I
sayf
"Blue
doesnot
exist,"
I
am
thin
ing
just
of
blue,
and not
at
all
of a
pr,esentation
nd
the
capac
it
-may
have. It
is as
if
the
blue
musi
have
$ing_
in
.the
first
pla
before
we
can raise
the
question
of
its being
(sein)
or non-be
(Nichtsein).
But
in
ordef
not
to fall
into
new
paradoxes
or ac
The
Theory
ol Obiects
8.
t)ber Annahmen,
PP.
98 ff'
9.
See
"Uber
Gegensiinde
hijherer
Ordnung,"
loc. cit',
pp.
186 f'
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
5/21
[84]
ALEXIUS
MBINONO
The
Theory ol Objects
[8
absurdities,_perhaps
he
following
turn
of
expression
may
be ap_
propriate:
Blue,
or
any-
other
Oblect
whatsoevlr,
s
somehLw
given
prior
to
our
determination--of
ts
-being
or
non-biing,
io
; way"that
does
not
Trry
any
prejudice
to
its
ion-being.
we"'co-urd
uiJo a"-
scnoe
ne
srtuation
rom
its
psychological
ide
n
this
way:
if
I should
be
able
to
judge
that.a
certain
Otieit
is not,
then
I
upi.u,
to have
had.to
gra-sp
he
ObjecJ
n
some
way
befoieh*A,
i"'iiJ"r-to
,uy
anything
about
its
non-being,
or
morl
precisely,
i
orao
io
"mr-r to deny the ascriptionof non-being o^theObject
This
fact,
despite
ts commonplice
charactlr,
is seen
o
be
of
re
to
do
justice
oit
with
somewhat
rs of
the
following
considerations.
I
a certain
thing,
A, is
not-more
st
as
much
an
Objective
as
is the
tainty
with
which
I am
iustified
in
degree
of certainty
that
the Objective,
above,thatithassubsistencef
:,::itfffl#l",i3li;"ti"li#i',",ffi1
f
-i:
u
seinsobiektiv
or
Nichiseinsobiiictiv,
stands
n
relation
to
its
9Uj"."l
(Obiekt),
albe-it
um
grano
salis,
as the
*n.f"
t it, p".tr.
But if the whole has being,so must its parts.
This
seems
o
iean,
when
t is
extended
o
theiase
of
the
objective:
if the
objectivi
has
being
(rsl),
so,
in
some
sense
or
other,
must
the
object
*rri.n
u"-
longs
to
it,
even
whel
th9
Objective
is
an
objective
of
non_being
(Nichtseiwobiektiv).
Furthermore,
since
the
otjective
rtri"tly pr"-
vents
us
from
assuming
hat
A has
being,
(being,
as we
have
si"n,
can
sometimes
e
understood
s
existence;
ometimes
s
subsistence),
it
appears
hat
the
requirement
hat
the
object
have
beinj
r*rri"n
was
inferred
from
the
being
of
the
Nichtseinsobiektiv)
o,u[",
,ror"
only
insofar
as
the
being
in
question
s
neither
existence
nor
sub-
sistbnce-only
ihsofar
as a
third
order
of
t"in ,
it
oo"
t"1,
ip""t
this way, is adjoined o existence nd subsistence.his rort of ueing
must
belong,
herefore,
o
every
Object
as
such.
A
Nichtsein
of
the
same
ype
cannot
be
set
in opposition
o
it, for
a Nichtsein
even n
this
new-sense
rculd
have
g
immediately
produce
difrculties
analog-
ous
to those
which
arise
fibm
Nichtsein
in its
ordinary
sense,
and
which
the
new concept
was
o
have
eliminated.
The teri
"euasisein,
seemed
o
me for
a while
to be
a
completely
suitable
expression
or
this
rather
oddly
constituted
typey'f
being.
This
designation,
owever, ike
others
hat
were approved
ea
(for
instance,
"Pseudoexistenz"and
"Quasitranszendenz,"
r)
r
for
such
a
postulate.
Must we not
take
thought to avoid
it
in
case also wherever t is possible?The considerationwhich se
to force us to such a
postulate
s,
to be sure,
an experience
w
is easilyobserved.As
we have seen,
A must
be "given"
to me n
s
way
or other
if I
am
to
grasp
ts non-being.
This
produces,howe
as
f
have
already
shown elsewhere,l2
an assumption
(Annah
possessing
ffirmative
quality:
in
order
to deny
A,
I
must
first ass
the
being
of
A. What
I
refer
to, so
far as
the
being of
A is
cerned,
s
thus
something
which is
to a certain
extent
only a
claim
to
being
(ein gewissermassen
orgegebenes
ein
des 4
.
But it
tfte essence f assumption hat it
direct
itself
upon
a being
w
itself does not need
to
be.
Without
a doubt,
t would be
comforting
o be
able
o
say
ha
strange kind of being which belongs o that which does not h
being
(Sedn
des
Nichtseiendes)
s
just
as
absurd
as it
sounds'
S
a view could recommend
tself
to us were it
not
for
the fact
tha
Objective,which
has
being,
always
seems o
require
n turn an
O
which has being. For
the
present,
his requirement
s based
s
on the analogy o the
part-whole
relation:
an
Objective
s
the
treated as
a
complex
of some
kind and
the Object
belonging
as a kind
of
component.
n many:respects
his
may
be
in
accord
with our insight into
the nature
of an Objective,
which
is as
yet
exceedingly
defective.However,
no
one
will
deny
that this
ana
is only
an initial
expedient n our
embarrassment
nd
that
t
would be no
grounds
or following
this
analogy rigorously
eve
part
of
the
way. Thus, nsteadof
deriving
he
being
of an
Object
the being of an Objective,
even
on tle basis
of a
questionable
na
where
the
Objective
s
an
Objective
of non-being,
t would
be b
to conclude
rom
the
facts
with
which we are
concerned
hat
analogl does
not apply
to the Objective
of non-being-i.e.,
tha
being of
the
Objective
is
not by any
means universally
depe
upon the being
of its Object.
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
6/21
[86]
ALEXIUS MEINONG
This is a
position
which
speaks
or
itself
without
any
further ado.
If
the
oppositionof being
and non-being
s
primarily
a matter of
the
Objective
and not
of the
Object,
then
it is, after all, clearly under-
standable hat
neither being
nor non-being can belong essentially
to the
Object
in itself. This is not to
say,
of course, hat
an Object
can neither
be nor
not
be.
Nor is it to
say
that
the
question,
whether
or not the
Object has being, is
purely
accidental o
the
nature
of
every Object. An absurdObject such as a round squarecarries n
itself the
guarantee
of
its
own
non-being
n every sense;an ideal
Object, such
as
diversity,
carries in itset the
guarantee
of its own
non-existence.
nyone who seeks o
associate
himself
with
models
which have
become famous could
formulate
what has
been shown
above by
saying
that the
Object
as
such
(without
considering he
occasional
peculiarities
or
the' accompanyingObjectire-clause
which
is always
present)
stands
"beyond
being
and
non-being."
This
may
also be expressedn the following
less
engagingand also
less
pre-
tenticlusway,
which is
in my
opinion,
however, a more appropriate
one:
The
Object s by nature ndifferent to being
(aussersetend),
l-
though at least one of its two Objectives of being, the Object's
being or non-being, subsists.
What
one could thus
call with
propriety
the
principle
of the
in-
difference
of
pure
Objects
to
being
(den
Satz
vom Aussersein
des
reinen
Gegenstandes)
inally eliminates he
appearance
f a
paradox
which
was the
immediate
occasion or the assertionof this
principle.
As
soon
as t is
recognized hat, apart from
special
cases, oth being
and non-being
are
equally external to
an
Object, it is
then under-
standable
hat nothing
more, so to
speak,
s
involved n comprehend-
ing
the
non'being
of the
Object
than there
is
in
comprehending
ts
being.
The
above-mentioned
rinciple
of the hdependence
of
Sosein
from
Sein now
presents
a
welcome
supplement o this view.
It tells
us that that which is not in any way external to the Object, but
.constitutes
ts
proper
essence,subsists
n its Sosein-the Sosein
attaching
o
the Object whether
he object has being
or
not. We are
finally
in
a
position
to
see
with sufficient clarity
what confronted
us
above
as the
prejudice
n favor
of the existence,or at
least
the
being, of
afl
possible
Objects of knowledge.Being is not the
pre-
supposition
under
whi&
knowledge inds,
as it
were, its
point
of
attack; it is
itself such a
point
of
attack. Non-being
is
equally as
The Theory ol Objects
5.
TnB
Tnsonv
or Onrncrs ns Psvcnotocv
We now know
that
those
Objects
which exist, and
e
which
have being,
run
fan short of
the sum-total
of
Objects
edge,and
we
can
see
herefore
how inaccurate
t would
be
a scienceof the actual, or a scienceof being in general,n
how
comprehensive
ts scope,as a science
of
Objects
of
k
taken
simply
as such.
Moreover,
n the
prwious paragraph
considered
only the
Objects of
cognition. But the
quest
at the very
outset of this
exposition
had to take
into con
the
fact that
not only cognition
but
every case of
judg
presentation
as
ts
Object-not
to
mention
the
Objectivity
stiindlichkeir)*
of extra-intellectualexperiences.
his all-e
importance
of
Objectivity
for
the
psychical
side
of
life
indeed be
precisely
ts distinguishing haracteristic,
as I ha
mentioned
already-may
now
suggest
o us that
(owing
to
clusive
attention to
cognition)
we
permitted
ourselves
down a detour that might easilyhavebeen avoided.For tlr
which
most
naturally
would
have to do with Objects
as
su
be the
very
one whose business t
is
to deal
with this
O
This task,
in
view of what I
have
ust
touched
on once ag
to belong to
psychology.
In any event,
t must
be
conceded hat
the current di
psychology
s
not entirely opposed o such a
conception
o
There s,
for
example,
a
psychology
f sound as
well as a
p
of color, within which by no
rneans
he least important
taken to
be
the
ordering of the
diverse Objects belongi
sensory
domain
concerned,
and
the investigationof
their d
nature.13 t is also natural that the scienceof psycholo
draws into its
range of
investigation
he distinctive activit
psychological
sphere-in
particular,
intellectual
activities
be
an odd
psychology
of
judgrnent
hat took
no notice
of
acitf which
(under
sufficiently
avorable circumstances)
e
beyond itself to take
possession
f reality
in sorne way.
*
[By
"Objectivity"
is meant
here
merely
the
characteristic
of referrin
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
7/21
[88]
ALE)SUS
MEINONG
The
Theory
ol
Oblects
[8
something
besides eality which
can
be known,
and
it is
sometlfng
which wg are
n a
position
o know
with the
aid
of certain
ntellectual
operations.Psychology,
herefore,
certainly
cannot
refrain
from
con-
sidering
both
this capacity
o know and
also
that something
outside
of reality
(Ausserwirkliche)
toward
which
these
characteristic
ac-
tivities
are directed.
To this extent,
therefore,
he Objects
of
judging,
assuming,
and
presenting,as well as the Objectsof feeling and desiring,undoubt-
edly
gain
entry into
psychology.But everyone
will notice
at
once
that
this
science
does not
take these
Objects
nto
consideration
or
their own
sakes. n
practice,
both
inside and
outside
of scientific
pursuits,
it is, frequently enough,
quite
an incidenql
matter
as
to
what
result
s a
primary-
goal,
and
what is
just
accepted
as
an
acci-
dental by-product . For
example, t
is certainly
useful
to archaeology
that what
philologists
often
find necessary
merely
for
textual
inter-
pretation pbints
to
the
"real
things,"
yet
is no
proper
part
of
classical
philology,
Otherwise,
he latter science
could
easily
lay
claims
to
being the most
basic
discipline,
since
work on
4ncient
languages
has provided the starting point for all sorts of scientificactivity.
Similarly,
psychological
nquiry
can bear
fruit
for related
areas
as
long as
they belong o sciences
which are
either
less
developed
han
psychology
or
have not
yet
been
formally
recognized
as
sePar,ate
Cciences t all.
Nothing
more clearly
demonstrates
hat
this
has
happened n
the
caseof theoretical
consideration
f
Objects
han
the
eximple of colors mentioned above,
where
investigation
of
the
psychological
acts
first
led to the
investigation
of
facts
concerning
Objects;
an example s
the
investigation
of
the relationships
among
colors conceived n spatial terms
(der
Farbenkdrper
auf den
Far-
benraum).ra
The
reference
o linguistic
science,already
ntroduced,
shows n another respect how little psychologY an qualify as the
true
scienceof Objects.
n
dealing
with
the meaning
of
words
and
sentences,l6inguistic science
s necessarily
lso
concerned
with
Ob-
jects,
and
grammar
has done
the spadework
or a
theoretical
grasp
of Objects n a very
basic way. Thus,
in
point
of
fact, the
viewpoint
from
which
psychology
was
to have
been conceded
any
prerogative
in this matter is
not apparent; rather,
it is
clearty seen
hat
neither
of these ko
disciplings an be that
science
f
Objects
we
are seeking.
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
8/21
Ie0]
ALB)CUS MEINONO
which, strange o say,
has not
yet
entirely
been orgotten.
This argu-
ment states hat
if
"esse"
need
not be
precisely
percipii'
it must at
any rate
be
"cogitari";
for
no one
can think of an
"essd'
without-
thinking of
it. In any case, he
effect
of
such considerations
may
be
more opposed o, than
in accord with,
their intent.
If, for example,
the ultrawhite
mentionedabove s
brought into the
domain
of theo-
retical consideration
ust
by meansof a
conceptiondirected
owards
it, then the
novel
psychological
events
which
come to ltfe
could
engender ew work for psychology.To be sure, his is by no means
necessary.n
the case
of the
examplewe are
considering
here, such
work is scarcely o be expected,
ince an
abundance
f similar con-
ceptions s already
available. However,
the
possibilty
must
cer-
tainly
be kept
in mind, and if it is
once
actually
rcaliz.ed,
hen
how
little
the conception
of ultrawhite is a
part
of
psychologywill
be-
come
quite
clear.
By viitue
of
this conception,
he work
of the theory
of Objects is to
a
certain
extent
already completed,
btrt
that of
psychology
has
yet
to be done. It
would be odd
do
consider
the
accomplishedask
a
psychological
ne
just
because f
the
task that
is still to
be
done.
6. Tns TnBonv or OsrBcrs ls e Tneony or
tnB
Os.recrs
oF
KNowrepcn
What
psychology
cannot
provide
us might
better
be sought,
therefore, n those
areaswhere
the
very
nature of
what
we
investi-
gate
s constituted, n
part,
by
Objects.
On the basis
of our
previous
discussion,
t can hardly be doubted hat in cog3itionwe
have
before
us facts of this type. Cognition s not merely a
jirdgrnent
hat
happens
to be true; it is true by its own n4fiug-frus
from
within, as
t were.
A
judgment
is true, however, not insofar
as
it has an
Object
that
exists,
or even one that has being, but only
insofar as it
grasps
an
Objective
hat has
being.
That
there
are black swans,
but
that there
is no perpetuummobile, are both true judgments;but the first con-
cerns an exfuent object, he
second
a non-existent bject.
n
the one
case, he being
of
the
Object in
question
subsists;n
the other case,
its non-being
subsistsri
ruth is always
bound up
with the being
of
Objectives
and
is
therefore
partially
constituted
out of it.
The
judgment
would not be true if therp were
no
Objective
o which it
referred. Nor would
the
judgmerrte
true
if
it were constituted
dif-
ferently than it is and therefore
did not agree
with the facts. The
The Theory
of
Obiects
coincidence
f
the
one subjective
and the other objective
eq
can thus
be entirely
accidental:
as
when
one draws a true
sion from
false premises.
Now
such
an accidental
or external
character
s surely
to
the
relation
between
knowing
and
what
is known. In t
of
knowing,
it belongs
o
the nature of the
judgrnent
that
not
miss ts
aim
at
what is to be
known. This distinctive e
cognition
achieves place
n the forum
of
psychological
nve
throughwhat we know as evidence Evidenz). However, the
judgment
tself
does
not constitute
he fact of cognition. It
i
tial
to
grasp
the
Object with respect o the
Objective, and
the
being
of the
latter is
indispensable.
n this respect, he c
entirely
resembles
he
judgment
which
is true
per
accide
were. For
this
reason, t
was
possible
even
at the beginnin
present
essay
to
call knowledge
a
double fact
(Doppelta
Anyone
who wishes
a scientifically loser
view of this compo
must
not restrict
himself to
the
psychological
aspect of it;
also
ake
into consideration,
s
quite
expresslya
part
of the
p
set
before him,
the other
side, i.e.,
the Objective
which
ha
and
the
Object which
is implicated
n
the
Objective.
With regard
o
our
major
problem,
we have
n
some
mea
turned to a standpointwhich we abandoned n the previou
graphs,
for we have
appealed o the fact
that objects be
only to cognition,
but also to false
udgment,
o
presentatio
psychological
ctivities which are totally
non-intellectual.
rf
clude
hat
the theory
of Objects alls
most
naturally
within
th
tific treatment
of
cognition, we
are confronted with
this
q
By
restricting ourselves
o
cognition
and
thus
excluding oth
chological
events,do we not.cut ourselvesoff from
certain
and
give
up that
universality
which is
required in dealing w
jects
as such?
The doubt
is unfounded. rn
order
to
see
his,
one mus
all,
remember he
characteristicdifference
between
psychol
the scienceof knowledge. t is obvious hat psychologys co
only with real
psychological
vents
and not
with
the merely
p
A scienceof
knowledgecannot set similar limitations on its
cause
knowledge
as
such
has
value, and therefore
somethin
is not
but
could
be
may
draw
attention to itself
as a desi
for
knowledge.Accordingly, not
only
are
pseudo-objects
n
and hence all objects which
are actually
udged
or
presente
included
as
Objects of our scientiflcknowledge
(Wissens),
b
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
9/21
lez
1
ALE)CUS
MBINONG
all
Objects which are Objects of our
cognition only in
possibility.
However, here is
no Object
which
could not
at
least
in
possibility
be
an Object of cognition; at any rate, we may say
this if
we adopt
the instructive iction that the
capacity
or
knowledge
s not impaired
by limitations,
such as stimulus hresholdsand
thresholdsof discrim-
inations, which
are
laid down by the constitution
of the subject
and are never entirely
absent.
Assuming an intelligence
of
unlim-
ited capacities,
here is nothing unknowable;
and
what is know-
able, is. Ilowever, since the preferredusage s
generally
o apply
"it
is"
(es
gibt)
to things
which
have being, and
particularly
to
existing
hings,
t would
perhaps
be clearer o say: All
that
is
know-
able is
given-narnely, given
to cognition.
To this extent, all
objects
are knowable.Given-ness
s a most
generalproperty
can be ascribed
to
Objects without
exception,whether hey are
or are not.
The
consequence f these considerationsor
the relation
of the
Objects of cognition to the
Objects of
other
psycho{ogical
ctivities
scarcelyneeds o
be
drawn
more
explicitly. Regardless
f the other
types of
experience ne might have of Objects,
all
Objects
are,
with-
out exception,
Objects of knowledge. Consequently,
anyone
who
undertakesa
scientific
reatment
of Objects
rom
the standpoint of
cognition need not fear that he rnightthus excludeany area rom the
totality of
Objects.
,7.
T'JinTnronv
or Osrncrs As "PURE
Loclc"
It
is
in
accord with long-established
rad$on
to think of
logic
first,
when consideringa scientific
reatment of cognition.
Actually,
it is only
very recently that
problems
have been set
for one
of the
main
parts
of logic, the so-called
pure
or formal
logic,18
which
agree
unmistak4bly
with
what must
properly
be demanded
f
a
theoretical
treatmenC
f
Objects as such.lo
have
already
expressed
lsewhere
my basic agreementwith
E. Husserl'sattack
against
psychologism"
in
logic.2o
did this at a time when external
circumstances
revented
me
from
obtaining
r,nore han a
preliminary
and
very incomplete
acquaintancewith thb extensivework of
this
author. Today,
when
I
trust
that
through
penetrating
study I have done
justice
in some
18. S.. E"
Husserl,
LogischeUntrry*lr,ngrr,
tnro
volumes,
(Leipzig
and Halle,
1900and 1901),
Pure"
and
"Formal"
Eogic are
explicitly dentified n
Vol.
I,
p,
252.
19. In
particular,
Vol. I,
pp.
241 ff,; also Vol. II,
pp.
92 fr.,
The Theory ol
Objects
measure o
the
merits of the
publication
in
question,
I ca
pletely
support
my
previous
expression
of agreementand
it
still further to
many another
of
those
"problems." trt s, th
haps
a
dissent
of
relatively rninor
importance hat I wotrld n
these
problems
precisely
o
"pure
logic."
I
am influenced
above all by this fact:
it
is only with
gre
culty
that
the notion of
logic can be separated rom that of
nology devoted o
the
advancement f
our intellectual
powe
sequently, ogic alwaysremains a "practical discipline."zl W
say at
most
that
a transition can be
made from
the
work
practical
discipline to what
tr have
occasionally
chancteriz
"theoretico-practical
discipline."z
When
logic is
thus calle
Iogic,"28
would
prefer
to say
that the result is not logic
at a
I would
refer
tle
probiems
set
for
"pure
logic" to that
the
discipline,
or to one of
those theoretical disciplines, o
whic
like
all
other
practical
disciplines,must fina-llybe traced.
I am
in
complete agreement
with
the
author
of
the
L
Untersuchungen,
s
I
have
ust
mentioned, n insisting hat r
is
not
to be
made exclusively o
psychology.
ndeed, when
sider
the
guiding
idea to
which
our author returns
again an
in his polemic against"psychologism" n order to characte
extra-psychological
omain of
knowledge, t is difficult
for
avoid the
impression hat
he was not entirely able to
free
from
what he
had
opposed
with
as much zeal as truth. "Pur
has to
do with
"concepts,"
"propositions,"
"arguments,"
a
like.*
But are
not concepts,
after
all,
presentations
which
used for
theoretical purposes,
but which
are nevertheless
tions?
If one
disregards
he. obtrusive
grammatical
meaning
word
"proposition"
(Satz),
bs is explicitly demanded, .8., b
zano,
will
one then
be able to disregard he psychologica
(assumption
or
judgment)
expressed
by the
grammatical p
,1.
I
h"*
tried to
present
this in
greater
detail
in
my
work, tlber
phische llissenschaJt und ihre Proprideutik (Vienna,
1885).
See
particul
96 t.
22. Loc.
cit.,
p.
98.
23.
I find the equivalent term,
"formal
logic,"
objectionable
in that
it
mind what used to be taught under tlis
name and
what
has
properly
been
and
apparently overcome.
Is
this objection based
merely on a
personal
idios
We must also
give
some weight
to the
fact
that
the
term
"form"
cannot
p
clear
picture
of
what it
is
supposed to
mean.
*
[It
is
impossible to
reproduce
in English
the
full significance of M
remarks here
and
below. There is no
English
word or expression which d
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
10/21
le4l
ALEXIUS MBINONO
tion? More
precisely:
If
we do this,
what will
be retained
hat can
in some measure
ay claim
to
the
name
"proposition"?
Still,
there
is an
extralogical
sense
here in
which
one
can talk
of
a
"law
(Satz)
of contradiction,"
or the
"Carnot law
(Satz)"
and
so on,% although,
to be
sure, his has the
feel of a rather
extended
usageof
words.
As
far
as I can
see, such an extralogical sense s completely
lacking
in the
case of the word
"inference"
(Schluss).
Even
il one
speaks
quite
naturally
of
"the"
syllogism n modus Darapti, of "the"
hypo-
thetical syllogism,and the like, one means an intellectual event or
the
possible
results
of
such
an
event,
ust
as one means a
physio-
logical event
when one
speaksof
"the'
circulation of
the blood.
To contrast
"objective"
inferences
and
proofs
with thory
that
are subjective26
ight thus seem o obscure rather
than to
clarify
the facts
of
the matter.
But
the
entire
tenor of the Logische
Unter-
suchungen,
s well
as many
of
the
particular
statements
hat are con-
tained
in it,
convincesone
that,
despitecertain differences n detail
(at
present
navoidable),
he author's
goal
s
thesame as
our own.
It
is a
goal
o which
he
has
been orced by
mathematico-philosophical
studies20
nd by
certain
distinctions
which are in
part genuinely,
and
in part only supposedly,psychological; refer to the distinction
between content
(Inhalt)
and
Objectu and, what
is
even
more
to
the
point,
to that
between
Object and
Objective.2sUnder such
cir-
cumstances,
he common
causewill be better served f
I cease
dwell-
ing
on
these considerations
which
may be
largely terminological
anyway) and, instead,
ry to show briefly how,
in
my opinion, we
may
deal more
adequately
with
the danger
of
"psychologism"-2
danger which,
in spite of
the attention
devoted o it, may
not
yet
have been
entirely
avoided.
\
8. TUB Tnronv
or
Os.recrs
es Eprstsnolocy
Before
we-do
this, however,
we
may draw an
obvious
practical
consequence
rom the
criticisms we
have directed
against
he ex-
pression
"pure logic."
There is no need
to
invent a
name for
a
theory of scientifickq5rwledge
Wissen)
which
sets tself
no
practical
The Theory
ol
Objects
goals
and
accordingly
represents
a
theoretical
science.
One
not wish for a more
natural name
than the
designation,
T
remote.
"Psychologism,"as the name of a natural or considere
ency
to
solve
problerns with
predorninantly
psychological
involves
no blame in itself.2g
However,
within a
certain
sp
who
neglects
he secondside of this fact and so proceed
theory
of
knowledge
as if
there
were only a
psychological
cognition, or
one
who would foist
the viewpoint
of
psych
events on this second side,
is
not
to be spared
the repro
psychologism.
Can we make clear
to ourselves
why there
is
this da
falling
into such
a
psychologism,
a
danger from which
s
anyonewho has concerned
himself
with epistemological
mat
withheld
his tribute? The
double aspect
(Doppelseitigkeit)
nition is so
striking
that
hardly
anyone
could overlook
it
only existing
hings were to
be
known.
However,
as
we hav
all of mathematics,and particulad geometry,deals with th
real. Thus, the
prejudice
in
favor of reality
that I
have
rep
called
o attention eads
here to a dilemma
which seems
o b
illuminating
and which is, nevertheless,
asically
very
singu
be
sure,
we may
not
become explicitly
conscious
of it
eas
29. The
proven
objectivity
of
Uberweg-Heinze's
presentation
of facts
me
of this
in my
own case.
They
place
my
own scientific activity under
th
24,
What
is involved
here
is, of course,
the Objective;
see Uber Annahmen,
p.197.
'
Jntersuchungez,
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
11/21
Ie6]
ALE)CUS
MBINONO
The Theory ol Obiects
that has being.
And surely, whoever wishes
to
free
him
this misconception
need not make it
his task
to keep
p
at a distance
rom the theory of
knowledge.
The
psyc
cognition
must
always
constitute an integral
part
of
the
knowledge.The only thing
against
which
he rnust
guard
taking for
psychology
hat
part
of the
theory of knowle
is
and
must
remain
the theory
of
Objects.
If the theory of the Objects of knowledgeor, more b
theory of Objects, s
presented
o us as an
integral
part
of
of knowledge,so
he answer
o the
initial
questionof our
p
cussion
an easily be
found.
The
proper
place
for investi
jects
as such,
we
could then say, s the
theory
of knowle
in fact,
this result could be left standing
without rnuch
d
the theory of
Objects.
The
more
clearly
the theory
of k
becomes
ware
of
its
tasks, the more certainly
it will
be
remain,by virtue
of
one of
its
fundamental
parts,
a
theo
which
s to be known, of the
"given"
in
the sense
n
which
was employedabove, and
consequently
f the
sum-total
o
generally.
Often
enough,
epistemological
nterests
will
quite
prepare he way for an interest n the theory of Objects.
less, f
I
see ightly,
we
must
go
one step further
if we ar
do
justice
to the claims
which
a
theory of
Objects
is com
make in
virtue
of its
distinctive
nature.
9. TUB Tusonv or Osrrcrs
.4,s SppaRAre
ScrcNc
The
position
of
psychology,
which along
with
the
Objects
must be
given
a fundamental
share
n the theory
edge, oints
o this
fact. We
havealreadyseen
t to be
self-e
there can be no theory of knowledgewhich does not con
with
the
act of knowing and
which is not to this
extent a
chology
of
cognition.
However,
no one would
consider
cance
of
psychology
or
the theory
of knowledge
o be an
characterization
f
the
position
of
psychology
n the
syst
ences.No
one would wish
to regard
psychology
as noth
than
a
piece
of episternology.Shall we
be satisfied
with
analogous
charccteization of
the
theory
of
Objects?
Is it
it
may be
formulated
approximately
n
the following manner:
either
the
Object
to
which
cognition
s directed
exists n
reality or it exists
solely
"in
my
idea"
(more
briefly,
it
"pseudo-exists',).
erhaps
nothing
bears
more
eloquent
estimony
o
the naturalness
f
this
dis-
junction
than
the use
of
the
word
itdeal.',
According
to
modern
usage,
without
regard
for
its historical
meaning,
he
word
.,ideal,'
means
the
same as
"thought of"
or
',merely
presented";
hence
t
pertains,
apparently,
to
all
of those
objects which do not exist
or which could not
exist.
What does
not exist
outside
of us,
so one
automatically
thinks,
must
at least exist
in us. Such an
Qbject,
it
is
supposed,
elongs
before the forum
of
psychology;
one
then
makes
room
for
the thought
that
the knowledge
of eiisting
things
(and
along
with
this
knowledge
eality itself) cin
perhaps
be
treated
"psychologically."
And perhap5
his
prejudice
in
favor
of
what
is actqal can be
traced
one
step
farther
back
by exhibiting
the truth
from which it
could
have
originated.
t
would
certainly
be mi$taken
o believe hat
every
instance
of hnowledge
must concern
existence
or
something
existent.
But
is it
not
correct to
say that
all cognition
as such ul-
timately has to do with something which has
-being
(mit einem
Seienden)2
That
which
has
being, he
"fact,', without
which
no cog-
nition
could
count
as cognition,
s the
Objective. t
is the
Objective
which
is
grasped
by
the
relevant
cognitive
act and to which
being
(Sein)
or,
more
precisely,
subsistence
Bestand)
belongs,
whether
it is
positive
or negative,
whether
t
is
an
Objective of being
(Sein)
or of.
Sosein
Would it be
too
risky to suppgse
hat the faciuality of
its
Objective,
which
is unfailingty
associatedwith
any
instance of
cognition,
has
undergone
a sort
of transferenceo
the
Object
(which
is
almost
the only
thing
considered
by theory)
and
that
it is then
exaggerated
nto
the
tacit
demand
that everything
that
confronts
knowing
be
real?
-
The question
may
remain
undecided
here.
Our
problem
is
not
the
psychology
of
psychologism.
This
much, however,
stands be-
yond
all
doubt: psychologism
n the theory
of knowledge
s invari-
ably
based
on
the
neglect
or
misunderstanding
f the
Object side
\
of-
-the
cognitive
state,u
the
word
"Object,' being
here taken
in its
widest
sense,
n which
it includes
the
Objective).
One
falls
into
psychologism
f one
fails to
grasp
he
significance
nd
the
distinctive
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
12/21
Ie8]
ALE)CUS
MEINONG
for our
interest n the
theory
of
Objects o
proceed,
as it were,
by
way
of our
interest n cognition?
It
seems hat
anyonewho
has
involved himself
closely with the
problems
of the
theory of
Objects has
plenty
of
direct experience
to
the effect that
this is
not
the case.
We may acknowledge
hat
epistemology
may
utilize every detail which competent
nquiry in
the theory
of
Objects
has
produced
and will
produce,
o afford
some
further
information, perhaps
ess directly, but no
less clearly. We
can fully appreciate the basic significance of what the theory of
Objects
has to
show us
concerning
psychologism
n
epistemology,
s
we have
just
done,
and at the same
ime
admit
that
the theory of
Objects
raises
problems
whose solutions are interesting for
their
own
sakes.
This becomes
particularly
clear when
qe
make an
,assumption
which
may still involve
much that is
obscure,
but concerning
whose
essentials
have no fear
of making any
mistake.
I have
referred
before
to
the fact that
a suitable
place
for mathematics
ould never
be found in
the
systemof sciences.f
I am
not mistaken,
he
anoma-
lous
position
of mathematics
had
its basis n the
fact
that
the
con-
cept of a theory of Objectshad not yet been formed. Mathematics
is, in
its essential
eatures,
a
part
of
the theory of Objects. say
"in
its
essential eatures"
n
order to explicitly
leave
open
the
possibility
of
a
specific
differentiation
of
mathematical
nterests
which
I
believe
is
one of
the unexplained
matters mentionedabove).81
Apart
from
that, it
seems
quite
obvious to
me
that both
internal
and external
factors
have
secured or mathematicsan advantagewithin its
own
domain,
while the theory of
Objects
must
set
the entire
domain
of objects
before
itself as its task or hold this domain
before its
eyes
as an unattainable
deal. If.this consideration s
justified,
then,
as
soon
as some account s taken
of
the more
specific
aspects
of
the theory
of
Objects
we cannot fail
to see how little our interests
in it are epistemologicalnterests.
From
what has been said,
I
draw
the conclusion hat
the theory
of Objectshas
a claim to the
statusof
a discipline
ndependent
ven
^\
of the theory
of
knowledge,
and, accordingly,
to that
of
an
inde-
pendent
science.
Thh
claim
cannot
be
elevated o the level of an
accomplished
act, but, on the contrary, is scarcely beginning
to
be fulfilled, for
the theory as
a
whqle
is something
o
be developed,
and not something
eady
to'be exhibited.
The
high
stageof
devel-
The
Theory
ol Obiects
recognition
of its claims,
which can hardly
be
overestim
mathematician
might
well be disturbed by the
suggestion
is
"really"
a
theorist
of
Objects
(Gegerutandstheoretike
ever,
no one will
demand hat
a
physicist
or
chernist
consid
self to be
a metaphysician.
This is so becausea sciencewh
ready exists
cannot be either charactenzed
r even named n
of a science
which is still
merely an object of
aspiration
over, a relatively
general
science as such can
and
must se
goalswhich are foreign to the relatively specializedscienc
second
point
is
somewhatobscured, n
the
case
of
the
rela
mathematics
o
the theory of
Objects,
by
the
fact that
in t
main
of
the
theory of Objects
mathematics represents n
(of
several)
but, at least
for
the time
being, the
only spec
ence
of its type which
is known and
recognized.A twofol
perhaps
quite
dissimilar
in its two aspecls, s, accordingly
ascribed o
the theory of
Objects. On
the
one hand, the the
Objects
has
the
problems
of a scienceof the
highest degree
erality and comprehensiveness.
n
the
other, it
has,
as if
ing in
the
place
of
a whole
group
of specializedscience
problems
which
so far have not receivedany specialconsid
Because
of the
necessity
or descending nto relatively spe
domains which
arises from this situation, its
nature
as a
science s unavoidably again obscured.Consequently, he su
tion of
mathematicsunder
the
theory
of
Objects
can easily
to threaten he
distinctive characterand
specialclaim of the f
However, such external
and accidental matters ought
hamper
insight into the essentialconnection
between math
and the
theory
of
Objects
tg the extent that that connectio
This
not entirely simple situation
can,
perhaps,
best
be
gi
due by saying: Mathematics s certainly not the theory of O
but
is now
as before a science n its own
right.
However, ts O
are ncluded n the domain which the Theory of Objects,also
its own
justification,
must
deal with
as
a
whole.
10.
TnB
TnBonv oF OBJEcrs
,c,I.ro
rHen ScrsNrcrs;
GeNeRAr, NDSpncrArrzeo TueoRy
oF
Osrncrs
The theory of
science
can
adopt
two approaches
o its
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
13/21
[1oo]
ALEXIUS
MEINONG
then
the theory.
The several
sciences
nust
first be
given.
T'hen
he
necessity
or
examining more closely
their
nature
and
mutual
rela-
tionship
may
become
ustified.
However,
science
s
also, at
least
partially,
the
result
of premeditated
activity.
In
employing
such
ore-
sightedness,
he
theory of science
an also
deal
with
sciences
which
do
not
yet
exist but should exist. It
can
find
itself
directed
toward
rendering
he idea and the
tasks of
such sciences
s
precise
as
pos-
sible in anticipation of them.
In
the
preceding
discussionwe
found ourselves
compelled
by
our interest n
Objects
o. considerationswhich
belong
to
the
theory
of science.
n this connettion, it is
incumben?
upon
the theory
of
science
o function
in
the
second
of the two ways
mentioned
above.
The
theory of Objects, which
we
must
claim
to
be
a
proper
sci-
ence, s, in the main, a sciencehat for
the time'being
hardly
exists
at
altr-especially as a
separate
diibipline explicitly
recognized
n its
own right. But,
although
no
investigations
ave been
carried out
in
the name
of
the
theory of Objects, we must
not suPpose
hat
this
sciencehas been
wholly
neglected.
trf
we were to trace out in detail the numerous
and
intimate
rela-
tions which the sciencewe have just proposed bears to ways of
thinking that have
been followed in
the
past,
we would
see hat
it
justifies
tself by
what it
has
to offer. This is
not the
proper
time to
trace these
connections;
evertheless,
n introducing
his new science
it
is
appropriate
o make some mention of
them, Thus, some notice
can be
taken
of
necessitieswhich have
been
felt
for a long
time
and which have
already
ound
expression n
the r,nostdiverse
ways,
necessitieswhich
have arisen
in
consciouslyworking
out
interests
that
are
very widespread,
but which
have often been unconscious
of their
real
goal.
In
fact,
I believe
hht no specialhistorical
nvestigation
s
actually
required to establish hat, althoughthe theory of Objects may not
have been
pursued
"explicitly"
heretofore, t has all
the rnore
fre-
quently
been
pqrsued
"implicitly." To this I
must
add
that,
at
least
in
practice,
the implicit
status has degreeswhich smooth,fransition
to the
explicit status. Anyone
who
wishes
o
pay
attention
to such
transitions
and
their orsets should bear in mind that we
have
met
with
interests
of two different types
pertaining
to the theory o\
Objects: those
questiofis
certain specialdomains
The
Theory
of
Obiects
We have
referred above to the
faat
that speciatrized
in
tain
sense
he most specialized) ttreory of
Objec'r.s
as fo
mathematics
he
most
splendid
epresentation
hat could be
This
luster
has
long led to
efforts to make the
procedu
mathematico,
accessible
o
other
sciences-I might say,
ot
mains
of Objects.
We shall
scarcely
be tripped
unr by
any
cant
error
if
we
add: wheneversuch
atternpts
have been und
then to that extent an effort has been naadealso to do the
specialized
heory
of Objects
in areas
outside
of rnathern
course,
not every
application of
mat"hernatical
roceduresne
be
taken nto
considera{.ion.
hen
the merchant
or the
engi
culates,
he has
as little to do
with the theory of Objects as w
other
theory.
Flowever,
certain
presuppositions
having
to
Objects
ie naturally
at the base of
such
practican
applica
is not otherwise
when
the application results
n
a theoretic
est. In
contrast
with the
technique of calculation which
d
complete
attention,
the nature of these
presuppositions
an
fully
in the background"
This
is ilinrstrated
most clearly by th
of probability and the theory of probableerror, which even
still
not recognizedby everyone
as naturatrly
elonging o L
psychology.
The
nature
of these
assulroptions
an
possibly
calculations
n
question
at
the service
of
the
theory of Obj
we
can see n
the case of
the
theory of combinations). Me
geometry
seerns
better
prepared
than arithrnetic to extend
beyond ts
narrow borders
to discoveries
n
the
theory of
trf one
observes
hat the domain
of spatiatr
quantities
be
arithmetic,
then what is
offered as the translation
(so
fam
everyone)
of
the
geornetrical
view from
space to tirne is
extramathematical
nd,
moreover,
pertains
o
the theory
of
It pertains o the theory of Objects becauset is in no way
with
the
so-called
eality,
or more
precisely,
eal existence
It
is obvious
that the analogy s valid for
phoronorrny
o
greater
neasure;
f-what seems
o
me
to
need no
proof-,A.
is correct
in
contending that tension is the
"third
fund
phenomenon
of rnechanics"
along with space
and time,82
additional
direction s
indicated n which this
science,
withou
-
8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)
14/21
theory of
Objects
hrough the most thoroughgoing
priori
treatment
chology to
order the "perceptual
Objects"
("Empfindungsgegens'
tiinde')ts belonging o t}te difterent senses nd, where possible, o
understand heir multifarious
aspects n tep.s
of
spatial
representa-
tion are
particular$
instructive. Even
if, in regard
to
visual sensa-
tion, where these
effortl
have brought
forth
the most
tangible
results,sa
he
name
"color-geometry"
mplies
far more
praise than
is actually deserved,
t
still
becomes
undeniably
aPparent
hat
the
character of the
pertinent
investi$tions
belongs
much
more
to
the
theory of Objects han to
psychology. trust that
it is not
excessively
personal
for
me to report
at this time
that
much
of
the essential
nature
of
the
way in
which the
theory
of
Objects
rames
ts
ques-
tions originally occurred o me
while I was
engaged
n
supposedly
exclusively
psychological
abors
toward
clarification
of
thesematters.
What I have called the encroachmentof the mathematicalap-
proach
beyond
ts strictest
imits has
an instinctive
and
unconscious
iharacter in comparison with the
completely
explicit
attempts
to
expand that domain
and
to
generalize
o
the fullest
extent
possible
that
way
of framing a
problem.
These
have
probably
already
achieved
some
mportanceunder the
name of the
general
heory
of functions;
one
cannot
fail
to see
this in such
designations
s
"the
theory
of
extension" and "the theory
of manifolds,"
and
even under
the
fre-
quently
misunderstood
catchword,
"meta-mathematics."
From
the
point
of view we
have
addpted
here,
hesestrikingly
significant
nves-
iigations
represent
he transition
from
the specialized
o the
general
theory of objects.A similar
status
may
be ascribed
o the
endeavors
and results customarilygroupedunder the generalnameof "mathe-
matical
logic," even though
those endeavors
are in
many respects
intended or an'entirely
different
purpose.
On
the
o$er hand,
it
is
likely that
the
treasure
of
valuable
assertions
nd suglestions,
which
(non-mathematical)
ogi,q,
epistemology,
nd metaphysics
rom Aris-
totle to the
present
have
contributed o
the area with
which
we
are
33. A t** introduced
by
Witasek,
o,h?"h
,""-. to me
very
usefu