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Auction Theory
Class 9 – Online Advertising
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Outline
Part 1: Bla bla bla
Part 2: Equilibrium analysis of Google’s auction
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Outline1. Introduction: online advertising
2. Sponsored search– Bidding and properties– Formal model– The Generalized second-price auction– Reminder: multi-unit auctions and VCG– Equilibrium analysis
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Classic advertising
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Classic advertising: newspapers
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Classic advertising: TV
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Classic advertising: Billboards
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Online advertising
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Banner ads1. General:
1. Examples: banner, sponserd search, video, videa games, adsense, in social networks
2. Some numbers3. advantages over classic ads4. Ppi,ppc,ppconversion
2. Sponsored search:1. Some history2. Definitions: ctr, conversion-rate3. GSP- definition, non truthfulness.4. Diagram of first-price yahoo data.5. Analysis of equilibrium.
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Sponsored search
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Semantic advertising
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Email advertising
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Online Advertising:Some rough numbers
• 2008:– Worldwide advertising spending: about 500 Billion– Online advertising: about 10% of that (!!!!)
• Google : over 98% of revenue from advertising (Total $21 Billion in 2008)
• Double digit growth in online advertising in the past and in the near future (expected)
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Online advertising - advantages• Targeting
– By search keywords, context, – Personalized ads.
• Additional information– Time, history, personal data
• Advanced billing/effectiveness options– By eyeballs, clicks, actual purchases– “pay only when you sell”
• Advanced bidding options– No printing/”menu” costs.
• Variety of multimedia tools • Enables cheap campaigns, low entry levels.
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Advertising types• Brand advertisers
• Direct advertisers
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Revenue model• Pay per impression
– CPM- cost per mille. Cost per thousand impressions.– Good for brand advertisers
• Pay per click– CPC - cost per click. – Most prevalent– Brand advertisers get value for free.
• Pay per action– CPA – cost per action/acquisition/conversion.– Risk-free for advertisers– Harder to implement
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Outline1. Introduction: online advertising
Sponsored search– Bidding and properties– Formal model– The Generalized second-price auction– Reminder: multi-unit auctions and VCG– Equilibrium analysis
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Sponsored search auctions
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Real (“organic”) search result Ads: “sponsored search”
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Sponsored search auctions
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Search keywords keywordskeywordsAd slots
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Bidding
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• A basic campaign for an advertiser includes:
• Some keywords have bids greater than $50– E.g., Mesothelioma
• Search engine provides assistance • traffic estimator, keyword suggestions, automatic bidding
• Google started (and stopped) pay-per-action sales.
List of : keywords + bid per click
“hotel Las Vegas” $5“Nikon camera d60” $30
Budget (for example, daily)
I want to spend at most $500 a day
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Bidding: more details
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When does a keyword match a user search-query?– When bidding $5 per “hotel California”.
Will “hotel California song” appear?
• Broad match – California hotel, hotel California Hilton, cheap hotel California.
• Exact match: – “hotel California” with no changes or additions.
• Negative words:– “hotel California –song -eagles “
• Many more options:– Geography, time, languages, mobile/desktops/laptops,
etc.
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Economics of sponsored search
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Internet usersSearch engines
advertisers
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Click Through Rates
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• Are all ads equal?
• Position matters.– User mainly click on top ads.
• Need to understand user behavior.
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Click Through rate
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9%4%
2%
0.5%
0.2%
0.08%
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Click Through rate
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c1
c2
c3
c4
…
…
ck
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Formal model
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• n advertisers
• For advertiser i: value per click vi
• k ad slots (positions): 1,…,k
• Click-through-rates: c1 > c2 > …> ck
– Simplifying assumption: CTR identical for all users.
• Advertiser i, wins slot t, pays p.utility: ct (vi –p)
• Social welfare (assume advertisers 1,..,k win slots 1,…,k) :
k
iiivc
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Example
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v1=10
v2=8
v3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.03
c3=0.01
Slot 1
Slot 2
Slot 3
The efficient outcome:
Total efficiency: 10*0.08 + 8*0.03 + 2*0.01
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Brief History of Sponsored Search Auctions(Slide: Jon Levin)
• Pre-1994: advertising sold on a per-impression basis, traditional direct sales to advertisers.
• 1994: Overture (then GoTo) allows advertisers to bid for keywords, offering some amount per click. Advertisers pay their bids.
• Late 1990s: Yahoo! and MSN adopt Overture, but mechanism proves unstable - advertisers constantly change bids to avoid paying more than necessary.
• 2002: Google modifies keyword auction to have advertisers pay minimum amount necessary to maintain their position (i.e. GSP)- followed by Yahoo! and MSN.
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How would you sell the slots?
Yahoo! (that acquired Overture) sold ads in a pay-your-bid auction (that is, first-price auction).
Results: Sawtooth
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Pay-your-bid data (14 hours)
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Pay-your-bid data (week)
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Unstable biddingThink about two neighboring gas stations.
What’s bad with instability?• Inefficiency – advertisers with high values spend part of the
time on the top.• Investment in strategy – advertisers invest a lot of efforts
(time, software, consultants, etc.) handling their strategy. • Relevance – assuming advertisers’ values are correlated with
their relevance, bidders see less relevant ads.
Is there an efficient auction then?
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Why efficiency?Isn’t Google (and other internet companies) required
by their shareholders to maximize profit?
Reasons:– Long term thinking in a competitive environment.
– Making the whole pie larger.
– Easier to model and analyze…
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GSP
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• The Generalized Second price (GSP) auction– I like the name “next-price auction” better.
• Used by major search engines– Google, Bing (Microsoft), Yahoo
Auction rules– Bidders bid their value per click bi
– The ith highest bidder wins the ith slot and pays the (i+1)th highest bid.
• With one slot: reduces to 2nd-price auction.
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Example
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b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.03
c3=0.01
Slot 1
Slot 2
Slot 3
Pays $8
Pays $2
b4=1
Pays $1
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GSP and VCG
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• Google advertising its new auction:
“… unique auction model uses Nobel Prize winning economic theory to eliminate … that feeling that you’ve paid too much”
• GSP is a “new” auction, invented by Google.– Probably by mistake….
• But GSP is not VCG!• Not truthful!
• Is it still efficient? (remember 1st-price auctions)
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Example: GSP not truthful
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v1=10
v2=8
v3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.03
c3=0.01
Slot 1
Slot 2
Slot 3
wins slot 1.utility: 0.08 * (10-8) = 0.16
wins slot 2.utility: 0.3 * (8-2) = 0.18
b1=10
b1=5
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VCG prices
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b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.03
c3=0.01
Slot 1
Slot 2
Slot 3
Pays $5.625
Pays $1.67
b4=1
Pays $1Expected welfare of the others (1 participates):
8*0.03 + 2*0.01 = 0.26
Expected welfare of the others (without 1):8*0.08 + 2*0.03 + 1*0.01 = 0.71
VCG payment for bidder 1 (expected): 0.71 - 0.26 = 0.45
VCG payment for bidder 1 (per click): 0.45/0.08 = 5.625
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Outline1. Introduction: online advertising
2. Sponsored search– Bidding and properties– Formal model– The Generalized second-price auction Reminder: multi-unit auctions and VCG– Equilibrium analysis
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Reminder
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• In the previous class we discussed multi-unit auctions and VCG prices.
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• Non identical items: a, b, c, d, e,
• Each bidder has a value for each itemvi(a),vi(b),bi(c),..
• Each bidder wants one item only.
Auctions for non-Identical items
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Simultaneous Ascending Auction1. Start with zero prices.
2. Each bidder reports her favorite item Provisional winners are announced.
3. Price of over-demanded items is raised by $1. Following bids by losing bidders.
4. Stop when there are no over-demanded items.– Provisional winners become winners.
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Claim: this auction terminates with:(1) Efficient allocation. (2) VCG prices ( ± $1 )
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Walrasian Equilibrium• For a bidder i, and prices p1,…,pn we say that the
bundle T is a demand of i if for every other bundle S:
Sj
jiTj
ji pSvpTv )()(
• A Walrasian equilibrium is an allocation S1,…,Sn and item prices p1,…,pn such that:
– Si is the demand of bidder i under the prices p1,…,pn
– For any item j that is not allocated (not in S1,…,Sn) we have pj=0
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Market clearing prices
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• We saw: In a multi-unit auction with unit-demand bidders:– VCG prices are market-clearing prices
• Not true for more general preferences
– The allocation supported by market clearing prices (Walrasian equilibrium) is efficient.
• Always true
– The simultaneous ascending auction terminates with VCG prices
• And thus with an efficient allocation and market-clearing prices.
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Market clearing prices
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• Another interpretation of market-clearing prices:envy-free prices.
No bidder “envies” another bidder and wants to have their item + price instead oh hers.
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Sponsored search as multi-unit auction
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• Sponsored search can be viewed as multi-unit auction:– Each slot is an item– Advertiser i has value of ctvi for slot t.
• We can conclude: In sponsored search auctions, the VCG prices are market-clearing prices.– allocation is “envy free”
Slot 1Slot 2p2=3
p1=5I prefer “slot 1 + pay 5”to “slot 2 +pay 3”
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Market Clearing Prices
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b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.03
c3=0.01
Slot 1
Slot 2
Slot 3
Pays $5.625
Pays $1.67
b4=1
Pays $1 p1= $5.625 p2=$1.67 p3= $1
u1(slot 1)= 0.08*(10-5.625) =0.35u1(slot 2)= 0.03*(10-1.67) =0.25u1(slot 3)= 0.01(10-1) =0.09
Let’s verify that Advertiser 1 do not want to switch to another slot under these prices:
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Equilibrium concept
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We will analyze the auction as a full-information game.b2=1 b2=2 b3=3 ….
b1=1b1=2b1=3…
Payoff are determined by the
auction rules.
Reason: equilibrium model “stable” bids in repeated-auction scenarios. (advertisers experiment…)
Nash equilibrium: a set of bids in the GSP auction where no bidder benefits from changing his bid (given the other bids).
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GSP is efficient
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Next slides: we will prove that the GSP auction is efficient.– although not truthful– That is, there is an equilibrium (in the complete-
information game) for which the allocation is efficient.• (there might be other equilibria that may be inefficient)
• Way of proof: we will use the VCG prices to define the equilibrium in the auction.
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Equilibrium
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Let p1,..,pk be market clearing prices.Let v1,…,vk be the per-click values of the advertisers
Claim: a Nash equilibrium is when each player i bids price pi-1 (bidder 1 can bid any number > p1).
Proof:Step 1: show that market-clearing prices are
decreasing with slots.Step 2: show that this is an equilibrium.
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Equilibrium bidding
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b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.03
c3=0.01
Slot 1
Slot 2
Slot 3
b4=1
p1= $5.625 p2=$1.67 p3= $1
The following bids are an equilibrium:b1=6, b2=5.625, b3=1.67, b4=1
First observation: the bids are decreasing. Is it always the case?
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Step 1
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• We will show:if p1,…,pk are market clearing prices then p1>p2>…>pk
Slot j
Slot tUtility: ct ( vt – pt )
Utility: cj ( vt – pj )
Advertiser t wins slot t:
Market clearing prices: t will not want to get slot j and pay pj.
Since cj>ct, it must be that pt<pj.
≥ (j<t)
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Step 2: equilibrium
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• Under GSP, i wins slot i and pays pi.
• Should i lower his bid?If he bids below bi+1, he will win slot i+1 and pay pi+1.– Cannot happen under market –
clearing prices.
Slot i
Slot i+1
Slot i-1
• Let p1,…,pk be market-clearing prices.
bi-1=pi-2 , bi=pi-1 , bi+1=pi
bi
bi+1
bi+2
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Equilibrium bidding
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b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.03
c3=0.01
Slot 1
Slot 2
Slot 3
b4=1
p1= $5.625 p2=$1.67 p3= $1
The following bids are an equilibrium:b1=6, b2=5.625, b3=1.67, b4=1
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Step 2: equilibrium
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• Under GSP, i wins slot i and pays pi.
• Should i increase his bid?If he bids above bi-1, he will win slot i-1 and pay pi-2 (=bi-1)– But he wouldn’t change to slot
i-1 even if he paid pi-1 (<pi-2).
Slot i
Slot i+1
Slot i-1
• Let p1,…,pk be market-clearing prices.
bi-1=pi-2 , bi=pi-1 , bi+1=pi
bi-2
bi
bi-1
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Proof completed• We showed that the bids we constructed compose
a Nash equilibrium in GSP.
• In the equilibrium, bidder with higher values have higher bids.
• Auction is efficient in equilibrium!
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Another example
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• Let’s consider a 2-slot case, so we can present the solution graphically.
b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.04
Slot 1
Slot 2
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Another example
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• Let p1,p2 be per-click prices.• What are the Walrasian equilibria in this auction?
(Reminder, each bidder should get his demand)– Bidder 3 should not demand any item:
• p1,p2 ≥ 2– Bidder 2 prefers slot 2:
• 0.04*(8-p2) ≥ 0.08*(8-p1) p1 ≥ p2/2 - 4– Bidder 1 prefers slot 1:
• 0.08*(10-p1) ≥ 0.04*(10-p2) p1 ≤ p2/2 - 5
b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.04
Slot 1
Slot 2
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Another example
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b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.04
Slot 1
Slot 2
2
4
5
2
The set of all Walrasian price
vectors
p1 ≤ p2/2 - 5
p1 ≥ p2/2 - 4
p1,p2 ≥ 2p1
p2
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Another example
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• What are the VCG prices?p1 = (8*0.08+2*0.04-8*0.04)/0.08 = 5p2 = (2*0.04)/0.04 = 2
b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.04
Slot 1
Slot 2
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Another example
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b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.04
Slot 1
Slot 2
2
4
5
2
VCG prices
Recall: with unit-demand preferences, VCG prices are the lowest Walrasian prices
p1 ≤ p2/2 - 5
p1 ≥ p2/2 - 4
p1,p2 ≥ 2p1
p2
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Another example
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• What are the GSP prices?
p1 > 5p2 = (2*0.04)/0.04 = 2
b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.04
Slot 1
Slot 2
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Another example
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b1=10
b2=8
b3=2
c1=0.08
c2=0.04
Slot 1
Slot 2
2
4
5
2
GSP prices
Total revenue is greater than in VCG
p1 ≤ p2/2 - 5
p1 ≥ p2/2 - 4
p1,p2 ≥ 2p1
p2
VCG
![Page 64: Auction Theory](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022070421/568160a7550346895dcfc960/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
Conclusion• Online advertising is a complex, multi-Billion dollar market
environment. – With a rapidly increasing share of the advertising market.
• These are environments that were, and still are, designed and created by humans.
• Hard to evaluate the actual performance of new auction methods.
• GSP is used by the large search engines.It is not truthful, but is efficient in equilibrium.
– GSP is a new auction, invented by Google, probably by mistake…
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