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Graduate Faculty Phllosophy Journal
Volume 13. Number 2
Aristotle's Definition of Motion and
its Ontological Implications
Rellli Brague
1. Definition
Everyone has at least heard the formula by which Aristotle
attempts to define motion: "actuality [entelechyl of the potentially
existing qua existing potentially" (Physics, II!, 20la IOf).* It seems
to me understandable, even inevitable, that one would feel the
greatest perplexity in the face of this definit ion. In the following
pages, it is my sole intention to make this definition as clear as
possible, and, further, to show that it is particularly illuminating
when understood on the basis of Aristotle's presuppositions. In
order to do this, I will confine myself to an examination of the
above-quoted formula, leaving aside the other versions of this
formula the Philosopher has proposed and aJortiori the question of
its relation to the remainder of Aristotle's Physics (as a book) and
physics (as a discipline).Before calling attention to the obscurity, indeed, to the oddness of
the definition's content, a prior and more radical oddness may be
worth mentioning, namely, the one in general which consists in
Translated by Pierre Adler and Laurent d'Ursel.
The first part ("Definition") of this paper is a slightly abbreviated version of a
presentat ion made at a coIloquium (mainly intended for physicists) devoted to
Aristotle's Physics and organized by the Seminaire d'epistemoZogie et d'histoire des
sciences de Z'Universite de Nice. It was held on June 27-29, 1986, at the Universite
de Nice. The event was organized by Franc;ois De Gandt and Pierre Souffrin.
The second part ("Logos") consists of pages 501-509 of Remi Brague's Aristote et Za
question du monde (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988).
We would like to thank the author, and Pierre Souffrin, the director of th e
Seminaire, as weIl as the PUF for granting us perm ission to publish this translation.
*Translators' note: throughout this paper we have used Hippocrates G. Apostle's
translation of Aristotle's Physics (GrineIl, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1980),
henceforth abbreviated Apostle.
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trying to provide a dejinition of motion. A fact belonging to the
history of ideas can draw our attention to the strangeness of the
Aristotelian enterprise: Aristotle apparently had no predecessor in
this domain. 1 Moreover, we may wonder whether he has had any
successor. Of course, I in no way wish to question the legitimacy of
physics posterior to Aristotle: its conquests are too obvious, and its
validity has been confirmed on hundreds of occasions. But we may
wonder whether this physics has ever attempted to dejine motion
and whether it has not been content with the far more fruitful
enterprise which consists in studying its properties and, above all,
those which are measurable-this is precisely what Galileo
proposes in a famous passage. 2 In anyevent, at the end of a quick
and partial search, I could not find anyone who succeeded in
providing adefinition of motion that would meet the following
conditions: a) to be a true definition and not a provisional
characterization; b) to be valid for all the species of motion and not
only, for instance, for local displacements; c) to avoid the circle
consisting in defining motion in terms of itself; d) and to have acertain originality with respect to Aristotle's definition. 3 This
lacuna is a cause of embarrassment only to philosophers.
Physicists, indeed, do not have to trouble themselves with defining
their object. What is more, if we examine the origins of the modern
enterprise of a mathematized physics (and this is exclusively what
we understand today by 'physics'), we see that, at least in the spirit
of its founders, this physics builds itself not only without adefinition of motion, but even in opposition to the only availabledefinition, and that precisely is Aristotle's. In the classical age, it
was good form to mock the definition of motion as the "actuality of
the potentially existing qua existing potentially," and everyonepoked fun at it. However, only the Logique de Port-Royal reveals the
nerve of the critique: "to whom was it [this definition] ever usejul
for explaining any of the properties of motion?"4
The foregoing suggests, I hope, two points: a) instead of speaking
of "the Aristotelian definition of motion," as if there were others,
one should simply speak of the definition of motion, which happens
to have been formulated by Aristotle; and b) the very attempt at
defining motion is not a matter of course, but something rather
strange-so much so that we have to wonder what induced Aristotle
to venture upon such an enterprise.
This is not the place to discuss Aristotle's theory of definition,
because it would lead us too far astray and, more decisively,
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because this theory explains more how to define in a valid way
than why it is necessary to define in the first place, Le., what is
gained by defining. I am content with noting that the possibility ofdefining attests to a certain consistency on the part of the objectdefined. In defining motion, Aristotle does not endeavor to
construct a concept, but rather to show that the manifest reality of
motion possesses a consistency of its own. His point is not to show
that motion does "exist," that "there is" motion. This is a basic
t ru th that induction suffices to establish and that Aristotle puts a t
the very basis of his enterprise of a physics (I, 2, 185a 12f). He has
rather to show that motion has such a dignity that it deserves to be
spoken of by using the verb 'to be'. In this case, the verb is neitherthe copula of judgment, nor is it used existentially. It designates, ifI may say so, the consistency, rather than the existence, and refers
less to the bare fact than to the well-grounded appearance. If
Aristotle has to display this consistency, this is so owing to its
having been denied-above all by Parmenides. The definition of
motion is thus the positive version of that which the refutat ion of
Eleatism-carried out in book I (chap. 3) of the Physics-
established negatively. It thereby constitutes i ts definitive refuta
tion.
Parmenides of course does not deny that we see things moving,birds flying, trees yellowing, plants growing, etc. His poenl actually
starts with the narration of a journey. To all the th ings we see, he
grants the totality of what we say about them, save one thing,
which he relentlessly denies them: that they are, or that we can say
of the whole show that "i t is." It seems that in his poem Parmenides
uses as a criterion for distinguishing between the real and the
illusory the possibility of saying in the present tense: "(it) is" (esti).
All that which, being as it is in motion, "has been" in the past, or"will be" in the future, is precluded from being the subject of 'it is'until the 'it is' finally secretes, so to speak, its own subject: "that
which is" (to eon), which, as such, can only be immobile.5 Hence,
motion for Parmenides is not worthy of being. In the face of
Eleatism, Aristotle's project is to reintegrate motion into being and,
in order to do so, to sh.ow that it can be defined. This at least is
what lies, it seems to me, in the background ofAristotle's attempt,
for the Philosopher does not make his intention explicit. At any
rate, we can look for a confirmation of this in the specialaccentuation that the verb 'to be' receives in two passages of the
text in which the definition ofmotion occurs, provided that we read
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them carefully: what Aristotle claims to have established with
his definition at 111, 1, 201b 6, namely, "hoti estin aute," is not "that
this is what a motion is" (Apostle, p. 44), but "that motion is
(indeed)"; the very particular actuality that he praises himself forhaving made visible despite the difficulty of the enterprise, is, at 111,
2, 202a 2f, "endechomenen d'einai," for which Apostle's 'it is
capable of existing' (p. 45) is too weak; I would rather translate: "it
admits of being (indeed)."
The consequence of this ontological rehabilitation ofmotion is an
undisputed fact, which I mention here only as areminder: it is
Aristotle's concern for the elaboration of a knowledge of the
sensible. I am not speaking of a nlathematized science, but rather,more modestly, of a "knowledge," of which science is a species. We
can only know what iso Now, in nature, the beings (or, what is) are
endowed with motion. Therefore, if that which is in motion, or, itsfundamental feature, motion, is not, then there is no knowledge of
nature. Hence, it is critical to grasp what is at stake in Aristotle's
defi11ition. And it is important to situate it correctly: he is not
concerned with the procurement of an instrument allowing arigorous description ofmotion or a derivation of its properties. As amatter of fact, it should be noted that Aristotle does not make much
use of this definition; he recalls it only once (at VIII, 1, 251a 9f). Hisconcern is not "to do physics," but rather to secure the legitimacy of
the entire enterprise of a knowledge of nature by making room formotion within being. 6 Owing to this fact, the Aristotelian definition
of motion is of a piece with the whole project which defines
Aristotelianism.
So far I have tried to bring out the "use" which this definition is
to serve. I now must provide a first idea of what it is meant to
define, namely, motion (kinesis). Since this definition does not
construct its object, it presupposes that we begin by having a senseofwhat 'motion' means. Now, what spontaneously occurs to us does
not coincide with Aristotle's understanding of 'motion' . Accord-ingly, we must make an effort to divest ourselves of our conceptionof motion, which above all is that of a displacement in aspace.
Such a displacement is precisely what the other, post-Aristotelian
definitions have in view. For the Philosopher, on the contrary, localmotion is but one of the forms of motion in general. These forms
are three in number, as manyas there are categories admitting of
the opposition between contraries (Physics, V, 2). The question
whether the coming into and the going out of being (genesis and
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phthora) , which occur in accordance with substance, should be
added to the three motions according to quality (alloiösis,
alteration), quantity (auxesis and phtisis, growth and corruption),and place (phora, locomotion), is given subtly qualified answers. As
for local motion, Aristotle sometimes ascribes it a certain pride ofplace, that of primacy.7 This does not mean, however, that all theother forms of motion could be reduced to displacement and thatthey would thus be mere epiphenomena of local motion. Nor does it
mean that the Aristotelian phora coincides with the translation
projected by classical physics. In the Aristotelian universe, the term'place' (topos) has a different meaning from the one it has in
classical physics. The "place" in accordance with which the phora
occurs is not a neutral space, but an oriented universe, stretched
between absolute upper and lower parts (respectively, the periphery
and the center of the sphere of the stars), to which bodies striveafter returning, according as they are light or heavy.Thus we will take a first step toward understanding Aristotle's
definition ofmotion only when we place it back into the universe as
the Philosopher conceives it. In order to do this, we must give up
the image of a displacement, of a cursor proceeding between two
points, etc., and we must include in the term 'motion' all thatAristotle sees in it. At issue are all the processes implying a passagefrom one extremity to another. To be sure, this holds oflocalmotion,but just as weIl of alteration, for instance: the autumnalleaf turns
from green to yellow and then to red; its sensible qualitycolor-changes, becomes altered. Generally speaking, motion is pas
sage from one extremity to another, "from something to something"(ek t inos eis ti, V, 1, 224b 1; 225a 1). For astart, we may rely on thischaracterization ofmotion. But this will do only to get started, for it
is one thing to give a description of motion and another to give itsdefinition. 8 We see, of course, that in everymotion there is a progressfrom a pOint of departure to a point of arrival. ButAristotle does notaim only at looking and recording; he seeks to grasp the essence ofmotion, what any definition must express. It is worth noting that,
when he attempts to define motion, Aristotle does not adopt thesame point ofview as the one fromwhichmotion appears as stretchedbetween a beginning and an end.We had to be reminded of these weIl-known facts because nothing
is more tempting than to introduce into the definition itself theidea of passage, which provides a satisfactory description ofwhattakes place when something is in motion. Why not consider the two
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concepts of potency (or potentiality) and actuality (or activity),which
Aristotleintroduces
to definemotion, as the extremities
between which motion would play? One would then say that motion
is the passage from potency to actuality. When the leaf turns fromgreen to yellow, the yellow coloration, in which the process ofalteration terminates, was indeed "potentially" in the leaf and is
"actually" at the end: the leaf, or rather its color, did proceed frompotency to actuality. This understanding of the definition ofmotion
has not been lacking. Rather, it was in place already as early asAntiquity, and without much hesitat ion, modern commentators
have followed in the footsteps of the Ancients.9
But was this notalready the way Aristotle understood his own definition? He doesnot hesitate to say that "it is the potentially existingwhich proceeds[more literally: walks (badizei)] to actuality" (VIII, 5, 257b 7), or, inspeaking of the light body rising up to its natural place, that "being
a potentiality, it comes into that upper place because it proceeds
towards entelechy (dunamei on, eis entelecheian ion, erchetai
ekei)" (On the Heavens, IV, 3, 311a 4). In motion, potency strivestowards actuality. Why then should we not interpret the Aristote-
lian definition of motion in this way?The answer: because nothing in the text where the definition
occurs (namely, Physics, 111, 1-3) suggests it. Accordingly, it ismethodologically sound to attempt first to understand what the textsays explicitly, and this all the more so because it is obviouslymeant to contain Aristotle's most fully elaborated doctrine on thetopic, the question of the essence ofmotion being treated there in athematic and central way. Moreover, to define motion by nleans ofthe idea of passage amounts to giving a circular definition. Thiswas already noticed at least in the Middle Ages,lo and we arereluctant to attribute such a glaring blunder to Aristotle. Conse-quently, we must try to understand the definition of motion as the
"actuality of the potentially existing qua existing potentially" on itsown.In order to do this, le t us not abandon too quickly the idea of
"passage," which will serve to indicate to us what 'actuality' heremeans. Aristotle does not have in view any manner of random
course, e.g., that of the billiard ball, which was a common exampleto the philosophers of the classical age, but rather a course orientedand directed towards a determinate end. This is revealed by the
examples he most readily examines when the elaboration of hisdefinition is still under way. To be sure, he hastens to generalize his
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results to any motion, but he does not read the essence of motion
off any motion. On the contrary, and surprisingly, the key examples
he chooses are processes that do not belong to any of the species of
motion distinguished by hirn elsewhere; they rather belong tohuman, technical, productive activity (what he calls poiesis): the
building of a house (1, 201a 16-18, b 8-13) or the making of a
statue (1, 201a 29-34). Although he mentions many sorts of
motion, these processes are the only ones to which he devotes an
analysis. In what sense are motions-or even motions particularly
representative of what Aristotle seeks to define-involved here?
A first answer would be that the builder or the sculptor does set
hirnself into motion: the workers are busy, the maul comes down
upon the chiseI, which sends the chips flying, etc. For Aristotle,
however, these gestures do not constitute the essential aspect ofthe
motion in which they are caught, and which ushers a matter
towards the form it has to take on. As he states it in another
context, albeit regarding the same example drawn from the
handicrafts, what matters is not what happens "when the tool
strikes down (empesontos tou organou)," but the form which the
carpenter seeks to obtain and which is the reason for his striking in
this fashion (De Partibus Animalium, I, 1, 641a 10-14). Both the
craftsman who works, and the architect who gives orders, do so
with this form in view. And to the extent that the architect has a
clearer idea of the completed edifice than the worker, he is in a
sense more at work than the worker. At any rate, the architect is
the one who perceives the true motion at stake here, Le., the
motion whereby the house becomes itself, behind the manifoldactivities of those who work towards its coming into itself. In this
sense, we find a good Aristotelian, for example, in the waiter who
answers, "It's on the way!" to someone ordering a sandwich: hedoes not mean thereby that he will yet quicken his hurried
behavior, but that the process which will end up in something
consumable is already underway-even when he has not gone past
merely having the idea of a sandwich present to his soul. He is a
good Aristotelian in that he grasps that the true motion is the wayin which a piece of matter takes on the shape of a sandwich,
receives the form owing to which the bread and the harn deserve tobe called by that name. In this example, as in those adduced by
Aristotle, motion is nothing but the process which leads to, andreceives i ts meaning from, a final, stable state.
This is the kind of process which, in Aristotle's view, deserves the
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name ofmotion. In contrast, processes not oriented toward an end,
such as those encountered in the realm of local motions (considerBrownian motion), would have no place in the Aristotelian
universe. Aristotle has in sight above all the processes which end in
a final, clearly identifiable state-the growth ofliving things toward
adulthood, the recovery of health, the making of an object,etc. -and he considers local displacements in such a way that they
lend themselves to being analyzed from the point of view of an end:
the motion of heavy bodies toward the natural place where they are
at rest, the path from a point of departure to a point of arrival. The
end captures the process leading to it and turns it into a totalitythat cannot be decomposed into parts without losing its meaning.
Aristotle designates this final state by means of two terms,
'energeia' and 'entelecheia'. These are also the two terms with
which he defines the motion leading to this final state. It is thus of
importance to take a closer look at them and to attempt to gobehind their usual translations. As a matter of fact, only the first
one has been translated in the history of the Aristotelian tradition,
since the second one, 'entelecheia', has simply been transcribed by
'entelechy'. 'Energeia' (and sometimes 'entelecheia') is at timestranslated by 'activity', the English limiting itself to transcribing
the Latin 'activitas'. This is not the place to quest ion the overalllegitimacy of this translation. l l However, it may be noted that
where it is a matter of making the Aristotelian definition ofmotion
comprehensible and even acceptable, this translation is a particu
larly infelicitous one. Indeed, what we usually understand by
'activity' retains from the etymology of the Latin 'actus' (from the
verb 'agere', to push ahead, e.g., a herd) and from its original
meaning (walking, movement, impulse) an unavoidable link with
the idea that is precisely to be defined, namely, motion. Our verb 'to
act' immediately evokes a motion. An inactive person is blamed for"remaining motionless," even when the action required of hirn or
her is metaphorical, as when adecision is to be made. For us, to
speak of activity is already to speak of motion. Hence, our
uneasiness with adefinition of motion such as "activity of the
potentially existing qua existing potentially": is this not circular?
One way to avoid the circle is to step back from the Latin and
English translations to the corresponding Greek terms. These are
two in number; we said: 'entelecheia' and 'energeia'. When
Aristotle formulates his definition ofmotion, he seems to prefer the
first one (1, 201a 11,17,28,30,33; 201b 5; 2, 202a 7; 3, 202b 5),
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but he feeIs no. hindrance in referring to motion as energeia (1,
201b 9; the authent icity of Metaphysics, Kappa, 9, 1065b 9 is
disputed; and see 2, 201b 31; 202a 2). Are we to suppose that each
of these terms has a specific nuance? There is no doubt that their
formation suggests this, whatever the precise way in which it is to
be conceived12 : the notion of energeia comprises the idea of "work,
result of work" (ergon), while the notion of entelecheia includes
that of "completion, perfection" (telos). Moreover, Aristotle explicitly
acknowledges, although in unfortunately very obscure passages,
that both terms are not absolutely synonymous (Metaphysics,
Theta, 3, 1047a 30f; 8, 1050a 22f). Accordingly, a specific use has
been reserved for each of the two terms: in comparison with
'entelecheia', 'energeia' is supposed to represent a less completed
stage in the evolution of a process toward its fuH unfolding. 13 Imust
confess that I am rather skeptical about these attempts, for even if
the words do have different roots, theyare used interchangeably.
Furthermore, the underlying idea is the same in both cases-not
"action," but the fact of being at work, in contrast with the fact of
being "on site," which could translate 'dunamis' (potency). To be at
work, in th is case, is not to engage in an activity; or, rather, it is so
only to the extent that the activity is above all that which reveals me
as the one I am. In such a case, the activity is not necessarily
"animated": what I am may appear more distinctly while I am at
rest than during the exercise of a capacity. Hence, it is not absurd
for Aristotle to speak of an "activity of immobili ty (energeia
akinesias)" (Nicomachean Eth ics, VII, 14, 1154b 27). Conse-
quently, we need a concept of energeia wide enough to include both
the mobile and the immobile modes of presenting oneself. It doeshappen that things present themselves as what they are through
the exercise of an activity, but it may also happen that thispresentation does not require such an exercise. Such is the case
with an exanlple of definition quoted, and approved 0[ , byAristotle,
because this example clearly shows how in adefinition one element
corresponds to matter, thereby to potency, and another to form,
thus to actuality: the luH is the stiHness of the wind, the calm is the
evenness of the surface of the sea. In such phenomena, the
"activity" is precisely the immobility: the winds, or the water of the
sea, do not "do" anything, but they present themselves under a
certain aspect (Metaphysics, Eta, 2, 1043a 22-26). To be sure,such examples represent only a limiting case. But they force us to
conceive of energeia in such a way that it may include them: in
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other words, they force us to conceive of it as the fact of a
phenomenon's presenting itself as what it isoThis captures the concept of actuality at work in the Aristotelian
definition of motion and in the examples meant to show its
legitimacy. Actuality is actuality of a potency, to take up again the
traditional equivalents of dunamis and energeia. When Aristotle
writes that "[blronze is potentially astatue" (1, 201a 29), he nei ther
means that bronze unfolds a force (a notion conveyed by our word
'dynamism'), nor that it may become astatue , but that it is suited
to becoming astatue, provided that a sculptor is able to see this
capacity in it. If the sculptor does, the actuality of the bronze will bethe statue, once the statue is sculpted. Vsing the terms of the other
example, we say that the actuality of the building materials will be
the bui lt house. What then does the bronze-or the bricks, planks,
etc. -"do"? They do nothing but fully manifest themselves as what
theyare. They do it even more distinctly than when they were either
a formless block or piled up on the building site. At that earlier
time, they exhibited only a blurred, because temporary, aspect:
planks, for instance, are in transit between the tree from which
they have been wrested by the saw and, say, the frame. They areonly "wood," a piece of pure matter, disfigured and awaiting the
configuration the art of the carpenter will confer upon it. Matter
(which Aristotle hardly ever separates from the "material(s)")appears in broad light only through the form it receives. The grain
of the stone or the wood and the diaphaneity of the glass truly
appear only when they are used for sheltering against bad weather,
supporting the walking person, or stopping the rain and letting the
eyes look through. In those cases, they "do their work" (ergon), in
the sense that they "do" nothing but be themselves. In so "doing,"they manifest what makes them suited to being a house, that is,their hardness, their polish, their transparency, etc. Therefore, and
in th is sense, the house is indeed the actuality of its materials; the
materials are the house in potency; the house is the actuality of its
materials in potency.
Now where are we to find motion as it is defined byAristotle? It is
also actuality. An easyanswer would be to understand the "activity"
(energeia) at stake here as actualization and not as actuality-as
process and not as result. However, this would amount to a circulardefinition: motion would be defined as the motion whereby apotency actualizes itself. Moreover, one would then have to assume
that Aristotle is guilty of having seriously confused two accepta-
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tions of the same term, 'energeia', whereas he uses it in a passage
in which he distinguishes between the actuality which is motion
and the actualitywhich is not (1, 201a 28,30). It is thus preferableto keep the same meaning for 'energeia' and not to see it as
denoting a process. 14 Of what is motion the actuality? It must be of
a potency. Again, a temptation arises to understand the potency
whose motion is actuality, as the capacity for becoming the result of
motion: e.g., the building of the house would be the actuality of the
materials' capacity for being asserrLbled into a house, that is, for
being built. In this case, building is the realization of the possibility
of building. We again end up with a circular characterization.
Hence, actuality must be conceived of as the actuality of a
potentiality to be, and not to become, the result. 15
If this is the case, we have only to try to understand the qualifier
added byAristotle in order to distinguish between the actuality that
motion is and the actuality as presence of the completed result.
Motion, he adds whenever he formulates his definition, is tl1.e
"actuality of the potentially existing qua existing potentially." The
house, we said, is the actuality of a potency, namely, of the fact thatits materials are suited to being a house. The house, however, is not
the actuality of this potency qua potency. Aristotle stresses this
twice, once in the example of the statue (1, 201a 29-31) and then
again in that of the house (1, 201b 10-13): the actuality of the
bronze qua bronze is not motion. This actuality is nothing but the
statue. Similarly, the actuality of the limestone and of the wood is
the house. Neither the sta tue nor the house are motion. They are
rather its result and, as such, they are the place where motion
ceases.The matter, however, requires a closer inspection: is the
actuality, which the house and the statue are, the one of the
materials qua materia ls? In order to grasp the materials qua
materials, a merely perceptual gaze, one which would see stones
and planks, is not enough. They must yet be seen as materials. The
materials are not merely stones and planks; of course, they are that,
but fo r something, namely, for the result of .the making. The
material of the house is not merely stone; it is the stone neededfor
the building of this house. It comprises, as it were, an orientation
toward the result of the building process in which it is involved. The
stone becomes construction material and the wood becomes timber
only if considered as suited to becoming a wall or a frame. This fact
of "considering as suited to ..." is not a function of a perceptual
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grasping: ifwe look at the parpens piled up on the building site or
at the block of bronze, nothing about them manifests that they aresuited to being a house or astatue; examine them for hours as wemight, the capacity for being assembled into a house, or for being
made into astatue, is not a property of tl'le marble or the stones
that we could ascertain in the same way as we perceive their
hardness, grain or color. Aristotle speaks of the materials
considered as such in terms of "the buildable" (1, 201a 16, b Bf),
coining an adjective whose suffix expresses capacity (what he calls
dunamis). This capacity, as we have seen, cannot be grasped after
the manner of that with which perception provides us (color,hardness, etc.); it requires a gaze capable ofprobing more deeply, ofproceeding from the real to the possible-as when Michelangelo
"sees" a David in the formless block abandoned by other sculptors.
W h ~ r e can we grasp the buildable as such? Not in the materials,
as we just said, as long as we see in them nothing but stone or
bronze. Nor in the final product: stare at the completed house as
one might, again, nothing in it will point to something like a
possibility. What the qui te real and visible assemblage of materials
conceals from us is theircapacity
for fornling a house. Reality has,so to speak, soaked up the possibility, as in Georges Braque's sense
that for the painter , " the painting is over when it has erased the
idea." Hence, the buildable will appear as such only in between the
point of departure (the materials as stone or bronze) and the point
of arrival ( the house or the statue), and it will be neither of these
two points. This in-between is motion. The capacitymanifests itself
as such in motion: the very building of the house reveals the stones'and the planks' capacity for forming a house; when the sculptor is
working, the bronze is seen as suitable for being a statue. Motion,thus, is indeed the manifestation of the capacity as such, or, to take
up again the received equivalents of the Aristotelian concepts, "the
actuality of the potentially existing qua existing potentially."
We are thus led to ascertain that the Aristotelian definition of
motion perfectly expresses the object which it meant to elucidate.
This object is not motion as it may be descnbed, but motion of
which adefinition seeks to saywhat it is, what its mode of being iso
Looked at from that point of view, the definition put forth by
Aristotle must be said not only to avoid the circular character often
exhibited in this domain and to be obscure only when divorced
from the perspective which endows it with its sense, but also to
constitute an extraordinary speculative achievement.
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2. Logos
Reflecting on the definition he has just set forth, Aristotle pointsout that from the very beginning his enterprise runs up against a
major difficulty: how is one to define (horizein) that which precisely
counts as indefinite (aoriston, 2, 201b 24-28)? What is indefinite
resis ts any description that would attempt to define limits that it
does not have. Showing himself indulgent (which he seldom does),
Aristotle notes that this is so not because of the failings of his
predecessors, but rather because of motion's very nature. He
formulates the difficulty by locating motion as an in-between, and
he justifies his definit ion by showing that it is able precisely to
capture motion in its very indefinability. Motion seems to be located
somewhere between potency and actuality: motion cannot be placed
"either under the potentiality or under the actuality of things (oute
eis dunamin tön ontön oute eis energeian)" (201b 28f). The
problem raised is thus clearly that of the ontological status of
motion, of the class of beings to which it belongs. A provisional
solution, it seems to me, is that motion seems to be (dokei) an
incomplete actuality (Bonitz, 391a 38-41). Aristotle specifies
elsewhere that this is the case less because it is itself an imperfect
actuality, than because it is the actuality (and, as such , it is perfect)
ofsomething imperfect (On the Soul, 111, 7, 431a 6f). Tllis imperfect
something (ateles) is the potency such that, far from being
absorbed by the result (the built house), it is, within motion,
brought to light as such in its very potentiality.
By a process of elimination, Aristotle finally reaches a degree of
precision which seems to me of crucial importance and which, in
my eyes, provides the key to whatever might still be provisional
about the preceding reflections. In the end (leipetai), motion isindeed an actuality, but such as has been stated, Le., "difficult to
grasp by sight but which admits of being (chalepen men idein,
endechomenen d'einai)" (202a 2f).16 We saw above how much
weight the verb 'to be' carries here, which wrests it away from the
platitude all too often attributed to this much-stressed passage:
not only does Aristotle say that motion exists (this, in asense, could
have been granted by Parmenides), but that it fully deserves to be
ascribed being. We may flOW proceed further: this being which falls
to motion is a being which exceeds what we are able to grasp bysight (idein). On the basis of this impossibility of a visual
grasp-and, along with it, of any mode of knowledge connected with
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the paradigm of sight-we ean understand, I think, in what sense
motion, or the aetuality defining it, is ateles: this aetuality is not
imperfeet or ineomplete in that it would be aetuali ty imperfeetly,but in the sense of not being eaught within an outline (telos) whieh
would make it visually graspable.
As we have seen, the seeond part of the sentenee under
eonsideration establishes that the question raised by Aristotle
eoneerns the mode oJ being of the movable. 17 The very existenee of
Aristotelianism as an alternative to Platonism depends on the
answer to this question: it is nothing less than a new eoneept of
being, wide enough to eneompass the being of the mobile things,
namely, energeia. The whole of Aristotelianism is indeed eharaeter
ized by an effort to widen the eoneept of being beyond the limits
imposed upon it by Plato (or, better, by a "Platonism" whieh
Aristotle eonstruets more or less ad hoc and uses as a foil), and to
enable its integration of physieal nature.
Aristotle does not name the ontologieal model he undertakes to
supersede, exeept perhaps onee in a passage where, dealing with
aetuality (energeia), he notes in passing that it is 11.0t eonfined to
being standing there (huparchein) like a thing (ktema), but that it
has a "beeoming" (gignesthai) (Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 9, 1169b
29f). However, Aristotle does not elaborate on the eoneepts at
issue-the two verbs and what the model of the "thing" (ktema,
what is acquired onee and for all , what is available) means. Now,
the first part of the same sentenee about motion, and about the
diffieulty of grasping it, allows me to eomplete these disereet
remarks about energeia with suggestions about the way of
apprehending it.In my view, indeed, the definition of motion gives us a hint of an
effort-probably an implieit one-not only at departing from adeterminate ontologieal model towards the model designated by the
term 'energeia', but also eoneomitantly at proeeeding from one
model of the relation to being to another more adequate model.Aeeordingly, the model of our aeeess to what is, eorresponds to, and
even implies, the model of what is able to present itself as being.
Aristotle no more names the model of our aeeess to what is in the
manner of energeia than he names the ontologieal model whieh
this new model allows hirn to supersede. It ean, however, be derived
from some indieations. Let us take up again the suggestion made at202a 2f: being (einai) exeeeds the objeetifying grasp (labein, 201b
33), as that grasping finds its eentral paradigm in sight. This grasp
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is not the criterion of "being," when the lat te r is energeia. Of the
energeia that motion is, we do have an experience (otherwise, we
could not name it), but one which is not a way of "seeing" it. This"seeing" that we are denied whenever energeia is at stake would
precisely be a "fixing" on the part of the gaze, which would
immobilize motion as such.
Aristotle does not name what is given to us in compensation, so
to speak, for this "seeing" which is denied to uso He suggests it ,
however. He does so in an all-important interpolated clause: while
analyzing his central example of the building of a house, he
explains that the motion of building takes place when wha t is in
actuali ty is not simply the material, but the material qua potency,as buildable. He expresses this as follows: "When the buildable,
insoJar as we say it to be such (hei toiouton auto legomen einai),
exists in actuality (entelechy), it is then being built, and this is [the
motion of] bUilding" (201a 16f).18 The sentence which I have
emphasized does nothing but develop and render explicit the 'qua'
(hei toiouton) which occurs a few lines above (at a 11) in the
definition put forth by Aristotle. I give it its fullest sense, Le., the
sense as it is const ituted within the syntactic structure of the
sentence: the 'qua' (hei) is constituted in and through a predication
by which we say (legomen) that the buildable (subject = auto) is
(copula = einai) such, that is to say, buildable (predicate =
toiouton).
Our gaze sees what is buildable (the materials, that is) because it
appears to us in a determinate and graspable form; but the
bui ldable as such-what, in the materials, makes them apt to be
assembled into a building-is not something we could factuallyascertain. It is something that we "say." It belongs to the possible
and not to the real. We grasp the possible as such, and we ascribe toi t something like "being" by means of a logos. If in Aristotle's texts
the definition ofmotion is one of the places (or the place) where the
paradigm of "seeing" is superseded, we now know that it is
superseded in favor of something like "saying." The just-acquired
data are gathered in the following table:
NE, IX, 9, 1169b 29f being ktema
mode of being huparchein
Phys., III grasp
15
idein
(2, 202a 2f)
energeia
gignesthai
legein
(1, 201a, 16)
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If this is the case, the Aristotelian definition of motion is one of
the passages where a dimension of "saying"·and of logos discreetlyarises according to which logos is more than the substitute for an
unavailable sight. 19 The logos can also go beyond sight and provide
access to what is on principle inaccessible to sight. This is what
occurs in the case of motion: in it, the paradigm of sight, which
dominates most of Greek thought, encounters the rent (perhaps
the only one) at which it starts becoming undone. Only the logos
can seek in things the dunamis which never gives itself to s ight as
a property on par with the remainder of their predicates. That ablock of marble is a possible David may only be discovered by a
faculty which Aristotle here implicitly calls 'legein' (to say).
This is the point of view we must adopt in order to understand
the logos which comes into play when distinguishing between
being a piece of matter and being a potency (dunamis) is at issue.
Were it impossible to make the distinction, motion could not be
distinguished from the final state towards which it proceeds.
Indeed, whereas the statue is the entelechy of the piece of bronze,
the process leading to the statue (Le., the sculpture as motion) isthe entelechy of the potency which the bronze comprehends and
which makes it apt to be a statue. In one sense, both are the same
thing, for the bronze and its capacity for becoming astatue cannot
be kept apart. Materially, this obviously cannot be done as if there
were two separable things. Nor can it be done by distinguishing
between the relevant and irrelevant properties: the properties which
make the bronze capable of being melted down, of receiving a nice
patina, etc., are properties of the bronze as bronze. However,Aristotle specifies that the bronze and its capacity for being astatuemust not be the same "without qualification and also according to
the logos (haplös kai kata ton logon)" (201a 32f). A logos
must be able to distinguish what appears as one. The logos at playin Aristotle's formula seems to be the crystallization into a noun of
the legein of 201a 16. Not only is the latter not ajudgment, but it is
only a linguistic fact derivatively. It seems that here a distinction
must be made between a predicative logos, which does not reach as
far as sight, but is i ts subst itute, and a non-predicative logos,
which reaches far ther than sight. This logos is not the mere
denomination of the buildable, but that which this denomination
presupposes, namely, the grasping of the possible as such.
Now when does this possible appear as such? Let us return to
Aristotle's example of the building of a house. We see a pile of bricks
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on a building site. When do they appear as a possible house? Onlywhen they are engaged in the process (motion) that leads to the
completed house. Such is the case when I use them as bricks; such
is not the case, however, when, for instance, I sit on the pile to wipemy brow. The possibility is made manifest in usage only, be it
effective or simulated in imagination. This presence of possibility is
plain whenever I am using something, whenever, that is, I perceive
things as instruments-not only as tools, but as materials as weil. 20
The definit ion of motion holds true for the instrument and for its
use: the lat ter is actuality of potency as such.
This then further corroborates what has been noticed for a long
time, namely, the influence of handicraft activity on the concept of
energeia and the latter's proximity to the concept of chresis, "use"
(see Bonitz, 854b 37f): it is as if the Aristotelian definition of
motion presupposed an understanding of instruments, as if kinesis
were a generalization of chresis and its transposition to physical
realities. Besides, is it really a transposition which is at stake here?
Is the "motion" ofwhich Aristotle speaks in his definition a physical
reality? To be sure , his definition is supposed to hold true for the
four species of motion discriminated by hirn. Still, the only example
which he analyzes, and offwhich he reads his definition ofmotion,
is that of making. And making does not belong to any of the four
species ofmotion; or, if we were to go to the limits of the acceptable,
it m ight be said that it belongs to the species of coming into being
(genesis), which the name 'motion' fits only with difficulty.21 Itmight be that nothing more than a pedagogical priority of art over
nature is involved here; still, one may wonder whether the
definition provided may be applied to anything other than motions
endowed with a telos or directed towards a completion aimed at by
an intention. In particular, does it apply to the motion of the wholeof nature , the revolution of the outernlost sphere?22Making is given pride of place because it is the motion that best
lends i tself to the definition put forth: the telos is clearly visible in
it, and this visibility is the criterion for what fully deserves to
display itself as being. 23 Making brings out the telos even more
distinctly than does natural generation, although Aristotle consid-
ers the lat ter to be the model imitated by art (Bonitz, 758b 49-52).
Granted, the telos is undeniably present in natural generation,
namely, in the adult of a given species, th is adult being in fullpossession of its form. Yet making retains an advantage: in
contrast to generation, it is a process of assembling and not the
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unfolding of a germ; it is a synthesis, not the enlargement of an
organism related to itself through con-cretion (sumphusis);24 it iscentripetal, not centrifugal. As a result, the form (eidos) which
unifies the materials and endows its components with an
irreducible sense, suddenly appears as it passes over from being
invisible, in the craftsman's imagination, to being visible in its
material concretization. By contrast, when generation is natural, a
form nlerely propagates itself from one individual to another,
without ever leaving the realnl of the visible. The sharpness with
which the artificial form emerges from the invisible results in a
purer manifestation of the possible as such, whereas in naturalgeneration, as in all cyclical processes, this possible (dunamis) is
never more than an entr'acte between two realities which
overshadow it. 25
The first answer to the question of motion, that is, to the
question why there is dunamis, is thus implicitly to be found in the
nature of our presence to the world, as that presence is manifested
by our possessing logos, our abi lity to look for what is not present
beh ind what is present. The logos introduces realities into the
world which arise in it as irreducible totalities, after the fashion of
those totalities which our lives are (and, in this respect, making,
paradoxically enough, is a better analogue of our presence to the
world than the very generation through which we enter it).
However, this first answer, which provides only the ratio cogno-
scendi of motion, clashes with its ratio essendi. The latter is the
second and quite explicit answer given by Aristotle to the question
of motion. The cause of motion, in the end, is nothing but the
motion of the sphere of the stars. The presence of the Whole, the
self-assertion of the universe as it comes back upon itself, takes the
place of the sudden emergence of a whole presence. Thereby, the
cosmological dimension regains the upper hand: the primacy of
actuality over potency is concretely instantiated in the dependence
of all beings upon realities that are always in actuality: the sphere of
the stars and then -probably at the highest stage of Aristotle'sthought-divine thought. But the latter is itself made necessary by
the concern that the ultimate motion is still a motion. 26 Drawing on
a previous analysis,27 I conclude that the fact that there are things
such as mobile beings, Le., the fact that there is something as
such, is once again dependent upon a reality which is not without
bearing analogy to our own facticity.
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NOTES
1. Simplicius, In Phys., 397 (15 Diels) mentions the almost conlplete silence of
Plato.
2. Galileo Galilei, Discorsi, 111, Opere (F'lorence: Edizione Nationale, 1890-1909),
volume VIII, p. 190.
3. Plotinus intends to give only a provisional characterization, a mere sketch (hös
typö eipen, VI, 3 (44), 22, 3). See his definition in note 9 below. In his
Elementatio Physica, Proclus does not include motion among th e terms he
defines. The Medievals follow in Aristotle's wake. The Stoics (see Stoicorum
Veterum Fragmenta, edited by H. von Armin (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964; 1905 1) ,
volume 11, pp. 160f), Descartes (Principia Philosophiae, 11, 25), and Kant
(Metaphysical Foundations oJNatural Science, chapter I, Def. 2) define motion
by one of it s species, Le., the former as translation, the latter as change.
4. See J. P. Schobinger, Kommentar zu Pascals Reflexionen über die Geometrie
im Allgemeinen (. .. ) (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe Verlag, 1974), p. 276; myemphasis. The author cites texts by Descartes and Pascal, as weIl as the passage
from Logique de Port-Royal, to which I refer here (11, xvi).
5. Here I can only provide an all too brief outline of the interpretat ion of
Parmenides. More can be found in my ar ticle "La vraisemblance du faux"
(Parmenide, Fr. I, 31-32), P. Aubenque ed., Etudes sur Parmenide (Paris: Vrin,
1986), volume 11: Problemes d'interpretation, pp. 44-68.
6. In The Sophist , Plato does concede to motion the digni ty of an ontological
principle...But .is it really physical motion as such which is granted such
dignity?
7. See H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsan
stalt, 1955; 1870 1 ) [referred to as Bonitz in the text], 392a 29f, and above all
Physics, VIII, 7, 261a 21. On the problem, see E. Berti, "La suprematie du
mouvement local selon Aristote: ses consequences et ses apories," J. Wiesner
ed., Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung, Paul Moraux gewidmet (BerlinINew York:
Walter De Gruyter, 1985) volume 1: Aristoteles und seine Schule, pp. 123-150.
8. I borrow th e application of this useful distinction from Leo Aryeh Kosman,
"Aristotle's Definition ofMotion," Phronesis XIV (1969), pp. 40-62.
9. At first (see note 3), Plotinus characterizes motion as "the path (hodos) from
potency to that whose potency it is" (VI, 3 (44), 22, 3f). The words 'proodos' and'agoge', which specify 'hodos', attest to th e fact that we are dealing here with th e
ac t of covering and not with th e path that has to be covered. The Greek
commentators, who were all tinged with Neoplatonism, use analogous formulas
(see Themistius, In Phys., 70,7-9 Schenkl; Simplicius, In Phys., 415, 13 Diels;
and Philopon, In Phys., 349, 25 Vitelli). For the Medievals, see Averroes,
Grosseteste, Guillaurne d'Auvergne, etc., who are quoted in A. Maier, "Motus es t
actus entis in potentia...", Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik, Studien zur
Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e letteratura,
1958), pp. 20ff; as weIl as Maimonides, The Guide oJ the Perplexed, 11,
Introduction, Proposition 5, and the commentators cited in H. A. Wolfson,
Crescas' Critique oJ Aristotle (Canlbridge: Harvard University Press, 1929), p.522. As for contemporary commentators, suffice it to refer to David Ross's
commentary in his ed ition of th e Physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960;
1936 1) , p. 537, concerning 201a 10-11.
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10.
11 .
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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To my knowledge, the most ancient author to have noticed this is Avicenna, in
the Shifd', as-Samd' at-tabrt 11, 1, edited by S. Zayed (Cairo: 1983), p. 82. For
the Latin translation of this quotation, see A. Maier, op. cit ., pp. 12f. Al-Färäbi's
commentary on the Physics is lost. Avicenna is followed by Thomas Aquinas, In
Physicam, 111, H, Ss. 284, and by Crescas, Or Adonat, I, i, 5, p. 23, Ferrara
edition [= Wolfson, Crescas' Critique ... op. cit ., p. 234].The translation of 'energeia' by 'actus' is disputed by Heidegger (Vorträge und
Aujsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967) volume I, p. 42 , and Nietzsche (Pfullingen:
Neske, 1961) volume 11, pp. 410ff.), and upheld by Pierre Aubenque in Le
probleme de l'etre chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962),
p. 441, note 1. Jean Beaufret takes up Heidegger's criticism and develops it in
"ENERGEIA et actus, " Dialogue avec Heidegger, volume 1: Philosophie grecque
(Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973), pp. 122-145.Before deciding this quest ion, one should have a detailed history of this
translation at one's disposal. The suggestion by J. Lohmann (quoted in ibid., p.
136), which draws attention to the detour by the Arabic j i ' l , is interesting;
however, the translation of 'energeia' by 'actus' anteda tes the thirteenth
century.
On the etymology of entelecheia, see P. Chantraine et ali i , DictionnaIre
etymologique de la langue grecque (Paris: Klincksieck, 1968-1980), p. 352 a,
whose 'enteles echein' is not without echoing the 'entelös echein' already put
for th by Themistius (In de An., 39, 17f Heinze). The parallel with the idea of
perfection, also drawn by Simplicius, will be canonized by the Arabictranslations (by 'kamdl' or 'tamdm'): for this, see R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic,
Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1962), pp. 95f. One
may think, however, that the idea of "perfection" is not the only one present in
the word, s ince otherwise Aristotle would not have ventured to use an
expression such as 'entelecheia ateles' (Physics, VIII, 5, 257b 8f) without
making an unbearable oxymoron.
See, for instance, H. Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica , Commentarius
(Hildesheim:Georg Olms Verlag, 1960; 1845 1), p. 387.
In understanding energeia as an actuality and not as an actualization, I follow
Aubenque, Le probleme . . ., op cit., pp. 453f; Wolfgang Wieland, Die
aristotelische Physik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), p. 299,note 25; Kosman, op. cit., p. 41; and Sarah Waterlow, Nature, Change, and
Agency in Aristotle's Physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 112f.
See Ernst Tugendhat, TI KATA TINOS. Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und
Ursprung Aristotelischer Grundbegrif fe (FreiburgIMunich: 1958), p. 93, note
24; and Kosman, op. cit., p. 44.
The sentence is rendered mute in Carteron's French translation (La Physique
(Paris: Les BeIles Lettres, 1961), p. 93) and slightly obfuscated in Apostle's
translation: "An actuality such as we have stated, difficult to grasp but capable
of existing" (Apostle, p. 45). Most of th e time 'energeia' is considered to be the
subject. Without being able to prove this, I wonder whether the parallelism with
201b 33 (where 'chalepon' qualifies the grasping, not of actuality, but ofmotion) would not invite us to construe the subject to be 'kinesis', in such a way
that we would have to translate as follows: motion "is a sort of actuality, but an
actuality such as we have stated, (it is therefore) difficult to grasp by sight...."
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17. Avicenna saw this most clearly: see op. cit ., p . 82, line 9 (nahw min al-wujud)
[= Latin translation, Maier, op. cit., p. 13 (modus existendi)].
18. Here I translate as Carteron does (op. ci t. , p. 90) and like Apostle: "insofar as itis said to be such" (p. 43), but in disagreement withWaterlow, op. cit.: "insofar
as they are as we have just specified."
19. See Aubenque, Le probleme . . . , op. cit., pp. 114f. For other examples of this
dimension of the logos, one can think of the theory of the dunamis meta logou
at Metaphysics, Theta, 2, or of the usage of the word 'logos' at Nicomachean
Ethics, VI. See R. Brague, Aristote et La question du monde. Essai sur le
contexte cosmologique et anthropologique de l 'ontologie (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1988), Subsection 20 c, pp. 158ff.
20. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963), p. 144, and
Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), p. 23. See the
transposition of the Aristotelian definition of motion in Sein und Zeit, op. cit.,p. 145 (regarding the EntwuTj) (on this see R. Brague, "La phenomenologie
comme voie d'acces au monde grec. Note sur la critique de la Vorhandenheit
comme modele ontologique dans la lecture heideggerienne d'Aristote," Jean-Luc
Marion and Guy Planty-Bonjour ed., Phenomenologie et Metaphysique (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France , 1984) , p. 271. About th e use (chresis) , see
Brague, Aristote ... , op. cit ., Subsection 26, pp. 198ff.
21. Wieland, op. cit., pp. 249f, deserves credit for wondering about this.
22. See Waterlow, op. cit ., pp. 95, 119, 127, note 14; and Harold Chemiss,
Aristotle's Criticism o f Plato and the Academy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1942), pp. 582f.
23. On the paradigmatic role of making for Greek ontology, see Martin Heidegger,
Gesamtausgabe, volume 24: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frank
furt: Klostermann Verlag, 1975), Subsections 11-12 a, in particular pp. 142f,
147, 149f, 162-165; and Gesamtausgabe, volume 31: Vom Wesen der
menschlichen Freiheit (Frankfurt: Klostermann Verlag, 1982), pp. 69-72. In
my view, however, these texts constitute onlya first approach.
24. Accordingly, we must refuse to follow Friedrich Kaulbach, Der philosophische
Begr if f der Bewegung. Studien zu Aristoteles, Leibniz und Kant (Köln/Graz:
Böhlau, 1965), when, upon having made interesting remarks about phusis as
sumphusis (pp. 13-18), he goes on to propose to extend this concept to
technical objects (p. 20).
25. This is eminently the case with the place-rotation of the sphere of the stars:
Aristotle is forced to reintroduce rather artificially the idea of potency (dunamis)
by isolating such and such point, which he then declares to be potentially with
respect to the place where it is not yet at a given time (see Metaphysics, Theta,
8, 1050b 21).
26. Only in comparison to the Prime Mover as pure actuality does the rotation ofthe
sphere of the stars on itself still appear to be a motion (seeWaterlow, op. cil., pp.
250f, 255). At another level, an analogue to our presence's being necessary for
this rotation's still being a motion can be discemed in Aristotle's apparently
needing the immobility of the earth th at bears us in order to distinguish
between the rotat ionand an
immobility which would suit itjust
asweIl:
see
Joseph Moreau, L'espace et l e temps selon Aristote (Padua: Antenore, 1965), p.
45, responding to Octave Hamelin, Le systeme d'Aristote (Paris: Alcan, 19312),
p. 325, note 1; and Averroes, who already noted this and is quoted by H. R.
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King, "Aristotle's Theory of Topos," Classical Quarterly 44 (1950), p. 90, note 1.Another example is given by Jean-Marie Le Blond, Logique e t methode chez
Aristote. Etude sur la recherche des principes dans la physique aristoteli-cienne (Paris: Vrin, 1973), p. 394: eelestialloeomotion, whieh is bereft of a goal,
only beeomes a good from the onlooker's point of view.
27. See Brague, Aristote ... , op. e it ., Subseetion 50 d, pp. 446-451.
Translators ' addendum. To make the l as t sen tenee more intelligible, we
translate a seleetion of appropriate lines from the text mentioned in this note:
"... beeause the Prime Mover is thinking of thinking, it is a life. Aristotle's
theology began with the word 'diagöge'; it now ends with the term 'zöe'. The
latter designates not the life whieh eaeh of us leads (preferably ealled 'bios'), but
rather the one whieh we possess when we are alive. When Aristotle attempts to
deseribe the thinking of thinking, he evokes the highest realization of the
phenomenon of life qua being alive: the thinking of thinking is the purest stateof the self-referenee that is eharaeteristie of life, and whieh takes on a different
form at eaeh level of life.... Now, it is as if the 'thinking of thinking' were a
mixture, a sort of eompromise between two human experienees, two
experienees that we have, and as if the thinking of thinking were the projeetion
of this mixture upon a divine bearer. These two experienees are ... those of
thinking and wakefulness.... Our presenee to the world is always aetuality.
. . . As thinking of thinking, Aristotle's god has the permanent aetuality of our
Dasein. . . . God is a thinking whieh, while remaining thinking, would be as
aetual, as unable to eseape aetuality, as life iso ... but it [godl is a Dasein in
whieh the whole presenee t% f the world has beeome presenee to the whole of
that whieh is present as eontent of the world" (ibid., pp. 448-450).
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