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Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Risknology, Inc.Independent Risk Assessment January 2006
APPENDIX AHAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY
(HAZID)
TO THE
INDEPENDENT RISK ANALYSIS(APPENDIX C1)
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Cabrillo Port LNG Project
Hazard Identification Study (HAZID)
Final Report
January 2006
Prepared for:
Ecology and Environment, Inc.San Francisco, California
Prepared by:
Risknology, Inc.previously A.J.Wolford & AssociatesHouston, Texas
Project No.: 304
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DISCLAIMER RELATING TO THIS REPORT
Risknology, Inc. previously AJ Wolford & Associates (AJW+) has made every reasonableeffort to perform the work contained herein in a manner consistent with high professionalstandards. This work is dependent on the accuracy of information provided by BHP Billitonand its contractors.
January 2006
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 2
2.0 Design Basis used in Workshops................................................................................ 2
3.0 Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA)................................................................... 3
4.0 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study............................................................................ 3
5.0 Release Scenarios.......................................................................................................... 5
6.0 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 8
ANNEX 1: List of Drawings (Hazid Binder Index.xls)
ANNEX 2: Guidewords (Hazid Guidewords.xls)
ANNEX 3: Security Vulnerability Assessment Logsheets (304 Cabrillo Port SVA
Logsheet.xls)
ANNEX 4: Hazard Identification Workshop Logsheets (304 Cabrillo Port Logsheet.xls)
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CABRILLO PORT LNG PROJECT
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID)
REPORT SUMMARY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
BHP Billiton, Inc. (BHPB) is in the process of applying for a deepwater port license for theCabrillo Port project. Ecology and Environment, Inc. (E & E) has been contracted by the UnitedStates Coast Guard and California State Lands Commission to write the Environmental ImpactStatement (EIS). The purpose of this report is to outline the methodology that was used toconduct the Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) and Hazard Identification (HAZID)workshops. Results of the workshops are discussed are including recommendations for release
/ consequence modeling to be conducted within the Independent Risk Analysis.
Objectives
The objectives of the SVA and HAZID workshops were:
To identify possible security threats and accidental hazards that have the potentialto impact the public and/or environment;
To document the identified threats and hazards associated with the security,installation, and operational activities that have the potential to impact the publicand/or environment;
To incorporate (identify and analyze) the public concerns that were recorded duringthe public scoping meetings;
To identify and determine adequacy of critical safeguards (hardware systems
and/or procedures) associated with the identified risks and proposerecommendations to improve the vulnerability and safety systems of the project;
To develop release scenarios, for which physical effects (consequence) modelingis to be conducted.
Study Dates
The SVA was conducted in Long Beach, California in the California State Lands Commissionoffices on April 5, 2004, and the HAZID workshop was conducted April 6-8, 2004.
2.0 DESIGN BASIS USED IN THE WORKSHOPS
BHPBs Cabrillo Port project is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility. The facility will consist of afloating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) that will receive incoming gas from LNG carriers,store the gas onboard the FSRU, and regasify the LNG to send to shore via pipeline. TheFSRU will be permanently moored approximately 12.2 nautical miles (NM) offshore of OxnardCounty, California in a water depth of approximately 2,900 feet. The FSRU will have a storagecapacity of 273,000 m3. Offloading time for the LNG carriers to the FSRU will take about twentyhours, and it is expected that there will be two to three carriers per week. The regasification unit
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will be designed for a peak production of 1.5 bscfd of gas and will send the gas through theexport risers to subsea pipelines. The pipelines will primarily be above the sea floor until awater depth of 45 feet, approximately 3,100 feet offshore. At a water depth of 45 feet, thepipeline will be directionally drilled, buried, and run underground to the metering station locatedinside Reliant Energys Complex. Once the natural gas pipeline reaches shore the pipeline willbe owned, operated, and maintained by Southern California Gas. Southern California Gas will
be responsible for delivering the gas to the end users.
3.0 SECURITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (SVA)
This SVA was conducted using a facilitated, team-based consensus process. Mr. William Baileyof E & E facilitated the SVA workshop. Mr. Bailey is a security professional with acomprehensive background in terrorism and intentional threat identification and assessment,qualified to design and lead security vulnerability assessments. He was the designatedmember of the third party EIS team that had security clearance and access to the BHPBCabrillo Port Security Plan. Mr. Bailey was assisted by William Daughdrill, also of E & E, andDr. Andrew J. Wolford of AJ Wolford & Associates. Sam Autry of AJ Wolford & Associates
recorded the workshop.
The report worksheets document the Threat and Potential Consequence defining eachscenarios identified by the Workshop Team. Specific vulnerability was not evaluated during theworkshop. Recommendations were generated by the SVA team for the scenario the team feltrequired additional safeguards.
The SVA team agreed not to use a Risk Ranking Matrix because many recommendations, thisearly in a project life, involve further studies and definitions necessary to perform a more precisequalitative risk ranking.
Sixteen different scenarios were discussed during the workshop. One specific recommendation
was made by the Workshop Team. The recommendation captured by the team addressedmitigation of the threat of a small craft being used to deliver a bomb or shape charge to theFSRU or LNG carrier alongside.
Consider having onsite standby vessel at all times to enforce safety zones aroundthe FSRU. The thought is that an onsite standby vessel could be used to deter orintercept incoming or unknowing vessels.
An additional column, Continued Work was added to the SVA worksheets after the workshopwas complete. The purpose for this column is to show which concerns are linked to the releasescenarios described below as a result of the SVA workshop discussions.
4.0 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID)
This HAZID was conducted as a facilitated, team-based review using hazard guidewords asprompts for identification. The work, conclusions and recommendations resulting from theworkshop are the result of consensus of the team participants and is based upon the cumulativeexperience and expertise of these professionals in the LNG industry. Dr. Andrew J. Wolford ofRisknology, Inc., previously AJ Wolford & Associates, a firm that specializes in process safetyand risk assessment, facilitated the meetings and provided knowledge of the HAZIDmethodology that was used. Dr. Wolford has been trained in the HAZID methodology, and has
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conducted numerous HAZIDs for a variety of offshore platforms, floating terminals and othermarine facilities. Team members were provided with an overview of the technique prior tobeginning the study.
The workshop team utilized the What-if? technique to identify potential hazards. The What-if? technique is recognized as an acceptable method of identifying and evaluating hazards.
The technique involves asking questions that require the team to analyze deviations from theanticipated normal operation of the FSRU complex. A representative example is What-if LNGis spilled overboard? Potential Consequences of each scenario are documented in the reportworksheets. Existing Safeguards were documented for those safeguards that already exist orare planned design / operational features that reduce the risk associated with the specificscenario.
The HAZID was broken up into nine different study sections:
Cargo System FSRU
Cargo System LNG Carrier
Marine System Ballast Control
Marine System Bilge
Utility Systems Pipeline Systems
Turret & Subsea Pipeline including Mooring and Risers
Hull Design
Operational Modes
Each morning BHP representatives provided the team with a presentation and details of each ofthese study sections. The BHP team was then excused from the meeting and did not participatein the workshop proceedings. Once the team had working knowledge of the individual sections,potential threats or concerns were identified and defined using the guideword technique. A list ofguidewords can be found in the appendix along with the log sheets.
The HAZID team agreed not to use a Risk Ranking Matrix because many recommendationsinvolve further studies and definitions necessary to perform a more precise qualitative riskranking in terms of severity and likelihood.
There were 40 identified concerns that generated 8 recommendations to address them. Belowis a list of concerns and recommendations from the study.
Verify or confirm the safeguards associated with the flame in the SCVs. There is aconcern that the flame could be considered a possible ignition source for an LNGleak or cloud.
The team expressed a concern that the potential exists for common cause failurethat can cause LNG cargo tank overfilling with liquid carryover to the compressorand possible over-pressurization of the tanks.
Verify whether or not a liquid spill valve will be installed on the local tank vents. Theconcern is for an LNG release from local vents potentially causing natural gas to bereleased around the process equipment.
The team expressed concerns about the understanding and decision as to why aninternal turret was not considered.
Team expressed concerns about the durability of the turret mooring system. Theconcern dealt with whether or not the extended amount of time the LNG carrier will
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be moored alongside the FSRU has been properly analyzed. This extended amountof time is more than most turrets operating today are exposed to.
Team expressed concern about seismic activity in the area and the potential extremeloads on the PLEM. The concern dealt with whether or not these extreme loads onthe PLEM have been properly analyzed.
Consider including in the operations manual the philosophy to shut down loading if
thrusters are lost. Clarify BHPBs intent to use tugs upon loss of thrusters. The team expressed concerns that the pump maintenance frequency will be much
higher for FSRU than trading LNG carrier, thus necessitating more frequent tankentries and higher exposure to air/gas mixtures.
5.0 RELEASE SCENARIOS
During the study it was agreed that the following release scenarios would be modeled. sescenarios were developed based on the concerns that arose from the meetings, and they aremeant to be used as bounding scenarios to all concerns discussed during the workshop. A briefdescription of the seven scenarios and the release results are given below. As discussed above,
a column was added to the workshop log sheets to link the scenarios below to each correspondingconcern.
Scenario #1: Accidental Explosion in Void
The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during thedetailed modeling process:
LNG leak into void
Ignition source
Explosion over-pressure possibly ranging between 120 140 psi
Potential failure of bulkheads and venting
Potential structural failure to center cargo tank support
Potential collapse/displacement of center cargo tank
Progressive failure of center cargo tank
Potential escalation for this scenario includes the following:
Ignited pool fire with entire center cargo tank inventory
Structural failure of hull/buckling/sinking
Release of adjacent cargo tank inventory subsea
Partially filled buoyant cargo tank float/drift causing the cargo tanks to heat up fromseawater heat transfer and failure with LNG release from cargo tanks at surface
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Scenario #2: Accidental Explosion in Cargo Tank
This scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during thedetailed modeling process:
Center cargo tank under maintenance, air environment (gas-free)
LNG introduced into center cargo tank Ignition source
Explosion
Potential missile generation
Penetration/leak from either or both adjacent cargo tanks
Potential escalation for this scenario includes the following:
Ignited cargo tank fire from one adjacent cargo tank
Structural failure of hull/buckling/sinking
Release of cargo tank inventory subsea
Scenario #3: Accidental / Intentional Marine Collision
The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during thedetailed modeling process:
Collision large enough to penetrate single LNG cargo tank
LNG leaks at approximate water line
Ignition source
Escalation for this scenario includes an ignited pool fire from inventory of center cargo tank.
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Scenario #4: Accidental Explosion between Vessels
The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during thedetailed modeling process.
LNG loading arm failure
LNG spill between FSRU and LNG carrier onto water
Ignition source
Explosion in confined space
Combination of venting and excessive loading on hulls
Scenario #5: Intentional Cargo Tank Breach Events
Scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during thedetailed modeling process:
Breach of side shell, inner bulkhead and multiple Moss Tanks, with equivalent hole sizeappropriate to intentional event mechanism (e.g. Rocket Propelled Grenade, othertactical weapon)
Release of LNG at water line
Ignition source (immediate and delayed)
FSRULNGCarrier
X
Waterline
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Scenario #6: Accidental / Intentional Cascading Multiple Tank Release (Escalating Events)
It was recognized that many postulated release scenarios have the potential for cascading(escalation) of the primary release by causing subsequent failures that result in additional releaseof LNG. Escalation should be evaluated in such a manner that does not require construction of
specific sequences of events and physical processes.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The above analysis should be considered preliminary, based upon the level of definitionprovided in design documents for review. The overall conclusions are:
Due to the early stage in design and limited data there are 40 identified potentialmajor risks with 8 recommendations to address them. The normal project designactivities should address these risks, but project hazard management processes
should verify follow-through.
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ANNEX 1
LIST OF DRAWINGS
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ANNEX 2
GUIDEWORDS
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HAZID Categories/Guidewords
Natural Disasters Equipment/Instrumentation Malfunction Loss of Containme
High winds - typhoons Cryogenic pump failure Leak from LN
Squalls, swells Pump seal failure Leak from pi
Hurricane Safety systems Leak from pr
Tornado Communication Leak from lo
Extreme wave Common cause failures Leak from tu
Extreme current Process Upsets Leak from exTsunami Pressure deviations Leak from va
Extreme heat Temperature deviations Leak from fu
High humidity Flow deviations Leak into ba
Lightning Level deviations Drains
Earthquake Improper mixing Bunker oil fir
External Effects Corrosion/erosion Engine roomDropped object Startup/shutdown Generator ro
Marine collision Simultaneous operations Accommoda
Helicopter impact Explosive ha
Reduced visibility Composition Problems Energy relea
Sabotage/terrorism Moisture Environmental ImpMooring line failure H2S Concentrations Flaring/venti
Structural failure CO2 Flaring/venti
Loading arm failure Utility Failures LNG leakTank sloshing Blackout Waste water
FSRU listing Cooling water Ballast water
LNG carrier listing Instrument air Oily water tre
Loss of station keeping Inert gas Crew TransportatioLoss of buoyancy Nitrogen Crew boat ac
Fatigue/cracking Fire water Accident dur
Human Factors HVAC system Helicopter ac
Occupational accidents Ballast system Inspection/MaintenImproper/inadequate training Thruster Confined spa
Weather monitoring Emergency Operations Machinery/inShipping traffic monitoring Escape/egress/rescue Reduced visMaterial handling Disconnect during loading
Man overboard Turning bow against intruder
Dynamic situations hazard Release from vent
Appendix A - Annex 2.xls - HAZID Guidewords
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ANNEX 3
SVA STUDY LOGSHEETS
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1 Interagency response2 Crew background checks
Security force onboard cruise shipsCruise ship industry security's comparable to the airline industry
4 ARPA radars (not helpful for small craft, night time or fog)5 24 hour manned control room for vessel traffic control6 Use of a standby vessel for monitoring (proposed)
LNG carrier must give 96 hour agency notice to arrive
Notice must have crew list communicated to agency8 Safety zone around FSRU will be marked on charts of appropriate scale9 MMS rules for pipeline in water depths of less that 200 feet
10Pipeline will go underground at a water depth of 45 feet (approximately 3100
feet offshore) all the way to Reliant
General Mitigations Discussed for Security
Cabrillo Port Workshop
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Appendix A - Annex 3_Mitigations.xls 1 of 1Risknology, Inc.
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ANNEX 4
HAZID STUDY LOGSHEETS
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Keywords/Concerns Captured During the Workship - Not Discuss Further
Relief Case?
Tank fatigue
Caustic materials
Loss of LNG containment from SCV tube into the water
Increased potential for human error due to increased frequency of loading
Failure of inert gas generator
Valve shuts at GC (offspec gas or GC malfunction)
Structural failure of the yoke
Commercial pressure to operate outside design envelop
Increased loads from accepting larger LNG carriers than currently available
Rapid reversal of currents during loading
Rapid reversal of winds during loading
Misjudgment or calculation of pipeline and seafloor coefficient of friction
Seawater in the SCVs
Dropped diesel refueling tank
Extreme weather causing tug to seek shelter