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Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE G.R. No. 164402
AGUILAR, represented by
ORLANDO U. AGUILAR, Present:
Petitioner,CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, andPEREZ,JJ.
SPOUSES EDERLINA B. ALFARO
and RAUL ALFARO, Promulgated:Respondents. July 5, 2010
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D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In an action for recovery of possession of realty, who has the better right of possession, the
registered owner armed with a Torrens title or the occupants brandishing a notarized but unregistered
deed of sale executed before the land was registered under the Torrens system?
As we previously ruled in similar cases,[1] we resolve the question in favor of the titleholder.
Factual Antecedents
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On August 3, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages[2] before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. She alleged that on May 16, 1977, her
husband Ignacio Aguilar (Ignacio) was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-9354[3] over a 606-
square meter parcel of land designated as Lot 83 situated in Brgy. Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental
Mindoro. Prior thereto, or in 1968, Ignacio allowed petitioners sister, Anastacia Urieta (Anastacia),
mother of respondent Ederlina B. Alfaro (Ederlina), to construct a house on the southern portion of said
land and to stay therein temporarily.
In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition Lot 83. Petitioner thus asked the
respondents, who took possession of the premises after the death of Anastacia, to vacate Lot 83. They
did not heed her demand.
Thus, petitioner filed a case for accion publiciana praying that respondents be ordered to vacatesubject property, and to pay moral, temperate, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and
the costs of suit.
In their Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses,[4] respondents did not dispute that
Ignacio was able to secure title over the entire Lot 83. However, they asserted that on April 17, 1973,
Ignacio and herein petitioner sold to their mother Anastacia the southern portion of Lot 83 consisting of
367.5 square meters as shown by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan[5] which bears the signatures of petitioner
and Ignacio. Since then, they and their mother have been in possession thereof. Respondents also
presented several Tax Declarations[6] in support of their allegations.
Respondents also raised the defense of prescription. They pointed out that accion publiciana or an
action to recover the real right of possession independent of ownership prescribes in 10 years.
However, it took petitioner more than 25 years before she asserted her rights by filing accion publiciana.
As alleged in the complaint, they took possession of the disputed portion of Lot 83 as early as 1968, but
petitioner filed the case only in 1995.
By way of counterclaim, respondents prayed that petitioner be directed to execute the necessary
documents so that title to the 367.5-square meter portion of Lot 83 could be issued in their name. They
likewise prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for award of moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees.
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In her Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,[7] petitioner denied having signed the Kasulatan sa Bilihan
and averred that her signature appearing thereon is a forgery. She presented an unsworn written
declaration dated January 28, 1994 where her husband declared that he did not sell the property in
question to anyone. As to the issue of prescription, she asserted that respondents occupation of
subject property cannot ripen into ownership considering that the same is by mere tolerance of the
owner. Besides, the purported Kasulatan sa Bilihan was not registered with the proper Registry of
Deeds.
During the trial, petitioner presented the testimonies of Orlando Aguilar (Orlando) and Zenaida Baldeo
(Zenaida). Orlando testified that he has been staying in Lot 83 since 1960 and had built a house thereon
where he is presently residing; and, that his mother, herein petitioner, denied having sold the property
or having signed any document for that matter.
Zenaida also testified that in 1981, her father (Ignacio) and Ederlina had a confrontation before the
barangay during which her father denied having conveyed any portion of Lot 83 to anybody. She further
testified that she is familiar with the signature of her father and that the signature appearing on the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan is not her fathers signature.
For their part, respondents offered in evidence the testimonies of Estrella Bermudo Alfaro (Estrella),
Ederlina, and Jose Tampolino (Jose). Estrella declared that she was present when Ignacio and the
petitioner affixed their signatures on the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, which was acknowledged before Notary
Public Juan Q. Dantayana on April 17, 1973. She narrated that her mother actually purchased the
property in 1954, but it was only in 1973 when the vendor executed the deed of sale. In fact, her fatherFrancisco Bermudo was able to secure a permit to erect a house on the disputed property from the
Office of the Mayor of Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro in 1954.[8] She was surprised to learn though that
their property is still registered in the name of the petitioner.
Ederlina corroborated the declarations of Estrella. She also alleged that her parents occupied the
property in 1954 when they built a hut there, then later on, a house of strong materials.
Jose corroborated the declarations of the other witnesses for the respondents that the disputed portion
of Lot 83 is owned by Anastacia.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
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In its Decision[9] dated September 21, 1998, the court a quo ordered the respondents to vacate subject
premises and denied their counterclaim for reconveyance on the grounds of prescription and laches. It
held that the prescriptive period for reconvenyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. In this case, however, it is not disputed
that OCT No. P-9354 covering the entire Lot 83 was issued to Ignacio in 1977. The trial court likewise
held that respondents are guilty of laches and that the reconveyance of the disputed property in their
favor would violate the rule on indefeasibility of Torrens title.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in the light of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Ordering the defendants and any person claiming right under them to vacate the premises in question
and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff;
2. To pay the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as and for reasonable attorneys fees;
3. To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 7, 2004, the CA promulgated its Decision*11+ reversing the trial courts Decision and dismissing
the complaint, as well as respondents counterclaim. The CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan since it is a notarized document and disputably presumed to be authentic and duly executed. In
addition, witness Estrella categorically declared that she was present when petitioner and Ignacio signed
the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. The CA elaborated that in order to disprove the presumption accorded to a
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notarized document, the party contesting its authenticity and due execution must present a clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, which the petitioner failed to do.
The CA likewise disagreed with the court a quo that respondents counterclaim should be dismissed on
the ground of indefeasibility of title. It emphasized that the Torrens system was adopted to protect
innocent third parties for value and not to protect fraud. Nonetheless, the CA did not grant the relief
sought in respondents counterclaim considering that not all interested parties were impleaded in the
case.
The dispositive portion of the CAs Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is REVERSED, and a new one ENTERED
dismissing the complaint and counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Issue
Without seeking reconsideration of the CAs Decision, petitioner interposed the present recourse raising
the sole issue of:
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
VALIDITY/GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE PURPORTED DEED OF SALE OF THE PORTION OF
THE LOT DESPITE THE VEHEMENT DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VENDORS.[13]
Petitioner contends that the CA grievously erred in upholding the validity and genuineness of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan. She alleges that she wanted to take the witness stand to disclaim in open court her
purported signature appearing on respondents Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but could not do so because she is
too old, bed-ridden and has to bear a tortuous five-hour drive to reach the court. Nevertheless, she
executed a sworn statement declaring that she and her husband never sold any portion of Lot 83 and
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that their signatures appearing on said deed were forged. She avers that the assistance of an expert
witness is not even necessary to detect the patent dissimilarities between said forged signatures and
their authentic signatures.
Petitioner likewise argues that the CA erred in taking into consideration the appearance and condition of
the paper where the Kasulatan sa Bilihan is written. She posits that the fabrication of an ancient-looking
document nowadays is no longer difficult. She also points to several circumstances which cast doubt on
the authenticity and due execution of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but which the CA inexplicably ignored
Furthermore, petitioner maintains that her title is indefeasible. And while there are exceptions to the
rule on indefeasibility of title,[14] she emphasizes that respondents never disputed her title. With
regard to the tax declarations presented by respondents, petitioner asserts that it has been the
consistent ruling of this Court that tax declarations are not necessarily proof of ownership.
In their comment, respondents assert that in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law can be raised. Factual issues are prohibited. From the arguments advanced by the
petitioner, however, it is clear that she is asking this Court to examine and weigh again the evidence on
record.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme Court may review factual issues.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari.[15] It is settled that
in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case.[16] This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions,[17] one of which is when
the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, like in the present case.
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Nature and purpose of accion publiciana.
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion,[18] accion publiciana is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.[19]
It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action
or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[20]
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.[21]
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue todetermine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however,
is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving
the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession.
The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.[22] The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of
ownership.[23]
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential guideposts, we shall now resolve the arguments raised by the
parties in this petition.
As against petitioners Torrens title, respondents Kasulatan sa Bilihan cannot confer better right to
possess.
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name the title appears.[24] It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein.[25] It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership
of the property, including possession.[26] Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,[27] this Court declared that the
age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
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In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire Lot
83. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their claim
of ownership. Thus, even if respondents proof of ownership has in its favor a juris tantum presumption
of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over petitioners Torrens title. This has
been our consistent ruling which we recently reiterated in Pascual v. Coronel,[28] viz:
Even if we sustain the petitioners arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it would
still not bolster the petitioners case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners
superior right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of
which between the certificate of title and an unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative
weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There, the Court held that the court
a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner, as opposed to the
unregistered title in the name of respondents. The Court stressed therein that the Torrens System was
adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized.
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err in
giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis--vis the contested
unregistered Deed of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is
preferred to possess the property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the
person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. (Citations omitted.)
As the titleholder, therefore, petitioner is preferred to possess the entire Lot 83. Besides, there are
telltale signs which cast doubt on the genuineness of the Kasulatan. To cite a few:
1. The date of its execution unbelievably coincides with the date the buyer, Anastacia, died;
2. Despite its alleged execution on April 17, 1973, respondents brought up the Kasulatan only
when petitioner asked them to vacate the disputed premises. Prior thereto, they neither asserted their
rights thereunder nor registered the same with the proper Registry of Deeds;
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3. The lawyer who notarized the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, as well as the witnesses thereto, was not
presented in court; and,
4. The District Land Officer who signed OCT No. P-9354 by authority of the President is a public
officer who has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing said title.
Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.
Moreover, respondents attack on the validity of petitioners title by claiming that their mother became
the true owner of the southern portion of Lot 83 even before the issuance of OCT No. P-9354constitutes as a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their
possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective is to
impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.[29] This cannot be allowed. Under Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, a certificate of title
cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident to
the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.[30] This manner of attack
is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose
main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet
implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of.[31]
Thus, in Magay v. Estiandan,[32] therein plaintiff-appellee filed an accion publiciana. In his defense,
defendant-appellant alleged among others that plaintiff-appellees Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004
was issued under anomalous circumstances. When the case reached this Court, we rejected defendant-
appellants defense on the ground that the issue on the validity of said title can only be raised in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose. Also, in Co v. Court of Appeals[33] we arrived at the same
conclusion and elaborated as follows:
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In their reply dated September 1990, petitioners argue that the issues of fraud and ownership raised in
their so-called compulsory counterclaim partake of the nature of an independent complaint which they
may pursue for the purpose of assailing the validity of the transfer certificate of title of private
respondents. That theory will not prosper.
While a counterclaim may be filed with a subject matter or for a relief different from those in the basic
complaint in the case, it does not follow that such counterclaim is in the nature of a separate and
independent action in itself. In fact, its allowance in the action is subject to explicit conditions, as above
set forth, particularly in its required relation to the subject matter of opposing partys claim. Failing in
that respect, it cannot even be filed and pursued as an altogether different and original action.
It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondents to the property
in question, which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is
apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of
title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted
for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the land in
question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper
action.
The lower courts cannot pass upon or grant respondents counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction.
Both the trial court and the appellate court considered respondents counterclaim as a petition for
reconveyance. In which case, it should be treated merely as a permissive counterclaim because the
evidence required to prove their claim differs from the evidence needed to establish petitionersdemand for recovery of possession. Being a permissive counterclaim, therefore, respondents should
have paid the corresponding docket fees.[34] However, there is no proof on record that respondents
paid the required docket fees. The official receipts were neither attached to nor annotated on
respondents Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses*35+ which was filed via registered
mail[36] on August 19, 1995. It has been our consistent ruling that it is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the full amount of the prescribed
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docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.[37]
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.[38]
On a final note, and as discussed above, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue
of determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final
and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties to file an
action for the determination of the issue of ownership where the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and
of OCT No. P-9354 can be properly threshed out.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 7, 2004
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the September 21, 1998 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, insofar as it orders the respondents to vacate the premises is REINSTATEDand AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
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FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT G.R. No. 141447
SANGKAY, namely, CEBU
BATOWA-AN, SAYANA,
NASSER, MANTA, EDGAR, Present:
PUTRI, MONKOY and AMIR,
all surnamed MACABANGKIT, PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,Petitioners, YNARES-
SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR., and
- versus- CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.
NATIONAL POWER Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondent. May 4, 2006x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1]ofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 54889 which set aside the Special
Order[2]dated September 7, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofIligan City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 4094, as well as the Resolution dated
November 12, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The said
Special Order of the RTC granted the Urgent Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal filed by plaintiffs therein of its Decision and Supplemental Decision, thusobliging the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to pay
plaintiffs P79,472.750.00 as just compensation.
The antecedents are as follows:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn1 -
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Macabangkit Sangkay was the owner of a 227,065-square-meter parcel of
land located in Iligan City. When he died intestate, the property was subdividedinto nine parcels and subsequently titled to his heirs, namely:
Name Title No.
1) Edgar Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1003
2) Nasser Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1004
3) Sayana Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1005
4) Manta Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1007
5) Cebu Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1008
6) Batowa-an Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1010
7) Amir Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1012
8) Monkoy Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1027
9) Putri Macabangkit - OCT No. P-1028[3]
The said Heirs declared their properties for taxation purposes in their
respective names.[4]
In 1979, NAPOCOR constructed an underground three-kilometer long
tunnel traversing the properties of the Heirs, about 100 meters beneath the
surface. The tunnel was used to siphon water and divert the flow of
the Agus River for the operation ofNAPOCORsHydro-Electric Project in Agus
V, VI, and VII, at Ditucalan and Fuentes, Iligan City. A transmission line alsotraversed the property. The Heirs were not informed that such underground tunnel
had been constructed; neither did NAPOCOR compensate them for the use of their
property.[5]
The Heirs filed a complaint for damages and recovery of possession of theproperty with alternative prayer for just compensation against NAPOCOR before
the RTC of Iligan City, alleging the following in their complaint:
8. In the early part of 1996, plaintiffs entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation for the sale
of their property. On July 5, 1996, plaintiffs received a letter from the GlobalAsia Management and Resource Corporation, refusing the plaintiffs land due to
the presence of defendants underground tunnel. Copy of the Memorandum of
Agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of Global Asia Management and
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20141447.htm#_ftn3 -
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Resource Corporation, from the agreement are attached herewith as ANNEXESW and X,forming as part hereof;
9. On October 10, 1996, plaintiffs offered their land as collateral for a
loan applied with the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines,
Iligan City Branch, and again the said parcels of land were not accepted ascollateral due to the presence of defendants underground tunnel, copy of theletter of the said Bank, dated October 10, 1996 is herewith attached and marked
as ANNEX Y,forming as part hereof;
10. That the act of defendant is equivalent to unlawful taking and
condemnation of plaintiffs parcels of land, without just compensation and/or
reasonable rental since 1979. Written and oral demands were made for defendant
to vacate and remove its tunnel, or, in the alternative, to pay just compensationand rental of plaintiffs parcels of land, but defendant refused and continuously
refuses, sans any valid ground. Copy of plaintiffs demand letter is attached
herewith as ANNEX Z forming as part hereof. Also, the answer of defendant toplaintiffs demand letter is also attached herewith and marked asANNEX Z-1,forming as part hereof;
11. That, as a consequence of defendants unlawful taking andcondemnation of plaintiffs properties and the illegal construction of defendants
underground tunnel, the defendant were deprived of the agricultural, commercial,
industrial and residential value of their land aforesaid;
So also, by the same reason aforestated, the surface of plaintiffs land
became unsafe for habitation as the defendants tunnel will someday collapse, and
the surface will be carried by the current of the water. Those of plaintiffs andworkers with houses on the surface were forced to transfer to a safer site in 1996,
as they were continuously disturb day and night, because of fear and the danger,
coupled by the sound being produce by the water flow and which sometime shakethe surface;
12. That the current aggregate assessed value of plaintiffs, parcels ofland as indicated in their respective Tax Declarations is ONE HUNDRED SIX
THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED TEN (P106,710.00) PESOS, more or
less;
13. That defendant must be held liable for damages in the form of
rental and other damages starting [from] 1979 when the defendants underground
tunnel was constructed up to the present, plus additional damages beyond 1997,
should defendant continue to illegally stay on plaintiffs land, in such amount asmay be determined and deemed just and equitable by the Honorable Court;
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14. That it is necessary for defendant to dismantle its underground
tunnel illegally constructed beneath the lands of plaintiffs and to deliver
possession of the same to plaintiff the subterrain illegally occupied by defendant;
15. The construction of the tunnel by defendant beneath plaintiffs
parcels of lands have caused danger to their lives and properties; sleepless nights,serious anxiety, and shock, thereby entitling them to recover moral damages in theamount of TWO HUNDRED THOSUAND (P200,000.00) PESOS. And by way
of example to deter persons similarly minded and for public good, defendant may
be held liable for exemplary damages, also in the amount of TWO HUNDREDTHOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS. Or in both cases, in such amount as may be
determined by the Honorable Court;
16. That to protect the interest of the plaintiffs and for purposes offiling the instant case, they were compelled to engage the services of counsel, in
the amount equivalent to TWO [HUNDRED] THOUSAND (P200,000.00), plus
court appearance fee of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00), as and by way ofattorneys fees.[6]
They prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor after due proceedings,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs pray that judgment be
rendered as follows:
1. Directing defendants to remove and dismantle its underground
tunnel constructed beneath the land of plaintiffs and to deliver possession of the
subterrain area illegally occupied by defendant;
2. To pay plaintiffs a monthly rental from 1979 up to the time the
defendant vacates the subterrain of the land of plaintiffs, in such amount as may
be considered reasonable by the Honorable Court;
3. In the alternative, if and when the removal of defendants
underground tunnel is not legally possible, to pay plaintiffs of the justcompensation of their land in the amount as may be deemed reasonable by the
Honorable Court. But, in either case, (either by the removal of the tunnel or by
paying just compensation) to pay plaintiffs a reasonable rental;
4. To pay moral damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P200,00.00) PESOS and exemplary damages of another TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, or in such respective amount asmay be determined by the Honorable Court;
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5. Pay attorneys fees in the amount of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P200,000.00), plus appearance fee of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,0000.00) PESOS, as and by way of attorneys fees;
6. Such other relief deemed just and equitable under the
circumstance.
[7]
In its answer to the complaint, NAPOCOR interposed the following special
and affirmative defenses:
6. That while it is true that under Article 437 of the New Civil Code, theowner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and everything under it and
can therefore construct thereon any work or make any plantation and excavation
which he may deem proper, yet, such exercise of right is without detriment to
servitude and is subject to other limitations imposed either by special law orordinances;
7. That under Section 3, paragraph (f) of Republic Act 6395, as amended,which, by its nature, is a special law, defendant herein is authorized to take water
from any public stream, river, creek, lake, spring or waterfall in the Philippines
for the purposes specified therein; to intercept and divert the flow of water from
lands of riparian owners and from persons owning or interested in water whichare or may be necessary to said purposes, upon payment of just compensation
therefor; to alter, straighten, obstruct or increase the flow of water in streams or
water channels intersecting or connecting therewith or continuous to its works orany part thereof; thus, the construction of tunnel by defendant is legal and
sanctioned by law;
8. That assuming arguendo, without admitting, that a tunnel was indeedconstructed in 1979 under the land claimed by the plaintiffs, their cause of action
against the defendant is barred not only byprescriptionbut also
by estoppeland laches.Under our laws and jurisprudence, easement of aqueductcanals and tunnels are apparent and continuous easement and any action arising
therefrom prescribes in five (5) years which prescriptive period is to be reckoned
from its accrual. In the instant case, the cause of action of the plaintiffs, if any,has accrued in 1979 and yet they only filed the complaint in 1997 or after the
lapse of almost eighteen (18) years;[8]
The Heirs adduced in evidence the Certificate issued by the City Assessors
Office stating that the property had an assessed value of P400.00 to P500.00 per
square meter. Witnesses testified that the adjacent parcels of land were sold
at P700.00 and P750.00 per square meter and that the area where the property is
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located is classified as industrial, and residential and adjacent to subdivisions with
industrial classification.[9]
On August 13, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
Heirs. Thefalloof the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. The prayer for the removal or dismantling of defendants tunnel is
denied[.] However, defendant is hereby directed and ordered:
a) To pay plaintiffs land with a total area of 227,065square meters, at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS
per square meter, or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND AND
FIVE HUNDRED (P113,532,500.00) PESOS, plus interest, asactual damages or just compensation;
b) To pay plaintiffs a monthly rental of their land in the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS from 1979
up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum;
c) To pay plaintiffs the sum of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages;
d) To pay plaintiffs, the sum of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, as exemplary damages;
e) To pay plaintiffs, the sum equivalent to 15% of the totalamount awarded, as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The RTC declared that the construction of the underground tunnel affected
the entire area of the Heirs property. Consequently, plaintiffs lost the agricultural,
industrial, commercial and residential value of the land.
On August 18, 1999, the RTC rendered a Supplemental Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
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Therefore, paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original
decision should read, as follows:
a) To pay plaintiffs land with a total area of 227,065
square meters, at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS
per square meter, or a total of ONEHUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTYTWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113,532,500.00)
PESOS, plus interest, as actual damages or just
compensation;Consequently, plaintiffs land or properties arehereby condemned in favor of defendant National Power
Corporation, upon payment of the aforesaid sum;
This supplemental decision shall be considered as part of paragraph 1(a)of the dispositive portion of the original decision.
[11]
Before NAPOCOR was served with a copy of said Decision, the Heirs filed
an Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal, alleging that
execution pending appeal was justified, considering the trial courts finding that it
(NAPOCOR) had acted in bad faith in constructing the tunnel. They pointed out
that it had been illegally occupying their land for a long period of time without any
compensation or rental having been paid to them, and that to prolong the execution
of the decision would likewise prolong its illegal act. The Heirs pointed out that
once they received their share of the money judgment, they would be able to
purchase safer lands and build new houses thereon. They insisted that any appeal
which may be taken by NAPOCOR would be dilatory and frivolous.
The Heirs appended to their motion their Joint Affidavit wherein they
alleged that they constantly feared that an earthquake could happen at any time,
and that the tunnel could collapse or cave in, which would necessarily cause
serious injuries or even death.[12]
NAPOCOR opposed the motion. It contended that the Heirs failed to prove
that it acted in bad faith when it constructed the tunnel; hence, there was no
justification to grant their motion. It pointed out that the Heirs were
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never deprived of the beneficial use of their land; in fact, there was no evidence on
record that they ever attempted to use the affected portion of the property.
NAPOCOR claimed that the Heirs demand for rentals was without factual and
legal basis.
NAPOCOR further alleged that the Heirs claim that the tunnel exposedthem to danger was belied by the testimony of Nasser Macabangkit. On cross-
examination, he testified that only two of his siblings, Sayana and Edgar
Macabangkit, starter to reside in the subject property in 1998, after the complaint
was filed on November 21, 1987. It further alleged that it had already filed an
appeal, which, as gleaned from the evidence and the applicable jurisprudence, was
not a mere dilatory tactic.[13]
On September 7, 1997, the trial court issued the Special Order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal and awarded 70% of the money judgment,
or P79,472,750.00, upon the filing of a P1,000,000.00
bond. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Execution PendingAppeal is therefore granted, but only for the amount equivalent to SEVENTY
PERCENT (70%) of the amount awarded as fair market value of plaintiffs land or
for a total of SEVENTY-NINE MILLION FOUR-HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO
THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY (P79,472,750.00) PESOS,Philippine Currency, subject to the condition that plaintiffs shall file an execution
bond duly approved by this Court, either in cash, surety or property in the amount
of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS, which bond is in addition toplaintiffs land already condemned in favor of the defendant, to answer for any
damage that defendant may suffer as a result of the execution of the decision
pending appeal, should it later on be ruled on appeal that plaintiffs be not entitledto it and the decision be reversed.
Monthly rentals, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fee and cost
are excluded from the execution pending appeal.
Let the corresponding Writ of Execution Pending appeal be issued upon
the posting and approval of the aforesaid execution bond. Mr. MontoyLomondot, Sheriff-IV, RTC, Lanao del Norte is hereby commanded to cause the
implementation and execution of the portion of the aforesaid decision in
accordance with the Rules of Court, together with
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his lawful fees for the service of the Writ. He shall be assisted by the other
deputy sheriffs assigned to this Court or in another branch after securing the
consent of the presiding Judge thereof. He shall likewise be assisted by Atty.Cairoding Maruhom, Ex-officio Provincial/City Sheriff of Lanao del Sur-Marawi
City, and Palao Diamla, Sheriff-IV, RTC, Lanao del Sur, subject to the consent of
the Presiding Judge concerned.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to assess and collect the
corresponding additional filing fee from the judgment award.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The trial court declared that among the good reasons to grant the motion for
execution pending appeal was the fact that NAPOCOR had occupied the property
and had used it in bad faith since 1979 without having paid just
compensation therefor. Moreover, the construction of the tunnel rendered the
subject property unfit for industrial, residential, or commercial use because of the
danger it posed; neither could the Heirs dispose of the property. Thus, they had the
right to compel NAPOCOR to pay the price of the land or the proper rent under
Article 450 of the New Civil Code. The trial court also declared that the appeal of
defendant was dilatory and frivolous, which was resorted to so that it could
continue enjoying and using the property for free. It also stated execution of
judgment pending appeal would not cause prejudice or irreparable damage to
defendant, since the amount of just compensation sought to be executed was
equivalent to the fair market value of the Heirs land, while the rentals were for
NAPOCORS use of the land. It also ruled that the Heirs could file their motion for
execution pending appeal even before NAPOCOR received a copy of the
decision.[15]
The RTC thereafter issued the Writ of Execution[16]on September 9, 1999.
NAPOCOR assailed the trial courts Special Order and Writ of Execution
before the CA via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, claimingthat
respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion in granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and issuing the
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concomitant writ despite the absence of compelling reasons therefor.[17]It
citedAquino v. Santiago[18]to support its argument. It claimed that it was not in
danger of being insolvent as would justify execution of the decision pending
appeal. It further posited that since Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, was aspecial law which recognized the construction of water pipes to divert the flow of
water for purposes of generating electricity as a limitation to ownership of
property.
NAPOCOR further claimed that the assailed Special Order rendered
nugatory its right to appeal the decision sought to be executed. It insisted that itshould not be obliged to pay the alleged market value of the property since it was
not entirely affected by the support tunnel.
For their part, the Heirs averred that execution pending appeal is a matteraddressed to the second discretion of the trial court and cannot be nullified by theappellate court unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown. They claimed that NAPOCOR failed to prove that the trialcourt was guilty of grave abuse of discretion in granting their motion for execution
pending appeal. They pointed out that it was justified by good reasons, and that
they adduced proof of the fair market value of the property and posted therequired P1,000,000.00 bond. The Heirs cited the ruling of the CA inNational
Power Corporation v. Ibrahim
[19]
andMunicipality of Bian, Laguna v. Court ofAppeals.[20]
The appellate court heard the parties on oral argument. On November 12,
1999, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and set aside
the assailed orders of the trial court.[21] According to the appellate court,
even assumingNAPOCORsbad faith in constructing its tunnel beneath thesurface of the property, it was not an urgent and compelling reason to grant the
motion for execution pending appeal. The matter goes into the merits of
the case, which the CA should resolve on appeal. Moreover, it was not for the trialcourt to rule on whetherNAPOCORsappeal was dilatory; the merits of the appealshould be resolved first, considering the other matters involved in the appeal aside
from the fact that the total amount of the award was P113,532,500.00.
According to the CA, under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, the act
revising the charter of NAPOCOR, any action by any person claiming
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compensation and/or damages shall be filed within five (5) years after the right-of-
way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have beenestablished; after the said period, no suit can be brought to question the same. It
stressed that the effect of this proviso on the decision of the trial court can be better
addressed in the appeal.
The Heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[22] which the trial court deniedfor lack of merit on January 13, 2000;[23]hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners allege that the CA erred in granting the writ of certiorariin favor
of respondent NAPOCOR on its finding that the trial court committed grave abuse
of its discretion in issuing the Special Order. Petitioners maintain that the trialcourts finding that respondent NAPOCOR acted in bad faith and that its appeal
was dilatory was supported by the evidence on record and the pleadings of the
parties. They insisted that the appellate court should not substitute its findings forthose of the trial court. Its reliance on Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 wasmisplaced because the law does not apply to the construction of a tunnel
underneath the surface of their property. Petitioners further aver that the CA should
have applied its ruling inNational Power Corporation v. Ibrahim.[24]By itsdecision, the CA condoned the unjust enrichment of private respondent at their
expense.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in finding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of its discretion in granting petitioners motion for
execution pending appeal of its decision and supplemental decision in the amountof P79,472,750.00.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
The rule is that execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceedings upon the expiration ofthe period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been perfected.[25]However, the
trial court may grant execution before the expiration of the period to appeal upon
motion of the prevailing party provided that it has jurisdiction over the case and isin possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may
be, and there are good reasons for such execution to be stated in a special order
after due hearing. The rule does not proscribe the prevailing party from filing suchmotion even before the losing party has received his copy of the decision or final
order of the trial court. Such motion for execution pending appeal may be filed bythe prevailing party at any time before the expiration of the period to appeal. It
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may happen that, upon service on the prevailing party of a copy of the decision or
final order of the trial court, he files a motion for execution pending appeal but thelosing party files a motion for reconsideration of the decision or final order within
the required 15-day period under Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. In such a
case, the motion of the prevailing party for execution pending appeal may be heldin abeyance pending final resolution of the losing partys motion for
reconsideration of the decision or final order. Upon the other hand, if the losingparty does not appeal the decision or final order, the execution of the decision
becomes a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party. In such case, themotion for execution pending appeal becomes moot and
academic, as the prevailing party may file a motion for a writ of execution of the
decision or final order.
As provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, execution
of the judgment or final order pending appeal is discretionary. It is the exceptionto the rule that only a final judgment may be executed, hence, must be strictlyconstrued. Execution pending appeal should not be granted routinely but only in
extraordinary circumstances.[26] However, if the trial court grants execution
pending appeal in the absence of good reasons therefor, it is incumbent upon theCA to issue a writ of certiorari; failure to do so would constitute grave abuse of
discretion on its part.[27]
The CA ruled correctly when it held that the trial court acted with grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it granted
private respondents motion for execution pending appeal in the absence of goodreasons to justify the grant of said motion.
The Rules of Court do not enumerate the circumstances which would justify
the execution of the judgment or decision pending appeal.[28]However, this Court
has held that good reasons consist of compelling or superior circumstances
demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losingparty secure a reversal of the judgment or final order. Were the rule otherwise,
execution pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and inequity
instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice.[29]
The existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on acourt to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. These reasons must be stated in
the order granting the same. Unless they are divulged, it would be
difficult to determine whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised in thecase. The mere posting of a bond will not justify execution pending appeal.
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Furthermore, a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which
impels the grant of immediate execution. The requirement of a bond is imposedmerely as an additional factor for the protection of the defendants creditor;
otherwise, execution pending appeal could be obtained through the mere filing of
such bond.[30]
Petitioners insist that, as gleaned from their Joint Affidavit, when theydiscovered the existence of respondents tunnel in 1996, they were impelled to
transfer their residence; they then lived with one of their brothers-in-law, Camama Ibrahim in Mahayahay, Iligan City. They assert that there is nothing
in the testimony of petitioner Nasser Macabangkit which would negate the urgency
to buy properties located in a safe area. The relevant portion of the Joint Affidavitreads:
4. That we constantly fear that an earthquake may happen at any timewhich would could cause the collapse or caving in of the tunnel with the resultant
violent destruction of our houses, and would necessarily cause us serious injuries,or even our death or those of the members of our family. The recent incident of
erosion and landslide at Cherry Hills, Antipolo City, is not remote possibility,
that it may had happen to us. May God forbid.
5. That our fear has been aggravated by the fact that we often feel the
vibration of the area beneath our houses whenever the volume of the water that
passes through the tunnel increases, especially at midnight. Thus, we have beensuffering from sleepless nights or, at least troubled sleep, for countless times ever
since the tunnel was illegally constructed by the defendant;
6. That as a result of the very real danger that we have been exposed to,we have long decided to leave our houses and reside at the residence of our
brother-in-law, one Camama Ibrahim, at Mahayahay, Iligan City, and suffered a
humiliating condition, as well as the congestion. As soon as we have the financialmeans, we have to liberate our family from the same humiliation and congestion,
by purchasing a lot
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and construct a house. We are entitled to a humane, dignified and decent shelter
which commensurate to our social standing in the community.
7. That we, therefore, need money very badly right now and, if we
received our share in the damages awarded to us in the decision, we would readily
use it for a suitable land far from the area where the tunnel exists, and build ourhouses thereon, so that we may be freed from the ever-present fear of a very realdanger to ourselves, our families and our properties, which we have been
subjected to for many years due to the illegal acts of the National Power
Corporation.[31]
On the other hand, in their Complaint filed before the RTC on November 11,1997, petitioners alleged that the construction of the tunnel by the respondent
caused danger to their lives and properties, and gave them sleepless nights, serious
anxiety and shock. The Court rules, however, that this claim of petitioners was
merely an afterthought and is barren of merit.
Petitioner Nasser Macabangkit testified before the trial court on December 1,1998, and declared that only two of the petitioners, Edgar
and Sayana Macabangkit, resided in the property starting only in 1998:
Q Was there anyone of your brothers and sisters who have actually
visited/resided in this land in question?
A As of now, there is, Sir.
Q Will you tell us the name of your brother or sister who is now residing inthis land of yours?
A Edgar and Sayana Macabangkit.
Q Do you know when was it when they started residing in that land of yours?
A This year, Sir.
COURT:Q This year 1998?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, December 1, 1998, pp. 21-23)[32]
What the Court cannot fathom is the fact that shortly after filing theircomplaint on November 11, 1997, petitioners Edgar and Sayana Macabangkit stilldared to establish their residence in the property. Indeed, it is incredible that after
discovering the existence of the tunnel and finding the area very dangerous,petitioners would still choose to live therein. If petitioners truly believed that the
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tunnel posed danger to their property and their very lives, any decision to stay on
would be short of suicidal on their part.
Thus, the Court holds that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the execution of its Decision and Supplemental Decision pendingappeal, compelling respondent to remit P70,472,750.00 to petitioners simply
because petitioners Edgar and Sayana Macabangkit needed their share(P11,353,370.00 each) just so they could buy land and establish their new homes.
Petitioners insist, however, that the good reasons cited by the trial court
for granting their motion for execution pending appeal are based on the trial courts
findings of facts, i.e, respondent acted in bad faith in constructing a three-kilometerlong tunnel underneath petitioners property without their knowledge and consent;
respondent had not compensated the petitioners for its use of the property since
1979; respondent profited from its use of their properties; the existence of thetunnel rendered petitioners property unfit for industrial, residential or commercialuse due to the danger posed by it, and no one was willing to buy the property; and
the fair market value of the property had been amply proved by evidence.
For its part, respondent avers that, it acted in good faith based on Section
3(f) and (g) of Republic Act No. 6395,[33]as amended. Respondent posits that it is
incredible that petitioners failed to discover the tunnel when it was constructed in1979; hence, petitioners slept on their rights for 18 years or so. It further averred
that the precise amount due to petitioners for the respondents use of the tunnel, by
way of compensation, is another contentious issue on appeal. Even assuming thatpetitioners are entitled to compensation or reasonable rentals for the portion
appropriated by respondent, the appellate court still has to resolve the issue ofwhether, as claimed by the respondent, petitioners claim is barred by Section
3(i)[34]of Republic Act No. 6395.
The well-established rule is that it is not for the trial court to determine the
merits of the decision it rendered and use the same as basis for its order allowingexecution pending appeal. The authority to determine the merits of the appeal and
the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the trial court is lodged in theappellate court. The trial court cannot preempt the decision of the appellate court
and use its own decision as basis for affirming the trial courts order of executionpending appeal.[35]
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Neither is the trial court justified to order execution pending appeal, on its
assertion that the appeal of the respondent is a dilatory tactic. As the Court heldinManacop v. Equitable PCI Bank:[36]
Besides, that the appeal is merely dilatory is not a good reason for granting
execution pending appeal. As held inBF Corporation v. Edsa Shangri-la Hotel:
itis not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision herendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not
within competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for
execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatoryand rely on the same as basis for finding good reasons to grant the
motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory intent of
an appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for
execution pending appeal
Petitioners reliance on the ruling of the CA inNational Power Corporationv. Ibrahim,[37]is misplaced. We agree with the following ratiocination of the CA in
its decision:
We note that in support of its case, private respondents cited the case of
National Power Corporation v. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, et al. (CA-G.R. SP No.41897) which was decided by the Special Seventeenth Division of this Court. In
the said case, the discretionary execution granted by the public respondent was
upheld. While we are not unmindful of the findings in the said case, it is ouropinion that based on the circumstances obtaining in this case, it would best serve
the ends of justice if the appeal on the merits of the case is first resolved withoutany execution pending appeal, not only because the total amount involved is quite
substantial - ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDREDTHIRTY-TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P113,532,500.00), but also because of the other matters involved in the
appeal.(citation omitted)[38]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
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WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief JusticeChairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
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SECOND DIVISION
BONIFACIO M. MEJILLANO,Petitioner,
- versus -
ENRIQUE LUCILLO, HON.
GREGORIA B. CONSULTA, Presiding
Judge of RTC,Legaspi City, Branch 4,Respondents.
G.R. No. 154717
Present:
QUISUMBING,J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION,JJ.
Promulgated:
June 19, 2009x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision[1]
dated March 14, 2002 and the Resolution[2]
dated August 12, 2002 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62322. The Court of Appeals had
affirmed the Orders dated September 13, 2000
[3]
and October 23, 2000
[4]
of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 9879,
which dismissed petitioners appeal from the Decision[5]
dated July 5, 2000 of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Daraga, Albay in Civil Case No. 945 and denied
his motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents of this petition are as follows:
Faustino Loteria died sometime in 1931 leaving two parcels of land, Lot
No. 9007 which contains an area of 6,628 square meters, and Lot No. 9014 whichcontains an area of 4,904 square meters. During his lifetime, Faustino Loteria
begot six children. He sired three children by his first marriage to Ciriaca
Luciada, namely, Tranquilino, Antonia and Cipriano; and another three during his
subsequent marriage to Francisca Monreal, namely, Julita, Felix and Hospicio.
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On May 25, 1959, the surviving children of Faustino Loteria with Ciriaca
Luciada, namely Tranquilino and Antonia, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
and Cession.[6]
In said agreement, Tranquilino and Antonia divided Lot No. 9007
equally between them and Antonia ceded her one-half (1/2) share in the property to
Tranquilino. On March 1, 1978, Tranquilino executed a Deed of AbsoluteSale[7]of Lot No. 9007 in favor of Jesus Lorente. Soon after, he modified the
agreement to include Lot No. 9014 in an Amended Deed of Absolute
Sale[8]
dated September 11, 1978.
The conflict arose when the children of Faustino with Francisca Monreal,
namely Felix and Hospicio, claimed that Lot No. 9014 is their inheritance from
their late father. Hence, Jesus Lorente could not have validly bought it from
Tranquilino. The conflicting claims to occupy and use the disputed property led
Jesus Lorente to file an action for recovery of possession with the RTC of Legaspi
City. The RTC, in a Decision[9]dated September 20, 1985 in Civil Case No. 6005,
dismissed the complaint and declared that Felix and Hospicio Loteria are co-heirs
or co-owners of Lot No. 9014. As such, they are entitled to the possession of the
property, subject to the final determination of their rights as heirs of their late
father.
Thereafter, the heirs of Hospicio sold to respondent Enrique Lucillo their
one-half () share in Lot No. 9014 by way of an Extrajudicial Settlementand Sale
[10]on April 28, 1995. The remaining one-half (1/2) portion was also sold to
respondent Lucillo by Felix on August 7, 1995 by way of Deed of Absolute
Sale.[11]
When respondent Lucillo was about to enter said property, however, he
discovered that petitioner was occupying Lot No. 9014. Respondent Lucillo wrote
petitioner a letter[12]requesting him to vacate said property, but petitioner refused to
surrender possession thereof claiming that he is the owner of Lot No. 9007 and Lot
No. 9014 by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition and Sale executed in their favor bythe heirs of Jesus Lorente. Hence, on September 18, 1995, respondent Lucillo filed
an action for recovery of possession of real property against petitioner with the
MTC of Daraga, Albay.[13]
In its Decisiondated July 5, 2000 in Civil Case No. 945, the MTC decreed:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered orde[r]ing defendant
Bonifacio Mejillano to relinquish possession of Lot No. 9014, situated at
Pandan, Daraga, Albay, and to turn-over the peaceful possession thereof
to plaintiff Enrique Lucillo. Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed the foregoing decision to the
RTC, but failed to file an appeal memorandum. Consequently, respondent judge
dismissed petitioners appeal onSeptember 13, 2000:
For failure of appellant to file a memorandum pursuant to the
mandatory requirement of Rule 40, Sec. 7(b) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, despite the lapse of the period therein given, the appeal
is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
On October 9, 2000, petitioner, through new counsel, filed a motion for
reconsideration attaching thereto the appeal memorandum. Petitioner alleged that
his failure to file the required memorandum on time was due to ignorance, the
untimely demise of his former counsel and the mistaken notion that what was
needed in the appeal was merely a notice of appeal and nothing more.
[16]
In itsOrder
[17]dated October 23, 2000, the RTC of Legaspi City, ruled:
x x x x
The Court cannot accept [petitioners] claim of ignorance for
the records will show that he personally made the Answer to the
Complaint (Exp. pp. 9, 10, 11 & 12) and the Notice of Appeal (Exp. pp.
1-7).
Neither can the Court accept his claim of poverty because he
chose to be represented by the late Atty. Delfin De Vera, a lawyer of noordinary caliber and there is no indication on record that his services
were for free. But even assuming that the entry of Atty. Delfin de Vera
into the picture was financially excessive on him, why did he not seek
the services of the PAO before which he subscribed and swore the
Verification and Certification of his Answer on November 23, 1995?
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In view of the foregoing, the Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration stands to be meritorious.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. In aDecision dated March 14, 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling
that respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
appeal. Thefalloof said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DISMISSED and the assailed orders are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[18]
On August 12, 2002, the appellate court also denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the instant appeal. Petitioner now raises the following
issues for our resolution:I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IN
FILING HIS APPEAL MEMORANDUM WITH THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY IN THE INTEREST OF
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERATHER BELATED FILING THEREOF BY PETITIONER WAS
UNINTENTIONAL AS SHOWN IN HIS AFFIDA[V]IT OF MERIT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT
THE SALE OF SUBJECT LAND TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
NULL AND VOID.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE MERITORIOUS CAUSE OF ACTION OF
PETITIONER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[19]
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Stated simply, the issue for our resolution is whether the appellate court
committed reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC dismissing petitioners
appeal for failure to file on time his memorandum on appeal.
Petitioner avers that his failure to file his memorandum on time was due tohis lawyers untimely death. He avers that he received the notice to file his
memorandum, but because he is not a lawyer, he did not fully understand the tenor
of such notice. It was only later after he talked with a Public Attorneys Office
district lawyer that he came to file, albeit belatedly, his appeal memorandum. He
insists on a liberal application of the rules, arguing that in a long line of cases, this
Court ruled that dismissals of appeals on purely technical grounds are frowned
upon and that rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override
substantial justice.
All circumstances in this case having been considered carefully, we now
find the petition bereft of merit.
Section 7 (b), Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly states:
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty
of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall brieflydiscuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall
be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days fromreceipt of the appellants memorandum, the appellee may file his
memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be
a ground for dismissal of the appeal. [Emphasis supplied.]
The rule is clear. It is obligatory on the part of petitioner to file his
memorandum on appeal within fifteen days from receipt of the notice to file the
same; otherwise, his appeal will be dismissed. InEnriquez v. Court of
Appeals,
[20]
we ruled:
x x x The use of the word shall in a statute or ruleexpresses
what is mandatory and compulsory. Further, the Rule imposes upon an
appellant the duty to submit his memorandum. A duty is a legal or
moral obligation, mandatory act, responsibility, charge, requirement,
trust, chore, function, commission, debt, liability, assignment, role,
pledge, dictate, office, (and) engagement. Thus,under the express
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