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Executive Summary
Using foundational multi-sourced data
regarding armed groups, the Centre for
Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) in
partnership with the United States
Institute for Peace (USIP) conducted
mixed-method, field-based research on
militant and political alliances in the five
Afghan provinces of Kabul, Herat,
Helmand, Kunduz and Nangarhar. The
study took place over the course of
eleven months from 1 December 2013 to
30 November 2014, and was designed to
examine two central themes – structure
and identity.
Making the decision to work with other
groups was described differently across
respondents in different provinces. In
Kunduz, for example, most of the
commanders sought assistance and
coordination from the shadow district
governors and provincial authorities
after a series of heavy losses at the
hands of the Afghan government and, to
a lesser extent, Coalition Forces.
Nangarhari respondents, by contrast,
attributed all decisions regarding inter-
group working agreements to the
provincial authorities in a top-down
process. Interviews with Herati groups
revealed that commanders in the
province were overall more judicious
and reluctant to forge working
agreements with groups outside the
immediate cluster. Finally, the extreme
insecurity and unchecked violence so
pervasive in Helmand province has
created some surprising partnerships
out of necessity.
Overall, the decision to forge an alliance
with another group is very much context
specific. Commanders have to weigh a
host of factors including the extent to
which they are integrated in a higher
command structure and the relative
strength of local leadership, the level of
violence or security in the area, and the
specific objectives of the group. Not
surprisingly, then, some trends were
observed on a provincial level as the
regional variable renders a similar
context within a province.
The mechanics of formation were
described as fairly straightforward.
Though each group has a unique
contextual experience, the actual
protocols may have very subtle
variations, but there were three common
paths to solidifying a working
agreement. The first, phone call or
walkie talkie transmission, was used
most often for short term, ad hoc
alliances. As this approach does not
involve face-to-face communication, it
carries minimal risk of betrayal or
interception by GIRoA authorities. The
second pathway involves direct, face-to-
face meetings wherein the terms of the
agreement are negotiated. This
approach was by far the most commonly
cited in all provinces, though some
logistical aspects varied by the
individual alliances. The third major
mechanism of formation were jirgas,
meetings convened at the request of the
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head commander or leadership and
involved commanders from all local sub-
groups in the cluster.
It is often assumed that community
members and tribal elders play a large
role in the activities of armed groups
operating in their area. However, the
sample respondents indicate that tribal
elders rarely play a role in alliance
formation. In the rare cases where non-
members are included in formation
meetings, the precise extent of their
influence over the outcome remains
unclear. Though limited in the formative
stages, communities do appear to play a
supportive role once alliances are
established.
Generally, the working agreements
studied were considered mutually
beneficial to the extent that respondents
had a difficult time imagining cessation.
Though a small variety of situations
were offered as examples that might
prompt an individual group to cease
working with another, all can be
described as prompting distrust.
However, in those few groups that did
report breaking a working agreement,
the most prominent reason given was
anger that, what ground-level
commanders perceived as the core
values of the conflict – Afghan
sovereignty, the establishment of a
sharia-ruled government, and greater
economic opportunities – were
compromised by involvement of
neighbouring state security apparatuses
at the upper echelons of insurgent
institutions.
Ultimately, soldier respondents were
steadfast in their support of the
alliances. Soldiers unanimously
communicated a strong belief that the
alliance improved the strength of the
group, thus making it better equipped to
reach the groups’ mutual goals. Though
not necessarily stated outright, the
underlying message was that working
together with another group made the
group stronger, and the individual
members stronger. Commanders were
more pragmatic in their assessments of
the alliance. Commanders did report
that their working agreements with
other groups were a worthwhile
mechanism to aid in advancing the
group’s goals. But commanders were
also more willing to recognize the cost of
alliances, particularly financial costs.
Political alliances were expected to
exhibit some unique characteristics,
though the precise nature of was
unclear. Fieldwork confirmed that
indeed, high-level political alliances
differ significantly from those among
armed groups at the provincial level.
Though all respondents expressed a
desire of their candidate and parties to
remove tribalism concerns from
government, all were acutely aware of
provincial tribal sensitivities and cited
tribal inclusion as a driving factor and
primary benefit of the alliance. Members
of a political alliance tend to measure
the outcome and benefit of alliances in
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very concrete terms, i.e., promises of
specific positions in government
pending a win or votes delivered from
specific provinces. Finally, the demand
for these benchmarks render these
agreements relatively fragile, as
respondent groups proved both capable
and willing to realign themselves with
another group if they thought their
partner would not deliver on promises.
Ultimately, alliances in Afghanistan
share some commonalities; however,
observed variation at both the provincial
and individual levels underscore the
extent to which each partnership is
situated within the contextual
environment. Each agreement, militant
or political, is forged to address a
specific need. The parameters of
alliances consequently reflect both the
demands and constraints facing both
groups. Thus, while broad trends can be
drawn from the data to enhance our
understanding of the phenomenon as a
whole, it is impossible to neatly
typologise these partnerships.
Furthermore, homogenizing the notion
of alliances in this manner may
undermine our ability to better
understand the conflict through this lens
and apply lessons learned toward
identifying pathways towards peace and
unity. As this research very much
constitutes an exploratory study of the
subject matter, CAPS can provide
insight and a foundation of evidence to
advance the pursuit of long-term peace
and stability.
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Recommendations
1) Support and develop
meaningful mechanisms for
political reconciliation and
reintegration at all levels of
society. The high level of
organizational consolidation coupled
with unwavering support for top-down
commander led decisions can be used to
foster peace and stability in 2014 and
beyond. For this to happen, however,
the Afghan government and
international community need to
recognize the necessity of a multi-level
political reconciliation and
reintegration. Domestic and
international stakeholders should work
together to create opportunities for both
dialogue and political participation by
members of the opposition. Ensuring a
place in government and safe position in
society would create an environment
where fighters can feel more confident
laying down their arms. Simply put, if
commanders and leadership lay down
their arms the data suggests the soldiers
will follow.
A political reconciliation between
Taliban and GIRoA leadership would
probably do the most to encourage
soldiers to lay down their arms by
officially ending the conflict, but it is
also the most difficult. While efforts at
peace talks should be bolstered, political
reconciliation efforts at the provincial,
district, and community levels must
begin immediately and in earnest.
Protecting key values of diversity and
women’s rights can take place while
inviting back our fellow Afghans into an
inclusive society.
2) Strengthen and expand APRP
protections, benefits, and job
training to attract and maintain
fighters who want to lay down
their arms. While political
reconciliation and reintegration is
perhaps the single most important
element of peacebuilding, stakeholders
must continue to expand and improve
APRP. Respondents repeatedly
expressed regret for joining APRP
because they felt that they never truly
received the protection and financial
support they were promised. Some even
admitted considering going back to the
opposition as a matter of survival – not
ideology. Of course a stronger APRP will
not win over the hard line ideologues; it
will, however, encourage pragmatic
commanders to rethink their situation
and make a choice that could benefit
both their country and their personal
situation. At the very least, APRP must
deliver on promises made to current
reintegrees who are the most effective
recruiters for all future reintegrees.
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Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
RECOMMENDATIONS 5
RELEVANT ACRONYMS 8
INTRODUCTION & 9
RESEARCH METHODS 9
METHODS 10
A NOTE ON RESPONDENT CODES 13 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 13
NETWORK ANALYSIS 16
NETWORK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 16
OVERVIEW OF RELATIONSHIP MAPPING EXERCISE 16 DECISION MAKING PROCESSES 19
MECHANICS OF FORMATION 26 DOCUMENTATION 28
OUTSIDE COMMUNITY INFLUENCE 29
ALLIANCE DURATION 31
TACTICS 34 COMMUNICATIONS 34
COMMUNICATION METHODS 36 CESSATION 37
MECHANICS OF CESSATION 39
ALLIANCE & IDENTITY 41
SOLDIERS 41 COMMANDERS 43
KABUL: POLITICAL ALLIANCES 47
IMPORTANCE OF TRIBAL UNITY 47 CONCRETE OUTCOMES 48 RELATIVE FRAILTY 50
CONCLUSION 52
APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRES 53
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COMMANDER/LEADER QUESTIONNAIRE 53 SOLDIER QUESTIONNAIRE 56
DETAINEE QUESTIONNAIRE 60 COMMUNITY QUESTIONNAIRE 64
APPENDIX II: RELATIONSHIP MAPPING MATRIX 67
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Relevant Acronyms
APRP Afghan Peace & Reconciliation Programme
CAPS Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies
DG District Governor, referring to the Taliban shadow District
Governor
GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GIS Geographic Information Systems
HIG Hizb-e Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
MOI Ministry of Interior
NDS National Directorate of Security
PG Provincial Governors
PPC Provincial Peace Council
USIP United States Institute of Peace
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Introduction &
Research Methods
In Afghanistan, it has been presumed
that many – if not most – militant
groups operating at the sub-national
level work together with other groups
along some form of alliance. Popular
and scholastic imagination both
generally portray alliances among
militant or political groups as unstable
yet calculated agreements formed and
broken at the whim of politically shrewd
figureheads. Depicting militant and
political alliances as such implies that
alliances in Afghanistan serve as
spoilers, or forces that have the
potential to undermine the peace
process as the nation continues to
transition towards full military, political,
and economic independence in the
coming years.
Yet sub-national variation in alliances is
understudied. Instead, research on war
bargains and settlements has typically
focused on what causes alliances to form
and break up, with little focus on the
structural nature and patterns of
alliances themselves. Using foundational
multi-sourced data regarding armed
groups, the Centre for Conflict and
Peace Studies (CAPS) in partnership
with the United States Institute for
Peace (USIP) conducted mixed-method,
field-based research regarding alliance
formation, structure, maintenance, and
resilience among armed groups as well
as alliances between political groups in
the five Afghan provinces of Kabul,
Herat, Helmand, Kunduz and
Nangarhar. The study took place over
the course of eleven months from 1
December 2013 to 30 November 2014.
While the study sought to positively
contribute to the understanding of
alliances in Afghanistan, the eleven-
month project duration required that
the scope be tailored to supplement
existing research and fill knowledge
gaps while remaining feasible to
execute. After reviewing existing
literature on the nature of alliances in
Afghanistan, the study was designed to
examine two central themes – structure
and identity.
First, CAPS wanted to examine the
structural attributes of militant and
political alliances, particularly at the
intra-provincial level. As mentioned
above, Afghan and international
stakeholders are quick to assume
alliances between militant or political
groups are unstable. However, little
research directly with fighters,
commanders, and political figures exists
to support such a lofty assumption.
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Key sub-questions quickly emerged:
1. How are alliances among armed and political figures formed and what modes of alliance maintenance are employed? Are there clear differences in the structure of political alliances versus militant alliances?
2. To what extent, if any, are intergroup alliances vertically integrated (i.e., down the chain of command)?
While structural attributes of alliances
are indeed important, any analysis or
conclusions drawn solely based on
structure and facets of day-to-day
maintenance would remain superficial
without a complementary examination
of the impact alliances have on both
individual and group identity. Thus the
second major focus of the study sought
to directly ascertain how alliances shape
the way individual participants think
about their place in the group, the
group’s overall political vantage in the
local landscape, and the state of the
conflict as a whole. Again, two main sub-
questions guided the project design:
1. How do both the decision makers and general members of the alliance perceive the cost/benefit of the agreement?
2. Does the presence/absence of an alliance shape the political efficacy of the soldiers involved? How and to what extent?
By studying structure and identity
together it was our express hope that we
could better understand the way
Afghanistan’s future peace prospects
might be impacted by the very existence
of alliances.
Methods
The best approach to ensure the study
produced a manageable amount of high
quality data in the relatively short
project duration was to choose a sample
of provinces that represented the
geographic regions and the broad
cultural attributes and conflict dynamics
found in Afghanistan. In addition to
wanting a representative sample that
included all regions of the country,
CAPS also factored its previous working
experiences in the provinces, existing
social capital in communities, relative
travel ease, and staff origin when
choosing the provinces. The five
provinces selected for the study were
Kunduz (North), Herat (West),
Helmand (South), Nangarhar (East),
and Kabul.
Once the target provinces were selected,
the research teams were systematically
deployed to the field for data collection
in teams of two. Field visits lasted an
average of 21 days with Helmand
province data collection taking a full 42
days. CAPS strategically chose not to
limit sample size, but to collect full and
varied case studies for as many alliances
as time, security, and participatory
enthusiasm allowed. This means that
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the number of groups profiled and
respondent varied from province to
province. Figure 1 shows the proportion
of respondents hailing from each of the
five target provinces. In total, CAPS
researchers conducted 145 individual
interviews with active, re-integrated,
and detained militant commanders,
soldiers, community elders, and political
leaders from approximately 42 groups in
the provinces.
This study represents a marked
departure from orthodox data collection
strategies typically employed by
security-related research in Afghanistan.
Research NGOs and think tanks usually
rely solely on interviews with
community members and Afghan
government (GIRoA) security officials to
create a perception-based report of
security dynamics in the provinces. This
is primarily to help ensure safety of the
researchers, but can seriously warp
findings with inaccurate information. In
addition, when research is conducted in
this manner it can be difficult to
separate reliable data from potentially
biased analytical interpretations offered
by respondents.
In order to ensure that the data was as
reliable as possible, the study was
designed to incorporate multiple sources
of data, but primarily rest on direct
discussion with fighters and
commanders themselves. All groups
profiled were either actively fighting at
the time of the interview or had
reintegrated through the Afghan Peace
& Reintegration Program (APRP) within
the six months prior to that field visit.
Guided by jointly developed
questionnaires translated into local
languages, semi-structured interviews
were conducted with non-member
community leaders, group
leaders/commanders, lower level
soldiers, and some detained group
members (See Appendix I for
questionnaires).
Tailoring the questionnaires to each of
these groups ensured that interviews
were completed in a reasonable time
period and pertinent questions were
asked in a way that respondents could
understand and to which they were able
to respond confidently. In addition,
some foundational interviews were
conducted with local leadership in
GIRoA security institutions and the
Herat20%
Helmand24%
Kabul 11%
Kunduz24%
Nangahar21%
Geographical Representation of Respondents
Figure 1
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Provincial Peace Councils (PPCs). These
interviews helped coordinate CAPS
operations in the field, gain a general
understanding of the local conflict
dynamics, and identify potential groups
and alliances to profile in case studies.
These foundational interviews, however,
are not included in our total interview
list as many of the individuals were
either not authorized or were reluctant
to officially report on the topic to CAPS.
The CAPS research team supplemented
the qualitative interviews with the
completion of a relationship mapping
matrix wherever possible. The mapping
matrix seeks to measure relationship
strength between two individuals based
on deviations within five different
variables: shared family relationships,
village/distance, tribe, fighting legacy,
and religion. (Appendix II includes
guidelines for relationship mapping
variables.) Willing respondents would
assess their relation to other group
members and members of partner
groups with respect to the five variables.
Weighting each variable equally, CAPS
researchers then created composite
score based on the average. In some
cases, group members were also able to
provide this information for other
individuals in the group, even if they
were not interviewed as an official
respondent. Despite recognition that
there could be some factual
inconsistencies, we have included some
of this data where group size and
dynamics were such that we felt
confident in the data quality and where
the additional data could help further
illustrate broad patterns.
The purpose of this two-pronged
approach was to cross verify information
told to the research teams with
secondary, measured information. In
doing so, CAPS has been able to feel
confident in the data used for analytical
exercises. Secondly, the relationship
mapping data has allowed CAPS to
visualize and examine quantitative
evidence of group and alliance structure.
At the project outset, CAPS intended to
also collect geospatial information
systems (GIS) coordinates for interview
locations in order to also examine the
geospatial relationship between allied
groups. While some of this data was
collected, CAPS ultimately decided not
to include the data in our analysis. First,
CAPS prides itself on our commitment
to the Do No Harm approach to
research. While we have made every
effort to protect our respondents’
identities, including locational data
increased the risk that the respondents
could be identified beyond what we
deemed ethically responsible. In
addition, insecurity in some of the
provinces sometimes rendered traveling
throughout the various districts and
villages unfeasible. In these instances,
interviews were conducted in district or
provincial centres at neutral locations.
GIS data would therefore have merely
reflected interview location and could
have significantly skewed any geospatial
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relationship analysis beyond a
confidence level with which CAPS
analysts were comfortable.
A Note on Respondent Codes
In order to protect their identity, all
respondent names have been replaced
with a code to ensure anonymity. These
codes are used in the text to refer to and
attribute quotes to specific individuals.
The codes follow a uniform format of
XX-XX-XX wherein:
The first two letters refer to province: Helmand (HL), Herat (HE), Kabul (KA), Kunduz (KU), and Nangarhar (NA)
The second two numbers refer to the base group: 01, 02, 03, etc. When we speak of alliances, we are therefore referencing a working agreement between two or more such groups. (i.e., between KU-03 and KU-09). Group number is logically absent from community member interview codes because they are not a member of the group.
The final set give an individual identifier based on type of interview and individual number. The letters correspond to the respondent group: commander (C), soldier (S), detainee (D), and community member (COMM). 1 The last
1 As mentioned above, there were some
indiv iduals included in the relationship mapping
number simply grants an individual number to the respondent. As Kabul respondents were all members of a political group holding various positions, they all belong to the same respondent group and are referred to simply by number.
Thus, when the reader sees “KU-01-C1,”
it should be understood to reference the
commander of Kunduz Group 1.
Likewise, “HE-COMM-02” refers to the
second community leader respondent in
Herat province.
Challenges and Limitations
The project faced some challenges
although most were not unique to the
subject matter, but were expected
consequences of conducting research in
war-torn Afghanistan and during
presidential election season. As such,
most challenges were overcome with
flexibility and fortitude.
General insecurity in the target
provinces presents a challenge. CAPS
field teams spent significant time prior
to departing Kabul coordinating their
that were not interviewed as official
respondents. The presence of these additional
indiv iduals has been clearly marked on any
relevant images using the identifier “A” along
with an indiv idual number. For example, HE-
03-A1 would indicate a respondent from Herat
Group 3 provided relationship information
about an additional member of the group who
was not available for interview.
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arrival with provincial representatives of
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and
National Directorate of Security (NDS),
as well as Provincial Governors (PGs)
and local contacts. Despite these efforts
to begin cooperation and gauge the
security environment, arrival in the
provinces and direct person-to-person
networking is truly critical to ensuring
data collection runs smoothly and CAPS
researchers are able to move about and
freely recruit respondents without fear
of legal misunderstanding. While CAPS
is well versed in these protocols, every
study and every individual province
presents a unique set of circumstances.
For example, security coordination in
Helmand province was particularly
difficult compared to others. Travel
within the province was regularly
curtailed or delayed several days due to
an inability to ensure safe passage. In
many instances, it was more practical to
hold interviews with respondents in the
provincial capital, although travel did
stymie some respondents from
participating in the study who otherwise
would have. CAPS researchers overcame
this challenge by working closely with
the PPC who ardently supported the
project and helped coordinate
interviews with recent reintegrees.
Additionally, the CAPS field office and
strong reputation in Helmand has built
trust and generated a level of social
capital within provincial communities
that probably boosted participation in
the study. Still, data collection in
Afghanistan’s most volatile province
took nearly twice as long as any other
province.
Second, the project took place during
the months immediately preceding the
presidential elections on 5 April 2014
and 14 June 2014. The campaigns and
election did impact data collection in the
provinces. Some scheduled interviews
were postponed due to security concerns
and travel restrictions when candidates
announced arrival in a province. The
election, however, had the greatest
impact on Kabul data collection. An
increase in violence in the capital in the
weeks prior to 5 April prompted CAPS to
restrict all non-essential movement
within the city in order to minimize risk
to staff. These restrictions coupled with
candidates’ busy campaign schedules
caused some delays in the data
collection, and the announcement of an
extended campaign season due to the
necessity of a runoff between the two
lead candidates further added to delays.
CAPS overcame this issue by expanding
the interview list to include political
alliances that were most accessible in
this bustling political climate, and
waited where necessary to schedule
interviews until it was clear the
respondents had adequate time and
energy to devote to providing quality
information.
Two substantive challenges must also be
acknowledged. First, was the surprising
refusal of local political leaders in all
provinces to acknowledge or report on
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alliances at the provincial or district
levels. Respondents would continually
insist that alliances between political
parties were strategic decisions that took
place at the Kabul level. Of course, even
the most rudimentary understanding of
Afghanistan confirms that community-
level politics do affect the manner in
which parties manifest themselves in the
provinces. Respondent denial of this
probably betrays a lack of confidence to
speak of these dynamics individually, as
well as an apprehension toward even
implying that local political mechanics
do not always take the exact shape
dictated from Kabul level decision
makers. Whatever the reason, repeated
denial of locally-based political alliances
across all provinces prompted CAPS to
revise the project scope somewhat to
focus on militant alliances in Helmand,
Herat, Kunduz, and Nangarhar. Political
alliances thus became the primary focus
of Kabul data collection.
Second, the various provincial realities
and fluid conflict dynamics always
presents a challenge with respect to
uniform data quality across all target
provinces. This project is not an
exception. Because CAPS research is
firmly grounded in the Do No Harm
approach and requires that all
participation in interviews is voluntary,
respondents always have the right to
decline to provide information. Given
the sensitive subject matter – inner
workings of militant groups and their
allied partners – this happened
periodically. Some respondents were
particularly uncomfortable with
providing the depth of information
asked for in the relationship matrix.
This was particularly acute in Nangarhar
province, although it happened
sporadically in other provinces as well.
Because CAPS does not compel
information from respondents, this
means that quantitative relationship
analytics was performed wherever
possible, but do not include all groups
studied.
In a similar vain, while the CAPS
researchers generally took respondent
answers at face value to be true, we have
tried to highlight inconsistencies in
numbers and events across respondents
where possible. CAPS was judicious in
the standards of data quality accepted
into the final sample. A small number of
interviews (approximately 18), primarily
with detainees in Helmand province,
were relegated to contextual information
and were not included in analytical
exercises due to glaring factual
inconsistencies and/or obvious
untruths. Ultimately, the CAPS research
team is confident that the analysis
contained within this report rests on the
highest possible quality of data on the
subject matter to date.
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Network Analysis
Network Analysis Methodology
Social Network Analysis is a
methodology grounded in sociology with
widespread, cross-disciplinary
applications for determining the kinship
and cooperative ties across members of
a given social group. The premise of the
methodology is to identify primary
actors as graphical nodes and ranked
relationship ties as connecting lines
(technically referred to as edges)
between nodes. The spatial organization
and positioning of one node to another
is not typically used in the analysis
beyond the use of clustering
relationships. The specific spatial
pattern is merely aesthetic as long as the
primary information is clearly
communicated.
The advantage of social network analysis
is the ability to visualize clusters, to
identify central actors between clusters,
measurements of network closure and
propinquity (the tendency of nodes to be
conjoined by geography). Within this
study, militant groups were measured
primarily by homophily, the affinity of
individuals to bond with others on
common values (value homophily) or
social status (social homophily).
Overview of Relationship mapping
exercise
Initial Data Collection Process
In order to conduct a diagrammatic
social network analysis of the various
groups, it was necessary to quantify the
internal and external relationships.
Naturally this is not a perfect system, yet
the important aspect of the exercise
remains intact as the overall attributes
of the nodes and edges remain
thematically valid. In other words,
given the large sample size, the
aggregate maintains overall reliability
even though small details may be
obscured at the granular level of data
collection. Likewise, the diversity of
agents assigning perception rankings
provide a method to check and cross
check each perception.
To create specific categories for analysis,
an ethnographic process of semi-
structured and open discussions were
held with a diverse pool of Afghans for
several weeks to identify the most
prominent themes in social ties. These
themes were identified as family ties,
shared village history, tribal ties,
religious values (such as common
mosque attendance), and a history of
fighting together in the past.
Researchers were trained and instructed
to provide a ranking of 1-5, wherein 1 is
the weakest and 5 is the strongest per
category, for interactions between each
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militant member in relation to the next.
So for example, when interviewing a
Helmand Commander (HL-02-C1)
about his relationship to a given soldier
(HL-02-S1), it became clear that these
two men were from the same tribe,
family, and village, attended the same
mosque, but had had zero history of
fighting together in the past. This
relationship was assigned a 5 for each
category except for fighting, where it
was ranked with a 1. See Table 1 below
for clarification.
Visual Network Modelling
Following the valuation of each
individual across 5 criteria, the criteria
were consolidated by statistical mean so
as to assign a single relationship value
between 1 and 5 between each
relationship. To diagram the
relationships into social networks, the
excel data was introduced into
Cytoscape.
Within Cytoscape, the first column of
names was assigned the relational
priority, the second set of names was
ascribed target status, and the mean
relationship was used as the relational
value. Following the input of the data, a
network diagram was generated that
merely displayed linkages, with no
reference to hierarchy, strength, or
proximity. In instances where a node
connected to itself, these self referential
loops were removed.
The diagrams were then organized by
applying a hierarchical algorithm for
sorting (most important persons at the
top) and discreetly filtering the
transparency of the edges (the
connecting lines) so that the stronger
the relationship value, the darker the
line. Lastly the vary nodes were parsed
into identifiable clusters using random
colours so as that each militant group is
clearly distinguished from the next
within the network.
Table 1
Social Network Structure Analysis
The generated social networks are
broken down into three provinces:
Helmand, Heart, and Kunduz. Each
provincial network varies in
composition, as it was possible in some
instances to go beyond mapping internal
hierarchies but to also identify and map
Co
mp
osite
Fa
mily
Villa
ge
Trib
e
Fig
htin
g
Re
ligio
n
(HL-
02-
C1)
(HL-
02-
S1)
4.
2 5 5 5 1 5
(HL-
02-
C1)
(HL-
02-
S2)
4 4 5 5 1 5
(HL-
02-
C1)
(HL-
02-
S3)
4 4 5 5 1 5
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the interactions of some groups in
relation to one another.
Overall, the relationship between
members of a group and across alliance
partnerships loosely conforms to
classical/orthodox assumptions
regarding alliance structures.
Consistently, each commander
maintains an authoritative position over
his unit, the soldiers have varying
degrees of horizontal relation to one
another, and outsiders are at a distance
from the pyramidal structure of the unit.
The strength of relationships between
soldiers and their commanders vary
considerably, and are not necessarily
stronger than the linkages between
some outsiders and the commanders.
The most significant finding of the social
network analysis is that the
relationships between groups tend to
rely upon outside individuals who have
not been identified as belonging to a
particular unit, as found in Figure 1.
Rather they frequently share
relationships between units. Because of
the challenge to interview combatants,
interviews were frequently conducted
across outside individuals in discussion
of other parties, consequently creating a
gap in understanding the identity and
role of these individuals.
However, we can see from the social
networks that these individuals tend to
be situated as essential stakeholders –
such as a governor or other similar
official position - in the local community
given their wide range of ties. Or, in the
event that the individual is not a major
stakeholder in the community, that
individual nonetheless merits high
respect among individuals retain official
and unofficial influences.
Figure 2
HE-07-A2 (Highlighted in
RED) is not a significant
figure of official status but
maintains a range of strong
connections across two
militant groups. Arguably,
such a figure is an influential
figure via informal channels.
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Alliance Formation
The interviewees were, by and large,
very candid in sharing their experiences
forging a working agreement. Though
the terms of working relationships
formed vary widely to respond to the
specific local environment, respondents
largely described alliance formation as a
fairly linear process. As such, this
chapter will examine the most critical
aspects of alliance formation – the
decision-making process encouraging
formation as well as the mechanics or
specific logistical steps taken to
negotiate and establish an agreement.
Finally, this section will also address the
manner in which the outside community
played a role in the establishment of an
alliance in some instances.
Decision Making Processes
Making the decision to work with other
groups was described differently across
respondents in different provinces. In
Kunduz, for example, most of the
commanders sought assistance and
coordination from the shadow district
governors and provincial authorities
after a series of heavy losses at the
hands of the Afghan government and, to
a lesser extent, Coalition Forces.
Nangarhari respondents, by contrast,
attributed all decisions regarding inter-
group working agreements to the
provincial authorities in a top-down
process. Interviews with Herati groups
revealed that commanders in the
province were overall more judicious
and reluctant to forge working
agreements with groups outside the
immediate cluster. Finally, the extreme
insecurity and unchecked violence so
pervasive in Helmand province has
created some surprising partnerships
out of necessity.
The decision to form alliances with other
groups was described as a more
collaborative process in Kunduz than in
other provinces. Commander
respondents repeatedly told CAPS that
they requested assistance from their
shadow district governor (DG), who
then helped make the appropriate
arrangements. For KU-02-C1, the
decision to work with other groups was
made over time and out of necessity.
“Over the last year, the number of
Taliban soldiers in our area has
decreased, making it harder to defend
the area. The foreign troops left, but I
was still attacked many times by the
government authorities so I decided to
make an alliance with other Taliban
groups.”2
Once he recognized the need for help to
hold his area, KU-01-C1 reached out to
the Taliban DG in his district of Imam
Sahib. “I just called him,” he explained,
“and reported my conditions. He then
arranged a meeting [with the other
commander] and we reached an
2 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014).
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agreement.” 3 KU-10-C1 described a
similar process with the Al Qaeda
representative4 to whom he reports. In
his case, however, KU-10-C1 felt he
should use his group’s strength to aid
other struggling Taliban groups in the
area. “I contacted him and asked about
supporting other small groups in
Kunduz. He approved, so I made the
decision to go ahead. They need help
and they share our commitment to our
objective so we wanted to help them.”5 A
third variation on this approach can be
seen in the alliance between the groups
KU-11 and KU-02. According to KU-11-
C1, repeated attacks from governmental
authorities over the course of a year
made an alliance between the groups an
intuitive mechanism to stem losses. The
alliance was conceived at the
commander level, but then approved by
the upper echelons of Taliban authority
in the district.6
Though many commanders reportedly
reached out to ranking officers to
request assistance vis-à-vis local
alliances, Kunduz respondents also
explained that provincial oppositional
leadership would also sometimes initiate
3 Ibid.
4 KU-10-C1 explained to CAPS that he reports
directly to an Al Qaeda representative who
jointly operates under the Taliban structure.
5 Interview, KU-10-C1, Kunduz (10 January
2014).
6 Interview, KU-11-C1, Kunduz (8 January 2014).
the process with a direct order.7 In these
cases, the commanders’ discipline and
respect for the chain of command
become paramount to the cost-benefit
analysis of the alliance itself. Even if a
commander felt the alliance would not
benefit his group, it is extremely unlikely
he would refuse to follow the order as
insubordination within the Taliban
structure is usually accompanied by life-
threatening consequences.
Nangarhari respondents, by contrast,
reported a much more top-down
process. Commanders in this province
overwhelmingly placed the decision
making power in the alliance process
firmly in the hands of the district and
provincial Taliban leadership. For
example, NA-04-C1 directly told CAPS,
“I did not have to make the decisions for
any agreement because we were all
working under Commander [redacted]. .
. We would receive orders from him,
come together, and implement the
plan.”8 Another respondent, NA-09-C1
reported that he had known his fellow
alliance partner since they fought
together during the Mujahidin era, “But
I received orders from [my senior
commander] to work with [that
group].” 9 NA-02-C1 reported the same
7 Interview, KU-07-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014); Interview, KU-08-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014).
8 Interview, NA-04-C1, Nangarhar (13 January
2014).
9 Interview, NA-09-C1, Nangarhar (12 January
2014).
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experience, “We belong to the same
tribe, knew one another previously, and
were friendly. But the head commander
was the main decision maker. He was
responsible for organizing joint
operations between the groups
operating in the area.” 1 0 Compared to
Kunduz, the decision making power
with regards to alliance formation in
Nangarhar appears to be much more
consolidated in the district and
provincial power players.
Discussions with the Herati
commanders revealed a greater level of
hesitance to work with other groups
than respondents from other provinces.
More Herati respondents told CAPS
Researchers that they worked alone than
in any other province. HE-06-C1, for
example, noted that several other
Taliban groups were working in his area
including a close friend of his father.
“When I started fighting the Afghan
government, [he] came to me and
offered assistance. I thanked him, but
told him that I wanted to stay entirely
independent.” 1 1 HE-06-C1 chose to
operate even outside the Taliban
structure as a way to retain control over
operational procedures, and fully defend
his area from outside intervention. The
experience of HE-01-C1 also exemplifies
a deep mistrust with respect to working
with groups outside his immediate
subgroups. HE-01-C1 commanded five
1 0 Interview, NA-02-C1, Nangarhar, (30 December
2013).
1 1 Interview, HE-06-C1, Herat, (2 March 2014).
subgroups in the Pashtun Zarghon
district of Herat before he ultimately
joined APRP. He also served briefly as
the Taliban Provincial Commander
before severing ties with the Quetta-
based organization in favour of
independence. In his interview, HE-01-
C1 explained that both during his tenure
with the Taliban and after, he refused to
work with other commanders or allow
his subgroups to work with groups
outside the immediate cluster of his
command.1 2
In fact, he reportedly disarmed any
groups that crossed into his territory.1 3
For HE-01-C1, the main objective of his
armed activities was to protect his
immediate area and community from
insecurity and outside intervention.
Working with the Taliban was only a
mechanism to further that goal, and he
did not hesitate to cut ties with the
Taliban when the group allegedly
encouraged him to enter into an
agreement with foreign forces.1 4
1 2 Interview, HE-01-C1, Herat (23 February
2014).
1 3 Ibid. This was also confirmed to us by his son
and sub-commander, HE-02-C1 who also
reported that his group “disarmed two major
Taliban groups who used to operate [in our
district] and did not let them return until we
joined the peace process. Interv iew, HE-02-C1,
Herat, (26 February 2014).
1 4 Ibid.
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In that sense, HE-01-C1 and his five
subgroups more closely resemble an
illegal armed group than an integrated
part of the Taliban structure. To
observe Figure 3, it is clear that the
forces of HE-01 and HE-02 are tightly
integrated. Naturally the commanders
both float at the top of the hierarchical
structure and near one another (as we
understand their father-son
relationship.
This particular network model however,
maintains a higher level of mixed-unit
integration than any other group. In
addition, the strength of the ties,
characterized by the darkness of the
edges (connecting lines) suggests
shifting levels of interdependence
regardless of proximity (authority).
HE-03-C1 was similarly reluctant to
work with other groups outside those
with whom he shared familiar relations.
Though he reportedly commanded
about 12 subgroups in Herat at one
point, he and soldiers in his direct
command rarely worked with other
groups – the main exception being his
brother-in-law/sub-commander, HE-
04-C1.1 5 As HE-04-C1 put it, “He is my
brother-in-law and we are from the
same tribe. There were other groups too,
but frankly we did not need them.”1 6
The overall tendency of Herati
respondents to maintain independence
or gravitate toward working with direct
1 5 Interview, HE-03-C1, Herat, (3 March 2014).
1 6 Interview, HL-04-C1, Herat, (4 March 2014).
HE-01-C1 HE-02-C1
Figure 3
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family members only is probably
attributable to the fact that GIRoA
presence is stronger and more visible in
Herat than many of the other provinces.
Though it was not directly said,
increased government control in Herat
makes supporting the opposition a
dangerous game. Therefore, it is only
logical that commanders would work
with only those peers with whom they
have the strongest levels of trust, and
whose shared familiar and tribal bonds
prevent betrayal with the de facto threat
of dire social and personal safety
consequences.
Helmand province is irrefutably among
the most insecure and volatile in
Afghanistan. The tenuous security
environment has a clear impact on the
manner in which alliances are formed
and maintained. Though a smaller
number of groups were available for
interview in Helmand than in the other
target provinces, the sample includes
three surprising alliance configurations.
Ultimately, it is clear that the intensity
of the conflict in Helmand make
alliances a necessity for survival;
sometimes this means forging a working
agreement with an unlikely partner.
The social network model generated for
the alliances between H2-H11-H12 is
likely the most robust model from the
study. The model, Figure 4, captures the
deeply rooted trust of the 4 members of
HL-02, with extending ties into HL-12.
While the distributions of relationship
strength vary only by degree, the tight-
knit proximity of HL-02 versus the
regular spatial distribution of HL-11
illuminates the distinction in
organizational resilience, with HL-02 as
the clearly more resilient and possibly
better commanded forces.
Figure 4
A few of the Helmand alliances followed
a similar pattern as seen in other
provinces. For example, HL-04-C1
reportedly leads 15-20 men as a
subgroup of a higher commander who
also served as the shadow mayor for
Lashkargah City. HL-04-C1 explained
that he does work with other groups in
ad hoc alliances, but he has no decision
making power to forge or end such
alliances.
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“We have no right to make alliances of
our own with any group. The Taliban
says that they are responsible for
maintaining the proper structure and
determining troop movements. If a
commander made their own alliances
[with another commander], the Taliban
would think those particular
commanders have bad intentions –
plotting to betray the Taliban or maybe
joining the Afghan government. It might
cost them their lives.”1 7
HL-04-C1’s account of the tight grip
upon which the Taliban provincial
leadership holds on is similar to the
abovementioned reports from
Nangarhar. However, not every
commander denied having the
autonomy to forge working agreements.
HL-03-C1 commands a subgroup of men
for a senior commander who controls
five other groups in southern Helmand.
Interestingly, he reportedly has
maintained an alliance with another
commander outside the cluster for the
last three to four years. He and his
alliance partner first met as neighbours
in Pakistan during the winter, but when
the second man transferred from
Kandahar to Helmand, an alliance
naturally formed. “He is just a great
person,” explained HL-03-C1, “He
helped me extensively after my former
commander died. I think he knows we
1 7 Interview, HL-04-C1, Helmand, (2 January
2014).
have the same commitment.” 1 8 This
decision closely resembles experiences
in Kunduz, where group-level
commanders appeared to enjoy the
greatest level of freedom to request,
suggest, or form working agreements.
Two other alliances highlight variety of
decision-making processes regarding
alliance formation in Helmand. The first
is a surprising alliance between
historical rivals Hizb-e Islami
Hekmatyar and the Taliban, as reported
by HL-02-C1. HL-02-C1 reported that
Taliban in Greskh district vastly
outnumbers his group, HIG. “We work
with [Partner Commander] out of
necessity because we are weak and we
need them.” 1 9 Lack of trust and even
hate between the two groups is
pervasive; however, the alliance has
remained intact at the direct written
order of HIG leadership in Pakistan.2 0
This agreement highlights both the
manner in which the extreme violence
and instability demand pragmatism
among Helmand’s opposition leaders as
well as the pre-eminence of respect for
the chain of command.
The experience of HL-06-C1 further
illustrates the extent to which Helmand
armed groups must weigh their
1 8 Interview, HL-03-C1, Helmand (27 January
2014).
1 9 Interview, HL-02-C1, Helmand (14 January
2014).
20 Ibid.
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ideological predilections against the
practical need to survive and manoeuvre
through the mine-ridden political and
security landscapes. HL-06-C1 leads a
small group of about 10-11 men in the
Deh Adam Khan area of Greskh district.
Working for a brief period in the Greskh
Police Headquarters, HL-06-C1 was
attacked and brutally beaten by the
Taliban – an incident that prompted
him to form his own group and align
himself with the powerful Taliban
commander, HE-05-C1.2 1
21 Interview, HL-06-C1, Helmand (26 January
2014).
However, as illustrated within Figure 5,
this alliance was not about an
ideological commitment to the Taliban
political goals. “It was a way for me to
stay protected from Taliban wrath, and
keep Taliban from outside our area from
coming and bothering us.” 2 2 The
financial gains, however, were another
driving factor in his decision. “If we
cannot make a living, we have to find
other ways of earning money. Worse
comes to worst, the first thing we would
do is rob people.”2 3
22 Ibid.
23 Interview, HL-06-C1.
Figure 5
Enlarged View
Weak Ties
Police
Taliban
HL-06-C1 (Circled in RED) alliance
with HE-05-C1 (Circled in ORANGE)
Independent
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Though technically allied under the
Taliban structure for a period of time, it
is clear that HL-06-C1 considers his
group independent. Not only did he
admit to undermining outside Taliban
intentions for his area, 2 4 Furthermore,
he also ordered his men to work with a
local Afghan Local Police (ALP)
commander, HL-09-C1 to help resist the
Taliban in the area. Clearly this is a
paradoxical decision, but the shared
personal history with each of the
partners makes it easy to switch sides
when the situation is most convenient.
The respondent expressed sentiments of
loyalty to both that felt genuine, which
probably makes the justification of
working with both sides of the conflict
easy to internalize.
Helmand alliances are a clear product of
the intense level of violence that
permeates the province. Because the
fighting is fierce and varies somewhat
from area to area, the decisions made
with respect to alliances are more
diverse than observed in the other target
provinces. Some Helmand groups
adhere very strictly to the organization’s
chain of command and refuse to step
outside it for fear of harsh repercussions
from leadership. Other groups that may
have been more cut off from leadership
concentrations in the district and
provincial centres were able to initiate
24 HL-06-C1 reportedly ordered his men to
diffuse or throw away land mines that were
designated to be planted in his area. Interview,
Helmand (26 January 2014).
working agreements with other groups.
Finally, in two cases, we saw that the
security environment demanded
commanders be pragmatic in their
decisions to work with others. This
pragmatism, however, created strange
bedfellows.
Overall, the decision to forge an alliance
with another group is very much context
specific. Commanders have to weigh a
host of factors including the extent to
which they are integrated in a higher
command structure and the relative
strength of local leadership, the level of
violence or security in the area, and the
specific objectives of the group. Not
surprisingly then, some trends were
observed on a provincial level as the
regional variable renders a similar
context within a province.
Mechanics of Formation
Once the decision to explore an alliance
has been made, the mechanics of
formation were described as fairly
simple and straightforward. Though
each group has a unique contextual
experience, the actual protocols may
have very subtle variations, but there
were three common paths to solidifying
a working agreement.
The first manner in which alliances are
solidified is through either a phone call
or walkie talkie transmission. This
approach was used most often for short
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term, ad hoc alliances. 2 5 As this
approach does not involve face-to-face
communication, it carries minimal risk
of betrayal or interception by GIRoA
authorities. Telecommunications also
reduce or even eliminate the need for
advance planning, a particular
advantage when a group finds itself
under a direct and imminent threat.
Though the advantages to this approach
are numerous, respondents who
reportedly primarily relied on
telecommunications for formation
usually did so with partners with whom
they had a previous and longstanding
relationship.
The second pathway to alliance
formation involves direct, face-to-face
meetings wherein the terms of the
agreement are negotiated. This
approach was by far the most commonly
cited in all provinces, though some
logistical aspects varied by the
individual alliances. In Kunduz for
example, where the district governors
are very active in their management of
the local groups, respondents usually
told CAPS that the DG was present in
the initial meetings alongside both
prospective partners. 2 6 Though it was
25 Interview, KU-09-C1, Kunduz, (8 January
2014).; Interview, KU-07-C1, Kunduz, (2
January 2014); Interv iew, NA -08-C1,
Nangarhar, (1 January 2014).
26 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014); Interview, KU-11-C1, Kunduz (8 January
2014).
not specifically stated, this likely serves
a two-pronged purpose.
First, the DG’s presence probably
removes apprehension and aids in trust
building, particularly when the
prospective partners do not know one
another or belong to different tribes.
Second, it also allows the DG to monitor
an alliance and maintain consolidated
control over his men.
Other respondents reportedly met with
their alliance partner without the
presence of a head commander. This
was usually done after the head
commander had given orders for the
groups to work together, or in advance
of seeking approval for the agreement
from leadership.2 7
Most respondents reportedly met only
once while a few interviewees said the
agreement was designed over multiple
meetings. For example, KU-02-C1 met
with KU-11-C1 and the DG twice to
discuss the full parameters of the
alliance. 2 8 Though meeting in person
carries more risk than
telecommunications, the former lays the
groundwork for a genuine relationship
27 Interview, HE-02-C1, Herat (26 February
2014); Interv iew, NA -09-C1, Nangarhar (16
January 2014 ); Interv iew, NA -03-C1,
Nangarhar (13 January 2014); Interview, HL-
03-C1, Helmand (27 January 2014).
28 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014).
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and mutual respect. Consequently, the
network model, Figure 6, of this alliance
exemplifies direct communication and
resulting functionality.
Figure 6
The third major mechanism for alliance
formation reported by interviewees were
large meetings of commanders.
Sometimes referred to as a jirga while
others simply called them planning
meetings, these meetings were usually
convened at the request of the head
commander or leadership and involved
commanders from all local sub-groups
in the cluster. 2 9 If there is to be
29 Interview, KU-08-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014); Interv iew, KU-03-C1, Kunduz (29
December 2013); NA-08-C1, Nangarhar (1
January 2014).
community participation in alliance
formation, it occurs during this
mechanism; however, not all larger
meetings include tribal elders.
Respondents unanimously agreed that
regular foot soldiers were not included
formative meetings, only commanders.
Because of this soldier respondents
rarely answered questions relating to
issues of formation, and those who did
only spoke in general terms based on
their general understanding.
Documentation
Every respondent was asked whether a
written record of the agreement exists or
if it was strictly verbal. About one third
of the interviewees did not respond to
this question. The precise reason for the
high non-response rate is unclear.
Respondents may have been reluctant to
admit that the agreement was strictly
oral because it would reveal their
illiteracy. It is equally possible that
interviewees felt answering the question
gave too much detail with respect to the
procedural workings of the oppositional
organizations. Whatever the reason,
CAPS researchers chose not to press
non-response questions in favour of
preserving the trust required to continue
to the interview.
Of those that did offer a response, it was
found that the clear majority –
approximately 68% – were strictly oral
and lacked any sort of documentation.
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Of the responses that indicated the
existence of a written record of the
agreement, about 71% were from
Kunduz. KU-11-C1 explained that his
agreement was written and on file with
the Taliban council, but did not have a
copy himself.3 0 KU-02-C1 even went so
far as to say that written records are not
only kept for formative meetings, “Most
of our meetings are documented,
including the dates. All of the
documents remain with the Taliban
council.” 3 1 Though this penchant for
documentation appears to be
predominantly unique to Kunduz, it
suggests a higher level of formality and
organization than is commonly
associated with lower level oppositional
groups.
Outside Community Influence
Tribal elders and prominent community
members played a role in alliance
formation in very few cases. KU-03-C1
explained that the DG invited
community elders to the jirga where the
alliance was formed. “The groups were
there, along with other Taliban and the
community elders. The elder’s
recommendations are considered, and
the group helps work out any
disagreements and decide who will lead
the two groups. Sometimes it can take a
30 Interview, KU-11-C1, Kunduz (8 January
2014).
31 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014).
few meetings to solve all the issues.”3 2
Likewise, KU-08-C1 described a similar
meeting where elders met with the DG
and all of the commanders in the area.
Though the interviewee did not
elaborate on the extent to which the
elders had influence over the terms of
the alliance, he did highlight that the
meeting space was held in an elder’s
house.3 3 In Herat, HE-04-C1 explained
that the tribal elders in his area played a
key role in persuading the higher
commander to forge alliances. “The
elders were saying that US forces trust
the Persian speakers and will kill the
Pashtuns.”3 4
It is often assumed that community
members and tribal elders play a large
role in the activities of armed groups
operating in their area. However, the
sample respondents indicate that tribal
elders rarely play a role in alliance
formation. In the rare cases where non-
members are included in formation
meetings, the precise extent of their
influence over the outcome remains
unclear.
Though limited in the formative stages,
communities do appear to play a
supportive role once alliances are
established. HE-01-C1 and his alliance
32 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (29 December
2013).
33 Interview, KU-08-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014).
34 Interview, HE-04-C1, Herat (4 March 2014).
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partners enjoyed a large amount of
support. “Local people supplied our
groups. They were giving us lodging,
food, and even clothes. In return we
tried to serve them well. They still bring
food and other stuff to my home even
now when I have reintegrated.”3 5 HE-
01-C1 also reportedly met with local
ulema every Friday to discuss issues,
some of which pertained to agreement
activities. Though community members
were not involved in the formation of
the alliance, HL-06-C1 reported that
tribal elders did sometimes attend
meetings between the alliance partners
and weighed in on issues pertaining to
the partnership. 3 6 These experiences
were not unique; stories such as these
were countless from both commander
and soldier respondents.
35 Interview, HE-01-C1, Herat (23 February
2014).
36 Interview, HL-06-C1, Helmand (26 January
2014).
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Alliance Duration
Alliance or working agreement duration
among the study sample produced a bell
curve distribution. Individual answers
were used to form an aggregate group
estimate. This approach helped account
for intra-group variance that might be
attributed to different perceptions of
time passage or individual tenure within
a group. The quantifiable group
estimates3 7 were then situated into one
of 6 categories.
37 Not all indiv iduals or groups offered a
quantifiable estimate. Some responses were
non-quantifiable, which included groups where
the respondent was unsure of the duration of the
alliance, unwilling to report, or offered a vague
statement that could not be corroborated by a
quantifiable duration with certainty.
Additionally, the few groups that did not
consider itself having an alliance were also
placed into this category.
As shown in Figure 7, most of the
working agreements were reported to
have lasted between two and four years.
More notably, however, is the fact that
approximately 68% of the quantifiable
working agreements last less than two
years. This is somewhat surprising given
the relatively strong interconnection
illustrated by the relationship mapping
endeavours above. Logically, very
interconnected groups should be more
durable rather than less. So why were
most of the alliances reported as lasting
such a short period of time?
DURATION OF REPORTED
ALLIANCES
Figure 7
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There are a few possible explanations for
the dissonance between the reported
intra and intergroup relationship
strength and the outcome on alliance
duration. First and most startlingly is
the possibility that the strength of
relationships as determined by the
enumerated networks are simply not
correlated to one another. This study
was informed by traditional Afghan
notions of camaraderie and loyalty as
well as the conventional discourse on
militant and political alliances in
Afghanistan. Both rest on the
assumption that the stronger the
relationships within the group and with
alliance partners, the stronger and more
durable the alliance. The data from this
sample suggests that this assumption
may need to be reconsidered.
Before totally abandoning the idea that
more connected members produce more
durable alliances, a few other
possibilities should be explored. For
example, there may be more important
factors that indicate relationship
strength between two individuals than
those used here. CAPS researchers took
great care in the selection and definition
of the five factors on the relationship
mapping matrix as well as the variance
within each indicator. Familiar
relationships, physical distance, tribe,
fighting legacy, and religious affiliations
were all considered by CAPS as strong
social linkages between individual
members of a given Afghan community.
Though well-informed by native cultural
fluency, it is possible that these
indicators were not the ideal indicators
by which to measure and forecast
relationship strength. Perhaps there are
other indicators that were not collected
that have a greater impact on
relationship strength. In this sense, the
relationship mapping in this study is
explorative; measuring the strength of
personal relationships between human
beings is not an exact, quantifiable
science. Further exploration solely of
relationship metrics in Afghanistan is
certainly warranted and encouraged.
Relationship metrics aside, there are
several more possible explanations that
may account for the short duration of
the sample working agreements. First, is
that soldiers were unable to reliably
speak about working agreement
duration beyond their own tenure in the
organization. Thus, a soldier who had
been with a group for sixteen months
would usually remark that the alliance
had been in place at least a year. In
reality, however, the agreement may
have been in place for several years prior
to his addition to the group. The
aggregate duration was based on all
quantifiable responses from
respondents in a group to help account
for this, but tenure length of soldiers
likely still influenced reported duration.
The same is also true for commander
respondents. Given that commanders
were broadly recognized as the sole
decision maker about the alliance, it
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follows that commander respondents
should be able to provide the most
reliable assessment of alliance duration.
Yet this is also not necessarily the case.
Almost no commanders would speak
about existing relationships with other
groups prior to his own tenure as
commander. In order to preserve the
interview, CAPS researchers did not
question this reluctance. Instead, it was
understood that restarting the group
narrative with the commander’s
ascension to power helped consolidate
his image and generate a cult of
personality. Taking credit for the
establishment of an alliance, even
implicitly, reinforces the commander’s
projections of power. Alternatively,
recognizing that the group has
relationships that extend beyond the
tenure of the commander may subtly
suggest to the soldiers the commander is
replaceable. It is therefore in the
commander’s best interest to construct
and maintain barriers to institutional
memory, both with respect to alliances
and other organizational matters. Thus
it is probable that even the commander
respondents under reported some of the
alliance durations.
Finally, it is also worth noting external
security developments may have
impacted the formation of working
agreements in that 2-year time period.
Most of the interviews for this study
took place in late 2013 and early 2014,
and included groups that had
reintegrated within six months of the
field visit. Looking two and a half years
into the past from data collection would
situate the alliances within the height of
the infamous US troop surge under
President Barak Obama. It is also
possible therefore that the sample
alliances were merely formed at a time
of heightened pressure on the
insurgency and only aged 1-2 years by
the time of interview or the group’s
decision to join APRP.
Afghanistan has long been recognized
for its social and political complexities.
Alliances are no exception. Particularly
with the potential correlation between
intra and inter-group relationships and
alliance duration, the data raises more
questions than it provides answers.
Traditional assumptions that a stronger
connection between group members and
across groups creates more durable
alliances should be re-examined. The
task of adequately measuring individual
relationship strength in Afghanistan
definitely represents a need for further
exploration in future studies.
Additionally, the apparent lack of
institutional memory projected by both
soldiers and commanders probably also
contributes to underreporting with
respect to duration. Finally, the short
duration of the majority of sample
working agreements might be
adequately contextualized by the troop
surge and increased pressure placed on
anti-government militant groups at that
time.
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Tactics
Alliance activities – specifically the
tactics employed to further alliance
goals – were remarkably similar across
all respondents, irrespective of province.
The answers offered to these questions
were very generic and overall
unsurprising for any reader with even a
rudimentary understanding of the
Afghan war. For example, KU-10-C1
explained that his alliance primarily
consisted in “trainings on proper
fighting technic, planting landmines,
and how to understand mapping
coordinates. We also would plan attacks
on Government check posts in hopes of
scaring them out of the area.”3 8 NA-05-
S1 told CAPS that one alliance activity in
which he had participated was an attack
on a convoy of Coalition Forces.3 9 Other
soldiers offered even more generic
answers. HE-02-S2 simply said, “We
were doing Jihad against Coalition
Forces and trying our best not to harm
government personnel.”4 0
Though disappointing, the reason
respondents were evasive when asked
directly about alliance tactics is simple:
Though many of the respondents were
no longer actively fighting, they may
have been hesitant to describe tactics in
detail for fear of legal repercussions.
38 Interview, KU-10-C1, Kunduz (3 January
2014).
39 SInterv iew, NA-05-S1, Nangarhar (31
December 2013).
40 Interview, HE-02-S2, (2 March 2014).
APRP does protect former fighters from
prosecution for their wartime activities.
However, such activities did constitute
crimes at the time at which they
occurred, and respondents would not
want to implicate themself in case there
is even a remote possibility of legal
repercussions in the future.
Communications
Once the working relationship has been
solidified between the two groups,
respondents indicated that most
communication took place on an ad hoc
basis. This is unsurprising given the
elastic nature of these alliances, where
subgroups come together primarily for
joint operations at the request of a
higher commander or District Governor.
Overall, the amount of maintenance
communication varied by agreement
and activity.
Respondents near unanimously agreed
that all maintenance communication
took place at the commander level,
usually at the request of a higher
commander, often the District
Governor. Indeed, most soldiers denied
participating in planning or preparatory
measures prior to a joint operation. And
despite the relationship mapping
matrices suggesting otherwise, most
soldiers claimed that they did not
regularly speak with the men in the
other group outside of joint fighting
opportunities. The primary exception to
this phenomenon came from NA-01-C1
who explained how he removed himself
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from direct communication with the
alliance partner.
“He is responsible for radio
communications with a member
from [partner commander’s]. That
member is also responsible for all
radio and walkie-talkie related
activities. They contacted one
another if there was a need for a joint
operation or a meeting.”4 1
Commanders were primarily responsible
for maintenance communications, either
directly with one another or through a
higher commander or the district
governor. One commander in Kunduz
told CAPS, “All the Taliban commanders
have each other’s mobile numbers. We
can call someone at any time for help,
even if we do not have a standing
agreement.”4 2
The frequency of communication,
however, between commanders varied
widely on a case-by-case basis. NA-08-
C1, for example, reported having
participated in only about 12-15
meetings with his alliance partners to
plan joint operations over a period of
about three years.4 3 “Whenever we were
planning to attack the check posts or
41 Interview, NA-01-C1, Nangarhar (30
December 2014).
42 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kundux (1 February
2014).
43 Interview, NA-08-C1, Nangarhar (1 January
2014).
Coalition Forces, about 10 commanders
of small groups would participate in a
meeting to plan the best way to attack
the check posts,” he explained.4 4 In this
instance the Provincial Chief
Commander prompted communication
among the lower level commanders. In
Helmand province, a working
agreement between Hizb-e-Islami (HIG)
and the Taliban generated one monthly
maintenance communication between
commanders.4 5
Other groups had more frequent contact
with one another. In Herat, HE-03-C1
reported that he participated in alliance
maintenance communications “once or
twice a week.”4 6 This is probably also a
natural consequence of a close familiar
relationship as HE-03-C1 and HE-04-C1
are brothers-in-law. Additionally, the
commander/sub-commander
relationship is expected to produce more
maintenance communication than
between sub-commanders with a
working agreement. The alliance
between HE-01 and HE-02, which is a
commander/sub-commander
relationship between father and son,
follows a similar communication pattern
where they spoke or worked directly
with the other sub-commanders often.4 7
44 Ibid. 45 Interview, HL-02-C1, Helmand (14 January
2014).
46 Interview, HE-03-C1, Herat (23 May 2014).
47 Interview, HE-01-C1, Herat (23 May 2014).
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Though communication frequency
varied among alliance partners,
respondents also regularly reported that
communication and activities planning
still required approval from the chain of
command. HE-02-C1 said, “My brother,
my uncle [partner sub-commanders]
were also welcome to directly contact
me if they needed. But if we were going
for a joint operation, the final command
must come from HE-01-C1, the
‘Supreme Commander.’”4 8
Frequency of communication varied
significantly across the sample, but
some trends were observed in the data.
Typically commanders reported that
they spoke with their counterpart on an
ad hoc basis and soldiers only said they
had little or no contribution in planning
partnership activities, only speaking
with members of the other group during
actual joint activities.
Partnerships between commanding
officers unsurprisingly generates the
most communication, particularly when
the partners share close familial bonds.
Where respondents reported
partnerships between sub-commanders,
maintenance communication was less
common and most often prompted by
the shared commander. Sub-
commander level communication still
took place independent of the
commander, but the importance of
48 Interview, HE-02-C1, Herat, (23 May 2014).
commander-sanctioned action was
stressed.
Communication Methods
While the frequency of communication
varied according to the structure of the
working agreement, the preferred
methods of inter-group communication
were near-unanimously reported across
all respondents and provinces.
Commander respondents did report
attending in-person meetings with their
partners to coordinate joint activities,
but this was relatively rare and only
when absolutely necessary. Most often,
mobile phones and walkie-talkie were
preferred. This is unsurprising given the
dominance of oral culture, limited
communications infrastructure, and
formidable topography of Afghanistan.
Afghans generally value oral
communication strategies over written,
something that probably both
perpetuates and is a consequence of
extremely low literacy rates
countrywide. Passing written notes
through the mountains is simply
impractical and would open the
messenger to interception by state
authorities. Similarly, internet-based
communication technologies are simply
not available in most areas of the
country for both financial and logistical
reasons. Finally, though in-person
meetings are a key component of trust
building and are sometimes necessary,
they also open the attendants up
security threats. Any meeting carries a
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potential threat of ANSF or Coalition
attack; this risk increases exponentially
as a meeting grows to include more than
one group or commander. Aside from
the security risk, travel between
manteqas and districts – particularly in
areas with a strong ANSF presence
along the main roads – can be physically
taxing.
Cessation
When prompted to speak about the
causes and mechanics of ending a
working agreement, many respondents
appeared mildly amused. To most, the
answers seemed so basic and
straightforward that they were surprised
researchers had to ask.
Soldier respondents overwhelmingly
affirmed unwavering support for the
alliance under their commander’s
leadership and stressed that nothing
would make them want to end the
agreement. Most echoed the belief of
one soldier who told CAPS, “the
agreement will last until we bring an
Islamic government into power and we
do not need it anymore.” 4 9 A few
soldiers, however, were willing to
speculate as to the type of situations that
could cause the end of a working
agreement. Two such examples included
situations where a partner group might
fail to come to a scheduled joint
49 Interview, KU-09-S2, Kunduz (1 January
2014).
operation resulting in huge losses for the
group, 5 0 or running operations in a
partner’s area without permission
and/or killing local community
members of the home group5 1 . Another
respondent expressed concern that the
already tenuous Taliban alliance with
his group, Hizb-e Islami, would not
survive the elections due to different
approaches to electoral participation
between the two groups.5 2 “Members of
Hizb-e Islami,” he explained, “are likely
to follow leadership and participate in
the upcoming polls while Taliban are
producing propaganda that prohibits
their men from participating. This is a
point that might turn us against them.”5 3
Each of these situations – whether
hypothetical or current – signify an
overall degradation of trust. Thus, it can
be inferred that other situations that
similarly damage trust between
leadership and group members may lead
to alliance cessation.
Two groups, KU-09 and NA-02, noted
animosity toward and mistrust of
Pakistani involvement in the conflict as
a cause of alliance cessation.
Respondent KU-09-C1 reported his
50 Interview, KU-07-S2, Kunduz (5 January
2014).
51 Interview, NA-09-S1, Nangarhar (12 January
2014).
52 Interview, HL-02-S1, Helmand (29 January
2014).
53 Ibid.
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disillusionment when a trip to Pakistan
to meet with Taliban and Al Qaeda
leadership revealed a strong link
between the Pakistani Inter-Service
Intelligence (ISI) and the higher
echelons of fighters, including the
District Governor to whom he reported.
Ultimately, this revelation of foreign
meddling played a major role in KU-09-
C1’s decision to end the alliance. 5 4 “I
called him and said I did not want to
work with him anymore. I said, ‘You do
not fight for the rights of your people or
Islam. Your fighting is only for the
benefit of the ISI and our neighbour
[Pakistan].’”5 5
A reintegrated Nangarhari commander
echoed KU-09-C1’s disdain for Pakistani
involvement in the conflict. At the time
of the interview, NA-02-C1 had recently
broken his alliance with a larger
commander because he felt the mission
of jihad had been lost.
“We ended our agreement because we
came to realize that the Pakistani ISI is
really running the war and we cannot
destroy our homes for that. In the
beginning, we were conducting Jihad
54 Interview, KU-09-C1, Kunduz, (1 January
2014). KU-09-C1 also mentioned that a feud
between himself and a cousin partially
influenced his decision to end the agreement
with the DG after the latter had supported the
cousin in the feud. However, this was not offered
as a primary cause for cessation, but a
contributing factor.
55 Ibid.
against the government and Coalition
Forces. Over time, we realized the
money coming from Pakistan through
[the Taliban Provincial Head] was just
coming from the ISI who have their
own plans. Everyone knows that the
whole scenario is really just about
Pakistan and the ISI. So we ended our
agreement and reintegrated into the
peace process.”5 6
In both instances, disillusionment
prompted alliance cessation. The
perception that the political aspirations
of Pakistan were the “true motivations”
for fighting were fundamentally at odds
with the local commanders’ ideas of why
they were fighting the war – notions of
independence from foreign intervention
and a government that fit their own
understanding of Islam. Fighting
Coalition infidels in even tacit support of
Pakistani interests was therefore
inherently flawed.
Generally, the working agreements
studied were considered mutually
beneficial to the extent that respondents
had a difficult time imagining cessation.
Though a small variety of situations
were offered as examples that might
prompt an individual group to cease
working with another, all can be
described as prompting distrust.
However, in those few groups that did
report breaking a working agreement,
56 Interview, NA-02-C1, Nangarhar, (30
December 2014).
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the most prominent reason given was
anger that, what ground-level
commanders perceived as the core
values of the conflict – Afghan
sovereignty, the establishment of a
sharia-ruled government, and greater
economic opportunities – were
compromised by involvement of
neighbouring state security apparatuses
at the upper echelons of insurgent
institutions.
Mechanics of Cessation
Though the process of alliance
formation is nuanced and can take a
variety of forms, the mechanics of
alliance cessation are much more
straightforward and appear to take one
of 3 forms. Most commanders
responded that they would not need to
do anything; rather, they would just stop
communicating or associating with the
other group. Eventually, they reasoned,
the other group would realize they were
no longer partners. This approach
seemed especially pervasive when a
group had de facto broken a working
agreement by joining APRP. Joining the
peace process naturally places the
commander and his group at odds with
their former insurgent cohorts. Formally
ending the agreement through direct
communication would therefore only
make their new choice known more
quickly, and put the reintegrated group
into imminent danger as they await
processing into APRP.
The second avenue for ending an
alliance is through direct contact with
the other commander over phone or
radio. Of the commanders that offered
answers to the question, 5 7 a few noted
they would end a working agreement by
these means.5 8 Nangarhari commanders
in particular felt that this was the proper
protocol for ending a working
agreement. “I would make contact with
him [the other commander] through
radio or walkie-talkie, or I would call
him personally about the termination.”5 9
Another commander was more blunt as
he told CAPS, “I would call him to meet
me in private and kill him.” 6 0 However,
57 As stated above, many commanders and
soldiers were reluctant to openly speculate as to
the causes or logistical avenues of alliance
cessation, and abstained from answering. Most,
including all but one commander in Herat,
insisted that their working agreement was strong
and a positive force. Soldiers also near
unanimously chose to not offer an answer to the
question because they were either unsure of how
a commander ends an alliance or because they
believed speaking about a commander’s choices
violated local notions about the chain of
command.
58 Interview, KU-08-C1, Kunduz (2 February
2014); Interv iew, NA -02-C1, Nangarhar (30
December 2014);
59 Interview, NA-12-C1, Nangarhar (13 January
2014).
60 Interview, NA-05-C1, Nangarhar (13 January
2014). NA-05-C1 qualified his response by
explaining that he and the other commander had
a life long friendship prior to the alliance.
Therefore, the only situation in which he could
imagine wanting to end the agreement would be
one in which his partner’s greed impacted the
group.
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this was not a province-specific
response; KU-10-C1 also said he would
personally contact the other commander
to trigger cessation.
Kunduz respondents comprised the vast
majority of the respondents favouring a
third mechanism for alliance cessation.
Of the seven commanders asked about
cessation, four of the five who answered
the question told CAPS that the best way
to end a working agreement was to
inform the District Governor of their
choice. Again, most expressed
confidence in their respective alliances
and were reluctant to offer hypothetical
situations that would prompt cessation.
Both KU-02-C1 and KU-08-C1 reported
that the ultimate decision making
authority regarding alliance termination
lay with the District Governor.6 1 “We can
raise the issue with the District
Governor, but he will decide whether to
call the other group commander and end
the agreement.” 6 2 Other commanders,
such as KU-07-C1 implied that they had
more autonomy in this process. “I do not
need to let the other group know, I just
inform the District Governor and he will
do the rest,” said KU-07-C1.6 3 There is
61 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (1 February
2014); Interv iew, KU-08-C1, Kunduz (1
February 2014).
62 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (1 February
2014).
63 Interview, KU-07-C1, Kunduz (1 February
2014).
no way to determine the degree to which
the local commanders control decision
making over individual alliance
cessation, but it is clear that the District
Governors in Kunduz are intimately
involved in forming and ending alliances
throughout the province.
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Alliance & Identity
A secondary focus of the study sought to
improve our understanding of the
manner in which alliances shape the way
individual participants think about their
place in the group, the group’s overall
political vantage in the local landscape,
and the state of the conflict as a whole.
All respondents were asked a series of
questions designed to encourage the
respondents to think critically about the
costs and benefits of the alliance. In
doing so, CAPS researchers were able to
better understand how the alliance
shaped the individual’s feelings about
the group and his place within.
Ultimately, soldier respondents were
steadfast in their support of the
alliances. Soldiers unanimously
communicated a strong belief that the
alliance improved the strength of the
group, thus making it better equipped to
reach the groups’ mutual goals. Though
not necessarily stated outright, the
underlying message was that working
together with another group made the
group stronger, and the individual
members stronger. Prior to data
collection, it had been hypothesized that
the natural compromises inherent in a
successful alliance may adversely affect
individual efficacy towards the group in
some cases. This was not found. Instead,
most balked at the concept that an
alliance would have any aspect with
which they could disagree. It is unclear
however, if these responses were a
reflection of the interviewee’s true
feelings or their unwavering
commitment to their commander’s
authority and decision-making.
Commanders were more pragmatic in
their assessments of the alliance.
Commanders did report that their
working agreements with other groups
were a worthwhile mechanism to aid in
advancing the group’s goals. But
commanders were also more willing to
recognize the cost of alliances,
particularly financial costs.
Soldiers
Soldier respondents unanimously
favoured the existence of the alliance to
which they were a part. This
phenomenon was observed in all target
provinces, and did not appear to
correlate to group size or alliance
duration. “Before the agreement,”
explained NA-02-S1, “We had trouble
getting enough money and weapons to
conduct operations. After the
agreement, we were able to conduct
joint operations at a bigger scale. We
were strong, we even thought it made us
the strongest [group] in the area.” 6 4
Soldiers from all provinces echoed this
sentiment repeatedly. “Everyone was
happy. The alliance brought unity and
64 Interview, NA-02-S1, Nangarhar (1 January
2014).
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strength to our groups,” announced HE-
05-S1.6 5
Soldiers were also asked whether any
aspect of the agreement was difficult for
him and his fellow soldiers to accept.
Respondents were extremely hesitant to
name any such elements. Those who did
primarily listed relatively minor
grievances. KU-10-S1, for example, did
not appreciate having to serve as a
watchmen up in the mountains for joint
operations in wintertime. 6 6 NA-03-S1
admittedly had a difficult time accepting
that the agreement between NA-03 and
NA-05 created restrictions on the
planting of land mines and attacks
against Afghan government officials. 6 7
NA-01-C1 told CAPS that one
requirement of his alliance was that his
men were no longer allowed to smoke
marijuana during or before joint
operations, which some of the men
resented initially. He explained his
solution to stem resentment about the
rule, “I allowed them to sit out the
operation and participate during the
next one.”6 8 However even respondents
who struggled with an element of the
agreement maintained that they felt the
65 Interview, HE-05-S1, Herat (26 February
2014).
66 Interview, KU-10-S1, Kunduz (7 January
2014).
67 Interview, NA-03-S1, Nangarhar (30
December 2014).
68 Interview, NA-01-C1, Nangarhar (30
December 2014).
benefits of the agreement outweighed
the negative elements.
It is unclear whether the steadfast
support of the alliances were a product
of genuine, unwavering support or fear
of saying something that might be
construed as direct criticism for the
commander or organizational
leadership. As seen throughout the
interviews, the pressure to fully submit
to the decisions of the commander is
intense. Commander respondents both
recognized this and prided themselves
on their ability to maintain order and
authority in their groups. KU-07-C1
explained that it was not appropriate for
soldiers form their own opinions
regarding an alliance.
“They have to accept [the agreement]
because once it is approved by the
leadership they do not have the right
to say a word about it... If anyone
feels his commitment is changed
because of the alliance, he should
leave the group and stay in his house.
And if we were to hear that he joined
the government, he is dead!”6 9
It is likely, therefore, that soldiers were
hesitant to report grievances with the
alliances for fear of appearing
insubordinate.
69 Interview, KU-07-C1, Kunduz (2 January
2014).
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Commanders
The vast majority of commanders
viewed the alliance experience
favourably, but they were more
pragmatic in their assessment of the
costs and benefits. Similar to their
soldiers, commanders typically viewed
the strength that comes in numbers as
the biggest asset of the working
agreement. This notion of strength
includes both the logistic sense of extra
men during coordinated activities as
well as the idea that the organizations’
morale and overall ideological goals
were boosted from unity formed through
the alliance. “We became a big group
and the opponent cannot penetrate our
groups [with the agreement,]”
explained, KU-07-C1 adding, “We are all
brothers with the same religion and
objective.” 7 0 NA-05-C1 agreed that,
“Strength is the main benefit of the
agreement. We became strong enough in
the area to ensure we survived and were
successful.” 7 1 These statements are
exemplified within the particular social
network model of Kunduz groups 7 and
8 in Figure 8.
Within the model, each organization
maintains strong integration with each
other and within themselves, established
within a clear hierarchy. Although KU-
08-S3 appears an outlier in the general
7 0 Interview, KU-07-C1, Kunduz (2
January 2014).
7 1 Interview, NA-05-C1, Nangarhar (30
December 2014).
group structure, the consistently
modelled strengths of interaction
between all soldiers of KU-08 and KU-
07 reinforce sentiments of brotherhood.
Though many reported that the alliance
had only a positive outcome for their
group, a few respondents were more
pragmatic in their assessment. Some
recognized the increased financial
burden that accompanies joint
operations. HE-03-C1 reported that the
main negative aspect of the alliances was
the cost, “Our expenses were high and I
had to pay multiple groups. If there were
fewer groups I would be rich now.” 7 2
NA-07-C1 echoed this sentiment. “More
men and more operations is a big
expense for which we lacked sufficient
funding. I have to admit there was not
sufficient income to maintain the
alliance.” 7 3 KU-10-C1 complained that
his partner refused to pay him for the
cost of ammunition, even though he
believed the group probably collected
enough money from community tithes.7 4
Overall, however, he and the other men
felt the strength gained from the alliance
outweighed the financial losses.
Not all commander complaints were
financial; they also voiced concerns over
the security of themselves and their
men. By allying his HIG fighters with
local Taliban, HL-02-C1 feared that his
7 2 Interview, HE-03-C1, Herat (3 March 2014).
7 3 Interview, NA-07-C1, Nangarhar (31 December 2013).
7 4 Interview, KU-10-C1, Kunduz (3 January 2014).
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men were at greater risk because
“Taliban can now come to our area with
loaded guns. They could turn their guns
on us and attack at any time.”7 5 HL-05-
C1 also explained that he felt the joint
operations actually made his men less
safe than they were working alone.
In relation to the network model of
Figure 10, this commanders fear is valid,
as among three Helmand groups
(H2,H1,H12) is holds the highest level of
authority and thus assumes the highest
degree of visibility and risk.
In fact, his perception of the partner
casualty rate is higher in joint
operations because you depend on the
other group to fight alongside you, but
then when you need them they are late. I
lost a few friends this way. Another time
I was injured during an operation. I was
yelling for men from [the other group]
and waiting for them to help me during
a siege, but it did not help. 7 6 This
incompetence made HL-05-C1 the only
commander to say that the agreement
gave him “No key benefits.”7 7
HL-05-C1 has no plans to end the
agreement, yet the network model
(Figure 9) identifies this particular
commander as radically detached from
7 5 Interview, HL-02-C1, Helmand (14 January
2014).
7 6 Interview, HL-05-C1, Helmand (20 January
2014).
7 7 Ibid.
his own men and all other allied group,
which may indicate the source of his
problems and needs. While HL-05-C1 is
a known powerful Taliban commander,
the distance between him, his men, and
other groups suggests that there is likely
a bigger problem informing the troubles
this commander has experienced.
Possibilities range from poor leadership
or managerial ability on his behalf to
lack of supplies or logistical hurdles,
unfortunately it is not possible to know.
of his condition.
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Figure 8
Figure 9
HL-05-C1 HL-05-C1’s Unit
Strong
Interdependency
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Overall, commander respondents
expressed a belief that their alliances
made more capable tactically, and that
their strength positively impacted the
morale of their soldiers. Unlike their
subordinates, however, the commanders
took a more realistic assessment of the
costs of the working agreement. As the
main decision makers, the commanders
were privy to aspects of the agreements
that soldiers were not. This meant that
they were left to contend with the
financial and human costs of the
alliance, both of which posed real
problems for some commanders.
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Kabul: Political Alliances
As the seat of national power, the
inclusion of Kabul as a target province
allowed CAPS to study political alliances
at the highest level in the midst of a
presidential election cycle. The Kabul
sample included 16 respondents
representing five groups and three
separate alliances. For coherence as well
as to protect the privacy of the
respondents, analysis of the political
alliances will continue remain
anonymous similarly to the preceding
discussion. When referring to the
specific candidate as an individual, we
will use the code “Candidate 01” with the
number referring to the corresponding
group number.
Political alliances were expected to
exhibit some unique characteristics,
though the precise nature of was
unclear. Fieldwork confirmed that
indeed, high-level political alliances
differ significantly from those among
armed groups at the provincial level.
Though all respondents expressed a
desire of their candidate and parties to
remove tribalism concerns from
government, all were acutely aware of
provincial tribal sensitivities and cited
tribal inclusion as a driving factor and
primary benefit of the alliance. Members
of a political alliance tend to measure
the outcome and benefit of alliances in
very concrete terms, i.e., promises of
specific positions in government
pending a win or votes delivered from
specific provinces. Finally, the demand
for these benchmarks render these
agreements relatively fragile, as
respondent groups proved both capable
and willing to realign themselves with
another group if they thought their
partner would not deliver on promises.
Importance of Tribal Unity
Though tribalism undoubtedly affects
the composition of militant groups at
the community level, it was not cited as
having a profound affect on alliance
formation, maintenance, or identity
among the militant respondents. It was,
however, a central feature of discussion
with respect to motivational factors
impacting the decision to form political
alliances for the election. Respondents
unanimously told CAPS their group had
a desire to move beyond political
factions formed down tribal and ethnic
lines, a phenomenon that has dominated
Afghanistan’s history. Ironically,
however, the manner in which each
group sought to accomplish this goal
was to use alliances to form a multi-
tribal coalition in the name of unity. In
this manner, tribalism appeared to be
one of – if not the – biggest factors
influencing the decision to form the
alliance.
For example, KA-01-05 admitted that
KA-01 was specifically in search of a
prominent Tajik leader to support
Candidate 01 in order to lend weight to
the claim that Candidate 01 genuinely
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wanted to serve all Afghans, not merely
his own group. “We spoke with other
Tajiks and they all had high demands.
Candidate 03, however, has a prominent
legacy and did not [have as many
demands].” 7 8 KA-02-02 similarly
embodied this contradiction as he said,
“Candidate 02 is totally against ethnic-
based politics and was frustrated how
Uzbeks were locked out of high positions
in the country.”7 9 Not only was a main
concern of the candidate representation
of his own ethnic group in government,
the same respondent explained that a
main tenet of the alliance included the
promise of Candidate 02 to deliver the
Uzbek vote for Candidate 01.8 0
The large amount of attention paid to
tribalism in alliance formation at the
presidential level despite a stated desire
to transcend tribal and ethnic divisions
probably has more to do with the
electorate than the candidates and
parties themselves. Tribal sensitivities
are deep-rooted in Afghanistan with
grievances often tracing back for a
century or more. Candidates who want
to work beyond the lines of tribe must
still be cognizant of them. Low literacy
rates and under developed information
dissemination systems mean that large
sections of the population remain
isolated at the community and district
levels. Thus, the history of local conflicts
7 8 Interview, KA-01-05, Kabul (23 July 2014).
7 9 Interview, KA-02-02, Kabul (16 July 2014).
80 Ibid.
and perceptions of rival tribes are both
passed from generation to generation
and are commonly projected onto the
rival tribe on a national scale. Fears of
tribal subjugation are deep-rooted and
pervasive, and the leadership of each of
the political groups studied appear to
believe that acknowledgment and
inclusion of all major ethnic groups is
the first step toward pan-tribal unity at
the highest levels of Afghan government.
Concrete Outcomes
Militant alliances, as discussed above,
tended to measure outcomes in terms of
strength, identity and morale boosts
amongst group members, and financial
cost. Political alliances, by contrast,
were able to outline specific outputs and
benchmarks upon which they measured
alliance success. Interestingly, financial
cost was not mentioned as a significant
factor in considering success by
respondents of any group.
The Kabul respondents indicate that
political alliances are forged upon very
specific, measurable outcomes desired
by each side. In two of the three sample
alliances, this took the form of the
supporting party trading its
endorsement and the votes of its
political base (ethnic and geographical)
for a key position in the administration
should the dominant candidate succeed
in the election. Though respondents
typically commented that the two
leaders shared a common vision for
Afghanistan’s future and government,
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additional deciding factors driving
alliance formation were sometimes
clearly stated. For example, KA-02-02
told CAPS that there were two reasons
Candidate 02 decided to support
Candidate 01. “First,” he said,
“[Opponent] refused to promise
Candidate 02 the post he desired.
Second, Candidate 01 is a well known
Afghan leader who is qualified and
committed to an inclusive
government.”8 1 It appears therefore that
the desire for a specific high-level
position in the administration may have
actually determined Candidate 02’s
willingness to ally with any particular
candidate. Similarly, KA-03-01
explained that the primary tenet of the
four-page written agreement between
his party and KA-01 was an exchange of
Candidate 03’s willingness to rally his
ethnic group’s vote for Candidate 01 in
return for another key position in a
winning administration.8 2
The third alliance between KA-04 and
KA-05 reportedly did not follow this
pattern. According to KA-04-01, the
alliance between the two groups was the
product of a common history and a
shared commitment to “national unity,
democratic government, and youth
empowerment . . . There were no
incentives demanded or promised.” 8 3
KA-04-02 echoed the assertion that the
81 Interview, KA-02-02, Kabul (16 July 2014).
82 Interview, KA-03-01, Kabul (17 July 2014).
83 Interview, KA-04-01, Kabul (10 July 2014).
alliance was purely driven by shared
goals and common ideologies.8 4 KA-05-
01 explained that the leadership of KA-
05 expected that common ground with
dominant party would generate a sort of
soft power to influence policy. “The
alliance,” he explained, “can enable us to
pursue our goals and promote our
values.”8 5
Notably, respondents did not indicate
financial expense as a significant
indicator against which partnership
success was measured. In all three
alliances, interviewees acknowledged
that the dominant party agreed to cover
all or most of the campaign expenses
incurred by the supporting party. About
partnering with KA-01, KA-02-01 told
CAPS “Our agreement was not based on
finances . . . Both groups are sharing
some of the expenses.” 8 6 Overall,
however, it was understood that KA-01
did shoulder the majority of expenses.8 7
Still, respondents still focused on the
prospective political payoff as opposed
to the financial losses when asked to
assess the partnership.
This is another point of contrast from
the militant alliances in the other
provinces, although is a natural
consequence of the context within which
the political alliances are situated. The
84 Interview, KA-04-02, Kabul (12 July 2014).
85 Interview, KA-05-01, Kabul (13 July 2014).
86 Interview, KA-02-01, Kabul (15 July 2014).
87 Interview, KA-01-03, Kabul (12 July 2014).
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individual candidates and their parties
are some of the most influential – and in
some cases, wealthy – men in the
country. Additionally, competition at the
presidential level requires the ability of
political parties to rally support and
appreciate campaign contributions from
an intricate network of other influential
powerbrokers. Political alliances are
therefore forged in an environment
where capital is relatively plentiful. The
militant groups, by contrast, are forced
to allocate already limited resources to
alliance activities, putting capital in a
central position in commanders’ minds
when they think of alliance
performance.
The general tendency toward delineating
very specific terms to be used as
indicators of alliance success between
political groups is easily understood
through context. Unlike the militant
alliances, which are formed as both a
consequence of and a mechanism of
protracted conflict, the term of a
political alliance is discrete. That is to
say it has a definite end – either the
dominant party will succeed and alliance
promises are delivered or it fails and the
two groups return to their own
individual platforms. Thus it is
unsurprising that measures of success
primarily rest on the ability of both
partners to deliver on specific promises.
Goals of militant alliances, by contrast,
are part of a relationship that usually
spanned years, even if the groups did
not partner consistently throughout that
time. Because militant alliances were
generally assumed to extend until some
unknown point in the future,
partnership success was viewed in
broader terms of relative strength and
power.
Relative Frailty
The presence of specific success
indicators and expected outcomes in
political alliances is injects a frailty into
presidential political alliances that was
not observed in partnerships between
militant groups in the four other
provinces.
Because alliance objectives are discrete,
partners expect one another to uphold
their promises. The stakes are high; the
highest offices in the land are key
deliverables in these agreements, as are
the votes of critical sections of the
populace. Interviews therefore revealed
an overarching concern that the partner
may change course. This was
particularly acute in the partnership
between KA-01 and KA-03. In exchange
for support, Candidate 03 was promised
an executive level position in the
administration should Candidate 01
prevail. According to the KA-03 camp,
this agreement included a promise to
amend the Afghan Constitution to create
a higher level position for Candidate 03
than currently exists under Afghan
law. 8 8 At the time of interview, the
political climate surrounding the
88 Interview, KA-03-01, Kabul (17 July 2014).
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election was such that KA-03 members
were beginning to recognize the
ambition of that promise and speculate
as to whether Candidate 01 would be
able and willing to deliver.8 9 KA-03-01
was hesitant to say, however, whether
Candidate 03 would publically end the
agreement if Candidate 01 appointed
someone else into the promised seat. “It
is still too early to discuss this. Let us
hope it does not happen.”9 0
The unspoken desire of political parties
to ultimately find themselves standing
with the winner also suggests that
political alliances are perhaps more frail
than those observed among militant
groups. Several of the groups reported
having supported other groups at one
point in the campaign cycle. Of course,
this is in part because of the structure of
the Afghan electoral process. As
candidates are dropped in the different
stages, their support network then can
fragment and re-align with one of the
remaining candidates. This is precisely
what happened to KA-03. Candidate 03
initially endorsed another candidate –
thought to be a favourite – during the
first round of elections. When the
candidate ultimately lost and threw his
support in favour of a remaining
candidate, KA-03 then split the original
alliance in favour of KA-01. In a similar
vein, leaders of KA-05 actually backed
three different candidates in the first
89 Ibid.
90 Interview, KA-03-01, Kabul (17 July 2014).
round before placing a unified bet in the
second round.9 1
This tendency of political groups to
forge and fragment alliances throughout
an election cycle is hardly unique to
Afghanistan. The same phenomenon can
be seen in most democratic electorates
in the world. Still, this rendered political
alliances less stable than the militant
groups within the sample. It is true that
militant groups may face a trust deficit
with one another; however, two other
factors help counteract the deterioration
it causes. First, that most militant
alliances studied were integrated into
the Taliban structure. This inherently
strengthens the alliance by a reinforced
commitment to a shared political
ideology. Second, militant groups have
less options than political groups for
realignment – they can reintegrate and
join GIRoA or, in limited circumstances,
become an independent militia or
criminal group. Both alternatives would
put group members on a target list and
may not provide adequate protection.
Thus, militant groups probably feel
more compelled to continue working
agreements.
91 Interview, KA-05-01, Kabul (13 July 2014).
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Conclusion
For over ten years of conflict within
Afghanistan, militant alliances have
been frequently viewed as overly
complex and inaccessible. Given that
many Taliban and militant figures hold
far-reaching and deep connections
throughout provinces and villages, and
these ties are compounded by socio-
cultural infrastructures such as religion
and marriage, it is no easy task to
unravel these relationships from the
outside.
However this study, by focusing on the
mechanical structure of militant
alliances rather than the causal and
conditional factors, some advance has
been made toward clarity. In particular,
it has become clear through the use of
mixed methods it has been found that
not all factors are equal regarding
alliance construction. Notably, tribal
elders hold almost no influence within
alliance formation. Yet communities do
play a supportive role once the alliance
is established, if at least to not disrupt
the fragile stability introduced via the
alliance.
Upper and lower-level command was
supportive of alliance construction,
though typically for differing reasons.
Lower level soldiers primarily sought
strength in alliances while commanders
were more strategic toward deeper
ambitions. This pattern remained
steadfast, holding alliances together,
with the exception of instances in which
core values were confronted, in
particular situations of foreign
intervention within local politics.
Whereas political alliances within Kabul
are different in character and
expectation than field-level alliances
between armed groups, a tangible
outcome of this study is to recognize
that such distinctions are likely critical
to a functional peacebuilding process.
Simply put, systems that engage and
encourage reintegration and unity for
militant groups must not be modelled
on the political system.
Ultimately, it was the goal of CAPS to
provide a foundational understanding of
the formation and structure of alliances
in Afghanistan, as well as some of the
ways these partnerships affect the
identity of their participants. Though we
have learned that individual contextual
environment determines the outcome of
each of these three aspects of the
alliance, some trends have been isolated
with respect to formation, maintenance,
and expectations. Building on the
holistic snapshot provided here, future
research should look more deeply at
specific elements of these findings in
continuation of the pursuit to identify
and promote pathways toward long-
term peace and stability.
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Appendix I: Questionnaires
Commander/Leader Questionnaire
Date of Interview:
Interviewer Name(s):
Province:
Interviewee Name:
Ethnicity:
Position:
Group:
GPS Coordinates:
Mapping/File Code: (OFFICE)
Group Structure
1. What type of group do you lead? (Political or militant? Name?) 2. In what areas (districts, villages) does your group have influence? 3. How long have you been involved in this group? 4. How long have you been leading this group? 5. How many men do you command/lead? 6. Have any of your men joined your group after leaving another group?
a. If yes, please tell us about them. (What group were they in, why did they leave, etc)
7. What is the goal/political objective of the group you lead? 8. How do you try to meet your group’s goals? 9. How do you teach other members about your group’s goals? 10. Do you report to anyone else? Who? How often do you talk to him? 11. Do you work with any other political or militant groups to achieve your
goals? a. If yes, what groups? In what areas do they have influence (district,
village)
Alliance Structure
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12. When did you decide to work with X GROUP? How did you come to this decision?
13. What steps did you take to complete your agreement with X GROUP? a. How did you make contact with the other group? With whom did
you make contact first? b. Did non-group tribal/community elders play any role in the
establishment of the agreement? If yes, what type of role did they play?
c. Did you meet in person to discuss the agreement? If yes, how many times? Who all was at the meeting?
d. Were there any issues you did not agree with GROUP X? i. If yes, what were they?
ii. Were you able to resolve the disagreement? If yes, how? e. Is the agreement written or oral? (If written, can we have a copy?) f. What are the main provisions of the agreement / outcome?
14. Who are the main decision makers in the agreement? 15. Do you trust the leaders of GROUP X? Why? 16. Under the agreement, do you speak to or work with any other members of
GROUP X? a. If yes, how often do you speak with X to coordinate alliance related
activities? 17. Do any other members of your group work with members of X group
under the agreement? a. If yes, who (specify their ranks and positions in the groups) works
together? b. How often do they work together? c. What types of activities do they work together on?
18. Did the agreement with GROUP X have any impact on the monetary income or financial management of your group?
a. If yes, how did it affect your group financially? i. If the agreement had a negative impact on the financial
operations of the group: What makes this agreement agreement worth the financial losses?
19. Has GROUP X had a change of leadership since the agreement? a. If yes, how did it affect the agreement? b. If no, how do you think a change of leadership in GROUP X might
affect the agreement you have now? 20. Does your agreement affect your relationship with any other groups in the
area? a. How so?
21. How long do you think your agreement will last? 22. What would make you want to end your agreement with X? 23. If you wanted to end the agreement, how would you let X know?
Impact on Identity
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24. Has the agreement lived up to your expectations? a. If not, why not?
25. What do you think are the main benefits of the agreement? 26. What do you think are the negative aspects of the agreement? 27. Did you have to give up any aspects of your group for the agreement?
a. If yes, what did you give up? 28. Did your group or GROUP X change their name after the agreement?
a. If yes, from what to what? 29. What do your subordinates think about the agreement? 30. Was it difficult for your subordinates to accept the agreement? Why or
why not? 31. Do you think that the agreement changed the way your subordinates think
about your group? a. If yes, how do you think it affects the way they think about your
group’s goals? b. Did the agreement change the commitment of your subordinates to
the group’s goals? 32. Do you think the agreement with X affects your subordinate’s commitment
to the group? c. If yes, how so?
33. Did the agreement affect community perceptions of your group or GROUP X?
d. If yes, how so? 34. Are you willing to introduce us to a contact point in GROUP X?
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Soldier Questionnaire
Date of Interview:
Interviewer Name(s):
Province:
Origin Village/ District/ Province:
Interviewee Name:
Age:
Ethnicity:
Position:
Group:
GPS Coordinates:
Mapping/File Code: (OFFICE)
Group Structure
1. What group are you in? 2. Is this your only employment?
a. If not, what is your other profession? b. How much time do you spend on activities for GROUP? How much
time do you spend on OTHER PROFESSION? 3. How long have you been involved in this GROUP? 4. What position do you hold? 5. Have you ever held another position in this group? 6. How many men out rank you in this group? 7. How many men share your rank in GROUP? 8. How many men are below you in the command structure? 9. Other than your group membership, how do you know the other men in
GROUP? (HINT: RELATIONSHIP MAPPING QUESTIONS) 10. In what areas (districts, villages) does your group have influence? 11. Did you or any of your fellow group members join GROUP after leaving
another group? a. If yes, please tell us about them. (What group were they in, why did
they leave, what happened? Does that group still exist? etc) 12. What is the goal/political objective of your group?
a. How did you learn about the goal/political objectives of your group?
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13. What type of activities do you and your fellow group members undertake in order to meet GROUP’s goals?
14. Does your GROUP work with any other political or militant groups to achieve your goals?
a. If yes, what groups? In what areas do they have influence (districts, villages)
Alliance Structure
15. How long has your group been working with GROUP X? 16. What prompted your group to make an agreement with GROUP X?
a. Who made the decision? 17. Were you involved in the process of making the agreement with GROUP
X? a. If not, who was involved?
18. Do you know what steps were taken to complete the agreement with X GROUP?
g. Which group initiated contact? h. How was contact made? i. Did non-group tribal/community elders play any role in the
establishment of the agreement? If yes, what type of role did they play?
j. Was there a meeting in person to discuss the agreement? i. If yes, were you there? (If they were not there, who was?)
ii. How many times did the groups meet to discuss the agreement?
k. To the best of your knowledge, were there any issues where your group did not agree with GROUP X?
i. If yes, what were they? ii. Was the disagreement ultimately resolved? If yes, how?
l. Is the agreement written or oral? (If written, can we have a copy?) m. What are the main provisions of the agreement / outcome?
19. Who are the main decision makers in the agreement? 20. Do you know any of the members of GROUP X personally?
a. If yes, who do you know? How do you know them? (HINT: RELATIONSHIP MAPPING QUESTIONS)
21. Under the agreement, do you speak to or work with any other members of GROUP X?
b. If yes, how often do you work with members of GROUP X on alliance related activities?
c. Who from GROUP X do you work with? What ranks are they? d. What types of activities do you participate in?
22. Do any other members of your group work with members of X group under the agreement?
d. If yes, who (specify their ranks and positions in the groups) works together?
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e. How often do they work together? f. What types of activities do they work together on?
23. Did the agreement with GROUP X have any impact on the monetary income or financial management of your group?
a. If yes, how did it affect your group financially? i. If the agreement had a negative impact on the financial
operations of the group: What makes this agreement agreement worth the financial losses?
24. Has GROUP X had a change of leadership since the agreement? c. If yes, how did it affect the agreement?
25. Does your agreement affect your relationship with any other groups in the area?
b. How so? 26. Does your agreement affect your group’s relationship with the
communities in which you have influence? a. If yes, how? b. Is your relationship with the community better or worse after the
agreement? 27. How long do you think your agreement will last?
a. What types of situations would make you want to end the agreement?
b. Who determines when the agreement ends? (Commanders? Is there a vote? Etc.)
Impact on Identity
28. Has the agreement lived up to your expectations? a. If not, why not?
29. What do you think are the main benefits of the agreement? 30. What do you think are the negative aspects of the agreement? 31. Did you have to give up any aspects of your group for the agreement?
a. If yes, what did you give up? 32. Did you group or GROUP X change their name after the agreement?
a. If yes, from what to what? 33. What do your fellow group members think about the agreement? 34. Were any parts of the agreement difficult for you to accept?
a. If yes, what were they? Why were they difficult to accept? i. What made you ultimately accept them?
b. If not, why not? 35. Did any of your fellow group members object to any parts of the
agreement? a. If yes, who objected? What did they object to? Why?
36. Did the agreement change the way you think about your group? e. If yes, how does it affect the way you think about your group’s
goals? f. Did the agreement change your commitment to your group’s goals?
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37. Do you think the agreement changed the way your fellow group members think about the group?
a. If yes, how? b. If yes, do you think the agreement as affected your fellow group
members’ commitment to the group’s goals? 38. Did the agreement affect community perceptions of your group or GROUP
X? g. If yes, how so?
39. Are you willing to introduce us to a contact point in GROUP X?
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Detainee Questionnaire
Date of Interview:
Interviewer Name(s):
Interview Location (Prison / Province):
Interviewee Name:
Age:
Origin Village/ District/ Province:
Ethnicity:
Position:
Group:
GPS Coordinates:
Mapping/File Code: (OFFICE)
Basic Information
1. How long have you been detained? (Month/Year) 2. Of what crime have you been accused? 3. Are/were you a member of a political or militant group? 4. If yes, what group are you in?
a. Do you still consider yourself a member? (Then use tense accordingly)
5. Was this your only employment? a. If not, what is your other profession? b. How much time did you spend on activities for GROUP? How much
time do you spend on OTHER PROFESSION? 6. Prior to your incarceration, how long were you involved in GROUP? 7. Are there any other members of your group detained in this facility?
a. If yes, who?
Group Structure
8. What position did you hold? 9. Have you ever held another position in this group? 10. How many men out rank you in this group? 11. How many men share your rank in GROUP? 12. How many men are below you in the command structure?
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13. Other than your group membership, how do you know the other men in GROUP? (HINT: RELATIONSHIP MAPPING QUESTIONS)
14. In what province is your group active? 15. In what areas (districts, villages) does your group have influence? 16. Did you or any of your fellow group members join GROUP after leaving
another group? a. If yes, please tell us about them. (What group were they in, why did
they leave, what happened? Does that group still exist? etc) 17. What is the goal/political objective of your group?
a. How did you learn about the goal/political objectives of your group? 18. What type of activities did you and your fellow group members undertake
in order to meet GROUP’s goals? 19. Does GROUP work with any other political or militant groups to achieve
your goals? a. If yes, how many groups do you work with?
i. Do they all work together? Or do you maintain individual agreements with each?
b. What groups do you work with? In what areas do they have influence (districts, villages)
Alliance Structure
20. How long has your group been working with GROUP X? 21. What prompted your group to make an agreement with GROUP X?
a. Who made the decision? 22. Were you involved in the process of making the agreement with GROUP
X? a. If not, who was involved?
23. Do you know what steps were taken to complete the agreement with X GROUP?
n. Which group initiated contact? o. How was contact made? p. Did non-group tribal/community elders play any role in the
establishment of the agreement? If yes, what type of role did they play?
q. Was there a meeting in person to discuss the agreement? i. If yes, were you there? (If they were not there, who was?)
ii. How many times did the groups meet to discuss the agreement?
r. Do you know if there any issues where your group did not agree with GROUP X?
i. If yes, what were they? ii. Was the disagreement ultimately resolved? If yes, how?
s. Is the agreement written or oral? (If written, can we have a copy?) t. What are the main provisions of the agreement / outcome?
24. Who are the main decision makers in the agreement?
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25. Do you know any of the members of GROUP X personally? a. If yes, who do you know? How do you know them? (HINT:
RELATIONSHIP MAPPING QUESTIONS) 26. Under the agreement, did you speak to or work with any other members of
GROUP X? e. If yes, how often did you work with members of GROUP X on
alliance related activities? f. Who from GROUP X did you work with? What ranks are they? g. What types of activities did you participate in? h. Now that you are detained, do you know if your group continues to
carry out activities with GROUP X? 27. Do any other members of your group work with members of X group
under the agreement? g. If yes, who (specify their ranks and positions in the groups) works
together? h. How often were they working together before you were detained? i. What types of activities did they work together on? j. Do you believe/know if they are still working together?
28. Did the agreement with GROUP X have any impact on the monetary income or financial management of your group?
a. If yes, how did it affect your group financially? i. If the agreement had a negative impact on the financial
operations of the group: What makes this agreement worth the financial losses?
29. Has either group had a change of leadership since the agreement? d. If yes, what group had a leadership change?
a. How did it affect the agreement? 30. Did your agreement affect your (group’s) relationship with any other
groups in the area? c. How so?
31. Did your agreement affect your group’s relationship with the communities in which you have influence?
a. If yes, how? b. Is your relationship with the community better or worse after the
agreement? 32. Do you think your detainment has had an impact on the agreement?
a. If yes, how so? 33. How long do you think your agreement will last?
a. What types of situations would make you want to end the agreement?
b. Who determines when the agreement ends? (Commanders? Is there a vote? Etc.)
Impact on Identity
34. Has the agreement lived up to your expectations?
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a. If not, why not? 35. What do you think are the main benefits of the agreement? 36. What do you think are the negative aspects of the agreement? 37. Did you have to give up any aspects of your group for the agreement?
a. If yes, what did you give up? 38. Did you group or GROUP X change their name after the agreement?
a. If yes, from what to what? 39. What do your fellow group members think about the agreement? 40. Were any parts of the agreement difficult for you to accept?
a. If yes, what were they? Why were they difficult to accept? i. What made you ultimately accept them?
b. If not, why not? 41. Did any of your fellow group members object to any parts of the
agreement? a. If yes, who objected? What did they object to? Why?
42. Did the agreement change the way you think about your group? h. If yes, how does it affect the way you think about your group’s
goals? i. Did the agreement change your commitment to your group’s goals?
43. Do you think the agreement changed the way your fellow group members think about the group?
a. If yes, how? b. If yes, do you think the agreement as affected your fellow group
members’ commitment to the group’s goals? 44. Did the agreement affect community perceptions of your group or GROUP
X? j. If yes, how so?
45. Are you willing to introduce us to some other members of your group? 46. Are you willing to introduce us to a contact point in GROUP X?
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Community Questionnaire
Date of Interview:
Interviewer Name(s):
Interview Location (district / Province):
Interviewee Name:
Age:
Origin Village/ District/ Province:
Ethnicity:
Occupation:
GPS Coordinates:
Mapping/File Code: (OFFICE)
Basic Information
1. Are you from X VILLAGE originally? a. If not, where were you born? When did you move to X VILLAGE?
Why? 2. What is your trade/occupation? 3. How many sons do you have? 4. What is their occupation? 5. Do you sit on any local shuras? (CDC, PC, etc)
a. If yes, which ones? What position do you hold on it?
Community Landscape:
6. What are the major villages in your district? 7. Who is the District Governor?
a. Where is he from? b. What do people think about his performance in office?
8. Who is the District Chief of Police? a. Where is he from? b. What do people think about his performance in office?
9. Who are the most important community leaders? a. Names? What give them their influence with the people? b. What positions do they hold?
10. What shuras are active in the district? Which are the most useful?
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Security
11. Is your district secure? a. Why? Why not?
12. Has security improved or worsened in the last year? a. Why?
13. What areas of your district are the most secure? 14. What areas of your district are least secure? 15. What militant groups are active in your district?
a. How many anti-government groups are there? b. How many pro-government militant groups are there?
16. What political groups are active in your district? a. How many are there?
17. Over the past year, has the number of militant groups active in your district increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?
a. If it changed, why? 18. Over the past year, has the number of political groups active in your
district increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? a. If it changed, why?
Alliances
19. Do you know of any groups that have formed an alliance or maintain agreements under which they work together?
a. If yes, which groups have an alliance? b. If yes, how do you know about this alliance?
20. Have you or any other community members play a role in helping two or more groups form an alliance
a. If yes, tell us about it: i. What role did you play in the establishment of the
agreement? ii. Why did you and/or other community members help
facilitate the alliance? iii. Were you and/or other community members present during
the agreement negotiations? If yes, how many times did the groups meet? Who all was at the meeting?
iv. Were there any issues the two groups could not agree on? 1. If yes, what were they? 2. Were the groups able to resolve the disagreement? If
yes, how? v. Is the agreement written or oral? (If written, can we have a
copy?) 21. What are the main provisions of the agreement / outcome? 22. Did either of the groups change their name after the agreement?
Impact
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23. How has the agreement impacted security in your district? 24. How has the agreement impacted the political landscape of your district? 25. Has the agreement lived up to community expectations?
a. If not, why not? 26. What do you think are the main benefits of the agreement? 27. What do you think are the negative aspects of the agreement? 28. What does your fellow community members think about the agreement? 29. Did any of your fellow community members object to the agreement?
a. If yes, who objected? Why? 30. Did the agreement change the way you think about either group?
k. If yes, how? 31. Are you willing to introduce us to some members of either group?
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Appendix II: Relationship Mapping Matrix
Shared Family
Relationships
Village/Dista
nce Tribe
Fighting
Legacy Religion
1 (No
Relationship)
No family
relationship
Non-
neighboring
district
Different
ethnic group,
does not
speak same
language
No shared
history of
fighting or N/A
Different
sects
2
Distant relative
(greater than
2nd cousin)
Neighboring
district
Different
ethnic group;
speaks same
language/dial
ect
Both
previously
faught for
same faction,
but different
groups
Attends
different
mosque, no
religious
experience
3
Marriage
between
families (father
in-law;
brother-in law;
children are
married etc)
Different
manteqa,
same district
Same ethnic
group,
different
tribal
branches
(Barakzai &
Alizai)
Short shared
history of
fighting (1 -3
y ears)
Attends
different
mosque;
attended
same
madrassa
4
First tier
extended
family (Uncle,
cousin,
grandfather,
etc)
Different
v illage, same
manteqa
Same tribe,
different sub
group
(Noorzai,
Ishaqzai)
Shared history
of fighting (5-7
y ears)
Attends same
mosque,
attended
different
madrassa
5 (Strongest
Relationship)
Immediate
family
members
(Father, Son,
brother)
Live in the
same v illage
Same tribe,
same sub-
tribe (ex: both
Noorzai)
Shared history
of fighting (7+
y ears)
Attends same
mosque,
AND same
madrassa