Transcript
Page 1: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

CountryReport

Turkey

HaldunGülalp

November 2019

http://grease.eui.eu

This Country Report offers a detailed assessment of religious diversity and violent religious radicalisation in the above-named state. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. More basic information about religious affiliation and state-religion relations in these states is available in our Country Profiles series. This report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation. Countries covered in this series: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640

Page 2: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

2

The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation. Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends. While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failed because second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, with some turning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovative academic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights for governance of religious diversity. The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from The European University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members include Professor Tariq Modood from The University of Bristol (UK); Dr. H. A. Hellyer from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. Mila Mancheva from The Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Racius from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA (Germany); Professor Mehdi Lahlou from Mohammed V University of Rabat (Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University (India); and Professor Michele Grossman of Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). GREASE is scheduled for completion in 2022. For further information about the GREASE project please contact: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou, [email protected]

http://grease.eui.eu/ GREASE - Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives

Page 3: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

3

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5

2. POPULATIONCOMPOSITION ......................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

2.1CURRENTCOMPOSITIONOFTHEPOPULATIONANDCHALLENGESARISINGFROMIT .. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 2.2ECONOMICANDCULTURALFACTORSTHATRELATETOTHEPOPULATIONCOMPOSITION .......... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

3. STATE-RELIGIONRELATIONSANDRELIGIOUSDIVERSITYGOVERNANCE ......... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

3.1STATE-RELIGIONRELATIONSINHISTORICALPERSPECTIVE ................ ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 3.2.CURRENTINSTITUTIONALSTRUCTUREFORGOVERNINGRELIGIONANDRELIGIOUSDIVERSITY . ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

4. RADICALISATIONCHALLENGES .................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

5. POLICIESANDPRACTICESADDRESSINGANDPREVENTINGRELIGIOUSRADICALISATION ................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 26

Page 4: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

4

Page 5: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

5

1. INTRODUCTION:TheControversyoverTurkishSecularismTurkeyiswidelyconsideredtobeapioneeringexampleofasecularstateinaMuslim-majoritynation.AccordingtoErnestGellner,forexample,whocouldbecountedamongthe “orientalists” writing on Muslim society along with Bernard Lewis and SamuelHuntington,IslamisanexceptionamongreligionsbecauseitcannotbesecularizedandTurkey is “theexceptionwithin theexception” (Gellner,1997,p.236).Becauseof thepolitical/ideological significance of this seemingly unlikely combination of Islam andsecularism,muchcontroversyandmyth-makinghaveaccompaniedscholarlyanalysesoftheTurkishexperience.Whetherasanexpressionofappreciationorregret,therehasneverthelessbeenageneralagreementaroundtheviewthatMustafaKemal(Atatürk)andhisassociates,i.e.,theKemalistleadershipoftheRepublicofTurkey,embarkedona course of state-led, top-down modernization and secularization that aimed totransformthisMuslimnationintoaWesternized,secularentity,albeitwithonlylimitedsuccess.Anewgenerationofscholars,however,havebeenproducingagrowingliteraturethatchallengesandcomplicatesthisreceivedwisdom.CerenLord(2018,p.xi),forexample,buildingonDenizKandiyoti’s (2012) criticaldescriptionof the “masternarrative”ofTurkish history, notes that “many previous studies adopted a binary framework ofanalysis inwhich Turkish historywas narrated as beingmarked by a confrontationbetweenanauthoritariansecularKemaliststateandaMuslimsociety,”andgoesontoarguethatthisframeworkledmanytowelcometheriseoftheJusticeandDevelopmentParty(AKP)topowerasaprocessofdemocratization.Inadditiontoaseriesofworksthatquestiontheassumptionsofthis“masternarrative”(e.g.,Azak,2010;Akan,2017;Lord,2018),thereisalsoasetofrecentwritings(e.g.,Adak,2015;TombuşandAygenç,2017;Mutluer,2018;Öztürk,2018)thataddressstate-religionrelationsinTurkeyinthelightoftheAKPexperienceandcriticallynotethecentralrole,underAKPrule,ofwhathas always been described as the backbone of state secularism, the Directorate ofReligiousAffairs(DiyanetİşleriBaşkanlığı,DIB).Buildingonthisliterature,aswellasmy own previouswork, I offer in this report a critique of the receivedwisdom andquestionwhether Turkey’smodel of state-religion relations has really ever been anexampleofsecularism,letalone“oppressive”(Yavuz,2003)or“assertive”(Kuru,2007)secularism.AsuccinctarticulationofthereceivedwisdomonTurkishsecularismmaybefoundinTariqModoodandThomasSealy(2019,p.10),whospeakof“Ataturk’sTurkey,whichsoughttocontrolandutilisereligion;through,forexample,theDiyanet(DirectorateofReligiousAffairs).”Butthisaccountismisleadingonseveralcounts.Theinstitutionsthatareheldresponsiblefor“controlling”or“regulating”religioninTurkey,suchastheDIB,werenotinventedbyKemalAtatürkhimselfortheKemalistleadershipofthemodern

Page 6: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

6

state,butinheritedfromtheOttomanEmpireandthentransformedtoacertainextent.Thus,first,iftheKemaliststateistobeconsideredsecularbecauseoftheseinstitutions,thenbydefinitiontheOttomanEmpireoughttobeconsideredsecularaswell.Second,the Kemalist leadership in fact restructured these institutions in order to separatereligionfromthestate,butdidnot(orcouldnot)gofarenough.AnimplicitelementofthereceivedwisdomisthatIslamwassuppressedbytheKemalistregime,a“grievance”frequentlyexpressedbyIslamistcircles.Thistooisfalse,astheregime’sintentionwasnottosuppressreligionorreligiosityperse,buttopreventthemanipulationofreligionfor political ends. Here again the regime was unsuccessful. The Kemalist project ofseparation was never accomplished, but remained as an object of contestationthroughoutTurkishpoliticalhistory.Finally,ifby“utilizationofreligion”ismeantthepoliticalmobilizationofthemassesthroughreligiouslanguage,thisissomethingthatwouldbedonemorebythosepoliticalforcesormovementsthatareclosertoIslamismthantosecularism,andthathasindeedbeenthecaseinTurkishpoliticalhistory.FortheKemalists, a proper separation between religion and the state had to include aseparationbetweenreligionandpolitics.Thiswaspartlyjustifiedongroundsoffreeingstateaffairsfromreligiousinfluenceandpartlybasedonaconcernaboutthedangerofdebasingreligionbyinstrumentalizingit forpoliticalends.BothofthesearerelevantconcernsforapoliticsofsecularismandtheirveracityhasindeedbeenborneoutbytherecentAKPexperience.Inordertoelaborateonthesepointsinthisessay,IfirstaimtoshowinthenexttwosectionsthatreligionhasalwayshadacentralroleintheTurkishstate(a)indefiningthecoreofthenationand(b)bureaucraticallyoccupyingpartofthestatestructure.ThepossibilityofinstitutinganIslamistregimealwaysexistedduetothisconfiguration,andtherecentAKPexperienceservedtodemonstratethispotential,alarmingnotonlythesecularists(Kemalistorotherwise)butalsotheerstwhilesupportersoftheAKPwhowereliberalcriticsofKemalism.TheAKP’seffortstoinstituteanIslamistregimefromabovealsoalarmedarangeofreligiouscircles,becausetheuseofstateinstitutionstoimposereligiosityineffectturnedpiouspeopleawayfromreligion,adangernotedbyKemalistsearlyon.

2. NationandReligion:IslamastheDefiningCoreoftheTurkishNationIn earlymodernEuropean state-building, cleansingofpopulations inorder to create“national”homogeneitytookplacefirstalongreligiouslines(Marx,2003).Bycontrast,the Ottoman Empire (OE), although an Islamic empire, self-confidently containeddiversepopulationsthatwereidentifiedandorganizedonthebasisofreligionratherthan ethnicity or language. A religious community (called “millet”) could includedifferentethnicandlinguisticgroups,andresidentsofdifferentregionsoftheempire,andhadsomemeasureofpoliticalpowerandsignificance.WhiletheMuslimpopulationwasatthetopofthehierarchy,theimperialstatenonethelessgrantedeachmilletsomeformofautonomyintheirinternallegal,judicial,aswellculturalandeducationalaffairs,

Page 7: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

7

andeachwasrepresentedbyaleaderwhosepositionwasincorporatedintothecentraladministrationoftheempire(BraudeandLewis,1982;Barkey,2008).Theissueofahomogeneous“national”identityintheOEonlyarosewhentheconceptofequal citizenshipwas first introduced in themid-nineteenthcentury.Theeffort tobuildacollectiveidentityledtothenotionofOttomanism–aprematureandultimatelyunsuccessful attempt to create a proto-secular nationalist ideology. The notion ofOttomanism represented an attempt to imagine a unified territorial identity for theinternallydiverseempire.Itwascreatedinanefforttoretaintheloyaltyofnon-Muslimsandcombat the separatistmovements thathadappeared in theBalkans,bybuildingequal citizenship irrespective of religion (Kayalı, 1997). Regardless, the empirecontinuedtobedismemberedthroughoutthelatenineteenthcenturyand,inconstantwarfareduringitslastdecades,lostmuchofitsBalkanterritories,whichwerepopulatedmostly by Christian subjects and whose Muslim occupants migrated to Anatolia.Alternative ideologies competing with Ottomanism were Islamism and “Turkism”(Akçura, 1904). Particularly during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876-1909),Islamism became more prominent as state ideology, although Ottomanism was notofficially abandoneduntilWorldWar I. Finally, the failure ofOttomanism initiated apolicy of primarily religious purification of what would eventually become Turkey,although it was legitimized as Turkish nationalism. The Armenian population wassubjectedtoforcedmigration,conversionandmassacreduringtheWar(Akçam,2004).FurtherpurgingofChristianstookplacewiththepopulationexchangebetweenTurkeyand Greece in the 1920s, which was on the basis of religion rather than language:Turkish-speakingOrthodoxChristiansofAnatoliawereexchangedforGreek-speakingMuslims(Hirschon,2003).Duringthenineteenthcentury,asnewnormsofequalcitizenshipwerebeinginstitutedin theOE, the term“millet”hadbegun toacquire its currentmeaning in theTurkishlanguage, i.e., “nation” (Karpat, 1982). Although the millet system was significantlycircumscribedinthelastdecadesoftheOEanditformallydisappearedwiththecreationoftheTurkishRepublic,therearestillremnantsofitbothintheformalstructuresofthestateandinpopularnotionsofnationhood.Indeed,asalegacyofthemilletsystem,bothTurkey and the post-Ottoman nation-states in the Balkans pursued nation-buildingthroughreligioushomogeneity(Todorova,1996).ModoodandSealy(2019,p.9)characterizeGandhias“thefirstnationalisttomobilisemassesthroughareligion,”andPakistanas“thefirstmodernstatebasedonareligiousidentity.”Inbothregards,however,theTurkishexperienceishistoricallypriortothesecases.In1920,duringtheTurkishWarofLiberation,MustafaKemal(Atatürk)referredto thepeopleofAnatolianotasTurksbutasamosaicofethnicitiesunitedby Islam.AddressingtheNationalAssembly,hedeclared“[themembersofthisAssembly]arenotjustTurkorCircassian,KurdorLaz.TheyarecomposedofalltheIslamicelementsandconstituteacoherentwhole.”(TürkİnkılapTarihiEnstitüsü,1990,p.74).TheTurkishnationwasindeedcreatedbytheexpulsionofnon-MuslimsfromtheterritorydefinedasTurkey,andtheremainingsmallpopulationsofnon-Muslimcommunitiesweregiven

Page 8: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

8

“minority” statusandbroughtunderprotection (andgrantedsomesmallmeasureofautonomy)by theLausanneTreaty, signedon24 July1923,which securedTurkey’sindependenceandlaidthefoundationforthedeclarationoftheTurkishRepublicon29October1923.Turkishrepublicannationalismthushadmutuallycontradictorysources,inheritedfromtheOttomanperiod.ItunsuccessfullyattemptedtosynthesizeIslamism,Turkismandterritorialnationalism,thoughasa legacyoftheOttomanmilletsystem,religion retained its centrality in Turkish national identity (Kirişçi, 2000; Cagaptay,2006).Kurds,forexample,asnon-TurkishspeakingMuslims,wereconsideredcapableofassimilation into theTurkishnation,butnon-Muslimswerealwaysassumed tobeinassimilableandfundamentallyalien.Thehopeandexpectationwerethattheywouldleave the country, as they indeed did during political crises involving coordinatedattacksontheirlivesandpropertyinthe1940s,1950sandearly1960s(Yannas,2007).Therefore, during the republicanera, aswell, the remainingChristianpopulationsofAnatolia(Armenians,Greeks,andtheoften-forgottenminorityofSyriacs)wereforcedtoleaveinsuccessivewaves.Inshort,minorityandnon-Muslimhavebeen(andstillare)identicalinTurkishnationalconsciousness:anon-MuslimcitizenofTurkeyisnotconsidereda“Turk.”Non-Muslimsremainas“step-citizens”oftheRepublic,withsignificantlycurtailedcitizenshiprights(Ekmekcioglu,2014).Inalawpassedin1926,andstilldefactoinpracticedespiteitsrepealin1965,positionsinhighbureaucracyandthemilitaryareeffectivelyclosedtonon-Muslimcitizens.Indeed,theIslamicidentityofthenewTurkishstatewasevidentinitsfirstconstitution,adoptedbytheNationalAssemblyinApril1924.Article1definedthestateasaRepublic,andArticle2definedthereligionofthestateasIslam.Theclausethatdefinedthereligionofthestatewasremovedin1928andsubsequentlyreplacedbyaclause thatdefinedthestateas “secular” in1937.While thecharacterizationof thestateas“secular”hasremainedintheconstitutiontothisday,thesamecannotbesaidaboutactualstructureofthestateanditspolicies,asweseeinthefollowingsections.Intermsofbothpopularculturalassumptionsandstatepolicy,then,theTurkishnationisprimarilyimaginedasa(Sunni)Muslimentity.Thisreligiouscoreofnationalidentityseemstodefythesecularismofthestate,enshrinedintheConstitutionanduncriticallyaccepted inestablishedhistoriography.Unlessdeclaredandprovenotherwise, everychildbornasacitizeninTurkeyisregisteredasMuslimandthis is indicatedintheirgovernment-issuedidentitycard.Moreover,thereisalimittothechoiceofreligionsthatcouldlegallybestatedinanidentitycard–onlythosereligionsofficiallyrecognizedbythe stateareacceptable, identifyingoneself as “atheist”oreven just leaving thatboxblankarenot(albeitinpracticetheremaybeexceptions).“Muslim”isthusanidentityconferred upon the Turkish people by the presumably “secular” state. Islamistsespecially delight in repeating at every opportunity that 99 percent of the people ofTurkeyareMuslim.Butthisnominalcharacterizationdoesnotreflectthedemographicreality,formanyofthoselistedasMuslimdonotnecessarilypractice,andself-declaredatheistsmayconstituteupto3percentofthepopulation(Azak,2018).Arecentsurvey(conductedinMay2019)foundthatonly90percentbelieveintheexistenceandunityofGod,andonly40percentsaythattheyregularlyperformtheirprayers,nearly5per

Page 9: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

9

centbelieveintheexistenceofaCreatorbutnotinanyreligion,andtheremaining5percentareeitherunsureordonotbelieveintheexistenceofaCreator(T24,15May2019).Asreligiousminoritiesarenotcountedintheofficialcensus,weonlyhaveestimatesoftheircurrentvarietyandnumbers.The1965censuswasthelastoneinwhichMuslims(albeitwithoutanyaccountoftheirdivisionintosects)andofficiallyrecognizednon-Muslims (Jews, Greeks and Armenians) were counted. Despite some inconsistencybetweentheprovincesintheirdefinitionsandclassifications,nation-widesurveysfrom1927to1965neverthelessgiveusasenseofthedeclineintheirnumbers.Thenumberof“Christians”ingeneraldeclinedfromabout320,000(2.4percentofthepopulation)in1927toabout207,000(0.65percent)in1965.ThelargedeclineisprimarilyduetotheexodusofthoseGreeksthatwereinitiallyexemptedfromthepopulationexchangeinthe1920s.Thenumberof“Armenians”declinedfromabout78,000in1927to70,000in1965,andthenumberofJewsfromabout78,000in1927toabout38,000in1965,asmanymigratedtoIsraelafterthatstate’screation.Also,theremainingminoritieschosetomovefromtheirprovinciallocalestoIstanbul,wheretheywouldfeelsafer.FortheArmenians,thepercentageofthoselivinginIstanbulrosefrom70to90between1927and1965,andfortheJewsfrom60to80.Finally,thenumberofthosebelongingtoallothernon-Muslimreligions,classifiedinthecensusas“other/unknown”declinedfrom20,000in1927to15,000in1965(Dündar,2000,pp.55-64).Currentlywehavenoofficialdata,butanumberofsources(rangingfromtheUSStateDepartment, Minority Rights Groups, and private companies that administerquestionnaire surveys)offerestimates thatvarywidely. Still, ina totalpopulationofroughly 82 million, non-Muslims are in miniscule proportions. Armenians may beanywhere between 60,000 and 90,000, Greeks between 2,000 and 5,000, and Jewsbetween16,000and20,000.Inaddition,theremaybe3,000ChaldeanChristians,5,000Jehovah’sWitnesses,upto7,000membersofProtestantdenominations,10,000Bahais,15,000 Russian Orthodox (mostly composed of Russian immigrants), 25,000 RomanCatholics(again,composedofimmigrants),and25,000Syriacs.Therearealsoroughly3millionShiaMuslims.But the most significant religious minority in Turkey are the Alevis, that may beanywherebetween10to30percentof thepopulation(i.e., roughly10to25millionpeople).Consideredahereticsectbymainstream(Sunni)Muslimopinion,aswellasbySunniauthoritieswithinboththetheologicalfacultiesofuniversitiesandtheDIB,theAlevis themselves aredividedbetween thosewhoemphasize the syncreticnatureoftheirfaithandthosewhoinsistthattheyarepart,orindeedthecorrectinterpretation,ofIslam.Regardless,whetherundertheKemalistortheAKPregimeofsecularism,thedemandsofthevarietyofAlevishavebeenignored,andtheyhavebeendiscriminatedagainst or outright persecuted. The limits of Turkish secularism are most clearlyrevealedbythestatusandexperienceoftheAlevis(Gülalp,2013).

Page 10: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

10

3. StateandReligion:TheInstitutionalFrameworkinHistoricalPerspectiveAlthough the received wisdom in Turkish historiography takes the creation of therepublicunderKemalistleadershipasabreakinthehistoryofreligiousaffairs,thereareinfactsignificantcontinuitiesbetweentheOttomanandRepublicanperiodsintermsofpolitical culture and state structure (Deringil, 1993a; Meeker, 2002; Gülalp, 2005;Bottoni, 2007). This is true whether we consider the secularization of society as amodernizationprocessortheinstitutionofsecularismasanormativepoliticalprinciple.By the former, I mean the process whereby “the social significance of religiondiminishes” through economic, social, and institutional differentiation andrationalization(WallisandBruce,1992,pp.8-9),whilethelatterreferstotheprinciplethat aims to guarantee citizens the right to freedom of “conscience and religion” asspelledoutininternationalhumanrightsdocuments(UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,Article18;EuropeanConventiononHumanRights,Article9),whichalsoincludesthefreedomof“atheists,agnostics,scepticsandtheunconcerned”(ECtHR,Kokkinakisv.Greece,14307/88,25May1993,para.31). It isusefultodistinguishbetweenthesetwoconcepts,becausebothintheOttomanEmpire(OE)andtheTurkishRepublic,thesecularizationof theeconomy,social life,and institutionsof thestateproceededtoagreater extent than the establishment of secularism as a political principle, despiteseriouseffortsinthatdirection.Or,usingJoseCasanova’s(1994,p.6)terminology,whilesecularizationas“differentiationandemancipationofthesecularspheresfromreligiousinstitutions and norms” started early and progressed considerably, secularization as“privatization,”althoughattempted,remainedfarbehind,withoccasionalboutsof“de-privatization”andeven“de-differentiation.”Thisisevidentfromtheaboveaccountofnationalidentity,butalsoneedstobeassessedwithregardtotheorganizationofthestate,aswedointhissection,andwithregardtopoliticalstrugglesandfluctuations,inthesectionstofollow.Theearlymodernizingandsecularizing“reforms”oftheOEbeganduringthereignofSultan Mahmut II (1808-1839), whose successor, Sultan Abdülmecit I (1839-1861),issued the Gülhane Rescript of 1839, starting the Tanzimat (Reorganization) period,culminating in the Constitution of 1876, which was proclaimed (but then quicklyshelved)bySultanAbdülhamitII(1876-1909).TheTanzimatreformspointedtowardthe building of a modern state in place of the patrimonial empire that the OE was(Deringil,1998,p.9).Drawingtheoutlinesofaconstitutionalmonarchy,theTanzimatreforms introduced guarantees for the security of life, honor, and property, andprotectionfromarbitraryactionsofthestate,aswellasafairsystemoftaxationandafair system of military conscription, to all subjects of the empire without regard toreligion.Thereformswouldthuspotentiallybringthemilletsystemtoanendbymakingeachindividual,quaindividual,equalbeforethelawandindependentofthecommunalhierarchy,thusturningimperialsubjectsintocitizens.AlthoughAbdülhamitIIshelvedthe constitution almost as soon as he ascended the throne, he continued with themodernizing and secularizing reforms of the state, building a rational bureaucracy,expandingmassschooling,thepostalservice,railways,andsoon,whileatthesametimehe legitimizedhispower through Islamist ideology.Hewasanautocraticruleranda

Page 11: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

11

ferventmodernizer.Manyofthebureaucratic institutionsofRepublicanTurkeywerefounded during his reign. Abdülhamit was “implementing the concrete policy of arationalsecularprogramme,”buthewasdoingsothroughthepoliticallanguageofIslam(Deringil,1993b,pp.5-6).As the OE was integrated into global capitalism, the judicial system also had to besecularized.Intheclassicalmilletsystem,therewasjudicialpluralitybecauseJewsandChristianshadtheirowncourtsoutsideoftheIslamicjusticesystem.Additionally,therewasanotherparalleljusticesystemapplicabletoforeigntraders,whichwasarrangedthrough“capitulations”grantedtothegovernmentsoftheirhomecountries.Indealingswiththem,animpersonalandwritten(“Weberian”)legalsystemprevailed,asopposedtothe“kadi justice”ofIslamic law.Asthesecapitulationsbegantocovernon-MuslimOttoman citizens aswell, because foreign powers could also bring themunder theirprotectioninbusinessdealings,Muslimtradersfellintoadisadvantage.Consequently,the state was forced to create a system of “secular and heavily western-influencedcommercialcourtsinIstanbulandCairointhe1850s”(Kuran,2011,p.208).Asimilarsecularization trend also prevailed in the education system in the mid-nineteenthcentury. The needs of the bureaucracy and themilitary to adapt to the pressures ofmodernization, trying to catch up with Western European states, necessitated theintroductionofsecularcurriculaandmethodsofeducation,whichdevelopedalongsidethetraditionalreligiouseducationdominatedbytheIslamiculema(Ortaylı,1983).Butthesesecularizingmovesdidnotchangethewaythatstate-religionrelationswereorganizedintheOE.InWestern/Christiansocieties,secularismisoftenconceptualizedasamodeofrelationshipbetweenchurchandstate,i.e.,betweenclericalandtemporalauthority,arrangedinavarietyof forms,suchasstrictseparation,mutualautonomy,institutionalcooperation,andsoon.NoneoftheseconceptsarerelevanttotheOttoman-Turkish experience, as clerical authority has never had a corporate existenceindependent of the state. In medieval Europe, the Catholic Church was the onlybureaucraticpowerthatwasorganizedacrossthecontinent,withauthorityoverlocalpowers. The establishment of territorial political authority in early modern EuropenecessarilyinvolvedaconfrontationwiththeCatholicChurch.TheoppositionoftheselocalpowerstothecentralizedstructureoftheChurchfueledtheEnlightenmentideasandthepoliticalrevolutionsagainsttheclergy(Gay,1966;Harris1966).Consequently,the European nation-states either became secular or founded their own nationalchurches. The religious establishment in the Ottoman Empire, by contrast, wasincorporated into the state structure, dominated by the sultan. Although doctrinallythereisnoclericalhierarchyinIslam,asnointermediaryshouldgobetweenGodandthefaithful,therewasjustsuchabureaucracyaspartoftheOttomanstate(İnalcık,1989,pp.169-71).Butthisbureaucracydidnothaveanyrealindependentpower,becausethesultanwasalsotheCaliph,andthereligiousestablishmentonlyexercisedauthorityinhisname.TheŞeyhülislam,astheheadofthereligioushierarchy,wasthegovernment’schiefjurist,whoseadvicethesultanwouldseekonlegalandpoliticalmatters,buthewasdirectlyappointedanddeposedbythesultan(İnalcık,1989,p.94).

Page 12: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

12

WhenIstanbulcameunderBritishoccupationattheendofWorldWarI,paralysingtheOttoman government, the nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal formed a parallelgovernment inAnkarawaging theLiberationWar (1919-1922). In1920, theAnkaragovernmentcreatedtheMinistryofShariaandPiousFoundationinplaceoftheofficeoftheŞeyhülislam,whichwasbasedinoccupiedIstanbul.AftertheLiberationWarwaswonandtheRepublicfounded(1923),amongthenewinstitutionscreatedin1924wastheDirectorateofReligiousAffairs(DIB)attachedtotheprimeministry,whichtooktheplace of the Ministry of Sharia and Pious Foundations. DIB formally resembled theOttoman institution of Şeyhülislam, insofar as each was part of the respective statestructure. But the substantive difference between them illustrates the character ofKemalism’sprojectof“secularism.”WhiletheŞeyhülislamwouldissuereligiousopinionregardingmattersofstateandlaw,warandpeace,andsoon,asthesultansformallysoughttheirpoliticalandlegaladvice,therepublicanregime,attemptingtoturnfaithsolely into a private and personal matter, had restricted the role of DIB to issuingopinionsonthedailyaffairsoftheaveragebeliever.SomearguethattheKemalistregimecreatedtheDIBspecificallyinordertodominatereligious affairs and even suppress religiosity in society. According to Hakan Yavuz(2000, p.29), for example, “In order to subordinate religion to the politicalestablishment,aswasdoneintheCommunistEasternbloc,thenewKemalistRepubliccreateditsownversionofIslambyestablishingtheDirectorateofReligiousAffairs”(seealsoTuram,2007,p.42;Kadıoğlu,2010,pp.492-3).Butthisinterpretationisfalse.Infact,the creation of this institution had “liberal” origins, intended precisely to separatereligion frompolitics.At the timethat the lawwaspassed, thegovernmentstructureincludedboththechiefofstaffofthemilitaryandtheheadofthereligiousinstitutionasmembersofthecabinet.MustafaKemalhadalreadymadeclearhisviewsontheroleofthemilitaryincivilianpolitics(VolkanandItzkowitz,1984,pp.66-7).Inasinglebilloflaw, both of these seatswere removed from the cabinet and reduced to the level ofdepartmentsoftheprimeministry,ongroundsthatneithermilitarynorreligiousaffairsleadersshouldbeinvolvedinpoliticsorpoliticaldecision-making(Genç,2005).ThisishowMustafaKemalspoketotheNationalAssemblyaboutthebill:“Honorablemembers!Theprincipleofkeepingthearmyseparatefromthegenerallifeofthecountryisapointwhich the Republic always regards as fundamental… Along the same lines, … it isindispensable to liberate the religion of Islam, within which we have been livingpeacefullyandhappilywithdevotion,fromthecustomarywaysinwhichithasbeenameansofpolitics”(quotedinAkan,2017,p.139).Moreover, as a result of the parliamentary debate onwhat to call this department’saffairs, the term “religion” (din), which was in the original proposal, was foundinappropriateandthedecisionwasmadetocallit“piety”(diyanet).ThecorrectEnglish-language renderingof thenameof thisdirectorate is therefore “affairsof thepious,”ratherthan“affairsofreligion”(orreligiousaffairs)asiscustomary.Thedifferenceissignificant,fortheobjectivesofthedepartmentweredescribedintermsofhelpingpiouscitizenswithquestionsabouttheirprivateaffairsregardingreligiouspracticeandno

Page 13: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

13

morethanthat.Theintentionwasindeedtheprivatizationofreligionanditsseparationfrompolitics.The privatization of religion was not a new idea. An early precedent existed in astatementattributedtoSultanMahmutII(1808-1839).InadiscussionoftheconceptofOttomanism,Akçura(1904,p.20)notesthattheSultanfamouslysaidthathewishestosee religious differences between his subjects only when they have entered theirmosques, synagogues and churches. While this ideal of “privatization,” preciselyimaginedinordertocreateequalcitizenship,continuedtoexistasanideal,itwasneversuccessfully achieved, even during the Republican period. In 1927, Mustafa KemalAtatürkdeliveredaspeechintheNationalAssemblythatlastedseveraldays,inwhichhegaveadetailedaccountofthenationalstruggleandthefirstyearsoftherepublic,indicating accomplishments and failures. This speech, which has been published inEnglish (as The Speech) and other languages, has been treated as the authoritativehistoryofthecreationoftherepublic.Needlesstosay,thisaccountreflectedhisownpointofviewandmanyofitsdetailsweredisputedbyotherpoliticalactorsoftheperiod.Butwhatconcernsushereishisconceptionofsecularismasstatedinthespeech:“Agovernment that has various religious communities among its citizens and isresponsiblefortreatingindividualsfromeveryreligioninajustandequitablemanner,andforprovidingjusticeinitscourtsequallytosubjectsandforeignersalike,isobligatedtorespectthefreedomofreligionandthought.”(Atatürk,1927,p.523).Hegoesontoindicate that secularismmeant bringing sovereignty down from the heavens to thepeopleandthat thosewhopursuedpoliticsbyreferencetoreligionwereopposedtobothpopularsovereigntyandthefreedomofreligion.During the early years of the Republic, the government under Mustafa Kemal’sleadership continued with the measures started in the Ottoman period to furtherrationalizeandsecularizethelegal,judicialandeducationalsystems.ThedualstructuresintheformofparallelIslamicandsecularinstitutions,stillinexistenceasinheritedbytheRepublic,werefinallyeliminatedandunified.TheLawofUnificationofEducationwas passed inMarch 1924, on the same day that the DIBwas created. All religiousschools run by the defunctMinistry of Sharia were closed and responsibility for alleducation,includingthereligious,wastransferredtothejurisdictionoftheMinistryofEducation.Amonthlater, inApril, Islamiccourtswereclosedandthe judicialsystemwasunifiedundertheMinistryofJustice.Butthisunificationdidnotmeanthatthelegalsystemwasunified.Religiouslawscontinuedtoexistalongwiththesecular.In1926,asetofnewlawswerepassed,whichweremostlyadoptedfromEuropeancodestakenasmodels.ThemostimportantoftheseforourpurposeswastheCivilCode,whichreplacedtheIslamicfamilyandpersonalstatuslaw.Inthepreparatorystagebeforethepassingofthislaw,theleadersofthenon-Muslimcommunitieswereinvited(somewouldsay,pressured)torelinquishtheirrighttohavetheirownfamilylawsgrantedtothembytheLausanne Treaty, which they did, so that when the law was adopted it becameuniversallyvalidforallcitizens(Oran,2003).

Page 14: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

14

UsuallycountedamongtheKemalistregime’s“secularizing”measuresistheabolitionoftheCaliphate,whichincidentallytookplaceonthesamedayasthecreationoftheDIBandhenceconsideredtobesomehowrelatedtoit,asifoneinstitutiontooktheplaceoftheother.Butaswesaw,DIBtooktheplaceoftheMinistryofSharia,whichinturnhadtakentheplaceoftheOttomanofficeoftheŞeyhülislam.TheabolitionoftheCaliphatewasanaltogetherdifferentmatter.Whenthenationaliststruggleendedinvictoryinthefallof1922,EuropeanpowersinvitedboththeOttomangovernmentbasedinoccupiedIstanbulandthenationalistgovernmentbasedinAnkaratocommencepeacetalksatLausanne.Inresponse,theNationalAssemblyinAnkarameton1November1922toseparate the Caliphate from the Sultanate and to abolish the Sultanate, in effectdissolvingtheOttomanEmpireforgood.TheOttomansultanatthetime,Vahdettin,thensoughtrefugewiththeBritishandfledthecountry,andhiscousinAbdülmecitIIwasnamedthenewCaliphbytheNationalAssembly.Twoyearslater, in1924,thenewlydeclaredRepublic, passeda law that abolished the seatof theCaliphateoccupiedbyAbdülmecit II,with the justificationthat thecaliphate is intrinsic to themeaningandconceptofgovernmentandrepublic,andthereforecannotexistasadistinctcenterofpower(Genç,2005,p.35).ThesamelawbanishedtheOttomandynastyfromTurkey,sendingAbdülmecitandhisfamilyintoexile.Paradoxically,however, thesemeasuresdidnot involve thebuildingof secularism inaccordancewiththenormativeprinciplesofequalityandfreedom.Islamicinfluencewaspresumablyremovedfrompoliticalandpublicaffairs,butIslamstillremainedaspartofthestateestablishmentandidentity.HereinlaythecontradictionoftheKemalistproject.AsKandiyoti(2012,p.516)remarks,“theblowsthatKemalismdealttothesymbolsandinstitutionsof Islam…mustnotbeconflatedor confusedwitha transition toa civicconceptof citizenship thatpositions the state inanequidistant relationship toall itsethnicallyandreligiouslydiversecitizenry.”Thequestionis:howdoweaccountforthis?

4. SecularizationofSocialLifevs.PoliticalSecularismWehavealreadynotedthat,asnoreligiousorganizationsuchas theCatholicChurchexisted independent of the state, a concept like “mutual autonomy” would not beapplicable.UnlikeinFrance,forexample,theKemalistsdidnothavetostruggleagainst,or reach amode of accommodation with, the clergy per se, because the clergy wasalreadyintheemployofthestate.Butonecouldperhapsimagine“mutualautonomy”betweenstateandreligioninaslightlydifferentwayandconceiveofitintermsofthestate leaving religious organization to the forces of civil society without any directinterventionor regulation, andabandoningprecisely thoseactions that the statehasassumed,suchaslicensingmosquesandputtingtheclergyongovernmentpayroll,andsoon.Thiswouldobviouslybepreferable,because,afterall,the(Sunni)Muslimclergy’ssalarycomesoutofthetaxesofallcitizens,whetherMuslimornot,orwhetherreligiousornot.Could(orshould)nottheKemalistshavegonefurtherandcompletelyseparatestateandreligioninthissense,andrelieveitselfandthenon-Muslimandnon-religiouscitizensoftheburden?

Page 15: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

15

Perhapstheycould,exceptthattheytendedtoseeuncheckedreligiousassociationsasapoliticalthreator,worse,assimplydangerous,giventhe“ignorance”oftheilliterateanduneducatedmasses.Thewaytheysawit,theirstrugglewasnotagainsttheclergy,butpreciselyagainstthose“civilsociety”forcesthatmightusethereligioussentimentsofthemassestopoliticallyunderminetheregime(i.e.,therepublic).Inthisstruggle,theysawtheclergyontheirside,astheprojectwasnottosuppressIslam,ashassometimesbeen claimed, but to build what they considered a “proper” and “enlightened”conception of Islam (Azak, 2010). The division that has historically existed betweensecularistsandIslamistsinTurkey,then,hasnotbeenbetweenlaypoliticalleadersandtheclergy,butbetweenthesecularistsandIslamiststhatcouldbefoundbothwithintheclergyandamongthepoliticalleaders.The“proper”IslamimaginedbytheKemalistswasfreeoftheelementsof“folk”Islam,suchas“superstitious”beliefsandlocal“sheiks”whocouldmanipulatethereligiosityofthe masses. Efforts to propagate “proper” Islam included publishing the Turkish-languagetranslationoftheQur’an,sothatthebelievercouldfindoutwhatwasinitforhim/herself.Thisparticulareffortinfactstartedthroughprivateinitiativebeforeitwasundertakenasastateproject,andthegovernmentonlygot involvedwhenthe initialtranslationswereseentobeofpoorquality(Wilson,2009).ThatIslamistsobjectedtothisendeavortomaketheQur’anaccessiblewasfurtherevidencefortheKemalistsofthe intention to keep pious people in the dark in order to exploit their religioussentiments.1925wasacriticalyearfortheKemalistregime,whenitwaschallengedbyaseriousuprising in the Kurdish-populated southeast, led by Sheikh Said, an influential andreveredheadoftheNaqshbandiorder.SaidpubliclycondemnedtheKemalistregimefordestroyingreligionandincitedrebelliontoendthe“blasphemy.”Researchersnotethatalthoughtheobjectivewastocreatean independentKurdistan,orat leastgainsomeform of autonomy, religious languagewas used tomotivate followers into rebellion(Bruinessen, 1978; Tunçay, 1981; Olson, 1989). In addition, the British had alongstandinginterestandinvolvementinKurdishnationalism,andalthoughtherewasno direct evidence of British involvement in the Sheikh Said rebellion, as far as theKemalistswereconcerned,theKurdswereinalliancewiththeBritishandwereservingasinisterimperialistplantodivideupthecountrywhichthenationalistshadfoughtsohard tosave fromoccupation (Tunçay,1981,pp.130-1;Olson,1989,pp.124-33).TherebellionbrokeoutinFebruary;SaidwascapturedandexecutedinApril.Theincidentled the regime to envisage an intimate connection between the Kurdish and Islamicthreats to its own stability, and prompted it to accelerate itsmove towards furtheremphasisonsecularizationandTurkishnationalism.InMarch1925,soonafterthebeginningoftherebellion,theLawfortheMaintenanceofOrder (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) was passed, giving the government extraordinarypowers.InJune1925theregimecloseddowntheoppositionpartyintheparliament,theProgressiveRepublicanParty, becauseof its alleged Islamist leanings (Ahmad,1993,

Page 16: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

16

pp.57-60).InNovember1925,theLawforDervishLodges(TekkeveZaviyelerKanunu)was passed, banning sufi brotherhoods and other grassroots religious groupings,becausetheywereseenbytheregimeaspotentialsourcesofpoliticaltrouble.InMarch1926,anewPenalCodewasadopted,includinganarticlethatbanned“theutilizationofreligionorreligioussentimentorthingsconsideredsacredbyreligionforincitingpeopletoviolatethesecurityofthestateortoformassociationstothiseffect”and“thefoundingofpoliticalassociationsbasedonreligiousideasandsentiments.”Thesamecodealsoincluded several articles protecting the “freedom of religion,” by banning anypublications“denigratinganyofthereligionsrecognizedbythestate”andanyacts“thatpreventedreligiousworship”or“damagedreligioussitesorobjects.”TheLaw for theMaintenanceofOrder remained ineffectuntil1929.Alongwith theintroduction of the Civil Code and the Penal Code, the infamous “Hat Law,” oftenassociated with the regime’s “secularizing” efforts, was introduced in this period,althoughitslinkwithsecularismorsecularizationisnotclear,exceptthatmostoftheoppositiontoitoriginatedfromIslamiccirclesandwasbasedonthecomplaintthattherimofthefedorahat,mandatedbythislawtoreplacetheuseofthefez,wasunsuitableforMuslimprayer,asifitcouldnotberemovedalongwiththeshoesduringtheprayer.Whileonemaydebatewhetherimplementingdresscodesisausefulorevenmeaningfulpractice,onemustalsonotethattheyhaveexistedthroughouthistoryinallsocieties.Moreover, headgear regulation had a precedent in Ottoman history. In the classicalregime,“clothes,andparticularlyheadgear,wereimportantmarkersofethnic,religious,andothercommunalidentitiesaswellasofsocialclassandrank”(Yılmaz,2013,pp.22-3). Sultan Mahmut II had proclaimed the fez, an inauthentic item, as the nationalheadgear to represent the equality of Ottoman citizens before the state through auniformappearance(Bottoni,2007,p.181).TheobjectiveoftheHatLawwasthesame;butitalsoexpressedthedesiretosimulatetheoutwardappearanceofwhatatthetimewasconsideredtobe“civilized,”consideringthattheEuropeansassociatedthefezwithOttoman tradition and backwardness (Yılmaz, 2013, p.29). No dress code waspromulgatedforwomen,butthosewhowereusingthefaceveilandçarşaf(similartothe Iranian chador) were encouraged to remove them and wear headscarves andovercoatsinstead.Fortheregime,thiswasastepinthelegalandpoliticalemancipationof Turkish women; more steps would be taken later. Removing the face veil wasnecessary forwomen’s activepresenceandparticipation in thepublic sphere (Adak,2014).YetanothernoveltyintroducedinthistimeframewastheLatinalphabetinplaceoftheArabicscriptusedtowriteTurkishduringtheOttomanEmpire.Thesemeasureshaveoftenbeendescribedastop-downimpositionsrejectedbysociety.Intheportrayalofthe“masternarrative”alludedtobefore,“thereligiousspherewasparticularlysubjecttoconstraintandrepressionbytheauthoritarianKemalistregime,”with this view “being particularly pronounced among authors ofMuslim sensibility”(Clayer,2015,p.98).But, infact, thesemeasures,whichcouldindeedbedescribedas“secularizing”sociallife,werenotplannedandimposedasablueprint,butarrivedatin“a changing context both within Turkey and abroad” (ibid., pp.119-20). Anti-veilingcampaigns,forexample,“wereshapedbydiscussions,negotiationsandconcessionsat

Page 17: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

17

the local level” (Adak, 2014, p.60).Often local elites, such asnewspaperwriters andeditors,prominentmembersoflocalassociations,professionalorganizations,andsoon,ratherthanstateadministrators,tooktheleadinthesecampaigns.Womenthemselves,whowantedtotaketheirplaceinsocietyasequaltomen,werealsoactiveinanti-veilingefforts(ibid.,pp.66-77).Infact,mostofthese“novelties”werenotthatnovelatall,asthey had origins in the Ottoman times, but also the collapse of the Empire and thenationalistrejuvenationcreated“asocialandpsychologicalenvironmentconducive”totheinstitutionofanewregime(Yılmaz,2013,p.13).Therefore,manyofthesemeasuresmetwithmixedreactions,giving “amuchmorecomplicatedpicture thaneither totalcomplianceortotalresistance,”andparticularly“Westernizedlocalelitesfoundmanyofthestate-promotedreformsandlifestylesacceptableandevendesirable”(ibid.,p.74andp.105).Itwaslikewisewiththealphabet“reform,”inthatthe“transformationtothenewalphabetwas infactmoregradualandthegovernmentpolicytowardnoncompliancemoreaccommodatingthanhasoftenbeenassumedintheliterature”(ibid.,p.178).Theregimefeltsecurelyestablishedbytheendofthe“MaintenanceofOrder”periodin1929,butexperiencedashockinlate1930,leadingtoaturntowardanewpolicy.Inthatyear,theprojectofinstitutingamulti-partydemocracyby(re-)creatinganoppositionpartytotherulingRepublicanPeople’sParty(RPP),foundedbyMustafaKemalin1923,endedalmostassoonasitbegan.TheFreeRepublicanPartywasfoundedbyatrustedassociate of Mustafa Kemal, but was dissolved by the founder himself within threemonthsofitsexistence,becausetheoppositionthatgatheredaroundthisparty,mostlymotivatedbytheeconomiccrisisof1929duetotheglobaldepression,wasmuchbiggerthananticipated,posingarealchallengetotherulingRPP,andseemed(orwasallegedbythegovernment)toalsoincludeIslamistadversariesoftheregime(Emrence,2000).Abiggertraumathanthisfortheregime,however,wasanincidenceofviolencethattookplacelaterintheyear,allthemoreshockingbecauseittookplaceinadistrictofacoastalcityinthewest,wheresecularizationwassupposedtohavetakenfirmerhold.Amob,marchingthroughtown,chantingandcallingforthereinstitutionofthecaliphateandsharia, attackedandkilled two local guards anda reserveofficerwhoarrivedat thescenetomaintainorder.Theythenbeheadedtheyoungofficerandparadedthroughthestreetstotheapplauseofbystanders.Thegovernmentreactedbydeclaringmartiallawintheareaandsentencingnumerousrioterstothedeathpenalty(Brockett,1998,pp.54-6).These incidents, perceived as threatening to the regime, caused a change in thegovernment’sorientation,whichcouldbeobservedinitspoliciesregardingtheplaceofreligioninsociallife.TheholymonthofRamadanwasalwaysanoccasionforfestivitiesduringtheOttomanEmpire,inwhichthegovernmenttookpartandplayedanimportantroleinorganizing.ThiscontinuedinthefirstyearsoftheRepublic,evenin1925,whentheSheikSaidrebelliontookplace.Therewas,inotherwords,aclearseparationfortheKemalistregimebetweentheplacethatreligionhad(oroughttohave)insociallifeandthat in politics. During the “Maintenance of Order” years, therewas a decline in thegovernment’senthusiasmforthesecelebrations,buttherealchangecameafter1931(Adak,2010).Therewasaconsiderableeffortintheseyearstoshifttheorientationfor

Page 18: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

18

definingnationalidentityfromIslamtoTurkishness.TheAssociationfortheStudyofTurkishHistoryandtheAssociationfortheStudyofTurkishLanguagewerefoundedbythe government, in 1931 and 1932 respectively, and each developed ideologicallyextremetheoriesthatwerelaterdiscarded,suchasthe“TurkishHistoryThesis,”whichclaimed that Turksmoving out of their original habitat in Central Asia spread theircivilizationtotherestoftheworld,includingAnatolia,whoseinhabitants,suchastheHittites and Sumerians, were therefore of Turkish origin, thus combining a racialdefinitionofthemodernTurkishnationwithaterritorialone,andthe“Sun-LanguageTheory,”whichclaimedthatall languagesof theworldderived fromtheoriginalonespoken by Central Asian Turks. National holidays, marking historical events of thenational struggle, were promulgated by law in 1935 and began to acquire greatersignificanceandmoreenthusiasticstate-organizedcelebrationsthanreligiousholidays.Finally,in1937,“laiklik”(secularism)enteredtheConstitutionasadefiningfeatureoftheRepublicofTurkey.TheTurkishHistoryThesisandtheSunLanguageTheorynevertookholdasconvincingaccountsoftheidentityoftheTurkishnation,althoughremnantsofsomeelementsofthesetheoriesmaystillbefoundintheideologicalaccountsofnationalistextremists.Intheend,bythetimethatAtatürkdiedin1938,andhiscloseassociateİsmetİnönütookover as President and head of the RPP, the national identity was still Muslim andappealing to that identitywas still an effectivemethod ofwinning political support.Besides,racistdefinitionsofthenationweretofallintodisreputewiththeendofWWII,whichTurkeywiselymanagedtostayoutof.Throughallthis,moreover,thereligiousbureaucracy(DIB)remainedaspartofthestatestructure.Completeseparationnevertookplace,althoughthesignificanceoftheDIBdeclinedthroughthe1930s.Itsbudgetand functions were already limited as it was primarily concerned with theadministrationofmosquesandtheirpersonnel,withfurtherlimitationin1931,whenthisparticular functionwas transferred to theDirectorateofPiousFoundations,alsopartofthegovernmentbureaucracy.TheDIBwasthenonlydirectlyresponsiblefortheappointmentoflocalmuftis(Islamicscholars).Butthisdeclinephasedidnotlastverylong. At the end of WWII, only several years after secularism entered the TurkishConstitution, statepolicieson religion experiencedyet another shift, this time in theoppositedirection.

5. Policies,Politics,andCurrentTrendsTheendoftheWorldWaropenedanewchapterforTurkeyinmanyways.RecruitedbytheU.S.fortheanti-SovietfrontintheColdWar,theRPPgovernmentwasencouraged,or perhaps pressured, to introduce multi-party democracy and expand theinfrastructureforreligion.TurkeywasincludedintheMarshallPlan,althoughithadnotparticipated in the World War, and was soon to become a member of NATO, aftersending troops to distant Korea. In the context of the Cold War, Turkey’s religiousidentitywouldbeausefulideologytoreinforcenationalsolidarityagainstthe“foreign”influencesofsocialismandcommunism.TherulingRPPandtheDemocratParty(DP),

Page 19: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

19

themostimportantamongthosepartiesformedintheimmediatepost-Warperiod,werein full agreement on this policy of placing greater emphasis on Turkey’s religiousidentity (Akan, 2017, pp.12-4, 137-8, 144-56). The DP was an offshoot of the RPP,seriouslychallengedit inthefirstmulti-partyelectionsof1946,andbrought itdownfromofficeinthe1950elections.AlreadybeforetheDP’sascenttopower,andpartlyunderthepressureofcompetitionfromtheDP,theRPPgovernmenttookstepsbetween1946and1950towidenthespaceforreligion.TheadministrationofallmosqueswasreturnedtotheDIB,anditssizeandbudgetwereincreased.AnumberofImam-HatipSchoolswereopened,designedtotrainpreachersandprayerleadersemployedbytheDIB,alongwithaFacultyofTheologyatAnkaraUniversity.Despite thesemoves, theDPwon the 1950 elections. Its active presence in politicalcompetitionandinpower,however,revealedthenuancebetweentheKemalistsandtheIslamistsintermsoftheexactplaceeachwouldassigntoreligioninpublicandpoliticallife.TheanthropologistPaulStirling,speakingaboutlocalpoliticsinthevillagethathewasstudyingattheendofthe1940s,rightbeforethe1950electionsthatbroughttheDPtopower,notesthefollowing:“IrememberaDemocratPartyman…[who]cametothevillagepropagandizing.Heactuallywenttothemosqueandtheyallwentwithhim,sothatheactuallydidhisprayersinfrontofthevillageandshowedthathewasagoodMuslim.TheRepublicanPeople’sPartydidn’tdothat”(Shankland,1999,p.23).ThistypeofbehavioroftheDPpoliticianswascriticizedbytheleadersoftheRPPwhiletheywereinopposition,includingbyİnönü,Atatürk’ssuccessoraspresident,whounderlinedthedistinction between “the exploitation of religion” and the “religiosity of the citizens”(Azak,2010,p.130).ReminiscentofEdgarMorin’sconceptof“catholaicité”todefinethefusion of Catholicism and laicité in present-day France, the anthropologist MichaelMeeker(2002,pp.52-53)usestheterm“Kemalo-Islamism”todescribetheactivitiesoflocalRPPpoliticiansinthevillagethathestudiedinthe1960s:“Theywouldextoltheradical secularist policies of the RPP in the midst of a coffeehouse discussion, thensuddenlyexcusethemselvestoperformtheirablutionsandprayers…EchoingofficialRPPpolicyoftheday,theycondemnedtheJPanditspredecessor,theDP,forinjectingreligion into politics, even as they took care to display their religious piety.” Thisbehavior, in fact, reflected the Kemalist position of separating religion from politics,implyingthatonecouldbebothMuslimandsecularatthesametime.Therehasbeen,andtherestillcontinuestobe,adebate(orstruggle)ontheproperplaceofreligioninpublicandpoliticallife,wheretheoutcomeisdeterminedbytherelativeroomformaneuverthatthepoliticallypowerfulgroupmayhave.But,whiletheroomforreligiousexpressioninthepublicspherehasbeensubjecttopoliticalfluctuations,theinstitutionalsetuphasremainedthesame,withatrendtowardtheexpansionofthereligiousinfrastructure.TheKemalistswerecriticaloftheDP’suseofreligioninpoliticaldiscourse,butalsowaryofaninstitutionaldesignthatwouldleavereligiousaffairstothe forcesofcivilsociety,andhencestill in favorofkeeping theDIBwithin thestatestructure.Despitesomedebateanddiscussioninthewritingofthe1961Constitution,after themilitary coup of 1960 that overthrew theDP government, theDIB actuallyfounditswayintotheconstitutionforthefirsttime.Theexpansionofthisinfrastructure

Page 20: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

20

reachedanewthresholdwiththe1980coup.WhileonlyabriefmentionoftheDIBmaybe found in the 1961 Constitution, Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution assigned aspecificroletoit, inaformulationthatisinternallycontradictory:“ThePresidencyofReligious Affairs … shall exercise its duties … in accordance with the principles ofsecularism, … aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” In another internalcontradiction,Article24ofthesameConstitutionmadeinstructionin“religiouscultureandmorals” compulsory in primary and secondary schools, while at the same timedeclaringthe“freedomofconscience,religiousbeliefandconviction.”Inshort,nationalsolidarity and integrity were important goals for the military as a bulwark againstsocialistandcommunistideologies,andIslamwasfoundtobeaconvenientidentitytounitearound(Akan,2017,pp.135-6,196-9).Thus,with theadoptionof theso-called“Turkish-IslamicSynthesis”(Çetinsaya,1999)asofficialideologybythemilitaryandthefurtherexpansionofthereligiousinfrastructurewithinthestate,Islamistmovementsfoundunprecedentedfertilegroundforpoliticalmobilization.Superficiallyitappearsasif,asErnestGellner(1994,pp.199-200)statesinaccordancewiththereceivedwisdom,thatthemilitary,regardedbyallastheguardianofKemalism,doesnotseemtohesitatetostepineverytimeademocraticelectionresultsinIslamistvictory.Acloser inspection,however, reveals that “manycrucialmomentswhere theinstitutionalpreferencesoftheKemalistCHP[RPP],intellectuals,orthemilitarycamefrom an explicit pursuit of the political end ofmobilizing religion (as the cement ofsociety)againstleftmovementsandhadnothingtodowiththecommonperceptionthatthe‘threatofIslam’requiresastrategyofcontainment”(Akan,2017,p.207).Itissafetosay,therefore,thatofthe“controlandutilize”model,whichwasperhapsmorevalidforthe post-WWII Turkey than pre-WWII, the emphasis was on “utilize” more than“control”;andbetter“utilization”ofreligionwasindeedmadebygovernmentswithanIslamistbent,startingwiththeDPandfollowingonwithitssuccessors,allthewaytothecurrentlyrulingAKP.TheendoftheColdWarcreatedatemporaryconfusionandsetbackfortheexpandingIslamicinfluence.FollowingthecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991,theconservativegovernment in power took the opportunity to lift both the ban on “communist”organizations in the Penal Code and the ban, put in place back in 1926, on politicalorganizations“basedonreligiousideasandsentiments.”Thisopeningallowedgreaterroom for Islamist mobilization at a time when the “communist threat” had alreadyceased.But,soon,Turkey’sgeo-strategicpositionasamemberofNATOledtoanewformofassignment.In1995,NATOformallyshifteditsattentionfromthenow-extinctSoviet bloc to the rise of Islamistmovements around theworld,with Turkey as the“centerpiece”ofU.S.policyandpursuitofinterestsintheMENAregion.NowthatthecommunistthreatwasreplacedbythethreatofIslamic“fundamentalism,”TurkeywasurgedbyNATO(andtheWesterncommunityofnationsmoregenerally)totakeafirmerposition domestically to prevent the development of Islamist politics (Gülalp, 1996).Thisconfiguration,combinedwiththeelectoralsuccessesoftheIslamistWelfareParty,resulted inyetanothermilitary intervention in1997,which,bycontrast to the1980coup,imposedlimitationsonreligiousexpressioninthepublicsphere.TheWelfare-led

Page 21: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

21

coalitiongovernmentwasforcedtoresign,andinthefollowingyeartheConstitutionalCourtruledfortheclosureofthispartyforviolatingtheprincipleofsecularism.ThisclosurewasupheldbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsin2001andbyitsGrandChamberin2003.AnattempttocreateanotherpoliticalpartytoreplaceWelfarealsoended in similar closure in 2001. Theban inTurkishuniversities (and certain otherinstitutions)ontheuseoftheheadscarfasasymbolofIslamicidentitywasimplementedparticularly in this time frame. Similar bans were imposed in a number of otherEuropeancountries,andthesebanswerealsoupheldbytheEuropeanCourt.Thispolicysoongavewaytoanalternativeconcept,however.Inthepost-9/11context,a concept of “moderate Islam”was contrastedwith “radical Islam” and promoted tocounterthethreatof“terrorism.”TheAKPwasfoundedin2001andconceivedasarolemodelof“moderateIslam”thatTurkeycouldoffertotheMuslimworld.Initiallyclaimingaprojectofcorrectingtheallegedpast“injustices”ofKemalistsecularismanddescribingits own ideology as “conservative democracy,” andwelcomed by theWest, the AKPswepttopowerin2002andhasremainedinofficetothisday.But,cautiousatfirstandspeakingthelanguageofdemocratization,theAKPgraduallyturnedauthoritarianandbegantoIslamizethestateandsocietyasitmoresecurelyentrencheditselfinpower(Özbudun,2014;Kaya,2015). Itdidsobytakingadvantageoftheinstrumentsatthestate’sdisposal,paradoxicallyassociatedwithKemalistsecularism.I have elsewhere argued that Islamist-inclined governments may very well use theinstitutional instrumentsat thedisposalof thepresumably“secular”Turkishstate topromoteanIslamistagendaandthattheruleoftheAKPconstitutesaperfectexampleinthisregard(Gülalp,2017).WemayconsiderthecaseoftheDIB,depictedbyauthorscriticalofKemalistsecularismasaninstrumentofthesuppressionofIslaminTurkey.The DIB continued to grow in size and extend its reach in the 1980s, during thehegemonyoftheideologyof“Turkish-IslamicSynthesis”;andespeciallyduringtheAKPperiod,itturnedintoapowerfulandprominentinstitution(Gözaydın,2009).AccordingtothestatisticsontheDIB’sofficialwebsite,thenumberofitspersonnelgrewroughlyfrom74,000in2002to120,000in2014.Itsbudgetfor2015,asreportedontheFinanceMinistry’swebsite,exceededthecombinedtotalofthebudgetoffivecabinetministries(MinistryofYouthandSports;ScienceandTechnology;ForestryandWater;CustomsandTrade;andtheEuropeanUnion).DIB’sfunctionswerediversifiedduringthisperiod.In2012,itstartedtorunitsowntelevisionchannel,DiyanetTV,targetingwomenandchildren in particular. New projects empowered DIB representatives to directlyintervene in community and even familial affairs in provincial neighborhoods. DIB’sStrategicPlanfor2012-2016,andfor2017-2021,includedsuchstrategicaimsasplayinganeffectiveroleinthesolutionofsocialproblems,findingwaystopreventthemoraldegenerationofsociety,increasingcollaborationwithotherMuslimnationsinordertopresenttotheworldan“objective”imageofIslam,andsoon.Inadditiontoitsenormoussize and daily involvement in social life, DIB also plays a significant political role inlegitimizinggovernmentactions,whichmaytaketheformofpublicstatementsbytheDirector of DIB or written sermons prepared by DIB headquarters and sent to allmosquesaroundthecountrytobereadatFridayprayers.

Page 22: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

22

Finally,theAKPgovernmentpassedanewlawin2010thatvastlyexpandedthescopeofactivitiesoftheDIB,conferringtotheorganizationawiderangeofresponsibilitiesintherealmofsocialandculturallife,tokeepvaluesandmoralsalive,andtoeducatethepeopleinthewaysofIslamregardingtheeconomy,genderrelations,andsoon(Adak,2015; Akan, 2017, pp.239-43;Mutluer, 2018). The long list of duties enumerated inArticle6ofthislawinclude“offeringlegaladvice”onthelaws,statuesandregulationspreparedbytheadministration,apparentlybringingtheDIBclosertothepositionoftheofficeoftheŞeyhülislam,asintheOttomanEmpire.Clearly,thisreversestheroleoftheDIBasoriginallyenvisagedbytheKemalists,whoseaimwastomovetowardsecularism.Theinstitutionalstructurethatincorporatesthereligiousestablishmentintothestate,then,readilyallowsfortheuseofreligiouslanguageforpoliticalmobilizationandhenceoffers a natural advantage to Islamist political forces and movements. Politicalmobilizationbasedontheideathattheessenceofnationalidentityisreligionhasbeenmost effectively expressed and put into practice by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, currentPresidentofTurkeyandleaderoftheAKP.Heexpressedhispoliticalperspectivemostsuccinctlyinaninterviewbackin1993,atthebeginningofhissuccessfulpoliticalcareer.Henotedthatdemocracyisa“meansratherthananend,”usefulonlytoarriveatthesystem desired by the people (Sever and Dizdar, 1993, pp.419-20). He added: “Webelieve that almost all people inTurkey, bothdue to their natural existence and thegeographytheyliveinandthehistoricalmissiontheycarry,arealreadyMuslim.Buttheyhavebeendeterred from fulfilling this characteristic. Theyhavebeen suppressedbyforce.Ifwecouldliftthisoppressionintheirbrains,theywillnaturallyselectIslam.Fortheiressenceconsistsoffaith.”(ibid.,pp.431-2).Thistypeofidentity-basedpoliticsisnaturallyauthoritarianandpotentiallytotalitarian.AfternearlytwentyyearsofunbrokenAKPrule,however,thereseemstobeasocietalbacklash.NaderHashemi(2018)describeshowthetop-downIslamizationofsocietyinIrancreatedtheoppositetrendtowardsecularizationamongthemiddleclass,theyouth,and civil society in general, including “negative feelings toward religion” (p.186). Asimilar process may be observed in Turkey today. Erdoğan announced in 2012 hisintentionto“raisepiousgenerations”throughtheschoolingsystem(Cengiz,2014).Theoutcomehoweverhasbeentheopposite.Reports indicateadecline inreligiosityandriseindeismandatheism,alarmingtheAKPgovernmentanditsreligiousestablishment(Hurtas, 2019). A pamphlet prepared by the DIB and distributed to readers free ofchargeexplainedthatthere isan inverserelationshipbetweenseculareducationandreligiosity,andthatpersonswithhigherlevelsofeducationtendtoturnawayfrombeliefand worship as a result of the “questioning” and even “discriminatory attitudes”associatedwith“modernityandsecularism”(DemokratHaber,29January2019).UmutAzak(2018)notes,however,thattherecentriseinthevisibilityofatheisminTurkeyisnot an inevitable result of the secularist legacy of the Republic, nor a sign ofsecularization,but“areactiontothesuccessofTurkishIslamism”(pp.70-1).Onemightalso add to this picture the growing trend among young women to shed theirheadscarves.Anearliergenerationofyoungwomen(andmen),especially in the late

Page 23: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

23

1990s,hadstruggledtohavetherightforwomentoweartheheadscarfinuniversitiesand government offices and won this right under the AKP government, first inuniversitiesin2011andthenallgovernmentofficesin2013.But,now,thosewearingheadscarves either through previous choice or under family pressure, or just out ofseeing it normalized in their natural environment and among friends, have formednetworkswheretheysharetheirdecisionstoremovethemandoffereachothersupport.The best known of these networks is a website called “Yalnız Yürümeyeceksin”(https://www.yalnizyurumeyeceksin.com/),meaning“youwillnotwalkalone.”ThesetrendsseemtoconfirmthemisgivingsexpressedearlyonbyKemalistsecularists,thatthe uneducated may be more politically pliable through religion and that bringingreligiondownfromitsexaltedplaceintheheartsandmindsofpeopletomixitupwiththeworldlyaffairsofpoliticsandthepowerstrugglesofpoliticianswouldbeadisservicetoit.

6. LessonsoftheTurkishCaseAccordingtoBhikhuParekh(2017,pp.321-2),thefollowingfourconditionsshouldbemetforastatetobeconsidered“secular”:(1)“thestateshouldbeautonomousinthesense that the source of its authority should be located within it and not in sometranscendentalprincipleorbeing,” (2) “thestateshouldpursueobjectives thatall itscitizensshareindependentlyofwhetherornottheyarereligiousandofwhatkind,”(3)“the state should not establish or institutionalise a religion or require its citizens tobelongtoitasaconditionoftheircitizenshiporoccupancyofaparticularoffice,”(4)“thestate’sdecisions,policiesandlawsshouldbepubliclydefendedandjustified,andshouldbebasedonreasonsitscitizenscanassessanddebate.”Heconcludes:“Astatethat fails on any of these is to that extent not secular, and cannot attain its basicobjectivesinareligiouslydiversesociety.”Itisclearfromtheforegoingthat,judgedbythesecriteria,amongwhichperhapsonlythefirstoneismet,theTurkishstateisnotandhasneverbeen“secular.”Givenbothitsinstitutionalstructureandprevailingnotionofnational identity,bothofwhichhavebeeninheritedfromtheOttomanEmpire,albeittransformed to a certain extent, it cannot serve as a goodmodel of secularism andregulationofreligiousaffairsinadiversesociety.HowdowethendescribetheTurkishmodel?Leavingasidethose,alreadymentioned,whoattachsensationalqualifierstoTurkey’ssecularism,suchasoppressive,assertiveoreven“pathological”(Kadıoğlu,2010),amoresophisticatedanalysismaybefoundinAndrewDavison’sattempttodrawacarefulconceptualdistinctionbetweensecularandlaicist.HearguesthatTurkeyisnotsecularbecausecompleteseparationhasnottakenplace, but is laicist because while religion has been removed from certain areas ofpoliticalaffairsithasbeenretainedinothersthroughstateauthority.Heconcludesthatsecularismisthereforepreventedbylaicism(Davison,2003).Thoughinteresting,andoverlappingwithaspectsoftheanalysisofferedinthispaper,thisargumentstilldoesnotprovideasatisfactoryanswer.Firstofall,itisnotcertainthatthereisindeedaclear

Page 24: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

24

distinctionbetweenthesetwoterms.TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,forinstance,usestheterms“secularism”and“laicité”interchangeablyintheEnglish-languageandFrench-languageversionsof their judgments. Second, ifwedefineTurkeyas “laicist”becausethereligiousestablishmentisincorporatedintothestatestructurethroughtheDIB, as the argument goes, how dowe define the Ottoman Empire, fromwhich thisinstitutionalstructurewasinherited?Or,ifwecallTurkey“laicist”becausethestatehashegemonyoverreligionandpresumestodeterminecorrectIslamthroughitsreligiousinstitution, thendowealso call IranandSaudiArabia “laicist”?Or, ifwecallTurkey“laicist”becausethenationhasareligious identity,andthestateanestablishedoratleast a “preferred” religionwithwhich the citizens are to be associated, then, againwheredoweputawholehostofothernationsthathavethesamecharacteristics?Consideringwhathasbeensaidsofar,theTurkishmodelofstate-religionrelationsmostclosely resembles “identity-based religious majoritarianism nationalism” among thecategoriesidentifiedbyModoodandSealy(2019,p.11).TheprimarygoaloftheKemalistprojectwastoseverthetiesoftheindividualstotheirparochial(religiousorethnic)communitiesandlinkthemupdirectly(asdistinct individuals)withthenation-state.Thismodelofnation-statebuildingfollowedthe“ideal-normative”Frenchexampleofnation-building.TheOttomanstatehadleftthe“primordial”communitiesintact;andyetin its ownway itwas also “secular” as far as the links between political power andreligionwereconcerned,butobviouslynotinthenormativesenseofprovidingfreedomof conscience and religion. Indeed, secularism understood as state domination ofreligion necessarily (or at least tendentially) precludes “neutrality,” which impliesreligiouspluralismandthestate’sequidistancetothem.TheTurkishRepublicanmodelwasnotsomuchaquestionofsecularism(forenlightenmentor fordemocracy)asaquestionofcreatingnationalhomogeneity.Perhaps,then,thefocusofanalysismustshiftfromthequestionof“secularism”tothatof“equalcitizenship.”TheUKprovidesagoodcounterexample.Ithasanestablishedchurchandtheheadofthestateisalsotheheadofthechurch.Yet,onewouldbehard-pressedtodefinetheUKasanythingotherthan“secular”inthestate’streatmentofitscitizens,despiteitsoutwardappearanceasa“religiousstate.”TheUKhad“blasphemylaws” in its books, when the “Rushdie affair” broke out. The Muslim communitydemandedthatthesameprohibitionalsoapplytoblasphemingIslam,towhichthestateresponded (albeit belatedly) by lifting blasphemy laws altogether. This is a goodexampleofthenormativerespectforequalcitizenship.ButsupposetheMuslimdemandwasmet,andthenanotherreligiouscommunitydemandedthesamekindofprotectionfortheirownsacredbeliefs.Wouldthereeverbeanyendtothisorwouldthestatehavetodrawalinesomewhere,and,ifso,where?Theprincipleoffreedomofreligionandconscience,bydefinition,necessitatesfreedomfrom religion. The sanctity of a belief only concerns the believer. Non-believers orbelieversofotherfaithshavenoobligationtowardthefaiththattheydonotshare;theyonlyhavetorespecttherightofthebelieverstohavethefaiththattheymaywishtohave.Itis,inotherwords,ahumanright,therightofanindividualtofreedomofthought,

Page 25: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

25

beliefandconscience;itisnottherightorfreedomofafaithorbeliefsystemtoimposeitselfonothers.Tomaintainsocialpeaceinadiversesocietyasecularlogicmustprevailinordertonegotiateissuesofcommonconcernbetweenbelieversofdifferentfaithsandnon-believersalike.Secularism,then,entailstheexistenceofapoliticalspaceseparatefromandindependentofreligionsforthepurposeofnegotiatingcommonissuesandareasof concern, so that the social andpoliticalneedsof all religiousand irreligiousmembersofsocietymaybemet.AcknowledgmentsIamgratefultoÖzgürÇatıkkaşforhisresearchassistance.

Page 26: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

26

ReferencesAdak,Sevgi(2010),“KemalistLaikliğinOluşumSürecindeRamazanlar(1923-1938),”TarihveToplumYeniYaklaşımlar,11.Adak,Sevgi(2014),“Anti-VeilingCampaignsandLocalElitesinTurkeyinthe1930s,”inStephanieCronin(ed.),Anti-VeilingCampaignsintheMuslimWorld,London:Routledge.Adak,Sevgi(2015),“’Yeni’Türkiye’nin‘Yeni’Diyaneti”,Birikim,No.139.Ahmad,Feroz(1993),TheMakingofModernTurkey,London:Routledge.Akan,Murat(2017),PoliticsofSecularism:Religion,Diversity,andInstitutionalChangeinFranceandTurkey,ColumbiaUniversityPress.Akçam,Taner(2004),FromEmpiretoRepublic:TurkishNationalismandtheArmenianGenocide,London:ZedBooks.Akçura,Yusuf([1904]1987),ÜçTarz-ıSiyaset,Ankara:TürkTarihKurumu.Atatürk,MustafaKemal([1927]1963),Nutuk,Ankara:TürkDilKurumu.Azak,Umut(2010),IslamandSecularisminTurkey:Kemalism,ReligionandtheNationState,London:I.B.Tauris.Azak,Umut(2018),“SecularismandAtheismintheTurkishPublicSphere,”TurkishPolicyQuarterly,16(4).Barkey,Karen(2008),EmpireofDifference:TheOttomansinComparativePerspective,CambridgeUniversityPress.Bottoni,Rossella(2007),“TheOriginsofSecularisminTurkey,”EcclesiasticalLawJournal,9.Braude,BenjaminandBernardLewis,eds.(1982),ChristiansandJewsintheOttomanEmpire,NewYork:HolmesandMeier.Brockett,Gavin(1998),“CollectiveActionandtheTurkishRevolution:TowardsaFrameworkfortheSocialHistoryoftheAtatürkEra,1923-38,”MiddleEasternStudies,34(4).Bruinessen,Martinvan,Agha,ShaikhandState,Utrecht,1978.Cagaptay,Soner(2006),“PassagetoTurkishness:ImmigrationandReligioninModernTurkey”inHaldunGülalp(ed.),CitizenshipandEthnicConflict:ChallengingtheNation-State,London:Routledge.Casanova,Jose(1994),PublicReligionsintheModernWorld,ChicagoUniversityPress.

Page 27: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

27

Cengiz,OrhanKemal(2014),“Erdogan’sReformsMeanttoEducate‘PiousGeneration’,”Al-Monitor,26June.Çetinsaya,Gökhan(1999),“RethinkingNationalismandIslam:SomePreliminaryNotesontheRootsof‘Turkish-IslamicSynthesis’inModernTurkishPoliticalThought,”TheMuslimWorld,89(3/4).Clayer,Nathalie(2015),“AnImposedoraNegotiatedLaiklik?”inMarcAymes,BenjaminGourisseandEliseMassicard(eds),OrderandCompromise:GovernmentPracticesinTurkeyfromtheLateOttomanEmpiretotheEarly21stCentury,Leiden:Brill.Davison,Andrew(2003),“Turkey,A‘Secular’State?TheChallengeofDescription,”SouthAtlanticQuarterly,102(2-3).DemokratHaber,24January2019(https://www.demokrathaber.org/guncel/diyanet-isleri-baskanligi-egitim-seviyesi-arttikca-dinden-uzaklasiliyor-h112391.html).Deringil,Selim(1993a),“TheOttomanOriginsofKemalistNationalism,”EuropeanHistoryQuarterly,23(2).Deringil,Selim(1993b),“TheInventionofTraditionasPublicImageintheLateOttomanEmpire,1808to1908,”ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory,35(1).Deringil,Selim(1998),TheWell-ProtectedDomains:IdeologyandtheLegitimationofPowerintheOttomanEmpire,1876-1909,London:I.B.Tauris.Dündar,Fuat(2000),TürkiyeNüfusSayımlarındaAzınlıklar,İstanbul:Çiviyazıları.Ekmekcioglu,Lerna(2014),“RepublicofParadox:TheLeagueofNationsMinorityProtectionRegimeandtheNewTurkey’sStep-Citizens,”InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies,46(4).Emrence,Cem(2000),“PoliticsofDiscontentintheMidstoftheGreatDepression:TheFreeRepublicanPartyofTurkey(1930),”NewPerspectivesonTurkey,23.Gellner,Ernest(1994),ConditionsofLiberty:CivilSocietyandItsRivals,NewYork:AllenLane.Gellner,Ernest(1997),“TheTurkishOptioninComparativePerspective,”SibelBozdoğanandReşatKasaba(eds),RethinkingModernityandNationalIdentityinTurkey,Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress.Genç,Reşat,ed.(2005),Türkiye’yiLaikleştirenYasalar:3Mart1924TarihliMeclisMüzakereleriveKararları,Ankara:AtatürkAraştırmaMerkezi.Gözaydın,İştar(2009),Diyanet:TürkiyeCumhuriyeti’ndeDininTanzimi,İstanbul:İletişimYayınları.Gülalp,Haldun(1996),“IslamismandKurdishNationalism:RivalAdversariesofKemalisminTurkey,"inTamaraSonn(ed.),IslamismandtheQuestionofMinorities,Atlanta:ScholarsPress.

Page 28: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

28

Gülalp,Haldun(2005),“EnlightenmentbyFiat:SecularizationandDemocracyinTurkey,”MiddleEasternStudies,41(3).Gülalp,Haldun(2013),“SecularismintheAgeofGlobalization:TheAKPandtheRevivaloftheOttomanLegacy,”inRivaKastoryano,ed.,TurkeybetweenNationalismandGlobalization,London:Routledge.Gülalp,Haldun(2017),“SecularismasaDouble-EdgedSword?StateRegulationofReligioninTurkey,”inAnnaTriandafyllidouandTariqModood(eds),TheProblemofReligiousDiversity:EuropeanChallenges,AsianApproaches,UniversityofEdinburghPress.Hashemi,Nader(2018),“CharlesTaylor’sASecularAgeandSecularizationfromBelowinIran,”inMirjamKünkler,JohnMadeleyandShylashriShankar(eds.),ASecularAgeBeyondtheWest:Religion,LawandtheStateinAsia,theMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,CambridgeUniversityPress.Hirschon,Renee,ed.(2003),CrossingtheAegean:AnAppraisalofthe1923CompulsoryPopulationExchangebetweenGreeceandTurkey,Oxford:BerghahnBooks.Hurtas,Sibel(2019),“TurksLosingTrustinReligionUnderAKP,”Al-Monitor,9January,https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/01/turkey-becoming-less-religious-under-akp.html#ixzz5cCvdhagkKadıoğlu,Ayşe(2010),“ThePathologiesofTurkishRepublicanLaicism,”PhilosophyandSocialCriticism,36(3-4).Kandiyoti,Deniz(2012),“TheTravailsoftheSecular:PuzzleandParadoxinTurkey,”EconomyandSociety,41(4).Karpat,Kemal(1982),“MilletsandNationality:TheRootsofIncongruityofNationandStateinthePost-OttomanEra”inBenjaminBraudeandBernardLewis(eds),ChristiansandJewsintheOttomanEmpire,vol.1,NewYork:HolmesandMeier.Kaya,Ayhan(2015),“IslamisationofTurkeyundertheAKPRule:EmpoweringFamily,FaithandCharity,”SouthEuropeanSocietyandPolitics,20(1).Kayalı,Hasan(1997),ArabsandYoungTurks:Ottomanism,Arabism,andIslamismintheOttomanEmpire,1908-1918,UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Kirişçi,Kemal(2000),“DisaggregatingTurkishCitizenshipandImmigrationPractices”MiddleEasternStudies,36(3).Kuran,Timur(2011),TheLongDivergence:HowIslamicLawHeldBacktheMiddleEast,PrincetonUniversityPress.Kuru,Ahmet(2009),SecularismandStatePoliciesTowardReligion:TheUnitedStates,France,andTurkey,CambridgeUniversityPress.

Page 29: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

29

Lord,Ceren(2018),ReligiousPoliticsinTurkey:FromtheBirthoftheRepublictotheAKP,CambridgeUniversityPress.Marx,Anthony(2003),FaithinNation:ExclusionaryOriginsofNationalism,OxfordUniversityPress,2003.Meeker,Michael(2002),ANationofEmpire:TheOttomanLegacyofTurkishModernity,UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Modood,TariqandThomasSealy(2019),“SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligiousDiversity,”GREASEConceptPaper,WP1.1.Mutluer,Nil(2018),“Diyanet’sRoleinBuildingthe’Yeni(New)Milli’intheAKPEra,”EuropeanJournalofTurkishStudies,27.Olson,Robert(1989),TheEmergenceofKurdishNationalismandtheSheikhSaidRebellion,1880-1925,UniversityofTexasPress.Oran,Baskın(2003),“Lozan’daAzınlıklarınKorunması,”ToplumsalTarih,115.Ortaylı,İlber(1983),İmparatorluğunEnUzunYüzyılı,İstanbul:HilYayınları.Özbudun,Ergun(2014),“AKPattheCrossroads:Erdoğan’sMajoritarianDrift,”SouthEuropeanSocietyandPolitics,19(2).Öztürk,AhmetErdi(2018),“TransformationoftheTurkishDiyanetbothatHomeandAbroad:ThreeStages,”EuropeanJournalofTurkishStudies,27.Parekh,Bhikhu(2017),“RethinkingSecularism,”inAnnaTriandafyllidouandTariqModood(eds),TheProblemofReligiousDiversity:EuropeanChallenges,AsianApproaches,UniversityofEdinburghPress.Sever,MetinandCemDizdar,eds.(1993),“RecepTayyipErdoğan[interview],”2.CumhuriyetTartışmaları,Ankara:BaşakYayınları.Shankland,David(1999),“AnInterviewwithProfessorPaulStirling”TheTurkishStudiesAssociationBulletin,23(1).T24,15May2019(https://t24.com.tr/haber/optimar-dan-din-inanc-anketi-yuzde-89-allah-in-varligina-ve-birligine-inaniyor,821459).Todorova,Maria(1996),“TheOttomanLegacyintheBalkans,”inCarlBrown(ed.),ImperialLegacy:TheOttomanImprintontheBalkansandtheMiddleEast,NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Tombuş,H.ErtuğandBerfuAygenç(2017),“(Post-)KemalistSecularisminTurkey,”JournalofBalkanandNearEasternStudies,19(1).Tunçay,Mete(1981),TürkiyeCumhuriyeti'ndeTekPartiYönetimininKurulması(1923-1931),Ankara:YurtYayınları.

Page 30: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

30

Turam,Berna(2007),BetweenIslamandtheState:ThePoliticsofEngagement,StanfordUniversityPress.TürkİnkılapTarihiEnstitüsü(1990),Atatürk’ünSöylevveDemeçleri,Cilt1,Ankara.Volkan,VamıkD.andNormanItzkowitz(1984),TheImmortalAtatürk:APsychobiography,TheUniversityofChicagoPress.Wallis,RoyandSteveBruce(1992),“Secularization:TheOrthodoxModel,”inSteveBruce(ed.),ReligionandModernization,Oxford:ClarendonPress.Wilson,M.Brett(2009),“TheFirstTranslationsoftheQur’aninModernTurkey(1924-38),”InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies,41(3).Yannas,Prodromos(2007),“TheHumanRightsConditionoftheRumOrthodox,”inZehraF.KabasakalArat(ed.),HumanRightsinTurkey,Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2007.Yavuz,Hakan(2000),“CleansingIslamfromthePublicSphere,”JournalofInternationalAffairs,54(1).Yavuz,Hakan(2003),IslamicPoliticalIdentityinTurkey,London:OxfordUniversityPress.Yılmaz,Hale(2013),BecomingTurkish:NationalistReformsandCulturalNegotiationsinEarlyRepublicanTurkey,1923-1945,SyracuseUniversityPress.

Page 31: Country Report Turkey - grease.eui.eugrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/Turkey-report.pdf · Country Report Turkey Haldun Gülalp November 2019 ... Greece, Italy, Hungary,

TurkeyCountryReportGREASE

31

Project name: Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives Project Acronym: GREASE Project Coordinator: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou Contact: [email protected] November 2019 Document series reference: D2.1 Country Reports

This document can be downloaded from the publications section of the GREASE website at http://grease.eui.eu/ The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the authors. The European Union is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.

The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640


Top Related