Download - Crowning the Pyramid: The Egyptian Beer Industry’s “Mature” … · The Egyptian Beer Industry’s “Mature” Period (1940–1952) By the late 1930s, beer had become a significant,

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WiththegenerousgrantsupportfromtheHistoryProjectandtheInstituteforNewEconomicThinking(INET),IwasabletoaccessarchivesinEgyptandtheNetherlands.Thisarchivalresearchsatattheheartofmydissertationentitled“GrandPlansinGlassBottles: ASocial,EconomicandTechnologicalHistoryofBeerinEgypt1880-1970.”Thisisachapterexcerpt:

CrowningthePyramid:TheEgyptianBeerIndustry’s“Mature”Period(1940–1952)

Bythelate1930s,beerhadbecomeasignificant,thoughcontentious,elementof

“modern”Egyptianculture.TheascentofbeercorrespondedtoatransformationinEgypt’s

beerproductionfromartisanalcrafttowell-developedindustry.Thischapterlooksatthe

twocompaniesthatcametodominatethebeerindustryinthe1940s,CrownBreweryand

Bomonti-PyramidBrewery.AstheyenterwhatIcalltheir“matureperiod,”whichspanned

from1940to1952,thesecompaniestooktheformthattheywouldmaintainuntil1963:

thatis,apartnershipwithconvergingexecutivestructures,shareholders,andbusiness

practices.ThisconvergencewasspearheadedbytheAmsterdam-basedmultinational

corporationHeinekenBrewingCompany(HeinekenBierbrouwerij-Maatschappij),

hereafterHeineken.HeinekenhadtargetedtheCrownandPyramidbreweriesforinclusion

intheirever-expandingempireafterhavingseenthedevelopmentsandprofitsofthese

twocompaniesupto1940.Athirdfeatureofthecompanies’matureperiod,inadditionto

beingcharacterizedbypartnershipandbyHeineken’sinfluence,wastheirstruggleto

maintaintheirhybrididentitiesastrulytrans-nationalventures.Thecompaniescouldnot

beclassifiedeitherasstrictlyDutchorEgyptianventures.Thishybridstatewascrucialto

thecompanies’successpriorto1940,butitbecameproblematicinthe1940sastheworld

thatwasfarlessacceptingofambiguityinnationalityandeconomics.

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ThetransformationofthecompaniesfromrelativeautonomousentitiestoHeineken

guidedventuresstemmedfromasinglecatastrophicevent:WorldWarII,thelargestwar

thattheworldhadyetseen.Heineken’spushtoconsolidateCrownandPyramidBreweries

representeditsunwillingnesstocontinuetosuffertheinefficiency,ofwhichithadbecome

acutelyawareofduringthewar,ofbeingapassiveshareholderacontinentaway.Afterthe

war,Heinekensoughtgreatercontroloveritsassetstomaximizeprofitsandeasethe

exploitationoftheEgyptianmarket.ThismeantthatnotonlywouldCrownandPyramidbe

morecloselytiedtogether,butalsothatHeinekenwouldplayalargerroleintheactivities

ofbothcompanies.TheseactionsreflectedHeineken’sattempttotransformthese

companies,inthewordsofRobertL.Tignor,frombeinglooselyadministeredfirmsto

tightlycontrolledfirms.1

Heinekenwasnottheonlypartythatwasinspiredbytheextraordinary

circumstancesofthewartodemandgreatercontrolofthebreweries.TheEgyptian

government,too,cametointeractandcontrolbusinessesinawaythatithadneverbefore.

Sincethe1920s,therehadbeengrowingdemandamongEgyptianpoliticiansforgreater

controloftheireconomy,especiallyvis-à-visthe“foreign”elementspresent.Thesetwo

trends,towardgreatercontrolandtargetingthe“foreign”element,convergedin1947in

theCompanyLaw,whichgrantedunprecedentedpowerstotheEgyptiangovernmentto

dealwithjoint-stockcompaniesthatitclassifiedas“foreign.”Whereasinthe1920sand

1930sthesecompaniesandtheiractionshadbeenrelativelyunsupervised,startingin

1947,theyhadtoreckonwithamoreinvasiveandself-assuredgovernmentthathadavery

narrowideaofwhatanEgyptiancompanywas.

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Asbothoftheseforces,HeinekenandtheEgyptiangovernment,exertedgreater

controloverPyramidandCrownbreweries,theydidnotsitpassively.Rather,theyfought

bothactivelyandsurreptitiouslyagainstoutsidecontrol.Inbothcompanies’interactions

withHeineken,theyusedthegeographicdistancebetweenthemandtheAmsterdam

headquartersinordertorejectorslowdownactionsthattheyfounddistasteful;thus,they

wereabletonegotiatefromapositionofweakness.Inthebreweries’interactionswiththe

Egyptiangovernment,despitetherisingpoliticaltideofeconomicnationalism,theywere

able,withtheaidoftheirDutchbackers,tomaintaintheirhybridity.

Theargumentofthischapterproceedsinfivesections.Thefirstsectionlooksat

howcinematicportrayalsofbeersignaledanewculturalacceptanceofthebeverage.The

followingsectionexamineshowHeinekenenteredtheEgyptianbeerindustry.Thethird

andfourthsectionslookathowthenewconglomerationofHeineken,Crown,andPyramid

dealtwithexternalfactors.Sectionthreediscusseshowthesethreeentitiesmanaged

Egypt’sinvolvementinWorldWarIIanditsaftermath.Thefourthsectionthenlooksat

howHeineken,Crown,andPyramidgrappledwithamoreinvasiveEgyptiangovernment

pushingEgyptianization.Finally,thischapterclosesbylookingathowthedemographicsof

theshareholdersofCrownandPyramid’sexemplifiedtheirstatusesasendangered

transnationalenterprisesinanincreasingly“nationalistic”Egypt.

CelluloidConsumptionIntracingtheplaceofbeerinEgyptianculture,filmisanexcellentplacetolook,as

itsdevelopmentinEgypttrackedaparallelpathtothedevelopmentofthenation’sbeer

industry.FilmenteredEgyptbeforethebeerindustry,in1896.2BothEgypt’sbeerindustry

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anditsfilmindustryadoptedtechnologicaladvancesfromEurope.Thefirstfilms,recorded

onacinematographbytheLumierebrothers,AugusteandLouis,hadbeenplayedforParis

audiencesin1895.3Lessthanthirtyyearslater,thefirstfilmsappearedinEgypt.Thefirst

full-lengthfilmproducedinEgypt,FibilādTutʿAnkhAmūn(IntheLandofTutankhamen),

premieredin1923.4Thissectiontraceshowcinematicportrayalsofbeersignalanew

culturalacceptanceofthebeverageinEgypt.

Bythe1930s,thefilmindustry,likethebeerindustry,hadbecomewhatEuropeans

wouldcallamodernindustry;andbythe1940s,ithadbecomeapowerfulforcein

Egyptianculture.Between1945and1952,thefilmindustryproducedoverfourhundred

films.5Itwasinthissameperiodthatfilmbecameanartformthatwascraftinganew

“middle-classbourgeoisnationalistidentity.”6Itstandstoreasonthatbeerwouldappear

infilms,asittoowasbecomingaculturalforceinthisperiod.Indeed,from1940to1952,

thebeerindustryexperiencedsustainedsuccess.After1923,otherindustries,likehard

manufacturing,foodproduction,andtextileswouldovertakethebeerindustry,butnever

thelatterlostitsprofitability.In1946,forexample,CrownBrewery’snetprofitstotaledthe

significantsumof106,000LE.7

Thefilmsdiscussedinthissectiontendtoshowthatbeerdrinkerswerecoming

fromtheoldgroupingsoftheeffendiyaandtheurbanunderclass.However,asLucie

Ryzovanotes,theboundariesofthesegroupingshadshiftedbythe1940s.Theeffendiya,

theurbanofficeclass,intheperiodfollowingEgypt’ssemi-independencein1922cameto

represent,atleastfortheliberalnationalists,theperceivedmiddleofEgyptiansociety.The

effendiyawerethebearersofthenationalmission,andtheyweredistinctfromtheawlād

al-balad(nativesons,“thegoodguys”),thefellahin,andtheawlādal-dhawāt(Arabic,sons

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ofdistinction,the“elite”).8Inpractice,tobeaneffendiwastoinhabitaliminalplace

betweenthelowerandupperclasses,tobeasecular,modern,andliberallyeducated

personwhostroveforthemodern,secular,elitelifestyle,butwhosebackgroundand

financialstatuskeptoneseparatefromthatelite.9

Withthisshiftfrombroadtospecificcharacterizations,theeffendiyabecame

distinctfromtheclassesaboveandbelow,atleastinthemindsofintellectuals.Whereas

previouslytheeffendiyaincludedboththeeliteandtheWesterneducatednon-elite,the

termcamemoreandmoretorefertothoseurbansubalternswhohadundertaken

“effendification,”whiletheWesternizedelitetookthenameofawlādal-dhawāt.Likewise,

withmostoftheneweffenditransitioningfromtheurbansubaltern,whatitmeanttobea

non-effendiresidentofatownoracitycametobeencapsulatedintheconceptsofthe

awlādal-baladandal-futūwwāt(Arabic,youths).AsWilsonChackoJacobhasshown,

despitethetermfutūwwa’smultivalentandcomplicatedhistory,bythe1930s,theterm

wasdivestedofmuchofitspositivecharacteristicsandcametoresembletheconceptofal-

balṭagī(thug,tough,etc.).10

Likethedepictionofcigarettesinfilms,itwastheseimaginedgroups(awlādal-

dhawāt,awlādal-balad,futūwwāt,andtheeffendiyya)thatshapeddepictionsofbeer

consumptioninEgyptinthepost-independenceperiod.11Fortheelite,theirconsumption

ofalcoholwasassumedandunquestioned.Manymoviesfromtheperiod1930to1950

showupper-crustmenandwomendressedinfineWesternclothing,listeningtomusicand

dancingwhileenjoyingalcoholicbeverages.Whilegenerallythetypeofalcoholremains

obscure,inafewnotableexceptions,beertakescenterstage.Forexample,inal-ʿAzima

(Determination,1939),asʿAdliBey(AnwarWagdi)talkstoMuhammadHanafi(Hussein

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Sidky)abouttheirjointbusinessventure,usingaphonelocatedinabar,aStella

advertisementsitsprominentlyinthebackground.12Theadvertisementissolegibleand

prominentthatitcanonlyhavebeenintentionallyplacedintheframe.

Inanevenmoreprominentexample,fromthemovieʿUstaHasan(BossHasan,

1952),therichSvengali,Kawsar(ZuzuMadi),hasarefrigeratorstockedwithbeerbottles

bearingtheunmistakablestarlogoofStellabeer.13Thebottleisfetishized,withthecamera

makingitoneofthemostprominentimagesonthescreen.Inaddition,thebottleisusedas

ametonymyforbeerandalcoholmoregenerally.Thisabilitytohavethebrandedbottle

serveasasignifierofalcoholingeneralisevidenceoftheeffectivenessofthebeer

advertisementsofthe1930s.Bythe1940s,theseadvertisershadachievedwhatthey

desired:thebottle,asymbolofwhatIcalltotalcontrolbrewing,hadenteredEgyptian

cultureasthesymbolofbeer.Totalcontrolbrewingwastheideathatacompanycould

produceastandardized,sturdy,andsanitaryproductbyassiduouslyapplyingthelatestin

brewingtechnologies.ThesceneinʿUstaHasanisimportantinshowingthecultural

footprintofthebeerbottle,andofbeeringeneral.Thefilmagainlinkstheconsumptionof

beertotheelite,althoughitaddsalayerofcomplexitybyportrayingupperclasswomen’s

consumptionofitasnormative.Thisportrayalwasatypicalforthetime,asalcoholwasstill

generallyreservedformen.

Egyptianfilmsalsoportrayedurbansubalternsasdrinkersofbeer.Thetwomost

prominentexamplesofsuchcharactersareHamida(ShukriSarhan)inIbnal-Nil(NileBoy,

1951)andHasan(FaridShawqi)inʿUstaHasan.14InIbnal-Nil,whoseverytitleevokesthe

ideaoftheawlādal-balad,afellahnamedHamidatravelstoCairotoescapehislifeinthe

village.Freshoffthetrain,Hamidasearchesforaplacetospendthenightandendsupina

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danceclub.Unsurprisingly,heisenticedbythevicesoftheclub,andinanactthatsetsoffa

terriblechainofevents,hesuccumbstoadancerandtobeer,andeventuallylosesallofhis

money.Inthescene,beer,depictedinanoverflowingstein,iscloselyassociatedwiththe

dancer(SamihaTawfiq)throughinterspersingofimagesofthefrothymugwithher

gyrating.InthecaseofHasan,Kawsarenticeshimtoabandonhishumblelifestyleand

becomeherparamourwithgiftsandplentifulfoodanddrink.Inoneofthefilm’spivotal

scenes,inwhichtheprotagonistbeginstorealizethepleasurespossibleinthisnewlife,

Hasangorgeshimselfonawholeturkeyanddrinksthreebottlesofbeer.Thisplenty

appearsinstarkcontrasttothepenuriouslifestylehelivedinhishumblehome.

Theblatantconsumptionofbeerinthefilmisnotwithoutconsequencesforthetwo

maincharacters.Acommonrefrainintheseandotherpre-1960sEgyptianfilmsisthatthe

ibnal-baladwhodrinksultimatelysuffersfordoingso.InthecaseofHamida,hisfirstnight

ofdrinkingtransformshimfromthenaïveyetauthenticibnal-baladintoacynicaland

violentfutūwwa.Eventually,hisnewlifestyleleadshimtojail,althoughheislaterfreed

andreturnshome.AsforHasan,beermarksanevenmoretragictransformation.Heleaves

hislifeashard-workingmechanictobecomeamorallycorruptbonvivant.Therehehas

twounhappyrelationships(withhiswifeandKawsar),andseeshissoncometophysical

harmandKawsargetmurdered.Hasanisonlyfreedtolearnfromhismistakesandresume

hisoriginallifebecauseofthesurpriseconfessionofKawsar’sinvalidhusbandtothe

woman’smurder.ThesedetailsfromthefilmIbnal-Nil,whichemphasizethedangersof

modernitytotheuneducatedbutauthenticawlādal-balad,thetransformativepowerof

beeremergesasakeytheme.Ineachcase,alcoholhascausedtheprotagonisttomakethe

incorrecttransition.Neithercharacterhasmovedfromauthenticnativesontohard

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workingandrespectablememberofthemiddleclass.Instead,theybothtransitiontomore

profitablebutmorallybankruptphases.Thisnarrativeofthedrinking-leddownfallforthe

ibnal-baladisechoedinothermediaaswell.Forexample,weseethisnarrativeinBayram

al-Tunsi’szajalpoems,“rhymedstrophicpoemscomposedinnon-classicalArabicbased

rhythmicallyonmetricalpatternsadaptedfromtheclassicaltradition.”15Inhismassive

1924zajalpoemIlBaladi,“Abdal-Salam,thewriter,isbroughtdownbyhisever-

increasingconsumptionofbeerandwhiskey.”16

Theideathattheconsumptionofbeerandalcoholisdangerousingeneralis

supportedbythedepictionoftheeffendiyainmovies,whogenerallyremainteetotalers.

Forexample,themainprotagonist(andarch-hero)ofal-ʿAzima,MuhammadHanafi,avoids

drinkingevenwhenhevisitshisgoodfriend,theeliteplayboyʿAdli,inabar.This

abstemiousnessisseeninothereffendiprotagonistslikeHamid(ʿImadHamdi)inal-Suqal-

Sawdaʾ(BlackMarket,1945)andTahaEffendi(YusufWahbi)inIbnal-Haddad(Sonofthe

Blacksmith,1944).17Themiddleclassprotagonistisnotalwaysstrictlyabstemious;for

example,Munir(Faridal-ʿAtrash)inAhebbekInta(ILoveYouOnly,1949)isatelegraph

operatorandpart-timesinger,whointhecourseofhisworkconsumesalcohol.Inthisrole

andmanyothers,Faridal-ʿAtrash’scharactersarenotablefortheirentirelynormative

relationshipswithalcohol.18

Thedifferencesinthefilms’treatmentsofalcoholcanbeattributedtodifferencesin

thefilms’respectivepurposes.Thedifferencebetweenthe“commercial/melodramatic”

filmandthe“art/realistic”filminEgyptmaynothavebeenassharpassomecriticswould

imply,asWalterArmbrustandJoelGordonhaveargued,butthedifferencestilldidexist.19

Infilmslikeal-Suqal-Sawdaʾ(TheBlackMarket,1945),ʿUstaHasan(BossHasan,1952),al-

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ʿAzima(Determination,1939),andotherrealisticfilms,directorsportrayed,withvarying

degreesofsuccess,Egyptasitexistedineverydaylife.Whilethemelodramaticfilms

starringMuhammadʿAbdal-Wahab,FaridʿAtrash,andAbdal-HalimHafiz,certainly

reflectedsomeaspectsoftheEgyptianreality,thefilmsaimedmoretoentertainthanto

faithfullyreproducethesocialconditionsofcontemporaryEgypt.Thismeantthatthese

filmsdepictedalcoholconsumptionasapartoftheaspirationallifestylethatthefilms

glorified.Thisdepictioncontrastedtorealisticfilms,inwhichalcoholconsumptionwas

citedalongwithgamblingandsexasasymptomofcorruptionwroughtbymimickingthe

West.Thedifferentdepictionsofalcoholconsumptionvis-à-vistheimaginedmiddleclass

oreffendiyareflectedEgyptianintellectuals’uncertaintyoverwhattheidealmixofmodern

andtraditionalshouldbe,particularlyforthegroupwhomtheyenvisionedtobethetrue

bearersofEgypt’sfuture.20

ConsolidationWhilethedepictionofbeerandalcoholinfilmwassomewhatambiguous,therewas

noambiguityaboutwhocontrolledthebeerindustryinEgyptinthisperiod,itwas

Heineken.Howitcametodominatewasaconvolutedprocessemblematicofgreater

changesintheEgyptianeconomy.TheBomontis’purchaseofPyramidBrewerymarkeda

distinctbreakinthehistoryofthebeerindustryinEgypt.After1923,thebeerindustrywas

subjecttotwotrendsparticulartotheEgyptianeconomybetween1918and1950:

consolidationandEgyptianization.TheconsolidationprocessbeganwiththeBomontis

whocombinedthreecompaniesintoBomonti-PyramidBreweryin1923.Beforeeven

consolidatingalloftheirholdings,Bomonti-Pyramidhadworkedoutasalesagreement,as

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detailedinchapter3,withtheirmaincompetitor,CrownBreweryin1921.Thissales

agreementprovedverylucrativeforbothfirms.Forexample,theysoldmorethan75,000

hectolitersofbeerinEgyptin1928.21

TheirsuccesscaughttheeyeofReneGaston-Dreyfus,thesonofawealthyFrench

banker,whohadestablishedabreweryinMorocco,BrasserieduMaroc,inthe1920s.Thus

in1928hestartedoverturestotrytoenterintotheEgyptianbeermarket.Gaston-Dreyfus

initiallywenttoCharlesCantoni,whowasservingastheheadofCrownBrewery,with

grandplansofbuyingtheentirelocalindustry.However,whenCantonionlyoffered

Gaston-Dreyfus3,000shares,asmallnon-controllingstake,hedecidedtolookforother

waystoachievehisgoals.Gaston-DreyfussettledonBomonti-Pyramid,whenoneofhis

businesscontactsalertedhimthatJacquesRuch,whoowned45%ofBomonti-Pyramid

stockandwasthelargestshareholder,waswillingtosell.Afteraninitialrebuttal,Gaston-

DreyfuswasablenotonlytobuyRuch’ssharesinBomonti-Pyramid,butthoseinthe

Istanbulbased-breweryBomonti-Nectar.WiththeseinterestsnowaddedtohisCairo,and

Moroccaninterests,Gaston-Dreyfusnowhadasmallmulti-nationalventure,whichhe

incorporatedandnamedSociétéFinaciereBrasseries(Sofibra)in1929.

AfterbuyingintoBomonti-Pyramid,Gaston-Dreyfussetoutto“purify”theboardof

thecompany.AlthoughBomonti-Pyramidhadbeensuccessful,itappearedtoGaston-

DreyfusthatCurtBomonti,thesonoftheeponymousfounderWalter,andhiscousin

RudolphYost,hadplacedthecompanyonadangerouspath.Gaston-DreyfussawCurt,who

wasthechairmenoftheboard,asadimwittedclodwhopreferredtospendnightsouton

thetownratherthandoanywork.Theonlyreasonhemaintainedhispositionwasdueto

thefactthathisfamilyheldsomanyshares.Yost,whowasthemanagingdirector,in

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Gaston-Dreyfus’viewhadenrichedhimselfoffthecompany,buthaddoneverylittleforit.

Asaresultoftheirmismanagement,Bomonti-Pyramidwasunabletohaveproductionmeet

upwiththegrowingdemandsoftheEgyptianpopulationandthushadtosellinferiorbeer

thatwouldhaveotherwisebeentossedaway.22Thusby1932,Gaston-Dreyfus,through

someclevermaneuvering,wasabletoexcisebothBomontiandYostandreplacethemwith

ReneIsmalunandPierreGeisenberger,respectively.Gaston-Dreyfuswasfamiliarwith

GeisenbergerandhisworkatbreweryinDakar,whileIsmalun,whowaspartofthe

EgyptianJewishcommunity,camhighlyrecommendedbyoneofGaston-Dreyfus’

associates.Gaston-Dreyfus,showinghisimperialchauvinism,didnothaveahighvaluation

ofIsmalun.Hebelievedthathewaslazyand“notagenius,”buthewas,mostimportantly,

honest.23

AfterreorganizingBomonti-Pyramid,Gaston-Dreyfussetabouttakingcontrolof

Crown.HefoundhiswayinwithastockholdernamedMr.Rollo.Afterconvincinghimto

sellhis4,000shares,hewasabletomanipulatehimandCrownandraisehisstockholding

to9,000shares.Hewouldhavebeenabletotakeamajorityoverthecompanybybuying

the3,000sharesfromCantoni,wereitnotfortheinterventionofConstantineMouratiadis.

Asdiscussedinchapter3,hewasthetangiblelinkbetweenCrownandPyramidunderthe

Bomontis,asheranthesalesoperationsforbothbreweriesinCairoandwasamajor

stockholderinCrown.SeeingtheaggressivemaneuveringofGaston-Dreyfusandfearing

forthelucrativelifehehadcarvedoutforhimself,heentrenchedhimselfbothwithinthe

operationswithCairoandintheCrownBreweryboard.Thus,beforeGaston-Dreyfuscould

havethechance,hewasabletobecometheChairmenoftheBoardofCrownandthe

majorityshareholderinCrown.24

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Gaston-Dreyfus,soughttheadviceofhismenontheground,likeGeisenberger,on

howtoproceedtothefirstrealroadblocktohiscontroloftheEgyptianbeerindustry.They

advisedGaston-DreyfusthatifSofibraengagedinopenwarfarewithMouratiadis,they

wouldbeembroiledinaruinouswarthatwouldfracturetheexcellentworking

relationshipbetweenCrownandPyramidandcostBomonti-Pyramidagreatdealof

money.25TheyratheradvisedGaston-DreyfustocometoanagreementwithMouratiadis,

whichgrantedhisdesiredautonomyintheAlexandria,sothatheandSofibracouldwork

togetherandmaintaintheprofitabilityofthetwobreweries.Thisdétentenotonlyavoided

acostlyconflict,butallowedBomonti-Pyramidtobuildupenoughreservesthatif

Mouratiadisprovedhimselfaproblemtheycouldengageinopenwarfarewithhim.

However,itnevercametothatasaftertheinitialbitofposturingtheysettledintoa

workableandprofitablepartnership.Gaston-Dreyfuscultivatedanexcellentrelationship

withtheirrespectiveadministrations.Althoughhewasbasedabroad,inParis,he

spearheadedclosecollaborationsbetweentheboardsandencouragedunanimityinthe

breweries’goals.26Gaston-DreyfushadsuchapositiveinfluencethatwhenHeineken

boughthimout,membersoftheCrownBreweryboardaskedhimtostayonasan

executivemember.27

Theforeign-backedconsolidationofthebeerindustryinEgyptwastypicalofthe

Egyptianjointstockcompaniesofthetime.AsRelliShechtershowsinSmoking,Cultureand

EconomyintheMiddleEast,theEgyptiantobaccoindustryunderwentasimilarprocessof

centralizationdrivenbythemulti-nationalBritish-AmericanTobaccoCompany(BAT).In

theperiodthatBomonti-Pyramidwasconsolidatingthebeermarket,BATrapidly

expandedinEgypt.By1927,itownedsixtobaccofactoriesinEgyptandhadbecomethe

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secondbiggesttobaccocompanyinthecountry.Inthatsameyear,itmergedwiththe

largesttobaccocompanyinEgypt,Matossian,andrenamedtheconglomerationEastern.At

thatpointEasternowned90percentofthetobaccomarket.28Likewise,RobertL.Tignor

describeshowafew,“heavilycapitalized,verticallyintegrated,andpoliticallypowerful

firms”tookcontrolofthetextileindustryinEgyptinthe1920s.29Thepushfor

consolidationinalloftheseindustrieswasspurredonbythetariffreformsof1930.Local

leadingbusinessmagnatessawthesereforms,whichweremeanttolimitimports,astheir

opportunitytodominatetheirrespectivesectors.Theythusaimedtoestablish“largeand

powerfulfirmsinthelate1920s”tomakeitdifficultfornewfirmstoenter.30

AfterbuyingintoCrownandPyramid,Gaston-Dreyfuscontinuedtolooktoexpand

hisinternationalholdings.HismainprojectafterCrownandPyramidwasincreasinghis

presenceinIndonesiabyestablishingabreweryinJava.31SinceitwasaDutchcolonyatthe

time,Gaston-DreyfusaimedtopartnerwithaDutchbreweryintheventure.Hefounda

willingpartnerinHeinekenBrewingCompany,oneofthelargestbrewersintheworld,and

itsrepresentativeinthearea,JonkheerPieterR.Feith.WhenSofibraandHeinekenwentto

JavatheyagreedthattheonlyplacesuitableforanewbrewerywasthecityofSurabaya.

Unfortunately,anothercompany,ColonialeBrasserie(Cobra),hadpurchasedlandtherein

hopesofbuildingtheirown.Althoughtheywereinitiallydiscouraged,Sofibraand

Heinekencameuponasolutionwhen,inthe1930s,theymetanothermultinational

brewinginterestlookingtoexpanditsbrand,SociétéAnonymeInternationaledeBrasserie

(Interbra).ThisBelgiancompany,hadinterestsinBelgium,France,BelgianCongo,and

Angolaand,incidentally,ownedColonialeBrasserie(Cobra).32

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InlinewithHeineken’saggressiveinternationalexpansionplanofthe1930s,the

brewinggiantpurchasedallthreeofthecompanies(Sofibra,Intebra,andCobra).With

regardtoEgypt,theinvestmentinSofibraprovidedanentranceintoamarketthatit

coveted;thechairmanofHeinekenhadvisitedEgyptaftertheFirstWorldWarandwas

impressedbytherapiddevelopmentthatthebeercompanieshadmadeduringthattime.33

Heineken’sentranceintotheEgyptianbeerindustrythusbeganin1937andwas

spearheadedbytheinvestmentcompanyCobra,re-namedN.V.KolonialeBrouwerijen,

whichrelocatedtoAmsterdam.34Cobrahadbecome,afterthepurchaseofand

incorporationofSofibraandInterbra,themainvectorforHeinken’sinternational

expansion.IthadinvestmentsnotonlyinEgypt,butalsoinIndonesia(Heineken

Netherlands-IndonesianBrewingCompanyinSurabaya),Singapore(MalayanBreweries),

andBrussels(SociétéInternationaledeBrasserie).Thislastbreweryevenhaditsown

internationalholdingsinFrance(MetzandTours)andinBelgianCongo(Leopoldville).35

Insteadofpurchasingthebreweriesoutright,Cobraboughtalargenumberof

sharesinBomonti-PyramidandCrownBrewery.Althoughthismightsoundlikearather

straightforwardprocess,theacquisitionoftheshareswasamulti-stepventure.Heineken,

actingthroughCobra,asaDutchcompany,boughtsharesincompanieswhosemainbases

ofoperationwereinEgypt,butthatwereregisteredasBelgiancompaniesinBrussels.The

multinationalnatureofthenewenterprisemeantthatthemovementofinformationwas

notafrictionlessprocessandwasoftenheldupbylanguagebarriers.Forexample,if

HeinekenwantedtoimplementanewpolicyonthegroundinCairo,ithadtogothrougha

multi-stepandmulti-lingualprocess.Heineken,locatedinRotterdam,wouldsenda

directivetoCobra,locatedinAmsterdam,viaaletterwritteninDutch.Cobrawouldthen

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relaythisinformationtotheCEOsofCrownandPyramidBreweries,whowerelocatedin

AlexandriaandCairo,respectively;thiscommunicationwouldagaingobyletter,butthis

timeinFrench.TheCEOswouldthenrelaythemessagetotheirrespectiveboardsin

Brussels,throughlettersortelegramsinFrench.Finally,afterapprovalbytheboardsin

Brussels,thepolicywouldbeimplementedthroughtheaidofworkerswhohadbeen

informedoftheplaneitherorallyorthroughwrittenArabic.

Thedifficultiesincommunicationinthisnewsetupwereexemplifiedbyoneof

Cobra’sfirstattemptstoattendageneralmeetingofCrownBrewery’sshareholdersin

Brussels.BecausetherelationshipbetweenCobraandCrownhadnotyetbeenformalized,

CobraputonethousandsharesofCrowninthetrustofanagency,theNetherlandsTrading

Society(NederlandscheHandel-Maatschaapij)inAmsterdam,whichthensentanagentto

representCobraatCrown’sshareholders’meeting.Allthewhile,Cobrahadto

communicatethesestepstoallthepartiesinvolved(Heineken,CrownandPyramid,

NetherlandsTrading)inFrenchandDutch.36

Despitetheaddedlayerofadministrativeinefficiency,theinvolvementofoneofthe

largestbrewersintheworldwasapositivedevelopmentfortheEgyptianbeerindustry.

ThisrelationshipprovidedPyramidandCrownaccesstotheexpertiseofHeineken,which

wasonthecuttingedgeofbrewing.Inaddition,Heinekenwasamultinationalcompany

withworldwidebusinessinterestsandthuswaswellacquaintedwiththeparticularitiesof

brewinginallmannerofclimatesandregions.Thebenefitsofthisrelationshipbecame

apparentwhen,forexample,CrownBreweryinvestedinkegs.Kegs,likebottles,werea

beer-deliverymethodwithinthetotalcontrolbrewingsystem.Thekegwasthephysical

embodimentofthemodernbrewer’sbeliefthattheapplicationofthemostcutting-edge

16

technologywouldenablehimtodeliverastandardizedanddurableproducttocustomers.

Assuch,thekegestablishedtwoimpermeableboundaries;onebetweentheoutsideworld

andthebeerandonebetweenthebeercontainedwithinthekegandthekegitself.

Thefirstimpermeableboundaryseparatedthecontentsofthekegfromtheoutside

world.Likeglassbottles,kegshadtopreventanymicroorganismsorotherforeignbodies

fromenteringfromtheenvironment.Afterthesekegshadbeenfilledtheywouldbe

pasteurized,inasimilarprocesstothatusedonbottles,toassurethatnoforeignbodies

werepresent.Unlikeglassbottles,however,kegshadtocarryamuchlargeramountof

beer.Whereasbottlescontainednomorethan750mlofbeer,kegscouldhousethirtyliters

ormore.Thislargesizemeantthatthekegwasasmuchastoragedeviceasitwasa

deliverydevice,andthatitthushadtohaveasecondimpermeableboundary.Besides

keepingtheoutsideworldawayfromthebeer,theyalsohadtonotreactwiththebeerheld

inside.Anyseepagefromthekegsintothebeerwouldaddflavor.Thiswasnotsuchan

issuewhenthekegsweremadeofwood(mostoftenreferredtoasbarrelsorcasks)

becausetheywouldimpartanaturalwoodyflavorthatcouldchangetheflavorprofile,but

wouldnotruinit.However,bythe1930swoodenbarrelshadbeenreplacedbymetalkegs,

asmetalwassturdier,moreeasilyshipped,andcouldbereusedmoreoften,andseepage

becameaseriousissue.Notonlycouldthemetalalterthetasteofthebeerbyaddingan

unappealingmetallictaste,butthebeer,dueitscarbonation,couldstartcorrodingthe

insideofthekeg.37Thus,notonlydidthisseepageruintheproduct,butitalsorequiredthe

replacementofthekeg,adoubleloss.

Giventheimportanceofkegstotheoverallbrewingprocess,whenCrownwantedto

purchasekegsin1938,theyturnedtotheirnewmultinationalpartnerfortheirexpertise.

17

Heineken,speakingthroughCobra,offeredtworecommendationsforcompaniesfrom

whomCrownBrewerycouldpurchasetheirkegs:aDutchfirm,T.Knape,locatedin

Wassenaar,Netherlands,andaGermanfirm,Rosista,locatedinDortmund.38

Beyondmerelysuggestingthetwofirmsfromwhichthebrewerycouldbuyitskegs,

Heinekenalsoadvisedthemonthepotentialconsiderationsassociatedwithbuyingfrom

each.OnemajorissuewithT.Knape’skegswasthatalthoughtheywerecheaper,theywere

madefromuntreatediron,meaningthatthebrewerieswouldhavetobuylacquerfrom

anothercompanyandapplyalayertothekegthemselvesbeforethekegscouldbeused.

Heinekenwaswillingtorecommendothercompanieswhocouldprovidethelacquer,but

advisedCrownagainstthisoption.Fromitsexperience,theapplicationofthelacquerwasa

trulylabor-intensiveanddifficultprocessthatrequiredassiduousadherenceto

instructionsaswellasabsolutelyidealconditions.39Ifthesestrictconditionswerenotmet,

theresultswerealwayspoor.Inadditiontothelacqueringissue,T.Knape’skegsdidnot

comewiththeirownbung,thestopperthatclosedtheopeningthroughwhichthekegwas

filled.Thusthecompanyhadtobuythemseparatelyand,besidestheadditionalcost,this

toocouldcauseseriousissues.AsHeinekennoted,whenbeerwaspasteurizedinkegs,

everythingexpanded;however,thebeerdidsofasterthanthekeg.Theendresultwasthat

ifthebungwasnotfittedperfectlyorthekegwasoverfilled,thebung,alreadyloosenedby

theexpandingmetalofthekeg,wouldbeplacedundertremendouspressure.Thiswould

oftenleadtothefailureofthebungandthelossordegradationoftheproduct.

Forallofthesereasons,HeinekensuggestedthatCrowngowiththemuchmore

expensivekegsfromRosistainDortmund.Despitethemoresignificantfinancialoutlay,

Rosista’skegsweremadefromstainlesssteel,meaningthattheydidnotrequireanypre-

18

treatmentbeforetheycouldbeused.Thestainlesssteelwasalreadytreatedtopreventany

corrosionormetalseepage.AnotherbenefitoftheRosistamodelwasthatitcamewithits

ownspeciallydesignedmethodofclosingthekeg.40Althoughthissuggestioncamewiththe

implicationthatCrownwasnotuptothetaskofmeetingthedemandingconditions

requiredfortheT.Knape’skegs,CrownBreweryprovedveryreceptivetotheadviceof

Heineken.TheyreckonedthattheT.Knapekegswouldbemoretroublethantheywere

worthandaskedHeinekentoinformRosistathattheywouldexaminebidsontheir

services.41

ThisinteractionbetweenHeinekenandCrownillustrateshowHeineken’s

investmentinCrownandPyramidBreweriespaidsignificantdividendsfortheEgyptian

companies.Theinteractionalsoillustratesthepositiveeffectthatthepresenceof

multinationalcompanieshadonbusinessesinEgypt.Beingapartofamultinational

corporationgavethebreweriesaccesstothelatestinbrewingtechnologyandtechniques

andthusallowedforthesmarterimportationoftechnologies.Thebrewerieswereableto

tailortheirimportstotheparticularitiesofthecountrybeforespendinganymoney,in

contrasttopreviousattemptsbyentrepreneurstobringtechnologyintoEgypt.Such

entrepreneursoftenassumedthattheimportprocesswouldbefrictionless,onlytofind

difficultiesinapplyingtechnology.ButCrown,insteadofgoingforthe“cheaper”kegoption

andsufferingfromtheirfalseeconomy,chosethe“moreexpensive”optionthatwasbetter

suitedtotheirneeds.

Heineken’sadvicetoCrowndidnotarisesolelyfromadesiretobuildupthe

Egyptianbeerindustry;italsocamefromitsdesiretopreservethebottomlineforan

investmentthatwasalmostimmediatelyprofitable.In1939,Heinekenreceivedatotal

19

divinedpaymentofover23,000poundssterlingfromthe8968sharesitownedinCrown

Brewery.42Admittedly,aswitheveryotheraspectofdoingbusinessintheearlyyearsof

thisnewmultinationalinterest,receivingthemoneywasnotstraightforward.The

impedimentinthiscasewastheglobalconflictthatwasslowlystartingtoengulftheworld,

whatwouldeventuallybecalledWorldWarII.Oneofthewar’sprimarycombatantswas

Britain,whichstilltreatedEgyptasadefactocolonyandwashighlyconcernedthatany

moneyflowingoutofEgyptdidnotgotoenemycountries.Inordertocomplywith

governmentregulations,companieshadtoshowthatanymoneyleavingEgyptwasnot

goingtoenemysubjects.43Thisrequirementnecessitatedtheauthenticationofallmoney

recipients,thushamperingmoneytransfer.Thiswasespeciallytruewithamoneytransfer

aslargeasthisdividendpayment,whichwasgoingtoBelgium,acountrythathadbeen

occupiedbytheGermansin1940.Infact,Cobra—whichwas,perusual,servingasthe

intermediarybetweenHeinekenandthebeercompanies—wassurprisedthattheEgyptian

government,notknowingwhothefinalrecipientofthemoneywouldbe,hadevenallowed

thetransferprocesstobegin.44Unsurprisingly,evenwiththehelpofPyramidBreweryand

aBelgianBankcalledtheSociétéGénéraleàBruxelles,Crownwasunabletotransferthe

money.45Thisblockadeondividendsremainedineffectuntil1948.46

WorldWarIITheinabilitytotransferdividendsfromCrownBrewerytoHeinekenwasoneofthe

numerousdifficultiesthatthenewmultinationalbeerconglomeratefacedduringthewar.

AnotherdifficultyincludedthelossofGermanemployees;afterthewarbegan,Crownvery

quicklylostitsGermanbrewmasteranditscooper(themaninchargeofmakingwooden

20

barrelsorcasksforagingthebeer),asbothabandonedtheirjobstoreturntothetheir

homeland.47AnevengreaterdifficultythatCrownfacedaftertheoutbreakofthewarwas

thatallofitsactivitiesinvolvingthegovernmentsorcitizensofanyoccupiedcountries(e.g.

Belgium,theNetherlands,andFrance)cameunderthepurviewofanEgyptian

governmentalbodycreatedduringthewar,theOfficeofOccupiedandControlled

Territories(Fr.OfficedesTerritoiresOccupésetContrôles,Ar.Maktabal-Bilādal-Muḥtala

waal-Khāḍīʿli-l-Riqāba,henceforth,OTOC).48ItwasthisbodythatCrownhadtodealwith

when,asdiscussedabove,itwantedtodisburseitsdividends,anditwasthisbodythat

decidedtoputaholdonanydividendpayments.TheOTOCservedasawatchdogofany

actionthebreweriestookwithregardtoBelgiumortheNetherlandsandalsohadfull

controlofCrownandPyramid’stransactionswiththesecountries.Forexample,duringthe

war,theOTOCnotonlyblockedanyCrownfundsgoingfromEgypttoHolland,butalso

keptthemintheirowncoffers.49Thus,in1945,whentheOTOCinformedCrownthatit

couldstartpayingouttoitsstockholders,themoneycamefromtheOTOC.50When,in1948,

theOTOCdidunblockfundsflowingtoHolland,anagreementbetweentheEgyptianand

DutchgovernmentsenabledtheEgyptiangovernmenttocontrolthebasesthroughwhich

companiescouldtransferthemoneyfromonecountrytotheother.Intotal,theOTOCheld

nearly48,000poundssterlingduringthewarthatwasmeanttobetransferredfromCrown

toCobra.51

TheOTOC’sinvolvementwithCrownwasemblematicofhowWorldWarIIallowed

governmentalbodiesinEgypttobecomemoreinvolvedinprivatebusinessesinthename

ofnationalinterest.AnevenclearerexampleoftheEgyptiangovernment’snew

relationshipwithCrownBrewerywastheinstanceofCrown’smovingitsheadquartersto

21

Egypt.Sinceitsestablishmentin1897,CrownBreweryhadbeenamultinationalventure.

Whileitsmainoperations—theproduction,transportation,andsaleofbeer—tookplacein

Egypt,thecompanymaintainedasmallheadquartersinBrussels.Despitethenumerous

changesinownership,includingtheinvolvementoftheBomontis,ReneGaston-Dreyfus,

andHeineken,thestaffinBrusselsremainedrelativelystable.Emblematicofthisstability

wasaBelgianindustrialist,ArthurRoland,whohelpedleadCrownBreweryinBrussels

fromitsbeginningsin1897until1943.52TheresiliencyoftheEuropeanheadquarterswas

challenged,however,bytheGermaninvasionofBelgiumin1940.Accordingtoboth

EgyptianMartialLawandBelgianlaw,CrownBrewerywasrequiredtomoveits

headquarterstoAlexandriauponthearrivaloftheGermans.53Alsoduetomartiallaw,the

headquartershadtohavealloftheirexpendituresapprovedbytheEgyptianMinistryof

Finance.TheheadquarterswouldremainatAlexandriauntil1945.Despitethedisruption

ofhavingtomoveitsheadquarters,CrownBrewerywasstillabletomaintainitsfinancial

viability.Inaninternalmemo,oneofitsadministratorsnotedthatduringthewarCrown

useditsbrewerymachinerynonstop.54

AlthoughtheoccupationofBelgiumendedin1944,Crown’sproblemsdidnot.Infact,

theissuesthatCrownwouldfaceafter1945werelinkedtothoseofthelargerworld,

particularlyEgyptandBelgium,asitattemptedtorecoverfromWorldWarII.Inthe

postwarperiodofnormalization,theMinistryofFinanceofbothcountriesaimedtomake

upfortimelostinthewar.Inthissituation,CrownBrewery’smultinationalnaturebecame

aliability.AsaBelgiancompanywhosemainoperationswereinEgypt,Crownwas

expectedtopaybacktaxesonitscapitalandprofitsfortheperiodfrom1935to1940in

bothBelgiumandEgypt.ThisrealitywasashocktoCrown,asthisdoubletaxation,atleast

22

intheireyes,threatenedtheveryexistenceofthecompany.55ThetotalfortheBelgium

taxeswouldhavetotaledseventeenmillionBelgianfrancs.56Thecompanydidnothavethe

moneytopaythisenormousfee,asanyprofitsthattheyhadmadeduringtheperiodin

questionhadalreadybeendistributed.Crowndidnotwanttodipintoitsreserves,asthat

moneywasneededtobringitsmachineryuptodate.Mostoftheequipmentthatitwas

usingin1945datedfromtheearlydaysofthebreweriesandwasatleastfortyyearsold.57

Facingthisintractabletaxsituation,CrownturnedtotheirDutchinvestor,Heineken,in

hopesthatthelargecorporationcoulduseitsownexpertisetosolvetheproblem.

Heineken,recognizingthatoneofitsnewestassetswasdistressed,diditsbesttoresolve

theissue.ItsentDirkStikker,theheadofCobra,toAlexandriatoevaluatetheCrown

situation,anditenlistedtheserviceofPaulBodart,adoctoroflawandtheheadofInterbra

(oneofthebrewingcompaniesitacquiredaroundthesametimeitboughtintoCrownand

PyramidBrewery),andCarlodeMey,anexpertinfiscallaw,toconsultwiththeCrown

leadershipandfindaworkablesolutiontothetaxissue.Allofthesepartiesspentovera

yearworkingontheproblem,studyingBelgianlawinhopesoflesseningthecompany’stax

burden.

Onesolution,suggestedbyCarlodeMey,thatgainedagooddealoftractionwasto

abandontheheadquartersinBrusselsandmovealloperationstoEgypt.IndeMey’s

estimation,thelawthathadforcedCrown’smovetoEgypthadnotbeenabrogated;thus,

Crowncouldclaimthatthecompanyneededtoremainthere.BecauseallofCrown’s

businessactivitieswerelocatedinEgypt,thisargumentwasfeasible.Makingtheargument

wouldrequireeliminatinganyconnectionbetweenCrownandBelgium.Bymakingthis

switch,thecompanycouldhopetoevadetheBelgiantaxauthoritiesandonlyhaveto

23

reckonwiththetaxesinEgypt.58AlthoughthecompanyhadbeenfoundedasaBelgian

enterpriseandhadbeenconnectedtothecountryformorethanfiftyyears,thistransition

seamedfeasibleintheextraordinarycontextofthewar.AnadditionalpointinCrown’s

favorwasthatithadallowedthepresidencyoftheheadoftheBelgianoperation,Arthur

Roland,toexpirein1943withoutfindingareplacement.59

Nevertheless,noteveryoneatCrownwasinagreementonthispotentialsolution.Paul

Bodart,theotherlegalexpertwhomCobrahadchargedwiththetaskoffindingasolution,

waslessthansoldontheproposal.WhileBodartrecognizedtheclevernessofdeMey’s

thinking,hewasextremelyworriedabouthowtheBelgiangovernmentwouldreactto

whatwasarelativelycynicaltax-avoidancemaneuver.Yes,thismovecouldexemptCrown

Breweryfromanoneroustaxburden,buttheBelgiangovernmentcouldalsoforceCrown

topayfortheliquidationofthecompanyinBrussels.60Likewise,whileitmayhavebeen

easiertoneverreturntoBrusselsthantrytoarguedownthetaxes,theremayhavebeen

otherchallengesiftheBelgiangovernmentprovedunwillingtonegotiatewiththeEgyptian

government.61

BodartwasnotaloneinhisskepticismofdeMey’sscheme.BeforedeMeymadehis

suggestiononmovingoperations,theexecutiveboardofCrownwasfullycommittedto

returningtoBelgiumafterthewar.Eventhoughthecompanywasgoingagainsthis

judgment,heofferedsomereasonablefinalsuggestionsinamemotoCrown.Thefirstwas

thatCrownshouldaffirmthat,sincethebeginningofthewar,theadministrativeseatofthe

companyhadbeeninEgyptandwasalwaysmeanttostaythere.Bodart’ssecondbitof

advicewastoholdanExtraordinaryGeneralMeeting,inAlexandriaofcourse,toconfirm

thattheheadquartersofthecompanywouldremaininEgypt.62Thecompanydidnotheed

24

hisadvice,insteadopeningupthedecisiontoanExtraordinaryGeneralMeetingin

Brussels.Fortunately,theexecutivesinattendancerecognizedthattherewas“technicalor

geographicalreasonformaintainingtheplaceofGeneralMeetingsinAlexandria.”63

Thus,havingmadeitsdecision,CrownBreweryofficiallymoveditsheadquartersto

Alexandriain1946.NotwithstandingtheworriesofPaulBodart,Crowndoesnotappearto

havehadissueswiththeBelgiangovernmentafterthispoint.Forexample,atmeetingof

shareholdersin1947,therewasnonewsabouttheBelgianresponsetoCrown’sgambit.64

TheBelgiangovernment’sindifferencetothemovementofabeercompanywhosesales

andproductionwaslimitedtoaforeigncountrywasonlynatural,asthiscountry,likethe

restofEurope,wasatthatpointprimarilyconcernedwithrecoveringfromthewar.Still,it

isimportanttonotethat,despitesometokenmentionbybothdeMeyandtheCrown

executivesaboutbecominganEgyptiancompany,Crowndidnotproceedwithanytypeof

Egyptianizationaftermovingtheirheadquarters.Infact,thecompanychangedremarkably

littleafterthemove.FortheexecutivesofbothCrownandCobra,thecompanycontinued

tofunctionasa“foreign”companywithinEgypt.

Crown’sbreakwithBrusselswasnotacompletelycleanone.AlthoughArthurRoland

hadceasedhisdutiesastheheadoftheBelgianoperationsofCrown,someCrown

employeesstillremainedinBelgium.Inparticular,CrownhadappointedMarcelCuvelier,a

Belgiancitizen,asthecompanyrepresentativeinBelgiumforthetransitionfrombeinga

BelgiancompanytoanEgyptianone.Also,Crown’slegalcounsel,DeMayandBodart,both

operatedoutofBrussels.Themainissuewiththeseremainingemployeeswasthat,as

residentsofBelgium,theysoughtcompensationinBelgianfrancs.Duringthewar,this

currencyhadbecomeincreasinglyrareinEgypt,soCrownwasnotabletoacquireenough

25

currencytopaythewagesofthesethreeemployees.65CrownappealedtoCobratoprovide

100,000BelgianFrancstocoverthewagesofdeMeyandCuvelier,whowereintheemploy

ofCrownBrewery.CrownleadershipdidnotbelievetheywereresponsibleforBodart,for,

afterHeineken’spurchaseofInterbra,hehadbecomeanemployeeofCobra.Crown

rightfullypointedoutthatdeMeyhadcomeattherecommendationoftheheadofCobra,

Mr.Stikker,andhadbeentremendouslyhelpfulinthenationalityissue,whichcouldhave

costCobraagreatdealofmoney.66

Nevertheless,CobrawasunconvincedbyCrown’sargumentsastothenecessityof

compensatingtheseBelgianemployees.Cobrastatedvaguelythatitwasunabletofinda

solutiontotheproblemoftheemployees’pay,67anditprovidednoreasonforwhyitdid

notwanttohelpCrowninthismatter.Theexplanationwasmostlikelynotmoney,for

while100,000BelgianfrancscouldbeasignificantsumforCrown,itwasnotaproblemfor

amassivemultinationallikeHeineken.Cobra’sdesiretonotpaytheseemployeeswas

probablydrivenbyitsvaluationthattheseemployeeswerenotworthit.Cobra’sestimation

ofCuvelier’svalue,forone,becamepatentlyclearwhen,nearlyayearafterreceivingthis

request,thecompanysentarepresentativetoBrusselstoinformCuvelierthathisservices

werenolongerneeded.68

TighteningControlThisanecdoteaboutCuvelier’sterminationillustratesthat,despitethegeneraltenorof

respectthatpermeatedtheinteractionsbetweenCobraandCrown/Pyramid,the

relationshipwascharacterizedbyadistinctpowerdynamicofwhichnopartywas

ignorant.AmainpointofcontentionbetweentheEgyptiancompaniesandtheir

multinationaloverseersinvolvedtheplacementofCobra/Heinekenemployeesonthe

26

Crownboard.Asisclearfromtheabovediscussion,thecommunicationchainbetween

HeinekenandCrown/PyramidBrewerywashighlyinefficient.Forexample,inthecaseof

decidingonthenationalityofCrown,Cobrahadtosenditshead,Mr.Stikker,toEgypttoget

ahandleonthesituation.Likewise,ifCobrawantedtoberepresentedatshareholders

meetings,ithadtogothroughsignificanthurdles.Asdiscussedabove,itcoulddeposittheir

shareswithatradingcompanyinHollandwhowouldthensendarepresentativetothe

meeting.Anothermethodthatitstartedusingafterthewarwastogivepowerofattorney

toanemployeeofPyramidBrewerytorepresentCobraatCrown’sshareholdermeetings.69

Thismethodinvolvedanotherstepas,accordingtotheregulationsofCrown,thisemployee

hadtobeashareholderinCrown,andthushadtobuysharesinCrownbeforeattendinga

meeting.70

After1947,CobraaimedtoeliminatethisinefficiencyandworkedtohaveaCobra

employeeontheboardofCrown.Theplacementofsomeoneontheboardwasanattempt

totransformCobra’sbeerventurefromalooselycontrolledventureintoatightly

controlledventure.71Inlooselycontrolledfirms,“foreigninvestorshadconsiderable

foreignmanagerialandtechnicalinvolvement,”butwereunabletotranslatethis

involvementintodomination.72Tightlycontrolledfirms,ontheotherhand,werecarefully

linkedtoEuropeancorporateandindividualinvestors,andoftentimesservedas

subsidiariesandbranchesofthefirms.73BeforeWorldWarII,CrownandPyramidwere

undeniablylooselycontrolled,asthemanagersandexecutivesonthegroundinEgypt

exertedthemostinfluence.However,seeingthedifficultiesthatHeinekenexperienced

duringthewar,Cobratriedtochangethatpractice.

27

Ashasbeendiscussedabove,MouratiadisandCrownhadfoughtandsecuredalarge

degreeofautonomyintheirbattlewithReneGaston-Dreyfus.Theywerethusdeeply

protectiveofthisautonomyandwerenotkeenonanyencroachmentfromCobra,

especiallyCobra’srequestbyCobraforrepresentationontheirboard.TheonlywayCrown

wouldevenconsidertheconcessionwasiftheywereallowedtohavearepresentativeon

theBomonti-Pyramidboard.74Thisrequestillustratesthat,despitetheexternal

appearanceofunanimitybetweenCrownandPyramid,peoplewithinbothcompanies

viewedthemasautonomousbodies.Thispointbecomesevenclearerwhenweconsider

thereactionofoneH.G.Ivens,anemployeeofPyramidwhowasrepresentingCobraatthis

Crownshareholdermeeting.Ivens,reportingthatCrown’spresident,SpiroSpiridis,had,in

1947,requestedrepresentationonthePyramidboardinexchangeforCobra

representation(andforasecondtimenoless),calledtherequest“absurd.”75

SohowdidCobraattempttocircumventCrown’sprotestationsaboutCobra’s

representationontheirboard?ItappearsthatCobrausedtheotherbrewery,Pyramid,

againstCrown.Theirbasicstrategywastogive4860sharesofCrownBrewery,from

amongthe8978itowned,tothePyramidBrewery.Withcontroloftheseshares,Pyramid

wouldbecomethelargestshareholderinCrownBrewery.ThiswasabackdoorforCobrato

acquirelocalrepresentationinCrownwithoutforcingtheirhandandsouringthe

relationship.CobrawasthelargeststockholderinPyramid,andbecausePyramidhadnot

beenasrecalcitranttomembersofCobrasittingontheirboard,ithadhandpicked

representativesontheboardofPyramidBrewery,whowereconsultedonallmajor

decisions.76Inparticular,anexecutivenamedOscarAdrianEduardEgbertLeweWittert

28

vanHoogland(whohereafterwillbereferredtoasWittertvanHoogland)hadtakenalarge

leadershiproleinPyramidafterhisappointment,assumingthetitleofmanagingdirector.

WiththeseCobraemployeesembeddedintheupperexecutiverealmofPyramid,

Pyramid’snewstakeinCrownmeantthatCobranowhadanindirectwayofinfluencing

Crown.Throughtheclassicimperialistployofdivideandconquer,Cobraconvinced

PyramidBrewerytogoalongwiththeirplan.Althoughthisplanendedupbeinganelegant

solutiontoCobra’sproblems,Bomonti-Pyramidunsurprisinglylookedaskanceatthe

dealingsofCobra,whichtheDutchcompanyframedasanexchangeofnearlyfivethousand

sharesofCrownforthefiftythousandsharesofNigerianBreweryLimitedinLagosthat

Pyramidowned.77

ThefivemainpartiesinvolvedinthenegotiationswereAhmedFarghaliPasha,Yusuf

ZulficarPasha,andReneIsmalun,allofwhomwereofEgyptiannationalityandsatonthe

boardofBomonti-Pyramid;WittertVanHoogland,whoalsosatonthePyramidboard;and

G.A.Martin,aBritishshareholder.ThethreeEgyptiansrepresentedtheinterestsof

Pyramid,whileWittertvanHooglandandMartinspokeforCobra.Theexchangeofshares

wasobviouslyatouchysubjectbecauseWittertvanHooglandwasdilatoryinproposing

theplantothethreeEgyptians.WhenHeinekenhadaskedhimtolookintoitonJanuary

21,1952,WittertvanHooglandrespondedaweeklaterthathehadonlytalkedtoFarghali,

verybriefly,andcouldprovidenoconclusiontothematter.78Farghaliprovedanelusive

figure.WhenWittertvanHooglanddidfinallyscheduleameetingnearlyamonthlater,

onlyIsmalunandZulficarattended.Farghalicancelledthirtyminutesbeforethemeeting,

insistingthathewasheavilyembroiledincottonnegotiations.(Farghali’smainbusiness

venturewasthecottoncompanyheinheritedfromhisfather).79Thiswasnotthefirsttime

29

FarghalihadproveddifficultwhenitcametomeetingwithWittertvanHoogland,foras

WittertvanHooglandnoted,thistimetheexcuseappearedtobevalid;therewasaCotton

Fairgoingonatthesametime.80

WhenWittertvanHooglandmetwithIsmalunandZulficar,thetwomenhaddifferent

reactionstoHeineken’sproposal.Ismalunwasimmediatelyonboard,butZulficar,despite

alongconversationwithWittertvanHoogland,wasreluctant,citingtheneedtohearthe

opinionsofFarghalibeforemakinganydecisions.81Zulficar’shesitationdispiritedWittert

vanHooglandbecauseifZulficarcouldnotbeconvinced,thenconvincingFarghaliwould

beanevenmoredifficulttask.82Regardless,becauseWittertvanHooglandaswellas

MartinandIsmalunwereonboard,theycouldalloutvotethedissentersandpushthrough

thetransaction.However,WittertvanHooglandthoughttheyshouldavoidthistactic

unlessCobrathoughtitwasabsolutelynecessary,thebettertomaintaingoodrelations.

Instead,WittertvanHooglandthoughtthatanotefromCobraandMartinaboutthe

importanceofthedealcouldconvincetheEgyptianstoacceptit.WittertvanHooglandwas

convincedthatthey,CobraandHeineken,wouldneedeverybitofpersuasiontosway

Farghali,andhewascorrect.83

WhenWittertvanHooglandwasfinallyabletogatheralloftheEgyptianstogetherin

Aprilataboardmeeting,itwasFarghaliwhoheldupthedeal,doingsobyraisingquestions

aboutthedeal’sfairness.CobrawouldexchangetheCrownsharesfortheNigerianshares

atapriceof120piasterspershare,asumthatcoveredbothPyramid’soriginalinvestment

inthesharesandathreepercentyearlyinterestonthem.Althoughtherewouldbealossof

about863Egyptianpounds,thiswascoveredbyCobra’sone-sterlingdiscountonthe

CrownsharesthatPyramidwasgetting.84Farghaliwasunconvinced,however,and

30

believedthatbecausePyramidwasgivingCobrasuchabelow-marketpriceontheNigerian

stock,thattheleastCobracoulddowaspayafourpercentyearlyinterestinsteadofthree

percent.85WittertvanHooglandeventuallyconcededtofourpercent,andthisconcession,

plusthedirectcontactthatCobramadewiththeEgyptiansatWittert’srequest,was

instrumentalingettingthedealpushedthrough.86Withthedealcompleted,somequestion

remainedaboutwhowouldrepresentPyramidBreweryattheshareholders’meetingfor

CrownBrewery.87Unsurprisingly,Cobrachosethemanwhohaddonesomuchworkfor

theminthismatter,WittertvanHoogland.88WittertvanHooglandwouldhaveapowerful

roletoplayinbothofthecompaniesfrom1953to1957,servingasCobra’smainmanon

theground.89

Thegreatdifficultyinfinishingthisdeal,whichultimatelybenefitedbothparties,

evincesadeeperriftbetweentheEgypt-basedentrepreneursandtheirEuropean

counterparts.WittertvanHooglandremarkedonthisriftindiscussingtheparticularitiesof

thedeal.Hestated,“WhenoneproposessomethingtoanEgyptianhegenerallythinks

thereissomethingthathedoesnotseebehindtheproposalandthereforethatheisbeing

had.”90FromtheEuropeanside,thisstatementspeakstotheessentializedviewthat

EuropeanshadofEgyptians.EvenarelativelymagnanimousEuropeanwhowaswillingto

accommodateEgyptianwishesforthesakeofgoodrelationscouldviewEgyptiansasan

undifferentiatedmassratherthanasindividualswhohadtheirowndistinctcharacteristics.

Nevertheless,thestatementandtheactionsofFarghalialsohintatasenseofdistrust

amongEgyptianbusinesselitesvis-à-visEuropeans.Thisdistrustwouldonlybenatural

consideringthelegalandeconomicadvantagesofEuropeanbusinessmeninEgypt,suchas

theduallegalsystemthatfavoredthosewithforeigncitizenship.91Ofcourse,Farghali’s

31

intuitionmayhavebeencorrect,asCobrawasusingthisdealtomanipulateEgyptians,just

nothim.

TheseharddealingsalsotellussomethingmorepersonalaboutFarghali.Ashewas

arguingwithWittertvanHooglandoverthepercentinterestontheNigerianshares,he

madeastatementtoReneIsmalun,hisfellowEgyptianontheboardandamemberofthe

EgyptianJewishcommunity:“Ithinkweshouldbelikethejew[sic]andaskCobrato

compensateusonthebasisof4%interest.”92Thisbitofoff-the-cuffanti-Semitismwas

meantasawaytojustifyFarghali’shardline,buttothemodernreaderitexemplifieshow

anti-Semitism,likecolonialattitudesamongEuropeans,pervadedEgyptiancultureatthe

time.Infact,thebreezinesswithwhichFarghalimentions“jews”asajokesignalsthe

culturalpervasivenessofanti-Semitism.Ismalun’sresponsetoFarghalionlyaffirmsthe

point,ashenotesinaquickrejoinder:“[t]hatwouldnotbelikethejew[sic]butlike

Farghaly[sic].”93Thisresponsenotonlyconfirmsthattheanti-Semitismwasexpressedin

jest,butthatthiswasprobablynotthefirstinstanceinwhichIslamunhadheardsucha

statement.

WhatHeinekenControlledWhileitisclearfromtheabovediscussionthatHeinekenwaswillingtogotogreat

lengthstoassertitscontroloverCrownandPyramidBreweries,itisnotimmediately

apparentwhatthistightercontrolmeant.Thissectionexploreswhatthistightercontrol

entailedbecausetheformandfunctionoftheHeineken–Crown–Pyramidpartnershiptook

afterthedealwouldcharacterizethebreweriesuntil1963.Heineken’smainbaseof

operationswithinEgyptwasPyramidBrewery.Asshownintheabovediscussion,dueto

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Heineken’spenetrationoftheexecutivebranchandthelongdurationoftherelations,

Heineken’scontrolofPyramidwasmuchgreaterthanofCrown.

IntheeyesofHeineken,itsservicestoPyramidcameinfiveforms:advising,control,

staff,yeast,andsupplies.94Asshownbythekegexample,Heinekenhadservedtheadvisory

roleforaslongasithadbeeninvolvedintheEgyptianbeerindustry.However,withits

pushforgreatercontrolafterWorldWarII,Heinekencametoadviseonalltechnical

mattersrangingfromthefirststepofbrewing(rawmaterialsused)tothelast

(refrigeration).Throughthisadvisoryrole,HeinekenpushedPyramidBreweryto

implementthelatestinnovationsinbrewinginthenameofmaintainingahealthybottom

lineandaproductbefittingtheHeinekenlabel.Forexample,itadvisedPyramidnotonlyon

whatproducts(thetypeofmalt)andproductionmethods(newmaltingsystems)they

shoulduse,butalsodirectedthemonhowtoconducttheirownlab-basedanalysisofthe

rawmaterialsandthebeerproduced.95Thisadvicewasgenerallyrenderedinmonthly

technicalreportsexchangedbetweenPyramidandHeineken.Formorecomplexmatters,

however,HeinekeneithersentarepresentativetoPyramidorrequestedthatPyramidsend

onetoHolland.96

Thissystemofmonthlytechnicalreportsandvisitswasatoncethemeansbywhich

HeinekenadvisedPyramidandprovidedtheirsecondservice,control.Whilethetechnical

reportswereanimportantwayforHeinekenandPyramidtodiscussbestpractices,they

werealsoawayforHeinekentokeepconstanttabsonthecompany.Thesereportswere

usuallywrittenbyoneofthemenwhomHeinekenhadplacedontheboard,which

eliminatedanychancethatthereportwouldpaintarosierpicturethanthereality.

Likewise,thevisitsofHeinekenemployeesweremeantnotonlyasawaytoadviseon

33

technicalmatters,butalsoawayforHeinekentomonitortheoperationsandworkersof

thecompany.AthirdpointofcontrolforHeinekenwasthatithadPyramidsendamonthly

sampleofbeertobeanalyzedinoneofHeineken’slaboratories.97Thisservicewasmeant

toensurethatthebeerproducedinEgyptmatchedHeineken’sexactingstandards.

Heinekennotonlyreliedonreports,visits,samples,andmembersoftheexecutive

boardtoassurethatPyramidputoutaproductworthyoftheHeinekenname,butalso

placedamanhighlytrainedinHeineken’smethodsofmakingbeerasthebrewmaster.

Whiletheindustrializationofbeer-makingallowedcompaniestoproducebeerwithfewer

well-trainedworkers,itdidnoteliminatethecraftinmakingbeerentirely.Apersonwitha

largeknowledgebase,thebrewmaster,wasstillneededtoensurethattheproducttasted

thewaythecompanywanted.Thebrewmasterwasmassivelyimportanttothedirectionof

thecompany,anditisforthisreasonthat,asIdiscussbelow,oneofthemajorboonsinthe

nationalizationofthebeerindustrywastheexpulsionoftheforeign-trainedbrewmasters.

TheplacementofaHeineken-trainedbrewmasteratPyramidwasespecially

importantbecauseofanotherserviceHeinekenrendered,sendingtheirstrainofyeastto

Pyramid.Asdiscussedabove,thegreaterunderstandingandsubsequentcontrolofthelife

cycleofyeastinauguratedthescientifcationandmechanizationofbrewing.Withthisnew

understanding,breweriescouldoptimizethebrewingprocessandevenbegintobreed

proprietarystrainsofyeast.Thus,theyeastHeinekenusedtomakeitsbeerwasuniqueto

thecompany,acloselyguardedsecretthatdifferentiateditfromotherbrands.The

brewmasterhadtobeHeineken-trainedsothat,havinglearnedtobrewusingHeineken’s

strain,hecouldmaximizeitsoutputinadifferentsetting.Beyondthebrewmaster,

Heinekenalsoaimed,whenitcould,toplacepeoplewhomithadtrainedwithinPyramid.

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Inadditiontosendingpartoftheworkforce,Heinekenalsoservedasthebrokerfor

thePyramid’sacquisitionofnewmaterials.Inasimilarprocessasseenabovewiththe

kegs,Heinekensentpro-formainvoicestoPyramidforanyraworauxiliarymaterialsand

machinesandinstallationsthatwerenotpresentinthelocalmarket.98Whenpossible,

Heineken’sengineersinspectedanythingbeforeitwassenttoPyramid.Forthosematerials

availableinthelocalmarket,likecrowncorks(bottlecaps),HeinekeninsistedthatPyramid

sendthemtoHollandforinspection.99

Asnotedabove,HeinekenveryoftenmatchedtheseservicestoPyramidwitha

strongamountofsurveillance.Evengreatersurveillancewasdemandedbythefinancial

andadministrativehappeningsofthecompany.Pyramidwasresponsibleforsending

Heinekenmonthlyreportsonthepriceofbeer,PyramidandCrownsales,shareprices,

theircashsituation,andmeetingsoftheadministrativeboard.Beyondthesemonthly

check-ins,Pyramidalsohadtosendaquarterlybudgetandfeasibilitystudyofthatbudget,

ayearlyinventory,thepositionandcostofanyimports,anylawsuitsraisedagainstthe

company,anyregulationspassedbythegovernmentthatwouldaffectthecompany,and,

finally,thestatusofPyramid’srelationshipwithCrown.100

Asshouldbeobviousfromtheabovedescriptionofthemoretightlycontrolled

PyramidBrewery,Heinekenwasfullycommittedtoinstilling“totalbrewing”inthe

Egyptiancompany.ItviewedPyramidasanextensionofthecompanyandinsistedit

measureuptoHeineken’shighstandards.AsIwillshow,thesepoliciesoftencausedagood

dealofconflictbetweentheDutchinthecompanyononehandandtheEgyptian

entrepreneurs,managers,andworkersontheother.Still,thepoliciesrepresentedawell-

thoughtoutsystemthatwasdesignedtosupportacuttingedgebreweryinEgypt.The

35

depthsofHeineken’sdemandsfromthecompanyshouldcomeasnosurprisebecause

HeinekenwasamultinationalbreweryexperiencedwithbrewingoutsideofHolland.In

fact,theproceduresthatitenforcedinPyramidweresimilartothoseitimplemented

everywhereelseinitsbeerempire.101

Nevertheless,itwouldbeincorrecttoclassifyPyramidandCrownbreweriesas

“tightlycontrolled”firmsaccordingtothemetricsofTignor.Despiteallofthepushesfor

greatercontrol,aswesawwiththenegotiationswithFarghali,thepeopleontheground

stillhadamassiveinfluenceonthedirectionofthecompanies.Heinekenandits

representativesinthecompaniescouldmapoutwhateverbestpracticestheywanted;but

ultimately,thedecisiononwhetherpolicieswereimplementedreliedonthelocal

leadership.AsIdiscusslater,despiteallofHeineken’sadvantages,itwasneverableto

controlCrownlikeitdidPyramid.

(Partial)EgyptianizationHeineken’slackofcompletecontroloverCrownandPyramidwasexactlywhatthe

Egyptiangovernmentofthetimewanted.AsHeinekenwastryingtotransitionCrownand

PyramidBreweriesfrombeinglightlycontrolledforeignenterprisestotightlycontrolled

ones,theEgyptiangovernmentwasinstitutingpoliciesthatwerepushingprivate

industriestowardasingulargoal,Egyptianization.Thispushgrewoutofaseriesof

concurrenttrends.ThefirsttrendwastheslowerosionoftheCapitulationsandtheirmain

manifestation,theMixedCourts.TheCapitulationswere“asetofprivilegesgrantedto

nationalsofcertaincountriesthateffectivelyexemptedthemfromEgyptianlawand

judicialinstitutions.”102TheMixedCourtswasthebodythatattemptedtomanagethe

36

judicialneedsoftwoantagonisticforcesinEgypt,theEgyptiangovernmentandthe

capitulatorypowers.WhattheCourtsbecameinpracticewasaduallegalsystem,inwhich

Egyptianandforeigncompaniesweretriedseparately.WithregardtoprivateEuropean

companieslikeCrownandPyramid,thisdualsystemmadethempracticallyinviolate.

However,theMixedCourtshad,fromtheirfounding,beencontinuallyunderattackbyboth

theEgyptiansandtheBritish.103Oppositionreachedacriticalmassin1937,whenthe

MontreuxConferenceestablishedaphasingoutoftheCapitulations,whichwasthen

followedbytheabolitionoftheMixedCourtsin1949.Withoutthisimpediment,the

Egyptiangovernmentcouldnowdealwithforeignbusinessesthatforsolonghadresided

inEgyptasjudicialblindspotsthatwereexemptfromtariffsandtaxes.104

Atthesametime,WorldWarIIemboldenedtheEgyptiangovernmenttodealwith

foreigncompaniesinanew,moreinvasiveway.Asdiscussedabovewiththeactionsof

OTOC(OfficedesTerritoiresOccupésetContrôles,Ar.Maktabal-Bilādal-Muḥtalawaal-

Khāḍīʿli-l-Riqāba),theEgyptiangovernment,actingundertheauspicesofmartiallaw,

honeditsnewmethodsinregulatingbusinessesandtheirprofits.Thetacticsthatthe

governmentusedtoensurethatnomoneyflowedtoBritishenemies,i.e.requestinglistsof

shareholders,bankstatements,andlettersandstatementsfromexecutives,weresomeof

thesametacticstheyutilizedtoencouragetheEgyptianizationoftheeconomy.

ThedesiretoEgyptianizetheeconomygrewoutofasenseofeconomicnationalism,the

beliefthatEgyptiansshouldruntheEgyptianeconomy.Thisideaoriginatedinthe1920s

withtheSidqiCommissiononCommerceandIndustry,BankMisr,andtheEgyptian

FederationofIndustries,allofwhichformedduringtheperiodfrom1916to1922.Bank

Misr(Meaning,“BankofEgypt”inArabic),whichwasfoundedandheadedbyEgyptians,

37

seemedtobetheexampleparexcellenceofEgypt’sneweconomicnationalism.However,as

RobertVitalisshows,theseinstitutionsweregradualistandwerestillintimatelytiedto

non-Egyptiancapital.Inthe1920s,businessnationalismwasmerelyaconvenientwayto

supportnewventuresandgarnerpublicsupportforthemulti-nationalbusinessgroups

thatwereformingaroundcertainenterprisingEgyptianindividuals.105

However,beginninginthe1930sandculminatingwiththeJointStockCompanyLawof

1947,theidealsof1920sEgyptianeconomicnationalismbecamemoreofareality.Infact,

theremovaloftheCapitulationsandtheeventualabolishmentoftheMixedCourtswere

framed,ontheEgyptianside,bytherhetoricofeconomicnationalism.106TheCompany

Lawof1947,however,representedthefirstpowerfulpushbytheEgyptiangovernmentfor

Egyptianization.ItrequiredEgyptiancompanies(thosewithmajorbasesinEgypt)“tooffer

51percentoftheirstocktoEgyptiansandtoplaceEgyptiannationalson40percentofthe

boardseats.”107Thesemovespushedmanymultinationalcompanies,includingthebeer

companies,toemploymoreEgyptiancitizens.Withregardtothebeerindustry,itis

indisputablethatthemainleadershipbecamemoreEgyptian.Thepresident,Chief

ExecutiveOfficer,andprimarystockholderofeachofthebreweriesafter1950wereall

native-bornEgyptiancitizens:MuhammadAhmedFarghaliPashaforBomonti-Pyramid

BreweryandMuhammadʿAzizAbazaforCrownBrewery.Bothofthesemenwere

exemplarybusinessoligarchswhocametodominatetheprivatesectorinthe1940sand

the1950s.

AsRobertVitalishasshown,adistinctivefeatureoftheEgyptianprivatesectorfrom

the1930sthrough1950swasthebusinessgroupfrontedbyawell-connectedbusiness

oligarch.Althoughbusinessgroups—individualsandfamiliesorganizedascoherent

38

coalitions—hadbeenafeatureoftheEgyptianeconomysincethelatenineteenthcentury,

theEgyptian-ledbusinessgroupcametodominateintheperiodfrom1937to1957.Vitalis

identifiesthreedistinctcharacteristicsofthesebusinessgroups:(1)theyencompassed“a

diversityoffirmsacrossdifferenteconomicsectors;(2)[theyhadan]ownership-

managementcoalition,thoughasingleindividual[was]oftenidentifiedasthegroup’s

leader;(3)thegroup’scoreleadership[was]boundbypersonal,family,ethnicorother

communaltiesthatprovide[d]thebasisforcoordinatingitsoperations.”108

ThetwoEgyptianentrepreneurs,FarghaliPashaandʿAzizAbaza,andtheirbusiness

interestswereverymuchinthismodel.BothwereproductsofwhatEricDavisreferstoas

theEgyptianlandowningelites’familiarizationwithcapitalistenterprisethroughforeign

capital.109Farghali’sfatherwasasuccessfulAlexandriancottonmerchantwho,withthe

helpofforeigninvestors,establishedFarghaliCottonandInvestmentCompany.Usingthe

connectionsaffordedbyhisfather’sbusiness,aswellashisownbusinessacumenanda

familiaritywithEuropeanbusinesspracticesgleanedfromhiseducationinEngland,

FarghaliPashawasabletositonmanydifferentexecutiveboards.In1946,hesatonthe

boardsoftwenty-ninedifferentcompanies.110ʿAzizAbaza,amemberofoneofEgypt’s

largestlandholdingfamiliesandtheheadofCrownBrewery,alsosatonnumerousboards,

includingtheLandBankofEgypt,theSociétéAnonymedeMisrpourlethéâtreetlecinéma

(ThecorporationforEgyptiantheaterandcinema),andSEP(apetrolcompany).111

SeveralotherEgyptiancitizensjoinedFarghaliandʿAbazaontheseboards.Ofthe

sixothermembersontheBomonti-PyramidBreweryboard,threewereEgyptian

citizens.112Meanwhile,CrownBreweryhadasimilarpercentageofEgyptiancitizensonits

board.113Someoftheboardmemberssharedasimilarinvolvementinbusinessgroups;the

39

JewishEgyptianReneIsmalunofthePyramidBrewery,discussedabove,satontheboards

ofsevenothercompanies.114Moreover,the“foreign”elementswerenotasforeignasthe

governmentledobserverstobelieve.Forexample,inthecasesofXenonandKatherine

PilavachiandSpiroSpiridisontheCrownBreweryboard,theseboardmembersnotonly

livedinEgypt,butalsospokeArabicandwereintegraltothelargeGreekEgyptian

community,whichhadancientrootsandhadgrownsteadilysincethe1860s.115Thus,the

“foreigners”wereasinvestedinasuccessfulandprosperousEgyptaswasamanlike

Farghali;theyalsohadadistinctlydifferentrelationshipwiththecountrythan,for

example,theCobrarepresentativeswhosatonthePyramidboard.Ausefultermforthem

isthemutamaṣṣirūn,those“peopleofforeignoriginwhohadbecomepermanentresidents”

andintheirlanguageandhabitshadbecome"Egyptianized."116Nevertheless,the

mutamaṣṣirūndidnothaveEgyptiancitizenship,andthusthegovernmentgroupedthem

withmenlikeWittertvanHoogland,Kettner,andFeith.

TheEgyptiangovernment’sgroupingthemutamaṣṣirūnwithforeign-born

industrialistslikeWittertvanHooglandandKettner,wasbasedontwofactors:the

transnationalcharacterofthemutamaṣṣirūnandthecitizenshipprocessasitexistedfrom

the1930sto1950s.AsGudrunKrämershows,untilthelate1930stheprospectsoflegal

andfiscalexemptionthroughtheCapitulationsandtheMixedCourtsmadeitmuchmore

attractiveforlocalminoritiestoapplyforforeignratherthanEgyptiannationality.117Asa

result,therewasamassofresidentsinEgyptwhohadspenttheirentirelivesinthe

countrybutwerenotcitizens.Thistrendwasparticularlypronouncedamongthereligious

minoritycommunities;asKrämernotes“themajorityofJewslivinginEgyptinthe

twentiethcenturydidnothaveEgyptiancitizenship.”118Anexcellentexampleofsuch

40

residentsistheSuareses,aprominentJewishfamilywhowerealsoItaliancitizens.119The

linguistic,cultural,andeconomicheterogeneityofthismassofresidentsmakesany

attemptstoplacethemintothe“foreign”or“Egyptian”dichotomyreductive.However,that

isexactlywhattheEgyptianstate,withlegislationliketheCompanyLawof1947,

attemptedtodo.

Asaresultofthislegislation,thesemutamaṣṣirūnandthecompaniesthatemployed

themwerefacedwiththedilemmathatoneoftheirgreateststrengths—theircultural

dynamismandmulti-culturalfamiliarity—hadbecomeamajorthreattotheir

employment.120Fortheindividualcitizen,inordertosavehisjobheoftenhadtoseek

Egyptiancitizenship.AsSimonShamirshows,thepathtoEgyptiancitizenshipforthese

localminoritiesbefore1947wasverydifficult.121Inparticular,despitethe1929

NationalityLaw’sWesternliberalbasis,theburdenofproofneedtobecomeacitizenand

theinstitutionalbiasagainstmutamaṣṣirūnpreventedmanyminoritiesfromgaining

Egyptiancitizenshipeveniftheywantedit.122Despitepressurefromthegovernment,the

brewerieswereabletoavoidanytraumaticlossesofexecutivesoremployees.Infact,prior

to1952,thecompanieshadsomesuccesswiththeiremployeesgaining,orrather

confirming,theirEgyptiancitizenship.Forexample,CrownBrewery’sauditor,HannaYusuf

Hanna,aCopticChristian,whosedeclarationofstate-recognizedEgyptiannessiscontained

inthePyramidbreweriesrecords,didsucceedingainingcitizenship.123However,

citizenshipwouldbecomelessattainableaftertheascensionoftheFreeOfficers,asthey

wouldtakewhathadbeenlaiddownin1947andbuilduponituntiltheyhadremovedall

ofthe“foreign”elements.

41

ShareholdersThegreatestexampleofthepartialEgyptianizationofthebeerindustrywasits

stockholders.Sharesinthecompanieswereanambiguousentitythat,dependingonthe

numberowned,couldmeanagreatdealorverylittle.Thegreatmajorityofshareholders

werepassiveinvestorswithasmallnumberofshares,usuallylessthanonehundred,who

hadlittletonosayinthedaytodaymanagementorfutureplanningofthecompanies.For

example,theBomontifamily,whoaftertheHeinekenbuy-inhadnosayinthefutureof

Pyramid,wasstillstockholdersuntil1960,owningmorethanninethousandshares.124

Likewise,someofthefamiliesoftheearlyBelgianinvestorshadastakeinthecompanies

untilfullnationalizationin1962.125Generally,asmallminorityoftheshareholdersowned

thegreatmajorityoftheshares,whichreflectedtheirinvolvementinthecompanies.

WhenthesharesofPyramidandCrownweretakentogether,whichtheEgyptian

governmentdidbeforeitnationalizedbothcompanies,thelargestshareholderwas

HeinekenBrewery.By1963,Heinekenownedforty-fourpercentoftheCrownandPyramid

together.126Asthischapterhasshown,fromthetimeitpurchaseditsfirstshare,Heineken

worked,throughCobra,toputCrownandPyramidundertightercontrol.Heinekenwould

stayinvestedinthebeercompaniestillthebitterendrefusingtogiveupitssharesuntilthe

Nassergovernmentforcedthemto.Oftheremainingsixty-sixpercentofthestock,those

withEgyptiancitizenshipcontrolledthirty-fivepercent.Ofthisthirtyfivepercent,the

majoritywasinthehandsoftheFarghalis.127CrownandPyramidbreweriesweretrulya

familybusinessasthelargestshareholdersbesidesMuhammadAhmadFarghaliwerehis

wife,hisbrother,hisdaughters,hissons,andhiscottoncompany.128Theconcentrationof

stockinthehandsofcertainfamilies,however,wasnotlimitedstrictlytodecisionmakers

42

liketheFarghalis.Forexample,theTawfiqfamily(Hatim,Hazim,Hasan,andHisham

Tawfiq)eachownedtwenty-fiveshares.129Forsmallinvestorsthisfamilymodeloftenwas

theresultofafatherinvestinginstockforhimselfandhisfamily,sothattheywouldhavea

revenuestreamtoeithersupplementtheirfutureincomeoraspartofthesafetynetupon

thefather’sdeath.Forexample,therewerenumerousstockholderslistedasal-armala(the

widow)ofMr.So-and-So.

Asfortheremaining31percentofshareholders,theycamefromNorthAmerica,all

overEurope(Britain,Italy,Austria,Franceetc.)andtheMiddleEast(Syria,Lebanon,Iran,

Turkey,etc.).130Mostoftheseforeignstockholders,likestockholdersgenerally,wereofthe

smallvarietyowninglessthanahundredshareswithlittletonosayinthefunctioningof

thecompanies.Whilethenationalistnarrativewouldarguethatthiswasanexampleof

foreigninfluence,thesesmallshareholderswereindistinguishablefromtheEgyptian

shareholdersexceptforwhereCrownorPyramidsenttheirdividendcheck.Includedalso

amongthis“foreign”contingentwerethemutamaṣṣirūn),whohadanentirelydifferent

relationshipwiththecompanies.Althoughnoneoftheirsharenumberscouldcompete

withFarghali,shareholderslikethePilavachi’sandMouratiadis’hadasignificantimpacton

thedirectionofthecompany.Theyattendedshareholder’smeetingsandwereofteninthe

employofthecompany.These“foreign”stockholderslikewiseseemedtofollowthefamily

investmentplan,withhusbands,wives,andchildrenoftenowningsharestogether.

Whathasbeennoticeablefromtheabovediscussionoftheinnerdevelopmentsof

CrownandPyramidBrewerieshasbeenthecompletelackofwomen.However,inthecase

ofshareholders,thepresenceofwomenwasstriking.Inthelistingofshareholdersofthe

twocompaniesin1963,therewereeightyEgyptianwomenlistedasstockholdersofCrown

43

andPyramidBreweries,oneofwhom,RoseBasili,wastheonlypersonoutsideofthe

Farghalistoownmorethanathousandshares.131Itisnotclearifwomen’sownershipof

stockwasapathtorealinfluenceormerelyawaytoavoidtheappearanceofthe

concentrationofstockinapaterfamilias’hands.Onesignificantexampleofthepower

sharescouldprovidewomenwasKatharinePilavachi.

Whilein1963sheonlyownedaround400shares,inthe1950ssheownedmore

thanfivethousandshares.Thislargestockholdingmeantthatbetweentheyears1954and

1959PilavachisatontheboardofCrownBrewerywithherhusband,Xenon.132Shewas

alsoanactiveparticipantintheshareholders’meetings.Oneoftheparticularitiesof

shareholders’meetingsisthatforeaseoffunctioncertainpeopleservedasrepresentatives

foragroupofshareholders.Thisgroupingofstocksalloweddecisionstobemademore

quicklybecauseonepersoncouldspeakformanyorrepresentshareholderswhowerenot

inEgypt,whilestillmaintainingaquorum.Forexample,WittertvanHooglandwouldoften

representhimself,Feith,Kettner,CobraandCrowndependingonthemeeting.This

groupingofstockalsoshowedwhoreallywasinchargeofthestock.So,forexample,

despiteawholefamilyowningstock,itwasusuallythefatherwhorepresentedeveryoneat

themeeting.AllofthismakesthefactthatKatharinePilavachiattendedtheshareholders

meeting,inperson,exemplaryoftheactiverolethatsheaimedtoplayinthecompany.133

Anevenbetterexampleofheractiveroleinthecompanywasherandherhusband’s

recalcitrancetofallinlinewiththedemandsofPyramid.WhenEricKarlKettner,whoIwill

discussatlengthinthefollowingchapters,tookoverforWittertvanHooglandasthe

managingdirectorofPyramidin1957oneofhisfirsttargetswasCrown,who,inKettner’s

eyes,wasputtingoutaninferiorproductandwasnotdoingenoughtosellthatproduct.134

44

HefoundthebeerthatCrownwasputtingoutlackinginitstaste,brilliance,andfoam

stability.135Thesewerecardinalsinsbecause,asdiscussedabovewithreferencetobeer

advertisementsinEgypt,theseweremainsellingpointsofbeerintheEgyptianmarket.

ThispoormaintenanceofthebrandwascoupledwithpoorsalesinAlexandria,whichhe

believedwasthefaultofCrownnottryinghardenoughtoselltheproduct.Hewasso

distressedathowthisnon-standardizedbeerwasaffectingthesalesofStellainEgyptthat

hesuggestedthereplacementofthemaninchargeofbeerproductionatCrown,Michel

Mavroviti.136

However,allofthisgrandstandingwasnotmetwithcompliance,butarather

impertinentresponse.SpiroSpridis,themanagingdirectoratCrown,bosstoMavroviti,

andemployeeofthePilavachis,whosatonCrown’sboard,saidtoKettnerthatthe

differenceinqualitywasmerelyamatterofappreciation.137Crown’scustomersin

Alexandriahaveneverevercommentedonthebeer,whichfitsperfectlytotheirtaste.Not

onlythat,butthesesamecustomerssaidtheypreferredbeermadeinAlexandriatotheone

madeinCairo.138ThisintransigencyonthepartofCrown,grewoutoftheirdistancefrom

CairoandCrown’shistoryofautonomyfromBomonti-Pyramid,whichstretchedbackto

the1920swithConstantineMouratiadis.EmboldenedbythesetwofactorsthePilvachis

(XenonandhiswifeKatharine),whowerebothlargeshareholdersandsatontheboardof

Crown,feltnoneedtolistentowhatPyramidhadtosayinCairo,eveniftheywerebacked

byHeineken.139Thisdiscordbetweenthebrewerieswouldcontinueuntil1961,when

HeinekendecidedtheonlywayCrownwouldstartsellingthesamebeerwasbyhaving

Pyramidbuythe4118sharesthatHeineken,throughtheholdingcompanyCobra,was

holdinginCrownandthensendaHeinekenapprovedbrewmaster.140Thisplannever

45

cametofruition,astheEgyptiangovernmentnationalizedthecompanybeforetheycould

carrythroughtheplanandasIwillshowinthenextchaptersCrownremainedathornin

Pyramid’sside.

Conclusion ThischapterhastrackedthematurationofthePyramidandCrownBreweries

before,during,andafterWorldWarII.Thisphasewasmarkedbytwonewsourcesof

powerandintrusion,HeinekenBrewingCompanyandtheEgyptiangovernment.

Heineken’sinvolvementwentfrominvestmentinanattractiveassettoactiveparticipation

inthebeercompanies’dailyoperations.AlthoughHeinekenultimatelyactedlikeother

imperialistmultinationals,prioritizingtheirinterestsoverthoseofthelocalcompanies,its

dealingswithPyramidandCrownBreweriesweregenerallyconducteddiplomaticallyand

withaneyetowardconsensus.Heinekenwasmorethanwillingtovolunteer,ratherthan

force,itsexpertiseuponCrownandPyramid,andthesetwobreweriesbenefittedfromthe

technicalexpertiseofthemultinational.Thebalanceddynamicisnoteworthyconsidering

thesignificantpowerdifferentialbetweenthemultinationalandtheEgyptianbeer

companies.TherelativebalanceofpowercanbeattributedtotheEgyptianbreweries’

controlofthesituationontheground,andtothefactthatthepartiesultimatelysharedthe

samegoalofprofitingfromthesaleofbeerinEgypt.

Asforthesecompanies’relationshipswiththeEgyptiangovernment,thesewerenot

basedonmutualinterest;rather,theywerecharacterizedbytensionthatarosefrom

opposingdesires.AsthegovernmentpushedforamoreEgyptianeconomy,thebeer

companieshadavestedinterestinmaintainingahybridandambiguousnationalidentity.

46

Inthiscase,itwasthebeercompaniesthathadtheadvantage:theyhadadecades-long

historyofgovernmentnon-interferenceaswellasmultinationalconnectionstodealwith

thedemandsofthenewlyempoweredgovernment.Meanwhile,thegovernmentwasonly

juststartingtoescapeitscolonial/semi-colonialpast,andwasonlybeginningtomapout

whatitcoulddemandfromthese“foreign”businessesthatforsolonghadremained

inviolate.

Theremainingchapterswilldiscussthesethreeactors—theCrown–Pyramid

Breweries,Heineken,andtheEgyptiangovernment—astheirrelationshipschanged

between1953and1970.ThenextchapterwilllookathowthesynergyoftheEgyptian

breweriesandHeinekenreachedahighpointastheyconsolidatedadurableandpotent

identity,whichdominatedtheEgyptianbeerindustryuntilthe1970s.Atthesame,the

Egyptiangovernment,fullyemboldenedbytheNasseristtakeover,asserteditselfinaway

notpreviouslyseen,whichhadmajorconsequencesfortheprivatesectoroftheEgyptian

economy.

1RobertL.Tignor,EgyptianTextilesandBritishCapital1930-1956(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairoPress,1989),82-106.2RoyArmes,AfricanFilmmaking:NorthandSouthoftheSahara(Edinburgh:Edinburgh,2006),223JacquesAumont,“LumiereRevisited,”FilmHistory,8(1996):416-430;GeorgesSadoul,LouisLumière,1904-1967(Paris:Seghers,1964).4ViolaShafik,PopularEgyptianCinema:Gender,Class,andNation(Cairo:AmericanUniversityinCairoPress,2007),18-19.5Ibid.6NancyReynolds,ACityConsumed:UrbanCommerce,TheCairoFire,andthePoliticsofDecolonizationinEgypt(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2012),147.7“RapportduConseild’Administration,”NL-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminutenvanuitgaandestukkenvan,aanofbetreffendedeCrownBrewery,834-ArchivesofHeinekenNV(henceforth,AH),StadsarchiefAmsterdam(henceforth,SAA).

47

8LucieRyzova,“EgyptianizingModernitythroughthe‘NewEffendiya’:SocialandCulturalConstructionsoftheMiddleClassinEgyptundertheMonarchy”,InArthurGoldschmidt,AmyJ.Johnson,andBarakSalmoni(eds.),Re-EnvisioningEgypt,1919-1952,NewYork:AmericanUniversityinCairoPress,2005,131.9Ibid.,133.10Ibid.,260.11RelliShechter,Smoking,CultureandEconomyintheMiddleEast:TheEgyptianTobaccoMarket1850-2000(London;NewYork:I.B.Tauris,2006),119-120.12KamalSalim,al-ʿAzima,VideoRecording(Cairo:SharikaMisriyyalil-Tamthilwaal-Sinima,1939).13SalahAbuSayf,ʿUstaHasan,VideoRecording(Cairo:Aflamal-Hilal,1952).14YoussefChahine,Ibnal-Nil,VideoRecording(Cairo:Studioal-Ahram,1951).15MarilynBooth,Bayramal-Tunisi’sEgypt:SocialCriticismandNarrativeStrategies(Oxford:publishedfortheMiddleEastCentre,St.Anthony’sCollegeOxfordbyIthacaPress,1990),10.16Ibid.,178.17YusufWahbi,Ibnal-Haddad,VideoRecording(Cairo:Sharikatal-Aflamal-Misriyya,1944).18AhmedBadrakhan,AhebbakInta,VideoRecording(Cairo:AflamFareedal-Atrash,1949).19WalterArmbrust,“TheGoldenAgeBeforetheGoldenAge:CommercialEgyptianCinemabeforethe1960s,”inMassMediations:NewApproachestoPopularCultureintheMiddleEastandBeyond,ed.WalterArmbrust(Berkeley,Cali:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2000);Gordon,RevolutionaryMelodrama.20LucieRyzova,“EgyptianizingModernity,”133.21“HistoricalBackgroundontheactivityoftheReneGaston-DreyfusgroupinEgypt,”typedandundatedNL-SAA-191241,2.2.9.2.5-1080-Notahoudendeeenoverzichtvandelopendezaken,meteenhistorischoverzichtvandecontactenvanR.Gaston-DreyfusmetEgypte,834-AH,SAA22Ibid.23Ibid.24Ibid.25“RapportdeMonsieurH.Faivresurl’Egypte,”4Juin1935,116-120,NL-SAA-191213,2.2.9.2.5-1053-Africa,834-AH,SAA.26“LetterfromCrownBrewery(henceforth,CB)toN.V.KolonialeBrouwerijn“Cobra””9November1937NL-SAA-192209,1948-1950-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.27Ibid.28RelliShechter,SmokingCultureandEconomyintheMiddleEast:TheEgyptianTobaccoMarket1850-2000(London:I.B.Tauris,2006),99.29Tignor,EgyptianTextilesandBritishCapital…,13.30Ibid.31“Introduction,”834-834-AH,SAA,http://stadsarchief.amsterdam.nl/archieven/archiefbank/overzicht/834.nl.html32Ibid.33M.G.P.AJacobs,W.H.GMaas,MarkBaker,TheMagicofHeineken(Amsterdam:Heineken,2001),8.4.

48

34“LetterfromCobratoCB,”28October1937,NL-SAA-192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.35AnnualReport,HeinekenBierbrouwerijMaatschappijN.V.(HenceforthHBM)GevestigdTeAmsterdamVerslagOverHetBoekJaar1936-7,8,15/26,http://stadsarchief.amsterdam.nl/archieven/archiefbank/overzicht/834.nl.html36“LetterfromNederlandscheHandel-MaatschaapijtoCB,”27April1939,NL-SAA-192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.37GarretOliver,“Kegs,”OxfordCompaniontoBeered.GarretOliver(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,OnlineVersion,2013)AccessedMay23rd2014.38“LetterfromCobratoCBentitled“FûtsenferÉtamé,”24May1938NL-SAA-192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.39Ibid.40Ibid.41LetterfromCBtoHBM,”8June1938NL-SAA-192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.42“LetterfromBanquedeLaSociétédeBelgiquetoHBM”2June1939,NL-SAA-192209,1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.43“LetterfromCobratotheDirectorofHBM,”22April1940,NL-SAA-192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.44Ibid.,45“TelegramtoCobra”7May1940,NL-SAA-192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.46“LetterfromCobratoCB,”5June1948,NLSAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.47“LetterfromCobratotheDirectorofHBM,”22April1940,NL-SAA-192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.48“LetterfromOfficedesTerritoiresOccupésetContrôles(OTOC)toCB,”23March1946NL-SAA192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.49“LetterfromtheOTOCtotheDirectoroftheCB,”27June1948NL-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-CrownBrewerySAAlexandria,834-ArchivesofHeinekenNV,StadsarchiefAmsterdam,50“LetterfromOfficedesTerritoiresOccupésetContrôlestoCB,”23March1946NL-SAA192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.51“LetterfromtheOTOCtotheDirectoroftheCB,”27June1948NL-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.52“LetterfromCobratoPaulBodart,”24December1945NL-SAA192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-CrownBrewerySAAlexandria,834-ArchivesofHeinekenNV,StadsarchiefAmsterdam.53Ibid.54Ibid.55“SecretletterfromCrowntoPaulBodart(henceforth,PB)”24December1945,NL-SAA-192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.56“LetterfromPBtoCobra,”18November1946NL-SAA192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA..57Ibid.58“LetterfromCarlodeMeytoCB,”October1946NL-SAA192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.

49

59“LetterfromCobratoPB,”24December1945NL-SAA192209,4.1.2.4.2.2-CrownBrewerySAAlexandria,834-ArchivesofHeinekenNV,StadsarchiefAmsterdam60“LetterfromPBtoCB,”18November1946192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.61Ibid.62“LetterfromPBtoCB,”18November1946192210,1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.63RapportduConseilD’AdministrationaMessieursLesActionnairesDelaCrownBreweryReunisenAssembleGeneraleExtraordinaireaBruxelles,le26Mars1947,a11h.a.m64“LetterfromH.J.GIvenstoHBM,”12May1947NL-SAA-192210,1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.65“LetterfromCBtoCobraentitled‘NosrelationsfinancieresavecnotresiegesocialenBelgique’”6August1949.NLSAA192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1948-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.66Ibid.67“LetterfromCobratoCBentitled‘VosrelationsfinancieresavecvotreSiegeSocialenBelgique’”20August1949NLSAA192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.68“LettertoMr.MarcelCuvelierfromCobra,”4Aout1950NL-SAA-192210,1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.69“LetterfromCobratoH.J.GIvens,”16thApril1947NL-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.70Ibid.71Tignor,EgyptianTextilesandBritishCapital,83.72Ibid.73Ibid.74“LetterfromH.J.GIvenstoHBM,”12May1947NL-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.75Ibid.76ALetterfromtheboardtostockholders,6May1957,DWQ,MS,3019-5504-0009,SharikatBiratal-Ahram.77“Procés-verbaldelaréunionduConseild’AdministrationdelaSociétéAnonymedesBièresBomontietPyramidestenueàAlexandriele21Mars1952”NL-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.78“LetterfromWittertvanHoogland(henceforth,WvH)toCobra,”28January1952NL-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA..79“LetterfromWvHtoCB,”29February1952NL-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.80Ibid.81Ibid.82Ibid.83Ibid.84“LetterfromWvHtoP.R.FeithatHBM,”2ndMay1952Nl-SAA-192210,4.1.2.4.2.2-1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA..85Ibid.86Ibid.

50

87“LetterfromConstantinQasdaglitoMonsieurAdministrateur-DelegueofPyramid,”28Feb1953NL-SAA-192211,4.1.2.4.2.2-1950-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.88Cobra,“DeclarationofProxy”20April1953NL-SAA-192211,4.1.2.4.2.2-1950-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.89WittertvanHooglandwouldleavePyramidBrewerytobecometheheadofHeineken’sinternationalholidngcompany,Cobra,in1957.90“LetterfromWvHtoP.R.FeithatHBM,”2ndMay1952Nl-SAA-192210,1949-Ingekomenstukkenenminute…,834-AH,SAA.91Theadvantagesofthosewithforeigncitizenshipclearlygrewoutofthehistoryofthecapitulations,whichgaveforeignresidentsextra-territorialrightsinEgypt.ThecapitulationshadamassiveeffectonthelegalhistoryofthecountryseeBrown,NathanJ.“ThePrecariousLifeandSlowDeathoftheMixedCourtsinEgypt,InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudiesVol.25(1),February1993,pp.33-52.92Ibid.93Ibid.94SocietedeBiere“LesPyramides,”“SummaryoftheServicesRenderedbyHeineken’sBreweriesNetherlandstoPyramidesBreweryofCairo,”4November1961NL-SAA-191356,1977-VerslagenvanbezoekenenbesprekingeninzakedeSociétédeBièreLesPyramidesS.A.E.,4.1.2.4.2.6-OverigebrouwerijenbuitenEuropa,834-AH,SAA.95Ibid.96Ibid.97Ibid.98Ibid.99Ibid.100Ibid.101Ibid.102NathanJ.Brown,“ThePrecariousLifeandSlowDeathoftheMixedCourtsofEgypt,”InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies25(1993):33.103Ibid.104NancyReynolds,ACityConsumed:UrbanCommerce,TheCairoFire,andthePoliticsofDecolonizationinEgypt(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2012),151105RobertVitalis,WhenCapitalistsCollide:BusinessConflictandtheEndofEmpireinEgypt(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1995),49.106Brown,“ThePrecariousLifeandSlowDeath…,”45-46.107RobertL.Tignor,State,PrivateEnterpriseandEconomicChangeinEgypt,1918–1952(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984),184.108Vitalis,WhenCapitalistsCollide…19.109EricDavis,ChallengingColonialism(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1983),195.110Tignor,State,PrivateEnterpise,220.111E.J.Blattnered.,Who’sWhoinEgyptandtheMiddleEast(Cairo:ImprimerieFrancaise,1950),219.112“Kashfbi-aʿdaʾIdaratal-SharikatBiratal-Ahramfi1956,”DWQ,MS,3019-5504-0009,SharikatBiratal-Ahram.

51

113“Kashfbi-aʿdaʾIdaratal-SharikatKarwonBreweryTabiqanli-l-Madat23minal-QanunRaqm26fi1954,”DWQ,MS,3019-6808-0009,SharikatKarwonBrewery.114RobertL.Tignor,“TheEconomicActivitiesofForeignersinEgypt,1920–1950:FromMillettoHauteBourgeoisie,”ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory22(1980):434.115AlexanderKitroeff,GreeksinEgypt1919-1937(AtlanticHighlands,N.J.:IthacaPress,1989).116JoelBeininandZacharyLockman,WorkersontheNile:Nationalism,Communism,IslamismandtheEgyptianWorkingClass,1882-1954(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1987),9.117GudrunKrämer,TheJewsinModernEgypt1914–1952(Seattle,Wash.:UniversityofWashingtonPress,1989),31.118Ibid.119Tignor,“TheEconomicActivitiesofForeignersinEgypt…”,427.120JoelBeinin,TheDispersionofEgyptianJewry:Culture,Politics,andtheFormationofaModernDiaspora(Berkeley,Cali.:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1998),18-22.121SimonShamir,“NationalityoftheJewsintheMonarchyPeriod,”TheJewsofEgypt:AMediterraneanSocietyinModernTimes,ed.SimonShamir(Boulder,Col.:WestviewPress,1987),48-51.122Ibid.,52-9.123“IqrarHannaYusufHanna,”DWQ,MS3019-006808-0009,SharikatKarwonBrewery.124“LetterfromEricKettner(henceforth,EK)toWvH,”29September1958;and“LetterfromEricKettnertoWvH,”18June1960,NL-SAA-191356,1977-VerslagenvanbezoekenenbesprekingeninzakedeSociétédeBièreLesPyramidesS.A.E.,4.1.2.4.2.6-OverigebrouwerijenbuitenEuropa,834-AH,SAA.125“LetterfromEKtoWvH,”26April1962NL-SAA-191356,1977-VerslagenvanbezoekenenbesprekingeninzakedeSociétédeBièreLesPyramidesS.A.E.,4.1.2.4.2.6-OverigebrouwerijenbuitenEuropa,834-AH,SAA.126ListofShareholdersinPyramidandCrownBrewerydated1964,DWQ,MS,3019-5506-0009,SharikatBiratal-Ahram.127ListofShareholdersinPyramidandCrownBrewerydated1964,DWQ,MS,3019-5506-0009,SharikatBiratal-Ahram.128Ibid.129ibid.130ListofShareholdersinPyramidandCrownBrewerydated1964,DWQ,MS,3019-5506-0009,SharikatBiratal-Ahram.131Ibid.132ConseilD'Administration,“TaqrirMaglisal-IdaraSana1954-1958,”3019-006809,SharikatKarwonBrewery133“KashfHaḍūrmusāhimīnfial-gam‘aiyyaal-‘amumiyyal-sharikatKirāwnbrīūrīsh.m.mal-mun‘aqidab-maqaral-ra'isial-ka'inb-iraqm23shar‘ailūsīzb-iskanderiyyayawmal-ithnaynal-muwafiqkhamsatashirīnminmayu1959al-sā'aal-ḥādiyya‘ashrasabāḥan,3019-006810-SharikatKarwonBrewery134“EKfromWvH,”24May1957,1977-VerslagenvanbezoekenenbesprekingeninzakedeSociétédeBièreLesPyramidesS.A.E.,4.1.2.4.2.6-OverigebrouwerijenbuitenEuropa,834-AH,SAA.

52

Nl-Saa191356p.30-1135“LetterfromEK(administrateur-délégué)representingSocietedeBiere“LesPyramides”toSpiroSpiridis(administrateur-délégué),19February1957,1977-VerslagenvanbezoekenenbesprekingeninzakedeSociétédeBièreLesPyramidesS.A.E.,4.1.2.4.2.6-OverigebrouwerijenbuitenEuropa,834-AH,SAA.136Ibid.137“LetterfromSpiroSpiridistoEK,”23February1957,NL-SAA-191356,1978-CorrespondentietussenWittertvanHoogland…4.1.2.4.2.6-OverigebrouwerijenbuitenEuropa,834-AH,SAA138Ibid.139“LetterfromWvHtoEricKarlKettner,”19May1961NL-SAA-191356,NL-SAA-191356,1978-CorrespondentietussenWittertvanHoogland…4.1.2.4.2.6-OverigebrouwerijenbuitenEuropa,834-AH,SAA.140Ibid.

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