CULTURAL and LOCALIZED DIFFERENCES AND INFLUENCES IN
MEGAPROJECTS PRACTICES
Draft v.5 2013‐10‐20 L‐F Pau, Copenhagen Business School / Rotterdam School of Management/
Gordon Institute of Business [email protected] (*); A. Langeland, University of Stavanger; O. Njå,
University of Stavanger
ABSTRACT
Departing from traditional project management, this article focusses on national cultural and localized
differences and influences on a specific project activity, and furthermore on the specific influences on
important critical projects (also called “megaprojects”). It analyzes relevant methodologies, theories and
results from other disciplines such as micro‐behaviors influenced by local cultures, socio‐cultural theories,
cultural synergy processes and hybrid institutions, physioeconomics as well as different practices in
contracting. This is illustrated by different views in different countries or cultural groups. It is shown
thereafter that the very definitions wordwide of the concept of “megaproject” are diverse, and details
are given. A scaled gap analysis tool is proposed, rooted in the above theories and results, aiming at
identifying cultural differences between megaprojects from a set of qualitative measures. This tool has
allowed to analyze a sample of documented international megaprojects on 5 continents. To further allow
for causal analysis, a set of cultural impact measures is proposed, and the same sample of international
megaprojects is assessed correspondingly. Taking now the approach of characterizing a given culture, it is
shown as an example that Sdcandinavian project management practices, evidence a specific combination
of cultural influence measures relying on hybrid governance and communications, unique work culture
and tools, as well as an aproach to adaptation. The paper thereafter evaluates ethical characteristics of
megaprojects, to conjecture that the alternatives are far fewer and more globalized. The conclusion
shows that, despite the fact that to apprehend cultural factors in general is a very complex endaveour, it
is possible to identify a limited set of cultural influence measures in the case of megaproject phases.
Based on this results, megaprojects can be clustered or contrasted by cultural influences, or different
cultures in megaproject management can be characterized, thus serving concrete needs in megaproject
management.
KEYWORDS
Megaprojects, Project management, Cultural aspects, Gap analysis, Cultural influence, International
project management, Physioeconomics, Scandinavian project management, Micro‐behaviors, Civil
engineering, Energy, Transportation, Urban planning, High tech sector
(*): Article elaborated during the COST Short Term Scientific Mission in October 2013 by L‐F Pau to
University of Stavanger, Dept. of Industrial economics, under the COST Action Megaprojects
1. SCOPE
“Megaprojects” are carried out worldwide, with the developing markets showing the largest number of
instances [54]. They are very large projects involving regional, national, as well as international partners,
which each are characterized by different management organizations and by different decision & risk
management approaches, all rooted in different cultures / philosophies and religions. Even if the analysis
of the implications of these cultural aspects on key megaproject success metrics is of utmost importance
for all stakeholders, they have received very little attention, in contrast to project internals also called
“project culture” [31] or “internal stakeholder relations” [32].
Scandinavian project owners and engineering companies, despite their relatively small size, but thanks to
their high specialization, operate worldwide and have always granted this issue substantial interest.
This exploratory work in progress addresses:
‐comparison of definitions in different societies of very large projects, and relation to these societies sizes
(population, GNP, size of engineering sector) and local / national cultures;
‐comparison in organizational, cultural and management processes whereby the technical and socio‐
political implications are elicited;
‐use of results from other disciplines, such as economics and organizational theory, as far as they help
analyze the influence of local/ national cultural aspects on megaproject outcomes;
‐comparison between different approval processes for very large projects (w.r.t. national planning, PPP
driven by industry, political ambitions, etc...);
‐comparison of the cultural communications styles and perceptions of risk dimensions (e.g. where the
environment, urban planning, tribal zones, or the respect of single individuals, etc…are bigger
communications issues & risk attributes than money);
‐comparison of attributes for very large projects which are most exposed to cultural influences, by
estimating the weights given to each in different cultures;
‐analysis of a sample of some very large project cases, to assess the relative influence of cultural factors
and their consequences.
It should be highlighted that the present research is not about cross‐cultural project management with
multi‐cultural teams, or virtual teams ; it takes the view that most megaprojects implemented in one
location still tend to be dominated by local project initiators , local stakeholder relation styles, and local
execution practices , even if some contractors or experts may belong to another culture. Readers
interested in cross‐cultural project management or international joint‐venture issues are referred e.g. to
[21, 24, 25, 37].
If the above scope restriction itself is limited to most, but not all megaprojects, it is also because
megaprojects in some sectors are so much globalized in terms of stakeholders and best practices, that a
subset of megaprojects are not affected by local cultures; examples include: offshore, nuclear, fixed
communications infrastructure, etc...
2. CULTURAL VARIATIONS IN MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AROUND MEGAPROJECTS
Because they influence their context and environment, megaprojects are also influenced by those same
context and environment, thus justifying first an analysis of the cultural variations in processes around
megaprojects and the corresponding theoretical frameworks.
2.1. Elements of culture and micro‐behaviors
One can identify the following elements of culture, which significantly influence project management,
stakeholder relations and project outcomes : physical context and technologies (terrain, climate and
chosen technologies), language (as a tool for understanding and knowledge building amongst project
members), free‐speech (regarding the open communication style), education (in terms of capacities to
address different types of problems), religion / beliefs and attitudes (as they affect attitudes and work
ethics as well as governance), social organization (networking and risk /load sharing, communication
styles), political system (for governance, risk taking , project splitting practices, decision processes). These
elements are closely intertwined and thus may at first sight appear to overlap to some extent.
These elements in turn drive the micro‐level behavior of individuals, teams, but also decision making
boards involved in megaproject management. The projects are not just governed by specifications,
planning tools, technologies and budgets, with purely interchangeable standardized homogeneous
resources (see example below). Therefore these elements of culture are equally important elements to
the later, affecting megaproject outcomes, time‐plan and value.
CASE: Individual transport habits (micro‐behaviors) in Belgium and implications for transportation
projects
By and large, the Flemish areas in Belgium use largely bicycles, public transport, in addition to cars, thus
driving demands for the corresponding priorities in transport infrastructure. On the contrary, by and
large, the Walonese parts of Belgium rely mostly on a mix of public transport and cars, driving in those
regions a different set of priorities.
2.2. Socio‐cultural perspective
A socio‐cultural concept must be considered to explain the development in megaprojects, with the match
or mis‐match to the competence limits of the actors, the socialization in groups at all levels , and the
societal context [56]. The underlying theories deal with a functional perspective looking at gaps between
norms (individual, social, systemic) and beliefs on use and impact. These beliefs could be taken for
granted, so they never reach an explicit phase. But they may also, in some cultures, be just the expression
of power, by letting megaprojects serve some individuals or organizations in keeping their status and
position.
2.3. Hybrid institutions and cultural synergy processes
The fact that there is a global trend in megaprojects to involve more non‐state actors, such as the private
sector, civil society, NGO’s, and political forces, is symptomatic of the move towards hybrid institutions or
partnerships . The term ‘hybrid institution’ is not yet well‐established or clearly defined in academic
literature. The term itself was coined by administrative economist Oliver Williamson [12]. His original use
of the term to analyze modes of governance in the private sector conflates nicely with ideas of hybrid
governance more generally. Williamson explored hierarchal governance within the firm, and (self)
governance of single transaction markets. Williamson’s examination of the efficiency of hybrid modes of
governance which combine the responsiveness, efficiency and low transaction costs of markets with the
administrative and cooperative capacity within the firm resembles state‐market hybrids to some extent.
However, such a governance theory is insufficient in explaining and preparing for the cultural diversities
in the coordination and decision processes involved in hybrid institutions or stakeholder partnerships
initiating or executing megaprojects. Cultural synergy processes build upon similarities and fuses
differences even, first and foremost, amongst people of same culture, but also in multi‐cultural activities.
This is organizational culture. People must work together and must capitalize on their differences around
cooperative and combined actions, where there are three main different types of organizational cultures:
‐in a high‐synergy organization, employees cooperate for mutual advantage because the micro‐behaviors,
customs and traditions support such behavior; self‐organized project management may derive from it
[40];
‐in a low‐synergy organization, business has difficulty adapting quickly to change, and conflicts emerge
causing delays, cost over‐runs and often even mis‐specifications in the megaprojects;
‐in a no‐synergy and no‐creativity organization, there is no synergy inside each organizational cell, in
that all wait for orders from yet another cell, higher or lateral in the organization, and pass on the task
executions to others if they fail, irrespective of competence and other assets.
It is well known that the individualism‐vs.‐synergy and collectivism dimension of national cultures has
been noted as a major difference between Asian and Western cultures [29].
2.4. Physioeconomics and its consequences for megaprojects
The above variations are in terms largely attributable to differences of a more fundamental nature, which
are largely ignored in project management litterature, but which have already been surveyed and
quantified as part of physioeconomics [13]. The idea of this line of research is that physical sciences
(physics, physiology, energy savings) should be directly integrated into macroeconomics, and impact
therefore the context in which important megaprojects get carried out. It is argued that critical
economic axioms violate laws of physics and that convergence across nations and their key investments
such as megaprojects is unlikely, if not impossible, in the long run. This is backed up by statistical
references about linguistic cultures of the world [14], religious cultures of the world [15], national
cultures of the world ðnic diversity [16], and climatic effects on individual, social and economic
behavior [17, 18]. Free markets will, however, allow countries to converge to similar levels of well‐being
across individuals, but at dramatically different levels of income‐based consumption (i.e. low income
countries may remain so, but will not be “poorer” than high income countries in terms of access to
facilities), provided that citizens are given economic liberty. By mastering methods to survive over
centuries humans in the higher latitudes accumulated more knowledge and physical technologies to
produce goods. But, where populations increased, social technologies (institutions, law, social
networking, communication, governance, informal networks, etc.) developed as adaptive mechanisms,
also in project management as shown in [40]. As an example of such social technology differences, Table
1 shows project communication preferences, which is a key social technology, and their typical
differences between countries.
Country group with associated population growth Project communication preferences Japan (low), Taiwan (high), Brazil (high) 1. Face‐to‐face, analytical at milestones Hungary (low), India (high) 2. Written status reports, fixed intervals Netherlands (low), Germany (low) 3. Detailed progress reports, fixed intervals Australia (low), United States(low), Canada (low), New Zealand (low), United Kingdom (low), Scandinavia (low)
4. Continuous phone updates with written back‐up
Table 1: Project communication preferences by country groups and population growth [23]
These physioeconomics results imply in essence that megaprojects organized and executed at higher
latitudes focus on knowledge, knowledge transfer, technologies, and lean project execution resources ; at
the same time, megaprojects organized and executed in countries with significant population growth, are
bound over time to focus more on social technologies and to use them as adaptation mechanisms.
Obviously, these conjectures rooted in physioeconomics bear exceptions. We review below some cases
confirming the above, or not, and mixed situations.
CASES: 1)‐ Section 7 shows that Scandinavian megaprojects tend to rely both on knowledge, physical
technologies and social technologies (see [39] for a comprehensive literature compilation), despite slow
population growth, and a similar situation applies in Japan [26]. There is even a community around the
NORDNET conferences [42] about “cool” project management, meaning anything innovative and exciting
regarding project management and project management challenges and opportunities in the Northern
hemisphere (beyond North 55° North) which would delight physioeconomics.
2)‐Japanese are also known for qualitative assessments by Six Sigma, Kiazen, Kanban. Japanese project
managers emphasize measurement of key performance indicators in terms of quality; they strive to lower
cost difference between budgeted expenses and actual expenses. Japanese project managers used to rely
on centralized authority, a high level of formalization, multiple hierarchies, but also on consensual
decision making and group based communication [37]. Japanese believe in team work and effective
communication and information sharing are results of effective team work
3)‐Culturally, project managers from Arabian countries emphasize more Key Performance Indicators,
reports, sharing information, and communication plan [33, 34]
4)‐ Project managers from UK emphasizes more institutional, planning aspects such as use of a Project
Management Office (PMO), change management, monitoring, work breakdown structure (WBS), Gantt
chart and program evaluation and review technique (PERT, PROPS, etc.) [33][55].
5)‐Project Management Professional (PMP) is a project management credential offered by the Project
Management Institute (PMI). PMP certification is the most dominant accreditation in the world today,
with the highest concentration of PMP certified professionals in North America; whereas PRINCE 2
method and certification is endorsed by UK government and it is dominantly adopted in UK, South Africa
and Australia [35].
6)‐ Israeli project managers pursue higher performance indicators in terms of customer satisfaction and
technical performance [26, 33].
7)‐ European (UK, Ireland, Netherland, Italy, Sweden) project managers appear very keen on using agile
project management methodology alongside with a Waterfall model whereas on the other hand, many
project managers from North America (US) are mostly using the Waterfall methodology.
8)‐US based project managers in general rely on a mostly one‐dimensional view of the megaprojects,
with a uniform, formalized and functional view of their role; the dominating goal is to deliver on time and
meet basic specifications on quality and cost. They however use decentralized authority, a medium level
of formalization, flat hierarchy, individual decision making, and individual based communication [37].
9)‐US based project managers certainly understand the value of information management system to
manage projects; hence adoption of project management tools is very high among North American
businesses; not just enterprises but also in small and medium businesses. The next country that
represents highest subscription and adoption of Project Management tools is UK followed by Canada,
Australia, Netherlands, and Mexico among others.
2.5. Contractual terms in megaprojects
At a legal and administrative level, cultural aspects around trust and fulfillment also play an essential
part, as way as different ways of segmenting the phases in a megaproject, and the corresponding
contracts.
Of course, practices exist in different sectors, which may be commonly accepted best practices. For
example, the construction industry uses largely a split into : incubation, planning and specification,
construction, certification, delivery, operations, and dismantlment.But in some countries, several of these
phases are always bundled, or further sub‐divided due to local habits, regulations and laws.
CASE: Offshore oil industry in Norway [57]
Project phase acronym Project phase
E Engineering
P Procurement
C Construction
I Installation
C Commissioning
H Hook‐up
F Fabrication
Table: Typical phases in projects in the offshore oil industry
The legal and financial responsibilities are split between resource owner (normally a State), operators,
contractors and third parties, in many different ways. E.g. EPCH, EPCIC or “Bareboat charter” contracts
are largely used for platforms, while EPCI is used for oil transport infrastructure, and FC for
subcontractors. So, by allowing a given stakeholder to have different roles as owner or contractors in
different phases, the impact of cost‐overruns and delays can get pushed onto the society at large (as a
resource owner) or to a company (as a production license owner).Also, by this contractual process, no
stakeholder can be assured that sufficient planning efforts have been devoted inside the preparation of
any phase [58], as such efforts affect profitability.
3. INTERNATIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE DEFINITIONS OF MEGAPROJECTS
As established in Section 2, cultural aspects play an important role in projects, so it is necessary to re‐visit
the definition of “megaprojects” in that light.
According to the UK Collins dictionary, a megaproject is “a very large, expensive, or ambitious business
project”, but many practitioners and researchers have found this definition too vague to be useful. In
other languages, such as Chinese, Japanese, French, the term simply refers to “an important or critical
project”, and keeps the multifaceted aspects without only highlighting the business value.
In the English language, the term is defined as a “A very large public investment project, especially one
costing more than one billion US dollars” [1], with the 1 B USD limit attributed to Fiori et al [19]. In
market dominated economies, such as United States, United Kingdom, Australia, the business value
threshold itself is not uniform: 1 Billion USD in USA (approx.. 750 M Euros), anything between 100 M and
1 Billion GBP in United Kingdom (118‐1180 M Euros), 1 Billion DKK in Denmark (132 M Euros), 750 MNOK
for public projects and 10 BNOK for oil projects in Norway [53,57], and 100 M AU$ in Australia [5] (69 M
Euros), suggesting a relationship with either the public national budget or GNP. Public perception in the
press is also to be considered, where physical size , extent or environmental consequences have a higher
impact than value, especially in phased deployments. No meaningful regression can however be
established based on value only with either national budgets or GNP from the Wikipedia list of
megaprojects [6]. The 30 largest recent Chinese infrastructure projects [7] meet in general the 1 B USD
limit, but represent very often aid or regional development initiatives with no business return on
investment. And large overseas Chinese projects [8] sometimes represent many times the client country’s
GNP, as they often do not belong to market mechanisms but to aid or geopolitical ambitions.
The very confusing discussion in English on Wikipedia about megaprojects addresses no cultural or
regional differences [2]. Academic discussions nevertheless emphasize aspects such as complexity,
governance, cost overruns, management structures [3].Some also suggest a requirement for a definition
including governance structures which should be distinct from market and hierarchy [4]; others stress
that size and complexity are not enough [5]. The coordinated and regulated deployment of national
wireless telecommunications infrastructure, with several network megaprojects being bundled , in
response to technology migrations, license bids, always runs into interference from policy makers and
banks in developed as well as in emerging countries [9,10, 11].
We conclude that, despite all its ambiguities, the most adequate definition is still one of “an important
critical project”, where the assessment of importance & criticality depend in each instance on the
stakeholders (private, public, citizens, industry), but where risk and governance issues are always
essential. Very often megaprojects have sooner or later a measurable socioeconomic impact at a macro
level, rather than only a compartmentalized microeconomic impact. It is conjectured that a trigger to a
classification as a megaproject is that its approval always reaches the top‐level governing body in
companies, or government, Parliament , public interest groups, and last but not least, the press,
although the political process in a given country may not always involve all these stakeholders.
4. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN APPROVAL AND EXECUTION PROCESSES AMONGST STAKEHOLDERS
FOR MEGAPROJECTS: a GAP ANALYSIS TOOL
The cultural framework, backed by synergy processes and physioeconomics (Section 2) , helps us
understand megaproject stakeholder relations better in view of differences in the approval and execution
processes. But whereas Section 2 leads to a bipolar categorization around first governance and legality,
and next a tricolor categorization of organizational culture & synergy modes, we strive below in Table 2
after a scaled assessment tool which can be applied to specific megaproject cases affected by cultural
influences. It aims at indicating, on a ranking scale (Table 3), where the cultural differences manifest
themselves on a limited number of measures. Of course measuring quantitatively culture is not possible,
but the gap analysis on a ranking scale can combine subjective elements, with benchmark data (see
Section 2 and data from Planet Project, Roper Poll of Values, World Values Survey, & GLOBE [ 27,30, 36]),
or with neutrally measurable evaluations.
Regarding leadership , this scaled assessment tool includes two of the universal scaled measures derived
from the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) Research program
operating in 60 countries: charismatic / value based leadership, and synergistic team oriented leadership
[27, 30, 36] ; the first measure is studied in depth also in [28].
The proposed measurements are grouped and ordered into three groups:
‐cultural aspects limiting choices for different reasons;
‐types of rationality by main stakeholders;
‐culturally driven adjustment mechanisms.
Gap analysis has also been proposed in [22] to overall project management, but with binary values for
each measure; but that study’s exploitation is blurred by attaching several evaluation criteria to each
measure, which is not the case below. Another approach is to combine surveys with a Project
Management Quality model, and estimate averages (and discrepancies thereof) between countries [26];
but such an approach hides the nature of the projects, their sizes, and their importance.
Measure Lowest scale (1) Cultural difference Highest scale (5) Example of grading from Megaproject “Anholt Offshore Windfarm” [20]
I Equality/ Charismatic / value Hierarchy/ 3
Compromising based leadership of project
Authoritarian
II Innovative Project concept incubation style
Conformity, or standard solution to a new situation
1
III Bottom‐up/Democratic/Critics allowed
Endorsement processes in project initiation phase
Top‐down/Authoritarian/No critics allowed
2
IV None Governance Public scrutiny / Company wide
5
V No synergy/ conflict Organizational team culture
High synergy / organization /Consensus
4
VI Few people Project staffing (incl. Subcontractors)
Plentiful 2
VII No public communication
Communications style around project
Wide public communication and feedback
4
VIII Formal / Rigid / heavy forward planning
Executing and controlling the project
Pragmatic / Tools as a support
4
IX Decentralized between stakeholders
Accountability for success/failure
Centralized 5
X Nominal Significant fines actually levied in case of delays
Significant / Dissuasive
4
XI Embracing risk Risk view by Project owners (incl. contractor selection ,technology risks, etc)
Avoiding risk 4
XII Weak Political interference Strong 2 XIII Social and public
value Values: Main contractor Profitability 2
XIV Social and public value
Values: Project funders Profitability 3
XV
Low Willingness of project owners to change contractors
High 2
XVI No Project achieving Green policy goals
Very significant 5
Table 2: Toolbox measures, with their lowest and highest values in scaled gap analysis of cultural driven
effects on megaprojects ; see Table 3 for a clarification of the scale values.
Scale in gap analysis Interpretation
1 Has characteristics of lowest scale for the stated measure
2 Sub‐average
3 Average
4 Slightly above average
5 Has the characteristics of highest scale for the stated measure
Table 3: Interpretation of scale values in gap analysis using the measures in Table 2; the scale values serve
to position megaprojects compared to an average situation and two extremes; there is no implicit
assumption of linearity.
5. ANALYSIS OF A SAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL MEGAPROJECTS HAVING HIGHLIGHTED THE
IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL ASPECTS
The approach taken is to review a sample of megaprojects executed in different countries, from academic
or industrial publications, in view of the cultural gap analysis with the measures of the previous Section 4.
This sample was assembled based on the fact that they all have demonstrated clear cultural influences
(positive or negative). It should be stressed that megaprojects were chosen at random assuming existing
documentation of the cultural influences, and without any a priori selection w.r.t. a given type of
influence. Concretely, these influences are evidenced by the fact that at least one of measures for each of
these cases deviates significantly from the average, or that they exhibit a pattern of differences from the
average, or that at least one outcome is abnormal (Section 6) .
At a later stage, an attempt will be made to contrast the countries or dominant cultures by each of the
measures of that analysis.
Country
Megaproject
Reference
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
IX X XI XII XIII
XIV
XV XVI
Charismatic / value based leadership of project
Project incubation style
Endorsement processes in project initiation phase
Governance
Organizational team culture
Project staffing
Communications style
Executing and controlling the project
Accountability for success/failure
Significant fines actually levied in case of delays
Risk view by Project owners
Political interference
Values: Main contractor
Values: Project funders
Willingness to change contractors
Project achieving Green policy goals
Taiwan
Taipeh 101(long the tallest building in the world)
C1 3 4 2 3 2 6 4 6 2 1 2 2 5 5 5 2
Australia
Victoria (11 megaprojects)
C3 2 4 4 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 4 4 4 2 2 2
Denmark
Metroselskabet Cop
C4 3 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 4 2 4 4 4 1 3 1
enhagen
Denmark
Copenhagen‐Ringsted rail connection
C5 3 4 3 2 2 4 1 2 5 1 4 3 4 2 1 3
USA
Apple Headquarters
C6 5 2 5 1 1 2 3 3 5 4 3 1 5 3 4 2
USA
Hudson Yards (NY)
C7 4 3 4 1 3 4 2 4 5 1 3 3 5 4 5 1
China
Daocheng Yading Airport
C8 3 4 5 1 4 3 1 5 5 3 1 5 3 1 1 1
East Africa
Celtel (Soudan)/ Zain Group (Koweit)
C9 3 2 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 3 1 2 1 3 4 4
China
China high speed trai
C10
4 3 5 1 3 5 2 4 3 1 2 5 2 1 4 3
n network
China
ARJ21 COMAC Aircraft
C11
3 4 4 1 2 3 1 5 3 3 1 3 2 2 1 1
Denmark
Anholt Offshore Windfarm
[20]
3 1 2 5 4 2 4 4 5 4 4 2 2 3 2 5
Denmark / Sweden
Øresunds bridge
C12
4 2 3 5 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3
Norway
Offshore oil field Yme
[57]
4 2 4 2 2 3 1 1 4 2 2 2 5 2 1 1
Norway
E18 Kristianssand‐Grimstad
Table 4: Characterization of an international sample of megaprojects by cultural measures
6. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN APPROVAL AND EXECUTION PROCESSES AMONGST
STAKEHOLDERS FOR MEGAPROJECTS: IMPACT ON PROJECT OUTCOMES
Sections 4 and 5 above have allowed comparing megaprojects using a scaled gap analysis at the level of
specific subjective measures linked to local cultural elements. These cultural elements can be looked
upon as causal factors.
It is therefore necessary to propose effect variables characterizing the impact during completion and final
outcomes of megaprojects due to these cultural factors. Instead of taking the megaproject business
values (project cost, or net present value elements provided by investment analysis), it is chosen to select
outcomes linked to qualitative elements of the megaproject importance & criticality as discussed in
relation to international megaproject definitions in Section 2.This choice means ultimately that end user
value is put forward as in the KPMG 100 evaluation [54], as opposed to economic vendor / project owner
values.
The impacts and outcomes affected by cultural factors are again on a megaproject basis to allow for case
analysis, leaving to later the analysis of the linkage to specific countries.
CULTURAL FACTOR MEGAPROJECT IMPACT and OUTCOMES
Values Comments
A. Megaproject completion Yes/No (N/A is project underway and not stopped)
A megaproject may be stopped or get high priority due to cultural factors
B. Change in design Small/Medium/Large Cultural interference, decisions and risk mitigation approaches may lead to a change in design
Change in usage characteristics Small/Medium/Large Stakeholders and civil society at large may modify the usage set initially by initiators or project
owners
D. Impact on civil society's behaviors and other indirect effects
Small/Medium/Large A megaproject may affect other population groups or economic activities than those who directly use the megaproject infrastructure
Table 5: Cultural aspects’ impact on megaproject completion, importance and criticality
By analyzing the same cases as those featured in Table 4, we get in Table 6 the following aggregate
impacts of cultural measures from Table 3 on the sample cases from Table 4.
Country Megaproject Reference
A B C D
Megaproject completion
Change in design
Change in usage characteristics
Impact on civil society's behavior and other indirect effects
Taiwan Taipeh 101(long the tallest building in the world)
C1 Yes Small Small Small
Australia
Victoria (11 megaprojects)
C3 Yes Small Medium Medium
Denmark Metroselskabet Copenhagen
C4 No Medium Small Small
Denmark Copenhagen‐Ringsted rail connection
C5 N/A Medium Small N/A
USA Apple Headquarters C6 Yes Small Small Medium USA Hudson Yards (NY) C7 N/A Small Small Large China Daocheng Yading
Airport C8 Yes Small Small Medium
East Africa Celtel (Soudan)/ Zain Group (Koweit)
C9 Yes Small Large Large
China China high speed train network
C10 Yes Small Small Large
China ARJ21 COMAC Aircraft
C11 No Large Medium N/A
Denmark Anholt Offshore [20] Yes Small Small Medium
Wind farm Denmark/Sweden
Øresunds bridge C12 Yes Medium Small Large
Norway
Offshore oil project Yme
[57] No Large Small Small
Norway E18 Kristianssand‐Grimstad
Table 6: Impact of cultural measures on megaproject conduct and outcomes
7. SCANDINAVIAN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL APPROACHES IN MEGAPROJECTS
In this Section we will analyze in more detail the characteristics of the typical project management
practices in one culture, namely in Scandinavia (assuming a good homogeneity). When successful,
Scandinavian megaprojects have implemented well in advance and throughout the project life time, four
key elements.
7.1 Hybrid governance and communications
The first element is hybrid institutional or partnering governance, relying heavily on upstream
information, teaching and involvement of many stakeholders. This involves having project initiators
engage very early the civil society and their representatives, including unions in an industrial setting, and
help carry out fact finding amongst trustworthy bodies or specialists. In Scandinavia, the behavior of the
project manager is more diverse, polymorphic and, some say, “authentic”. The ambiguity about goals
means that the project’s potential problems, processes and perspectives provide unique occasions for
reflection, responsiveness and reconstruction of the space of opportunity [49].
Some call it the Scandinavian cooperative advantage [45, 49], but it is noted in Section 3.3 that it is not
unique. Progress and results are orchestrated into a public information campaign, first locally, then
sometimes on a national level. It may be time consuming process, and islands of resistance (NGO’s or
some special interest groups) may emerge which then get heard.
There are however audit processes put in place to review specifically the megaproject concepts derived
by the above approach, to ensure feasibility and realism of budgets. In Norway, auditing rules were
introduced since 2003 for megaproject concepts with public budgets above 750 MNOK [53]. Interesting
enough the goal is to ensure that” the choice of concepts of public investment projects is subject to real
political control” [53]. in a first stage named KS1, the proposals involving public funding must first be sent
for quality assessment to the Ministry of Finance which accepts audits by a list of authorized companies;
if the megaproject concept quality is approved, a quality and cost tracking process named KS2 is put in
place during execution, delegated to a public body (although this opens up for cases of insufficient
governance).
For private projects in the Norwegian oil industry involving investments above 10 BNOK a quality
evaluation is in force by the Oil Directorate, because if a megaproject in that sector fails, the risks and
consequences are borne by the Norwegian society and not by the oil operators as a result of the way in
which production licences and contracts are shaped [57]. A specific reason is that, contrary to some other
industries, the risks are only transferred from the State to the production operator from the moment the
production starts (see Section 2.5).
7.2 “Work culture”
The second element is a work culture, with the following main characteristics:
‐enhanced quality of life
‐tolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty and seeming lack of precise planning
‐ability to give and accept feedback in a non‐defensive manner
‐autonomy and control over each work cell’s work space
‐organizational communication and information orientation
‐participation and involvement in the enterprises
‐creative organizational norms or standards
‐high performance and recognized productivity
‐emphasis on new technology
‐emphasis on entrepreneurialism and intrapreneurialism
‐informal, non‐judgmental, and synergistic relationships
‐capacity to establish intense, short‐term member relations, and to disconnect for the next project
‐clarifying roles, relationships, assignments and responsibilities
7.3 Tools
Even the use of tools is made contingent on the above, even in related formal object‐oriented IT
modeling [47,48]; this does not mean that tool use is limited, but that the conceptual build‐up,
interpretation, analysis and decision processes around them go through the cooperative filter. Objects
with attributes transformations and relations dominate flow‐based or hierarchical database update
models; this view has significantly influenced both the Object Management Group (www.omg.org ) and
the Agile development Alliance (www.agilealliance.org ). The above approaches are also featured
prominently in Scandinavian IPMA certified training programs and associated training material,
operationalizing corporate social responsibility e.g. [43, 44]. The related research community as a result
distinguishes between: solid project leadership, aspired project teams, flaming project strategies, and
flowing project execution, where the terminology illustrates the concept [42].
7.4 Adaptability and its challenges
In practice, project managers face a dilemma in having to encourage both behavioral flexibility
(adaptability) and behavioral rigidity (discipline). The process is therefore [50]:
1. First to define a vision rather than a goal that motivates rather than restricts peoples’ activities. It
motivates since the idea that the “sky is the limit” does not rely on experience to define what is possible,
as the case would be where the goal is set at the beginning.
2. Second, the result of the project is open until the results are known (practice), which allows for a
definition of success based not on previous experience but on what the situation has allowed for,
thereby reducing the “ok, but what could have been achieved?”
7.5. Remarks
When analyzing the Scandinavian megaprojects in the sample from Section 4, the four characteristics
above 7.1‐7.4 can be verified as appearing explicitely with high or low scaled gap values of these
megaprojects in terms of the following cultural influence measures: project incubation , project funders'
values, communications style, green values, levying fines and willingness to switch contractors.
It should be stressed that in Scandinavia, other project planning paradygms exist , e.g. the COWI
Reference class forecast approach [51,52] which is in line with linear project management, with
probabilistic risk and optimism reduction steps. That approach and the typical Scandinavian above are
compared in the case [C5].
6. ETHICAL CHOICES
Throughout cultures and nations, there are three main criteria when making ethical choices:
• Utilitarian Criterion ‐ made solely on basis of outcomes or consequences
• Focus on Rights ‐ made consistently with fundamental liberties and privileges
• Focus on Justice ‐ requires imposing and enforcing rules fairly and impartially for equitable
distribution of benefits and costs
All stakeholders in megaprojects everywhere face such ethical questions and issues, because of the
importance of these projects. The legal and social context can present additional ethical dilemmas,
especially between two opposite streams: cultural relativism and ethical realism.
Cultural relativism refers to differences in ethical values between different cultures; thus right and wrong
should be decided upon by each society’s predominant ethical values. Cultural relativists base their
argument on three points:
a) moral judgments are statements of feelings and opinions: neither wrong nor right;
b) moral judgments are based on local ethical systems: cannot judge right or wrong across cultures;
c) prudent approach: do not claim an action is either right or wrong.
In ethical realism, morality does not apply to international transactions, people will not behave morally
because no power rules globally, and because others will not behave morally one is not morally required
to behave ethically.
At this stage of the research, it is not yet clear which ethical principles apply in specific megaprojects, or
dominate in given cultures. In [40] is discussed the relationship between ethics, orgazinational welfare,
innovation and creativity. But it is a fact that the two streams exist and none is uncommon in
megaprojects, precisely because of their importance and visibility; this is elaborated upon in relation to
corporate social responsibility in some training programs such as [44].
CONCLUSIONS
It is first pointed out that “Megaprojects” have different definitions in different cultural and economic
contexts. We conclude that, despite all its ambiguities, the most adequate definition is still one of “an
important critical project”, where the assessment of importance & criticality depends in each instance on
the stakeholders (private, public, citizens, industry), but where risk and governance issues are always
essential. This is also in line with the fact that there is no unique, even value/ monetary measure of
“importance”, as this measure is also influenced by local culture and behaviors.
The results of this study also extend the proposition that each local culture has a “preferred coordination
mechanism” [38,46], it also extends the results of the GLOBE project and of physioeconomics, to verify
that “Megaprojects” are subject to the same effect , and not governed by universal stakeholder relations
and values. There is not one single way of co‐creating value between project owners, project builders,
and end users! By analyzing the relations between organizational behavior and micro‐level behavior in
megaprojects, it appears that each megaproject’s organization structure is built to match its culturally
preferred micro‐level behavior in terms of communication and efficiency. To avoid mismatches, it is
therefore essential to recognize fully the cultural practices, instead of forcing down some general
principles on megaprojects.
Task complexity, team experience and legal governance processes are given at the start of a
megaproject, and micro‐level behavior is fixed in the short term based on local cultures; therefore :
organization , decision processes, communication and ethics are the only variables a project manager and
megaproject owners can influence. Megaproject managers should find the organization style, decision
processes, communication style and ethics, that provides the best match to their megaproject’s
characteristics and their team’s micro‐behavior; the shared vision around these factors then becomes the
change engine [40].
We have also identified a set of measures, and proposed a scale based gap analysis tool, based on the
same frameworks, aiming at characterizing megaproject differences resulting from local cultures. A set of
cases are provided for illustration purposes. It allows both to identify gaps between local/national
cultures with respect to specific measures, or gaps between megaprojects based with respect of specific
measures. It allows finally also clustering similar megaprojects into different categories on the basis of
their full multivalued characteristics affected by local culture.
By separating out the cultural measures from their aggregated impact on the conduct and effects of
megaprojects, we open the way for causal analysis. A set of non‐value based attributes are proposed for
the cultural influences on megaproject realization, conduct and impact for users and society at large.
These attributes are estimated for the same sample of international megaprojects as those used to
provide the rating based gap analysis, paving the way for further causal effect studies.
We thereafter turn to a specific culture , that is the Scandinavian culture, as it affects the way important
projects are carried out there. The typical Scandinavian project management culture is shown to rely
heavily on cooperation, and on a “motivation driven work culture” allowing for adaptation and specific
modeling. It is also shown that quality assessments are carried out at an early conceptual stage.
Finally, over‐riding even cultural differences in megaproject management, ethics is touched upon as
being critical, but where the ethical choices are not necessary locally defined but more fundamental and
universal.
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(http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us‐china‐airport‐idUSBRE98F0AG20130916 ( 3,68 BUSD)
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(4 BEUROS)
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