![Page 1: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
DOWNS’ MODEL OF ELECTIONS
1
![Page 2: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
A. Assumptions1. A single dimension of alternatives.2. Voters.
a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).
![Page 3: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
A. Assumptions1. A single dimension of alternatives.2. Voters.
a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).
![Page 4: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
A. Assumptions1. A single dimension of alternatives.2. Voters.
a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).
![Page 5: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
A. Assumptions1. A single dimension of alternatives.2. Voters.
a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).
b. Many voters (many ideal points) will be represented with a frequency distribution.
The dotted line indicates the median.
![Page 6: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
A. Assumptions3. Candidates (can exceed two)
a. Represented by letters.b. Move across the spectrum to maximize their
chance of election.
A B C
![Page 7: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
A. Assumptions4. Vote using plurality rule, not majority rule.
a. Def: the candidate with the most votes wins.
A has a plurality A has a majority
If a candidate wins a majority, then it wins a plurality.
However, if a candidate wins a plurality, it may or may not win a majority.
![Page 8: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
5. Ideologya. Downs argues candidates adopt ideologies to
simplify their message to voters.b. Since candidates want to appear responsible and
reliable, they won’t jump each other.
![Page 9: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model1.
Who votes for A?
![Page 10: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model1.
Who votes for A?Who votes for B?
![Page 11: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model1.
Who votes for A?Who votes for B?Who votes for C?
![Page 12: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model1.
Who wins?C because he/she receives the largest area.
![Page 13: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
Same model, just moved to the right.
![Page 14: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
What would be B’s best response?
![Page 15: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
What would be B’s best response?Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.
![Page 16: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
What would be B’s best response?Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.
![Page 17: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
What would be B’s best response?Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.
![Page 18: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
What would be A’s best response?
![Page 19: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
What would be A’s best response?Perhaps to move right as well.
![Page 20: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
What would be A’s best response?Perhaps to move right as well.
![Page 21: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
B. Action in The Model2.
Now A wins, because B takes away more votes from C than from A.
What happens to B?1) B gets caught in the center and looses.
Does the candidate closest to the median win?a. No, the median voter theorem does not apply, because we
are not using two candidate, majority rule.
![Page 22: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
C. Discussion1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate policies in
order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies.“ Does this seem reasonable?
a. Anne Lewis, former chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee, said “parties exist for two purposes: to govern and to win elections.”
b. Do candidates really change policies to get elected?2. Can mom-and-pop candidates win elections?
![Page 23: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
C. Discussion3. What is ideology according to Downs?
a. a simplified message to voters that helps` party candidates get elected (i.e. a sales pitch).
4. Does that seem reasonable?5. What is the role of responsibility and reliability in
Downs analysis?a. They prevents candidates from radically changing
positions.
![Page 24: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
C. Discussion6. Why are there two dominant parties in the United
States, but many parties in other countries?Italy
PSI PCI MFI CS Dem Rep CD
Key: PSI – Socialists, PCI – Communists, MFI – fascists, CS – Christian Socialists, CD -- Christian Democrats.
Note: Downs says it has to do with multimodal electorates,but perhaps it has to do with plurality rule in singlemember districts.
![Page 25: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
C. Discussion7. If Downs is correct, why don’t candidates fully
converge toward the median?8. Is a single dimension of alternatives reasonable? 9. Who is more likely to abstain from voting, voters on
the extremes or voters in the middle?10. Other thoughts?
![Page 26: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem:
![Page 27: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis.
![Page 28: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson.
![Page 29: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart.
![Page 30: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore.
![Page 31: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.
![Page 32: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.
Rep: Bush.
![Page 33: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.
Rep: Bush, Robertson.
![Page 34: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.
Rep: Bush, Robertson, Dole.
![Page 35: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections2. 1992Dem: Clinton, Paul Tsongas, Tom Harkin.
![Page 36: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections2. 1992Dem: Clinton.
Rep: Bush (incumbent). Ind: Ross Perot
![Page 37: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections3. 2000Dem: Gore.
Rep: Bush. Reform: Buchanan
Green: Nader
![Page 38: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
D. Presidential Elections4. 2008Dem: Obama, Clinton, Edwards.
Rep: McCain, Romney, Huckabee, Paul.
![Page 39: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
E. Preference Restrictions1. A single dimensional model rules out certain
preference orders.a. Consider three voters, and three candidates
(A,B,C).A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A CB B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B BC C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A
A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A CB C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C BC B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A
A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B CB A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A BC C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A
A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B CB C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C BC A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A
A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C CB A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A BC B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A
A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C CB B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B BC A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A
There are 216 possible orderings, 36 of which are displayed here.
![Page 40: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
E. Preference Restrictions1. A single dimensional model rules out certain
preference orders.a. Consider three voters, and three candidates
(A,B,C).A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A CB B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B BC C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A
A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A CB C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C BC B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A
A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B CB A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A BC C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A
A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B CB C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C BC A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A
A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C CB A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A BC B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A
A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C CB B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B BC A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A
There are 216 possible orderings, 36 of which are displayed here.
Roughly 2/9ths of these orders, displayed in red, cannot be placed on a line.
Pick one of the red.
![Page 41: Downs’ Model of Popular Electionsspia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/dougherk/irc_downs.pdf · Downs’ Model of Popular Elections C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022071014/5fcc7d81ae680a649877b7af/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
Downs’ Model of Popular Elections
Point: Assuming a single dimensional model limits the type of voting orders individuals can have.